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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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Memorandum for Holders-1
USIB-D-28.1/20
9 March 1976
Limited Distribution

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-28.1/20

SUBJECT : Indications and Warning, Korea

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-28.1/20, 27 February 1976,
Limited Distribution, and Attachment V
circulated to USIB Principals as

b. USIB-M-717, 4 March 1976, Item 1

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The attached report is forwarded as a replacement to reference a., which was amended on the basis of Board discussion at its meeting of 4 March. The recommendations were either approved or endorsed by the Board as appropriate to the subject matter. The reference report as well as Attachment V should be destroyed in accordance with current security regulations.



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Executive Secretary

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Attachment



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Attachment
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USIB STUDY GROUP

US CAPABILITIES TO WARN OF A NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

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1. Visit Synopsis and Persons Contacted
2. Tactical Warning Systems
3. Communications: PACOM Intelligence Watch
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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 8 January 1976, the Director of Central Intelligence requested that the Director, DIA, in his role as J-2 of the Joint Staff, organize a review group representing the USIB agencies for the purpose of assessing the Korean Indications and Warning problem. The review group visited the Pacific and Korean commands from 28 January to 7 February.

The principal conclusions of the review group are summarized as follows:

- North Korea will attempt to suppress indications of an attack to achieve surprise;
- In event of a North Korean decision to attack, there would be detectable anomalies in North Korean activity 
- These anomalies would be limited, and the all-source data base against which to measure the anomalies is deficient;
- Analysis and interpretation of the anomalies would not reach a point to support warning of probable attack until about H minus 

The review group then makes a series of recommendations to improve the all-source data base and the Indications and Warning posture. The report concludes by noting that the recommendations, if effected, would not necessarily afford additional warning time, but would increase the confidence with which the intelligence community could offer its existing estimate of warning time available.



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