

7838

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

April 18, 1966

The message further announced that the House receded from its amendments Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to the bill (S.2729) to amend section 4(c) of the Small Business Act, and for other purposes, and concurred therein.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mrs. SMITH:

Report to the Legislative Research Committee on the first 5 months of a study of the feasibility of establishing a medical school in Maine, by John B. Truslow, M.D., under date of March 16, 1966.

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia:

Editorial entitled "Double Standard Is Applicable," published in the Southwest Virginia Enterprise.

Article entitled "Huge German Steel Plant for Red China" written by Holmes Alexander and published in the Lynchburg, Va., News.

Article entitled "U.S. Friends Assist China Economic War," written by Elliot Janeway and published in the Chicago Tribune of Monday, March 28, 1966.

By Mr. HARTKE:

Speech entitled "Financial Aid Practices Discriminating Against Women in Higher Education," delivered by Josephine L. Ferguson, April 6, 1966, at convention of American Personnel and Guidance Association.

THE CIA AND MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, as a member of the Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee following the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, I inquired of the CIA regarding the criticisms directed by certain professors of Michigan State University concerning certain activities of the university with relation to a contract with the CIA and the employment of secret agents of the CIA within the university. I believe it is in the interest of accuracy to make public the facts as I get them.

On December 21, 1954, President Eisenhower directed the Operations Coordinating Board to have prepared a report on the status of the U.S. programs to develop foreign police forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.

Upon completion of the report on December 8, 1955, the National Security Council directed Mr. John Hollister, then Chief of what is now the Agency for International Development, to assume leadership of U.S. efforts to improve the internal security capability of police in a number of foreign countries. At the same time, the NSC, with the President's approval, instructed the Director of Central Intelligence and other Government agencies to lend all possible assistance to this effort to include assignment of qualified personnel to effect the needed improvements in foreign police forces. The urgency of the situation in Vietnam, which was in the President's mind, and the non-

availability of adequate personnel, resulted in AID contracting this responsibility to Michigan State University. It was in this connection that CIA officers with specific MSU agreement participated in the MSU program in Vietnam, a program designed to improve the effectiveness of the police services of that country as a part of the overall effort to preserve that nation's independence. The CIA representatives worked specifically in the training of Vietnamese police services, not in clandestine CIA activities.

TOO MUCH GLOOM AND DOOM ON VIETNAM

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, an honest election in South Vietnam establishing civilian authority should be welcomed enthusiastically by the United States.

It is incomprehensible to me why there is so much gloom and doom about the prospect of such an election in South Vietnam.

What have we been fighting for out there, except for the right of the people of South Vietnam to their own government?

Useful as a military junta may have been in the military conflict against communism, an elected government would be far, far better not only in the view of people throughout the world but obviously in the eyes of the people of Vietnam.

It is true that the protests against the Ky government have impeded the war effort. That is a high price to pay. But if the result of these protests is an honest election, the benefit will be worth the price.

It is imperative in any election contest that the United States follow a policy of the strictest possible neutrality. Our only interest should be to assist the Vietnamese, when requested, to help guarantee a thoroughly honest election with maximum participation.

While a countrywide election is something new, local elections are not. The South Vietnamese have held them and abided by the results. There is a good prospect that they would do the same in a national election.

In view of the immense investment this country has made in South Vietnam in the lives of our own soldiers, not to speak of billions of dollars of military assistance, maintaining our neutrality in an election will be extraordinarily difficult.

But the CIA, as well as every other American agency in South Vietnam, must keep hands off every phase of this election. Our total neutrality is imperative.

Of course, we must also abide by the wishes of whatever government is elected, regardless of how unwelcome their wishes might be. If our commitment to self-determination in South Vietnam does not mean this, it means nothing.

Mr. President, in this connection, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an editorial entitled "Better News," published in the Washington Post on April 15, 1966.

There being no objection, the editorial as follows:

BETTER NEWS

The military government of South Vietnam and the dissident Buddhist leaders seem to be in general agreement on plans to hold an early election of a constituent assembly that will give the country a civil government. This is better news than any but the most optimistic has dared hope for in the past week.

How far the agreement goes beyond the bare accord on holding elections is not altogether clear. But if there is any real meeting of minds on the essentials, the details should not be beyond the ingenuity of the leaders of the different factions.

The United States, for its part, will enormously gain by the presence of a government of civilians enjoying the mantle of legitimacy that only orderly elections can confer. Such a government, no doubt, will make decisions with which the United States may differ. There will be disagreement over many policies in which interests are not the same. It will not be as easy to locate authority or to get it to act. The difficulties of democratic rule lie in a field of knowledge and experience where we do not require instruction. But all the difficulties are outweighed by the single advantage that is enjoyed by a representative and democratic regime that can claim to speak for the people of South Vietnam.

In the trying interval that has led to some agreement, the United States, on the whole, has behaved with commendable detachment and restraint. It will need to exercise the same restraint in the weeks preceding an election. No interest that we may have in particular political leaders will rival our interest in having the South Vietnamese make choices not influenced by a foreign power. A government freely selected is the best hope for the right conduct of civilian affairs and the best hope as well for an energetic and efficient prosecution of the war.

Americans must not expect that a country in the midst of war can suddenly summon forth perfectly functioning democratic institutions. But the South Vietnamese are not without experience with elections and democracy. Local and provincial governments have been proceeding with elections and abiding by democratic methods in parts of the country throughout the war. There is a tradition in the country on which it should be possible to build.

The President of the United States has dealt on a friendly and cordial basis with South Vietnam's present government and will continue to do so while it is in power. His administration will be able to deal in the same manner with the successor government shaped by elections.

Such a government will have before it choices that are difficult for a democratic government to make. It will be confronted by all the harsh alternatives of war; and, sooner or later, by the equally anguishing problems of procuring a peace in South Vietnam. It may wish to deal with some of these problems differently than we would deal with them. But this should confront us with no problems with which we cannot deal. We are in South Vietnam to preserve the right of a small people to govern themselves and make their own choices. That principle will be vindicated whatever the course the people choose. We have undertaken to preserve their opportunity to make a choice. An elected government is a necessary instrument for determining what that choice really is.

FLIGHT OF THE VIETNAMESE FARMER

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, after the Honolulu Conference, President Johnson sent 10 agricultural specialists