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


The USIB Committee

Survey Task Group Report


August 1973

NRO review(s) completed.



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Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000100020006-0

Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000100020006-0



THE USIB COMMITTEE SURVEY TASK GROUP REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. PROBLEM	1
II. INTRODUCTION	1
III. SURVEY TASK GROUP FINDINGS	2
IV. CONCLUSIONS	4
V. SURVEY TASK GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS	5

ANNEXES

- ANNEX A The Framework for Community Level Committee/Staff Roles and Functions
- ANNEX B Survey Task Group Individual Committee Highlights
- ANNEX C Alternative USIB Committee Structures
- ANNEX D Statistical Material and Miscellaneous Data

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THE USIB COMMITTEE SURVEY TASK GROUP REPORT

I. PROBLEM

To survey USIB committees as a basis for recommendations to the DCI on the role and functioning of the committees and the organizational position of the committee chairmen, with a goal of optimizing committee support for the USIB and the IRAC and for the DCI in both his community program and his managerial responsibilities.

II. INTRODUCTION

1. On 16 March 1973 the DCI authorized the D/DCI/IC to survey the USIB committee structure and give his recommendations on the role, functions, and organizational position of the committee chairmen.

2. A three-man task group of IC staff members was formed on 21 March to conduct the survey and report on its findings. The task group examined the activities of the 15 USIB committees in terms of their professional support to USIB in carrying out its duties as described in NSCID No. 1 to advise and assist the DCI with respect to:

- (1) The establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.
- (2) The production of national intelligence.
- (3) The supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material.
- (4) The protection of intelligence sources and methods.
- (5) As appropriate, policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

3. The task group also examined the capabilities of the present committees to support the DCI and the IRAC in the areas of intelligence production and resource management.

4. The task group used the concurrently developed DCI memorandum for the President, "Objectives for the Intelligence Community," and "The DCI's Perspective of the Intelligence Environment" as input guidance for its efforts.

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5. A questionnaire was sent to each of the 15 committee chairmen requesting basic data on committee functions, membership, staffing, publications and activities. Each of the committee chairmen was interviewed, and USIB members and observers (except for AEC and the FBI) were either interviewed or provided their views in writing to the task group. A number of other key officials of the intelligence community also were interviewed.

6. Highlights of the Survey Task Group's findings on the individual committees are described in Annex B of this report.

7. The task group next addressed the following questions:

a. How does the community decision-making process operate?

b. What roles and functions are essential to support the DCI's community program and his USIB and IRAC advisory group?

c. How should these roles and functions be structured to assure the DCI and the community managers effective inputs to the community decision-making process?

8. The processes by which the task group addressed these questions are described in Annex A, which provides the framework for the findings and recommendations.

III. SURVEY TASK GROUP FINDINGS


9. The present community committee structure is an historically developed bureaucratic patchwork which lacks any systematic interactive capability to support community level management and decision making.

10. Much of the committee output tends to be ad hoc, primarily because of a lack of management direction. Self-generated activities and make-work projects abound as the committees seek to interpret what they consider to be current policy trends and decision needs.

11. The CIA directorates dominate the community committee structure. CIA personnel chair nearly all community committees and almost half of the sub-committees and working groups. CIA provides most of the committee staff personnel and drafts nearly all of the committee outputs.

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12. The issuance of collection "requirements" and "guidance" by most committees tends to be an ineffective use of committee time and resources for the following reasons:

a. Such requirements are generally uncoordinated with respect to any integrated collection guidance system or objective strategy.

b. Most substantive intelligence requirements lack a common prioritization base and/or have no prioritization indication at all.

c. For the most part, these requirements do not actually drive collection programs and are not structured for collector performance evaluation.

d. They are often viewed as merely necessary outputs to show that "collection requirements" exist, although it is unofficially recognized that they have little or no operative impact upon collection system decision behavior and actions.

13. Nearly all of the so-called collection and production committees lay claim to providing collection guidance and making evaluations of the collection effort. For the most part all of these efforts are uncoordinated and devoid of any means of determining their own effectiveness. Only COMIREX appears to have a systematic, closed-loop approach and endeavors to provide feedback to both operators and management. It is significant that COMIREX is the only committee in which the community is paying the price of having such a job done; i.e., by provision of a full-time management staff with a chairman who has appropriate contacts with the program managers.

14. The community committee structure tends to neglect any meaningful guidance and evaluation of processing and exploitation.

15. The use of community committees in the national intelligence production area has been of limited value.

a. To date, few committees have had any involvement in intelligence input to NSSMs and committee inputs to NIEs have in recent years declined in importance as compared with organizational contributions.

b. Inputs from one or another organization tend to dominate most committee production output. The product is more often than not oriented to a particular narrow field; e.g., nuclear energy, missiles, etc.

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c. Specialization of this type tends to fragment individual agency views on the larger consumer problems and issues to which national intelligence products are intended to respond.

d. The primary rationale for such committee production activity has been the coordination of subject matter. However, more often than not the result is duplicative and without adequate consideration of the interdisciplinary variables in the broader context of the basic issues.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

16. The roles and functions essential to support the DCI's authoritative leadership of the community and his USIB and IRAC advisory groups can be accomplished with or without a community committee structure.

17. The choices are among: (a) a strong central community management staff with participants detailed from community agencies; (b) a community committee structure with appropriate full-time participants detailed to each committee; or (c) some combination of a full-time staff with committee assistance.

18. Whether staff or committee, the salient point is that full-time personnel are necessary if the DCI is to accomplish community level management control including an effective evaluation program; i.e., one that closes the loop between input demand criteria and performance output.

19. The advantages of retaining some form of committee structure are behavioral; i.e., avoidance of the appearance of a large management staff and provision of a sense of participation to all major community elements. However, the management need has been stated clearly and it is not a free good. Disadvantages of a committee system include a lack of direct control, greater inefficiency, and compromises which often result in softness of judgments and recommendations.

20. The advantage of the staff approach is essentially one of direct management control. Disadvantages include the requirement for more personnel than have thus far been planned for the DCI staff and a greater potential for line/staff confrontation.

21. If a DCI/USIB community committee system is to be retained, it must be an interrelated group of committees tied to an evaluation strategy in support of the community level decision and policy making process, and to the output of an improved national intelligence product. To attain these goals, several basic rules are essential:

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a. Management control must rest with the DCI and committee chairmen should be responsible to him and detailed to his staff.

b. The DCI should invest in a small, full-time, coordinating and monitoring capability to ensure that the committees perform effectively and in coordination with USIB and with his Intelligence Community staff.

c. Community coordination of national intelligence products should be achieved through management controls emanating from the DCI level. Committee responsibilities for provision of coordinated intelligence community products must be clearly understood by all production organizations, and arrangements made for objective presentation of alternate views and interpretations, as appropriate.

d. The major program and product evaluation tasks must not be placed in the hands of those being evaluated.

e. The role and functions of each committee should be stated explicitly, with clear indication as to how the committees relate to each other and to other community elements such as the IRAC and the DCI's Intelligence Community staff.


V. SURVEY TASK GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS

22. Five alternative USIB committee structure options were considered by the task group. Alternative A, which is being recommended, involves the establishment of seven geographic and three topical committees, retention of the Security Committee with expanded responsibilities, and the Watch Committee. Four Support Groups also are recommended. Alternatives B, C, D and E are described in Annex C.

A. The Geographic Committees

23. The task group recommends that the following USIB geographic committees be established:

- a. The USIB Committee on the USSR and the Warsaw Pact
- b. The USIB Committee on the People's Republic of China



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- d. The USIB Committee on the Far East and South Asia
- e. The USIB Committee on Southeast Asia
- f. The USIB Committee on the Middle East and Africa
- g. The USIB Committee on Latin America

24. Each of the above committees would be responsible for:

a. Evaluating the responsiveness of intelligence production, processing, and collection to consumer needs and intelligence objectives and priorities.

b. Responding to NSCIC and DCI guidance in the production of estimates (NIEs, NIAMs, and NSSM inputs), assigning responsibilities for inputs, and overseeing the coordination of products and reports.

c. Reviewing and evaluating on a quarterly basis the performance of existing intelligence assets in terms of intelligence objectives.

d. Reporting to USIB quarterly on its evaluation results with recommendations for issuance of DCI guidance to program managers.

25. Each geographic committee would have a full-time chairman who would be detailed to and responsible to the DCI. Each geographic committee would have a full-time staff commensurate with its workload. Staff members detailed to these committees would be from community agencies and represent an equitable input on the part of USIB participants.

26. The geographic committees' quarterly reports to USIB would:

a. List the primary substantive priorities for the current quarter and indicate changes from prior quarter objectives.

b. Show primary producer schedules of product output related to objectives.

c. Provide an evaluation of current production capabilities in meeting consumer needs.

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d. Provide an evaluation of progress made on gaps and deficiencies in prior quarter performance by collection source.

e. Provide an evaluative projection of the ability of each collection source to fill listed gaps and deficiencies in the coming quarter.

f. Recommend USIB guidance on tasking for management centers of collection, processing, and production.



27. The organization of USIB committees along geographic lines would enable the development of intelligence strategies that are oriented toward policy needs as opposed to intelligence resource or topical subject (disciplinary) interests. For example, policy issues involving the PRC would be assigned to the PRC Committee to produce an evaluation of collection, processing and production assets in terms of their performance and capabilities in meeting the policy need.

B. Topical Committees

28. The task group recommends the formation of two new topical committees and the retention of one of the existing USIB substantively-oriented committees:

- a. The USIB Committee on Strategic Weapons and SALT
- b. The USIB Committee on General Purpose Forces and MBFR
- c. The USIB Economic Intelligence Committee

29. The subject matter of some problems of very high USIB and DCI interest involves more than one geographic area, or is of such significance as to call for a particular focus of attention. Intelligence relating to strategic arms limitation agreements falls in the latter category and is considered of sufficient importance to warrant the establishment of a committee devoted to strategic weapons/SALT matters.

30. The MBFR problem might be handled jointly by the USIB Committee on the USSR and the Warsaw Pact   but in view of pending negotiations it is considered that the potential importance of this topic is sufficient to call for establishment of a committee specifically charged with intelligence relating to MBFR.

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31. Some economic intelligence undoubtedly will come within the cognizance of individual geographic committees, but the interregional, even worldwide, importance of a considerable number of economic intelligence problems is considered to justify retention of the existing EIC. Economic intelligence involves a considerable number of non-USIB organizations which now participate in the work of the EIC and its sub-committees. A government-wide economic intelligence mechanism is considered desirable, and the EIC can provide such. Another option for the handling of USIB economic intelligence functions would be the establishment of an Economic Intelligence Support Group (see paragraph 37).

32. The provisions set forth in paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 for the geographic committees also would apply to the three topical committees.

C. The USIB Security Committee

33. Recognizing that such community level security problems as compartmentation and foreign release require the responsible attention of corporate intelligence management on a full-time basis, the task group recommends that a USIB Security Committee be retained with provision made for a full-time chairman and staff.

34. The task group further recommends that responsibilities of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee be assigned to the new Security Committee.

D. Disposition of Existing USIB Committees and Their Functions

35. The task group recommends that the seven geographic committees, the three topical committees, and the Security Committee be recognized as the primary USIB committees, and that four support groups be established. These support groups would absorb the functions of eight existing USIB Committees. The groups would be tasked by the USIB or, under guidelines approved by the DCI, directly by the primary committees. The chairman of each support group would function as action officer for all USIB-related actions. The support provided by the collection-oriented support groups would be essentially in the area of advice on collection strategies, on the consolidation of requirements, on the application of priorities by collection system, and on specific security problems.

36. The recommended support groups are as follows:

a. **The IREX Support Group:** This group would be composed of the current COMIREX permanent chairman and staff and would continue to carry out present COMIREX responsibilities related to the guidance, tasking, and evaluation of the reconnaissance imagery program.

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b. **The SIGINT Support Group:** This group would be under the chairmanship of a representative of NSA in recognition of the DIRNSA responsibility for SIGINT asset tasking and the USIB responsibility to provide adequate guidance to such tasking. The group would replace the SIGINT Committee.

c. **The Human Sources Support Group:** This group would be composed of a chairman from CIA/DDO and representative members from all agencies with human source assets. [Redacted] The group would replace three present USIB committees -- the Human Sources Committee, [Redacted] and Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC).

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d. **The Foreign Science and Technology Group:** This group would provide foreign scientific and technical support to the primary committees and would absorb the functions of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), and the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC). The primary focus of this group would be on direct support of the Strategic Weapons/SALT Committee. Functions of the group would include monitoring the adequacy of technical information on the capabilities and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapons and weapons systems, and participating in the formulation of collection strategies to meet the needs for intelligence on such weapons and weapons systems. The chairman would be selected by the DCI and the group would include representatives of all organizations now having membership on GMAIC, JAEIC or SIC.

37. Optionally, rather than continue the present Economic Intelligence Committee as one of the topical committees, an Economic Support Group could be established, composed of a chairman from CIA/DDI and members representing all of the agencies involved in the production of economic intelligence. This group would provide support on economic intelligence matters to each of the geographic committees.

38. It is further recommended that:

a. The current Watch Committee be continued pending a USIB and DCI decision on the warning and crisis management issue;

b. The Intelligence Handling Committee (IHC) be disestablished and its functions and permanent personnel transferred to the DCI's Intelligence Community staff;

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c. The Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) be disestablished;

d. The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee (TSCC) be disestablished and its functions assumed by the USIB Security Committee;

e. The National Intelligence Survey Committee (NIS) be disestablished and any remaining functions, such as publication of the *Basic Intelligence Factbook*, be made the responsibility of the CIA/DDI; and

f. Appropriate DCIDs be prepared to implement the recommended changes in the USIB committee structure and action be initiated to make such changes as may be required in current NSCIDs.

E. Major Reasons for the Recommended Selection

39. Considerations which led the Survey Task Group to recommend a USIB committee structure which is basically geographic and topical in nature are:

a. Such a structure is target and product oriented in terms of consumer needs and approved intelligence objectives to a greater extent than are the other alternatives examined.

b. Geographic committees facilitate cross program/function evaluation and objective issue identification and resolution.

c. This structure supports focus of attention on primary management evaluation problems at the community level: e.g., the assessment of the relative worth of major collection/exploitation systems in terms of approved objectives and cost/benefit considerations.

d. The recommended committee structure requires an interdisciplinary approach to problems.

e. With the DCI having reported the plans to replace the Board and Office of National Estimates, a geographic and topical committee structure is more adaptable than the existing pattern of committees for use in the development of NIEs, NIAMs and intelligence inputs to NSSMs.

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f. Overall, a geographic committee structure is considered to be better suited to the behavioral patterns required by the evolving new DCI community-level evaluation and management review procedures than are the existing committee structure and existing committee bureaucratic practices.

40. While each of the other alternatives (described in Annex C) possesses some advantages unique to its structure and to the institutional environment of the intelligence community, no other alternative is considered to match the geographic/topical committees with respect to the above-listed set of interactive considerations.

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ANNEX A

The Framework for Community Level Committee/Staff Roles and Functions

1. The purpose of this general statement is to provide an overview and framework for the objectives and findings of the Survey Task Group report.
2. After having looked at the functions and operations of each of the committees, the Survey Task Group addressed the following questions:
 - a. What is our understanding of the community decision-making process?
 - b. What roles and functions are essential to support the DCI's community program and his USIB and IRAC advisory groups?
 - c. How should these roles and functions be structured to assure the DCI and community managers effective inputs to the community decision-making process?
3. A number of key assumptions regarding concept were made.
 - a. If USIB is to carry out its primary responsibilities as listed in NSCID No. 1 (Revised February 1972), it must have a mechanism for the continuous review and evaluation of existing intelligence assets in terms of consumer needs and substantive objectives. This mechanism and its output is essential not only to allow USIB to provide meaningful guidance to collection and production assets, but also is a vital USIB input to the IRAC resource allocation consideration.
 - b. IRAC's concern is primarily one of future assets and the resource allocations required to provide them. The IRAC view of the relative value of existing resources must essentially be derived from USIB and integrated in its evaluations and studies for future resource allocations.
 - c. The relation of the IC staff to the NSCIC, USIB, and IRAC activities is one of coordinating and monitoring these activities to assure that DCI corporate community management actions and decisions result in a compatible community program which meets stated DCI policies and objectives.
4. As a point of departure, the problem was addressed in terms of the fundamental divisions or sub-systems of the intelligence process; namely (a)

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collection, (b) processing and exploitation, and (c) production. The support functions, such as security and information handling, were each handled as separate problems.

Definitional Problems and Resolutions

5. At the outset it was recognized that a large part of the problem of discussing roles and functions at the community level was one of language and reducing ambiguity to a point where usage was effective.

6. In this context, the Survey Task Group found it essential to explicitly define and clarify many terms which, although often in common community usage, were far too ambiguous for effective use in the survey. In one sense, they are more than definitions, they are the foundation and framework of the survey's findings, alternatives, and recommendations.

Intelligence Objectives

7. One of the primary functions of the USIB is to advise and assist the DCI in the establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives. However, the NSCIC has been charged by the President to provide direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs upon which national intelligence objectives are to be based.

Current Intelligence Objectives

8. In operative form, current intelligence objectives are expressed by consumers at the national level through requests for NSSM inputs, for NIEs or for special intelligence estimates. In the absence of specific requests for intelligence, elements of the national intelligence community exercise initiatives in an attempt to anticipate consumer needs. The development of "key intelligence questions for FY 1974" which the DCI has initiated is a new aspect of the community effort to develop formal expression of intelligence objectives.

Projecting Intelligence Objectives for Planning

9. A primary issue involved in projecting substantive intelligence objectives for planning purposes is determining the relative value or priority applicable to each topic. Another issue or problem relates to the method of arriving at an expression of such objectives. The current method of preparing the Attachment to DCID 1/2, "US Intelligence Objectives and Priorities," uses an ad hoc committee process involving representatives from community organizations. The NSCIC and its Working Group are not thus far involved in the process, although guidance in this area is a NSCIC function.

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10. A third issue related to such objectives is their use and impact upon decision making at the various levels of intelligence management. Inasmuch as no systematic evaluation at either the community management or lower levels takes place using the objectives and their relative values as a criteria, there is some reason to suspect the effectiveness of the objective statement and their priorities as a form of guidance, especially in the case of collection programs.

11. From an operative decision and management standpoint, the objectives and their relative values are essential to one important form of management evaluation; this is the evaluation of the performance of each of the existing collection systems over a given period related to given objectives (i.e., cross program or inter-program). The net evaluation of a collection system is a function of both its performance relative to a given objective as well as the relative value of the objective in the objective universe. (See Collection Systems Relative Evaluation below.)

Collection

12. The Survey Group divided collection into the following basic groups:

- a. Imagery
- b. COMINT
- c. Telemetry
- d. ELINT [Redacted]
- e. [Redacted] Human sources (including open sources)

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
13. These basic groups were then looked at in terms of the following functional tasks or variables, and their relation to the community level management and decision problem.

14. **Collection Operational Tasking:** This function is wholly within the province of the collection operator/manager. There is no community level management role required. (Collection Tasking Guidance is considered to be apart from Collection Operational Tasking and is noted below.)

15. **Collection Tasking Guidance:** This is current guidance for a given collection type (i.e., imagery, COMINT, etc.) which is based upon and stated in terms of:

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a. Substantive guidance derived from intelligence objectives and reduced to specifics by the production function.

b. The technical and operational environment and its constraints.

16. The community level management problem in the case of collection tasking guidance is one of determining the degree of guidance required by the specific collection operator. The problem is complicated by the variation of substantive capabilities found in the collection organizations and the managerial arrangements under which each operates.

17. For example, NSA possesses a high degree of substantive knowledge resulting from the fact of its integrated exploitation and production activities. Behaviorally, NSA believes it has the necessary knowledge and expertise to provide tasking guidance to the CSS collection effort. As a result, NSA tends to regard tasking guidance from the community level as an intrusion.

18. It is in this same sense that the collection programs closely related to CIA, DIA, and State/INR tend to regard efforts to influence their operational activities through tasking guidance.

19. In the case of NRO, the fact is that it is institutionally isolated from the primary exploitation of its imagery collection effort (i.e., NPIC)), as well as from the substantive concerns of intelligence production. As a result, the external provision of collection tasking guidance is essential, hence the large permanent COMIREX staff.

20. Both collection planning and programming guidance and tasking guidance require a high degree of cooperation from the production, collection and management staff personnel involved. All three require a sharing of collection, production, and management information.

21. **Collection Planning and Programming Guidance:** This is basic mid-range community level guidance for a given collection type (i.e., imagery, COMINT, etc.) which is based upon and stated in terms of:

a. Substantive guidance derived from intelligence objectives and reduced to specifics by the production function.

b. The technical, operational, and budget environments and their constraints.



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c. The evaluation by community level management of the relative value of collection systems in reaching specific intelligence objectives. (This is primarily an IRAC concern with evaluations of current performance from USIB.)

22. **Collection Program Evaluation:** The purpose of collection program evaluation at the community level is primarily to aid decision making in resource tasking and allocations. It also functions as feedback guidance to collection development, collection tasking, and production analysis. Collection Program Evaluation has two basic forms, collection system program evaluation and collection systems relative evaluation.

23. **Collection System Program Evaluation:** This is evaluation of the performance of a given collection system (i.e., imagery, COMINT, etc. and divisions thereof) expressed in terms of its effectiveness (including costs) in meeting collection planning and programming guidance and collection tasking guidance. The key to this type of evaluation is that the performance effectiveness criteria must be directly related to the substantive guidance. It is the point at which substantive, technical, operation, and cost factors must be joined. The best example of this type of evaluation in the community today is in the COMIREX effort.


24. Individual collection system program evaluation is primarily the task of the collection manager as opposed to the corporate community level management (which should be more concerned with collection system relative evaluation.)

25. During the past 25 years of incremental budgeting, the tendency of community level management has been to orient its decision making and program review forums toward functional and institutional, as opposed to objective concerns. Recognition of the need for cross program evaluation and review is primarily a function of decrement budget decisions which emphasize the need for corporate community level management to implement the decrement policy effectively.

26. The point is that community level management structures (i.e., the IC staff and USIB committee structure) require revision to ensure productivity on agreed targets and objectives. Community level management needs to impress upon collection system managers the requirement for better individual collection program evaluation to be undertaken by the operating manager, while community level management emphasizes cross program (inter-program) evaluation.



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27. Collection Systems Relative Evaluation: The purpose of this type of evaluation is to provide the relative value of the performance of each of the existing collection systems as they relate to a given intelligence objective. The burden for this type of evaluation must fall predominantly upon the production function because only the production function integrates all sensor inputs in producing intelligence for consumers. However, where such evaluations are projective in nature, collection as well as processing and exploitation expertise are required.

28. There is no integrated or systematic plan for this type of evaluation in the current committee structure; however, individual committees have made approaches to the problem (i.e., IGCP under the SIGINT Committee and JAEIC. An example of this tendency can also be found in a CIA program in DDI/IRS.)

29. The need for collections system relative evaluation played a key role in the survey group consideration of alternative structures and functions of USIB committees.

Processing and Exploitation

30. Processing and Exploitation (P&E) is the turning of the raw form of sensor-derived information into forms suitable for use by the production function. Examples are imagery interpretation, telemetry tape analysis and interpretation, COMINT traffic analysis, etc.

31. The Survey Group divided processing and exploitation into the same grouping as collection:

- a. Imagery P&E
- b. COMINT P&E
- c. Telemetry P&E
- d. ELINT and other technical sensor P&E
- e. Human Sources P&E

32. Again, as in the case of collection, these basic groups were looked at in terms of the following functional tasks and their relation to community level management and decision problems.

33. **Processing and Exploitation Tasking:** This is direct operational tasking and wholly within the province of the P&E operator/manager.

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34. **Processing and Exploitation Planning and Programming Guidance:** This is basic planning and programming guidance from the community level for a given P&E type (i.e., imagery, etc.). As indicated in paragraph 21, above.

35. **Processing and Exploitation Tasking Guidance:** This is current P&E tasking guidance for a given P&E type (i.e., COMINT, etc.) which is based upon and stated in terms of:

- a. Production function substantive, analytical and format needs and priorities.
- b. Collection feedback needs.
- c. Technical, operational and cost factors of the P&E process involved.

36. **Processing and Exploitation Program Evaluation:** The purpose of P&E Program Evaluation at the community level is primarily to aid decision makers in resource tasking and allocation. It also functions as feedback guidance to P&E management.

37. At the present time, there is a need for two basic forms of P&E program evaluation. One is the evaluation of a given P&E system (i.e., imagery, etc.) expressed in terms planning and programming guidance and tasking guidance. The second, is the evaluation of allocation of, and opportunities for allocation of, P&E responsibilities for the maintenance of designated content reference files and data bases.

38. There is too little attention given to either of these evaluations in the current committee system. The main point is that there is no strategy of systematic arrangement of P&E program evaluation on the community level.

Production


39. The community level problem with the actual production of national intelligence involves:

- a. Allocation of production responsibilities among producers in the community, some of a planned redundant basis and others on a unique basis.

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b. Tasking arrangements with the community production organizations in terms of their interests and capabilities.

c. Assembling the community production organization inputs and providing a single national intelligence product which meets specific consumer needs and identifies divergent community producer views and measured uncertainties.

40. **Production Tasking:** Because the national intelligence product is not the result of any single producer, the tasking of community producers for national intelligence products must be the responsibility of DCI level management. To date such tasking for national level production has not been centralized. For example, the NIE and NSSM tasking arrangements are today separate and essentially uncoordinated. The DCI is currently reviewing the problem in a context apart from this survey. The DCI also has presented to USIB a plan for establishment on his staff of National Intelligence Officers having geographic or topical responsibilities.


41. **Production Planning and Programming Guidance:** Under current planning, this function will essentially be achieved through the following:

- a. DCI guidance to the community
- b. NSCIC guidance
- c. Consumer research projects
- d. Guidance from D/DCI/IC Product Review Group

42. **Production Tasking Guidance:** This is de facto the terms of reference for any given national intelligence product. Here again, the subject is currently a part of another D/DCI/IC review.

43. **Production Evaluation:** This evaluation has two aspects: (a) production evaluation, and (b) evaluation of production process factors, i.e., qualitative and quantitative manpower needs, machine support needs, training needs, methods and techniques, etc.

44. **Production Evaluation:** The most effective form of product evaluation is that done directly by the consumer. This area is also the concern of another D/DCI/IC review.



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45. Evaluation of Production Process Factors: This function is the long term concern of the D/DCI/IC program for product improvement. It is also the concern of every production manager.

Miscellaneous

46. It is recognized that there are many miscellaneous activities coordinated within the present committee structure related to such items as sanitization, release to foreign governments, etc. Under a revised USIB committee structure such items would flow through the D/DCI/IC and action officers assigned accordingly within the staff, the USIB Committee structure, or departments and agencies as appropriate.

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ANNEX B

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ANNEX B

Survey Task Group Individual Committee Highlights


Introduction

1. The problem of presenting comprehensive statements on the 15 USIB Committees and their 54 subcommittees and working groups is not the purpose of this annex. What is attempted is to provide highlights of Survey Group findings as they relate to each of the committees.

2. Annex D, Tab 1 lists all of the committees and their subcommittees and working groups and shows the distribution of chairmen by government agency or department for the subcommittees and working groups. Tab 2 of Annex C is designed to give the reader a feeling for the number of people involved in the effort and the activity engendered.

3. Annex D, Tab 3 shows the distribution of full-time personnel assigned to USIB committees and represents another way of looking at the effort being devoted to community management through the committee structure. The purpose of Tab 4, Annex C which lists the papers submitted to USIB by each of the committees over the past fifteen months is again, to provide the reader with some insight to committee activities.

4. The order in which the committees are covered in this annex is not particularly significant.



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As the Survey Group found, this distinction is not a very useful one in terms of the actual roles and functions performed by these committees. The customary classification suggests a good deal more order and systematic nature in the committee system than was found to exist.

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COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION (COMIREX)

5. COMIREX is the largest community committee with a full-time chairman and staff which includes 22 professionals and five clericals.

6. The primary difference between COMIREX and the other USIB "collection" committees such as SIGINT and IPC, is that COMIREX has evolved a systematic and closed loop procedure for imagery collection involving requirements guidance, system tasking guidance, and collection performance evaluation in terms of individual systems.

7. The COMIREX Standing Collection Guidance is tailored to the collection system demands making it directly usable by the collection system management in system planning and programming.

8. The COMIREX collection tasking guidance is a part of a collection strategy oriented toward the operational and system environment as well as consumer needs. The Tasking Guidance is fed directly to system operating management.

9. COMIREX collection evaluation procedures are designed for immediate feedback for mission planning and periodic evaluation of the entire collection program for higher level management purposes.

10. The COMIREX-NRO relationship has resulted in one primary channel to the operator from his consuming community. The effort is dynamic and continuously being refined. The system operates with a well organized data handling system which is focused upon the evaluation objectives.

11. Evaluation of the imagery exploitation effort is not organized as well as the collection evaluation. This is particularly true in the instance of the "Phase 3 Basic" monitoring and maintenance effort. An in-depth investigation of the exploitation effort with recommendations for correction is required.

12. COMIREX has attempted to function as a "program project office" for the planning and programming [Redacted]

[Redacted] This includes, (1) processing and exploitation, (2) dissemination to users, and (3) feedback guidance to the collection system. COMIREX lacks adequate authority and manpower to carry out this task. It does not seem reasonable that a system costing [Redacted] should lack adequate management and organization of its pay-off sub-system.

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13. Decision lines from the Chairman, COMIREX to the national level for which he works are blurred. He currently reports to the CIA/DDI on substantive matters, the CIA/DDS&T on technical matters, and the D/DCI/IC on matters of community policy.

14. COMIREX-NRO frictions are at reasonable levels considering the fact that any intelligence guidance/tasking/evaluation system which attempts to address itself to the collection, technical and operational environment is going to result in points of contention between the consumer-oriented input and operational factors.

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THE SIGINT COMMITTEE

15. The primary functions of the SIGINT Committee are to provide coordinated guidance to the cryptologic community and to evaluate the responsiveness of SIGINT resources to US needs for intelligence. The committee has no full-time personnel assigned despite the fact that its area of concern is larger and more complex in many ways than that of COMIREX.

16. The Committee, with the assistance of its SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS), provides five-year guidance for satellite systems. This guidance provides a substantive rationale for planning and programming, but does not actually resolve or control technical options or costs, respectively, by fiscal year. Also, with SORS assistance, the Committee provides collection tasking guidance in an attempt to optimize the application of particular SIGINT payloads, but actual operational tasking is accomplished by NRO components with NSA assistance.

17. SORS does not routinely attempt to provide exploitation guidance to community components such as NSA, CIA, FTD and their supporting contractors, nor does the SIGINT Committee attempt to provide practical evaluations of the performance of overhead systems.



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19. [Redacted] COMINT collection and reporting guidance exists as Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming (IGCP). Such guidance, completed and issued in 1970 at the insistence of OSD (DDR&E), has not been kept up-to-date or refined because of NSA intransigence and past chairmen's unwillingness to become involved in programs/budgets/-management issues. The Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS), sponsor of this type of programming and reporting guidance, met only three times during 1972, and then only at the insistence of DIA and CIA.


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20. The SIGINT Evaluation Subcommittee (SES) has never met since it was chartered in about 1970.

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22. The SIGINT Committee does not have an orderly and systematic program for the evaluation of COMINT, ELINT, and Telemetry collection and exploitation programs based upon national intelligence objectives and priorities and the system oriented guidance derived from those objectives.

23. There is a tendency to regard the SIGINT Committee task and responsibility as being similar to that of COMIREX. It is not, nor can it be so under the current institutional arrangements and responsibilities assigned to the Director of NSA and CCS. The fact is that NSA's capabilities in the substantive, technical, and operational areas of SIGINT make detailed tasking guidance from without unnecessary and behaviorally unacceptable.

24. The real problem area is evaluation of the types of SIGINT and of the systems within each type in terms of substantive intelligence objectives.

25. The Director of NSA is responsible, for example, for making technical evaluations of competing COMINT, ELINT, and Telemetry systems. However, the Director of NSA should not be asked to provide relative evaluations of the performance of such systems in meeting intelligence objectives. This should be a function of corporate community management. The information input needs to accomplish such relative evaluations require a degree of explicit SIGINT system information which has heretofore neither been available to, nor organized by corporate community management.

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**INTERAGENCY CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PRIORITIES
COMMITTEES (IPC)**

26. The sole function of the IPC is to provide a community-agreed listing of intelligence needs "whose fulfillment necessitates clandestine collection operations by the Directorate of Operations of CIA." One full-time professional is assigned to the Committee by CIA/DDO.

27. Unlike the other so-called collection committees of USIB, the IPC has no responsibility for evaluation of the effort it is charged with guiding. The IPC list is a compendium of broad intelligence needs which has little or no relationship to the necessity for clandestine collection or to the capabilities of clandestine collection.

28. The sole function of the IPC appears to be one of giving the community a sense of participation in guiding the clandestine collection program.

29. The Survey Group could only conclude that this committee serves little more than a bureaucratic behavioral need and is useless to the community-level management and decision making process, to USIB, and to any meaningful driving of the CIA Clandestine Service.

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HUMAN SOURCES COMMITTEE

30. The Human Sources Committee with no full-time staff support has been in existence since the first of the year. Its terms of reference limit it almost exclusively to matters pertaining to requirements processing.

31. Its Chairman, its staff support and its location within the Intelligence Directorate of CIA will almost certainly cause the committee to be viewed by other members of the intelligence community as something less than a truly community organ.

32. Although functioning in the human source area, the committee's future appears almost fatally flawed by the exclusion of the CIA clandestine collection effort. Under present USIB committee structure, requirements for clandestine collection are considered by the IPC Committee.

33. The Survey Task Group conclusion was that this committee has little or no chance of making a meaningful contribution to the evaluation of human sources as an input to community-level management or in effectively guiding human source collection.

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JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (JAEIC)

38. JAEIC is the oldest of the committees and is the only USIB committee named in the NSCIDs and given a specific mission.*

39. JAEIC is chaired by the Chief, Nuclear Energy Division, OSI/DDS&T/CIA. The committee has a permanent staff of one professional and one clerical, both provided by NED/OSI.

40. According to the Chairman, JAEIC spends [Redacted] of its time concerned with collection matters, most of it on the evaluation of collection performance and collection R&D programs. Another [Redacted] of JAEIC's time is spent on production, three quarters of which is devoted to current intelligence (nearly all of which relates to reporting nuclear events). Of the remaining [Redacted] half is spent on processing and exploitation concerns, and nearly all of the remainder on other miscellaneous matters. [Redacted] of JAEIC's time is attributed to "Identification of Consumer Needs."

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43. In view of the DCI's expressed views of production needs, the JAEIC production for NIEs appears to be outmoded. The nuclear production organs of each community production center provide an essential ingredient to the individual position of those centers on key consumer policy matters. Under the circumstances the JAEIC arrangement tends to reduce key uncertainties and differences before they are related to larger considerations, such as in a strategic force estimate for particular policy concerns.

44. The [Redacted] of JAEIC time devoted to event reporting appears excessive. In addition, there is reason to question the need for the degree of coordination which exists in current intelligence nuclear event reporting.

**NSCID No. 3, p. 3, para. 7,d. "The production of intelligence on atomic energy is a responsibility of all departments and agencies represented on the US Intelligence Board with responsibilities for production of finished intelligence to be coordinated through the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee structure."
(Underscoring added.)*

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[Redacted]

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GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (GMAIC)

45. GMAIC is chaired by the Chief, Systems Division, FMSAC/DDS&T/CIA. It has an office and permanent staff (one professional and two secretaries) in the Pentagon.

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46. GMAIC attributes [Redacted] of its effort to Production, [Redacted] to Collection, [Redacted] to Processing and Exploitation and, [Redacted] to Identification of Consumer Needs.

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47. GMAIC's activities in the collection area [Redacted] are concerned with collection requirements and tasking [Redacted] evaluation of collection performance [Redacted] and evaluation of collection R&D [Redacted]. All of these activities tend to be ad hoc in nature. For example, there is little systematic evaluation in terms of the relative value of each collection effort performance in terms of Soviet missile objectives.

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
48. GMAIC, like the other committees which coordinate particular production inputs for NIEs, tends to reduce individual producer views to a common denominator before they are related to larger concerns, such as strategic force estimates or NSSMs.

49. Although GMAIC provides a forum for the exchange of information in its subject area, the Survey Task Group found that its input to community-level management and decision making was marginal. In the fifteen month period from January 1972 through March 1973, GMAIC submitted four actions for USIB consideration, only one of which required a USIB decision, [Redacted]

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY COMMITTEE (NIS)

50. The NIS Committee is the USIB body responsible for management of the National Intelligence Survey Program as directed and described in NSCID No. 3

51. Its USIB Committee status provides a useful means for reflecting community participation in the management of the program as well as effective means for applying community pressure to achieve production deadlines and assuring consistency of content and format.

52. The Chairman, the Director of OBGI, devotes about [redacted] of his time to committee affairs. About [redacted] of all NIS inputs are contributed by CIA (OBGI, OCI, OER) and CIA funds the entire production program [redacted]

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[redacted] Other substantive contributors to the program are DIA and the Department of Commerce. State Department, although not a substantive contributor, provides a useful review function.

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53. The Committee does not prepare requirements nor does it task any collectors. The Committee periodically conducts user surveys to determine the value of its product.

54. The Survey Task Group concluded that the NIS program did not require any formal committee structure. Since completion of the survey, the DCI, with USIB concurrence, has decided to terminate the NIS program.

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SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (SIC)

55. SIC has no permanent staff but has eight subcommittees and/or working groups.

56. The Chairman and Vice Chairman are from CIA/DDI 
 of the working group chairmen.

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57. SIC has coordinated and published two publications since 1 January 1972, one on science and technology in PRC, and the other on Soviet Military R&D.

58. SIC does not perform any explicit evaluation of collection or exploitation programs relative to its subject areas.

59. There is no way of ascertaining whether its guidance to collection programs is effective or ineffective.

60. Probably its most important function is as a forum for the exchange of information.

61. The Survey Group could not find any intrinsic rationale for the continuance of the committee without a major redirection to support the community management program.

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[Redacted]

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (EIC)

62. The Economic Intelligence Committee has no permanent staff and is essentially run by CIA/DDI [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The primary value of EIC (i.e., OER) at the present time appears to be its ability to bring together the wider US economic community in an exchange discussion of the issues and problems.

63. Coordination of production does not require such a committee. The encyclopaedic nature of the Combined Economic Reporting Program (CERP), its lack of prioritization or focus upon policy problems, and its lack of adaptation to the technical and operational constraints of the sensor systems it is supposed to be guiding, suggest that it is of questionable value. In fact, the complete lack of any closed loop evaluation process in the system does not allow for any measurement of the success of the guidance or the performance of the collectors.

64. If this committee activity is to provide meaningful support to community-level management, a major transformation is required.

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


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CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE (CCPC)

65. The primary difference between the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) and other USIB committees is that the CCPC has no continuing responsibilities. The CCPC is a standing committee, available to take on ad hoc assignments in the collection area as assigned by the DCI or USIB, or at the request of one of the USIB agencies.
66. Tasks assigned to the committee usually concern the adequacy of collection capabilities in a geographic area, the adequacy of collection response for a substantive matter of interest such as narcotics, or an identification of the impact of changing substantive priorities on collection.
67. CCPC studies frequently involve the consideration of substantive production matters as well as collection matters. As a result, the committee has been criticized by managers in the community for getting too far into their responsibilities in both the collection and production areas. Similarly, chairmen of committees such as SIGINT and COMIREX have been concerned about the scope of CCPC findings and recommendations.
68. The conclusions and recommendations of the CCPC frequently have only a subjective basis. The committee and its one-man secretariat have no rigorous or systems-analytic capability.
69. Previous suggestions that it undertake post-mortem evaluations of NIEs and SNIEs for the purpose of identifying collection gaps and deficiencies have been denied.
70. Follow-on collection tasking guidance for new resources recommended by the committee has been left to appropriate collection managers.
71. The Survey Group could find no rationale for continuing this committee except as a vehicle for study exploitation by the Chief, Planning and Evaluation Group, IC staff, in support of community-level review efforts.

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**TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COMMITTEE
(TSCC)**

72. The TSCC has had a permanent staff of two professional and one clerical and has reported to the D/DCI/IC.

73. The primary function which TSCC claims is the promotion and coordination of the development and use of the means to defend US personnel and facilities against penetration by technical surveillance.

74. Upon review, the real value of the committee appears to be the knowledgeability and energy of its chairman in seeking out and finding problem areas upon which he can bring to bear the force of a coordinated community position or a reasonable arbitration.

75. Although the efforts of the present chairman of the TSCC have been in retrospect essential to the effectiveness of many sensitive problem areas which often transcended the explicit concerns of the TSCC mission, it is doubtful that succeeding chairmen could operate in this manner.

76. The Survey Group found that normal TSCC concerns tend to overlap considerably with the activities of the Security Committee and concluded that the TSCC functions could best be handled in a reorganized effort of the Security Committee.

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THE SECURITY COMMITTEE

77. The Security Committee has two full time personnel, one professional and one clerical. The Chairman is the Director of Security, CIA.

78. Aside from its activities in the investigation of "leaks," the Security Committee appears to be a rather inactive organ.

79. With respect to the Computer Security Subcommittee, the Chairman of the Security Committee suggested that this problem was a community issue more closely related to the IHC Committee concerns and communication issues.

80. The principal problem of the current community Security Committee is that an attempt has been made to place the responsibility for community security problems upon a security manager (e.g., the Director of Security, CIA) who already has a full-time job. Major community security problems such as compartmentation, sanitization, release to foreign governments, etc., require continuing full-time attention and should be the responsibility of a full-time chairman and supporting staff.

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THE WATCH COMMITTEE

81. The Survey Group concluded that any meaningful review of the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center must be done in the larger context of the strategic and tactical warning problem.

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
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THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HANDLING COMMITTEE (IHC)


82. The Information Handling Committee (IHC) of USIB is responsible for facilitating the timely exchange of intelligence information and promoting the continuous improvement of community information handling resources. The chairman has been assigned to the D/DCI/IC Staff and is supported by six full-time personnel.

83. The IHC membership has consisted largely of hardware-oriented personnel. Accordingly, it has focused on questions of systems compatibility, data element and code standardization, description and inventory of systems, training, sponsorship of symposia for exchange of information on systems and techniques including secure handling of information, and the development of a Community On-line Intelligence System (COINS) to determine the feasibility of making selected files in the community available to multi-access from remote locations.

84. COINS has been a limited technical success but a substantive failure because "cooperating agencies" have withheld support and current data from the system, notably CIA.

85. While the IHC staff claims  of the committee's time has been concerned with soliciting community requirements for centralized data bases, types of files, follow-on systems to COINS, computer security and standards, it is fair to say that the committee actually has been dependent upon other sources to identify and allocate responsibilities for the maintenance of centralized files in the community. For example, USIB approved Intelligence Guidance for COMINT 

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86. The committee has not attempted the task of providing information handling objectives and providing program guidance in functional and resource terms. Similarly, the committee has not attempted rigorous survey and evaluation of present information handling techniques, and correspondingly has not identified hardware and software options available for specific applications.

87. The committee has only recently begun the examination of the interface between communications and information handling needs in the community. The ever-growing information and data exchange in the community is a legitimate concern of major importance.

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88. The charter of the present Committee and composition (organization and membership) of the supporting secretariat and subcommittees are simply not designed to have a real impact on information handling within the community.

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Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000100020006-0

ANNEX C

Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000100020006-0



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ANNEX C

Alternative USIB Committee Structures

1. The Recommendations presented in the basic study represent Alternative A of the five alternative committee structures considered by the Survey Task Group. The other four alternatives which were examined are described in this Annex.

Alternative B


2. **General:** The primary committees would be designed to concentrate functionally upon the collection and exploitation of basic sensor system groups. Thus, emphasis would be placed upon individual system evaluation and guidance as opposed to cross function/program evaluation. Relative evaluation of collection systems (i.e., cross function/program evaluation) would have to be accomplished either by a USIB committee established for this purpose or by the Intelligence Community staff.

3. The USIB Committees:

a. USIB Committee for Imagery Collection and Exploitation Guidance and Evaluation.

b. USIB Committee for COMINT, ELINT, and Telemetry Collection and Exploitation Guidance and Evaluation.

c. USIB Committee for Other Collection and Exploitation Guidance and Evaluation



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d. USIB Committee for Human Resources Collection and Exploitation Guidance and Evaluation



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e. USIB Committee for Collection Systems Relative Evaluation.


f. USIB Watch Committee.

g. USIB Committee for Security.

h. USIB Committee for Intelligence Information Handling.

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4. Related Actions for Alternative B:

a. An Intelligence Objectives and Priorities Subcommittee would be organized under the NSCIC Working Group.

b. CIA/DDI would be made executive agent for any actions related to the National Intelligence Survey program as it is phased out.

Alternative C

5. **General:** The primary committees would be designed to concentrate upon topical or subject areas worldwide. Emphasis would be placed upon cross program/function evaluation within a topical or subject area. Integration of topical or subject evaluations would be handled within the DCI/IC staff.

6. The USIB Committees:

- a. USIB Committee for Military Intelligence
- b. USIB Committee for Political Intelligence
- c. USIB Committee for Economic Intelligence
- d. USIB Committee for Scientific and Technical Intelligence
- e. USIB Committee for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
- f. USIB Committee for Terrorist Activities
- g. USIB Committee for Security
- h. USIB Watch Committee

7. Related actions for Alternative C would be the same as those in Alternative B, plus the appending of the permanent COMIREX staff to the DCI/IC staff.

Alternative D

8. **General:** This alternative would retain the existent committee structure with minor changes. The primary change would be to emphasize the evaluation function of the committees as opposed to other functions. All


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committees except JAEIC would be relieved of all intelligence production coordination functions. All committee chairmen would be responsible to the DCI.


9. The USIB Committees:


- a. USIB Comirex Committee
- b. USIB SIGINT Committee
- c. 
- d. USIB Committee for Human Resources
- e. USIB Committee for Clandestine Collection
- f. USIB Committee for Missiles and Space
- g. USIB Committee for Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
- h. USIB Committee for Security and Countermeasures
- i. USIB Watch Committee
- j. USIB Committee for Information Handling
- k. USIB Committee for Economic Affairs
- l. USIB Committee for Science and Technology

10. Related actions for Alternative D:

a. The functions of the Critical Collection Priorities Committee would be absorbed by the DCI/IC staff.

b. Functions of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee and the Security Committee would be combined in the USIB Committee for Security and Countermeasures.

c. Responsibilities of the National Intelligence Survey Committee would be assumed by the CIA/DDI 



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Alternative E

11. **General:** This alternative recognizes that a committee structure at the community level is not essential. Those functions currently the responsibility of USIB committees would be: (a) returned to operational channels where applicable; (b) undertaken by the DCI/IC staff; and/or (c) dealt with through the establishment of ad hoc interagency task groups as and when necessary.

12. Other actions and concepts:

a. The COMIREX chairman and staff would become part of the DCI/IC staff.

b. CIA/DDI would be made executive agent for any actions related to the National Intelligence Survey program as it is phased out.



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d. All cross program evaluations would be handled through the DCI/IC staff and interagency task groups.

e. Specific guidance for collection managers beyond that contained in such documents as the Attachment to DCID 1/2 and DCI community planning documents would be obtained through the DCI/IC staff.

Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000100020006-0

ANNEX D

Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000100020006-0



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ANNEX D: STATISTICAL MATERIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS DATA

Table of Contents

- Tab 1: Distribution of USIB Sub-Committee and Working Group Chairmen by Government Agency or Department
- Tab 2: USIB Committees, Subcommittees, and Working Groups: Meetings, People, and Time
- Tab 3: Distribution of Full-Time Personnel Assigned to USIB Committees
- Tab 4: Committee Papers Submitted to USIB: January 1972 to March 1973
- Tab 5: USIB Committee Survey Task Group: Initiating Memoranda

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Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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ANNEX D - Tab 5

**USIB COMMITTEE SURVEY TASK GROUP
INITIATING MEMORANDA**

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23 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Committee Chairmen

SUBJECT : DCI Survey of USIB Committee Structure

REFERENCES : a. D/DCI/IC Memo to DCI, "USIB Committee Structure," dated 16 March 1973

b. General Graham Memo to D/DCI/IC, "IC Task Group for Survey of USIB Committee Structure," dated 21 March 1973

1. The DCI has directed that his Intelligence Community Staff conduct a survey of the role and functions of the USIB Committee structure (Reference a.).

2. Each USIB Committee Chairman will be contacted during the week of 26 March by the Survey Task Group Chairman to arrange an interview with members of the Task Group (Reference b. lists these members).

3. The following information also is required:

a. The name and organizational title of the current member of each Committee, Subcommittees and Working Groups.

b. The number of meetings held since 1 January 1972 by each Committee, Subcommittee and Working Group.

c. A listing of all publications disseminated by the Committee since 1 January 1972, along with a brief statement of the purpose of each publication and its primary customers. (Minutes of meetings, briefings and administrative documents should not be listed.)

4. In addition, a separate response is requested to the following question: What percentage of the Committee effort has been devoted since 1 January 1972 to the following:

a. Collection

1) Evaluation and Preparation of Collection Requirements

2) Preparation of Collection Tasking (by Type Sensor)

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- 3) Evaluation of Collection Performance
 - 4) Evaluation of Collection R&D Programs
 - 5) Other (Identify)
- b. Processing and Exploitation
- 1) Evaluation and Preparation of Processing and Exploitation Requirements
 - 2) Preparation of Processing and Exploitation Tasking
 - 3) Evaluation of Processing and Exploitation Programs
 - 4) Evaluation of Processing and Exploitation R&D Programs
 - 5) Other (Identify)
- c. Production
- 1) Preparation of Substantive Inputs to other Intelligence Products (NIEs, etc.)
 - 2) Preparation of Substantive Products for Direct Dissemination to Non-intelligence Consumers
 - 3) Evaluation of Intelligence Analyses and Products
 - 4) Improving Production Techniques
 - 5) Other (Identify)
- d. Identification of Consumer Needs
- 1) Solicitation of Consumer Needs
 - 2) Evaluation and Analyses of Consumer Requests
 - 3) Preparation of Projections of Consumer Interest
 - 4) Other (Identify)
- e. Other
- 1) (Specifically Identify)

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5. It is requested the information described in paragraphs 3 and 4 be forwarded to the Survey Group Chairman, [redacted] Room 6E2914, CIA Headquarters Building [redacted] within three days of receipt of this memorandum.

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[redacted]

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Daniel O. Graham
Major General, USA

ATTACHMENT:

Reference a & b

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[redacted] (23 Mar 73)

Distribution:

- Original - PRG Projects: C - Unnumbered projects
- 1 - each USIB Committee Chairman
- 1 - each Survey Task Group member
- 1 - PRG Chrono
- 1 - [redacted] Chrono

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NOTE: Copies for Chairmen were distributed by USIB Secretariat.

Confidential

DCI/IC 73-0153/1

21 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Allen

SUBJECT: IC Task Group for Survey of USIB
Committee structure

REFERENCE: Memo dated 16 March 1973, to DCI from you,
Subj: USIB Committee Structure

1. In accordance with the Director's approval of your memorandum of 16 March (reference), I propose using a task group of IC staff members to conduct a survey of the USIB committee structure. This task group survey will provide recommendations on the role and functioning of the committees and the organizational position of the committee chairmen.

2. The survey will involve interviews with all of the committee chairmen and the documentation of such data on the role and functioning of the committees as may be necessary. Findings and recommendations will be prepared by the task group for your consideration.

3. Members of the task group will be:

[Redacted]

4. [Redacted] will supervise the effort.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Daniel O. Graham
Major General, USA

CONCUR:

[Redacted] 23 MAR 1973
date

[Redacted]
D/DCI/IC date

DCI/IC-73-0152

Executive Registry

73-1356

16 MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The DCI

SUBJECT: USIB Committee Structure

1. You have expressed an interest in examining the role of the USIB committees.


2. With your permission, my staff will conduct a survey of the USIB committee structure as a basis for recommendations to you on the role and functioning of the committees and the organizational position of the committee chairmen.



Lew Allen, Jr.
Major General, USAF
D/DCI/IC


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APPROVED:



James R. Schlesinger, DCI

Top Secret



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