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USSR REPORT
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ARMED FORCES

UDC 621.37/.39

EXCERPTS FROM BOOK ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Moscow RADIOELEKTRONNAYA BOR'BA (SREDSTVA I SPOSOBY PODAVLENIYA I ZASHCHITY RADIOELEKTRONNYKH SISTEM) in Russian 1981 (signed to press 10 Sep 81) pp 1-8, 152-153, 228, 316-320

[Annotation, table of contents, introduction, excerpts from parts I, II and III, and bibliography from book "Electronic Warfare (Means and Methods of Jamming and Protecting Radio Electronic Systems)", by Aleksandr Ignat'yevich Paliy, Order of Labor Red Banner USSR Ministry of Defense Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 20,000 copies, 320 pages; passages in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] The book generalizes material from open Soviet and foreign literature on means and methods of communications jamming and protection of radio electronic systems, illustrated with examples of combat actions by armies of capitalist states in Vietnam and the Near East.

The book is intended for Soviet Army and Navy officers.

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Introduction

After means of radio communications were introduced into the Army and Navy in the early 20th century, signal intelligence and communications jamming began to be employed. Subsequently new methods and technology were developed for intercepting and jamming radar, radio navigation, radio communications (including radio relay) as well as other radiotechnical equipment. Later the jamming of electro-optics and sonar began to be employed. Measures were

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developed simultaneously for ensuring the security of electronic equipment against signal intelligence and for preserving its working capacity under the effects of intentional jamming and homing weapons. Genuine engagements developed in the field of electronics, which were called electronic warfare (some foreign armies specifically use the term warfare). Use of EW means helped achieve success in combat operations on the land, in the air and at sea.

Electronic equipment (RES), which includes apparatus for radio communications, radar, radio remote control, radio navigation, radio telemetry, television, electro-optics and sonar equipment, allows the accomplishment of diverse missions in intelligence and control of forces and means of armed conflict. The detection, identification and determination of coordinates of targets, guiding weapons to them, the collection and processing of data on the enemy, navigation support to combatants, aircraft and spacecraft, and the transmission of orders, instructions, reports and other information needed for activities of the armed forces is a far from complete list of the capabilities of electronic equipment. Electronic gear has become the most important component of many kinds of weaponry, military equipment and automated reconnaissance and control systems. It considerably increased the efficiency and reliability of controlling troops, naval forces* and weapons and increased the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the means of armed warfare.

The stability with which the RES functions has a substantial influence on the effectiveness of reconnaissance, command and control and weapons control. This is why all armies of capitalist states are intensively developing and perfecting technology and methods of combating enemy RES and ensuring stability in the operation of similar means of their own armed forces. As an analysis of the foreign press shows, electronic warfare (REB) is taken to mean a system of measures and actions by troops (forces) for the use of special electronic equipment, and tactical and technical procedures for the detection and jamming of enemy electronic equipment and command and control and weapons control systems, and for protecting similar equipment and systems of friendly troops (forces) against enemy jamming. According to official views of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) command element, and the United States and the FRG above all, its component parts are: electronic countermeasures, electronic security and measures for their support.

/Electronic countermeasures/ (REP) consist of the measures and actions conducted by troops (forces) in combat and in an operation to disorganize or reduce the operating effectiveness of enemy electronic systems and equipment by acting on them with electromagnetic or acoustic emissions. REP includes the creation of active and passive electronic jamming, the use of radar, infrared (thermal) and sonar decoys, acting on the environment of the propagation of electromagnetic (acoustic) waves, and radio deception.

Various weapons are used in combination with the REP equipment for neutralizing RES.

*Subsequently "naval forces" are called "forces" for short (editor's note).

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/Electronic security/ (REZ) represents the aggregate of methods and means assuring stable operation of RES under conditions of pressure by means of REP and special enemy homing weapons. It is achieved by concealing RES emissions from signal intelligence, by protection against electronic jamming and destruction by homing weapons, and by training crews to operate under ECM conditions.

/REB support measures/ provide for collecting data on enemy RES, target designation for REP equipment, and warning friendly troops when they are being illuminated by electronic equipment and about enemy use of communications jamming and use of weapons homing on RES. Signal intelligence--a form of military intelligence conducted by means of the detection, interception and analysis of electromagnetic emissions and determination of the location of RES--is considered to be the primary element of REB support. Information collected by signal intelligence is used in analyzing the enemy grouping and actions as well as in organizing and conducting electronic warfare.

The idea of the possibility of combating electronic equipment was expressed for the first time by the inventor of radio--the Russian scientist, Professor A. S. Popov. In a memorandum to the Russian military department in 1903 he expressed the idea of the possibility of performing reconnaissance and creating radio interference for means of radio communications, and he suggested measures for protecting such means against reconnaissance and jamming. In 1935-1936, when the first Soviet models of radars were being tested, one of their creators, Professor A. M. Bonch-Bruyevich, pointed out the need to combat radio jamming and to develop radio countercountermeasures.

The first instances of the performance of signal intelligence and communications jamming were noted in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War. For example, during the Battle of Tsushima the commanders of the cruiser "Izumrud" and the destroyer "Gromkiy" ordered the jamming of radio communications of the Japanese ships. Signal intelligence and communications jamming saw further development during World War I and especially during World War II, and later in the largest local wars unleashed by imperialist states in Korea, Vietnam and the Near East.

During World War II, beginning with the summer of 1943 British and American bomber aviation successfully created passive and active jamming of gun laying radars of fascist Germany's air defense system. Radio deception was conducted during combat operations. Air and artillery strikes were delivered against radar posts and communications centers. The use of communications jamming led to a reduction in effectiveness of German AAA fire. For example, an average of some 3,000 rounds would be expended by AAA to destroy a bomber under conditions of jamming, and only 600-800 rounds in the absence of jamming.

During the postwar years scientific research in developing new REB equipment was expanded continuously in developed capitalist countries. In 1950-1952 special commissions for scientific research in the field of creating REB equipment were set up in the United States and Great Britain. The commissions drew up recommendations on the further development of REB equipment and methods of its use and proposed methods for evaluating its effectiveness on

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the basis of an analysis of the experience of combat employment of jamming equipment during World War II.

In 1953 the United States adopted a special REP equipment development program--QRC (quick reaction capability) program. In the opinion of the developers of this program, electronic jamming equipment differs from other electronic equipment above all by the fact that it has to have the capability of a quick reaction to a change in characteristics of the RES being jammed. It was believed that in comparison with means of destruction, the REP equipment and methods of its use change faster. In the 1950's the United States determined the role and place of REP equipment in the armed forces and developed the basic principles for organizing a system of this equipment as well as tactics of its use.

During the wars in Vietnam and the Near East the air force, ground forces and naval forces employed active and passive jamming of radars, radios and the homing heads of surface-to-air missiles. It was then that they began to employ antiradiation missiles for the destruction of radars, and decoys for deceiving the operators of these radars. Technical means and methods of protecting RES against jamming and the destruction by homing missiles also were employed.

According to foreign press statements, the capabilities and role of electronic countermeasures and electronic security are growing even more at the present time in connection with an increase in the scope of use of RES in the armed forces. The imperialist states have created ground-based, airborne, shipborne and space signal intelligence systems which continuously intercept and analyze electromagnetic and acoustic emissions and determine the location of their sources. The means and methods of REB are developed or improved with consideration of the data collected.

Thus a continuous struggle is going on in the world between the means and methods of electronic countermeasures and electronic security. Examples of the use of means of REB in combat operations are described in the book based on the experience of local wars and exercises conducted in armies of the capitalist states. Only publications from foreign sources were used in writing chapters 3, 6-8 and 11-14.

Part I - Electronic Countermeasures and Destruction of Electronic Equipment

As shown by the experience of local wars unleashed by imperialist states in Southeast Asia and the Near East, electronic equipment was destroyed or jammed basically by homing missiles and means of REP. Destruction of RES also was accomplished by aviation, artillery and reconnaissance-sabotage subunits. Missiles homing on sources of electromagnetic emissions are considered to be the most effective means of destroying RES.

Electronic countermeasures are conducted by creating electronic jamming, by using false targets and decoys, by changing the electrical properties of the environment (in which electromagnetic and acoustic waves are propagated), by reducing the radar, optical, thermal and acoustic contrast (visibility) of military equipment and objects, and by radio deception.

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Part II - Electronic Countercountermeasures

Chapter 9 - Electronic Countercountermeasures Against Intentional Communications Jamming

9.1. Basic Concepts and Definitions

Protection of RES against intentional and unintentional electronic jamming is achieved by using technical means for ensuring noise stability and by the accomplishment of organizational measures [1, 4, 5, 12, 18]. Noise stability (PU) characterizes the capability of electronic equipment and systems to operate with the requisite quality under the effect of interference. It is evaluated by the probability that the RES (system) will perform missions under conditions of intentional and unintentional jamming. For example, the PU of a radar often is characterized by the probability of correct detection of signals reflected from targets. The demands on PU are distinguished by great diversity depending on permissible distortion of the signals (data) being received. For example, in some data transmission systems using EVM [electronic computers], a distortion of no more than one character per million transmitted is permitted, while a radar sometimes can perform its functions with a loss of up to 40 percent of the signals reflected from the targets.

The accuracy with which a signal is reproduced at the receiving location under conditions of jamming or the signal-to-noise ratio often are taken as a quantitative measure of PU. This means the minimum signal-to-noise ratio at the input of the receiver's linear part which provides a given quality of reception of the data (signals). The less the signal-to-noise ratio required for operation of RES with the necessary quality, the greater its PU with all other conditions being equal. In addition, the PU can be evaluated by the probabilities of a false alarm and missing a target, by mistakes in transmission of sampled data, and so on.

As shown in information theory, all methods of providing the requisite PU are based on obtaining redundancy in the message being transmitted, i.e., on increasing signal volume V_c by increasing duration τ_c (transmission time), signal bandwidth Δf_c and the signal-to-noise ratio. This provision of information theory is described by the expression $V_c = \tau_c \Delta f_c \log_2 \left(\frac{P_c}{P_n} \right)$.

It is not only the PU of electronic equipment and systems that are distinguished, but also the PU of their individual elements--receivers, range meters and so on. Noise stability is provided by using technical methods and means of protection against jamming, accomplished in designing the RES, and by performing organizational measures during operation.

Part III - Electronic Warfare in Combat Operations

The armed forces of capitalist states have special EW units, subunits, aircraft and ships for jamming RES in combat operations, outfitted with signal intelligence equipment, equipment for active and passive electronic jamming, antiradar missiles, devices for using decoys, and means of radar, thermal and

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optical camouflage. During combat operations the protection of RES against electronic jamming is assured by organizational measures and by use of technical devices for protection against jamming. In addition, missile systems, field artillery, aviation and naval forces are employed for the destruction of electronic objects [26, 27, 28, 29].

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BOOK EXCERPTS: TRAINING FOR MODERN BATTLE

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[Table of contents, annotation, introduction, conclusion; and excerpts as indicated from the book "Man in Modern Battle", by G. V. Sredin, D. A. Volkogonov, and M. P. Korobeynikov, Voennoye Izdatel'stvo, 35,000 copies, 254 pages; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

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Annotation

The book examines the theoretical bases and methods for the moral-political and psychological training of the Soviet servicemen. The authors analyze experience in this work and show the broad complex of ways for its improvement with consideration of the contemporary level of development of military affairs.

The book is intended for commanders, political officers, and teachers of the higher military educational institutions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Introduction

A special feature of the contemporary era consists of the intensification of the influence of real socialism on the entire course of world development. The further strengthening of the socialist commonwealth's positions is continuing. The sphere of imperialist dominance in the world has narrowed. Internal contradictions in the countries of capital and competition between them have become aggravated.

As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the difficulties which capitalism is experiencing also influence its policy, including foreign policy. The struggle around the basic questions of the capitalist countries' foreign-policy course has become intensified. Recently, the enemies of detente, arms limitations, and improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have become noticeably more active."¹ Imperialism's aggressive nature and, first of all, American, has increased sharply.

The CPSU and the Soviet state are opposing imperialism's dangerous intrigues with firmness and self-restraint and a consistent, constructive policy of peaceful co-existence, mutually advantageous and equitable collaboration, and the decisive defense of the vital interests of the peoples. In the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put forth new, cardinal ideas and important, constructive suggestions in the field of foreign policy. They are the organic continuation and development of the historic Peace Program which was proclaimed by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses as applicable to the most urgent problems of international life. It is a Peace Program for the 80's. At the same time, considering imperialism's increased aggressiveness, the Soviet Union has been forced to concern itself with the strengthening of its defensive capability and the improvement of its Armed Forces.

V. I. Lenin's instruction that any revolution is worth something only if it is able to defend itself² remains exceptionally timely for our time, too. Lenin's scientific substantiation of the objective necessity for the armed defense of the socialist fatherland comprises an important part of the theory of socialist revolution, for there has not yet been a case in world history where the exploiter class, having lost power, would not try to regain it by force. That's how it was in the past, and that is how matters stand even now. "The experience of the revolutionary movement of recent years," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "has shown graphically: if a real threat to the domination of monopolistic capital and its political henchmen arises, imperialism will stop at nothing, rejecting any appearance of democracy whatever."³

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The entire history of the struggle for socialism proves convincingly that the victory of the socialist revolution and its achievements require reliable guarding against the encroachments of imperialist reaction. As historic experience shows, possible errors, omissions, and miscalculations in this field are fraught with serious consequences. In characterizing the content of the regularity of the defense of the socialist revolution's achievements and its attainments, a number of important aspects can be noted.

First. Armed revolutionary violence as a responsive measure in regard to counter-revolution and imperialist aggressors is completely and historically justified, proper, and necessary. Violence never was an ideal of socialism. The working masses have recourse to it only as a forced, responsive measure necessary to defend their fundamental class interests and uphold freedom and independence. Therefore, the fantasies which bourgeois propagandists are spreading to the effect that a striving for violence allegedly is inherent in socialism only plays the role of covering the military circles' own aggressive preparations.

Second. The armed defense of socialism is not exclusively the domain of military affairs. It is connected with all spheres of public life: politics, economics, ideology, science, and culture. The Soviet people, having built a developed socialist society, created all the necessary material and spiritual preconditions for the maintenance of the combat might of the Armed Forces at the level of contemporary requirements. This became possible thanks to the big successes of our state in the field of economics, science, education and indoctrination of the Soviet people, and the steady improvement of military organizational development.

Third. The defense of socialism bears a clearly expressed international nature. In all the wars which were imposed on our people by imperialism, and especially in the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces, in defending their fatherland, also accomplished a liberation, international mission. And now, when newer and newer countries have set forth on the path of building socialism, class solidarity in ensuring the security of creating a new life acquires special significance.

Fourth. As long as imperialism exists, the necessity to protect socialism will be preserved. Aggressive imperialist forces are whipping up the arms race, which represents a serious threat to the peace and security of peoples, and are trying in every possible way to prevent the relaxation of tension. The CPSU proceeds from the Lenin principle that peace "will move the matter forward an infinite number of times better than war...."⁴ Therefore, the struggle for the confirmation of the principle of peaceful coexistence in the practice of international relations is not only an objectively desirable form of mutual relations of states with different social systems, but also an important method for blocking the main reason of contemporary wars which is rooted in the aggressive essence of imperialism.

It is known that the Soviet Armed Forces now have no domestic function, which is reflected in the CPSU Program. In a developed socialist society where a high level of socio-political unity of the people has been attained, there are no social forces against which the employment of the army would be necessary.

The external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has become even more multifaceted. It is accomplished in two main directions.

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The first of them reflects the necessity for the reliable defense of the socialist fatherland as well as of the entire socialist commonwealth. This is attained by the maintenance of constant combat readiness to repel a possible attack by any aggressor and to stop the provocative attacks on the part of militaristic forces. "A strong alloy of high technical equipping, military skill, and invincible morale--such is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress.⁵

It is important to stress that our Armed Forces ensure favorable external conditions for the building of socialism and communism in the closest collaboration with the armies of the fraternal countries within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Another expression of the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces consists of the fact that they are a powerful factor in the security of all peoples and the prevention of a new world war.

After World War II, imperialism created many centers of tension, conflicts, and local wars. It repeatedly brought the world up to the dangerous line of a big military conflagration but, considering the might of the socialist commonwealth and its resolve to defend peace, it was forced to withdraw. Now, operating from a position of strength, it is all the more difficult for imperialism to dictate its will to peoples and unleash war with impunity. A paradox appears in ever greater relief: the military capabilities of imperialism's aggressive blocs are increasing, and their ability to attain their political goals with the use of military force is decreasing. This is the direct consequence of the objective changes in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism and the intensification of the role of socialist armed forces as the guarantee of peace and international stability.

In implementing the majestic plans of communist creation the Soviet Union, at the same time, is devoting the necessary attention to strengthening the country's defensive capability. "...If they force us," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "we will find a rapid and effective response to any challenge of militant imperialism."⁶

The contemporary situation imposes special demands not only on the technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also on the ideological maturity and moral-political qualities of the personnel. Ever greater significance is being attached to the spiritual factor under contemporary conditions. The morale of the people and the army has not played such an active role in the solution of the problem of war and peace in any era as it does now.

Instilling lofty moral-political and psychological qualities in the personnel is one of the main directions in raising the level of combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The strengthening of the role of moral-political and psychological training now is caused by a number of factors.

The improvement in the means of conflict causes a change in the procedures and methods for the conduct of war. The increase in the scope of combat operations, their dynamism, changeability in the situation, the lack of sufficient and checked information about the combat situation, interruptions in control, the constant threat of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, exhaustion, and wearing down

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of the troops, the necessity to restore their combat effectiveness and organs of control, and other conditions of contemporary battle require of the men mobility of thought, independence, self-control, endurance, steadfastness, activity, selflessness, and other qualities. Moral-political and psychological training is aimed at their formation.

The general-educational, technical, and cultural level of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces has now grown significantly. This requires the introduction of certain adjustments in the forms and methods of work with the men and the scientific organization of moral-political and psychological training. Considerable experience on these problems has been accumulated in the Armed Forces. Supported by the basic provisions of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the CPSU, commanders, political officers, and party organizations are improving the process of the personnel's moral-political tempering. Many scientific recommendations are being introduced successfully into troop practice, which leads to an increase in the combat readiness and combat capability of the units and subunits. The main goal of this book is to further the improvement of the process of moral-political and psychological training of the men for actions under conditions of contemporary war.

Chapter I. The Spiritual Factor and its Role in Modern War

The spiritual factor has always played a tremendous role in the course and outcome of war, but now its significance is great as never before. This is explained by the ever increasing scope of the ideological antagonism of two social systems and the special features of contemporary war. "Our party," noted L. I. Brezhnev, "proceeds from the Lenin teaching that however great may be the technical equipping of the army, man, who has mastered the equipment to perfection, remains the main and decisive force in war. This is especially important now, in the age of nuclear missiles, when the fate of the war will be decided by people who have mastered weapons and combat equipment, are morally and physically tempered, and are boundlessly devoted to their motherland, the party, and the people."⁷

The significance of the spiritual factor in war, its essence, structure, and functions can be disclosed and understood correctly only on the basis of the basic provision of Marxism-Leninism concerning the most important role of social existence with respect to public consciousness which possesses relative independence and is able to exert an active influence on the course of social processes.

An analysis of the spiritual factor and its manifestations and role in war presumes the elucidation of the nature and political content of a specific war. Without this, it is impossible to see the socio-political direction of the spiritual factor for each of the warring sides. "The social nature of war," wrote V. I. Lenin, "and its true significance are determined...by /what policy/ the war continues ('war is the continuation of politics') and /what class/ is waging the war for what goals."⁸ The reasons, goals, and nature of a specific war directly cause the content and manifestation of the spiritual factor in war. A just war expands the spiritual possibilities of the fighting masses and, conversely, an unjust war limits and reduces them.

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Chapter II. Social Consciousness as an Object of Moral-Political and Psychological Training

The system of ideological indoctrination which exists in a socialist society proceeds from the necessity to so change and develop social and individual consciousness that communist world-outlook lines and the spiritual direction which characterizes the new man dominate in it. Our party's activity in this field is determined by the most important Lenin proposition that "the development of the consciousness of the masses remains, as always, the basis and main content of all our work."⁹ In the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work," it is stressed that its goals are "the indoctrination of all workers in a spirit of high ideological content and devotion to the socialist motherland and the cause of communism, a communist attitude toward work and public property, completely overcoming vestiges of bourgeois views and morals, the comprehensive and harmonic development of the personality, and the creation of genuine wealth of spiritual culture."¹⁰

Under conditions of the Armed Forces questions of the formation and development of a social and individual consciousness have special significance. It is not difficult to imagine how tremendous would be the spiritual loads and moral and psychological strain which would come down on the consciousness of a person in case of war. And if a situation of constant mortal danger, uncertainty, dynamism of the situation, and the uncompromising nature of the struggle require of a person, the collective and society the maximum straining of all spiritual strength in order to hold out in this competition and win, then both social and individual consciousness should be ready for this ahead of time. Therefore, it is important to have good knowledge of the structure, content, and regular laws in the forming of social consciousness--the main objective of the moral-political and psychological training of the troops.

Social consciousness is derivative and secondary from social existence. They do not oppose each other, but always step forth in dialectical unity. In stressing that social existence is primary and social consciousness is secondary, the classicists of Marxism thereby solved a basic question of philosophy as applicable to society. Social existence and its central, main part--productive relations, step forth as the basis for social consciousness. "Just as a person's knowledge reflects existing nature irrespective of him, that is, developing matter, so does the /social knowledge/ of a person (that is, different views and philosophical, religious, political, and other teachings) reflect the /economic system/ of society."¹¹ The specific condition of social existence of any historical era also finds its reflection in the corresponding social consciousness.

Social consciousness is the totality of the ideas, views, and concepts which exist in society in a given era and in which social reality is reflected. It comes forth as an integral spiritual system which expresses the most essential features inherent in a specific social system and material base. Corresponding to a developed socialist society and a state of the entire people is a specific qualitative state of spiritual culture, the most important part of which is socialist social consciousness. Certain types of social consciousness are inherent in each era and in each social system.

Ordinary consciousness is the synthesis of the knowledge of people which is acquired in the process of production and other experience and of social psychology.

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Empirical experience is accumulated over the duration of the millenia of human civilization in the course of man's struggle with nature and social forces, and as a result of the formation of a specific tenor and way of life. This experience was passed down from generation to generation in the form of traditions, morals, customs and views on various spheres of human activity and phenomena of social life which have been formed.

In the military field special significance was had and is had by past wars and the experience of enduring difficulties and overcoming dangers and burdens of field and campaign life. Of course, much of past military experience is gradually losing its significance because of the ever more decisive intrusion of the achievements and recommendations of science, new experience, and new, more improved knowledge into practice.

Political consciousness occupies a special place in the structure of social consciousness, for the systematized theoretical expression of the fundamental interests of specific classes and their goals and means of attainment is accomplished with its help. The provisions of political ideology are the most important tool in the struggle for power, its formation, and its strengthening. Political ideology is expressed in the form of party and state documents, political concepts, programs, platforms, plans, and declarations. In the society of developed socialism, political ideology is expressed in its most brilliant form in Marxist-Leninist teaching, our party's Program and Regulation, the Soviet constitution, and the decisions of the CPSU and the plenums of its Central Committee. The entire meaning and entire content of communist ideology are connected with serving the working people and their interests, requirements, and needs. The political form of social consciousness of a developed socialist society is characterized by a high degree of maturity, class wisdom, and an understanding of historic responsibility.

Political consciousness is expressed not only in ideological form, but also in psychological refinements: class feeling, social attitudes, spiritual atmosphere, revolutionary enthusiasm, and so forth. Class interests and requirements also step forth as the basis of the formation of socio-psychological elements of political consciousness. The working masses are capable of comprehending them in full measure and expressing them scientifically only in revolutionary theory--the teaching of Marxism-Leninism which opens up historical perspective for them, arms them with goals and the ideological means of conflict, and rallies the masses with their vanguard at the head--the communist parties. The political consciousness of bourgeois society reflects basically the class interests of the predominant, exploiter social forces and ideologically provides the appearance of legality of existing inequality, injustice, and social oppression.

The military content of political consciousness in a socialist society is expressed in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and the defense of the socialist fatherland, and in military doctrine, the principles of military organizational development, and the theory of party-political work in the Armed Forces. The assimilation and realization of their provisions in practice have tremendous significance for ensuring the security of our state and raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and the ideological indoctrination of the personnel.

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Legal consciousness reflects the will of the ruling class, which has been raised to a law, in the spiritual sphere. The political superstructure always includes a certain system of juridical standards which have been established by the state. People's realization of the essence of law and order and the understanding of the legal and illegal, just and unjust, should and must comprise the content of people's legal consciousness.

Moral consciousness reflects the moral interrelations of people. It exists in the form of moral standards, principles, aesthetic categories of good and evil, duty, honor, conscience, dignity, bravery, heroism and so forth which have been formed. The relation of society, class, and specific people to the interests of the motherland, the people, the collective, the family, and their own obligations is expressed in ethical categories. Society imposes moral requirements primarily in the form of public opinion, rules and standards of conduct, and socialist customs which have been formed.

Aesthetic consciousness is an artistic, figurative view of the world. The developed personality relates to the surrounding world not only with utilitarian yardsticks, but also with aesthetic ones for, in his social essence, man is capable not simply of producing material good, but also of creating, "he also forms materials according to the laws of beauty."¹² Art, as the most important manifestation of the aesthetic, not only accomplishes the function of satisfaction with the beautiful and the elevated, but it also creates a creative, constructive, and innovational element in the consciousness. At the same time, art performs political and moral-pedagogical functions, expressing in artistic forms one's attitude toward reality, social processes, and social existence. The role of art does not presume only copying reality and creating pale shadows of real life. Art reflects life from the viewpoint of the interests of various classes.

Religious consciousness, which still also occurs in a socialist society, is the fantastic reflection of reality which has been engendered by certain social reasons. The basis of religious consciousness is formed by faith in supernatural forces and submission to the Most High's will. Its origin is connected, in the social plane, primarily with the weakness of people when facing nature and the blind forces of social existence. In the past, the world-outlook lines of the workers and their feelings and aspirations depended to a tremendous degree on religious consciousness. "The feelings of the masses," the classicists of Marxism noted, "were fed exclusively with religious food..."¹³

The materialist world outlook has always come out against religious consciousness. In a socialist society the proportion and significance of religious ideas and views are decreasing more and more with the further strengthening of the materialist world outlook.

The forms and levels which are in social consciousness manifest themselves, but in a different plane and in the individual consciousness.

Ideological-indoctrinational work which is directed toward social consciousness and collectives of people requires constant differentiation and knowledge of the special features of each personality. The concept of an "individual approach" means not only the method and way of accomplishing indoctrinational influence, but also

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consideration of the specific character of the consciousness of each individual, his capabilities, inclinations, level of development, interests, and life's goals. There are no two absolutely identical people in the world, either. Even with great physical similarity twins differ in various parameters which characterize their psychophysiological, moral, and socio-psychological features. Each personality is inimitable and unique. And success in molding the needed qualities depends (along with many factors) on the degree of the study of each person's special features and the ability to find the most effective methods for indoctrinational influence on his consciousness, requirements, and interests.

An individual approach in ideological indoctrination and moral-political and psychological training presumes consideration not only of the level of education, professional preparedness, experience, and culture, but also of the personality's psychological features: requirements and motives, character, temperament, capabilities, and so forth.

Even a brief examination of the structure, forms, and special features of social consciousness shows how important it is consistently to consider all the special features of the object of our molding influences in the process of training a person for the most difficult tests of contemporary war. A genuinely scientific approach to moral-political and psychological training also consists in considerable measure of knowledge of the essence, features, and specific character of the consciousness of the collective, group, and individual serviceman.

Chapter 3. Methodological and World-Outlook Bases of Moral-Political and Psychological Training

In getting to know and transforming reality, people are guided by a specific methodology. When we are discussing the transformation of reality, by methodology we mean the teaching on the structure, logical organization, methods, and means of activity. If we are speaking about science, methodology is defined as teaching about the principles of the structure, forms, and methods of scientific knowledge. F. Bacon compared the role of method in scientific knowledge with a lamp which lights the road for the traveller in the darkness. As in theory, so in practice a person uses various methods. Some of them are general. They are used in all sciences and in all cases of practice. Others are special. They are employed only in particular sciences and in corresponding particular spheres of practical activity. The main and determining role here is played by general methods. Philosophical teaching about general methods of knowledge and the transformation of reality is also called **/methodology/** [in boldface]. Dialectical and historical materialism is accepted as the general methodology of scientific study in Soviet science. Marxist-Leninist methodology comes forth as a tool not only of theoretical knowledge, but also of the revolutionary transformation of reality. Problems of war and the army are investigated and studied within the framework of all component parts of Marxism-Leninism. The complexity of the scope and delving into the essence of the processes of war and the army is attained by this. The most important provisions of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army rest first of all on the basic conclusions of dialectical and historical materialism as well as of political economy and scientific communism.¹⁴ Because war, speaking in the words of V. I. Lenin, is an "archmottled" phenomenon, consideration of all its aspects, the combined employment of the means and methods of all component parts of Marxism-Leninism, and reliance on the achievements of other social sciences and, in particular, military history are necessary.

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Chapter IV. The Essence and Tasks of Moral-Political and Psychological Training

The tasks of moral-political and psychological training are determined by the objective requirements of war and the nature of contemporary combat operations. The armies of the socialist states determine these tasks and the ways for their accomplishment from scientific positions. The Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, in speaking to the personnel of a unit, stressed that in the field of moral-political and psychological training of the Soviet Armed Forces the tasks consist of developing in the men the abilities and skills to operate under the most difficult conditions of contemporary war. Ideological indoctrination forms the basis of this training.¹⁵

Psychological training ensures the instilling in the men of those qualities which make them capable of operating successfully under dangerous, strained conditions of contemporary war and accomplishing the combat mission in complete conformance with their communist conviction and moral principles of conduct. The qualities of the man's mind are improved in the course of psychological training: needs and motives, character, temperament and capabilities, sensations, perceptions, ideas, attention, memory, imagination, thinking and speech, feelings and will, knowledge, abilities, skills, and habits necessary for successful operations in contemporary war. The basis of psychological training in armed forces of the socialist states is moral-political training.

The requirements imposed on the intellectual components in the men's activity have now increased sharply. It should be noted that in works on the psychology of thinking, including operational-tactical thinking, a withdrawal has been noted from the traditional analysis of thinking types, forms, and operations and the qualities of the mind to an analysis of the structure of the thinking act--understanding the mission, estimate of the situation, and adopting a decision.

Thus, the essence of moral-political and psychological training consists of the purposeful molding of the moral-political and psychological stability of the personnel and their constant readiness to endure the most severe tests of contemporary war and not to lose the will for struggle and victory. The tasks of moral-political and psychological training are determined by those requirements which contemporary war imposes on the spiritual strength of the men. The most important task of moral-political and psychological training is teaching the men the ability to control their behavior in battle. Moral-political and psychological training is not an independent type of training of the personnel. Its basic content is envisaged by the entire system of political and combat training, military indoctrination, and the organization of military life.

Chapter V. Principles and Methods of Moral-Political and Psychological Training

The moral-political and psychological training of the troops is inseparable from party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces. Party-political work is the scientifically substantiated ideological and organizational activity on the implementation of party policy in the Armed Forces. It is directed toward the indoctrination of the servicemen in a spirit of communist conscientiousness, Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, political vigilance and class hatred toward the enemies of our motherland, loyalty to military duty and the military oath, and constant readiness to come forth for the defense of socialist achievements.

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The tasks of party-political work are the rallying of the Armed Forces personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, molding lofty moral-political and combat qualities and firm discipline in the men, mobilization for the attainment of high effectiveness and quality of combat and political training, improvement of field, air, and naval ability, and the mastery of new combat equipment and weapons; under combat conditions--mobilization for the accomplishment of the commander's combat order, for the defense of the socialist fatherland, and for the complete defeat of the enemy.

Chapter VII. Molding Correct Impressions of Possible War in the Men

Contemporary war is a phenomenon for which it is not easy to prepare. An incorrect notion of the processes of war and the nature of its course spiritually weaken a person in a combat situation. And if the training and indoctrination of the men do not fully prepare them for the possible tests of contemporary war, this will inflict great damage on combat readiness. "Nothing has such a negative effect on the tactical training of troops as simplifications and indulgences in combat training. They create in the personnel incorrect notions of contemporary battle, hamper the generation of lofty combat qualities in the men, and limit creativity. To teach the troops in a difficult and strained situation and under conditions as close as possible to combat conditions," stressed the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "is an immutable law of high combat readiness and it must be strictly observed."¹⁶

Chapter XI. Molding Psychological Stability and Physical Endurance in the Men

The performance of duty in peacetime and the conduct of combat operations in time of war are connected with the overcoming of difficulties and tests. Therefore, the serviceman must possess such qualities as psychological stability and physical endurance.

Psychological stability and physical endurance are unthinkable without the man's optimism. It is difficult to expect decisive and bold actions from people who are pessimistically attuned. A spirit of cheerfulness and optimism--this is what is typical of the psychological atmosphere of a collective which is well serried on an ideological basis and ready not only to stand its ground in a period of failures, but also to impose its will on the enemy and win. Formed in the consciousness of the serviceman along with optimism and faith in victory is conviction of the necessity for the complete defeat of the enemy who has unleashed war against our motherland.

Psychological stability of the serviceman is impossible without a high sense of his own dignity. Ambition should also be stressed. A sense of human dignity, noble pride, and the deepest spiritual requirement to operate always and everywhere as a personality richly endowed with intellect, will, and feelings help the serviceman to maintain the presence of spirit. A man who possesses a sense of personal dignity is able to submit to reason even at the moment of the strongest spiritual shocks. This ability is called self-control. The predominance of reason in such a man by no means weakens suffering, but only introduces a certain balance in its interaction with thought. It is important that the man have sufficiently developed self-respect.

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Under contemporary combat conditions, it seems that everything is directed toward making the serviceman psychologically unstable. Danger, physical strain, uncertainty, and chance--these are the obstacles and distracting circumstances which are directed toward disorganizing the mind. And when a man perceives the surrounding world, evaluates it, and foresees further development coolly, calmly, and quickly: then bravery is spoken of as the manifestation of the presence of spirit.

A man's behavior in a dangerous situation, his psychological stability, and physical endurance depend to a considerable degree on his temperament or type of higher nervous activity. Generally accepted vital indices of a psychological property are endurance, fitness for work, degree of fatigue, even temper, restraint, patience, assiduity, the ability to wait, evenness of mood, mobility, speed in shifting attention, ease in changing feelings, and ease in breaking an old stereotype and establishing a new one.

As psychological studies show, among persons with a weak nervous system hindrances of various types during work time and the distraction of their attention sharply worsen the accuracy and speed of perception and remembering, which leads to a rapid increase in errors; among persons with a strong nervous system, conversely, these functions may even improve in a difficult situation. Thus, for example, the very same side irritant (sharp, prolonged noise) lowers light-color sensitivity in people with a weak nervous system and, conversely, increases it in people with a strong nervous system. The same thing is also noted in relation to the distinguishing and remembering of various information (for example, blips on a radar scope).

Conclusion

In contemporary war, as always the decisive role belongs to man. The moral-political and psychological ability of the people and the army to endure the most difficult tests and not lose the will to victory depends on many factors. In addition to the determining ones--public-social, economic, and ideological--great influence on the spiritual strength of people is exerted by successes or defeats, the combat experience of the personnel, the quality of combat equipment and weapons, the maturity of command personnel and the ability to withstand the enemy's ideological sabotage.

Spiritual steadfastness and complete confidence in the certain triumph of our just cause provide the men of the socialist armies with indisputable moral-political superiority over the personnel of the imperialist armies. V. I. Lenin noted, "That people will never be defeated in which the majority of the workers and peasants recognized, felt, and saw that they are defending their own, Soviet power--the power of the workers, that they are defending that cause whose victory will ensure for them and their children the possibility to enjoy all the blessings of culture and all the creations of human labor."¹⁷

Without belittling the significance of other factors which decide the outcome of war, it can be stated that questions of the moral-political and psychological training of the troops for operations under conditions where contemporary means of conflict are employed have especially important significance.

In reading Napoleon's book "Thoughts," V. I. Lenin extracted the following sentence which interested him: "In each battle, there is a moment when the bravest soldiers,

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after the greatest strain, feel the desire to run; this panic is engendered by a lack of confidence in their courage. An insignificant instance, some pretence is sufficient to return this confidence to them: high skill consists in creating them."¹⁸ The combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces shows that in such a situation great significance is had by the ability of military leaders and commanders to master the situation when it is most critical and inspire the personnel with the inflexible resolve to accomplish the assigned mission. The personal example of the communists and Komsomols also plays a large role. In other words, in order to free some men from possible temporary confusion, a sudden thrust from without is necessary: the commander's confident behavior, a firm command, personal example. The goal of this energetic influence of commanders and political officers on the ideological and psychological elements of consciousness consists of seeing that each member of a section, crew, and subunit directs all his will, thought, and feelings toward the continuous accomplishment of his responsibilities and his military duty. In the words of V. I. Lenin, in the most difficult situation it is necessary not to let oneself become demoralized or disorganized but to preserve a sober estimate of the situation and maintain courage and firmness of spirit."¹⁹

By means of an external influence a person successfully overcomes possible temporary manifestations of spiritual weakness, and the public, social aspect of his behavior gains the upper hand over the instinct of self-preservation. Commanders' and political officers' constant contact with the personnel, their confidence and firmness in handling people, and the maintenance of high discipline guarantee against the manifestation of panic or confusion. V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed the thought that "war is war, it requires iron discipline."²⁰ The maintenance of a high degree of organization, discipline, and strict order strengthens the spiritual strength of the men and imparts even greater courage and steadfastness to them.

It is important that in foreseeing possible tests, each man possess sufficient experience in moral-psychological control of his behavior and be able to suppress or block some feelings (fear, confusion) and strengthen others (hatred for the enemy, a sense of military honor, and others). And here a special role belongs to commanders and political officers who can reliably control the spiritual condition of people by various methods of their influence.

What do we mean by controlling the spiritual condition of the personnel? In essence, it is the process of restructuring and making more active the moral-psychological capabilities of people so as to effectively ensure to the maximum high readiness and inflexible resolve for the fiercest struggle and victory over the enemy. If we define this thought concretely, it can be said that control of spiritual forces presumes good knowledge of the attitudes and opinions of people and constant moral influence on their consciousness so that feelings of firm confidence, calmness, and optimism dominate in the spiritual atmosphere of the military collectives. Control of the spiritual processes also means the timely disclosure and elimination of unfavorable elements in the moral-psychological state of the personnel.

The central element in indoctrinating necessary qualities in the personnel is political training. Mastery of Marxist theory permits molding a scientific world outlook in people. The system of political training of the personnel which has developed in our army meets contemporary requirements and is the most important element in training a person for the defense of the socialist fatherland and for the most difficult tests of war.

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The decisions of the 26th Party Congress disclose new, broad possibilities to raise the quality of the personnel's political tempering and their indoctrination in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. As L. I. Brezhnev noted in a report at the Congress, "A strong alloy of high technical equipping, military skill, and invincible morale--such is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces."²¹

In response to the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, socialist competition is being initiated more and more widely in the Armed Forces. The Soviet servicemen are accomplishing the socialist obligations assumed for combat and political training, raising ratings, and mastering new equipment. An important place in competition is occupied by moral questions: the struggle for observance of the standards of military ethics, overcoming antipodes of communist morals, and the creation of the most favorable moral climate in the troop collectives. All this helps raise to an even higher level the content and effectiveness of the troops' moral-political and psychological training.

One of the most important conditions for moral-political and psychological training is strict observance of the established tenor of army life, its traditions, and military customs. Scientifically substantiated strict regulation of military activity instills in the servicemen accuracy, execution, and self-collection and it trains them to value the time factor. However, the measured rhythm of everyday army life is interrupted occasionally by the assignment of unexpected missions and the most varied special situations with the subsequent execution of marches, firings, missile launches, and so forth in order to develop the personnel's readiness for a rapid transition from peacetime to combat conditions.

In molding the serviceman who is ready for any tests, the entire system of routine army days also accomplishes an important national, state indoctrinational task. By the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work," the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy have been charged with implementing measures directed toward the further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces' indoctrinational role. The CPSU Central Committee points to the necessity for the further increase in the glorious traditions of the Armed Forces, service in which is a remarkable school of work and military ability, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship. The Soviet servicemen, it is stressed in the decree, should have a profound realization of their duty to ensure the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the defense of the cause of peace and socialism.

Military service occupies a special place in the indoctrinational system of our society. In fact, it arrives at the age (from 18 years of age) when the process of the formation, development, and consolidation of a person's basic qualities is especially intensive. During service, the general process of communist indoctrination and the formation of a comprehensively developed personality of a socialist society continues extremely effectively.

Two groups of interconnected preconditions exert a certain influence on the spiritual development of the Soviet serviceman: the basic group consists of the socio-political conditions and spiritual factors which exist in a developed socialist society as well as the specific conditions of military service and way of life.

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The main feature of the conditions for today's military service consists of the necessity to be in a state of constant combat readiness. This special feature is a factor of tremendous social significance which has imposed a noticeable imprint on the entire structure, rhythm, and features of contemporary army life and its spiritual atmosphere. Realization of his direct responsibility for the security of the fatherland and for the future fates of the peoples accelerates the molding of the qualities of patriot and internationalist.

A system of combat and political training has developed and is being continuously improved in the Armed Forces, contributing in every possible way to the political, moral, professional, and physical development of the motherland's young citizens. The role of military labor is exceptionally great here. A high degree of regulation of actions, great tension, and the necessity constantly to subordinate one's efforts to the previously assigned task are inherent in it.

Army life itself with the special order inherent in it exerts a specific influence on the development of consciousness, habits, and many qualities of the personality. The generation of new rules, habits, and standards of behavior under the influence of the specific processes of service and life affects the development of the personality and its qualities, capabilities, and inclinations.

Under conditions of military service, these and other molding factors create extremely favorable preconditions for the formation of the personality. And the indoctrinators--commanders and political officers--always face an important methodological task: to be able to use, coordinate, and direct these molding factors. The essence of controlling the process of the spiritual development of the personality of the serviceman and the military collective also consists of this to a considerable degree.

Success of moral-political and psychological training is ensured by the joint, coordinated work of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations which are tirelessly attaining new achievements in the training and indoctrination of the personnel and the development, in them, of the moral-political, combat, and psychological qualities which are necessary for the accomplishment of the missions facing the Soviet Armed Forces which are called on to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing the immediate rebuff of any aggressor.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 20.
2. See: Lenin, V. I., "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 37, p 122.
3. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim Kursom" [Following the Lenin Course], Moscow, 1976, Vol 5, pp 481-482.
4. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 40, p 247.

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5. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 66.
6. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 May 1981.
7. Brezhnev, L. I., "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [On Guard Over Peace and Socialism], Moscow, 1979, p 139.
8. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 34, pp 196-197.
9. Ibid., Vol 13, p 376.
10. "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work": Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979, p 3.
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ARMED FORCES

BOOK EXCERPTS: CPSU DOCUMENTS ON THE ARMED FORCES

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FOREWORD

The Great October Socialist Revolution opened up a new historic era--an era of revolutionary renewal of the world, an era of transition from capitalism to socialism. The victory of the Great October, the major event of the 20th century, fundamentally altered the course of development of all mankind. The world split into two opposite social-economic systems: socialist and capitalist.

Imbued with class hatred for the popular masses, the international bourgeoisie decided to stifle the proletarian revolution no matter what and restore capitalist orders in our country. It not only was supporting the internal counterrevolution by all means, but also itself took the path of direct military intervention against the young Soviet state.

History placed the Communist Party face to face with a most difficult and at the same time urgent task of organizing armed defense of the first republic of workers and peasants in the world and countering the aggressiveness of the class enemy with the indestructible military might of the socialist state. In substantiating the objective need for creating a new type of army for protecting the socialist homeland against an attack by the joint forces of international imperialism and internal counterrevolution, Lenin emphasized that "any revolution is worth something only if it is able to defend itself,"¹ and that "we could not exist without armed defense of the socialist republic."²

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the greatest theorist and strategist of the proletarian revolution, was the organizer of the Armed Forces of the Soviet state. The birth of the Soviet Armed Forces and their heroic history are linked inseparably with the name of V. I. Lenin. He deserves the historic credit for substantiating a military program of the proletarian revolution and for elaborating the teaching on defense of the socialist homeland.

Lenin's immortal ideas about defense of the Motherland and the principles of military organizational development he elaborated became the basis of the Communist Party's military policy. From the very beginning they ensured the party's undivided management of the entire matter of national defense. The Central Committee Decree dated 25 December 1918 stated: "The policy of the military department as well as of all other departments and establishments is

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conducted on the precise basis of general directives issued by the party in the person of its Central Committee and under the direct supervision of the Central Committee."

Leninist principles of party management of the Army and Navy have been firm in all historic stages of the Soviet state's development.

In fulfilling Vladimir Il'ich's behests, our party performed an enormous amount of work in creating socialist armed forces. Proceeding from Lenin's guidelines, the CPSU believed and continues to believe that the teaching on defense of the homeland is part of the Marxist theory of socialist revolution and that defense of revolutionary achievements is one of the principles in building socialism and communism. Analyzing some of the lessons of socialism's contemporary development, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that "socialism can be established only if the power of the workers is able to defend the revolution against all attacks of the class enemy (and such attacks are inevitable, both within and most probably from without)."³

This edition of the collection "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuzu" contains resolutions of CPSU congresses and conferences, and of CC plenums; Central Committee decrees, direct orders, letters, addresses and greetings; V. I. Lenin's accountability reports at party congresses, addresses, letters and telegrams; Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches; and other documents reflecting the enormous work of the Communist Party to strengthen the Soviet Army and Navy and to increase their combat effectiveness and combat readiness.

The CPSU's work of strengthening national defense and organizing protection of the socialist homeland is exceptionally many-sided and encompasses many aspects of the life of Soviet society. This collection contains documents reflecting chiefly the political, ideological and organizational work of the Communist Party in the Soviet Armed Forces. A number of party CC documents on these matters are being published for the first time in this book.

The collection's contents graphically show the primary directions in the Communist Party's work of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the build-up in their combat might, and the increase in combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the troops. One can trace clearly in the documents how our party, in various stages of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, managed the work of their manning, technical outfitting and logistical support, and showed concern for improving troop organizational structure and the training and indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel.

A major place in the collection is occupied by documents devoted to party-political work in the Armed Forces and to organizational development and strengthening of political entities and party organizations. One of the RKP CC letters published states: "In order for the Red Army to be really socialist, it not only must be class in composition, but its personnel also have to perceive their class interests clearly and correctly. For this we need party work in its midst."

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Lenin viewed the work of Army and Navy party organizations, commissars and political departments as a powerful means of ideological conditioning of personnel and of raising the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. He emphasized that "where party policy is conducted the strictest . . . where discipline is firmest and where political work is conducted most solicitously among the troops . . . there is no slackness in the Army, its order and spirit are better and there are more victories."⁴ The party's leader revealed the essence of communist indoctrination of military personnel and elaborated principles and methods of party-political work among the troops. He taught military cadres and all party members to arrange ideological indoctrination work in the Army on a class basis and to develop in soldiers an unshakable ideological conviction and utter dedication to the cause of communism.

Lenin's statements on the need for perfecting all party-political work, elevating the role and influence of Army and Navy party organizations, and shaping and developing in military personnel high political and moral-combat qualities can be traced through all resolutions of party congresses, CPSU CC decrees, instructions to party organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and other documents. The Leninist science and art of political work among the masses and the party's enormous historical experience in managing the Armed Forces is a guarantee of successful accomplishment of the tasks of communist indoctrination of military personnel and of developing in them the political, moral-combat and psychological qualities needed for winning victory in modern warfare.

The documents contained in the collection attest to the fact that in creating and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Soviet state V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party showed daily concern for the training, indoctrination and placement of military cadres.

The party Central Committee took very effective steps aimed at mass training of commanders from among the workers and peasants. As early as late 1920 the country had 158 military educational institutions in which 54,000 cadets were training. In subsequent years the party did not relax attention to the training and indoctrination of military cadres. The work of training command-political and engineer-technical personnel of the Army and Navy assumed enormous scope in the Great Patriotic War years.

Following Lenin's behests, the CPSU has shown constant concern for military cadres and for their Marxist-Leninist conditioning and military-technical training even in postwar years. Our Armed Forces now have remarkable, highly trained officer cadres. Over 90 percent of all Army and Navy officers are party or Komsomol members. A majority of the officers have a higher military or military-special education.

All documents included in the collection are arranged in chronological order and reflect the most important historic stages of development of the Soviet state's Armed Forces. They are living proof of how the Communist Party developed and carried out measures for strengthening our Motherland's defenses step by step. In so doing the party gave thorough consideration to the features of

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the socialist revolution's historic development, the developing international situation, successes of socialist economics, the development of military science and the means and methods of warfare, as well as the growth in political awareness and in the general educational, technical and cultural level of Armed Forces personnel.

The collection "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" opens with the address of the 2d All-Russian Congress of Soviets "To Workers, Soldiers and Peasants!" and "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People," written by V. I. Lenin. These documents for the first time advanced the task of arming the workers and forming a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants, which was legalized by the Council of People's Commissars Decree on Organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

Subsequent documents, encompassing the Civil War period, reveal the titanic work of Lenin and the Communist Party to build the Armed Forces and manage their combat activities. The numerous party mobilizations and the dispatch of revolutionary workers to the front played an enormous role in the combat development of Red Army units, in increasing the personnel's solidarity about the party and Soviet power, and in reinforcing discipline and steadfastness in combat.

The 8th party congress was of very great importance for strengthening the Red Army. The congress approved Lenin's guidelines on building a mass, standing, regular Red Army; formulated the basic provisions of the party's military policy; and defined tasks in military organizational development and party-political work among the troops. "The Army must be an Army trained, armed and organized according to the last word of military science," it was emphasized in the congress resolution on the military question. The congress devoted particular attention to the planned allocation of party forces in the Army and Navy and to strengthening political work among the troops. The congress wrote in the resolution it adopted: "Shift the center of gravity of communist work at the front from front political departments to Army and division political departments so as to animate it and bring it closer to units operating at the front."

Party documents published in the collection define tasks during the fight against armies of the White Guard and foreign interventionists and contain concrete instructions on organizational and political strengthening of the Red Army and its logistical support.

The victorious conclusion of the Civil War marked the beginning of a new stage in development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet state was ringed by hostile forces which might act against our country at any time. "We ended one period of wars," said Lenin at the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, "and we must prepare for a second; but we do not know when it will arrive and we must make sure that when it comes we can be up to it."⁵ Proceeding from these tasks, the RKP(b) CC stated in a circular letter dated 12 January 1921: "The party decided and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets unanimously affirmed that the Army has to be preserved and its combat effectiveness raised."

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The 10th RKP(b) Congress outlined ways for reorganizing the Red Army. Congress resolutions on the military question reinforced Leninist principles of military organizational development in peacetime and outlined a program of party activity to strengthen and develop the Soviet Armed Forces under new conditions of socialist reorganization of the country's national economy.

Documents contained in the collection and taking in the period from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War clearly attest to the Communist Party's constant concern for strengthening the Army and Navy, for their technical reoutfitting, for improving party-political work and elevating the role of party organizations among the troops, for ideological-political indoctrination of Soviet military personnel, and for training military cadres.

In the face of imminent threat of aggression on the part of fascist Germany, the Communist Party took energetic steps to deploy the Armed Forces and outfit them with contemporary combat equipment, relying on successes of the socialist economic system achieved thanks to the country's industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. There was a rapid expansion of the industrial base of artillery and small arms in the prewar years, and the best tanks in the world and new types of aircraft and warships were created.

Much attention was given to reinforcing Army and Navy party organizations. From 1939 until mid-1941 the number of party members in the Armed Forces rose more than threefold and consisted of over 560,000 persons. Some two million Soviet military personnel were Komsomol members.

The party's vigorous work of preparing the country and the Army to repulse aggression, carried out in the period of peaceful construction and especially in the prewar years, laid the material and moral-political foundation of our victory over the fascist German invaders.

The Great Patriotic War was a serious test for the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. The Communist Party unfolded enormous work of mobilizing all the country's physical and spiritual capabilities and all the people's energy to combat the foe. It was the party which organized and rallied tens of millions of people and directed their energy and will toward a single goal--victory. The country became a single military camp. The party shifted the national economy to a wartime footing. Major industrial bases for producing arms were created in the east in short periods of time. In surmounting the unbelievable hardships of wartime, Soviet citizens in the rear assured the uninterrupted supply of the front with combat equipment, weapons, ammunition, food and clothing by their selfless labor.

The party performed enormous work of comprehensive strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces and a continuous build-up in their combat might. The documents being published indicate how the party took vigorous steps in the war years to raise the Army and Navy's combat effectiveness, to perfect their organizational structure, to outfit the troops with the latest combat equipment, to provide them with experienced cadres, to reinforce political entities and party organizations, and to improve party-political work among the personnel.

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The party's Central Committee was the staff from which supreme political and strategic leadership of military actions was exercised.

The Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, won not only a military victory, but an ideological victory as well over the enemy. The party's ideological influence was supported everywhere: at the front, in territory temporarily occupied by the enemy, and in the country's rear areas. Lenin's ideas of defending the socialist homeland took hold of the masses and were an enormous force which united millions of Soviet citizens for the selfless struggle for the freedom and independence of the Land of Soviets.

The defeat of fascist Germany and imperialist Japan, involving the Soviet Union's deciding role, and victory of revolutions in a number of countries of Europe and Asia sharply altered the arrangement of class forces in the international arena. A world socialist system formed and there began an active process of the downfall of colonialism.

These new achievements by forces of socialism and democracy caused fear and bitterness in the imperialist camp. Reactionary forces of the primary capitalist countries, and U.S. imperialists above all, waged a struggle against socialist states and liberated peoples. Imperialist circles began to whip up international tension. They created the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), untwisted a mad arms race, and unleashed a "cold war" against countries of the socialist community, and against the Soviet Union above all.

In the face of the growing aggressiveness of imperialism the Communist Party undertook cardinal steps for further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces and outfitting them with the most up-to-date combat equipment, including nuclear missile weapons. As a retaliatory measure and in order to unify forces for stopping possible aggression on the part of states of the aggressive NATO bloc, the socialist countries of Europe formed a defensive military-political alliance which went down in history under the name of the Warsaw Pact.

Documents of the postwar period published in this collection characterize the work of the Communist Party and its Central Committee to manage the Soviet Armed Forces in the difficult international situation and under conditions of scientific-technical revolution and fundamental transformations in military affairs. The documents formulate tasks of indoctrinating personnel in a spirit of utter dedication to the cause of communism, in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, allegiance to military duty and constant readiness to defend the socialist homeland. The resolutions of party congresses, Central Committee decrees and addresses on military matters, and speeches by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev outline paths of further development and strengthening of combat might and increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Documents published in the collection indicate that the party and its Central Committee are keeping a constant focus on questions of military organizational development and improvement of the USSR Armed Forces. The concern of the CPSU

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and Soviet state for strengthening national defense is reflected in the USSR Constitution, where it states: "Defense of the socialist homeland is among the most important state functions and is a matter of all the people..."

"It is the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people to defend the socialist homeland reliably and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."

Our country strode far forward in the postwar time. Successes achieved in economic development and the outstanding victories of Soviet scientific-technical thinking permitted a fundamental change in the Army and Navy's technical outfitting as well. First-rate combat equipment and weapons were created by the hands of Soviet scientists, designers and workers.

The appearance, development and improvement of nuclear missile weapons and the outfitting of our Armed Forces with missiles of various classes and other new means of warfare led to a sharp increase in their combat might and had a decisive effect on the forms and methods of conducting military operations.

In December 1959 the CPSU CC and Soviet government adopted a resolution on creating a new branch of the Armed Forces--the Strategic Missile Forces. This was a fundamentally new step ensuring a further increase in the USSR's defensive might and in the security of fraternal countries of the socialist community. The party conducted a fundamental reorganization of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. Their arms, combat equipment, organizational structure, and methods of training and controlling the troops were placed in conformity with the demands of conducting military actions in modern warfare.

Together with the technical outfitting of the Army and Navy and assurance of the harmonious development of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, the Communist Party and Soviet government give unremitting attention to the training and indoctrination of military cadres. A special place in resolving the complex tasks of troop management is given to military councils, which have the rights of examining and resolving all the most important issues in the life and activities of the Army and Navy and which bear responsibility to the CPSU CC and Soviet government for the status and combat readiness of the troops.

The transformations in military affairs place higher demands on our Armed Forces personnel. In exercising its management of the Armed Forces, the Communist Party and its Central Committee consistently strengthen one-man command and at the same time elevate in every way the role and influence of political entities and party organizations. The CPSU demands that commanders, political workers, and all Army and Navy party members steadfastly improve the combat schooling of unit and ship personnel and indoctrinate Soviet military personnel in a spirit of high ideological conviction, efficiency, unremitting vigilance and constant combat readiness.

The party teaches that the importance of moral-political and psychological training of the troops rises sharply in modern warfare, especially with the

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use of nuclear missile weaponry. In order to endure in combat and win victory over a strong enemy, Soviet military personnel not only have to master weapons and sophisticated combat equipment, but also be ideologically convinced and possess high volitional qualities and the ability to overcome all hardships of modern combat physically and psychologically.

The need to strengthen the ideological-political indoctrination of Soviet military personnel under present-day conditions also is determined by the sharp aggravation of ideological opposition between socialism and capitalism.

The development of countries of the socialist community, the growth in their might and the strengthened beneficial effect of the international policy they conduct now make up the primary direction of mankind's social progress. The attractive force of ideas of scientific socialism is growing steadily and more and more millions of people on all continents are assimilating these ideas.

In an attempt to check this process, the forces of imperialism and reaction intensify ideological struggle. Imperialist propaganda, with which the propaganda of Beijing hegemonists openly coordinates, continuously wages a furious assault on the minds of Soviet citizens and attempts, with the help of the most refined methods and modern technical means, to poison their awareness with slander of Soviet reality, to blacken socialism, to embellish imperialism and its predatory, inhuman politics and practices. Hired ideological subversives make attempts to disarm Soviet citizens and our military personnel spiritually.

The Communist Party proceeds from the assumption that there can be no place for neutralism and compromises in the struggle of the two ideologies. High political vigilance, vigorous, efficient and persuasive propaganda work, the exposure of hostile ideological subversive acts and a prompt rebuff to them are needed here.

All ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces is conducted on the basis of resolutions of party congresses and CPSU CC plenums, Central Committee decrees and instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The documents published in the collection contain the CPSU's demands for a further strengthening of the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces, a comprehensive improvement in party-political work, and the development in Soviet soldiers of a scientific outlook, high ideological conviction and irreconcilability toward the class enemies.

Enormous successes have been achieved in recent years under the tested management of the Leninist party in our country's social-economic development and in the increase in the workers' welfare and the culture and awareness of broad masses of the people. A developed socialist society has been built in the USSR by the selfless labor of Soviet citizens. The Soviet state's economic and defense might has become stronger as a result and a further improvement of the USSR Armed Forces is taking place.

In directing military organizational development the party always has proceeded and is proceeding from the assumption that it is an inalienable part of

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statewide organizational development. This is why all characteristic features inherent to our Armed Forces were developed further and were enriched with new content in the stage of mature socialism.

The USSR Armed Forces now are the armed forces of a state of the whole people. They act as a powerful tool for protecting the interests of the whole people and assuring security of the socialist homeland. Soviet soldiers, true sons of their people, are closely rallied about the Leninist Communist Party and the Soviet government. They are distinguished by a deep love for the people, high political awareness and a sense of responsibility for their Motherland's destiny. Brought up in a spirit of friendship of nations and proletarian internationalism, Soviet Army and Navy personnel are steadily strengthening the combat cooperation with personnel in armies of fraternal countries of socialism. The present generations of Soviet military personnel, like their grandfathers and fathers, are ready and capable of acting at any time in defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the cause of peace and socialism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked in the CPSU CC Accountability Report to the 26th party congress that "a firm alloy of high technical outfitting, military proficiency and indestructible morale--that is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. Now it is the sons and grandsons of Great Patriotic War heroes who stand in the ranks of the Motherland's defenders. They did not go through the severe ordeals which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers, but they are true to the heroic traditions of our Army and our people. And each time the interests of national security and the defense of peace demands it, when it is necessary to assist the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome all difficulties."

The CPSU and Soviet state are steadily conducting a peaceloving Leninist foreign policy. In the 1970's a normalization of the international situation was achieved above all as a result of the many-sided, vigorous work of the Soviet Union and socialist community, with reliance on a growth of the economic and defense might of countries of socialism. Peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems became established in the process of detente and began to be filled with concrete economic and political content, and a clear abatement of the "cold war" was seen.

But at the borderline of the 1970's and 1980's the international situation became seriously complicated through the fault of imperialist circles. The aggressive nature of the politics of imperialism, and American imperialism above all, rose sharply. Not wishing to reckon with the realities of the modern world, the aggressive NATO circles headed by the United States set a course for disrupting the military balance existing in the world in their own favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole, to the detriment of international detente and the security of nations.

Hence imperialism's line on strengthening the arms race, unleashing provocations against socialist and other independent states, the creation of centers of tension, and NATO's militaristic activeness. Antisovietism and anti-communism have been turned into an instrument for whipping up the arms race;

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into a tool of struggle not only against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, and not only against communists, but also against all enemies of war and peaceloving forces; into a means of undermining detente.

A rapprochement of aggressive circles of the West, and the United States above all, with the Chinese leadership is occurring on an antisoviet basis inimical to the cause of peace. The partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism represents a new, dangerous phenomenon in world politics.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is steadfastly continuing the course for preserving and developing international detente. At the same time the CPSU believes that intrigues of imperialism and other enemies of peace demand constant vigilance of Soviet citizens and comprehensive strengthening of our state's defenses in order to disrupt imperialism's plans for attaining military superiority and exercising world diktat.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the CPSU CC Accountability Report to the 26th party congress that "the party and state have not lost sight of questions /of strengthening the country's defensive might and its Armed Forces/ for a single day. The international situation obligates us to this."

Material included in the collection will help the reader understand even more thoroughly that CPSU management is the primary source of the might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces and the be-all and end-all of Soviet military organizational development.

Thanks to the CPSU's wise Leninist policy in the area of military organizational development, the Soviet state of the whole people has powerful Armed Forces which possess all necessary means for performing their responsible mission of being a guardian over the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the bulwark of universal peace.

This collection of documents unquestionably will be a valuable aid for all USSR Armed Forces personnel as well as for a wide range of readers studying the CPSU's activities in military matters.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVII, 122.
2. Ibid., XXXVIII, 138.
3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom: rechi i stat'i" [With a Leninist Course: Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978, VI, 588.
4. Lenin, XXXIX, 56.
5. Ibid., XLII, 143-144.

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Annotation

The collection contains documents drawn up by V. I. Lenin, resolutions of CPSU congresses and conferences, party CC plenums, CPSU CC decrees, directives, letters and addresses, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches, and other documents reflecting the many-sided work of the Communist Party in Soviet military organizational development and in the creation, strengthening and constant improvement of the USSR Armed Forces.

The book is intended for a wide range of military readers and everyone interested in the CPSU's military activities.

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NAVAL FORCES

BOOK EXCERPTS: SOVIET SUBMARINES IN GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow SOVETSKIYE PODVODNYYE LODKI V VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNE in Russian 1981 (signed to press 8 Sep 81) pp 191, 189-190, 3-8, 169-173

[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, and conclusion from book "Soviet Submarines in the Great Patriotic War" by L. A. Yemel'yanov, Voennoye Izdatel'stvo, 39,000 copies, 191 pages]

[Excerpts] Annotation

The book tells about methods of combat employment of the Navy's submarines during the Great Patriotic War and presents a great number of the most typical examples of how our submarines operated on sea lines of communication, during mine laying, in the conduct of tactical reconnaissance, the navigation-hydrological support of assault landings, and the accomplishment of other missions.

The book is intended for naval officers and officer candidates of higher naval educational institutions and is of interest for all those who are interested in the Navy's combat past.

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Foreword

Guided by the Lenin precepts on the reliable defense of the achievements of October, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government always attached great significance to the creation of a strong and combat-effective submarine fleet in the country. The six-year naval development program (1926-1932) which was approved in December 1926 envisioned the construction of 22 submarines. In addition to this class of ships, the fleet was to receive 3 destroyers, 18 destroyer escorts, 5 hunter-killer ships, and 36 torpedo boats.

In the years of the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), in foreseeing aggression against our state and wide-scale combat operations at sea, the construction of 137 submarines was begun. Of surface ships, 5 cruisers, 4 leaders, 46 destroyers, 6 destroyer escorts, and 27 minesweepers were laid down. During the prewar decade, the shipbuilding industry transferred more than 200 submarines to the fleet. By the start of World War II (1 September 1939), the Soviet Navy had occupied first place among the world's naval fleets for number of submarines.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet submarines accomplished a broad range of combat missions: they fought on enemy sea lines of communication,

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defended their own sea lines of communication, laded mines, conducted reconnaissance, transported people and cargo, and accomplished navigation and hydrographic support of naval forces. Their operations on enemy sea lines of communication were most effective. Destroying enemy vessels travelling with reinforcements for the front line and transports shipping strategic raw materials, submarines not only rendered assistance to our troops which were operating on the maritime flanks, but they also inflicted direct damage on the war-economy potential of fascist Germany.

Submarine combat operations played a large role in the Far North where the waterways had exceptional significance for supplying the German-fascist troops with ammunition, warm clothing, and food. Already in the third month of the war the fascist command was forced to admit that the strikes of Soviet submarines on the coastal communications in the Arctic significantly hampered the implementation of plans to capture Murmansk as early as 1941.

In the Baltic Sea, due to the activity of our submarines the enemy was forced to reduce water shipments significantly and to use the already loaded land roads to supply his troops at Leningrad.

On the lines of communication of the Black Sea, the attacks of our submarines were especially effective during the period when the occupiers were forced to evacuate the Crimea.

Some of the strikes of the Soviet submarines on the lines of communication proved to be especially telling for the enemy. In January 1945, submarine "S-13" of the Baltic Fleet attacked and sank the liner ("Wilhelm Gustlow") on board which were more than 7,000 soldiers, seamen, and officers including about 1,300 submariners. Three days of mourning were declared in Germany on this occasion. The convoy officer responsible for the safety of the crossing was shot, and the commander of "S-13," Captain 3d Rank A. I. Marinesko, was placed on the list of personal enemies of the Third Reich.

In April 1945 the transport "Goya" was sent to the bottom in the Baltic. The Hitlerites lost more than 5,000 soldiers, officers, and cadets as a result of the torpedo strike launched by the Guards submarine "L-3" (commander Captain 3d Rank V. K. Konovalov).

Exceptional significance, measured first of all by the material loss inflicted on the enemy, was had by the minefield barrier operations of the submarines. They also hindered the fascists in the deployment of combat ships, restricted the transports' freedom of movement, and attracted a considerable quantity of mine-sweeping and other supporting forces. The mines were placed in places most vulnerable for the enemy: at exits from bases, in narrows, and at communication hubs. For number of mines placed in active mine barriers (that is, in enemy waters), the submarines occupied first place among all naval forces.

Submarine operations proved to be effective in the defense of their own sea lines of communication. They played an exceptional role in the North where external waterways had a strategic character. At that time, the Soviet Navy could send out against the enemy's big surface ships based in northern Norway only submarines and, partially, aviation. Deployed near the exits from the fjords, the submarines were a factor which restrained the activity of the German squadron in that region. It was namely

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here that the flag battleship "Tirpitz," which had moved out as part of the squadron to intercept an Allied convoy, was attacked by submarine "K-21" (commander Captain 2d Rank N. A. Lunin). As a result, the squadron was forced to abandon accomplishment of its mission.

Submarines achieved great successes in accomplishing naval reconnaissance missions. Possessing the ability for covert operations, they penetrated into areas defended by the enemy where they observed his forces and means and reported important information to the command. The landing of reconnaissance groups on the enemy-occupied coast by submarines had substantial significance.

Submarines operated successfully when supplying besieged Sevastopol' with ammunition and with navigation and hydrographic support of amphibious forces, especially during the execution of the Kerch-Feodosiya amphibious operation in December 1941.

Submarines were the most universal forces in the fleet as regards the variety of the missions accomplished.

Soviet submarines had to accomplish combat missions under the most difficult conditions--in constricted and shallow areas and in the presence of serious mine danger and a strongly developed enemy antisubmarine defense. Not one foreign fleet which participated in World War II experienced such difficulties. Submarines of Germany, the United States, and Japan operated primarily in the oceans, outside a developed enemy antisubmarine defense. The opposition which was exerted against them, which proceeded primarily from ships for the close-in protection of convoys, remained not very effective for a long time.

In the Barents Sea, the sailing of our submarines was complicated by the long periods of the polar day and night, the fact that the enemy had skerried channels which were difficult for submarines to reach, frequent fogs, intermittant snowfalls, and strong tidal currents.

In the Black Sea, where communications passed close to the shores, submarines were forced to maneuver in areas with depths not exceeding 15-20 meters. When a submarine moved in the submerged position, a trace from the silt which was raised by the propellers, which was long and easily noticeable from a ship and airplane, often trailed behind it.

The most difficult conditions developed in the Baltic. Here, in order to emerge in the open sea our submarines had to cross the narrow and shallow Gulf of Finland which was densely crammed with enemy mines and nets.

Conditions for the combat operations of Soviet submarines became even more difficult in the course of the war. The loss of bases in the Baltic, in the northwest and on the Crimean coast of the Black Sea, and the blockade of Leningrad hindered the deployment of submarines and worsened conditions for their basing and repair.

Despite all this, our submariners operated actively, decisively, and boldly. They persistently looked for and sank enemy ships at sea. Their combat skill was strengthened and improved in difficult battles. Tactics were developed and new, more effective methods for the combat employment of submarines were employed.

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The position method was practiced initially, and then they began to employ cruising in limited areas. In the course of the war, submarines changed over to group actions. Instances of coordination with aviation, especially reconnaissance aviation, occurred considerably more often.

Methods for the combat employment of submarine weapons, primarily torpedoes, developed and improved. From firing single torpedoes, the submariners changed over to firing several torpedoes at time intervals, and subsequently, to firing a salvo with a "spread." The employment of more modern methods of torpedo firing increased the effectiveness of submarine operations.

When they did not have the opportunity to employ torpedoes, the submarines often surfaced and entered into a gunnery battle with enemy ships.

Even bourgeois military historians were forced to acknowledge the high combat skill of the Soviet submariners which was displayed in the years of the Great Patriotic War. For example, a former admiral of the Hitlerite fleet, (Yu. Rower), writes: "The strength of the Russian submariner consists of his readiness for self-sacrifice.... The Soviet submariners have no shortage of combat readiness and steadfastness or...the necessary navigational and tactical abilities."*

Typical of the Soviet submariners was the striving to accomplish the combat mission come what may. Even at the most difficult moments, none of the submarine crews lost the presence of courage, panicked, or permitted thoughts of abandoning the accomplishment of the combat mission or voluntary surrender to the fascists.

Much was told in our press about the military labor of submarine commanders and crews during the years of the struggle with fascism. Remarkable books by famous submariners have been published--by Heroes of the Soviet Union Ya. K. Iosselian', I. A. Kolyshkin, V. G. Starikov, I. V. Travkin, I. I. Fisanovich, and G. I. Shchedrin, submarine officers P. D. Grishchenko, I. S. Kabo, V. Ye. Korzh, M. K. Chuprikov, and O. G. Chemesov, and other authors. Prominent naval commanders Admirals N. G. Kuznetsov, A. G. Golovko, Yu. A. Panteleyev, and V. F. Tributs devoted many pages to the submariners in their memoirs.

This book will acquaint the reader with the nature and conditions of the combat operations of our submarine forces in 1941-1945, with their quantitative and qualitative composition, and with examples of the accomplishment of various combat missions by submarine commanders. The book does not claim completeness in illuminating these questions; it should be considered only as the next step in the study and generalization of the experience of combat activity of Soviet submariners during the Great Patriotic War.

Conclusion

In the years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet submarines accomplished a broad range of combat missions. Possessing great cruising capacity they went out to the enemy's

* (Rower, Yu). "Operations of Soviet Submarines in the Baltic in 1939-1945."
Translated from the German. Central Naval Library (TsVMB) No 78, 1958, pp 21, 23.

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sea lines of communication and, without giving themselves away, they attacked enemy vessels. In the Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas the submarines destroyed more than 300 transports with a total tonnage of more than 1 million gross registered tons and about 100 combat ships with torpedoes and mines.

Submarines played an important role in the accomplishment of such missions as the defense of their sea lines of communications and naval bases, reconnaissance, performing patrol duty, delivery of ammunition and food to besieged Sevastopol', and navigation and hydrographic support of amphibious operations.

The active operations of the submarines forced the Hitlerite command to divert considerable forces and means from the accomplishment of other missions, in particular from rendering assistance to their ground forces on the maritime directions, which reduced the combat capabilities of the fascist fleet as a whole.

The Great Patriotic War was not only a serious and comprehensive test of the combat qualities of the Soviet submariners, but also an important stage in the development of the tactics for employing submarine forces. At the start of the war, primarily the position method for employing submarines was practiced; later, the Soviet naval command began to plan cruising in limited areas and the redeployment of the submarines using the method of maneuvering positions. At the end of the war, the group employment of submarines in screens became widespread in the Northern Fleet.

The submarines changed from the independent accomplishment of missions to coordination with other fleet forces. Beginning with 1943, naval operations began to be conducted with the active participation of submarine forces. Submarines coordinated most closely with reconnaissance aviation which, through shore-based command posts, provided them with data on enemy ships and vessels at sea. Subsequently, when extendable antennas appeared on the submarines, it became possible to receive information directly from the airplanes.

Attempts were undertaken to organize the operations of several submarines in a tactical group; however, due to the imperfection of means for hydroacoustical communication, this proved to be impracticable.

The main weapon of submarine forces were the torpedoes. During the war, submarines accomplished 679 torpedo attacks and expended 1550 torpedoes. On the average, four or five torpedoes were expended for each sunken ship. At the beginning of the war, the aimed method of firing torpedoes was widespread in the fleets, but already by the end of 1941 the Soviet submariners had changed over to salvo firing with several torpedoes at time intervals. The method of firing with a "spread" began to be practiced from the second half of 1943. By this time, proximity fuses began to be installed on the torpedoes.

At the start of the war, torpedo attacks were accomplished under conditions of a relatively weak antisubmarine defense, which permitted closing with the target and launching torpedoes at short distances. Subsequently, when the system for the protection of transports became considerably stronger, the submarines were forced to fire from great distances, through the escort screening line. The number of night attacks increased significantly in the course of the war. The best trained commanders of submarines were the first to accomplish torpedo attacks using sonar data. This progressive method later became widespread in the Northern Fleet, especially at the end of the war.

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The working out of new methods of torpedo firing, the installation of more improved instruments and, of course, the growth in the combat skill of submarine commanders ensured an increase in the success of torpedo firing from 30 percent at the start of the war to 70 percent by its conclusion.

The submarines had recourse to guns primarily when attacking single transports when the employment of torpedoes was impossible for some reasons. In some cases, the submarines entered into a gunnery battle with antisubmarine warfare ships, but only for purposes of self-defense in order to break away from enemy pursuit.

Despite their relatively small scale, mine barrier operations of submarines greatly hindered the navigation and combat activity of the German-fascist fleet. During the war, submarines accomplished 90 mine-laying operations. There were 1,749 mines laid on which more than 50 enemy transports were blown up. The greatest effect was provided by laying mines in nests. They hindered sweeping and made considerable water areas dangerous for ships.

The organizational structure of submarine forces did not undergo any substantial changes in the course of the war. Brigades formed of several divisions completely justified themselves. At the same time, war experience showed that the control of submarines needed centralization. For this, on the Black Sea as well as on the Baltic several brigades were merged into one under a single command.

Fleet commanders assigned missions to submarine commanders and determined the areas and times for combat operations. In individual periods, they personally controlled submarine operations at sea. Such moments were typical of the Northern Fleet at the start of the war and of the remaining fleets during the preparation and conduct of sea operations.

Force staffs controlled the combat operations of submarines skillfully at all stages of the war.

Division commanders were occupied with the preparation of submarines for combat operations. All division commanders were participants in many combat cruises and taught subordinates the skill of fighting based on personal experience. As the closest teachers, they played a large role in molding lofty moral and combat qualities in young commanders.

Great significance for the success of submarine operations was had by all types of support, primarily the timely transmission of reconnaissance data on the coordinates and elements of the movement of enemy convoys (transports) and on their defensive system to the submarines. Information on the condition of antisubmarine defense, the intensity and disposition of minefields, and the routes of advanced cruiser lines and antisubmarine warfare airplanes meant much. The main role in reconnaissance of enemy lines of communication was played by naval aviation. Electronic reconnaissance equipment was widely used in the Northern Fleet and useful information was delivered by reconnaissance groups landed in the enemy rear.

One cannot imagine the combat activity of submarines without maintenance support. Thanks to the selfless labor of the workers of the maintenance enterprises and bases, the submarines eliminated damage received on combat cruises in the shortest times and

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returned to action. The workers of the ship-building industry gave the Navy 52 new submarines in the course of the war. To build up forces on the most important sectors, submarine units were transferred from one fleet to another. The Pacific Fleet performed the role of a unique submarine reserve for the Northern and Black Sea Fleets.

The combat successes of the Soviet submarines in the Great Patriotic War were determined to a great extent by the fact that their personnel, brought up by the Communist Party in a spirit of devotion to the socialist motherland and hatred for fascism, strived to inflict maximum damage on the enemy and to accomplish their assigned missions with honor. Under unusually difficult and complex conditions of combat cruises and, at times, in very dangerous and critical situations, the seamen displayed high military skill, inflexible steadfastness, and an unbending will for victory.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government evaluated highly the services of the submariners to the motherland. During the Great Patriotic War, about 6,000 submariners were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union for bravery and heroism, and 20 of them were awarded the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Four submarines which distinguished themselves the most received the honored title of Guards Red Banner, 12 became Guards, and 23 were awarded Orders of the Red Banner. High awards were also conferred on submarine forces: a brigade of submarines of the Northern Fleet was awarded Orders of the Red Banner and Ushakov 1st class, a brigade of submarines of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet--the Order of the Red Banner, the 1st Submarine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet--the Order of the Red Banner, and the 2d Brigade--the Order of Ushakov, 1st Class.

In the postwar years, thanks to the tremendous successes in the development of the economy, science, and technology, and as a result of the heroic labor of the Soviet people, revolutionary transformations were accomplished in our country in all fields of military affairs. The Soviet Navy was transformed beyond recognition and made a sharp qualitative leap in its development. It became a genuinely ocean-going and nuclear missile navy which meets all the requirements of modern war. Nuclear submarines and rocket-carrying naval aviation began to comprise the main strike force of the Navy.

In their combat capabilities, contemporary nuclear submarines can in no way be compared with submarines of the period of the Great Patriotic War. Armed with missiles, homing torpedoes, and various electronic equipment and possessing virtually unlimited cruising range, these underwater ships are capable of inflicting destructive strikes against shore installations on the aggressor's territory from any region of the world ocean and combating successfully ships of any classes.

The new generation of Soviet submariners are worthy successors and continuers of the glorious traditions of the war's veterans. With their patriotic deeds, they are constantly enriching this priceless heritage and are cherishing sacredly everything connected with the heroic history of the Soviet fleet.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) pp 148-150

[Article by A. M. Filitov: "Symposium on the History of World War II"]

[Text] An international scientific symposium devoted to the 40th anniversary of the military events of 1941 took place in Stuttgart (FRG) on 17-19 September 1981. Three West German institutions served as its organizers: The Library of Modern History,¹ the Institute of History of Stuttgart University, and the West German Committee of the International Society for the Study of World War II. Along with historians of the FRG, taking part in the work of the symposium were scholars of the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and a number of other capitalist countries as well as a Soviet delegation consisting of corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov (head of the delegation) and A. M. Filitov. The mayor of Stuttgart, M. Rommel, opened the symposium with a brief introductory speech.

The original name of the symposium was: "December 1941--Turning Point of the War." According to the program worked out by the organizers, it was intended to throw light on this subject on the basis of an analysis of events in the four theaters of operation of World War II. Accordingly, four sessions of the symposium were devoted as follows: the first--to the start of the war in the Pacific (reports by (S. Toyama) (Japan) and (P. Kherde) (FRG), the second--to the Atlantic Theater (reports by G. Weinberg (United States) and (Yu. Rover)) (FRG), the third--to military operations in the Mediterranean region (reports by (G. Sommerville)(Britain) and A. Santoni (Italy), and finally, the fourth--to events on the main front of World War II, the Soviet-German front (reports by A. M. Samsonov and (K. Reynkhard) (FRG)) were devoted to the Battle of Moscow).

With such a variety of themes and subjects, the definition of the concept of "turning point of the war" depended on finding the basic element and decisive event which caused the start of the radical turn in the course of World War II. Marxist historiography, as is known, considers the Battle of Moscow as such an event. Typical of bourgeois historiography is the tendency to belittle the significance of this victory, moving other factors and events to the foreground. Typical in this

¹ Founded in 1915 under the name "Library of the World War," the Library of Modern History, which is now located in Stuttgart, is not only the biggest collection in the FRG on the history of both world wars and on military history in general, but also one of the leading West German coordination centers on the study of these problems.

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regard were the introductory remarks of the chairman at the first session, (Ch. fon Lyuttishou) (United States), who represented the U. S. Army Center for the Study of Military History. On the one hand, he admitted the decisive role of the Battle of Moscow in the events of 1941 and in the failure of the Hitlerite blitzkrieg strategy, and on the other--he declared that the roots of the Soviet Army's success should be sought...in the events in the Pacific, in the peripetia of American-Japanese relations. The essence of his discourse was reduced to the fact that, he said, the United States and Britain "attracted" the strike of the Japanese aggressors and thus secured the eastern boundaries of the Soviet Union and permitted the Soviet command to accomplish the "mass" shifting of forces from the Far East to the west, which also decided the outcome of the Battle of Moscow.

The Soviet historians rejected this point of view as groundless. A. M. Samsonov showed that even prior to the entry of the United States in the war against Japan (and it began with defeats for the United States and Britain, so here in no way can a "turn" in favor of the allies be seen) the blitzkrieg strategy in the war of fascist Germany against the USSR had begun to suffer failure. He presented data on the disposition of Soviet troops by the start of the counteroffensive at Moscow, stressing the limited nature of the transfer of troops from the Far East and noting that for the duration of the entire war the USSR was forced to keep a considerable contingent there in case of a Japanese attack.

In concentrated form, the pro-American apologetic found expression in the report of the professor from the University of North Carolina, G. Weinberg, concerning American-German relations in 1939-1941. In accordance with his concepts, the entire course of World War II was determined by the United States even before it began to participate in it (!). He explained the initial failures of the allies by the "underarming" of the United States in the prewar years, and the final collapse of Hitler --by the fact that he "underestimated" the military-economic and moral potential of the United States. Despite the facts, the speaker tried to ascribe to the Soviet Union a tendency toward a deal with the aggressors--both with Germany as well as with Japan, and even toward giving them "assistance"(!). He stated that, allegedly, the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan of 13 April 1941 was a "success" of German-Japanese diplomacy. It untied the hands of the aggressors even more in their policy of expansion.

These statements received a well-reasoned rebuff not only on the part of the Soviet delegation. Typically, they were also subjected to criticism in the presentations of other participants in the symposium. (P. Kherde) noted that Japan's decision to refrain from attacking the USSR was not so much the consequence of various actions by the Western powers as the "experience of Khalkhin-Gol," that is, consciousness of the futility and danger of a policy of military adventures against the Soviet Union. He stressed that it is incorrect to interpret the Soviet-Japanese pact as proof of a concession by the Soviet side in face of the aggressor's policy. (P. Kherde) presented an extremely expressive example: Japan demanded as the "price" for concluding this pact the cessation of Soviet help for the victim of its aggression--China. However, the West German scholar stated, they did not succeed in achieving this--the USSR continued to assist her even after the signing of the pact. (A. Khil'gruber) (FRG) recalled the role of the Battle of Smolensk in Japan's decision to postpone the attack on the USSR.

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Further discussion, especially on problems of the "Battle of the Atlantic" and events in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, was reduced in considerable measure to a discussion of the military-technical aspects--primarily to an evaluation of the role of radio intelligence in operations to intercept transports and military vessels of the warring powers.

The futile attempt to belittle the significance of the Soviet people's heroic struggle against the German-fascist aggressors was displayed especially strikingly during the discussion of problems in the history of the Battle of Moscow. A. M. Samsonov, in his report, disclosed the natural character of the Wehrmacht's defeat at Moscow and showed the significance of this battle for the further course of the war as an event which marked the beginning of the radical turn in the course of World War II. The report showed the role of the defensive battles of the Soviet troops in the summer and fall of 1941 in the undermining of the Wehrmacht's striking force, the heroism of our fighting men, the role of the CPSU in organizing the enemy's rebuff, and the activity of the military command in directing the defense and preparing the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops at Moscow. A. M. Samsonov stressed the international significance of the Battle of Moscow for the cause of the common struggle of all peoples against the fascist aggressors. The report of A. M. Filitov on the historiography of the Battle of Moscow conducted a comparative analysis of the concepts "turn in the war" used in Marxist and bourgeois literature and subjected to criticism the thesis which exaggerates the role of the Western lend-lease deliveries in the victory at Moscow.

The basic propositions expressed by the Soviet historians did not cause any fundamental objections on the part of the Western participants in the symposium. It also proved to be no less characteristic that many important provisions of the report of (K. Reynkhard) proved to be in consonance with the theses of the Soviet speaker. The author of the book "Povorot pod Moskvoy" [Turning at Moscow] disclosed once again the catastrophic dimensions of the Wehrmacht's defeat at Moscow and its regularity.

In the course of the symposium, attempts occurred at artificially aggravating the polemics and "politicizing" the discussion using far-fetched statements about the "expansionism" of Soviet foreign policy. The matter was not limited to a repetition of the hackneyed stock phrases about the "striving of the USSR for hegemony" in Eastern Europe. One of the members of the American delegation--a teacher of the U.S. Army War College, H. Deutch, even stated that allegedly at the end of the 1930's the Soviet Union had the intention...to take Alaska from the United States. At times, the tendency was also displayed to uphold the "honor" of the Wehrmacht and whitewash the criminal policy and practice of the fascist aggressors on the territory of the USSR. Thus, (Yu. Ferster) (FRG) actually expressed the "military necessity" for the Hitlerite "order about commissars", thus making common cause with Nazi propaganda.

At the same time, condemnation of a number of falsification exercises of neo-fascist historiography were heard in presentations of participants in the symposium. Thus, (E. Yekel') (FRG) stressed that the Hitlerite attack on the USSR "was not provoked" and was not a "preventive war." Even in the report by G. Weinberg, along with the apologetic theses noted above, there was present admission of the fact that Hitler's aggressive plans were not at all the fruit of "improvisation" and that they had in mind not only the attainment of hegemony in Europe, as neo-Nazi authors write, but

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also the establishment of world domination. In this connection, G. Weinberg acknowledged that only the collapse of "Plan Barbarossa" forced Hitler to "put on the shelf" plans to attack the United States and capture the American continent.

Acknowledgements of this type testify once again to the significance of the exploit of the Soviet Army and our entire people who, 40 years ago, were the first to turn back the giant marauding military machine of the Wehrmacht. In an environment of acute ideological confrontation and faced by numerous more or less open or disguised attempts to belittle the significance of this exploit, the truth of its majesty and historic significance found understanding and response in the audience (among those attending the symposium were not only representatives of scientific and teaching circles of the FRG, but also the student youth which displayed great interest in the Soviet delegation).

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