

Security

20 February 1975

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While my knowledge of the extent of sensitivity of many of these items is limited - I think there is a difference in the degree of sensitivity of many items covered. I have marked on the attached copy a rough evaluation, using the following scale:

- A. Not to be disclosed
- B. Chairmen and Vice Chairmen only
- C. Committees Members only
- D. Closed session, members and committee staff.

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I am sure whoever prepared the list of sensitive intelligence matters could make a better evaluation. I don't know if this was what you wanted but hope it will serve as a starter.

I note on your list of annexes you have included "J. The Role of Security in CIA and the Intelligence Community" and in the cover letter it is described as prepared by the USIB Ad Hoc Group. This was purely a CIA preparation.

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CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER
THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION

I. The names of agents, informants, covert liaison contacts and operations or other identifying characteristics of sensitive clandestine sources

a. Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them. H

b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counter-intelligence purposes.

--The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organizations. H

--Specific statements of the use of technical devices in agent operations. C

--The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness against any given target organization or individual, or lack thereof. C

--Names of selected agency and/or ex-agency employees if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility. B

--Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role. B

II. Relationships with Other Intelligence Services

a. Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries. C

b. Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within a jointly targetted third country. B

c. The nature of support provided or arrangements with foreign intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations. C

d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service under conditions of continued secrecy. D

III. Cryptologic and Communications Activities

a. Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material. C

b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations. C

c. Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices in the U. S. and abroad. C

d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations of foreigners or foreign facilities (U. S. and abroad). C

e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and unfriendly targets in the U. S. and abroad. C

f. Covert signals intelligence collection including (1) assistance arrangements with commercial U. S. and foreign companies (2) taps (3) and from US installations abroad. C

g. Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved. B

h. Protective communications security measures. D

i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions especially critical to our work in ASW. D

IV. Technical Intelligence

a. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity. B

- b. Details of specific covert communications systems, including secret writing, special agent equipment, etc. D
- c. Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country. B
- d. Identification of technical counter-measures techniques. D
- e. Characterization of emplacement of devices for technical collection of foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement. C
- f. Details of secure U.S. communications systems. D

V. Other

- a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass the U.S. Government or frustrate the purpose of the operation. C
- b. Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations. C
- c. Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations. C
- d. Names of firms collaborating with U.S. intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles). C
- e. Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and covert tax arrangements. C
- f. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations against foreign intelligence targets. C
- g. The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic or military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our intelligence on military technologies of these nations. D