


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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Infiltration and Logistics--South Vietnam

REFERENCE : USIB-M-397, 5 August 1965, Item 6

1. The attached study on the subject, prepared as a response to the referenced United States Intelligence Board (USIB) action by an ad hoc interagency working group, is circulated herewith for consideration by the USIB. The ad hoc group was chaired by  of the Board of National Estimates and included representatives of CIA, State (INR), DIA and NSA, with the assistance of Army, Navy and Air Force representatives.

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2. The attached study is being placed on the agenda of the USIB meeting scheduled for 28 October.

  
Executive Secretary

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Attachment  
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INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS -- SOUTH VIETNAM

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
THE PROBLEM . . . . .	1
CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	1
DISCUSSION . . . . .	2
I. GENERAL . . . . .	2
II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . .	5
Internal Organization . . . . .	5
Internal Sources . . . . .	6
External Sources . . . . .	11
Critical Items of Supply . . . . .	13
III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM . . . . .	19
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved . . . . .	19
Types of Supplies Moved . . . . .	26
Organizational Control . . . . .	27
Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points . . . . .	28
Infiltration of Personnel . . . . .	31
IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM . . . . .	34
Supply Routes . . . . .	34
Organizational Control . . . . .	37
Forms of Sea Transportation Used . . . . .	39
Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved . . . . .	40
V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA . . . . .	42
Supply Routes . . . . .	42
Organizational Control . . . . .	46

	<u>Page</u>
Types of Supplies Moved . . . . .	46
Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory . . . . .	48
Cambodian Government Collusion . . . . .	48
 VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES . . . . .	 52
Organizational Control . . . . .	52
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas . . . . .	54

ANNEXES

ANNEX A. TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED FROM THE VIET CONG, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN . . . . .	58
ANNEX B. COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY OBSERVERS ON SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS, DECEMBER 1964- JUNE 1965 . . . . .	62
ANNEX C. METHODS OF PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES . . .	63
ANNEX D. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNAL VIET CONG LOGISTICS NETWORK . . . . .	65
 MAP. INDOCHINA AREAS	
 MAP. SOUTH VIETNAM: COMMUNIST LOGISTIC SUPPORT	

22 October 1965

SUBJECT: INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS -- SOUTH VIETNAM

THE PROBLEM

The object of this study is to assess the nature and amount of the support being provided to the Communist military forces and the population under Communist control in South Vietnam, including the manner in which supplies and personnel are provided both from inside and from outside South Vietnam by land and by water.

CONCLUSIONS  
(to follow)

*(See following pages)*



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## CONCLUSIONS

A. The most important source of manpower and supplies for the Viet Cong is South Vietnam itself. The Viet Cong have developed an effective logistic system which procures from internal sources almost all the supplies used by the Viet Cong. Important military materiel unavailable locally is obtained from external sources.

B. Within South Vietnam the Viet Cong transportation system and network of supply bases are indispensable to the operations of their forces at anything approaching the present level of military activity. The volume of supplies moving internally and the total stockpile in the supply bases cannot be determined from present evidence.

C. The Viet Cong are increasingly dependent on outside sources for arms and ammunition, certain technical equipment, medical supplies, cadre personnel, and trained technicians. These move into South Vietnam via three principal routes, as follows:

1. The Laotian corridor, which is continuously being improved, is the principal route for the movement of personnel and supplies from

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North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Supplies moved over this route are destined primarily for the northern and central highland areas.

2. The sea route from North Vietnam is probably being used less at this time, although it played an important part in stocking the supply bases in the southern and coastal parts of the country. The use of alternative routes for maintaining stocks of military materiel in these areas has not been detected.

3. Relatively convenient land and water routes from Cambodia provide direct access to the southern part of South Vietnam for the movement of supplies largely commercially procurable in Cambodia. Although there is cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower Cambodian government and military levels, central government policy, while generally favorable to the Viet Cong, stops short of military support.

D. Although it is impossible to compute the total amount of supplies available for infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam, it appears that the daily average thus far during 1965 has been at least 5 tons and may have been more than 8 tons. These amounts, primarily delivered

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by truck in the past dry season, may have been supplemented by additional supplies moved by porters and other means of transport. The additional amounts cannot be quantified. We have also been unable to determine comparable figures for the sea route from North Vietnam and the land and water routes from Cambodia. However, what evidence there is leads to the conclusion that the tonnages moving over these latter routes are significantly less than the tonnage moving through Laos.

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DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL

1. The rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent environment for the infiltration of supplies from adjoining areas and for clandestine movement within the country. South Vietnam is composed of the Mekong Delta, a coastal lowland, and a highland region. (See the map at Annex.) The delta area is interlaced with about 2,500 miles <sup>1/</sup> of navigable canals, rivers, and streams, and more than half of the area is flooded each summer and autumn. The principal streams are 800 to 1,100 feet wide in their upper courses and 2,500 feet to over 1 mile wide in their lower courses. The land adjacent to the streams consists of large areas of marsh and paddy land. Mangrove swamps also line the lower reaches of some rivers.

2. The coastal lowland extending northward from the delta plain varies in width from 5 to 30 miles. In some places, spurs of the highlands encroach on the lowlands and serve as potential avenues of ingress to the interior uplands. Where the highlands extend to the sea, many sheltered landing areas are found between the promontories and the steep rocky islands offshore. Between the coastal lowlands and the Mekong Valley lies the highland region, which extends from just northeast of the Mekong Delta northward into North Vietnam. North of about the 14th Parallel the highlands consist mainly of steep mountain ridges with intervening deep, narrow valleys. The southern part of the highlands, however,

<sup>1/</sup> Mileages are given in statute miles and tonnages in short tons throughout this report.

is a complex of mountain ranges and scattered plateaus. The mountains, some with peaks above 8,000 feet, and the deeply incised parts of the plateaus make surface transportation difficult.

3. The land boundaries of South Vietnam extend more than 900 miles, all of which adjoin Communist-controlled or unfriendly territory. On the east and south, for a distance of about 1,500 miles, the country fronts on the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. The boundary with Cambodia extends about 600 miles northeastward from the Gulf of Siam, about 460 miles of which is in the delta area and is crossed by numerous rivers and streams that can be used as infiltration routes. The remainder of the boundary with Cambodia crosses forested plains and the hilly-to-mountainous western edge of the Annam Mountains. Established vehicular roads cross the Cambodian border in the delta area and in the forested plains north of Saigon, but the Viet Cong can also use trails to cross the border in numerous places. The entire border with Cambodia is an area of tension because of frequent clashes between the forces of both countries. The boundary with Laos continues generally northward for about 300 miles along the crest of the Annam Mountains. Passage across this boundary is generally tortuous; the best trail crossings and the ones apparently used most by the Viet Cong are in the northernmost part, where the border is hilly rather than mountainous. The demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, about 50 miles long, descends the eastern slope of the Annam Mountains and crosses hills and a narrow coastal plain to the South China Sea. The Demilitarized Zone extends 5 kilometers

(about 3 miles) on each side of the demarcation line. An inoperable railroad and a road cross this line, but normal traffic on these routes has been stopped by military outposts on both sides of the border.

4. Within South Vietnam the terrain for the most part enables the Viet Cong to move supplies about quite freely using primitive transport. Most of the population of South Vietnam lives in villages, principally in the Mekong Delta. The few large towns are mainly in the delta and along the coast. Settlements in the delta are built along the banks of rivers and canals. Numerous small inland water craft provide the major share of transport in this area both for the local populace and for the Viet Cong. In the highlands, villages are located in scattered clearings on high ground. A sparse network of mostly one-lane to two-lane bituminous-treated roads links the large settlements and towns. The majority of the settlements, however, are connected by tracks or, at best, by one-lane earth roads or roads that have crushed-stone surfaces. Many villages are linked only by trails. In such terrain the Viet Cong can use porters, bicycles, carts, and occasionally modern vehicles. Poor modern transportation, plus the fact that the Viet Cong can mingle with the local traffic, makes government interception of Viet Cong traffic very difficult.

II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND  
THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Internal Organization

5. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam -- the southern branch of the Communist Party in North Vietnam -- is responsible for the complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort and of providing most of the essential, nonmilitary goods for the Viet Cong organization. Operating through a vertical series of Party committees which exist on almost all geographical levels from village to the Central Office, South Vietnam (COSVN) the Party has attempted to develop internal sources of funds and supplies for the war effort. A wide array of front, Party, and military elements -- under the overall direction of the Party -- implement the principal tasks of production, acquisition, and transportation of supplies. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party, the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military organization, and the various units of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) are the principal instrumentalities in these tasks. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party is the basic economic organization of the Viet Cong and the source of almost all supplies provided internally and some of those provided externally. At the province level and above, each Finance and Economic Section is headed by a policy level Party cadre and includes the chief of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong main force units. It is the responsibility of the various finance and economic units to supervise the economy of Viet Cong-controlled areas, to acquire

the money and goods required by the Viet Cong, and to implement economic programs designed to strengthen Viet Cong economic power and disrupt the economy of South Vietnam.

6. As a principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistics network, the Finance and Economic Section works closely with the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military units and with the various NFLSV organizations. This relationship with the Rear Services provides the Finance and Economic Section with a channel for supplying military units with required goods and for calling upon the military for assistance in meeting economic tasks. A similar relationship exists with the NFLSV organizations. The Finance and Economic Section relies on these organizations to supply civilian manpower for the economic tasks of the Party, and, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian population by supplying the necessary goods.

#### Internal Sources

7. The Viet Cong appear to be largely self-sufficient in regard to almost all nonmilitary supplies. Nonmilitary supplies available to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam are indigenous or imported through legal or illegal trade channels. The Viet Cong have developed a complex system of economic operations devoted to acquiring financial and material resources in South Vietnam for their military effort. Taxation, self-initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations appear to be the principal means of obtaining financial and material support for the Viet Cong.



8. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most important source of financial and material support for the Viet Cong. The US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) has estimated that the Viet Cong collect 50 to 100 million piasters per province annually, or about US \$30 million to \$60 million per year in all of South Vietnam. <sup>2/</sup> There is insufficient evidence to estimate actual tax collections in cash and in kind, but it is known that the Viet Cong impose agricultural, plantation, transportation, and business taxes on a wide scale throughout the country. Although tax payments are probably the major source of local currency, bond drives, monetary issues, and clandestine fund drives also represent significant sources of local currency.

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There is no specific evidence of a Viet Cong shortage of local currency, and in fact there have been unconfirmed reports that the Viet Cong are building a fund surplus to meet the costs of

<sup>2/</sup> This range is intended to be a rough approximation of internally acquired Viet Cong resources. In comparison, central government revenues in 1964 totaled about \$175 million, mainly from indirect taxes and customs duties collected in the Saigon metropolitan area. South Vietnamese piasters were converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 73.5 piasters to US \$1.

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administering additional areas that may come under their control.

9. Agricultural taxation is probably the most important source of Viet Cong tax receipts. During the past crop year the Viet Cong employed progressive tax schedules on agricultural income with as many as 25 separate rates in the Mekong delta region alone. If these rates had been applied only to rice production in Viet Cong-controlled areas of the delta, the collection of rice would have amounted to nearly 100,000 tons, an amount far in excess of Viet Cong requirements in the delta or even on a national basis. <sup>3/</sup> Because equivalent Viet Cong tax rates are applied to other agricultural production in the delta, it is estimated that the Viet Cong collect far in excess of their nationwide requirements for food in the delta alone. In the central part of the country agricultural tax collections cannot be calculated because the tax has not been applied as systematically or as comprehensively as in the Mekong delta area. However, there is little doubt that even in this area the agricultural tax supplies a significant portion of Viet Cong needs for rice, salt, manioc, fish, and other foodstuffs. In addition, in this area the Viet Cong often purchase or confiscate rice and salt.

10. Plantation taxes -- either in money or in kind -- also account

<sup>3/</sup> During January through August, rice deliveries to Saigon from the delta totaled about 650,000 tons in 1963, 440,000 tons in 1964, and 340,000 tons in 1965. It is possible that Viet Cong tax collections account for most of this so-called shortfall of deliveries to Saigon. There have been persistent reports that the Viet Cong are smuggling rice into Cambodia to acquire foreign exchange or otherwise generate funds for their effort. However, the amount of rice actually disposed of through Cambodia is not known.

for a significant portion of Viet Cong tax receipts. Rubber plantations close to War Zones C and D (see map at Annex) provide an important means of supply for Viet Cong forces in these areas; these plantations possess large stocks of rice, medicine, POL, and other supplies and have long been vulnerable to Viet Cong economic pressure. According to a recent captured document, the annual plantation tax is approximately 1,000 piasters (\$13.70) per hectare (2.47 acres) or a total of about \$1 million for the potentially exploitable area of 75,000 hectares if subject to Viet Cong taxation. Wage taxes on plantation workers and Viet Cong demands for labor service for transportation are also known to exist on a wide scale. Most of the internal transportation of the country, both personal and commercial, is also taxed by the Viet Cong, although it is impossible to estimate total receipts in cash and kind from this source. Taxes are also imposed on business establishments and commercial activities whenever possible. Small rice and sugar mills are taxed in areas outside of the control of the government of South Vietnam; woodcutters, charcoal kilns, and sawmills are generally easy prey for the Viet Cong. Import and export taxes are levied against trade between areas controlled by the Viet Cong and areas controlled by the central government in order to provide revenue and to promote a favorable trading pattern for the Viet Cong. Thus the import of medicines, cloth, POL, and printing supplies into areas controlled by the Viet Cong is not taxed at all, but the export of metal from Viet Cong areas is forbidden completely.

11. Despite the considerable financial and material resources available to the Viet Cong through tax collection and other financial

operations such as bond drives, monetary issues, and the use of credit cooperatives, additional economic activities have been initiated to support Viet Cong military personnel and the civilian population under Viet Cong control. For example, major efforts to produce their own foodstuffs, especially rice and manioc, have been made by the Viet Cong in the central highlands. Units to produce clothing have been established as subordinate elements of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military organization. Simple manufacturing units, which produce farm implements for the civilian population, also produce military goods such as mines, and grenades. Where materials are not ordinarily available through other means, they are often seized outright, although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between seizure through force and enforced tax collections. However, the Viet Cong do accumulate significant supplies as war booty, including medicines, communications equipment, foodstuffs, and military equipment.

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14. Military supplies that are moved via North Vietnam usually are transported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam. Until early 1965 the International Control Commission (ICC) observers were permitted to read the manifests but were not permitted to inspect the contents of the freight cars that moved into North Vietnam from China through Dong Dang. After the bombing of North Vietnam began and the

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
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[redacted] were pulled back to Hanoi in early 1965, [redacted]

reported that two military trains per day obviously loaded with many kinds of war materiel moved into North Vietnam. Although this materiel undoubtedly was destined for the forces of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN), supplies for the Viet Cong apparently are taken from PAVN storage areas. Reports are also available indicating that military supplies have been moved from China by junk or small coastal ships to various points along the North Vietnamese coast. Although it is possible that munitions are moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments have been identified. Information on the cargo carried by the 425 foreign merchant ships that called at Haiphong during 1964 is not complete. However, about 175 of the ships were owned by Bloc countries, and a considerable number of the Free World ships calling there were chartered to Bloc countries. Foreign seamen have reported that some merchant ships have unloaded cargo into junks and other small craft before entering the port of Haiphong. Such cargo could have been destined for sea infiltration into South Vietnam, much of which seems to originate in the Haiphong area.



Critical Items of Supply

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16. As mentioned above, the Viet Cong depend on the countryside and on the rural population for most of their food. Viet Cong taxation policy permits payments in rice, manioc, fish, salt, and other food items. Where food is not plentiful, particularly in the mountainous

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areas, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in farming. According to recently captured documents, prior to June 1963 the Viet Cong military units and administrative agencies were directed by COSVN to provide their own subsistence for a period of 4 months per year, with the remaining 8 months of subsistence furnished by COSVN. From June 1963 to June 1964, all units were required to furnish 100 percent of their own subsistence. Since June 1964, combat units have provided 50 percent of their own food and all other units 100 percent. Some reports have indicated that PAVN battalions operating in the northern part of South Vietnam receive some of their rice supplies from external sources.

17. The Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile products, such as hammocks and mosquito nets, are not extensive. Because of the mild climate, clothing is not a major problem. A number of items of clothing used by the Viet Cong, such as khaki uniforms, underwear, winter clothing for the mountain regions, and hammocks, are produced in North Vietnam. For the most part, these items have been issued to infiltrators who generally carry an individual supply of two uniforms, a knapsack, a hammock, and a mosquito net when entering the country. Clothing production units also exist as elements of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military organization. In addition the Viet Cong obtain cloth internally by discreet purchase and externally from Cambodian sources.

18. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the



present level of fighting. Aid stations, hospitals, and rest centers are located within South Vietnam and probably have been located temporarily in Cambodia and Laos from time to time. Approximately 48 of these medical facilities have been identified, some of which are reported to be well-staffed and supplied even with such sophisticated equipment as x-ray machines, laboratory facilities, and dental chairs. One major source of medical supplies is the open market in South Vietnam. With the exception of opiates and barbiturates, most drugs can be purchased without difficulty in pharmacies in the larger cities. Another major source consists of captured South Vietnamese medical supplies. Some Viet Cong military operations have been specifically directed toward obtaining these supplies from hamlets and supply convoys. Finally, medical supplies are procured from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam.

19. North Vietnam in particular appears to be engaged in building up its supplies of pharmaceuticals. North Vietnamese imports of penicillin and blood plasma -- both of which are widely used in treating battle casualties -- have risen sharply in 1965. Although Communist countries have been the predominant suppliers of most pharmaceuticals, Japan has provided virtually all the blood plasma imported by North Vietnam. The actual quantity of pharmaceuticals being shipped from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong is not known. In addition to equipping the PAVN forces now fighting in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese reportedly have used infiltrators to carry small packets of medical

supplies containing such items as penicillin, sulfa drugs, and quinine derivatives to the Viet Cong. Because of the relative ease of transporting pharmaceuticals, it would be possible for North Vietnam to deliver substantial quantities of medical supplies by small coastal vessels and over the land infiltration routes. Once in South Vietnam these supplies presumably would be stored in central areas near base hospitals.

20. Viet Cong requirements for POL products probably are quite small. They have some organic vehicles and self-propelled craft, however, and also power generators and other power-driven equipment for which they need fuel. Taxation of the contents of petroleum tank trucks, outright seizure of petroleum supplies, and discreet purchase from local gasoline stations throughout the country are known methods of acquisition from internal sources.

21. The requirements of the Viet Cong for construction materials are unknown. Simple construction in base areas probably can be accomplished by the use of locally available materials, mainly timber. Although the Viet Cong have been known to seize convoys carrying supplies of cement, their access to other internal and external sources of construction materials is not known.

22. The Viet Cong supply of weapons, explosives, and ammunition has been accumulated from various sources: supplies buried or left behind by retreating government forces in South Vietnam; supplies infiltrated by land and sea; captured supplies; and locally produced supplies. The

available quantities are unknown, but it is evident that substantial quantities of Soviet and Eastern European weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam for use by the Viet Cong. This flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has enabled the Viet Cong to achieve some progress in weapons standardization within main force units. Older weapons are being passed on to guerrilla units. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be on the reloading of ammunition and the fabrication of mines, grenades, and other explosive devices, rather than on the production of rifles and more complicated weapons. Some repair work is also carried on. The majority of the Viet Cong production facilities are located from Viet Cong Military Region VI south to Ca Mau. Annex A contains a list, by country of origin, of the types of Communist-supplied and locally-produced weapons and ammunition captured by central government and US forces from the Viet Cong.

23. Most of the telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong consists of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from the South Vietnamese. The importance of this source of supply has been noted in Viet Cong communications plans and in the North Vietnamese program of training Viet Cong operators in the use of US equipment. The types of radio equipment captured range from handheld, low-power transceivers to relatively large, vehicle-mounted transmitters having power ratings of from 300 to 400 watts. This captured equipment has been augmented to a small extent by comparable equipment of Soviet, Chinese Communist, and

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
Japanese manufacture, and by locally manufactured equipment. Spare parts and batteries are obtained by capture, infiltration, and purchase.

III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved

24. There is a scarcity of information on the overland movement of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam. It is apparent, however, that a major corridor from North Vietnam through Laos serves as a principal means of transporting supplies. Within this corridor, there are at least two distinct land routes. Both of these routes end in the same series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward supply points. From these points in Laos, supplies are moved across the South Vietnamese border by means of porters, bicycles, ox carts, and pack animals.

25. The route from Mu Gia Pass via routes 12/23/9/92 is the higher capacity route. This road network is in part useable only in the dry season for through motor transport, but it can be used during the remainder of the year by a combination of methods. Its maximum use is from about mid-December through May or June to supply the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos and the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Supplies from North Vietnam are trucked in stages along routes 1A and 15 through Mu Gia Pass into Laos and then south on routes 12 and 23 to supply dumps located along routes 23 and 9. <sup>4/</sup>



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Some supplies moving along this route eventually reach Ban Dong at the junction of routes 9 and 92 and then move down route 92 toward the South Vietnamese border. Although route 23 is a very important portion of this supply line, it is a seasonal road on which truck traffic is restricted from about June through November each year because of flooding and ground softening caused by the southwest monsoons. The Communists have nearly finished constructing route 911 as an alternate to parts of routes 23 and 9. When completed this road will reduce the distance from Mu Gia Pass to Sépone (Tchepone) by about one-third.

26. Before the completion of route 23 in 1962, some supplies for the Communist forces in southern Laos were moved by air. During January-June 1963, however, many large truck convoys were observed moving south on route 23. Although some of these trucks probably carried troops and supplies for the southern part of Laos, the remainder of the supplies may have been stockpiled or portered over the trails into the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Again in 1964 large convoys moved during the dry season only. Observation by road-watch teams was so incomplete in both years that it is impossible to estimate with confidence the volume of supplies moved into the area, or to establish the amount of materiel which may have been stockpiled or moved on into South Vietnam. As a result of considerably improved reporting by the road-watch teams during the 1965 dry season, however, it is possible to estimate that the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks

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VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES

Organization Control

68. Internal distribution of infiltrated supplies and transportation of locally procured goods are basic elements of the Viet Cong logistics network. About 14,000 personnel, exclusive of enforced labor, are used on a full-time basis. Viet Cong emphasis on the importance of local self-sufficiency testifies to efforts to reduce the internal logistics task. On the other hand, the existence of known internal logistics operations confirms that the requirements for internal distribution and transportation are substantial.

69. Viet Cong logistics operations are organized at all levels from COSVN to the village Party chapter. At every major echelon of the Party, the Viet Cong have a route protection or communications-liaison section whose mission is to establish, maintain, and supervise safe corridor routes for the flow of men, materiel, and messages. For security reasons, the Viet Cong appear to maintain separate routes for these transport tasks with the organizational subordination of any given task determined by the nature and importance of the task. The route protection and communications-liaison section of the Party exercises a crucial role in approving and safeguarding all types of logistics support operations. An estimated 2,000 or more Party cadre are probably directly associated with the communications-liaison function as guides, security personnel, station attendants, and supervisory personnel. In general, these sections supervise



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the work of the two basic transport organizations -- the Rear Services transport units and the Finance and Economic transport units.

70. Special and organic transport elements directed by the Rear Services are found at all military echelons from COSVN to local (regular) forces. The military elements of COSVN and the Viet Cong military regions control special military transport units which appear to be primarily concerned with the receipt and redistribution of infiltrated supplies. About 5,800 personnel are associated with these special military transport units subject to region or Central Office level control, according to MACV. In addition, every military echelon of the main and local forces has an organic transport element under its Rear Services to provide logistic support for its military and non-military requirements. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 personnel are associated with these organic transport units.

71. The second basic element involved in internal distribution and transport consists of the transport units of the Finance and Economic Section of the Party. These transport units appear to be generally responsible for transferring goods acquired locally to depots established within their area. In most cases, it is believed that the organized transport element of the Finance and Economic element is relatively small and is primarily responsible for recruiting local civilian personnel to accomplish movement of supplies. In some cases, however, where the movement of civilian-type goods is substantial, nonmilitary transport units have been permanently established under the Finance and

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Economic Section. About 2,000 personnel are probably permanently associated with transport elements of the Finance and Economic Section.

Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas

72. Personnel, infiltrators, and supplies acquired from both internal and external sources are moved over a fairly well-established network of protected routes within the Viet Cong-controlled areas of South Vietnam. The network includes an interconnected system of depots and way stations all the way from Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces in the north to the Ca Mau peninsula in the south. There are two roughly parallel north-south corridors, one of which closely follows the western border of the country and is used mainly for personnel. The other corridor is located nearly midway between the coast and the western border and extends from the highland region above the Do Xa base area to War Zone D northeast of Saigon. It is probably used for both personnel and materiel. These two corridors have several lateral routes leading east and west to and from infiltration points along the coast and the Laos and Cambodian borders. Both internal main corridors connect with COSVN base areas in Tay Ninh Province north of Saigon. Here COSVN apparently maintains the principal agency for coordinating operations over the entire system. This has been identified as the Postal Transportation and Communication Branch. The Tay Ninh base in turn forms the principal connection with at least three other corridors including the remainder of the network which forms a loop within the Mekong delta region. See the map at Annex for location of the Viet Cong war zones, storage areas, and main redistribution corridors, and Annex D for organizational chart.

73. Study of the routes, when plotted in detail on a map, shows that this logistic network relies heavily on overland movement and that the principal motorable roads are generally not used. Principal waterways are used, however, in the delta region and several land routes follow streams (probably for guidance at night). It is also noted that a major portion of the network is located at or near provincial boundaries where South Vietnamese surveillance may be least effective. Comparison of this network with a map of the current status of pacification shows that a considerable part of the transport system runs through unsecured territory which may be controlled by the South Vietnamese in the daytime but is used by the Viet Cong at night when most of their supply movements take place.

74. Supply depots which would normally have a nominal capacity of from 5 to 10 tons of supplies each are sometimes connected with the way stations and are controlled by the appropriate logistic organization. Although classes of supplies in these depots are usually mixed, some contain only weapons and ammunition, and some handle food exclusively. A typical depot may be described as consisting of a small cluster of huts or shelters surrounded by a security fence and occasionally an automatic weapons emplacement, all well concealed under foliage. A minimum of traffic is allowed at the depot, deliveries by transport units being made at some distance from the depot with final haul and storage made by the depot cadre. According to Viet Cong documents, supplies are moved in stages and handled through as many depots as necessary to insure their security and to build up a reserve for support of an engagement by Viet

Cong forces. In 1963, when Viet Cong forces in the central highlands were considerably smaller than at present, food depots were limited to a maximum of 5 tons because of the threat of South Vietnamese government action. Although the size of these depots has probably been increased, the fragmentation of storage areas is a basic constraint on the rapid initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions.

75. Because the communications-liaison routes often run across open country or over back roads and the Viet Cong do not possess any sizeable inventory of motor trucks, much of the shipment of supplies is handled by teams of porters provided by the local village and district Viet Cong organizations. Other forms of transport have also been utilized in significant amounts in the lowlands and in the delta region, including trains of oxcarts, river and coastal water craft, "hired" three-wheeler Lambretta-type motorcycle carriers, and occasionally commandeered cargo trucks. Movements by the transport units are secured by route protection forces usually assigned from local guerrilla units. These security troops may conduct raids near the routes as a diversion to screen movements of supplies over more exposed sectors.

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ANNEX A

TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION  
CAPTURED FROM THE VIET CONG  
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

1. Communist China

a. Weapons:

- 7.62-mm Pistol, Model 54
- 7.62-mm Semi-automatic carbine, Model 56 (copy of Soviet SKS)
- 7.62-mm Carbine, Model 53 (copy of Soviet M44)
- 7.62-mm Assault rifle, Model 56 (copy of Soviet AK)
- 7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 50
- 7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model K50
- 7.62-mm Sub-machinegun (copy of Soviet PPSH) VC modified
- 7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 53 (copy of Soviet DP)
- 7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPD)
- 7.62-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 58 (copy of Soviet GORYUNOV)
- 7.92-mm Light machinegun (copy of BRNO)
- 7.92-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 24 (copy of Soviet MAXIM)
- 12.7-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 54 (copy of Soviet DShK)
- 40-mm Grenade launcher, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPG-2)
- 57-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 36
- 75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 52 (copy of US M20)
- 75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 56
- Flame thrower (tentatively CHICOM)

60-mm Mortar, Model 31

82-mm Mortar

90-mm AT Rocket launcher, Model 51

b. Ammunition:

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 50

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 53

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 56

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model L

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model API B32

7.92-mm Cartridge

12.7-mm Cartridge

40-mm Grenade, PG-2

60-mm Shell, mortar

82-mm Shell, mortar

75-mm Shell, Recoilless gun

2. USSR

a. Weapons:

7.62-mm Carbine, Model M44

7.62-mm Rifle, Model M1891

7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model PPSH 41

7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model RP46

23-mm Cannon

b. Ammunition:

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P

7.62-mm Cartridge, API, Model B-32

3. Czechoslovakia

a. Weapons:

7.65-mm Pistol, Model M1927, N B46

b. Ammunition (sample of each type exploited):

7.92-mm Cartridge, rifle

7.92-mm Cartridge, Mauser

4. Viet Cong-Produced Materiel

a. Weapons and Explosive Devices:

Skyhorse (VC-Type Bazooka)

Grenade launcher

AA Machinegun (modified from US .50-caliber MG)

AT Parachute hand grenade

Bicycle mine

Mine delay firing device

Shaped charge (2 types)

Shaped mine, short cone type

Hollow cone mine, non-electric

AP mine, cylindrical type

AP fragmentation grenades (2 types)

AT mine, cast iron fragmentation



AT mine (constructed from British 100-mm mortar shell)

AT mine, iron case, cylindrical

AT mine, wooden, box type

Mine, turtle shaped, cement

Mine, turtle shaped, sheet metal

Mine, betel box shaped, cement

Mine, round volume type, sheet metal

Mine, round mound type, cement

Mine, 81-mm mortar container

Fixed directional fragmentation mine, Model DH-10

Incendiary grenade, sodium

Chemical firing device

AP mine, match box size

Antenna detonating device

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ANNEX C

METHODS OF PACKAGING AND  
TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES

1. Supplies are packaged in boxes, crates, bags, or other means normally used for market transactions or in sizes, shapes, and weights that can be handled by one porter. Listed below are some of the methods used:

- a. Rice in 220-pound fiber bags or sacks.
- b. Rice in 22-pound to 33-pound tubular cloth sacks carried over the shoulder or across the back.
- c. Salt in bags or sacks.
- d. Ammunition in squared, wooden boxes or cases, about 50 pounds each.
- e. Shoulder weapons wrapped in oil soaked rags or waterproof paper.
- f. Fuel in standard barrels or in cans of about 5 gallons each.
- g. Fish in cans or dried and salted in sacks.
- h. Meat, usually dried, in sacks.
- i. Clothing in sacks.
- j. Medicines in bottles or syrettes, in sizes that can be concealed on a person.
- k. Chemicals: saltpeter in 220-pound units; sulphur in 110-pound to 220-pound units; acid in less than one-quart bottles; mercury in containers weighing about 22 pounds.

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2. Transportation methods vary but are generally as follows:
  - a. By vehicles -- car or truck.
  - b. By human porters with 40-pound to 60-pound loads in back packs or shoulder poles, traveling in teams of 10 to 100 men.
  - c. Single or dual bicycles with up to 500-pound loads, traveling in teams of up to 30 men.
  - d. Horses and mules (seldom reported) with loads of 150 to 300 pounds.
  - e. Elephants with loads of 800 pounds.
  - f. Bull carts with 1,500 pounds.
  - g. Sampans with up to 1,500 pounds.
  - h. Motor carts (3-wheel) with 500 pounds.
  - i. Junks and oceangoing ships.

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