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29 October 1963

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**BRIEFING FOR SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**CASTRO'S PLANS FOR SUBVERSION
IN LATIN AMERICA**

I. Growing evidence has recently led us to conclude that Fidel Castro has decided he must instigate revolutionary action in other Latin American countries in the near future.

A. He seems to feel with increasing urgency the need for some dramatic new development to maintain the momentum of his own revolution in Cuba.

B.

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to a new aggressive policy.

1. In the first few months of Castro's regime, the Cubans tried several invasions in Central America and failed ignominiously.

2. Since that time, the Cubans have been telling the militant leftists of the


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hemisphere that Cuba will provide training, funds, and propaganda support, but not weapons or leaders.

(Guerrilla movements are expected to buy, steal or capture their own weapons and ammunition.)

3. Castro probably would still prefer to keep Cuba's helping hand concealed in any revolutionary outbreak, at least at the start.

- (a) Obvious Cuban involvement might cost local revolutionaries a good deal of public sympathy and support.

- (b) It would also make it easier for the United States to rally OAS support for countermoves.


4. Cuban leaders apparently have decided, however, that in their own interests the so-called "anti-imperialist struggle" must be launched now, whatever the risk to their revolutionary assets. While many revolutionaries may be lost in the initial struggle, they believe, it is necessary to make a start to create

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the conditions for ultimate success.

II. From Castro's viewpoint, things have been going badly for him since last June, shortly after he came back from the Soviet Union.

A. At home, even before Hurricane Flora, prospects were increasingly dim for any significant economic progress in the near future.

B. US pressures are increasingly effective, and the exile raids, stepped up since August, are not only maddening to Castro, but boost the morale of the internal opposition.

C. Castro is also concerned about Soviet moves to improve relations with the US. Like the Chinese Communists, Castro may look on revolutionary militancy as a means of reminding the Kremlin that his interests must not be sacrificed.

D. At Soviet urging, Castro went through half-hearted motions of seeking "peaceful co-existence" with the US when he came back from Moscow.

1. By 26 July, however, he recaptured much of the militant tone of his speeches last fall and winter.

2. He said "fighting revolutionaries" in



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Latin America must take advantage of conditions favoring revolution and "open the breach."

E. A September magazine article by Che Guevara argued at length that guerrilla warfare is the basic instrument for a Communist take-over in Latin America.

1. Guevara said the revolution must be continent wide. He said much blood will be spilled over a long time.
2. He repeated Castro's old line that the Andes would be the "Sierra Maestra of America."

III. Castro's assets vary greatly from country to country.


A. Venezuela remains his principal target.

1. It seems to be the only country where he now can call on significant elements in an active revolutionary movement to step up terrorism when it suits his purposes.

2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the Cubans may be planning to smuggle arms to the Venezuelans, or even fly them to remote jungle air strips.

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Until now Cuban guerrilla doctrine had been that this sort of help would be forthcoming only when guerrillas are ready to confront the security units and regular armed forces in open battle.

Castro may be ready to relax this caution.

B. In most other countries, Castro has little control over the militant revolutionary groups and parties. Nevertheless, there are a growing number of alumni of Cuban guerrilla training who can probably be considered under Cuban control.

IV. The immediate Cuban goal appears to be to organize and commit to action such cadres as will follow Castro's call to action. The aim will be, using these and any other appropriate Cuban assets, to mobilize all available opposition in order to cause the disruption and disorganization of public order, economy, and other established institutions wherever possible.

V. Castro's best chances appear to lie in Panama, Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru.



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