DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Security Committee

SECOM-D-324

18 August 1980

	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Chairman, SECOM	1
25X1A	FROM:	ES/SECOM	: :
	SUBJECT:	Storage of APEX Nondisclosure Agreement	
	1. The iss	sue of CIA providing a central repository for Nondisclosure Agreement has arisen again.	<u>.</u>
		partment of State has acquiesced and it looks be a standard APEX NdA.	
25X1A 25X1A 25X1A	of the AF (also	is the CIA representative to one of APEX Working Groups chaired by the AF SECOM member). At a recent meeting NSA and CIA opted for CIA to provide the wants a statement of position.	25X1A
	not be equipped	epeatedly informed	25X1A
	holding up to 20 and adding to the fight of the high side paper would have not be active in	se as I can figure, we are talking about 00,000 NdA within the first two years of APEX his at the rate of probably 5-10,000 per month de), 3-5,000 per month on the low side. Original e to be stored for 70 years. While there may interplay of this material, there would be rganized file subject to access and document	

retrieval on reasonable notice.

6. Resource requirement for this task are computed to be 2 people at the clerk level (GS-5 or GS-6) for the first year and one GS-6 full time each year thereafter. Space requirements would be approximately 40 linear feet the first year and an additional 2 or 3 linear per year thereafter. Before the first copy could be destroyed (70 years from initiation date), the holdings will have grown to require more than 300 linear feet of space. The material is unclassified but will require protective storage against weather hazards and effects of time.

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7. ______ continues to support the idea of central storage by CIA and I'm sure he will again seek your support and agreement to provide this service of common concern.

Sha11		encourage?	
Sha11	or we	discourage?	
			The second secon

25X1A

Distribution:
Orig Return ES/SECOM
1 - C/SECOM

15 August 1980

	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director of Security/CA	
25X1A	FROM:	Chief, Special Security Center	
	SUBJECT:	APEX Nondisclosure Agreements	
	Agreement which ment. Most of the favor of a central opposed to burden	tached agenda for the 14 August 1980 Working g contains an item on the Nondisclosure generated substantial discussion and disagreehe agencies represented were strongly in al repository for all Nondisclosure Agreements in the individual SIO's with this responsitively have no resources.	
25X1A	favored a centra	polled the attendees and found that all repository except NSA (which preferred to Nondisclosure Agreements) and CIA, which	
25X1A	abstained. central reposito	would appreciate a CIA position on a ry for Nondisclosure Agreementsthe point ther agencies (except NSA) would like to see responsibility to which I could not commit	
25X1A	the form of a me record as either Nondisclosure Ag concomitant reso The recent decis Agreement might	d appreciate guidance on this mattereven in mo from	
			25X ⁻

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02	APEX Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs)
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25X1A ^{0.5}	
06	Chairman, APEX Steering Group
07	Room 7E12, CIA HQ Building
8 0	
09	1. During the 29 July 1980 meeting of the APEX Steering Group
10	you tasked Working Group No 1 with preparing a draft letter to the
11	NFIB SIOs on establishing repositories for the APEX Nondisclosure
12	Agreements (NDAs) in their respective departments and agencies and
1.3	specifying other related details.
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15	2. A draft of such a letter is attached for your consideration.
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25X1A ¹ 9	1 Atch
20	Chairman, APEX Working Group Draft ltr on APEX NDAs
21	Number 1
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00 <u>D R A F T</u>

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: APEX Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs)

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1. Subsequent to a need-to-know certification and favorable DCIP 1/14 adjudication, all persons must undergo a security indoct ination and execute a Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA) as a condition of access to APEX material. Subsequent access to compartments within the APEX system will be accompanied by security indoctrinations that will include a reminder of the original NDA and its obligation.

2. The NDAs will be distributed to the Intelligence Community in the near future together with instructions explaining its legal implications. Implementation of the APEX orientation process will then commence.

3. As the NDA basically constitutes a legal document reflecting the signer's willingness to adhere to its provisions as a condition of access to APEX information, its preservation is a matter of vital concern for possible prosecution and other purposes. We have been unable to obtain agreement on the concept of retaining the NDAs in a central repository. Accordingly, each NFIB SIO must establish policies and procedures for the retention of NDAs completed by persons under his/her APEX security cognizance.

4. The attached guidelines are provided to insure that the Intelligence Community has a uniform policy on the retention of APEX NDAs.

25X1A

Attachment

GUIDELINES FOR RETENTION AND HANDLING OF THE APEX NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (NDA) AND RELATED ACTIONS

1. NDA Repository. Intelligence Community SIOs are responsible to maintain a repository for all NDAs completed by persons authorized APEX access under their APEX security cognizance. The NDAs should be kept for 70 years or whatever period is subsequently prescribed by proper legal authority. NDAs should be maintained in such a format (e. g., alphabetical by year) so as to be easily retrieved when required for legal or other purposes. The original signed copy of the NDA must be retained in the repository unless it is subsequently determined by proper legal authority that microfiche, xerox, or other forms of the original NDA are sufficient for prosecution purposes. Copies of the original NDA may be prepared and used elsewhere when needed for management, record keeping, or other purposes.

 2. Location of the Repository. The logical site for the repository is in the Washington DC Metropolitan area—preferably in areas controlled by the Intelligence Community SIO. This would facilitate interplay with the "current access status" and "access history" functions of the Community-wide, Computer-assisted, Compartmentation Control (4C) System to be established under APEX.

3. <u>Handling of NDAs</u>:

a. <u>Initial APEX Indoctrination</u>. The original signed NDA should be forwarded to the Intelligence Community SIO who authorized APEX indoctrination. This SIO would be responsible for submitting required data to the 4C system (or interim pre-4C system) and then retaining the NDA in its repository. IC SIOs may require a person to aperiodically complete additional NDAs for record-keeping, security, or other purposes. NDAs completed under these conditions need not be kept in the repository and may be destroyed when no longer needed.

b. Recording Individual APEX Access Categories. Each time a person is authorized access to an individual APEX compartment, subcompartment, product, or other APEX category, the fact will be reported to the SIO authorizing access who will enter the data in the 4C system. There is no need to record this access in the Intelligence Community SIO's NDA repository.

c. Debriefings. When a person is debriefed in toto or is removed from one or more APEX accesses, the Debriefing Certificate (DC) must be forwarded to the SIO who authorized the access. This SIO will enter the data into the 4C system and keep or destroy the DC, as desired. The DC need not be retained in the repository.

- d. Transfers Among Intelligence Community SIOs. Whenever a person under the APEX security cognizance of one Intelligence Community SIO is assigned (i. e., "in-status transfer, or change of employment) to duties requiring APEX access under the cognizance of another Intelligence Community SIO, the person will be required to sign another NDA. This NDA will be retained and handled by the gaining Intelligence Community SIO as outlined in paragraphs 1 and 3a, above. This is to facilitate the processing of security reviews and other matters which might arise as the result of APEX access acquired as the result of duties with the gaining Intelligence Community SIO.
- e. APEX Access Subsequent to Debriefing. Whenever a person is debriefed in toto and is again subsequently authorized APEX access, another signed NDA must be accomplished and handled as outlined in paragraphs 1 and 3a, above.

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APEX STEERING GROUP WORKING GROUP NUMBER ONE

8 August 1980

AGENDA Meeting, Thursday, 14 August 1980, 1000 Hours Room BD-951, Pentagon

- ITEM 1 Preliminary Comments
- ITEM 2 APEX Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA). (Please review the attached draft letter and be prepared to concur or provide alternate wording.)
- ITEM 3 APEX Briefing Guide. (Please review the attached draft letter and be prepared to concur or provide alternate wording.)

ITEM 4 New business.

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Chairman, APEX Working Group Number 1 2 Atchs

- 1. Draft ltr, APEX Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs)
 w/Atch
- 2. Draft ltr, APEX Briefing Guide w/Atch

DISTRIBUTION: See reverse

	DISTRIBUTION:	
25X1A	SAF/SS	Steering Group Staff 25X1A Room 7E12. CIA HQ Bldg
	Washington DC 20330	25X1A
25X1A	USASSG, OACSI, DA Room 2A-474 The Pentagon Washington DC 20310	Department of Justice Sp Scty Center, Room 6744 10th and Pennsylvania Ave, N. W. Washington, DC 20530
0EV4A		25X1A
25X1A 25X1A	Department of State INR/OIS/SB Room 6510A Washington DC 20520	Department of Energy Room GA-257 Forrestal Building 1000 Independence Ave Washington DC 20585
25X1A	NSA/ Ft Meade MD 20755	25X1A 25X1A
25X1A		
	Defense Intelligence Agency (RSS-4B), Room 2A-520 The Pentagon Washington DC 20301	Department of the Navy Room 5B-663, The Pentagon Washington DC 20350

0.0	INSC
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0.2	APEX Briefing Guide
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25X1A ⁰	5
20,,,,	o Chairman, APEX Steering Group
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0 9) 1. You tasked Working Group No 1 with preparing a draft APEX
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1	It is predominantly a "checklist" type guide as the group believes
1	this style would be more helpful to field activities. As noted in
1	paragraph 2 of my 14 July 1980 letter on this matter, APEX Program
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APEX BRIEFING GUIDE

FOREWORD

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 This guide is offered to assist personnel engaged in conducting personnel security briefings on matters within the purview of the APEX Special Access Control System.

The guide has been prepared in "checklist" format so that briefing officers can extract from it, in part or in whole, elements that satisfy their unique requirements within full applicability of the need-to-know concept.

There are certain core concepts which must be incorporated in all briefings:

- a. The individual must be told what he is to protect.
- b. The individual must be told how he is expected to protect the information and those procedures must be explained to him in understandable terms to his acknowledged satisfaction.
- c. The individual must sign a Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA) and have explained to his satisfaction what the conditions of that agreement are.

No predetermined word pattern can be offered to satisfy all perceptions of needs in briefing personnel who are expected to protect material using the APEX Special Access Control System. But the core concepts must be incorporated into the briefing.

The guide does not include specifics of the various APEX operational compartments, subcompartments, product compartments. Briefers must obtain this information from manuals and information disseminated by the APEX Program Managers and provide it on a need-to-know basis to the individual being briefed.

It is recognized that persons who have been indoctrinated into former compartmented intelligence programs will only require a minimum briefing to permit conversion to the APEX system. The briefing officer should adjust his briefing accordingly.

It is further recognized that there exist a number of personnel currently on the periphery of the APEX system who historically have been incorporated under an umbrella concept of program compartmentation. The required tests for determination of what material may be afforded protection of the APEX Special Access Control System may result in a determination that some activities, and thus some personnel, are outside of APEX compartmentation. The inclusion of material or activity, and thus personnel associated with this material or activity under APEX protection, does not mandate revelation of more information in the security briefing than is essential to do the job and help the individual recognize what it is he/she is to protect and how he/she is to accomplish this protection.

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General Officers and other "VIPs" should be given specialized briefings as their duties and responsibilities would not, for example, require detailed knowledge of "in-status" transfer procedures or how to wrap material for ARFCOS delivery. A sample outline on this type of APEX briefing is included. Similarly, a "Mini" Briefing is provided for those persons who require extremely limited knowledge about APEX. Both are examples of the type of "tailored" briefings that should be developed by briefers for types of persons routinely briefed into APEX.

APEX BRIEFING GUIDE OUTLINE

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Introduction (presented at unclassified level):

- -- General explanation of extreme sensitivity of the category of APEX information for which the person is being given access.
- -- Advisory that the person will be required to sign a contractual "Nondisclosure Agreement" (NDA) as a condition of access to APEX material. (Allow the person to read the NDA if applicable/asked.)
- -- Highlight the NDA requirements for prepublication review and cover other matters as detailed in the legal instructional package on the NDA.
- -- Allow the individual to express any reservations which he/she may have concerning the NDA or access to APEX materials. (Such servations could, in some cases, result in terminating the briefing at this point until issues are resolved.)

Substantive Briefing (classified according to content):

- -- Discuss need for, purpose of, and structure of the APEX Special Access Control System. (Use APEX Security Manual as source.)
 - --- Discuss the APEX "chain of command" (e. g., President, DCI, APEX Steering Group/APEX Control Staff, Intelligence Community SIOs, appropriate APEX Security Officer(s) and APEX Control Officer(s), etc, as required).
- -- Provide explanation of the specific level of APEX access for which the person will be authorized access (e.g., operational compartment, subcompartment, product, APEX General Phase I/II).
 - --- Cover its relationship to other information information processed by the US Government.
 - --- Provide specific details of the APEX category(ies), as appropriate to the person's duty assignment and as provided by the appropriate APEX Program Manager.
- -- Show examples of the APEX material for which the person will be authorized and which fall within his/her need-to-know (adjust if APEX General Phase I access is involved). Ensure that differences between the various APEX categories are known and recognized.
- -- Explain the sensitivity of each APEX category for which the person will have access.
 - --- Discuss the adverse effects on national security that could result from unauthorized disclosure of APEX information.

	Pro	ovide APEX administrative security requirements:
01 02	20.70 41.00 b	- Access verification and certification.
03 04	, may 2000 s	- Pre-publication review responsibilities and procedures.
05 06 07		- SBI update requirement and personnel security reporting responsibilities and procedures.
08 09 10	anno diami	- Review classification guides pertinent to the APEX material to which the person will have access. (OPTIONAL)
11 12	-	- Provide guidance on "portion marking" APEX material.
13 14		- Meaning/purpose of colored APEX coversheets.
15 16 17		 Inventory, certificate of destruction, and receipting procedures.
18 19	tone time	- "Two-person" rule.
20 21	grap Smi	- Discuss individual responsibilities:
22 23 24 25 26		 No discussion of APEX information over non-secure telephones or in areas that are not accredited as an APEX Control Facility (ACF). Advise location of secure phones and ACFs.
27 28 29		- Discuss administrative reporting requirements and procedures:
30 31		oo Unofficial foreign travel (DCID 1/20)
32 33		oo Security violations and incidents
34 35		oo Contacts with foreign nationals
36 37 38		oo Attempts by unauthorized persons to obtain APEX information
39 40		oo Possible loss or compromise of APEX material
41 42 43 44		oo Personnel security concerns (i. e., excessive drinking; illegal use of drugs; sudden, unexplained, affluence, etc)
45 46 47		Discuss requirements and procedures for couriering APEX materials
48	D	iscuss physical security requirements and procedures:
50 51 52		"Define" an APEX Control Facility (ACF).
53 54	94-	Discuss levels of access held by ACFs and how to verify such levels. Cover how to establish or expand an ACF
55		Approved For Refease 2003/02/27 ACIA-RDP82M60591 R000200050015-0



00 01 02			Discuss general APEX physical security storage requirements ments and the specific storage and handling requirements of the APEX material the person will have access.
03 04 05			Advise on how and where to report physical insecurities relating to APEX storage or handling.
06 07	ga. 17 Sand	Loca	al procedures for APEX-indoctrinated visitors.
08 09	gan m. r	"In-	-status" transfer procedures. (OPTIONAL)
10 11	-	The	need for, and frequency of, APEX reindoctrinations.
12 13 14	***	Res deb	ponsibility and procedures for, and applicability of, riefs from APEX access.
15 16		Ind	ividual classification management responsibilities:
17 18 19		the trial entr	General provisions of Executive Order 12065 and departmental or agency implementers.
20 21 22			General provisions of Information Security Oversight Office (ISSO) Directive Number One.
23 24 25 26 27		gang brisk from	Discussion of specific classification/compartmentation guides associated with the APEX material to which the person will have access. (Use Program Manager and other classification guides as source.)
28 29		1800 DET	- Classification challenges (rights and procedures).
30 31 32 33 34		dayar birin ari	- Specific decompartmentation and/or sanitization guide- lines associated with the APEX material to which the person will have access. (Use Program Manager and other guidelines as source.)
35 36		guardo Errello M	- Classification assignment responsibilities.
37 38	\$ M# 6	- Pro	e-existing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI):
39 40 41		goals sales? :	Identify pre-existing SCI equating to the APEX material to which the person will have access.
42 43 44			 Advise general handling and storage procedures and restrictions for such material.
45 46 47 48 49 50		cade search	 Relationship of the material to APEX (e. g., sanitize or decompartment if possible; if not, then "recontrol" as APEX using applicable classification/decompartmentation guides and threshold criteria).
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00 01		Direct any questions to the appropriate APEX Security or Control Officer, or alternates.
02		
03		Techniques used by foreign intelligence organizations to
04		obtain classified information.
05		
06		Reporting of attempts to obtain classified information.
07		
8 0		
09	Cor	nclusion Briefing (presented at unclassified level):
10		
11	D-E 20/2	Penalties for espionage and unauthorized disclosure.
12		The state of the s
13	-	Sanctions for violation or disregard of APEX security procedures
14		- 1 cc' . It replaces there is a question or gon-
15	***	Persons/offices to contact whenever there is a question or con-
16		cern regarding APEX security or procedures.
17		gively of the ADRY Nordigalogues Agreement (NDA)
18.		Signing of the APEX Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA).
19		Explanation of legal obligations (Use legal instructional
20		packet as source).
21		packet as source).
22		
23		

00	APEX "MINI" BRIEFING
01	and a superior of the ADRY with the
02	(Combining the needs to introduce people into APEX with the
03	need to limit information to the essential level (i. e., persons
04	to be given APEX General Phase I access and certain persons in industry), the following "Mini" Briefing can be used at
05	the discretion of briefers who believe it will satisfy their
06	
07 08	requirements.)
09	The US Government, in the interest of tightenting security,
10	has requested that all access approvals on Special Projects
11	ho reviewed It has also instituted new security procedures
12	and new forms which will make security accountability a great
1.3	deal easier.
14	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1.5	The only immediate concern to you is the signing of the new
16	form. Your security concerns remain the same; there is no
17	change in your status on the job. Keep on with what you are
18	doing, report any security concerns to your Security Officer (by name) and continue to protect the information you have
19	
20	been given.
21	
•	

(General Officers and other "VIPs" should be given specialized briefings as their duties and responsibilities would not, for example, require detailed knowledge of "in-status" transfer procedures or how to wrap material for ARFCOS delivery. The following is an outline of this type of APEX briefing.)

Introduction (presented at unclassified level):

-- General explanation of extreme sensitivity of the category of APEX information for which the person is being given access.

-- Advisory that the person will be required to sign a contractual "Nondisclosure Agreement" (NDA) as a condition of access to APEX material. (Allow the person to read the NDA if applicable/asked.)

-- Highlight the NDA requirements for prepublication review and cover other matters as detailed in the legal instructional package on the NDA.

-- Allow the individual to express any reservations which he/she may have concerning the NDA or access to APEX materials. (Such reservations could, in some cases, result in terminating the briefing at this point until issues are resolved.)

Substantive Briefing (classified according to content):

-- Abbreviated discussion of the need for, purpose of, and structure of the APEX Special Access Control System. (Use APEX Security Manual as source.)

-- Highlights of <u>key</u> aspects of the specific level of APEX access for which the person will be authorized access (e.g., operational compartment, subcompartment, product, or other). (Use Program Manager manuals as source.)

-- Office/person to contact for access verification and certification.

-- Individual responsibilities:

 --- No discussions of APEX information over non-secure telephones or in areas that are not accredited as an APEX Control Facility (ACF). Advise location of secure phones and ACFs.

--- Administrative reporting requirements and procedures:

- Unofficial foreign travel (DCID 1/20)

- Security violations and incidents

- Contacts with foreign nationals

- Attempts by unauthorized persons to obtain APEX informa-

- Possible loss or compromise of APEX material Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP82M00591R000200050015-0
- Personnel security concerns

00 01		Pre-publication review requirements and procedures.
02 03	and the	Requirements and procedures for couriering APEX material.
04 05 06	and great	General classification, decompartmentation and sanitization procedures and guidelines. (Use Program Manager manuals and guides as source.)
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08 09 10	6-9 6-9	Pre-existing SCI equating to APEX material to which the person will have access.
11 12	Cor	nclusion Briefing (presented at unclassified level):
13		The second secon
14 15 16		Discussion, as required, of the penalties for espionage and unauthorized disclosure.
17 18 19		Discussion, as required, of sanctions for violations or dis- regard of APEX security procedures.
20 21 22	SHAP WHITE	Persons/offices to contact whenever there is a question or concern regarding APEX security or procedures.
23 24	m- ma	Signing of the APEX Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA).
25 26 27 28	Novel Minds	Explanation of legal obligations. (Use legal instructional packet as source.)