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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 45/82)



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# WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

AEROSPATIALE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES PROFIT, REDUCED DEBT FOR 1981

Investment, Renovation Help

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 8 May 82 p 9

[Article by J.M.: "Satisfactory Situation at AEROSPATIALE"; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in boldface]

[Text] On 28 April, the president of AEROSPATIALE [National Industrial Aerospace Company], Mr Jacques Mitterrand, as the guest of the Association of Professional Aeronautics and Space Journalists, gave an overview of the activities of his company. In our last issue we provided our readers, as stop-press news, with a few significant figures taken from that lecture, which, however, deserves to be reported at much greater length today.

/The results/, before taxes, of the 1981 accounting period are largely positive, and the same will very likely be true for 1982. This satisfactory report is in keeping with a perspective of recovery which was started as of 1978. In 1977, the losses reached a level of 447 million francs, or less than 10 percent of the turnover (approximately 10 billion francs). In 1979, the balance had been restored with 8 million francs in positive results for an 11 billion franc turnover.

In 1980, AEROSPATIALE registered a 119 million franc profit for a 13.169 billion franc turnover; in 1981, the latter reached approximately 16.5 billion francs for the company, and 17.5 billion francs for the group, /with the results being between three and four times those for the 1980 accounting period.../

"The trade situation was good in 1981; it presents itself as satisfactory for 1982. The business, having gotten rid of its major clinkers, is of high quality." Other positive elements: an already very advanced and very clear /renovation/ of the enterprise as a whole, and specifically of its /industrial plant/; the /investment/ policy has recovered very actively: 129 million francs in 1977, 238 million francs in 1978, 493 million francs in 1979, 744 million francs in 1980 and /945 million francs in 1981/. The figures reported in the 1982 budget amount to approximately /1,200 million francs/; 40 to 45 percent of these investments were made in the "Airplanes" Division, in connection with the development of the Airbus program: in spite of the launching of the /ATR-42/ program in cooperation with Aeritalia, /the primary task of the Airplanes Division is to conduct the Airbus program/.

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/The indebtedness/ has been significantly reduced. In 1977, it was 4.411 billion francs; in 1978, it had been reduced to 3.663 billion francs, and in 1979 to 3.294 billion francs, in 1980 to 2.236 billion francs and /by the end of 1981 to 677 million francs/. But President Mitterrand believes that this level of indebtedness is almost sufficient and that in all likelihood it will be greater in the coming years...

This situation is due to significant down payments being made on certain contracts, to the relative reduction of expenditures, to the austerity of the management, and of course to the results of the business activities.

However, there are various worrisome elements: the need to renew the range of products, the marginality of the French domestic market, hence the need for significant /exports/, limited however by the serious crisis experienced by the airline companies, the sluggishness of European cooperation, the stagnation of some markets, the growing effort being made in terms of self-financing for study and future program development (in the face of a growing budgetary austerity), the evolution of currencies, and the lack of control of inflation. The increase in the value of the dollar was rather favorable, but it is difficult to contain French inflation, and President Mitterrand is afraid that serious problems may arise, which are tied to the evolution of currency exchange values and of the lack of control of inflation.

/In the social area/, an increase in contributions is to be noted, which threatens to become even greater. The measures of solidarity which have been taken will entail 220 to 230 million francs in supplementary wages and social contributions, or 3.5 percent of the aggregate remuneration of employees (5 to 6 percent over a full year).

Prior to the signing of the /solidarity contract/ with Mr Auroux, as 3,000 individuals seemed theoretically interested, they were counting on 1,500 departures, but there were 2,547 candidates...

On 31 December, the personnel strength was 35,390 individuals (parent company), as against a goal of 35,396. In 1982, natural attrition should produce approximately 500 departures; the reduction of working hours by 1 hour per week and the fifth week of vacation represent, in order /to restore/ the potential, the hiring of about 440 individuals. Taking into account the /increase/ in potential which is being considered, that is 570 individuals, and the effect of the solidarity contract, the 1982 hiring perspectives ultimately involve 3,390 individuals, or more than 10 percent of the current personnel strength. But experience shows that /it is difficult to find the necessary personnel/, especially in the skilled and highly skilled categories, including engineers. Competition with the other industrialists is intense...

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### Helicopter Sales

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22 May 82 p 15

[Article by J.M.: "AEROSPATIALE: More than 7,000 Helicopters Sold"]

[Text] On 30 June, AEROSPATIALE announced the following balance sheet for its helicopter sales:

- AS.332 "Super Puma": 144 units sold in 14 countries (of which 59 for the 1981 accounting period);
- SA.365 "Dauphin II": 407 units sold in 26 countries (of which 125 in 1981);
- AS.350 "Ecureuil/AStar": 945 units sold in 21 countries (of which 207 in 1981);
- AS.355 "Ecureuil II/Twin Star": 461 units sold in 21 countries (of which 210 in 1981);
- SA.340/341/342 "Gazelle": 1,060 units sold in 36 countries (of which 123 SA.342 in 1981);
- SA.315 "Lama": 369 units sold in 29 countries;
- SA.316/319 "Alouette III": 1,439 units sold in 74 countries (of which 15 in 1981);
- SA.321 "Super Frelon": 99 units sold in 8 countries.

Or a total of 4,924 helicopters; by adding the 680 "Puma" which have been delivered, the 1,305 Alouette III, and the 159 SA.1221 "Djinn," one arrives at a grand total of 7,000 units sold in some 100 countries.

The most remarkable points in these statistics are obviously related to the significant development in the sales of the three new generation helicopters: Super-Puma, Dauphin II, and the family of the Ecureuil/AStar; the latter, with 1,406 units sold, has already exceeded the Alouette II, and is coming within a hair's breadth of the Alouette III. There is a reasonable chance that, as of this year, AEROSPATIALE will go beyond the mark of the 1000 AS.350 and of that of the 500 AS.355.

Let us recall that in 1981, AEROSPATIALE sold 769 new helicopters as against 639 in 1980, 511 in 1979, 363 in 1978 and 343 in 1977. As of the middle of 1983, the production rate will reach 75 to 80 helicopters per month, of which 50 AS.350/AS.355, 16 Dauphin II and 6 Super-Puma.

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

INTERVIEW WITH CGIL'S LAMA ON CONFINDUSTRIA POLICY

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 24 May 82 pp 214-217

[Interview with Luciano Lama, secretary of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL), by Massimo Riva: "And on the contracts, let there be war!"]

[Text] "There's maneuvering going on in Confindustria, and it's aimed at cutting the workers' real wages," the CGIL secretary charges. The union will agree to the 16-percent cap, he says, but as for any discussion of changes in the COL index, the answer is a flat "No" until inflation has been brought down to tolerable levels.

If Confindustria wants war in the upcoming contract negotiations, it will get it. In response to the trumpets Vittorio Merloni sounded at Confindustria's assembly on Tuesday 11 May, Luciano Lama sounds the no less warlike tocsin in his union's stronghold. The quarrel would seem to be over the pre-negotiation demands laid down by industry: first we reach an agreement on labor costs, then we start talking renewal of labor contracts, which expired several months ago. The real stakes in these preliminary bouts, though, are a lot higher than that. In the interview granted PANORAMA, Lama warns that the core issue is the question of the workers' real wages: Confindustria is out to slash them, and the union is equally determined to protect them.

Even so, the leader of Italy's biggest labor organization admits that another heavy risk hangs over the contract negotiations: that battle could change to political war between political parties and special-interest groups that could divide both the nation and the political majority that keeps Spadolini's government in office. Lama openly accuses Confindustria of seeking to heat up the labor-management conflict to a point where it could bring down the government and precipitate a general crisis in the system.

Labor is ready to agree to a 16-percent cap on inflation in 1982, but will reject any attempt to cut the real purchasing power of



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the pay envelope. Therefore, Lama warns, any chance of labor's consenting to review the cost-of-living index will be postponed until such time as inflation has been brought down to acceptable levels. In any case, any audit of the costs of labor's demands must be conducted as part of contract negotiations: In Lama's view, there is no other bargaining table.

Merloni says he is firmly determined not to agree to contract negotiations, while Lama states his own determination to insist on them. As the opening shots in this contract war were fired, the conflict seemed wholly impatient of mediation: one or other of the combatants must lose. Luciano Lama's public statements reflect his boundless assurance that he is in the right. But will that suffice to give him victory in the end? Here, anyhow, is what he is doing to prepare for what will probably be the bitterest and lengthiest labor battle in this postwar period.

Question: Confindustria is standing pat, and Merloni said it again, to loud applause, at its latest assembly: no contract negotiations without prior agreement on labor costs and the COLA. What is Luciano Lama's response to this prior condition?

Answer: That nobody has ever got very far by laying down prior conditions, either on his own behalf or in the interests of others. There is a tendency these days to portray Confindustria's stubbornness as a great act of heroism. You would think that Merloni's words were the last word of the youngest of the Horatii! By rights, Confindustria ought to have the courage to say straight out what is hidden behind this sudden flight to pre-conditions.

Question: It seems to me, though, that industry has made it clear what it wants: to avoid shouldering the contract cost in addition to the costs it must pay as a result of such automatic adjustment mechanisms as the COLA. Isn't this, then, the real risk?

Answer: And we shall check to make sure about that risk when we sit down at the negotiating table. But no! Confindustria won't do that. Therefore I interpret its refusal as proof that there are some things hidden behind its pre-conditions that have nothing to do with money matters: and I mean political maneuvering against the government and against organized labor's role in the nation and in its institutions. They want to bring about a climate that would be propitious for a reactionary change of course. Of course they are laboring under a delusion, but that won't keep them from trying.

Question: It is, indeed, a rare occurrence for a president of Confindustria to attack a government the way Merloni has. And yet, the burden of his charges does not seem to have been cut from whole cloth. In June of 1981 Spadolini sponsored negotiations on labor costs, which led absolutely nowhere. Is it so surprising

that, after so many months, Confindustria should declare its disappointment with such "inconclusiveness?"

Answer: And what do we do about Confindustria's own "inconclusiveness"? In June 1981 there were two major commitments made: first, that both sides would base their behavior on respect for the assumption of a 16-percent rate of inflation in 1982; second, that the fight against inflation would not be waged by resorting to policies conducive to recession. At this point, it is we who are disappointed, not Confindustria.

Question: What has organized labor done or proposed over all these months, though?

Answer: We've done a lot. For instance, we have tried to set up talks with industry people on the matter of labor mobility and working hours, but they refused to talk. And again: we were the first to raise the issue of severance pay, which now has Confindustria howling both against the referendum and against the law to avoid it. Here again: flat refusal. But how can this be? In 1976 we reached an agreement, and now it is impossible to reach a new one: why? It's clear, though: somebody wants a head-on confrontation with organized labor, at all costs.

Question: And yet Confindustria has put the question of the COLA on the table, and you have refused to discuss it...

Answer: Of course we have, and we shall go right on refusing. In the June 1981 agreements there was the commitment to defend the real purchasing power of wages. But then, by laying hands on the COLA, they wanted to wriggle out of that commitment. So far only one industry spokesman has said it out loud: real wages will be cut. Probably what Mandelli says is what a lot of people in Confindustria want, but won't say so. In that case, it is they, not we, who are going back on the 1981 agreements.

Question: Are we ever going to get labor's opinion, once and for all, on this blasted cost-of-living index? You can't get very far by laying down pre-conditions, true: but you can't get far with taboos, either: right?

Answer: There are no taboos: the cost-of-living index will have to be modified. It is simply that we don't want any changes or reforms until inflation rates come down...

Question: So we're right back where we started: but isn't the cost-of-living index one of the reasons for high inflation?

Answer: Who says so? I can see countries that have no such machinery, and are sick with inflation just the same. I'm thinking of France and Great Britain, for example.

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Question: The fact remains that our situation is full of flaws and rife with negative consequences. Let me give you one instance: inflation has been dropping of recent months, but even so the next trigger-point will be around 12 points again. How do you explain this contradiction?

Answer: Simply: contrary to what a lot of people have always argued, the index catches up with inflation, rather than running ahead of it. In other words, it does not raise wages exorbitantly. Furthermore, you have to remember that the trigger point is still where it was 2 or 3 years ago. And we all know that 2,300 lire in 1982 is not the same as 2,300 lire in 1979, either in corporate costs or in the workers' pay envelopes.

Question: There are other drawbacks, too. For example, the COL index also reflects price increases due to increased taxes. When you do this, aren't you gutting Parliament's taxing power, and aren't you, de facto, hampering the government's freedom to take fiscal measures against inflation?

Answer: That's true, but only on the surface. The index is one of the defenses around wages, and then there are contracts, too. What you don't get from one side, you try to get on the other. That's what is done in all countries that look at consumer prices, without distinguishing between the gross and the net after taxes. Even in Sweden and in Germany...

Question: Actually, it seems to me that in Germany they have signed contracts for 1982 with increases below the inflation rate...

Answer: Very true: in Germany, the unions have agreed to a cut in workers' real wages. Precisely what we are not prepared to accept in Italy. This is a fundamental point that must be made clear to all parties, beginning with the government and Confindustria.

Question: But then, in these conditions, how do you get out of the stonewall-to-stonewall deadlock over the contract issue?

Answer: There is only one way out: get Confindustria to back down on its pre-conditions, and go to the table on national contract negotiations. This must be the place for lira-by-lira verification of the claimed cost of labor's demands.

Question: In the June 1981 agreement there was a 16-percent lid placed on inflation, to which labor contracts were also to be subject. Does labor intend to stand by that commitment?

Answer: Of course. We are perfectly happy with the 16-percent. Besides that, though, there must also be some allowance made for the productivity increases that might be achieved: these, too, must show up in the pay envelope. In any case, we must get into the merits of the contractual platform, and that is where we must talk about the overall costs.

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Question: Are you planning to ask the government to step in to get negotiations with industry started?

Answer: We're not going to ask anybody for anything. We shall push Confindustria into negotiations by means of union action, and by showing the whole country the futility and the danger of pre-conditions. As for the government, we expect it to be consistent in its behavior....

Question: In other words, to pressure the state-owned companies into breaking ranks with Confindustria and opening separate negotiations?

Answer: As for public employees, the government has dealt with the unions without laying down any pre-conditions. I see no reason why the state-owned corporations ought to behave otherwise.

Question: Well, though, there is political disagreement on that score right now among the parties and among cabinet ministers. From many quarters, one gets the impression that the contract issue is getting to be the central one in a lot of large-scale political maneuvers, some of them aimed at Spadolini's government. How does organized labor view these moves?

Answer: I am very much concerned about them, indeed, because we do not want to see this clash become politicized. The danger is that a matter of labor's interests could be manipulated to foster ends that have nothing to do with protecting the earnings of workers. The fact is that Confindustria, first and foremost, doesn't play around when it comes to politicizing, and that it is sniping at us and at the government alike. This proves that its objective is to turn the country around, politically, and thus to diminish the clout and the voice of the social classes represented by organized labor. This is the most alarming aspect of their resort to pre-conditions.

Question: There are people, even in Confindustria, who are holding out a hand to organized labor and urging both sides to put aside traditional antagonisms. What is your answer to these people?

Answer: For the time being, I say to them that they should get down to work at convincing Confindustria as a whole of the need to sit down around the table and negotiate. The only place to test good intentions is in bargaining.

Question: What if the loser in this showdown turns out to be the Spadolini government?

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**Answer:** That will be the final, incontrovertible evidence that some forces are determined to twist this whole process for political destabilization. Organized labor has no interest in stirring up confusion and disorder, and the workers will judge, with all due severity, those who try to use the contract issue for partisan political purposes.

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ECONOMIC

SPAIN

**LABOR AGREEMENT FAILS BECAUSE OF WORSENING ECONOMY**

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 14 Jun 82 pp 66-68

[News commentary: "The ANE That Never Was"]

[Text] A year ago, during the afternoon of 9 June, a historic pact was signed in Spain, the National Employment Agreement (ANE), which was touted as the philosopher's stone for all the problems of the Spanish economy. The strategy was simple: the workers would make a wage concession, with increases between 9 and 11 percent, and the employers would make investments creating 350,000 new jobs and reactivating the economy.

One year later, the mechanism has not worked. The workers have seen their wages reduced within the agreed-upon range (the average wage increase has been 10.29 percent); however, unemployment has continued to grow (279,000 more unemployment since the ANE was signed and as of the beginning of April) and prices continue out of control (a 5.2 percent increase in the first 4 months, even though the government's prognostication was 12 percent for the entire year).

Doubtless this will force an [upward] revision of wages in September-October, when the rise in prices for the first 6 months is known. As a guarantee clause imposed by the unions, the ANE established the following proviso: if prices rise more than 6.09 percent in the first 6 months (they are expected to increase between 6.5 and 7 percent) "an [upward] revision of wages will be effected equivalent to the excess above the figure cited, with computation of double this excess to allow for the behavior of the consumer price index [CPI] for the entire 12-month period."

**Wage Revision**

This increase will be effective retroactive to 1 January 1982, pursuant to the ANE, indexed to the wages used as the reference point for this year's increases. This [upward] revision could presage a "long hot summer," with some employers who never had faith in the ANE being beset by a complex of problems, with unions which have suffered a loss of wages and their own inability to make a serious offset of jobs in exchange for the wage concession.

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"The ANE is not the problem, as it was and is necessary. It is instead the fact that the ANE was not accompanied by other remedies, given the delay in international reactivation, the drop in consumption and economic activity and the absence of private investment," CAMBIO 16 was told by a distinguished PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] economist. As a matter of fact, the socialist executive committee has just described the economic situation as "of great concern," and criticism is mounting within the PSOE of those who defended the wage reduction as the answer to all problems. "We have seen that the bright idea of some UGT [General Union of Workers] leaders and a PSOE economist, who said that two percentage points less in wages are equal to 350,000 jobs, is somewhat unrealistic, except in a planned economy," added the socialist expert, for whom "the ANE has not done the job."

The employers signed the ANE under governmental pressure and a few months after the fateful 23 February; however, they never agreed with its philosophy. Now, Jose Antonio Segurado, the "hawk" of the employers' organization, the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], is stating it very clearly: "We employers will not sign another ANE. We favor agreements between social parties without government intervention." For experts of the business sector, the principal problem of the Spanish economy on this first birthday of the ANE is the public deficit. "The public deficit is destroying the ANE. It is preventing materialization of the hoped-for effect of the wage concession," an expert from the private banking sector told this magazine.

**The Worst, the Deficit**

In his opinion, the deficit in the public sector is pushing up prices, is forcing the Bank of Spain to adopt a policy of containment of available credit ("the fact that interest rates have not come down in the last few years is due principally to the deficit") and reinforcing the upward thrust of the peseta's rate of exchange.

"This is serious because it encourages the purchase of foreign products instead of national products, which means that we are exporting jobs; and that the deficit is destroying employment. Therefore, the PSOE has for the first time attacked the public deficit because it knows that it is working against employment," he added.

In fact, Joaquin Almunia, a member of the PSOE executive committee, has said that the increase in the public deficit is now 1 billion pesetas and that there is a lack of control and rigor on the part of the government. "The increase in this deficit will have negative repercussions on all the country's economic sectors," Almunia added.

For the employers and the political right, the deficit has become the principal offensive weapon against the government's economic team.

Jose Antonio Segurado, vice president of the CEOE, has accused the government of "not having the political will to control public spending." There are also indications that the subject of the deficit is an offensive weapon inside the UCD [Democratic Center Union] itself.

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"Anyone who says that the government does not have the political will to reduce public spending, if he knows what he is saying, is lying and, if he does not know what he is saying, he is irresponsible. I call upon whomever it may concern to go over the [budget] actions taken line item by line item," Finance Minister Garcia Anoveros stated inclusively as he presented the breakdown of the 1981 [as published] Budget, which had a bottom-line deficit of 618 billion pesetas, a figure which appears to have been reached already.

Garcia Anoveros, with a stern look on his face after a television interview, added that the government was all alone in the public deficit sector.

"There are many people complaining; however, requests for spending come from all sides. From the right, for example, the AP [Popular Alliance] has presented an illegal family allowance proposal to Congress which would entail the expenditure of 680 billion pesetas. And from the left, even though the figure is smaller, there is also a request for more spending."

If, for many experts, the public deficit is the number one economic problem, for most Spaniards unemployment is the main worry. And there is a certain amount of pessimism because, in spite of the wage concession, the number of unemployed continues to rise. The most recent figures from the National Statistics Institute (INE) speak of 2,062,600 unemployed at the end of March, 74,000 more than at the beginning of the year. And 279,000 more unemployed than when the ANE was signed.

"We have to be careful with figures. It is true that unemployment continues to rise; however, what is more important is that the employment situation is improving. For the first time in the first 6 months of 1982, employment has increased," CAMBIO 16 was told by a high official in the Ministry of Economy. In fact, during the first 3 months of the year, the work population increased 0.29 percent.

**Employment Improving**

"This gives us cause for hope, as it confirms the trend of the last three quarters, namely that the rate of job losses is dropping. Although this has still not halted the increase in unemployment, there is reason to hope that the increase in employment will absorb the growth in the work population," the administration expert added.

At the beginning of 1981, the rate of the drop in employment was 4 percent; at the end of the year it had only declined 2 percent; and in this first quarter it has increased 0.29 percent, for the first time. The impression is that the increase in unemployment is no longer being produced by the loss of jobs (except in some specific realignments) but instead by an increase in the work population, by those 150,000 young people entering the job market every year. But that increase in the work population cannot be stopped by the ANE, which has to be given credit for the rise in employment, according to government sources.



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Even so, employment will not be reactivated until the economy recovers. And that depends a great deal on the international economy, which is not improving as expected. The forecasts made at the beginning of the year by the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] for its 24 countries, a growth rate of 1.25 percent this year, will not be met; and now there is an estimated growth rate of between 0.3 and 1 percent.

Spain also has revised its 3 percent downward, to 2.5 percent, which, for business sector experts consulted by this magazine, "is a dream."

The very depressed international economy affects the level of economic activity, but very fundamentally Spanish prices. "We are paying the consequences of American policy which for a year and a half has been devaluating the peseta. Thus the factor of imported products, which are now more costly, is making the CPI rise more than expected," this magazine was told by sources at the Ministry of Economy.

For other experts, prices have risen more than expected because of the food factor (increases in agricultural prices) and because of the devaluation of the peseta, although it could be a factor in greater economic activity, given the way in which the market operates in Spain. All the experts are confident that if the dollar does not continue to rise, wages moderation can begin to come into play and prices, at year's end, will not have increased more than 13 percent.

There are indicators of economic activity to suit all tastes. One of the experts points out that investment and economic activity are stagnated, while others say that they are beginning to be reactivated. It all depends upon what side these factors are viewed from. "The economy is in the process of moderate expansion. Exports and public investment are picking up, while private investment is not now negative as in previous years," Ministry of Economy sources maintain.

The most recent somewhat revealing percentage figure, for January (oh, statistics!), speaks of a 3.3 percent drop in the industrial production index. Not so, say experts of the business sector. "Be careful. The month of January had one less work day; therefore, in reality there was a 2 percent increase," an administration expert points out. What is more, the prices of durable goods are increasing at a rapid pace, which is interpreted as indicative of a certain amount of reactivation of private consumption.

**Waiting for the Economic Takeoff**

The year 1982 was going to be the year of "the worst is over," the beginning of reactivation. However, the latest figures on unemployment and prices have darkened the picture, at least at the public opinion level. "Everything seems more negative because the government has given the country very inflated expectations which are now turning against it, in a 'boomerang' effect." The economy is going along more or less as predicted at the beginning of the year. We knew that it was going to be a better year than 1981, and it is; however, we had no reasons to expect a rapid reactivation and we have not had one," an expert close to the banking sector points out.

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The socialists think that things are not going better because the government is not taking the bull by the horns and does not have an overall economic policy. Joaquin Almunia has said, "The only way to overcome the economic crisis is a policy of coordination."

Confronted by both positions, the government continues to display moderate optimism. "The economy is reactivating as had been predicted. Employment is increasing; economic activity has picked up somewhat; and there are improvements in exports and the foreign deficit. The only things not going well, and we feel that these will be corrected during the year, are inflation and the public deficit, which must be controlled," CAMBIO 16 was told by a high official of the Ministry of Economy.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

FORMER PRIME MINISTER SEES DETERIORATION IN TIES WITH AFRICA

Paris LE POINT in French 24 May 82 p 88

[Interview with Pierre Messmer, former prime minister and African affairs specialist, by Mireille Duteil; date and place not given: "Doubt Has Arisen Between Africa and France"]

[Text] At a time when François Mitterrand is making his first official tour in black Africa, Pierre Messmer, former governor of French West Africa and specialist in African affairs at the RPR, considers that French policy is viewed with increasing disapproval in Africa.

[Pierre Messmer] At first, François Mitterrand's election was well received in most African countries. Within 1 year, however, I see that this favorable reaction has declined everywhere. In certain countries it has even been replaced by an unfavorable attitude.

[LE POINT] How do you explain that?

[Answer] This change has several causes. The first has to do with the present government's policy and its ideology. Socialists have a third-worldist policy that is aimed at all underdeveloped countries, whatever they may be. The recent reorganization of the Ministry for Cooperation illustrates this. Suddenly, Africans fear that the privileged relations they are used to having might again be challenged. That is one of the reasons for the doubt that has arisen in Africa.

The second reason is more political. Socialists and communists in power are somewhat suspicious of regimes that for the most part have been born of military coups d'etat. Such governments do not seem good to them. There is no natural sympathy between them. Rather, I should have said there is a natural antipathy between them. All that is discussed and repeated in Africa, and the favorable attitude at the outset has much diminished, the more so because there have been certain actions.

[Question] What do you mean?

[Answer] There were efforts at destabilization. There is no doubt that, despite government denials, the Patassé affair in Oubangui was one of them. The

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Oubangui government boasts of having seized documents containing explicit proof of it. At Libreville there is also a less serious matter but nevertheless of the same kind. I could cite more of them.

Question Should there not be a difference between PSF actions and those of the government?

Answer This distinction is easy for a European to understand, but it is unacceptable for an African, in whose eyes the PSF is above all the party of the president of the Republic. Africans wonder how the president could allow his party to conduct a policy that is different from his own. For them it is either duplicity or lack of authority. In either case, it is not good.

Question Can one deal, under the pretext of realism, with governments that trample on human rights?

Answer My reply is that the government is doing it in Chad by furnishing arms and munitions that allow the Chadians to massacre each other.

Question Let us discuss Chad. You cannot deny that the departure of the Libyans is a positive development.

Answer Quite so. But that is only a first step. The objective is peace. I see that it has not been attained; on the contrary. I think the policy to follow is not to intervene militarily, either directly or indirectly. Currently, direct military intervention has ended. I had already criticized it under Giscard. But, through the furnishing of arms, indirect military intervention continues. In my opinion the French ought to confine themselves to humanitarian actions, acting through de facto authorities wherever they exercise their power. With Kamougue, in the south; with Goukouni, at Fort Lamy; with Hissein Habré, at Abéché, for example. France does not have to choose sides with the different Chadian groups now tearing themselves apart to seize power.

Question Your solution amounts to legalizing an ethnic Chad...

Answer We tried in vain in the colonial period to eliminate it.

Question But it was the Gaullists who started things in Chad by supporting Tombalaye...

Answer You are right and it is because of that defeat that I stopped supporting that policy. For the past 10 years I have constantly proposed another one.

Question Today it is said that more democratic government-to-government relations must replace the personal relations between chiefs of state. Is it not time to clean up Franco-African relations? You cannot deny that in the past Bokassa's eviction and Dacko's arrival in a French plane deeply shocked African people. And yet Foccart left only good memories...

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**[Answer]** Government-to-government relations are no more democratic than personal ones. I do not believe that this is necessarily a step forward. Criticizing the personalization of political ties between France and Africa betrays ignorance of African psychology. However, one must never be a prisoner of these ties; de Gaulle and...even Pompidou were not; but VGE **[Valéry Giscard d'Estaing]** and François Mitterrand are, in a way, prisoners.

**[Question]** Mitterrand?

**[Answer]** I do not want to tell you how, but I know. And I have proof of it.

**[Question]** In your opinion what are the greatest current dangers to France's African policy?

**[Answer]** The greatest current dangers are the disinterest of the Socialist government and the indifference of a large part of the French public opinion.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

MEANING OF SOCIALIST RADICALIZATION EXAMINED

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French Sum 82 pp 276-280

[Article result of a discussion among persons of various professions and political views who have adopted the pseudonym 'Xenocrate']

The word "radicalization" is a quite recent neologism, for it appeared last summer in the wake of the left's installation in power. It was particularly linked to the June legislative elections, which gave the PS, as we know, the "impossible chamber," since with 269 seats the Socialists alone have an absolute majority in the Palais Bourbon. Thus the concept of "radicalization" does not in itself have a concrete or precise content. It proceeds at once from a reflex of fear by the different conservative and liberal families, and from a politicians' tactic by RPR and UDF leaders. It belongs to symbolic discourse: the idea that the whole state apparatus will break with pluralism and drift towards ever more planned and bureaucratic practices, with the Socialist-Communist coalition henceforth dominating our major institutions--the presidency, the National Assembly, the trade union groups. In a word, "radicalization" would mean imposition of state control and bureaucratization on the country, a "soft revolution" in the name of an ideology called socialist.

After a year in power, it is now of interest to ask whether this "radicalization" is more than a scare word or slogan, and whether it has found a foot-hold in our political and administrative reality.

It is evident that such a phenomenon can be seen in a thousand ways, depending on whether one is a member of the CNPF [French National Employers' Council] or a PCF militant. We can nevertheless strive to pinpoint the objective indices which contradict or confirm the process of "radicalization," and ask this question: do the changes effected since 10 May tend toward rampant statism?

The First Decisions

Several decisions taken and laws voted pursuant to the 110 Proposals for France--also known as the Mitterrand program--contain nothing in the nature

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of statism. On the contrary, we are seeing a determination to disengage the state: by departmental decentralization; by regionalization in a typically liberal form; by a special status for Corsica; by abrogation of such exceptional procedures as resort to the State Security Court, permanent armed forces tribunals, or special anti-demonstrator laws; by deregulation of private associative activities, etc. Concerning the broadening of the nationalized sector, we can legitimately ask what differentiates the mission of general administrators chosen by the government from that formerly assigned to chairmen co-opted by a "capitalist" board of directors. Indeed, if it is considered in terms of the injunctions addressed to the 51 administrators appointed by their supervising ministries--Economy and Finance or Industry--that mission is based on all the key words of triumphant liberalism: competitiveness, earning capacity, profit, strategy, efficiency.

The spirit of the reforms completed or in progress is not therefore synonymous with "radicalization," and it is moreover remarkable that those in power stress their desire to liberate society so as to return to each citizen all his responsibilities. The PCF leaders are not alone in insisting heavily on that goal of liberalization.

Fundamentally, the first acts of the government in power have seldom flowed from the logic of a coherent system. They have resulted either from commitments made by Francois Mitterrand, by chance, in the tribulations of his long march to the highest office--as is particularly the case with the nationalization program--or from the interests and aspirations of a certain electoral constituency, as in the case of the proclaimed determination to abolish the free schools; or from a rather Keynesian analysis of the economic crisis, which runs counter to that made in most Western countries, but which in itself is in no way "radicalizing."

Why then fear that the Socialist government is tightening the net of bureaucratic statism?

A Return to Dogmatism?

In truth, "radicalization"--if it should occur in a country as developed as ours--will not emerge from a series of texts or reforms, but from a reintroduction of dogma, of ideology, into the practices of power. From a knowledge born of experience, we would pass insidiously and slowly to one based on doctrinaire certitudes--"socialist" in this instance. More fundamentally, the government, to insure its legitimacy, would start from the following postulate: the French opted in May 1981 for a Socialist state, very specifically for Socialist bureaucracy, as the caste best able to guarantee the survival of technological society.

Such a return to dogmatism, which is never without regression or obscurantism, would inevitably proceed through a rehabilitation of the "party" as the instrument of instigation, initiative, and governmental action. The "party" would not only control but accompany the executive in management of state affairs.

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## Rereading Augustin Cochin

To understand the progression of that influence, it is not without interest to reread Augustin Cochin. Recently revealed to the public through a new edition of his works and through the studies devoted to him by Francois Furet, Cochin is the great historian of revolutionary dynamics. It is in the name of the nation, he explains, that philosophical societies speak. In principle, then, democracy would be unlimited. In the shadows, however, inner circles prepare decisions; a small minority, with mastery of the mechanisms by which is expressed the "national will," animates a process which intervenes to authenticate the democratic ideal to which it appeals. This mechanism is not static; in the course of successive siftings, it propels to the top a certain type of man; from Mirabeau to Robespierre, from the Constituent Assembly to the Convention, it tends necessarily, and independently of the leaders, towards an increasing "radicalization." "In deliberating political clubs as in philosophical societies, writes Augustin Cochin, "not all members are equally assiduous, active, zealous, or fitted for work. A spontaneous sorting operates in favor of certain temperaments better gifted for the operation in question. Out of a hundred members, there are hardly five effective ones, and they are the masters of the group; they are the ones who select new members, appoint the secretariat, make the motions, manage the votes ... Thus within society at large is formed another society, smaller but more active and unified, which will no trouble directing the larger without its knowledge. It is composed of the most ardent, least scrupulous, and most adept at the cuisine of votes. Each time the larger group meets, those few foregather in the morning, see their friends, concert their plan, give the word, excite the lukewarm, and bear down on the timid. Since their entente is of long standing, they hold all the trumps. They have cowed the secretariat, shoved aside the troublemakers, set the date and agenda....The "general will" is no freer than a locomotive on its rails."

Although Cochin's thesis applies primarily to the PCF, which is rather close to what the Jacobin Club and the philosophical societies were like, it applies as well to the PS, in which the essentially Jacobin tendency has now won the day.

## The Party Regime

In other words, and according to Cochin's reasoning, "radicalization"--statism--will become effective if the crossed ideologies of the PS and PCF succeed in irrigating the minds of the establishment. From a regime of consensus legitimized by the idea that the president, once elected, is the representative of all Frenchmen in their diversity and plurality of thought, we would then pass to a dominant party regime founded on the principle that the president is first the representative of the Socialists: a regime in which the philosopher's stone is given priority, if need be in contempt of the formal rules on which the republic is founded. It was Claude Estier, in L'UNITE of 22 January, who questioned the "ostensibly legal arguments"



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of the Constitutional Council against the nationalizations bill; it was Lionel Jospin who declared in October that "never have great waves of reform allowed themselves to be stopped by any supreme court"; it was Andre Laignel who said in a parliamentary debate: "You are legally wrong, for you are a political minority"; and it was Louis Mermaz, speaker of the National Assembly, who predicted: "Henceforth, it depends on us that there be an alternation between the only forces of the future...."

Francois Mitterrand's septennate has in fact inaugurated a ritual without precedent under the Fifth Republic: the weekly rendez-vous every Tuesday morning at an Elysee breakfast of the head of state, his prime minister, the first secretary of the PS, and a few barons of the Socialist apparatus. If this "summit," free of all formality, is not in itself a decision-making group, neither is it a mere gathering for mundane conversation. Whatever the intentions of Francois Mitterrand, such a meeting, when institutionalized, objectively gives the PS leadership the means to bring its weight to bear on the functioning of the public powers: the means to influence--if not to determine and control--national policy.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the impact of this very select committee, with the "party" readily assuming the title of "representative of the people of the left." The head of state, it will be said, intends above all to keep the upper hand over the troops of the PS. Of course. Francois Mitterrand will not, however, prevent a debate from arising between him, Pierre Mauroy, Lionel Jospin, and a few others. Who, in the end, dominates whom? The answer is difficult, since Francois Mitterrand, no matter what one says, has a very artificial public image: in him the personage masks the person. In the course of months and years, in proportion to the "charisma" of each, it is likely that a balance of power will emerge between the Elysee, Matignon, and PS headquarters--one in which socialist and partisan ideology will not count for nothing.

It is conceivable that the deep finalities of the state apparatus would then in time experience a shakeup. And the focus used above with reference to regionalization, nationalizations, and various reforms would be very suspect.

## Ideology and Archaism

Certainly, the process by which the ideology of one party, in a country such as ours, could mesh with the government's policy to the point of overwhelming democratic pluralism would clearly be very subtle. There are, nevertheless, certain warning signals which testify to a degree of exasperation on the part of Socialist leaders in the face of what they call the "soft" line followed until now. For example, Christian Goux, chairman of the Finance Committee of the National Assembly, warns that "we must finally apply our policy, and with men who believe in it." He is a statist, an advocate of economic planning, a true believer in strict control of prices and incomes. Other signs are the theme of "democratization of nationalized

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enterprises," that of "representation of political parties in enterprises," the debate provoked within the majority by the Anroux report. In a word, a number of PS leaders aspire to "ideologize" the social fabric, to reinvent a "citizenship" the French are held to have lost. A specious, groping maneuver grounded in reaction; one which presents itself as ideologically revolutionary, but is essentially reactionary in the face of modernity: in time, it would institutionalize a permanent balance of forces in all the mechanism of social life; to the informational, technological, and scientific complexity of the contemporary world, it would oppose a dogmatic, set, and simplistic language. If the next few months were to confirm this PS ambition to impose its tablets of law on the representatives of the state, the famous "archaism" formerly denounced by Michel Rocard could find room to spread.

In nationalized enterprises the logic of realism and pragmatism would be rapidly led astray, with social objectives regularly being put ahead of economic imperatives and requirements of profitability. Indeed profit--though not becoming the ultimate end, and though achieved with a concern for social progress--still remains the best instrument for measuring the quality of an enterprise. But it is a datum scorned by socialist ideology. It belongs on the list of banished words, with "money," "boss," "large," and "bourgeois." Such a view of the play of economic forces would not fail to influence the conduct of leaders, and we could see a slippage towards expediency, towards increasingly frequent recourse to public funds. That would be followed shortly by the vicious circle of inordinate budget deficits; protectionism--for there are those in the PS who want to reduce our foreign trade to 20 percent of our GNP; a marked increase in the burden of taxes and special levies; and a weakening of our international competitive position.

It can already be noted--to the extent that reduction of social hazards, and consequently of social performance, serves as the philosophical foundation for reduction of inequalities--that the authorities direct their main attack, by means of tax and income policy, against "productive inequalities," that is, inequalities between individuals. On the other hand, they permit continuation, and even expansion, of "collective inequalities" which are the vehicles of economic Malthusianism, and which are embodied in statutes, vested rights, and guaranteed minimum clauses. The decision promulgated by the Elysee on the "39-hour" question is a perfect illustration of such conservative and statutory practices. The brightest jewel of bureaucracy is "statutory" society. A "social" or socialist economy is the most elaborate form of a "statutory" regime favoring a permanent mass of people often mediocre and irresponsible.

It is difficult to conceive, however, that "radicalization" could make really appreciable gains unless economic difficulties take a sudden turn for the worse. It is when faced with adversity that a partisan government radicalizes itself, by imputing its vexations to this or that socio-professional group, and by cleverly appropriating all forms of discontent: in a word, by attributing to itself the noble role which would consist of denouncing corporate egoisms--the expression is in the air--or a reactionary "plot," "sabotage," all things which would serve as pretexts for extremist measures.

### Scenarios

In terms of political strategy several scenarios are conceivable:

The PS could progressively yield to the PCF without a fight. That would mean a soft "radicalization" which would proceed by a series of apparently minor concessions, whose cumulative effect would gradually lead to a transfer of power favoring the "pure and hard" ideologues of the Socialist-Communist coalition;

Or the PCF, while avoiding harsh defiance, could strive to weaken the government by opposing the "left wing" of the PS to its "right wing." That tactic, dubbed "Hungarian salami," would adopt the goal of denouncing all those who "compromise with reaction," and of shifting the center of gravity of the PS leftward;

Or thirdly--if this can be imagined--a direct confrontation between the PCF and PS could lead to the latter's capitulation, with the armistice between the two parties resulting in "Finlandization" of France.

It will be noted that the general resolution presented to the 24th PCF congress fits into the concept of a "Finlandized" Europe. Dismemberment of NATO and the EEC, gradual neutralization of West Germany, and military disengagement by the United States would reduce Europe to a mere cluster of more or less autonomous principalities on the marches of the Soviet empire, and whose bonds of vassalage would be reflected by economic and technological tribute. In such a situation, the Soviet interest, in a country such as France, would not lie in actually seizing power, but in insuring the docility--masked by democratic forms--of those vested with national sovereignty.

Beyond those most pessimistic hypotheses, another must be considered: the government could set up a facade of "radicalization" behind which it could carry out a discreet socio-economic reorientation. Did not radicalism, early in this century, break with socialism by putting forth new secular and republican slogans, thereby keeping the appearance of a party of the left? Secularism, the battle over schools, and antimilitarism in the Dreyfus affair allowed Waldeck-Rochet and Combes to break away from the conservatives while following a very prudent social policy. Today the Socialists, by speaking in a very leftish language on appropriate themes, could maintain a political excitation and pressure as a means of letting off the steam of the militants. The resurgence of the battle over schools is a good example of this method of compensation. In foreign policy, the diplomacy followed towards Latin America fits the same scheme. It is always possible to put a Phrygian cap on a relatively prudent policy: that is simply a matter of allowing the development, here and there, of permanent personality conflicts which the government can arbitrate with the desired degree of harshness. A few dissidents--heads of enterprises, journalists, and the like--can occasion admirably orchestrated figurative "executions."

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That theatrical "radicalization" of the left, which consists in concealing a return to opportunism beneath the cloak of a highly accentuated class vocabulary, reverts to the tradition of the right, which wraps its conservative policy in fine unanimist speeches. In that category, the Oscar winner is Mexico, which masks a plutocratic society behind an ostensibly revolutionary label.

This sketch of a "radicalization" of socialism in the French manner in no way pretends to prophecy. It is but one among some ten other possible paths of evolution for the present septennate.

It is likewise by deliberate design that no analysis has been made here either of the evident risks of a "radicalization" of rightist political forces in response to that of the left, or of the powerful obstacles the government would no doubt meet should it ever set in motion a process of radical state control. It is even now noticeable that a liberal center-left, concerned with both justice and realism, is becoming disturbed by trend which conforms but little with the results expected from the 10 May victory. Moreover, a drift by the regime would inevitably lead to the casting out or voluntary departure of several personalities, who would then be well placed to denounce before the public any possible threats to civil liberties. On the trade union front, the leaders of Force Ouvriere, the CFTC, CGC /General Managers' Confederation/, FEN /National Education Federation/, and CFTD, moreover, proved at the time of the Polish crisis what their attitude would be if our fundamental rights were one day threatened. As for the media, print or audiovisual, they maintain a salutary critical distance, although they are the systematic target of resentment by Communists and five or six PS leaders including Poperen, Estier, and Rousselet. Ruling out the worst case, it appears that "radicalization" would lead to growing isolation of the holders of power from the organizations which brought them to office.

This much remains, which should be remembered: in a relativistic, unstable, and cybernetic world, the ideological certainties which guide Communists and a number of Socialists are not without their dangers.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

**POSITION OF CONSERVATIVE CLUBS, UDF, RPR EXAMINED**

Paris PROJET in French May 82 pp 587-597

[Article dated 26 March 1982 by Colette Ysmal, Center for the Study of Contemporary French Politics (FNSP): "Opposition Group Situations"]

[Text] The results of the recent cantonal elections (14 and 21 March 1982) show changes in public opinion. The right, very much a minority in May and June 1981, finds itself a slight majority 10 months later.<sup>1</sup> The conservative parties, which had announced their intention of setting out to regain power starting with the local help, saw their wish fulfilled. They themselves were doubtless surprised by that. In fact, the paradox is that this electoral success is based on no real strategy and on institutional and programmatic deficiency. Ten months after the election of Francois Mitterrand to the presidency of the republic, the opposition has managed to channel discontent. But it has not yet overcome its structural weaknesses, weaknesses that its changeover from majority to opposition had exposed.

**The Flowering of Clubs and Colloquia**

During the weeks following the legislative elections there was disarray, which was expressed in the proliferation of "clubs" or study groups. Undoubtedly the conservative parties, still mesmerized by the left, were rushing to adopt proven recipes as their own. They too are discovering their powerlessness in the face of a government that no longer belongs to them, in the face of an overwhelming parliamentary majority and in the face of their own more or less highlighted nonexistence. In September 1981, two RPR [Rally for the Republic] leaders started The 89 Club, and Jean-Louis Berthet, former member of Jean-Pierre Soisson's cabinet [of advisers], brought together several dozen people close to the UDF [Union for French Democracy] in the Pact for Government and Liberal Action (PAGEL). In early December 1981, Charles Pasqua, with about 10 UDF and RPR cofounders rallying around him, introduced Solidarity and Liberty to the press. In January 1982, some individuals close to the National Center of Independents joined together in Independent and Liberal Presence, a Future and Liberty Association held its first press conference and the Republican Action Committees (CAR) made itself known through a poster campaign. Finally, during the same period, well-known people were reviving already existing structures. That was the case with Olivier Stirn, member of the Radical Party, who revived his

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Movement of Social Liberals, and with the CDS [Center of Social Democrats], which put new life into its France-Forum Club, named after the magazine founded in 1957.

With the exception of the Movement of Social Liberals, which says it is seeking "French-style social democracy," all these organizations claim to be antisocialist. However, the main thing is not so much their doctrine as their strategy. For all of them, whether they are close to the RPR or the UDF or are outside those two political formations, it is a question first of providing themselves the means of regaining their "educative power" from the left prior to any recovery of political power. Hence, the success of these study groups in becoming involved in debate on ideas and providing an opposition with plans and with a more stirring "ideology" for Frenchmen than mere management questions. However, these clubs are also a way of insuring a reduced presence. They address themselves easily to people who are not politically active, who at any rate were not so before 10 May, and who, as the CAR's posters say, "feel the need nowadays to get involved and to act without joining a party." The political formations are present in the form of their representatives, if only to monitor the operations of the clubs. But even if those formations are a little uneasy, they are thankful for initiatives that seem to be a good formula for the right, since the aversion of conservative voters for involvement in the parties is so great.<sup>2</sup>

The targets are relatively obvious: people who are naturally hostile to socialism, first and foremost independent workers and professional people,<sup>3</sup> but also those categories over which the left and the right have been fighting for about 10 years, especially professionals who, according to the opposition, committed the sin of voting Socialist in May and June 1981 but will have quickly gotten over their illusions. It is significant that many prime movers in these clubs are themselves high-level public or private sector professionals.

Getting "educative power" back implies the organization of colloquia and seminars. These have increased in number, in particular with the organizing of two big events: "For An Alternative to Socialism" (Paris, 5-6 December 1981) and the "Freedom Meetings" put together in Lyon on 29 January 1982. By so doing, the parties of the opposition seemed to draw closer to the groups of the "new right": the latter groups themselves, reviving Gramsci in passing, extol the "power of ideas" and maintain that renewal comes through revolution in mental outlooks. Alain Grotteray, Lionel Stoleru and Alice Saunie-Seite--members of the Republican Party--participated in the "For An Alternative to Socialism" colloquium in which GRECE [Research and Study Group for European Civilization] was a prime mover; Alain Juppe, Alain Grotteray and Alain Mayoud (UDF) led the Clock Club's political seminar (12 December 1981)...

**The Parties of the UDF Searching for Their Identity**

These supplementary or parallel activities must not, however, hide the fact of the crisis of the parties themselves--a crisis of which those activities are the expression, at least in part, and a crisis that undoubtedly affects

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the UDF more severely than it does the PRP. It is quite understandable that the UDF and the parties that comprise it up were the most affected by the May-June 1981 events. Their status as government parties, or "the president's parties," had deprived them of any doctrinal or strategic autonomy, since they were only there to expand on the decisions of the president of the republic. With Valery Giscard d'Estaing's defeat, the UDF lost its natural leader and found itself orphaned. Lastly, the very structures--weak and not very democratic--of each of the parties scarcely predispose them to converting themselves into instruments for mobilization of the masses or into tools for framing conservative opinion. So much so that the UDF parties appear to be once again searching for their identity.

**Upheaval of Structures and Lack of Activists**

Similar problems beset the Republican Party (PR), the Center of Social Democrats and the Radical Party--all rushing to become the spearhead of the "liberal" opposition. The first problems concern structure and modes of action. Each party has been well aware of its ineffectiveness or lack of preparation for confronting a new situation. That is why inevitable reflection has reemerged regarding party statues, which both the CDS and the PR are contemplating changing in the near future. To increase activism--to have more participation in decisions by party members, who insistently called for that at the time of the "summer universities" organized by the two political formations--to institute at all levels the principle of elections: such things are now the watchword. But, for the moment, all of this has become a dead letter, as has the quest for new modes of action. It is still just as difficult to find the staffs or the federations of the Republican Party and the CDS, and still just as difficult to follow the activity of their activists in the field. Their organizational activity, which is quite often organized around national elected representatives, is in abeyance for lack of militants. Perhaps for want of financial means, no big poster campaign (except for the cantonal elections, of course) has been undertaken. Finally, political activity has remained centered on the Parliament or the ruling bodies of the parties. With the exception of the Radical Party, which has held a congress, no party has called its activists together to include them in decisions to be taken or already taken. It is only the party bureaus or political councils (in which party activists are a minority) that have met. Once again in October 1981 the Republican Party changed the team surrounding Secretary General Jacques Blanc at the sole discretion of the latter and his close associates...

**Leader Absence**

The most current issue, however, is that of the party leaders, and the divisions to which that gives rise or which it maintains. There too each party clearly feels the need to provide itself with a leader who is not discredited in public opinion, who is capable of competing with Jacques Chirac and "electable to the presidency" in 1988 and who is also able to lead the party renewal. But who? In the CDS, the succession to Jean Lecanuet is bringing different views of the party and its policies into conflict. Among those who are best situated at the moment, Bernard Stasi, decked out in a

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center-left image, seems closer to the party activists and seems more favorable toward asserting the CDS outside the UDF, whereas Pierre Mehaignerie, more concerned about surrounding himself with technicians and experts, appears to be closer to the UDF and hopes to lead the latter toward "centrist" positions.<sup>4</sup>

However, it is within the PR that the issue arises most sharply, for there lurks the ghost of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The Republican Party suffers from two handicaps. The first is not having control over the former president of the republic's possible political return; the second is not even being unanimous about the appropriateness of that return. In fact, in the Republican Party nobody knows what the new Chamalieres County councillor is going to do and nobody knows what he should do. On this last point there are at least three groups coexisting in the party. First, the group of the faithful, such as Hubert Bassot, Claude Wolff and Michel d'Ornano, who stress that Valery Giscard d'Estaing is the natural leader of the Giscardians, that he must return and that in that event the party must, as has always been the case, put itself at his service.

Without being hostile to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, others, on the other hand, manage nicely without his being around and think that the Republican Party must be transformed and have autonomy and its own program without delay; these are the ones called the "young deputies" (Charles Millon, Francois Leotard, Francois d'Aubert). Finally, the last group wonder about the appropriateness of calling once more on the former president of the republic. They are afraid that the spring 1981 defeat discredited him as an individual. However, they ask themselves in a more profound way if it is not Valery Giscard d'Estaing's political theory itself--the liberalism put forward as codified by "Democratic francaise"--which was condemned in May 1981, and if it is not in the search for other political solutions that the PR will find its salvation. Be that as it may, this vacuum does not help the Republican Party's public image.

## Political Formations Without a Program

The third set of problems that the UDF parties must confront concerns their program. Up to now, the three political formations have confined themselves to parliamentary debate, making use of all legal procedures (motions of censure, amendments, moving the previous question, appeals to the Constitutional Council) to hold up changes sought by the Socialists. In both Parliament and the media they have made known their unrelenting opposition to socialism and have criticized government action. But the art of criticism seems to be easier for them to handle than that of making specific and concrete proposals. What would the parties of the UDF, driven from power, do if they were to return to power? That remains, for the moment at least, an open question.

During its November 1981 congress, the Radical Party reaffirmed its desire to go back to radicalism's roots and equip itself with a reform doctrine, one resolutely so, in particular by rethinking the Radical Manifesto published under the aegis of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. For its part,



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the CDS asserts, as it always has, that "hope is the center" (the theme of its new posters), and it wants to rediscover the inspiration of a liberal and social issues doctrine suitable for the heirs of Christian Democrats. Committees are working within the CDS to come out with proposals and texts with a view to the congress planned in May 1982. For the moment, nothing from those reflections has yet been revealed. As for the Republican Party, it has just made its "Republican Manifesto" pilot study public. As the title indicates, it is a matter of a declaration of principles more than of a program. In addition, more than half of the text is devoted to a criticism of socialism, which has nothing new and in which catastrophism prevails over analysis; the other half is a pure and simple repeat of "Democratic francaise," albeit stripped of the latter's analysis of French society and social developments.

In summary, the three parties have not really known how to extricate themselves from three pitfalls. The first is to believe that something new must necessarily be made out of something old, or to be so lacking in imagination that everyone is proposing to go back to their roots without asking themselves if those roots correspond to the present state of French society. The second is to confine oneself to talking in overall and general terms. The third is failing to avoid the traps--traps for those who are in opposition--of facile demagoguery. Should we smile when we read that only liberalism will make it possible to fight unemployment and inflation? What are we to think when we learn that after 7 years in power during which it blocked any change the Republican Party wants "reform in companies" giving more power to wage-earning employees?

## What Future For the UDF?

The crisis of the parties goes hand in hand with uncertainties concerning the future of the UDF itself. Does the UDF confederation--created in February 1978 to oppose the RPR with an eye on the March legislative elections--still have a function, and what is that function? Nobody seems to question the need for the UDF on a strictly electoral level for harmonizing candidacies and, if possible, arriving at single "liberal" opposition candidacies. But beyond that, how should the UDF stand in relation to the parties that comprise it? What is its right place? What purpose should it serve?

First of all, it is a matter of deciding whether the UDF should or should not remain a mere confederation of parties. In fact, only Jacques Blanc, secretary general of the Republican Party, has proposed--he did this in September 1981--a merger of the parties, which would, whatever the circumstances, be beneficial to his particular party organization. It is his organization, in fact, that is the strongest of all the organizations in the UDF, inasmuch as it has perhaps the greatest number of members, definitely the most members of parliament and local elected officials, not to mention the pool of men and ideas that make up the Outlooks and Realities Clubs. Since the merger solution was rejected, the UDF will remain a confederation. However, the centrifugal tendencies in it are growing; and each party holds the others more or less directly responsible for the [1981] defeat and demands its own identity and autonomy within the UDF organization.

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It is within the Radical Party that discontent is greatest: one faction, assembled behind Brigitte Gros, proposes that the party just plain leave the UDF. Whether or not that argument prevails in the end, the UDF is finding itself treated as being more conservative than centrist, and both the CDS and the Republican Party are accused of having constantly delayed the necessary reforms. The CDS as well is sorry it was not listened to enough between 1974 and 1981, and it barely conceals its reservations prompted by both the men and the ideas of the Republican Party, which are suspected of regarding social issues as totally insignificant. The result is that the UDF cannot speak with a single voice and cannot substitute for its parties, each of which maintains its own troops and principles.

The latter are undoubtedly less distant from one another than they think. But the debate over structures and political viewpoints is intensified by the leadership issue. The chairmanship of Jean Lecanuet is not immediately in question. But, as he has said, if the UDF wants to exist in actuality, it has to draw from within itself a credible candidate for the next presidential election. The day of reckoning seems a long way off, but it is also true that it takes time to make a name for oneself in public opinion. The whole field should not be left free for Jacques Chirac either. The issue of Valery Giscard d'Estaing reemerges here. The UDF is no more in control of the decision than is the Republican Party. Moreover, the former is more divided than the latter. Neither the Radical Party, which counts for little, nor the CDS in particular seem disposed to leave it up to the former president of the republic. In an interview in PARIS-MATCH, Bernard Stasi made it known in diplomatic terms that "Valery Giscard d'Estaing is not the only benchmark (of the CDS) and is not (its) natural leader for ever and ever." Other claims carry weight: Raymond Barre's--he remains very reserved about the UDF--and perhaps Rene Monory's. Finally, certain members of the CDS would like a new man from another generation. But belonging to which party? Even though necessity knows no law, will the different political formations that demand their autonomy and their own identity agree to gather together behind a single man without mental reservations?

## The Calm and Masterful RPR

By comparison, the RPR appears much calmer and more masterful. It is true that the RPR enjoys advantages superior to the UDF's--advantages that allow it to adapt itself better and more quickly to the present state of affairs. Its first advantage stems from its structures and its organization. The RPR's activist potential must not be overestimated. But unlike the constituent parties of the UDF, the RPR seems well entrenched all over the country and seems able to mobilize men for political action who are reliable, dedicated and accustomed to "classic" activism, even if under difficult political conditions. So the RPR's problem is not to create an organization but to improve the performance of the one that exists. In particular it has to make some very authoritarian structures more democratic--structures that currently convert activists into cheer-leading squads but keep them away from decision-making. An effort has been made to give party members a greater share in decisions and improve the cohesion of the whole. In fact, the RPR Party Conference, held in Toulouse on 23 and 24

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January 1982, was preceded for the first time by an overall consultation of party activists by questionnaire with regard to program; for the first time as well, this conference was not just a "high mass" in the Gaullist tradition--in fact, forums were organized in which the party members were able to express their views and discuss the final motion, which was put to a vote.

**An Undisputed Leader: Jacques Chirac...**

The RPR's decisive advantage, however, is having a sole and undisputed leader, Jacques Chirac, who was reelected chairman at the time of the Toulouse Party Conference by 99 percent of the recorded votes--a leader who, in addition, has managed to change his image. One remembers that at a press conference Valery Giscard d'Estaing had introduced his former prime minister as a hurried and restless man; one remembers as well the man of "coups"--the municipal elections in Paris, one that he pulled off, and the Cochin appeal, one that damaged him in public opinion. Now Jacques Chirac has changed into a "calm powerful figure" confident in the future, a responsible politician avoiding overweening behavior as anathema. This was clearly seen at the time of the cantonal elections when, in contradiction to the opinion of certain RPR and UDF friends, he declared that the results of those elections did not constitute a challenge to the national government, that government being based on another electoral legitimacy... In addition, the RPR chairman is anxious to impose this new style on his whole party, as if he dreads the schemes of slightly irresponsible party officials or activists. At the time of the Toulouse Party Conference, he recommended in particular that all aggressiveness toward the government and all personal attacks on men in the government be avoided. Sticking to policy criticism--that is the watchword.

**...But a Fuzzy Program**

By doing the above, the RPR wants to assume the role of opposition party. It still has to find itself a policy and a program. In that respect, things become less clear or less easy. The RPR's first current objective is to present itself as a fresh political formation of the future. For the RPR, that implies standing definitively aloof from "historic Gaullism." The Toulouse Party Conference made a real break with a whole body of symbolism. For the first time there was no portrait of Charles de Gaulle or photo of Georges Pompidou in the conference hall. Also for the first time, none of the historic leaders--the ones called the "barons"--appeared on the platform or spoke. The team that surrounds the chairman and secretary general, Bernard Pons--in particular the 24 "official representatives" named on 24 February 1982--is made up of men who did not experience either Free France or the RPF [Rally of the French People] or even the beginnings of the Fifth Republic. So trust is being placed in Jacques Chirac's followers, of course, but also in a new generation that has no use for solidarity born of past struggles. In the RPR there is no talk anymore except about the future, and it is not making appeals anymore except to young people.

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That description of the future was summed up at the Toulouse Party Conference under three themes: "Nation; Republican Ideal; Progress." Making the comparison with the traditional options of the RPR and even of Gaullism, none of the themes is really original. All of them stand as a total rejection of socialism or communism. Everyone is quite sure that Marxism is not a French doctrine and that the Communists included in the government are foreign agents. In a more practical vein, the government's foreign and defense policies were, after what was a wait-and-see period, condemned, without it being very clearly realized whether that reproach stems from a supposedly excessively accommodating attitude toward the USSR or from a submission to American interests that is considered excessive.

The rehabilitation of the "Republican Ideal" is in a way only a new incarnation of the Gaullist temptation to appropriate the republic for themselves and deny others the right to invoke it. Between 1946 and 1958, General de Gaulle did hardly anything else; besides, the republic was always a part of the Gaullist acronyms in the Fifth Republic: Union for the New Republic [UNR], Union of Democrats for the Fifth Republic [UD/VR], Union of Democrats for the Republic [UDR], Rally for the Republic [RPR]. The new element, however, comes from the shift from the question of institutions, which the left does not threaten as such, to a question of society, which is certainly never absent but is more topical now. It is no longer a matter of defending an institutional form but of defending a type of society that was thought to be defined once and for all in the principles of the middle-class revolution of 1789. The Socialists and, a fortiori, the Communists are not republican, for they do not derive their inspiration from the aforementioned principles or at least not from the interpretation the RPR gives them.

As for "Progress," it is still a empty slogan that gives hardly any specific indications about what the RPR would do if it came back to power. One finds in it the voluntarism characteristic of the RPR from the time when it was opposing Valery Giscard d'Estaing's policies. Growth */must/* [in italics] be high, unemployment */must/* [in italics] be fought, inflation */must/* [in italics] be stamped out--all that based on a liberal credo. One can, to be sure, make out a picture of the social strata that the PRP wants to keep or win over: the farmers, the manufacturers, the businessmen and the craftsmen, the professional people and, lastly, the managerial-level people, who are deliberately flattered. However, the conflicts between these different strata are hardly resolved. How is one to reconcile the hymn to freedom of enterprise and to the respect owed to leaders, which are being proposed to some people, with participation in decisions, which is being promised to others? Also, how is one to reconcile the values of order, discipline and authority, which appeal to some, with the ideas of general responsibility, which attract others? Is relentless denunciation of bureaucracy and collectivism enough to combine all these aspirations on a long-term basis?

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**The Opposition and Its Unity**

Whatever the problems the opposition has had to confront since 10 May, it managed to silence its dissensions and come to an agreement, in appearance at least, in order to face its first election deadlines. Unity on candidacies at the time of the June 1981 legislative elections, the January 1982 by-elections and the cantonal elections--motions of censure jointly signed and voted for--repeated declarations by the UDF officials closest to the center-left, Olivier Stirn and Bernard Stasi in particular, that their opposition is unrelenting--everything leads one to believe that the evil spirit of dissension is not about to take hold of the UDF and the RPR again. And yet nobody can ignore the fact that the question of leadership, which the various political groups will approach in different positions or with different advantages, must be faced at a future date.

Up to now the RPR has not been able, or rather has not wanted, to press its advantages. On the contrary, by agreeing to respect--especially at the time of the cantonal elections--gains in political situations within the opposition, it has avoided setting itself up as the spearhead of the opposition. However, despite having had fewer candidates than the UDF, and however vague political labels in that kind of election may be, the RPR seems to have been the main beneficiary of the election. More important, without a doubt, is the RPR's specific situation compared with the political groups in the UDF. The RPR actually exists, whereas the UDF is searching for an identity. The RPR has a leader who was already a candidate in the last presidential election, who achieved a respectable tally in it and who is certifiably "electable to the presidency," whereas the UDF is likely to be searching for a candidate for a long time yet. Even if the RPR is something vague and broad, it has a single doctrine, whereas each party in the UDF is trying to find its own in different ideological traditions... In short, one does not have to be an expert to foresee that with the passage of time the RPR and Jacques Chirac will be in a position to emerge in a leading role within the opposition.

From this perspective, the UDF appears to be in an untenable position. On the one hand, it is difficult for the UDF to put itself under the leadership of the RPR if one takes the past as much as the UDF's "centrist, liberal, and social logic" into consideration. So the UDF finds itself either faced with the risk of splitting apart or forced to counter the RPR in deliberate fashion. But in that case the UDF would be fostering division that the RPR would be able to make use of and that might put the UDF back into a subordinate and marginal role within the opposition; that situation would be even more serious within a new majority. Were it to call on Valery Giscard d'Estaing or Raymond Barre for help, one would see a confrontation of the 1981 type again at that point, since it is so hard to imagine Jacques Chirac stepping aside.

Should the leadership issue be settled, however, the opposition would still have to clarify its political positions or work out programs to meet deadlines in national politics. For the moment, whether we are talking about

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the UDF's constituent groups or the RPR, we have seen that those programs amount to criticisms of government action, fundamental opposition to the society they suspect the Socialist of being in the process of establishing and general principles teeming with contradictions. All of that may temporarily be enough to win conservative voters and attract malcontents from all sides. But what will it do when it is a matter of presenting a government program? It is true that there is no rush, since legislative elections are slated for 1986.

P.S. Valery Giscard d'Estaing has since been invited by Jean Lecanuet to sit on the UDF's Political Bureau, and when that group had its parliamentary meeting days, Jean-Claude Gaudin, the group's chairman, revived the idea of a merger. However, those two moves gave rise more to reservations than to enthusiasm. Attesting to that were the silence that greeted Valery Giscard d'Estaing's return and the irritation of a number of Radical and CDS members. Many would prefer that the UDF concern itself for the moment with immediate election deadlines and as far as anything else goes give itself time to reflect.

**FOOTNOTES**

1. Without getting into the controversy over the results, one can say that the voters who did not vote for the far left--the PC [Communist Party], the PS [Socialist Party], the MRG [Left Radical Movement?] and the true "miscellaneous left"--represent about 50.5 percent of the recorded votes.
2. Besides, there are precedents: the Outlooks and Realities Clubs, the Grenelle Club, Jean-Pierre Prouteau's Republic and Democracy, Edgar Faure's New Social Contract...
3. Let us note that the structures for accommodating people in these categories are increasing in number in parallel fashion without one always being able to specify the exact relations those groups maintain with the parties of the opposition. Let us mention Justice and Republic, for jurists; Horizon 86, established by and for attorneys; and Future and Freedom, in which doctors get together.
4. Let us remember that Rene Monory, Jacques Barrot and Jean-Marie Caro also figure as possibilities.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLITANO ON PSI, PCI RELATIONS

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 24 May 82 pp 73-75

[Interview with in-Party opposition leader Giorgio Napolitano by Chiara Valenti: There Is an Alternative. This One.]

Text Often pointed out as Berlinguer's man antagonist, as the leader of his laborite and moderate opposition, Giorgio Napolitano, 57, born in Naples, is in any case one of the CP's most visible spokesmen. In the Chamber, where he is PC party whip, he stubbornly pushes his own good-neighbor policy toward the socialists. Of recent weeks he made a lengthy trip to the United States to tend the connections he had initiated in recent years. In a time of confusion and apparent crisis in the PCI, confirmed by, among other indications, the findings of PANORAMA's poll published directly following this interview, we asked Giorgio Napolitano for his views on what is happening inside and outside his party.

[Question] Mr Napolitano, there is talk about the Communist Party's losing its grip and its credibility. Among the various symptoms reported, the survey findings we publish in this issue of PANORAMA point to this conclusion.

[Answer] I should not be one to attach overmuch importance to those findings. Looking at our party's political success most recently, such as our victory over the Mafia in Sicily or over Comiso, I should say on the contrary that we have gained ground. I feel I can say the same, if I am to judge from my observation post, about the Chamber of Deputies, where we communists are in contact with different and even hostile groups. There has been growing approval of the PCI's attitude, precisely on the issue of individual and collective liberties, and on the issue of democracy.

[Question] And yet people seem to be most baffled on this very ground. After the tough polemics with the USSR over the last few

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months, for example, the Politburo's spokesman, Vadim Zagladin, reinstated you in an interview in LA REPUBBLICA, calling you "a great Communist Party, a brother Party."

[Answer] Hot-and-cold showers are no answer to problems as grave and complex as those surrounding relations between the CPSU and the PCI. We have never been in favor of liquidating those relations. Breaking off diplomatic relations is not in the general interest, and primarily the interests of détente. We continue to be in favor of direct and frank discussion, but it will assuredly take more than a somewhat self-critical admission of error to make us set aside basic issues and positions. Or to make us return to relations bound up with a set of ideological reference points we cannot accept.

[Question] You have just come back from a long trip through the United States, where you met with intellectuals and experts close to Reagan. What do the Americans think of the "breakaway"?

[Answer] In all politically informed American circles, the positions we have taken since December have made quite an impression, and have been appreciated for their unquestionable authenticity.

[Question] In short, they had an even greater impact there than they did in Italy?

[Answer] As for Italy, I should not confuse two different levels. Here, in my opinion, our international positions have gained in credibility and in conviction. Even so, there is still some argument and uncertainty in areas of public opinion as to the actual possibility of communists' getting into the cabinet.

[Question] This is another sore point. Your proposal of an alternative seems unclear to a lot of people. Some of your very positive opinions in the aftermath of the Christian Democrats' convention have certainly evoked the ghost of the historic compromise.

[Answer] While there may have been some misunderstanding, it seems to me that Berlinguer effectively dispelled it. Having said that, I fail to see how anybody could imagine that we could be pinned down to a position of pure indifference and inertia toward what is happening in the DC. I believe that the Labourites in Britain, too, are greatly concerned over the conflict between Mrs Thatcher and other forces within the Conservative Party. Are we to take no notice when the line adopted in the preamble of the proceedings at the 1979 convention was shouted down? Are we not to perceive in this a portent of the fall of some hoary illusions and prejudices, like calling the communist question closed?



[Question] And yet the socialists, who were supposed to be your partners in an alternative government, seem to think otherwise. Claudio Martelli accuses you of fishing for deals with the DC: and now the two of you are at daggers drawn.

[Answer] I resent this description of our relations with our socialist comrades as if there were nothing to them but irreconcilable conflicts. You have to look a little deeper into things if you want to understand them. The attack, based on a flimsy pretext, like the rest of the polemics aimed at us, are thoroughly typical of the present PSI leadership. They are, I should say, an all-but-inevitable function of a strategy designed to maximize the PSI's role, vis-à-vis both us and the DC. This is clearly not what we would call the alternative strategy, and we have already put our finger squarely on the ambiguity of it all.

[Question] In other words, Martelli is attacking you just to get attention.

[Answer] All I am saying is that I see his charges as a maneuver calculated mainly to cast us communists as unenthusiastic proponents of the alternative. Yet there is always the possibility that there is a real obsession at work here, with the idea that the ever-dreaded deal between the Christian Democrats and the communists will be reached over the heads of the socialists. And yet that is a ridiculous and utterly groundless fear.

[Question] You, Mr Napolitano, seem to be very possibilist, yet UNITÀ has taken a very different tone.

[Answer] I should look more at the facts. And I should not forget that, along with all the noisy polemics, there is also collaboration between us and the PSI.

[Question] Could you cite me some practical examples of that?

[Answer] After a period of widespread tension, we have built good working relationships in the governance of such great cities as Florence, Milan, and Turin. Furthermore, I maintain that the very fact that we did not insist -- beyond a certain degree -- on June elections warded off serious tension between PSI and PSI and opened the way to convergence on goals to be pursued in Parliament as well.

[Question] Did you have any direct influence on this socialist decision?

[Answer] I believe the socialists took our adamant opposition into account, yes.

[Question] The new DC secretary, Ciriaco De Mita, has said that the PCI is not so much a different party as a confused party.

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[Answer] I find this smug tone from the secretary, even the new secretary, of a party like the DC, whose chronic confusion is legendary, altogether uncalled-for. Besides, they have been calling all along for more debate and less doctrinaire attitudes in the PCI, yet now here they are practically complaining that our party is not the repository of absolute, immovable certainty. The truth of the matter is that some of our fundamental positions are spelled out in very precise and clear-cut terms. On other issues there is some soul-searching going on, and it is very serious indeed.

[Question] In short, you mean that different lines are stirring in the PCI these days.

[Answer] I am not talking about hard and fast opposing positions. On the alternative line, there is unity in the party. And, just to make things clear, I am in complete agreement, too, with what Berlinguer and Sulmona have to say about the way we form our attitudes toward the DC.

[Question] Let's try to sum that up one more time, for the benefit of those who are not experts in the subtleties of political issues. You say you don't want to join in a government with the DC, but you also talk about an alternative in which there are several poles, among them a Catholic one. What does that mean, in practical terms? That you are still hooked on the old dream of splitting the party of De Gasperi, Fanfani, and Giulio Andreotti?

[Answer] That is a hypothesis that cannot be ruled out, but one on which we are very cautious. We think, first of all, given an alternative government, we might advance the traditional boundaries of the left forward a little, so as to make room for part of the Catholic forces, which could be made to flow toward the PSI, the PCI, or the other lay parties. And we believe that we must be mindful of the existence and the positions of major Catholic organizations. We are also thinking in terms of a DC that is not forever doomed to remain a conservative party, in the strict sense of the term, but rather as one that can change under the prodding of the more progressive portion of the Catholic electorate and that, some day, might turn into the moderate opposition to a government based on the left.

[Question] That sounds like a delightful prospect. Reality, though, would seem to be pulling in the opposite direction.

[Answer] Of course our proposal for an alternative presupposes some profound changes, not only in relations among the political parties, but in the nation as a whole.

[Question] Mr Napolitano, you have always had the reputation of an honest reformer. How do you envision the future of your party? Do you think that the third way coincides with the social-democratic way?

[ Answer ] About that "reformist" tag, I remember what happened to Fernando Santi, who was always known as a reformist, but who wound up to the left of the PCI. I believe that we are a party determined never to abandon the most vital and still valid core of communist tradition. A party at the same time determined to come together with the most advanced positions of the European socialist movement. One might well ponder: is it mainly we who are thinking about the communist experience, or the French socialists, who are re-thinking the social-democratic experience? I say this merely to underscore the fact that, if we are to judge ourselves and others in these times, we simply must break out of the old patterns.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON PCI, USSR POLEMICS

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 24 May 82 pp 75-76

[Survey results: "It's better not to trust them..."]

[Text] The PCI's break with Moscow is not changing many minds. For a lot of people, the Communist Party is still a party to be kept under a ban. There you have the most unexpected findings in the PANORAMA/Demoskopoea survey. Why this attitude?

On 15 December, 1981, Enrico Berlinguer stood alone before the TV cameras and touched off a revolution in the PCI's history: the sudden, total "break" with the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter came Moscow's savage response, the rebellion of Armando Cossutta and, with him, an entire wing of the Party, and the long, lacerating internal strife of recent months.

What did all this mean to ordinary people, to the voters? To what extent was their opinion of the PCI altered by the stunning collapse of one of the most cogent arguments in the anti-communist arsenal, the PCI's ties to Moscow? To find out, PANORAMA commissioned Demoskopoea to conduct a survey, interviewing 2,000 people selected as representative of the Italian population. The finding -- quite unexpected -- is that the breach has changed very few minds, and that for most people, the PCI should still be barred from government.

In reply to the question: has your confidence in the PCI increased or diminished since the "break" with the USSR? 49 percent, practically half the people interviewed, said they trusted it exactly as much as they had before. And against 20 percent who trust it more spoke another 20 percent who trust it less. The substance of that opinion is borne out by the response to another question, which asked whether or not the communists can hope now for a place in government like any other party. For 36 percent who said they might, there were 45 percent who were convinced that "the PCI has yet to prove that it is genuinely democratic and independent."

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"Same As E. er, More Than Ever..."

The PCI's recent positions on events in Poland and its heated polemics with the USSR have led to a break between the PCI and Moscow. Can Italians trust the PCI now that the break has come? And if so, how much?

	(SECONDO LA PREFERENZA POLITICA)										(IN TOTALE)
	Dc	Psdi	Psi	Pli	Pr	Psdi	PII	Msi	Pdup		
Più di prima .	14.3	39.6	24.9	21.3	47.3	18.8	9.2	2.2	25.7	20.9	
Meno di prima	24.8	12.1	22.1	11.8	21.5	24.8	34.0	51.6	32.9	20.1	
Come prima .	52.5	43.9	47.3	63.5	31.2	52.1	50.9	48.2	41.4	49.1	
Non indica . .	8.4	4.4	5.7	3.6	—	4.3	6.0	—	—	9.9	

Responses (by political preferences) in %, left to right.

Answers (top to bottom): More than before; Less than before; Same as before; No answer.

What's going on between PCI and PSI?

Now that the PCI has pulled away from the USSR's positions, do you think the split between the PCI and PSI still makes sense?

Answers, top to bottom: Yes; No; None.

**Cosa cambia fra Psi e Pci**

Si, ha ancora un senso . . . . .	53.1
No, non ha più senso . . . . .	29.7
Non indica . . . . .	17.2

Social Democrats? No Way!

Since its break with Moscow, do you think the PCI will become more like the European Social Democrats (those in Scandinavia or Germany), or do you think it will go on being the kind of communist party it has always been?

	(CON TITOLO DI STUDIO)			(SECONDO LA PREFERENZA POLITICA)										(IN TOTALE)
	Superiore	Media	Elementare o nessuno	Dc	Psdi	Psi	Pli	Pr	Psdi	PII	Msi	Pdup		
Un partito simile alle social-democrazie europee . . . . .	26.0	24.0	14.8	13.1	32.4	30.0	21.5	43.9	8.1	6.0	9.3	41.9	19.9	
Un partito comunista come è nella sua tradizione . . . . .	60.1	48.0	40.8	53.1	50.1	45.6	58.7	47.8	66.8	64.1	72.9	50.5	47.3	
Non sa . . . . .	13.9	27.9	44.4	33.8	17.4	24.4	19.8	8.4	25.1	29.9	17.8	7.6	32.8	

Responses, by schooling (College, high school, elementary or none) and by political preference (%), left to right.

Answers: Like the European Social Democrats  
The same communist party it has always been  
Don't know.

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If the respondents are broken down according to their political preferences, we find that among Christian Democrats the percentage of nay-sayers jumps to 64 percent, among Republicans to 60 percent, among Social Democrats to 70 percent, and among Liberals to an astounding 81 percent. Respondents giving favorable replies reacted in an unexpected way to another question, to wit: if it would be better for the country if the PCI formed a coalition cabinet with the DC or without them, 49 percent answered "with the Christian Democrats" and only 44 percent answered "without."

On the whole it is a negative picture, one that shows us us that the PCI has never stood so low in the public esteem as it does right now.

What is going on here? According to one young and brilliant student of politics, Gianfranco Pasquino, who is in favor of the left alternative, the blame for this frame of mind among the people lies squarely upon the PCI itself. "The decline in confidence is the initial reaction to confusion, to uncertainty. Once they had made the break, the communists gave the impression that they would like to mend it again. The likeliest assumption is that they don't have enough intestinal fortitude, or unity enough in their leadership, to make it stick. And people can sense this," says Pasquino. Somewhat more ironic in his assessment is Alberto Ronchey, the inventor of the "K factor." "Where the misunderstanding arises is in the choice of the word 'strappo,' which means a rending or tearing apart only if you're talking about cloth or paper. This, however, turned out to be a sprain [a second meaning of the word]." In Ronchey's view, all this mistrust toward Berlinguer's party stems less from international issues than from its having opted for the left alternative. "A PCI that wants to form a government only with the Socialists is far scarier than a PCI that is somehow tamed by the historic compromise. And it is this very fear that I call the K factor."

Further confirmation that the PCI's new decisions have not gone down too well comes from a set of questions about its getting to be more like a social democrat party.

Only 20 percent of respondents, a slim minority, sees the party going down that road. "The fact is that this party can't seem to come up with new images, new points of reference," says sociologist Franco Ferrarotti, a PCI sympathizer. "The basic attitude is conservative, stand-pat, and the third road fails to materialize." This is a loss of credibility that carries in it some electoral repercussions as well. Asked, "do you think that the PCI will get more votes from now on?" only 14 percent answered "yes." When the same question is asked about the PSI, the "yes" replies shoot up to 49 percent. Then there was one curious detail. This optimism as to the success of Craxi's party is shared by just about half of the communist voters.

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**AIR BASES CONDUCT REGULAR WAR SCENARIO EXERCISES**

**Base Defense Tested**

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 82 pp 28-30

[Article by Air Force Brigadier General Jacques Boichot: "Tactical Evaluation"]

[Text] The tactical evaluation of an air base has the essential aim of keeping the command periodically informed about the units' ability to carry out their wartime missions and also missions in time of crisis or in peacetime.

The air bases carry out daily combat-training activity in order to be ready to cope, in time of crisis or in wartime, with multiple aggressions or missions.

In order to make an overall evaluation of the ability of the bases, and also of the operational units stationed at them, to carry out their missions, the command periodically sets up "tactical evaluations." Thus, an evaluation team, composed of officers and noncommissioned officers from the general staff and directorates of the air region and from the major user commands concerned, arrives at the base unannounced to observe the reactions to the various exercises and incidents introduced at a high rate, for a block of time that can be nearly a week.

For the base command and personnel, the fundamental principle then consists in "playing out" the plans and directives at all levels and in the most realistic way possible. In effect, the only way of reacting leads to this question in each instance: "If this incident or serious event were really occurring today, what could be done with the means at our disposal?" During this time, the evaluators stay at the posts assigned to them, without impeding the activity of the personnel, and they record the different reactions observed without comment, unless safety is at stake.

**A Realistic Scenario**

The various incidents and events initiated during the evaluation have been prepared for very thoroughly several weeks in advance, in accordance with a coordinated and coherent scenario that calls all of the base's units into action. Such a scenario can, for example, unfold as follows.

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On J day at 2300 hours, the evaluation team, which has previously met in the greatest secrecy for a preparatory presentation, arrives at the gate of the base chosen and immediately issues an alert that calls for the personnel to be called out and the base to be put into an operational posture, notably with camouflage and reinforcement of defense, and also for the air combat units to be activated. The airplanes are prepared and immediately dispersed and camouflaged. The first two planes ready take off on alert for a night-interception mission. At dawn the next day, the base undergoes a heavy air attack that starts a serious fire and causes serious damage to the electric-power plant and to the means of communication.

The air-watch network, activated from the beginning of the exercise, signals many air raids that put the base's antiaircraft defense to the test and cause several serious incidents: for example, destruction of the mess, so that field kitchens are activated, and an exercise in neutralization of an unexploded bomb.

In a following phase, the rescue teams have to save a pilot wounded during a mission and then get his damaged plane, which is partially blocking the landing field, out of the way. At the same time, the Medical Corps has to set up a field medical group to accommodate many wounded.

**Activity Continues**

After night falls, commando units carry out harassment of sensitive points of the base and attempt to penetrate its defense system. The entire base is placed on reinforced alert and weapons are distributed to all personnel, who take up their assigned combat positions.

During the entire day following, the mechanics must nevertheless continue to prepare and arm the airplanes, which take off at an accelerated cadence for assault missions and real firings on the firing ranges. The results of these firings determine the success of each pilot's mission.

In the afternoon, the task of the personnel is further complicated by radioactive contamination due to fallout from a nearby explosion. On this occasion, the know-how of the specialized teams for receiving airplanes in a radioactive environment has to be demonstrated.

During the following night, the commandos, who have tested the alertness of the base's defenses, attempt actions in force, including helicopter-borne raids, in order to lay siege to the field.

The last day is devoted to a "hot" debriefing on the commando actions, the shooting by the personnel with individual weapons, and a detailed inspection of the barracks and technical installations to check whether the base has the means best-suited to its missions and to study what improvements are possible.

The evaluation is now completed, but the commander of the air region and the major user commands concerned now have a very detailed report, a veritable "photograph" of the base and its units. This document brings out the points on

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which the base commander will have to concentrate his efforts, but it will also be exploited at the various levels of command, to remedy the deficiencies regarding the means, to amend the operations directives and orders if necessary, or to take advantage of the good ideas and interesting actions taken that will be forwarded to the other air bases concerned.

In effect, it is not a matter of knowing whether an evaluation has been successful or not, but it will certainly be "useful," for the essential thing to be obtained from its definition is the word "capability." This word relates, of course, both to the means available to the base and to the know-how and motivation of the personnel, but also to the deficiencies and the progress to be achieved in all areas and at all levels.

Thus it has been possible to note, at all our bases, an important metamorphosis that has been going on for the last several years: shelters for airplanes and personnel, enclosures, camouflage, antiaircraft protection--to mention only the most spectacular achievements. These results are not, of course, exclusively the fallout from the evaluations; but only exact knowledge of the situation can enable us to progress, and the evaluations thus contribute to improvement of the conditions of preparation of our air bases and combat units, with a view to continually increasing the operational effectiveness of the Air Force.

General Jacques Boichot, a graduate of the Flight Training School (class of 1952), has made most of his career in operational units. He commanded the 2/11 fighter squadron, and later the fourth fighter wing. In 1976, he commanded the B.A. [expansion unknown] of Toul, and then became chief of the third bureau of the EMAA [Chief of Staff of the Air Force]. At present he is director of the First CATac [Tactical Aerial Corps]. General Boichot totals 5400 flight hours.

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**Pilots' Reaction Time Tested**

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 82 pp 31-33

[Article by Air Force Major General Theodore Mahlberg: "Putting Units in Posture"]

[Text] In peacetime, an important part of air activity is devoted to training of the squadron, with the aim of ensuring, on a priority basis, the combat pilots' progression toward higher qualifications. This form of training, though indispensable, is not sufficient for obtaining truly operational units; it is also necessary for them to be capable of reacting rapidly to the least indication of alert, and, particularly for the tactical units, capable of maneuvering within sizable formations and operating in a coordinated manner within an interbranch framework.

The Air Force has a limited number of combat airplanes capable of carrying a wide variety of armaments and of taking action in highly varied zones of operations. Because of its characteristics of speed of intervention and flexibility of use, the air arm is a favored means of battlefield action. It is therefore necessary for the units to have the ability to adapt to varied situations and to balance out their efforts in such a way as to be capable of intervening rapidly where the need is manifested.

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**Intervening Rapidly**

Rapid intervention supposes first of all a reaction in the shortest times possible. This capability is indeed an essential condition in order for a unit to be declared operational. It requires reflection beforehand on a certain number of scenarios, and imagining their development. Secondly, regular practice of activation exercises makes it possible to "break in" the reflex actions that make the phrase "putting into posture"\* almost automatic. Thus, depending on the mission assigned to the unit, what is involved is, on the one hand, the arming of the planes with bombs, rockets or air-to-air missiles, and on the other hand, fitting them with extra tanks appropriate for the range of action anticipated. Furthermore, frequent changes of configuration are practiced so as to create automatic routines among the technical personnel and thus reduce the risks of error.

It is important, during this delicate and fundamental phase, for the work of each person involved to be done in good order and to be well-coordinated. It is by long practice that the time-periods can be effectively reduced to the minimum.

Rapid reaction also necessitates a permanent alert structure, at both the command level and the level of the means of execution. Continuousness, which is the rule in the Air Force, involves both the air-defense chain, the operational centers of the central general staff and of the big commands, and the alert teams or the teams taking part in security and protection at the air bases. Thus, for the Air Force as a whole, thousands of men and women keep a watch in addition to their normal activity or are on alert ready to take action. The unexpected missions that could be triggered can take various forms: setting up a Jaguar patrol thousands of kilometers away, where a presence mission is necessary; interception of an intruder who penetrates the national air space; transport of equipment in humanitarian-aid situations; medical evacuation in liaison with the SAMU's [expansion unknown]; assistance to military or civilian airplanes in trouble; etc.

Finally, the capacity to intervene in short times requires appropriate modes of action, and the success of any distant operation is mainly dependent on in-flight refuelling these days, because it makes it possible to eliminate stops and gives the possibility of operating at long distances from home bases.

**Flexibility of Use**

This is the second quality to be maintained and developed in our units. It is indeed fundamental, in view of our available potential airpower, to take the best possible advantage of the flexibility of use that the airplane offers.

The mobility of the units is a decisive factor in this area. The exercises involving all the tactical units generally entail deployments and redeployments that make it possible to vary the formation and adapt it to the evolution of the threat. In metropolitan France, it is usually the combat squadron that does such movement. As for external action, smaller units are often used to adapt the air support to the particular conditions of each operation.

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\* "Putting into posture" is an expression used in the Air Force to mean putting the units on a war footing.

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There is the same quest for mobility in the routine training of the units, which regularly deploy outside their home bases to do firing exercises at special centers or combat exercises at sea. These numerous trips put heavy burdens on the personnel, who are frequently absent from their homes; but this is the price that has to be paid in order to have operational units.

Flexibility of use depends also on the maintenance of a certain multipurpose character in our combat squadrons. Air missions are usually grouped in two large families--tactical support and air defense; the former has the offensive character of attack on ground targets, while the latter, related more particularly to air combat, therefore takes place at generally high altitudes. For each of them, aircraft with specific performance characteristics are needed, and crews that have had appropriate training.

As regards the airplanes, in view of the relatively small number of them which, because of costs, a country like France can provide itself with, the best compromise between high-altitude and low-altitude performance characteristics is generally sought in the design stage.

As regards the crews, the growing complexity of the equipment and the limitation of air activity to 180 hours per year per pilot, because of the rise in the cost of fuel, no longer make it possible to have combat pilots capable of carrying out missions of a highly technical character in both of these two fields of specialization at the same time. However, in order to be capable of carrying out a strong effort in a particular area or one that requires considerable concentration of means, each air unit will have to maintain--in addition to its main mission, which certainly takes priority in the training process--the capacity to carry out one or even two missions designated as secondary, in a simplified version and within a limited framework. Thus a unit whose main mission is, for example, all-weather penetration, will be assigned a daytime-interception role on a secondary basis. Day-to-day training will be proportioned in function of the degree of priority assigned to each of these activities.

The tactical reaction exercises have resulted in considerable progress in the conditioning of the units. They make the personnel break out of the base training routine by crystallizing the efforts of everyone toward a common purpose and generally permitting the activation of the entire chain of command, from the operational staffs responsible for mission conception to the units charged to carry them out. They periodically place the units in fictitious crisis situations that are as realistic as possible in order to evaluate the activation procedures and the application of the dispersal and camouflage procedures. Thus, the putting-into-posture exercises ordered several times per year at the level of the FATAC [Army Light Plane Division], 1st RA [Air regiment], will involve one or more air bases of the region, or even all of them. Others, of broader scope, such as Datex, will involve the entire Air Force. This practice, which has proven its worth, is to be continued.

Air Force Major General Theodore Mahlberg has done a large part of his career in operational units: Fighter Squadron 1/11, 5th Fighter Wing. In 1973 he was commander of the Dijon air base,

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then chief of staff for air defense, deputy chief of Air Force general-staff operations, and he is presently second in command of the FATAAC/1st RA and commander of the northeast air-defense zone.

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**Firing Exercises Conducted**

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 82 pp 34-36

[Article by Air Force Colonel Roger Mathieu: "Toward the 'Direct Hit'--Checking Combat Pilots' Firing and Bombing Ability"]

[Text] For any combat pilot, the end purpose of a flight is destruction of the objective. Through the "firing exercises," tactical evaluations, intersquadron competitions and training missions, the Air Force monitors the operational level of its units and its pilots' ability to put their shots on target.

At 10,000-meters altitude, off Corsica: four Mirage IIIE's make a live firing pass, with 30-mm cannons, at an acoustic target towed by a Mirage IIIC.

On the Captieux air-to-ground firing range, north of Mont-de-Marsan, four other Mirage IIIE's come in at low altitude for an operational rocket-firing pass.

These patrols have taken off from their base field in the course of a tactical evaluation: placed in conditions as close to a real mission as possible, the pilots will be judged on their firing results in particular. For destruction of an objective in the air or on the ground will always remain the end purpose of combat aviation.

Monitoring of the firing and bombing ability of the pilots in operational units is a permanent concern of the command: it is present daily in the course of training missions, but especially during the special periods of the "firing exercises," the tactical evaluations and the intersquadron competitions.

**Firing Ability: Daily Checking**

Whether a fire-power-support mission with conventional weapons, the firing of an air-to-air or air-to-ground missile, or a very conventional dogfight is involved, the pilot returning from his flight in peacetime must know with maximum certainty what would have happened "if he had really fired." Indeed, the mission is considered successful only after detailed restitution of the firing phase.

The recording aim camera, which runs during the period of simulated firing, makes such precise restitution all the easier to achieve in that our airplanes' "head up" visualizations present all the essential parameters today.

The tape recorders on board present valuable supplementary information by recording the pilots' "live" comments and any radio exchanges that may occur.

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**But Nothing Takes the Place of Live Firing**

The cost of modern armaments, which has only increased with the sophistication of the munitions and the missiles, is well-known. The combat squadrons are therefore being allocated only a limited amount of real munitions and "exercise munitions"\* annually.

Each full squadron carries out an operational assignment of 3 or 4 weeks at Cazaux or Solenzara in order to do an annual "firing exercise" oriented primarily toward air-to-air cannon, but also toward conventional air-to-ground firing.

These exercises are the concrete focus of the Air Force's effort to maintain a high operational level among the combat-unit pilots:

- training of young pilots under simplified firing conditions;
- perfecting of older pilots under limit conditions of use of conduct-of-fire.

In air-to-air cannon firing, for example, an acoustic target is towed 500 meters behind a fighter that gradually maneuvers into conditions close to those of a dogfight. The firing pass is tricky, demanding the firing pilot's entire concentration: often at supersonic speed, under considerable acceleration, a very short burst, of half a second, is fired.

There is an immediate confirmation report, for the pilot learns at once, by radio, how many shells passed within a radius of 3.5 meters around the acoustic target.

For the purpose of standardizing the level of firing skill required of the pilots, they undergo "qualification" tests in the course of three missions in which a certain minimum score has to be achieved; this is the case for the unit's priority and secondary missions.

Apart from these firing exercises, regular training in air-to-ground firing (cannon, rockets, bombs) makes it possible to keep up the level achieved and also to pass certain qualification tests: on return from a ground-attack mission, the airplanes do live firing on one of the authorized firing ranges.

**Aerial Firing: the Operational Goal above All**

The combat pilots' motivation for this aeronautical discipline has always been very sharp: indeed, the entire stakes of a 1-hour flight are in the balance in the few seconds in which the objective is sighted and the pilot takes position, aims and fires. Thus there is a latent competition among the pilots of a squadron and between the squadrons themselves; and this wholesome emulation plays a part in maintenance of the highest level for the results achieved.

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\* An exercise munition (shell, rocket) has no explosive charge. An exercise bomb is a simplified projectile but has the same ballistics.

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Among the exercises having the character of competitions organized to this end, the most celebrated is indisputably the "Comet Cup," which, every 2 years, pits all the French fighter and reconnaissance squadrons against one another: each is represented by two pilots, one of whom must be the squadron commander (or second in command), who thus have to demonstrate their abilities publicly.

The tests, in two flights, include an attack on a ground objective, air-to-ground cannon firing, an interception and air-to-air cannon fire.

What better opportunity could there be for judging the firing ability of our pilots?

The range of our armaments is diversifying and is becoming increasingly coherent with the airplanes and the conduct of fire: in addition to the conventional munitions, there are the scatter weapons, the guided munitions, the missiles. The costs of these sophisticated munitions rule out the possibility of a great deal of training firing in the units: this firing comes only in grouped exercises that make it possible to confirm the areas and procedures of use. On the other hand, simulated firing, in the air or at the ground, ensure a satisfactory level of training for our pilots.

Monitoring of the firing and bombing ability of the combat pilots is, in the last analysis, a constant factor in all missions, whether they involve live firing or not.

The main guarantee of the level achieved will always remain motivation for flying--and for firing!

Colonel Roger Mathieu entered the Air School in 1958, and has commanded Fighter Squadron 1/13 and the 30th Fighter Wing. He has graduated from the ESCA [Higher School of Air Warfare], and is currently chief of the "operations" division of the 3rd Department of the EMAA [Air Force General Staff].

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