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Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200060024-9

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-286

17 July 1980

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, [] Steering Group
25X1A FROM: []
SECOM Member
SUBJECT: Zero Base Review of Clearances

1. At the 15 July 1980 meeting of the [] Steering Group, there were discussions related to the advisability of doing a Zero Based Review of current SCI access approvals. Some comments indicated an element of confusion. This memorandum is presented to document some DCI directions that may have a bearing on whether and when a Zero Base Review should be conducted. My observations are supported with copies of source material.

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a. There is no question that the DCI elected to have a Zero Based approach to clearances in all agencies and industrial contractors. He told Director, NSA this in May 1978. Tab A:

b. In his Notes from the Director of 11 October 1978 the DCI mentions that it is his intention that Zero Based Reviews become a long range and structured aspect of our security program and that they be carried out throughout the Intelligence Community. Tab B.

c. The DCI tasked the Security Committee in early November 1978 to start a Zero Based Review throughout the Executive Branch and in Industry. The Chairman, SECOM tasked his Chairman of the Compartmentation Subcommittee accordingly on 15 November 1978.

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CIA's Special Security Center, which had initiated trial Zero Based Reviews, was noted as offering a service of common concern in collecting information from contractors to be transmitted to sponsoring agencies for their action. Tab C.

d. The Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee of SECOM issued implementing orders to members on 15 December 1978. Tab D.

e. The NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation met on 19 December 1978 and raised the question of the Zero Base Review. Noting that the proposal for the [] Control System includes a recommendation that a Zero Based Review take place at the beginning of the implementation phase in order to better define and limit the population which will be given access within the [] system, it seemed to be redundant, if not burdensome to conduct two such reviews within such a short period of time. [] SA to the DCI wrote and informed him of the observation. [] argued that the ground rules for justifying product access under the present ground rules are much looser than the ground rules under the [] system so that the Zero Base Review conducted at that time would not be of much value when we go to implement []. On the other hand, it was noted that the system for operational compartments is essentially the same in both worlds so that a Zero Base Review of operational clearances conducted at that time would be highly useful and give us a leg up when the new system starts. The DCI approved [] recommendation to defer the Zero Base Review product clearances until the implementation phase of the [] program but to complete the review for holders of operational clearances. Tab E.

f. On 8 Jan 1979 the Chairman, SECOM instructed the Compartmentation Subcommittee accordingly. Tab F.

2. The CIA elected to have the Special Security Center proceed with the Zero Base Review of both product and operational accesses in industry facilities with CIA contractors. Offers were made and rejected by many members of the Community. It was accepted by Program A and C. Only SI, TK [] accesses were reviewed.

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3. From March to the end of FY 1979, [redacted] industrial contractors holdings were reviewed. The net result of the review was a reduction of 7.2% in the number of personnel with any access and a reduction of 13.2% in the number of accesses held. (Some people lost some of their tickets but held others - hence the difference between figures for people and accesses). The Zero Base Review has continued through the third quarter of FY 1980 with almost similar results; reduction of 7.2% of people and 13.4% of access approvals.

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4. These facts combined with the numbers recently developed in the recent in-house survey, support the contention that there is merit in a Zero Base Review.

5. There is no question of the DCI's intention in this regard and he anticipates that a Zero Base Review will be made at the beginning of the [redacted] implementation phase.

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6. Note should be made of the argument presented to him in petition for postponement of his call - "the ground rules for justifying product access under the present compartmented systems are much looser than the ground rules under the [redacted] system." This seems to imply that a different criteria for access will be applied, one that will be tighter. Accordingly, your caution against members planning for a one-for-one substitution without review is well taken and should be underscored at subsequent meetings of the Steering Group.

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Attachments

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- 1 - SECOM Subject
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9 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral B. R. Inman, USN
Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Clearances

1. Congressman Rose approached me the other day about problems of cryptographic security and prevention of leaks in general. He indicated he had had many very fruitful and helpful discussions with you.

2. He is most concerned at the number of SI clearances extant in the Department of Energy, which he said was about 400. I indicated I thought most of these stemmed from the old Atomic Energy Commission clearances. Even in consideration of Energy's responsibilities, I think 400 sounds like an inordinate number for that Department. I would appreciate your view on this and how to approach a reduction.


3. For your information, I am about to start a zero-based approach to clearances in all agencies and industrial contractors. Perhaps DOE is the best place to start within the Government and determine whether these numbers are accretion from previous requirements or whether they in fact are continuing needs.



STANSFIELD TURNER

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Notes from the Director

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11 October 1978

NIO FOR WARNING

One of the major reasons why this Agency and my office were created was the determination of the Executive and of Congress that this country not have another Pearl Harbor. Obviously, strategic warning must be my highest priority. Every one of us in fact, no matter what his job, is responsible in some way for ensuring that the nation never again suffers a surprise attack. No less important is warning in the broader sense—warning of any development serious enough to concern the President and the National Security Council.

It is apparent that we need a stronger national structure for warning than that which now exists. I have therefore asked Dick Lehman to step aside from his position as Associate Director of NFAC to devote himself exclusively to establishing new national warning procedures as a matter of highest priority. I am establishing for him a special position as National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

In this capacity as NIO/Warning, he will be my senior staff officer for all warning matters. On the policy and management side, he will chair an interagency "Warning Working Group," and will serve as Executive Secretary of an NFIB-level warning committee chaired by the DDCI. On the substantive side, that is, in deciding of what to warn and when to do it, he will work through and direct the other National Intelligence Officers, among whom he will be first among equals. He will also be my "ombudsman for warning" in the Community, available, should anyone believe a serious threat is being overlooked, to listen and if necessary to take action in my name.

In the establishment of new warning procedures and disciplines, we will be asking many of you to give greater attention to warning matters. This will not be just another bureaucratic exercise; it is a serious effort to meet a critical requirement. The NIO/Warning will have my strong personal backing.

CHANNELS FOR DISSENT

The principal method for the expression of dissent within the Agency involves the various avenues available within each Directorate for challenging or testing analysis, policy and procedure. This is a process which must take place in a routine yet vigorous fashion if our products and activities are to be maintained at a level of high quality. The squelching of divergent views on significant issues can lead to intellectual stagnation and second-rate performance. It is important, therefore, that

employees be made to feel that presentation of well-reasoned dissenting views on significant substantive issues in the normal course of their work is not only tolerated but is welcomed by enlightened line managers. It is also important that each Directorate publicize its philosophy on dissent, as well as its methods for processing it.

There are occasions when employees may feel that valid views on matters of particular significance have not received adequate consideration by line management. In such cases, an employee may believe—rightly or wrongly—that the Director or Deputy Director should be informed of divergent opinion which could have an important impact on significant analytical, operational, or managerial issues. The Deputy Director and I encourage the submission of such dissenting views directly to us in writing and have asked [redacted] SA/DCI, to make certain that such papers are given expeditious handling and made available promptly.

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It is important that dissent not be confused with personal grievances or complaints, for which a different procedure exists. While dissent can be defined as an expression of significant substantive opinion at variance with formally accepted positions within the Agency on analytical, operational, or managerial matters, a grievance is a request by an employee for relief from dissatisfaction with career matters, working conditions or burdensome administrative decisions which affect the employee personally.

While there may be special circumstances in which a dissent should be registered confidentially, the real value of dissent lies in the open airing of an issue and the intellectual debate it stimulates within a Directorate.

Dissent should, of course, be confined to matters within the Agency's field of competence and authority. While there may be foreign policy decisions, for example, with which some of our people disagree, this Agency does not make foreign policy. It would therefore be neither profitable to use our forums to air such disagreements nor appropriate to encourage dissent on matters which are the proper province of other agencies or departments.

Employees are assured that submissions of dissent will be seriously reviewed and responded to appropriately. The Deputy Director and I consider dissent by employees to be expressions of legitimate and healthy concern for the achievement of superior performance by this Agency. It can play a vital role in maintaining the intellectual integrity and validity of Agency products and practices.

ZERO-BASED REVIEW OF COMPARTMENTED APPROVALS

At my direction, the Office of Security recently completed a zero-based review of compartmented approvals as held by one Agency contractor and one Agency component. Under the methodology of such a review, each and every compartmented approval must be rejustified or cancelled. As I suspected it would, our pilot study reflected that a significant percentage of the individuals concerned had no current valid need for such approvals. These people, accordingly, have been debriefed. While I recognize that such zero-based reviews involve significant effort on the part of the Office of Security, the Agency components involved, and contractors, it is my intention that they become a long-range and structured aspect of our security program and that they be carried out not only in the Agency but throughout the Intelligence Community.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

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Copy 1 of 2

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Chairman

SUBJECT: Zero-Based Clearance Reviews

1. In April of this year, on instructions from the DCI, I had the Special Security Center, CIA (SSC/CIA), initiate a pilot program zero-based clearance review of Special Access Approvals held by one CIA contractor and one CIA component. The review required that each and every compartmented access be either rejustified or cancelled. In the contractor review, approximately one fourth of the personnel cleared were determined to have no current valid need for such approvals. In the CIA component review, it was determined that almost 10% of the personnel held approvals no longer fully justifiable. Accordingly, debriefings have been undertaken.

2. Based upon these pilot results, the DCI has decided to expand this program throughout industry and the Executive Branch. Also, his Legislative Counsel is currently conducting a review of all extant Legislative Branch approvals.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

15 DEC 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Compartmentation Subcommittee Members

SUBJECT: Zero-Based Clearance Review

1. The DCI has directed that each NFIB agency and department conduct a zero-based review of all SCI accesses held by its personnel. CIA will also conduct a review of SCI accesses held by non-NFIB agencies. The Compartmentation Subcommittee, SECOM has been designated as the Executive Agent for conducting the review.
2. This review will require each NFIB agency and department to conduct an internal examination of all individual and/or billet positions currently authorized SCI access. A written justification (short paragraph) outlining the "need-to-know" requirement for each SCI access, the individual name and/or SCI billet number, and title will be submitted to the SIO of the NFIB agency or department for final validation and retention. In order to streamline the review, authority is granted to submit one justification for an entire branch, group, section, or unit if all assigned personnel require SCI access for the same reason; e.g., communicators working in a SCI communications center, analysts or other support personnel working in support of an SCI project. The single justification will also list the names of each individual or, in the case of DOD agencies, the SCI billet number and title.
3. The Special Security Center (SSC), CIA will also conduct a review of industrial contractors, many of whom hold SCI contracts with a number of Intelligence Community sponsors. Contractor monitors will be required to provide justification for all SCI indoctrinated contractors as well as the identity of their sponsor. CIA will collect the approval justification data and forward it to the sponsoring agency or program office for validation. CIA will not make access determinations for individuals sponsored by other agencies. Each member agency and department is requested to advise their SCI contractor monitors to cooperate fully with the SSC/CIA review.


This letter is

unclassified

when standing alone.

4. The DCI has requested that the SCI zero-based review be completed by 30 September 1979. On 15 February, 15 May and 1 August 1979, Compartmentation Subcommittee members will submit interim reports to the Subcommittee Chairman indicating the number of accesses/billets authorized, the number reviewed, the number of personnel debriefed or SCI billets deleted, and the number of billets/accesses remaining after the review. The final report should be submitted no later than 1 October 1979. Please submit interim and final reports in the attached format. Please also include a brief resume of your review in terms of overall results, recommendations, or other comments.

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Chairman, Compartmentation
Subcommittee
DCI Security Committee

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Report Format

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-429

8 JAN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Chairman

SUBJECT: Zero-Based Clearance Reviews

REFERENCE: Same subject, [redacted]
dated 15 November 1978 [redacted]

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1. The reference asked that all NEFB Agencies and Departments conduct a zero-based review of all their Special Access Approvals. As we jointly agreed, this would be a review of all active SI, TK [redacted] tickets and was to be completed by 30 September 1979.

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2. Based upon the 15 December 1978 reaction of the Compartmentation Subcommittee as to the wisdom of conducting such an all-out review in the face of a switchover to the [redacted] Control System concept, the matter was re-referred to the DCI. He agreed to forego a review of the product approvals at this time, but felt that we should still proceed with review of the operational compartments. Further, it is now clear that his desire is that this review be expanded to include all [redacted] [redacted] approvals held within the Community since they will be incorporated under the single [redacted] system. Also the DCI made clear that he wants stringent tests applied when verifying the continued need for access.

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3. In order to meet the benchmarks established for the Walsh Working Group, I must now ask you to reconvene the Subcommittee and give them this amended tasking to which a deadline of 1 May 1979 for completion is attached. In view of the new earlier deadline for completion, only a final report will be required and you may ignore the interim report dates.

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[redacted]
Robert W. Gambino

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20 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [redacted]
SA to the DCI

SUBJECT : ~~Zero-Base Review of Compartmented Clearances~~

1. Action Requested: This memorandum has a recommendation in paragraph 4 for your approval. [redacted]

2. Background: Earlier this month at your direction, the Office of Security tasked the Community to participate in a zero base review of the holders of compartmented clearances, both operational and product. As you know, the proposal for the [redacted] Control System also includes among its recommendations the zero base review to take place at the beginning of the implementation phase in order to better define and limit the population which will be given access within the [redacted] system. [redacted]

I met with the NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation yesterday to hand out the work program over the next several months. Several of the participants raised the question of the zero base review, noting particularly that it seemed to them to be a redundant, if not burdensome, exercise to conduct two such reviews within such a short period of time. Their major emphasis was fixed on the question of clearances for access to codeword product which, of course, is a much larger population than those holding operational clearances. Moreover, the ground rules for justifying product access under the present compartmented systems are much looser than the ground rules under the [redacted] system so that the zero base review conducted at this time would not be of much value when we get to implement the [redacted] system. On the other hand, the system for operational compartments is essentially

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the same in both worlds so that a zero base review of operational clearances conducted at this time would be highly useful and give us a leg up when we start the new system. [redacted]

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After some discussion, the consensus of the Group seemed to be that it would be desirable to postpone the zero base review for product clearances until we start implementing the [redacted] program, but to continue to carry out the zero base review for operational clearances. I think this makes a lot of sense and would advise you to assent to this change. [redacted]

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3. Staff Position: I have discussed this question with the Director of Security, and he concurs in my proposal. [redacted]

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4. Recommendation: That you authorize the Director of Security to defer the zero base review product clearances until the implementation phase of the [redacted] program, but instruct him to complete the zero base review for holders of operational clearances. [redacted]

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[redacted signature]

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APPROVED : Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: Director of Central Intelligence

DATE : 22 DEC 1978

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SA/DCI: [redacted] (20 Dec 78)

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee, return to SA/DCI
- 1 - DCI
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