


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2 March 1966

DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE

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
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S E C R E T

2 March 1966

DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

I. Mr. Chairman, I sent you a letter last week informing you that the Bureau of the Budget had recently approved three items to be funded by releases from our Reserve for Contingencies. These items were not anticipated at the time of the 1966 budget submission to Congress and they all represent urgent items which cannot be absorbed within the program levels approved by this committee in the 1966 appropriations.

A.

B.

C. After that I have a few current intelligence notes for you.

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
2 March 1966

DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE

SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet Space Program

- I. The Soviets are carrying on a very vigorous space program. We expect more space spectaculars during the coming months.
 - A. The Soviets have already tried--unsuccessfully--to follow up the soft-landing of Luna 9 which sent back the moon pictures early in February.
 1. They launched another lunar probe on March first. It failed to eject from its parking orbit, and Moscow is passing it off as a scientific satellite.
 - B. Two Soviet Venus probes reached the planet around the end of February.
 1. The Soviets report that one crashed onto the surface and planted a flag. It may have been intended to fly by the planet.
 2. The other probe passed within 13,000 miles of Venus and has transmitted scientific data back to earth.



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C. On 22 February the USSR put a satellite carrying two dogs into an earth orbit. A major feature of the flight appears to be collection of data on the effects of radiation. We expect the dogs to remain in space about a month before being recovered.

D. The USSR is continuing the stepped-up satellite reconnaissance program. Thus far in 1966, four vehicles have been put up and successfully recovered.

(Only one set is available -- in DCI's book.)

(PHOTOGRAPHY, TYURATAM COMPLEX "J")

E. Recent high-resolution photography has given us our best look yet at Complex J of the Tyuratam missile test center. Each of the twin pads under construction at Complex J appears capable of launching space boosters with thrusts up to 10 million pounds. Judging from the rate of construction, flight tests could begin in early 1967.

1. The first photograph shows you--in the inset at upper right--the big assembly check-out building.
2. The second photograph, which is a 10-power enlargement of the first, shows

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the big blast deflectors under construction at the two launch pads. The third picture is an artist's sketch of the blast deflector.


ICBM Deployment

- II.. Early 1966 satellite photography has increased our count of ICBM dispersed single silos under construction.
- A. We have now found more than 80 of the large type--for the SS-9 missile--and more than 140 of the small type--for the SS-11 missile.
 - B. The coverage also shows that some of both types of silos are very near operational status. Externally, they appear to be complete with silo doors installed. A possible missile transporter has been seen at one large silo.
 - C. We estimate that about 17 of the large silos and 60 of the small will become operational around mid-April.
 - D. By mid-1966, 26 large and 100 small single silos are expected to be operational, increasing the Soviet ICBM force from the present 224 to 350 operational launchers.


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
Soviet Defensive Systems

III. The Soviets are also continuing to extend the deployment of the new defensive missile system which was first detected in the northwestern USSR  and more recently near Sverdlovsk in the Ural mountains.

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
- A. The latest launch complex, about 60 miles north of Moscow, may be the first of several to form a local-area defense of the city.
- B. We still feel that these complexes are for defense against bombers and cruise missiles, though we cannot eliminate the possibility that they are antimissile installations.
- C. Seven of the 12 complexes we have identified so far have some launchers and radar, so that they already have an operational capability.

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2 March 1966

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
GHANA

(MAP, GHANA)

- I. In Ghana, where the regime of President Kwame Nkrumah fell apart last week while he was in Peking, the new leaders are Western-oriented political moderates.
- A. The senior army and police officers who staged the coup have long been disaffected with Nkrumah's arbitrary rule, his ties with Communist countries, and his economic follies.
- B. They seem likely to be particularly friendly to the United States.
- II. From all indications, the coup forces have been in complete control since shortly after they initiated the action on February 24th.
- A. Significant resistance came only from Nkrumah's Soviet-trained civilian security detail, which tried to defend his Flagstaff House office.
1. A number of Soviet advisers--perhaps five--who were in liaison with this security guard evidently were killed then, suggesting they were actively supporting the resistance.

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- B. All regular army units and the special presidential guard apparently rallied quickly to the coup elements.
 - C. The police, disarmed by Nkrumah two years ago after an attempt on his life by a policeman, are being armed, adding additional muscle.
 - D. All available political officials of the Nkrumah regime and the leading members of his now dissolved political party are being detained.
- III. There has been widespread--and evidently genuine--popular enthusiasm for the change in Ghana. Nkrumah had alienated virtually all segments of society since he led the country to independence nine years ago.
- A. One of the most significant factors in the erosion of his once massive popularity was the tightening economic squeeze felt at all levels in recent years as Ghana's economy had deteriorated.
- IV. The coup leaders have moved quickly to set up an interim regime which seems to have begun to function effectively already.
- A. At the top is a National Liberation Council (NLC) of seven army and police leaders.

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1. It is headed by reinstated General Ankrah, who was fired by Nkrumah last year. It includes the two prime movers of the coup (Police Chief Harlley and 2nd Brigade commander Kotoka).
- B. The new leadership, inexperienced in civil administration, is backed up by several subordinate committees of senior civil servants and specialists to deal with such matters as foreign affairs, the economy, and so forth. The U.S. Embassy is particularly favorably impressed with the economic committee.
 1. As a group, Ghanaian civil servants were the best prepared for independence by Britain in Africa. Most have remained Western-oriented and were critical of many Nkrumah policies.
- C. For the present all the former politicians are out of the picture.
- V. Since coming to power, the new leaders have repeatedly emphasized their lack of political ambitions and desire to return Ghana to representative civilian government as soon as possible.
 - A. Although they have specified no timetable for this, they are publicly committed to sponsoring



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a new constitution, holding a referendum, and then to turning over power to whatever political force emerges from free elections.

- VI. The new regime has also moved against the large Soviet presence in Ghana. There are several hundred personnel including various intelligence types.
- A. Some elements were immediately confined to quarters. Others have been placed under close surveillance.
- B. On February 28 reliable reports indicated that the Soviet ambassador had been told that all Soviet personnel must leave Ghana promptly, except for a small embassy staff.
1. Two plane-loads of Soviet personnel were seen at the airport Tuesday, ready to leave.
 2. The new regime has revoked the landing rights with AEROFLOT, the Soviet air line, because an AEROFLOT aircraft brought Nkrumah back to Moscow from Peking.
 3. There are about 50 to 60 Chinese Communist technicians who probably will also be expelled. The camp where Chinese instructors were teaching guerrilla warfare and sabotage to Africans from other countries has been closed. The instructors may already have left the country.

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- VII. Nkrumah does not appear to have much prospect for reversing the coup in the near future, but he has evidently not given up.
- A. Even before he left Peking, he announced his intention to return, and tried to rally Ghanaians abroad to his side.
 - B. The diplomatic missions in Peking and Moscow have both announced their allegiance to the new regime in Accra. No Ghanaian mission anywhere is known to have come out for Nkrumah.
 - C. Nkrumah may plan to move on soon to Cairo, where his family fled immediately after the coup. (His wife is Egyptian.) From there, he may make early visits to radical African capitals such as Conakry (Guinea) seeking support.
 - 1. Radical African leaders, including Egypt's Nasir, have denounced the Ghana coup, but seem unlikely to give Nkrumah any significant material support.
 - 2. Madagascar has recognized the new regime in Accra, and other moderate African states will follow suit soon. The current meeting of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Addis Ababa, accepted a delegation representing the new leaders in Accra, and turned down representatives of Nkrumah.

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2 March 1966

DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE

SYRIA


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(MAP, SYRIA)

- I. In Syria, a radical military clique of the Baath party seized power in Damascus on February 23. The move met with some opposition from army units loyal to the ousted regime of Amin al-Hafiz and Salah al-Din Bitar--more moderate Baathis--and the situation remains unstable.
 - A. On March 1 a new cabinet was announced. At least one known member of the Communist Party of Syria, or CPS, was included. This is the first cabinet in three years of Baathist rule to contain CPS members, although the regime which was thrown out last week had named several party members or sympathizers to the Syrian legislative body last August.
 - B. A countermove by army units who have adopted a neutral posture for the time being could occur at any time. There is no evidence as yet that leaders of the 16,500 troops on the Israeli border,

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to the southwest of Damascus, have affirmed support for the new regime. The attitude of the northern command in Aleppo is also unclear. Some move might be attempted on March 8th, the third anniversary of the 1963 Baath takeover.

II. The conflict has been building up since December. At that time, the comparatively moderate regime dissolved the organization of the Baath in Syria, which had come under the domination of the radical military clique. Salah Jadid, who is now reportedly acting as provisional secretary general of the Baathist organization in Damascus, was considered the leader of the opposition force.

A. The new regime has announced the arrest of Presidential Chairman Hafiz and the party's key civilian leaders.

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III. The known leaders of the coup are considered radicals, but how far to the left of the socialist Bitar regime they would shift is still uncertain. They will probably intensify anti-US propaganda, already vitriolic under previous Baath governments.

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- A. In Amman, King Husayn has expressed his concern that Syria will move drastically to the left. The Jordanian Army has prepared a contingency plan for intervention, but would almost certainly take no action without US approval.
- B. Both the Iraqis and the Egyptians, long-time enemies of the Baath, have been broadcasting inflammatory reports concerning the unsettled situation. President Arif in Baghdad claims that the coup was inspired by the Chinese Communists, and has put his army on alert. He has also been in touch with Husayn on the matter.

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2 March 1966


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INDONESIA

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
(MAP, INDONESIA)

- I. In Indonesia, President Sukarno appears to be moving with increasing confidence to regain total authority and swing the nation back to its leftist course. At present, only anti-Communist students are offering open resistance to his downgrading of the military leaders and his reshuffle of the cabinet.
 - A. On February 24th, about 20,000 students conducted a demonstration in front of Sukarno's palace in a futile attempt to prevent the installation of the new cabinet.
 1. At one point, palace guards fired into the crowd, killing several students.
 2. The demonstration was held without the connivance of the army, which for the present at least, is withholding overt support from its student backers.
 - B. Two days later Sukarno banned the anti-Communist student group responsible for the demonstration.



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- I. In an effort to head off any further student agitation, the Djakarta military commander has extended the nightly curfew in the capital area.
- II. Now that Sukarno appears to have gotten away with his bold move against the anti-Communist military leadership, he is likely to resume the leftist policies he had pursued prior to 1 October.
 - A. At the installation of his new cabinet, Sukarno announced that Indonesia would now concentrate on destroying the "remnants of feudalism" within the country and on crushing "imperialism," with an emphasis on Malaysia.
- III. Although army leaders still seem unwilling to risk a direct confrontation with Sukarno, they are said to be considering various ways to retrieve their political position.
 - A. The most immediate plan under discussion appears to be a demand that Sukarno remove his leftist foreign minister and first deputy premier, Subandrio.
 1. The army considers Subandrio responsible for many of Sukarno's pro-Communist policies.

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2. Sukarno, who considers Subandrio indispensable, refused earlier army demands for Subandrio's ouster, and can be expected to do so again.

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2 March 1966

DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- I. Garcia Godoy is under bitter leftist criticism for the compromise formula resolving the prolonged civil-military impasse and it remains to be seen whether he will abide by it.
 - A. On 16 February, under the pressure of a successful leftist general strike, Garcia Godoy reiterated his intention to implement his 6 January decree assigning the air force and army chiefs of staff overseas.
 - B. The President did this despite having given written assurances to the military that he would seek no more command changes after Rivera, the former Defense Minister, took up his Washington attache job on 11 February.
 - C. Immediately after Garcia Godoy's 16 February speech, labor leaders affiliated with Juan Bosch implemented an apparently pre-arranged plan they had with the President, and called off the strike.

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- II. A compromise decision was reached in which the two service chiefs took higher ranking jobs that have no responsibility.
- A. Martinez, the army chief and De los Santos, the air force chief originally refused to step down.
 - B. The new Minister of Defense, General Enrique Perez y Perez, and other moderate military leaders helped persuade them that it was in the military's best interest for them to take their new posts.
 - C. The new air force and army chiefs were selected by Garcia Godoy from candidates presented by the military.
 - 1. The new chiefs are well thought of by our attachés, but being traditional military conservatives are as much disliked by the left as their predecessors.
 - D. Garcia Godoy is probably unhappy with the solution but he did not want to call on the Inter-American Peace Force to oust the generals by force, because he said he wanted a "Dominican solution".
- III. On 28 February, Juan Bosch bitterly attacked the President's decision, saying that he failed to keep his promise to assign the military leaders overseas.

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- A. Bosch said that Garcia Godoy, instead of leading the nation, "bobbed like a cork." He added that while the government "crowed like a rooster," it "laid eggs like a hen."
- B. While he did not call for a renewal of the general strike, Bosch clearly implied that one could occur and told his audience to keep "ready".
- C. Bosch said the President had established a precedent and the military would continue to disobey civilian authority, thus making the election of a new government on 1 June "useless".
- D. Bosch also stressed a theme he has privately advanced to US officials, that conditions are not right for elections.
1. Privately Bosch has reportedly urged a postponement of 4 months.
 2. Nevertheless, Bosch will probably run if he thinks he can win and assume office. This is a judgment he probably will not make for 1 or 2 months.
 3. In the meantime, the former President will probably threaten to boycott the race unless his demands are met.

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