

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10669

19 July 1982

West Europe Report

(FOUO 44/82)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10669

19 July 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 44/82)

CONTENTS

THEATER FORCES

BELGIUM

SP's Tobbyack on Cruise Missile Sites, Socialist Strategy
(Louis Tobbyack Interview; VRIJ NEDERLAND, 19 Jun 82) 1

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Alternative Defense Strategy Needed for Bundeswehr
(Wolf Perdelwitz; STERN, 9 Jun 82) 9

ITALY

Critical Analysis of NATO Strategy by Gen Salatiello
(RIVISTA MILITARE, Mar-Apr 82) 15

POLITICAL

FRANCE

Internal Dissension Among PCF Leadership Examined
(Irene Allier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 22 May 82) 29

Aron, Fontaine on Detente, Poland, Germany, North-South Issues
(Eric Roussel; PARADOXES, Apr 82) 34

MILITARY

FRANCE

Recognizing Enemy, Communicating, In European Theater
(Claude Delbos; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, May 82) 44

UNITED KINGDOM

'THE TIMES' QUESTIONS VALIDITY OF DEFENSE CUTS
(Editorial; THE TIMES, 1 Jul 82) 49

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THEATER FORCES

BELGIUM

SP'S TOBBACK ON CRUISE MISSILE SITES, SOCIALIST STRATEGY

Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND in Dutch 19 Jun 82 p 8

[Interview with Louis Tobback by Jef Coeck]

[Text] Louis Tobback, chairman of the Belgian socialists' parliamentary delegation, is known for wearing his heart on his sleeve. When he knows a thing for sure, or feels it, he says it. And it makes no difference whether it is criticism of his opponents, the closing of nuclear power plants, or, as in this case, the controversial placement of American cruise missiles in his country. "Give us Americans again at last who can read and write."

Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens's Catholic-liberal coalition, which, as is well known, possesses *plenary powers*, will soon face a number of important decisions. There is the semiannual evaluation of the *missile question*. It can be reasonably expected that the path of least resistance will be chosen, and that a definite decision will be postponed another 6 months. According to the Flemish socialists that is a kind of swindle. Karel van Miert, the party chairman, has declared that the decision has been made long since, and that he knows where the new cruise missiles will be put: in the little village of Florennes in the Ardennes.

Furthermore, before the recess of the Belgian regional parliaments a Broad Public Discussion on nuclear energy must flare up--for that discussion is still not so broad in Belgium that the population must be drawn into it.

Louis Tobback, the noisy chairman of the Flemish socialists' parliamentary delegation, has meanwhile announced that as of 1 July he wants to put an end to the cabinet's plenary powers. How Tobback will bring that about is completely unclear, but anybody that asks questions about that is a chronic old grumbler. We are talking with the defense specialist Tobback about nuclear rockets, nuclear power plants, and the future of his Socialist Party.

[Question] Not long ago DE MORGEN said that in some Flemish party circles closing the existing nuclear power plants is being advocated *on the Netherlands model*. Has nobody heard here that the PvdA [(Netherlands) Labor Party] has abandoned that position again?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] Oh, yes, certainly we know about that. That is why we do not want to get entangled in the PvdA's dead-end strategy! In the matter of nuclear power plants we simply want no new ones added. Closing the power plants that already exist is an untenable line. And it is precisely that point that the PvdA is always trotting out again!

[Question] It is quite logical that the SP [Socialist Party] does not advocate the closing of nuclear power plants, since the Socialist Willy Claes built them for years as minister of economic affairs.

[Answer] Look here, that is so typical! A malicious remark that shows little grasp of democratic processes! Claes never had a single power plant built. The government we have participated in since 1977 has established and respected a *moratorium*, a stoppage of the construction of nuclear power plants.

[Question] Moratorium? During the same period Doel-3 and Tihange-2 have been erected!

[Answer] But that decision had been made earlier...

[Question] You are not going to claim that Claes is against nuclear energy, are you? He put out a "White Book" that was largely in favor of nuclear power plants.

[Answer] No, in that White Book he left the choice open...

(Quotation from the White Book, 1978: "Prospects concerning the capacity to be installed. Under the minimal hypothesis, toward 1989 a nuclear power plant of 1,300 megawatts must be added; under the maximal hypothesis that must be done by 1986. At this moment it may be reasonably hoped that complete mastery of this energy technology will be achieved very rapidly. In evaluating the risks it must not be forgotten that *every* industrial activity involves certain risks." Etc., etc.)

Tobback: Do not forget that the situation is somewhat different on this issue in Flanders from the situation in the Netherlands. There you have a broad public movement against nuclear energy.

[Question] Here, too. The VAKS (Verenigde Actiegroepen voor Kernstop [United Action Groups for a Nuclear Stop]) are very active. The SP systematically steers clear of them, of course.

[Answer] Not true. Every time the VAKS has asked for a discussion we have received them.

[Question] Nothing has ever come of it.

[Answer] Yes, there has.

[Question] What, then?

[Answer] It will suffice if you take cognizance of the amendments that we are presenting with a view to the Great Energy Debate that will soon be held in

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

parliament. Then you would see that we take good positions on it.

[Question] In the meantime, of course, nuclear energy has become an opposition issue.

[Answer] No, no. Just compare Claes's views with those of Knoops (the liberal secretary of state for energy).

[Question] I have never said that it could not be worse.

(Scornful laughter resounds through the room.)

[Answer] Listen, I am not planning to accept all VAKS's positions unquestioningly. No matter how appealing and full of good intentions they may be. I myself am against any *additional* nuclear power plant and for development of alternative sources of energy. But I am not against nuclear power because it is nuclear. *I am not a green boy.*

[Question] Shall we now make the traditional transition from nuclear energy to nuclear rockets? The cabinet has announced that after the NATO summit meeting in Bonn it may possibly make a decision about the placement of the missiles. What decision is that, in your opinion?

[Answer] The decision has already been made and it is *yes*. What is the issue, essentially? It is a matter of Reagan's knowing for sure that he can set those things down in Belgium if he needs to do so. Well, he has that certainty. Before his departure for Europe the American President said: "We must salute the West German, British, and Belgian governments for their leadership in this critical issue." Surely that is clear? Apparently he cannot count on the Netherlanders, but he can count on the Belgians.

[Question] Such a statement is at most an indication, not proof.

[Answer] I agree, but there are also the statements of our defense minister, the Liberal Vreven. He speaks and acts as if to him it were a matter of course that those missiles are coming.

[Question] On the other hand, there is the "new flexibility" of the CVP [Christian Social Party]. It participated in the latest anti-missile demonstration of 6 June. At the demonstration in October of last year it was still completely absent.

[Answer] Oh, well. The CVP is mainly participating in the coming elections.

[Question] You think the CVP has its eye on the municipal council elections in October and is trying to take the wind out of the socialist opposition's sails?

[Answer] It is trying, but will not succeed. Among people who think at all, its cynicism can only increase the abhorrence of the CVP.

[Question] But it cannot be denied that the Catholic column and its political arm, the CVP, are under great pressure from opponents of the missiles. Let

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

me mention the Christian Labor Movement, the Interdiocesan Pastoral Consultation, Pax Christi, and whatever they all call themselves. I might also say, might I not, that the CVP is just democratically bowing to the majority position?

[Answer] You might say that, yes. And I think that is fine. The main thing is to keep the missiles away. If the CVP helps us do that, so much the better. It also furthers polarization, and that is a bonus. That way still more of the conservative-minded CVP'ers will flee to the Liberals. A splendid thing! If we can force the CVP to declare itself on more issues, maybe we will attain a healthy democracy in Flanders.

[Question] Where are the missiles to be located? The SP first said Zutendaal, then Kleine Brogel, and now Florennes. When I hear that I am inclined to believe the minister of defense, who says that the SP wants to get at the truth by lies. Why do you not simply admit that you do not know?

[Answer] Because I do know. It *will* be Florennes. And I should like to point out that you must read a little more carefully. It was not the SP but DE MORGEN that ever said that they would be placed in Zutendaal. That they were destined for Kleine Brogel was stated in the confidential report that Minister Simonet sent to the members of the parliamentary committee on defense and foreign affairs...

Confidential

[Question] My head is whirling. You did say that they will be in Florennes?

[Answer] Believe me, it will be Florennes. Not Zutendaal or Arendonk or Bachten-de-Kupe. *Florennes!* We have the best conceivable reasons for saying that so positively.

[Question] What reasons?

[Answer] Well, unfortunately, I cannot make that known; that is confidential information. But if Vreven should say tomorrow that it will definitely be Saint-Hubert, I am prepared to state that he is lying. It is no worse here than in the United States; did you know that? The Mormons of Salt Lake City were informed in advance of the placing of the MX rockets in Utah. Not only that, the president takes account of their objections and ultimately does not place the MX in Utah. The Belgian is not even supposed to know that there will be rockets in his country. And what does the minister of defense do? He *puts his tongue in his cheek*. "Aha, you are trying to get at the truth." As if that were a reproach!

[Question] You are assuming that the 48 Belgian rockets will also be *placed* in Belgium. Strictly speaking that need not be. There is a scenario conceivable by which Belgium and the Netherlands temporarily push their rockets off on each other. Suppose questions are asked about the matter in the Second Chamber. "Is it true that they are in Maastricht?" Then they are transported superfast to Belgium, and then the Netherlands minister can declare in all conscience that there is not a cruise missile to be found in the whole of the Netherlands. In the reverse direction it would, of course, work in exactly the same way.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] Haha! If that is true we had better cease our resistance. *Si non è vero è ben trovato*. This smells of Orwell! This presupposes such a large dose of *restrictio mentalis* (narrow-mindedness) that it must have come from a Christian brain.

[Question] The socialist Stemerding has found out that the CDA [(Netherlands) Christian Democratic Appeal] is toying with such a plan.

[Answer] There you are. I think the Holy Ghost has been at work here.

[Question] Surely it does not matter a straw where those things are located? Their great strength lies in mobility.

[Answer] Where *in Belgium* they are placed does indeed make no difference at all from the military point of view. If France is willing to take them off our hands and they are then set up right by the Belgian border, that gets rid of the problem as far as I am concerned. After all, I cannot prevent the French from putting their Pluto rockets there.

[Question] With all your talk about where they will or will not be placed, you have really been focusing the discussion on an irrelevant point.

[Answer] I have not focused the discussion at all. The SP is continuing to urge that no new rockets come to Belgium at all. That does not alter the fact that the residents are concerned about *the place* where they are set up.

[Question] And are the residents wrong about that?

[Answer] Oh, people react subjectively and emotionally. I, too. Hygienically it makes no difference whether my drinking water, so long as it is well controlled, comes from under the churchyard or not. But I would rather not know about it.

[Question] Reagan comes to Europe and suddenly the NATO summit meeting seems to be being held not in Brussels but in Bonn. Apparently the Americans feel it is fun to whisper secrets with the social democrats.

[Answer] I have it from a good source that it was not Schmidt but the liberal Genscher that invited the American President to Bonn. Schmidt has no secrets to whisper. At the last SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], where I was, by the way, he had to promise that the missile issue would be reviewed in the fall of 1983. For the Americans Schmidt has now more than ever become an unreliable partner. I am not initiated into the secrets of the CIA--it is different with the KGB!--but I could imagine that behind closed doors in the United States there is consideration of the replacement of Schmidt by *Strauss*. Or *Kohl*; that is still the greatest point of uncertainty. To put it euphemistically, Schmidt is being very poorly repaid for the services he has rendered. The Moor has done his duty, the Moor can go. Let it be a lesson to all other social-democratic leaders.

Pork and Beans

[Question] Is this anti-Americanism?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] No, I am not anti-American. I am against this administration, just as I was against the preceding one. I hope from the bottom of my heart that before too long a time there will be an American government that I can stand behind. The Kennedy line, Cyrus Vance--my full sympathy goes out to them. *Give us Americans once more at last that can read and write.* I have sat and watched French television broadcasting the show from Versailles. There was a interpreter of 14th century Ars Nova ballades on. They are smooth, light bits of music, but you could clearly see that they were over the head of the cowboy Ronald, who understands only his own pork-and-beans culture.

[Question] Oh, I thought you were about to go after the Sun King Mitterand?

[Answer] I must admit that what I have gotten to see of Mitterand lately is a real disgrace. I am almost inclined to say that it would do Thatcher credit that she left, if it were not that she so urgently had to wage war. *Versailles is a blot on the socialist scutcheon.*

[Question] Reagan once let it slip that if necessary he would deploy the cruise missiles without nuclear warheads...

[Answer] That is outright insulting, for it appears that Reagan thinks we Europeans are idiots. Rockets are *always* stationed without warheads. The warheads are often kept kilometers further up. *Naturally you can also load a cruise missile with a box of pralines. But let us agree that in that case the cost of the whole system seems a trifle extravagant.* What Reagan is demagogically aiming at is this. If you have 40 cruise missiles you fire off 39 of them with conventional charges to keep the opponent's defense system busy. Only one of the rockets has a nuclear warhead, and on the other side they do not know which it is. That makes the system relatively cheap, too.

[Question] If we had to do it all ourselves it would come out a bit more expensive, it is true. A number of European gentlemen, including Tindemans, our minister of foreign relations (and the CDA'ers Penders and Janssen van Raay), have set up an international pressure group to deal with European defense questions. How acceptable is it for Tindemans to play a prominent part in that?

[Answer] Completely unacceptable. This club just wants to try to keep the peace movement in check. It is a new movement from the extreme right, way over toward the fascists. That can be seen from the program and from the names: Strauss, Otto von Habsburg, von Kielmannsegg... Tindemans is now trying to deny that he has anything to do with it, but his credibility in the matter has been reduced to nil. I have the evidence in hand: documents, facts. The meeting at which the European Institute for Security Questions was founded was held at the Egmont Palace in Brussels. By the way, Bernard (to his assistant), that reminds me that I must ask the government what that piece of nonsense cost. (To me again:) The Egmont Palace is made available by the Belgian government for official and prestigious occasions.

[Question] I keep coming back to your way of conducting the opposition. Asking questions is fine; action is better. Won't you agree with that?

[Answer] That is why I have switched over to action in my own electoral district, Louvain. I have formed a list there with SP'ers, communists, and the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

politically homeless. The advantages are legion. If small leftist groups keep coming up with separate lists, they will never get a seat. In the Belgian electoral system the left-over votes go to the biggest party; i.e., the CVP. I also feel that the childish disputes of leftists among themselves have just got to stop. Not that I have now become a communist; I am not that crazy. The united list is also an appeal to the politically homeless: "As it is, you and those like you are everlastingly going to stand on the sidelines. I want to put the old slogan of the Netherlands New Left into practice: 'If you want the party further to the left, join in!'"

[Question] Excellent, but whom will you bring in that way? Phrase-making friars and democratic demagogues? I notice, for example, that the sound anticlericalism that certainly still exists within the party is systematically denied by the leadership. To say no more.

[Answer] I am what you call a sound anticlerical; Christians do not interest me. What interests me is that people who are progressive, or call it leftist, not be kept apart from each other because of those damned columns. Indeed, *the danger exists that you are going to form a club of social workers. The PvdA knows all about that.* I am particularly excited about the dialog that we in Louvain can engage in with the politically homeless, the independent leftists. They are the salt in the mass! They open the way into a world other than the party world. Because of its position as the underdog in Flanders the party is getting scared of its own shadow. Cold water fright! *It looks as if the SP had become a sort of tribe where you do not get the right to speak until after the initiation rites.*

[Question] *Exactly. At the SP congress early in May Jef Ulburghs, the Catholic pastor from Limburg, was allowed to take the floor. Nice for him, but what did he have to say? He talked about "socialism with a human face, the encounter function, and new and fresh analyses."* Is that the kind of fashionable chit-chat the SP needs?

[Answer] No. But it should first be said that not everybody is such a chilly materialist as you and I. Some people also have spiritual needs. Second, there is more to it than the words he uses. *A man like Ulburghs is a living reproof to the whole party.* What he is doing there in Limburg among imported laborers and other oppressed people, in short, *his involvement, is a hundred times as great as that of the ordinary SP militant.*

[Question] Agreed; that man was at the Limburg mines back in 1970 during the weeks of wildcat strikes. I did not see the SP there, then still called the BSP [Belgian Socialist Party]. So sincerity and the Breakthrough idea consist in your having to wait 12 years before get up to the trough a little bit?

[Answer] Why should you not be willing in politics to start small? It was not until Van Miert came in as chairman in 1977 that things began to change gradually. Because you are half Netherlands I will make another comparison with the Netherlands. What we are now striving for is not the Breakthrough of the Netherlands party in the 1950's; we want the New Left in power. *This is a warning: if anyone should ever try to cleanse our party documents of everything that might disturb the believers, I would resign immediately.* Why is our greatest concern for the Christians? That is just a sociological fact.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] Then it is not a matter of *votes*, or, to continue in that style, of *winning souls*?

[Answer] Not in the negative sense that you are giving to it. But it is a matter of winning *people*. You cannot get around the power of numbers...

...

The conversation has now clearly taken a different turn. The politician has gradually lost all trace of swagger and smart cracks; this is not a laughing matter. I still try to find out what the party has to offer the Breakthrough crowd. "Blood, sweat, and tears. But do it anyway," is the answer. The awkward feeling creeps over me that I also have Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons standing beside me on the sidewalk. But you can get rid of them by the *idle* use of God's name. I am saved by the telephone. Another journalist, this time from the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television (Dutch Service)], wants to talk with the parliamentary delegation leader.

COPYRIGHT 1982: VN/BV Weekbladpers.

8815

CSO: 3105/187

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THEATER FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY NEEDED FOR BUNDESWEHR

Hamburg STERN in German 9 Jun 82 pp 18-30

[Report by Wolf Perdelwitz: "Neither Red, Nor Dead"]

[Text] Critics say the FRG is armed the wrong way. Our armored armies are better suited to offense than defense— and in case of war we would only be left with the choice between capitulation and nuclear suicide. Is some kind of "alternative defense" a way out ?

At bottom, it is really quite simple. If the Warsaw Pact mounts an attack against us, we defend ourselves by conventional means until everything is kaputt in our country. Then, we defend ourselves with battlefield nuclear weapons until all of Central Europe is kaputt. And after that, we defend ourselves with the strategic nuclear missiles of the Americans until the whole world is kaputt. Even officers of the Bundeswehr's general staff view the consequences of NATO's existing "flexible response" doctrine in this manner.

The core of this doctrine which has been official NATO policy since 1967 is that an attack should be repulsed as close as possible to the frontier so that there will not be a "protracted struggle on the soil of the FRG." The Bonn defense white book of 1975 states that nuclear weapons should be used "as late as possible but as early as necessary." This uncertainty regarding the use of nuclear weapons is intentional. The enemy should not know what the NATO response will be and therefore be deterred out of fear of a general nuclear war.

But what if this deterrence does not work ? Are we then really rather dead than red ?

As in a fortress under siege, it seems, the Bundeswehr leadership in its ministry up on Bonn's Hardthoehle has taken shelter behind the deterrence doctrine. It has done so despite the fact that it can no longer be overlooked that the West German army—"one of the finest combat forces," as Minister Hans Apel has put it—can no more survive in its present state than the saurians whom the arms opponents like to point to by saying: "Died out—too much armor, too little brains."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Hardthoehe is being challenged from several directions at once—not that it seems to bother the armchair strategists one bit. Even the usually pro-military Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT was saying recently: "On Hardthoehe, clinging to old strategies and systems is deemed more important than looking for new departures; Defense Minister Apel has gone fishing intellectually."

There are more than enough reasons to look for new departures—towit:

There is the peace movement which considers President Reagan's arms policy of "re-arming in order to disarm" absurd and dangerous and would rather disarm right away.

There is the growing number of critics of all stripes politically who think they know by now what the secret behind Helmut Schmidt's sixties' philosophy is. The FRG, he said then, can only be defended "at the cost of total destruction." Given the fact that two-thirds of the 6,000 nuclear weapons deployed on FRG soil have a reach of less than 120 kilometers, they must perforce explode on German soil once they are fired. This is tantamount to defense through suicide and that is why the critics are looking for ways to mount an "alternative defense."

Then, there is the forthcoming lack of personnel which will force the Bundeswehr to trim down. Lower birth rates will reduce the number of available conscripts to below the 200,000-man annual minimum by 1987. Prologing military service would help very little, as the Bundeswehr has determined. Each month of added service would make up for just 10,000 of the missing conscripts; but at the height of the lower birth years, the shortfall would amount to at least 70,000 to 80,000 men.

Finally, there is the lack of funds projected for years into the future which will call for economy measures. During the boom years, the politicians gave the military just about anything they asked for; but now costs have outstripped the ability to pay. Last year, the Hardthoehe budget could only be preserved intact by taking up a collection among the other ministries.

Where only the newest and most complicated equipment was good enough, there grew up an army that put the fear of God even into high-ranking military men—not only those on the enemy side but on our own side as well. With the "Leopard 2," a maximum of technical sophistication has been reached which can just barely be handled by the conscripts.

Conurbations Are Dangerous for Tanks

Many critics also consider this type of equipment dangerous for other reasons. Locked into defense operations close to the border, the Bundeswehr has equipment at its disposal that is suitable to re-fighting the Blitzkriegs of World War II. Peace researcher Lt Col Alfred Mechttersheimer (ret) calls the Bundeswehr a "composite of the Afrikakorps and American expeditionary forces."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Bundeswehr, with its fast armored forces, would indeed be an exceptional attack force. For that matter, that is what it is supposed to be, since defense operations close to the border would be impossible except by mounting quick counter-thrusts, in the opinion of the military experts. But the neighbors to the East, who have had painful experiences with attacking German armies, might be justified in worrying about this type of equipment, critics say, asking themselves just how seriously we take article 26 of the Basic Law which calls the preparation of an aggressive war "unconstitutional."

Even high-ranking German military men doubt that the Bundeswehr, in its present form, is ideally equipped to defend the FRG. "I believe we have the wrong kind of military equipment," Major General Guenter Vollmer (ret) says. "We not only wish to defend ourselves; it even says so in our Basic Law. For defensive purposes alone, we do not need tanks! We have armor plating on just about everything; and tanks are an incredibly suitable attack weapon."

The senseless "hyper-sophistication of technology" applying to fully mechanized, armored army units comes in for criticism by Brigadier General Franz Uhle-Wettler. The price of progress is that these troops can be used on almost "half the terrain of Germany" only at the greatest risk, he claims. The densely populated conurbations along the Rhine, the Main and the Ruhr would be a dangerous environment in which to operate for tanks suited for combat in the open. And tanks would be of no use whatever in about 30 percent of the territory of the FRG covered with woods and highlands. Uhle-Wettler knows whereof he speaks. He is a Panzer general himself.

He feels the army has reached a "cul-de-sac."* Equipped with more and more perfect armaments, it cannot be used in a large part of the area it is meant to defend. Because perfect equipment is dependent on perfect supply, each combat soldier must be backed up by three support personnel. And this gigantic supply operation itself is such a delicate business that it must be protected in turn—by combat troops that are then missing at the front.

In addition, this train acts as an intellectual drain on the combat units, he says. The supply units are composed of the most intelligent conscripts for the most part; the combat units often have to make the best of it with the "dumbest." "In our high-technology armies," Uhle-Wettler says, "the huge non-combatant units constitute the cream of the crop. The combat units just get the low-fat milk most of the time."

Soldiers Should Go Back to Walking

For this reason, the Panzer general calls for doing without armor. The soldiers should climb out of their "Marten" armored personnel carriers and make their way through the woods lightly armed like the infantry of old. "Who else could dislodge the enemy from the Rhoen?" Uhle-Wettler asks.

* Franz Uhle-Wettler: "Combat Area Central Europe. Dangers of Hyper-Technology for the Armed Forces," Olzog Publishing House, Munich; 280 p.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Major General Jochen Loeser (ret)* goes one step further. He, too, deplors the "paralyzation of the armed forces by an oversized administrative apparatus" and the "hyper-technization and bureaucratization" under which the "striking power" of the Bundeswehr must suffer. He, too, knows whereof he speaks. Loeser was an armored infantry general. If the FRG cannot be defended by its existing military forces, Loeser says, then this comes down to a choice between capitulation and nuclear suicide.

But Loeser believes he has found a narrow alternative that lies between "red" and "dead"—"comprehensive defense" using conventional defensive weapons while at the same time renouncing the use of battlefield nuclear weapons.

This plan which originated with Starnberg peace researcher Horst Ahfeldt some years ago** makes a lot of sense. This, however, would call for complete re-thinking which might be painful for some of the generals because a multitude of small engagements—in which the aggressor would be worn down and at length forced to retreat—would take the place of decisive battles fought by fast-moving armored units.

The basic idea is this: If the Warsaw Pact really enjoys as massive a superiority as NATO always claims, it would make no sense for the West to prepare for battle, matching the other side tank for tank and cannon for cannon. Under such circumstances, the numerically inferior side invariably loses. It is therefore senseless for NATO to structure and equip its divisions exactly as the Warsaw Pact does because in a direct confrontation it would be bound to lose. "The West must pay back in another coin."

The coin Loeser and Ahfeldt have in mind is this: Small units are distributed throughout the territory of the FRG. It is their primary task to defend the area that has been assigned to them in peacetime and with which they are familiar. Wherever the attacker enjoys superiority, they pull back and even permit him to roll past them in the woods. Most of them are only lightly armed; their main weapons being small, portable precision missiles to deal with the enemy armor. Ahfeldt has come up with the surprising conclusion that if each of these 12 to 20-man units—which he calls "techno-commandoes"—knocks out just three enemy tanks, the Red Army will reach the East bank of the Rhine with just one tank and will have to give up.

Technically, this would not be a problem even today. The Bundeswehr's anti-tank rockets are extremely accurate; their hit ratio is more than 80 percent. They are also small, easy to transport and inexpensive. They do not even cost one percent of what a tank costs and there is a tremendous political advantage they have, too. They cannot be used in an attack, but on defense they are hard to beat.

* Jochen Loeser: "Neither Red, Nor Dead. Survival Without Nuclear War—
A Security-Political Alternative" Guenter Olzog, Munich, 280 p
** Horst Ahfeldt: "Defense and Peace," Carl Hanser, Munich, 346 p

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But Ahfeldt's plan has a big drawback, which is also political. It presupposes close cooperation between military and civil defense and as a consequence a greater degree of militarization of the FRG as well as the supply of arms to the population even during peacetime. The techno-commandos would practically have to keep their missiles in their cupboards at home.

Loeser, for his part, calls for a mix of small combat units and conventional armed forces. The small units are to delay the enemy advance with the larger units mounting lightning counter-thrusts. "The attacker would be faced with ever new surprising situations," Loeser says. "When he has captured a small sector, he is hit from new resistance pockets from the depth of the network which are hard to pinpoint with an intensity of fire which has an unexpected effect in conjunction with the many roadblocks and reinforcements of the terrain. Every little forest gully, every firebreak, every valley and every hill becomes a problem for the attacking armored units."

In the neutral countries of Europe—above all in Austria and in Switzerland—similar defense strategies have already been put into operation. They have one major advantage and some major disadvantages. Armed forces of this kind are suited for defensive purposes only and therefore cause no fear among the neighboring countries; but at the same time they create a risk of the weapons falling into the wrong hands and having war spill over the entire country.

Figuring on a "Protracted Nuclear War"

Partisan-like fighting methods have proved their effectiveness before and after all. During the past 40 years, only one regular army has been able to defeat a guerilla army—the British army in Malaya in a war that lasted from 1948 to 1957. But Mao Dze Dong's battle for China, Tito's victory over Hitler and the Vietnam War all are convincing proof of the chances for victory of such fighting methods.

The war in Vietnam, however, also shows what sacrifices such a battle demands. For decades to come, large sections of the country will still be studded with duds and contaminated with chemical defoliants. In Germany, the consequences would be none the lesser. A Bundeswehr study reached the conclusion that a conventional war of 20 days' duration would wreak the same destruction as a nuclear war lasting 5 days.*

For this reason, peace researchers as well as the peace movement are already going one step further. If deterrence no longer represents a credible way of preventing war, how then can war in Central Europe be prevented at all? There are four proposals being discussed in addition to Ahfeldt's and Loeser's defensive strategy alternatives:

A unified Europe should itself become a nuclear superpower.

The countries of Central Europe—led by the FRG and the GDR—should become neutral and nuclear-free.

* Wolf Perdelwitz/Heiner Bremer: "Hostage Europe," Olle & Wolter, 352 p

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The FRG should capitulate in case of an attack but should then resist occupation by resorting to civil disobedience.

Or, Central Europe should be at least partially disarmed while members of the three political parties represented in the Bundestag call for a reduction of nuclear arsenals.

Manfred Woerner of the CDU considers at least part of the nuclear weapons on German soil superfluous, if NATO were to rearm its conventional forces. Juergen Moellemann of the FDP thinks that most battlefield nuclear weapons in the FRG can be dispensed with but calls for a "substantial" reduction of the number of tanks in Eastern Europe to make up for it. And Egon Bahr, the SPD security expert, wants to see no nuclear weapons deployed at all in countries which cannot themselves decide on their use—which is another way of saying that he favors a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

But Bahr did not make any headway with this proposal in the discussions of the international commission chaired by former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. This disarmament study group—in which former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and CPSU central committee member Georgij Arbatov also took part—would only recommend a 150-kilometer wide nuclear-free zone on both sides of the Eastern border of the FRG. The fact is that most nuclear weapons are deployed outside this belt even now.

Of the four proposals aimed at lessening the danger of war in Central Europe, only the last one—involving partial troop reductions by both sides—seems at all realistic at this time. But some skepticism is called for. The negotiations on balanced troop reductions which have been going on for 9 years in Vienna have not even been able to agree on how many soldiers each side actually has at present. As for the other three proposals, they would touch upon the supremacy of the two superpowers in their spheres of influence and as such meet with resistance.

Meanwhile, the U.S. defense department is at work refining the ill-starred deterrence doctrine. A new "defense guidance" by the Pentagon has now come up with calculations on a "protracted nuclear war." DIE WELT was incensed—but only because these plans became public just a few days prior to Reagan's trip to the FRG. "Secret plans should stay secret," the paper said.

The highest court of NATO member country Norway, on the other hand, pulled the emergency brake at just about the same time. The state, the court found, does not have the right to force young men to take part in a war in which they must fight against mankind using nuclear weapons.

COPYRIGHT 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co

9473
CSC: 3103/544

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THEATER FORCES

ITALY

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGY BY GEN SALATIELLO

Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Mar-Apr 82 pp 25-39

[Excerpts] RIVISTA MILITARE, which wants to be regarded more and more as a highly qualified forum for the exchanging of ideas, is happy to publish an article by Army Corps General Luigi Salatiello.

The incisive thoughts contributed by this article unquestionably are in conformity with the role of the author as an emerging personality, giving evidence, as they do, of his unusual analytical ability in complex and delicate areas of military doctrine and policy.

The article is also particularly valid and definitely authoritative by virtue of the writer's exceptional preparation and many-sided experience, for during his prestigious career he has performed very important command and staff tasks and held positions of great responsibility within the domain of the central organizations of the Ministry of Defense (among other things, he has been Director General of Motor Vehicle Transportation).

An originality of concept is evident in the way the various parts of the article are put together which reflects a definitely personal manner of looking at military subjects of great significance.

Particularly characteristic of the article is the fact that it includes proposals and views which certainly will be the forerunners of suitable further doctrinal works on the part of "the people engaged in doing this work."

The deductive rigor of the author's inquiry into the subject matter gives linear coherence to the analysis which, conducted under the aegis of a cautious realism, constitutes a model of methodology and is distinguished by stimulating motivations of useful dialectical unrest.

While thanking General Salatiello for his courteous and welcome cooperation, RIVISTA MILITARE hopes that the article will encourage a constructive debate in a vivifying context of opinions, which are the primary carriers of the development of military thought.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Introduction

In recent months, military problems, and, more particularly, problems of military policy, have been the center of attention where public opinion is concerned. All the communications media, from the daily newspapers and the periodicals to radio and television, have been occupied with them. Experts, nonexperts and even the man in the street have talked about them. Two subjects, in particular, have polarized these discussions: the deployment of the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles which are intended to reduce the discrepancy between the two nuclear powers confronting each other in Europe, and which decidedly favors the Warsaw Pact at present, and the United States' decision to put the neutron bomb into production. That we would return from the Euromissiles and the above-mentioned bomb to a discussion of NATO strategy was inevitable, and that is what happened.

Sensible things, others which are less sensible and some things which were simply foolish were said. Some commentators endeavored--successfully--to be objective, while others, appointing themselves interpreters of the anxious longing for peace which quite properly animates almost the entire human race, lost sight, not always in good faith, of the fact that we are living in a world pervaded by tensions of all kinds (frequently bloody ones) and fell into the facile rhetoric of disarmament as if peace had not always been in danger of being broken by the sword for as long as the world has existed. Finally, not a few, who are the servants of a class-struggle ideology which knows only one fatherland, resolutely declared themselves to be in favor of maintaining the nuclear "status quo" in anticipation of negotiations which are destined to be of no avail.

Well-known scientists meeting at Erice discussed nuclear energy and, more generally, the goals which science should pursue, in a learned manner, and they agreed unanimously and without any reservations that science is unfaithful to its basic purposes if it does not aim at the moral and material elevation of mankind. One cannot fail to be in agreement with that attitude while at the same time not condemning those who have devoted themselves to maintaining the safety and ensuring the survival of their respective countries, and also not forgetting that war--which is never justifiable when it takes the form of offensive war--has always constituted a potent factor where speeding up scientific progress was concerned.

Those are opinions and discussions which fortunately have not cracked the firmness of the parliamentary majority on which the present administration relies. The courageous and opportune confirmation given last August to the decision to accept the installation of cruise missile bases in Italy in a process which started with the invitation to our allies to begin negotiations concerning a balanced reduction of the number of theater weapons does credit to our politicians--or at least to those capable of discerning the true interests of Italy through the cloud of lies raised to make it difficult to judge impartially.

Such lively participation by the mass media and the public in problems of military policy, and more specifically military problems, is an extremely

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

desirable occurrence. I mentioned that a few months ago in a study which appeared in this publication¹, stating that "national defense is a need which all Italians have in common and it is right that its aims, its subject matter and the ways that need is satisfied should be widely known and discussed in every center capable of contributing ideas."

The Minister of Defense, Honorable Lelio Lagorio, himself, in presenting the estimate of defense expenditures for 1981 to Parliament, asserted, with considerably more authority than I have, that "the purpose of this increased activity² is to be found in a desire to bring the problems of defense out of the limited area within which the employees of the ministry operate. The problems of defense, are political, social and economic problems which are of interest to the entire Italian population because the people are directly involved in them."

Having said the above, I should like to try, in the pages which follow, to put at the service of the readers of RIVISTA MILITARE the expertise and experience which I possess after 45 years of service, putting a little order into many things which are correct, incorrect and tendentious that have been said in recent times regarding the strategic courses being taken by NATO and, above all, to put forward some new ideas both in regard to the defense of Europe and the military instrument destined to provide it.

For that purpose, having defined the concept of deterrence, we will see what its structure is like and how it was modified, little by little, by the advent of the atomic bomb. Then, after summarily examining the repercussions the nuclear factor has had on ground operations, I will focus on current NATO strategy in the European theater, too, in order to judge whether the new theater weapons and the neutron bomb are going to affect that strategy, and, if so, in what ways.

In a third section, I will subject that strategy to a critical examination and state a personal opinion of my own--an opinion which will not be binding in any way upon official Defense circles where their ability to guarantee the defense of western Europe against the danger of aggression, or their lack of such ability, are concerned.

Finally, before bringing this article to a conclusion, I will go into the subject of the difficult economic situation in which our armed forces now find themselves.

Critical Examination of NATO's Current Strategy

Unfortunately, we have to state, frankly, that NATO's current strategy is not very credible either on the conventional or the nuclear level.

On the conventional level because the ratio of the respective forces is so unfavorable to NATO as to make it necessary, if there was not to be a quick and irreparable surrender, to increase the intensity of the response at a rapid rate of speed until the threshold of the first nuclear strike was reached.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

On the whole, this theory did not provide anything at all that was new, from the conventional point of view, because a defender has always, at least from the time when war made itself rational by providing itself with laws, principles and rules, had recourse to all the means in his possession, once the lines along which the attacker is moving have been identified during the initial resistance efforts, to block those penetrations when they have come a certain distance and then to reconquer the lost territory, if possible.

But there is more to it than that. A pitched battle, which is the fundamental act toward which the strategic maneuverings tend because of its consequences, which, if they are not decisive, provide the side which prevails with considerable advantages as far as continuation of operations is concerned, and which is highly dramatic because of the large number of sacrifices in men and materiel which it requires, obeys a logic and follows a pattern from which it cannot deviate, if one allows for the exceptions which prove the rule.³ The logic is that of every test of force in which each of the two adversaries seeks to prevail over the other and does not wait to do it until his back is against the wall.

The pattern can be summarized as follows. The side which assumes the initiative and attacks, and which has the resources to permit to do so, presses its attacks urgently because it knows that time is on the side of the defender, who, since he is unable to be strong everywhere, keeps many units in reserve and concentrates them where the pressure is the most violent. In its turn, the defending side must prevent the fighting from spreading into the open country, where--as I have observed in the past--the aggressor can make the weight of his superiority count, and for that purpose, while making use of adequate tactical depth, must not concede any successes to his adversary which would compromise his winning the battle.

So gradualness in responding, where conventional warfare is concerned, does not make sense tactically. It is only acceptable if one wishes to express a political intention to avoid sharp and dangerous accelerations in reacting to aggression--an intention which unquestionably is praiseworthy even if not very realistic for one of two reasons--either because battles are not won with prudence or because the ratio of the respective forces to each other is so unfavorable to one side that it can only hope to put a stop to the aggression by accomplishing a maximal acceleration of its reaction.

It is not credible on the nuclear level because it seems very improbable and not very realistic to me to believe that the Soviet Union would be able to "absorb" without reacting to that limited number of nuclear strikes, even though of slight power and demonstrative in nature, which, according to NATO, were supposed to demonstrate its firm intention to resist aggression at all costs. It might have been able to do so in the days of its nuclear inferiority, but why should it do so today when the terms of the confrontation have been reversed? And if it was not willing to give in, as seems logical, a chain reaction would be set off whose final, disastrous outcome would be a general nuclear war.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

On the other hand, let us not forget that the keys to the Alliance's nuclear power are almost entirely in the hands of the United States and it is hard to see why that country would be under an obligation to use them when what was at stake, in addition to the defense of Europe, was its own survival.

In spite of official declarations of loyalty to NATO, there are unequivocal indications of a progressive cooling off of America's interest in the Alliance. Too frequently the European partners in the Alliance have dissociated themselves from United States policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and have not supported having recourse to subtle "distinctions." Too frequently the European nations have professed, without having the means to support it, to have developed an autonomous role vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. And finally, there too frequently has not been an, and there still is no, agreement among those European nations on the evaluation of international events and the attitude to be taken toward the Soviet Union. It is not improbable that the hypothesis that, without greater cohesion in the Western national policies and an effective strengthening of the Alliance, the Americans will remove themselves from NATO will turn out to be true. The establishment of a mobile emergency force in the United States, which has been in the news recently, could foreshadow a revision of American policy toward Europe, if not specifically in the sense of a separation from NATO, then at least in the sense of a different conception of the military contribution to be given to the other members of the alliance.

This emergency force (RDF), which will be ready in 1985 and will be made up of 3 Army divisions, 1 of marines, 2 battalions of Rangers, 2 groups of special forces (Green Berets), the pertinent airborne carriers and adequate logistical support, would make it possible for the United States to have the benefit of the advantages of a central position with respect to the entire globe which the Soviet Union enjoys on the European-Asiatic continent.

The advantages of a central position from the military point of view are well known. They make it possible to deploy only a portion of one's power at the borders and to maneuver the main body of one's forces as necessity dictates. It was precisely by virtue of that position that the Central Powers in World War I and Hitler's Germany in World War II were able to make headway against preponderant forces for years, achieving successes in the first phase of operations which were all but decisive, and the reason they finally were defeated was that, since their strength consisted predominantly of ground forces, they were not able to paralyze maritime transportation and the role of such transportation was essential for the Allies.

The Soviet Union would have a better chance of successfully exploiting its central position now than the former central regimes had, in view of the fact that the Soviets have naval power, against the European nations, the noninsular Asiatic nations and the United States itself, if the latter were engaged in Europe. In its turn, the United States would be in a position to do the same thing by developing its emergency force on a world scale, thanks to the airborne and naval carriers available to it at present and in which it has an indisputable supremacy, within the framework of a return to its role of the primary economic power in the world and the champion of freedom which the new administration is pursuing in a decisive manner.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

If the above-mentioned forecasts were reliable, what reasons does the United States have for modernizing (Pershing 2) and strengthening (cruise missiles and neutron bombs) NATO's potential in the European theater? It can be supposed that it has done so for psychological reasons looking in two directions, as follows:

With respect to their allies, that the threat of the inadequately opposed Russian missiles could be conducive to compliant behavior—and there is no lack of indications of such a trend. With respect to the Soviet Union, which, strong in its conventional-forces superiority and convinced that the United States would not be the first to pull the nuclear trigger, could "precipitate matters" and "dictate" to one or more European nations or launch air-ground operations destined to achieve rapid success since the Europeans lacked the will to fight.

I imagine that many people, when they read these forecasts, will believe that they are the result of a pessimistic attitude, but it is the duty of people who prepare for war not to be optimistic and to adopt a coldly realistic way of looking at things.

I remember that the officers who, at the beginning of my career, introduced me to the complex subject of operational problems (and first of all the unforgettable General Saltini!), taught me that, when evaluating the enemy's possible lines of action for the purpose of determining our own plan of maneuvering, it is necessary to give proper consideration to the line of action of the enemy which is most unfavorable to us, even if it is not very probable. I do not think that such a wise rule has become invalid, even though the times have changed.

Points of Departure for a Revision of NATO's Current Strategy

I will not presume to suggest a new and different strategy on the basis of my own powers alone.

I can only indicate, in the form of suggested points of departure, the direction in which it would be necessary to move to avert a third world war and, if unsuccessful in that, to limit its scope.

1. It does not seem realistic to suppose that nuclear explosions, first warning explosions and then selective ones, would be the only ones that took place.

It seems more logical to think that they would end up setting off a war in the European theater which would devastate Europe.

2. In the same way, it is not very probable that a nuclear war in a particular theater will be dissociated from a general war. One would grow out of the other.

3. Consequently it can be presumed that the United States will not launch the first strike, which, spiraling, would involve it in a nuclear war.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4. In the same way, it follows that the response to a conventional attack, which is what the Soviets probably would launch if they undertook an aggressive move, even though their doctrine, for propaganda reasons, puts the accent on a combination of "nuclear" and "traditional," cannot be anything but conventional, without any hope of nuclear succor which would not arrive—a hope which might have a negative effect on morale.

5. If the preceding hypotheses were plausible, an improving and strengthening of our conventional forces would be absolutely necessary, not for the purpose of bringing them to the level of the Soviet conventional forces, which would entail unacceptable financial and social burdens for the Western democracies, but to obtain a ratio of forces which would make it possible to have an adequate chance of withstanding the initial attack while awaiting reinforcements which, however, should not be late in arriving.

6. In addition to being predictable, it is also probable that nuclear weapons will be banned. In the meantime, since any moratorium which would freeze the present Soviet superiority would have to be rejected, it will be necessary to go ahead with the modernization and strengthening of European theater weapons. If the Soviet Union became aware of a reluctance on the part of the United States to pull the nuclear trigger, they could be the ones who, in the face of an inferiority which might be a symptom of psychological disarmament, would take the initiative in setting off limited and selected nuclear explosions for the purpose of hurrying up the surrender of the West.

7. Although, as well as can be foreseen, a nuclear war appears improbable today and tomorrow, the ideological conflict which divides the Western democracies from the Marxist world, together with the ever-present expansionist impulse of the Soviet Union, makes a military initiative by the latter, trusting in its formidable conventional-warfare force, possible at any time.

There is an additional reason for believing in that possibility. The new American administration, for the purpose of restoring thrust to that country's foreign policy and building up its allies' confidence, has launched a program aimed at strengthening its military apparatus which, in addition to the development of the emergency force we have already talked about, contemplates strengthening and increasing its strategic nuclear deterrent (with the acquisition, among other things, of new intercontinental missiles--the MX--100 B-1 bombers and an undetermined number of the revolutionary "stealth" bomber. That decision constitutes a genuine technological challenge, and only two courses are open to the Soviet Union in the face of that challenge:

--Either to take up the gauntlet and, to keep pace with the high level of U.S. technology, augment their already considerable military expenditures to the detriment of expenditures for social purposes, which have been seriously in arrears for years, thus bringing internal problems about from which it is difficult to perceive a way out for them;

--Or, if time was pressing, to attack western Europe and confront NATO with the fait accompli of a more or less extensive invasion and uncontrollable developments.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Italian Situation

We cannot conclude our labor without taking a look at the Italian situation.

As far as the operational problems are concerned, we have nothing to add to the transitory allusions which were made in the preceding paragraphs, and all the more so in regard to the subject matter which we have dealt with in detail in other works which have appeared in this publication,⁴ with reflections which we believe are still valid.

On the other hand, there is an urgent need to emphasize the critical situation the army finds itself in where materiel is concerned, which, together with the inadequate financial compensation accorded the officer and noncommissioned officer cadres and the feeling of isolation from the central fabric of the country's life to which they point, not unjustly, is the cause of profound discontent—a situation whose importance should not be underestimated.

When, a few years ago, for reasons not unlike those which are making their appearance once again today, the restructuring of the army was implemented (but it would have been more truthful to call it a redimensioning), 87 battalions or equivalent units were done away with, the number of combat vehicles was reduced by 900, 450 artillery pieces were retired from service and a considerable number of territorial logistical and administrative organizations were dissolved. At the same time, a different structure of the field army was implemented by centering it, in order to put it in step with the nuclear age, on the brigade as the basic, combined-arms large unit.⁵ When the brigade was created, it was necessary to give up a good many divisional commands and all the regimental commands, either to prevent duplications or to slim down the chain of command. The abolition of the regimental commands represented a very painful sacrifice in view of the heritage of traditions connected with them, even though the pain was moderated, in part, by the fact that the glorious battle flags were turned over to the battalions.

What remained when the operation was completed—3 army corps commands, 4 divisional commands, 24 brigades of various kinds (armored, mechanized, motorized, mountain troops and parachutists) and various tactical and logistical support organizations—were regarded as quantitatively sufficient to present either a deterrent force capable of discouraging any threats from the northwest within the framework of a limited conflict or a defensive capability in line with the missions assigned by NATO in case of a general conflict.

I said "quantitatively" on purpose because, from the qualitative point of view, there is a different story to tell. As a matter of fact, the operational efficiency and readiness of units is measured in terms of the quality of materials and their reliability, strength levels, the competence of the cadres, the training of the personnel and the spirit which animates them. There is no doubt, at present, that, where materials and strength levels are concerned—factors which are almost exclusively dependent upon the availability of funds—we have been pursuing an involved course for years which is the result of and is characterized by inefficiency, and consequently it is impossible to perform the "minimal" tasks scheduled for performance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The cuts of which we have spoken were not accomplished without producing trauma and the chief of staff at that time, who had the courage to take the initiative in carrying them out, ran the risk of unpopularity. But to avoid making those cuts it would have been necessary to have offset them with an extraordinary endowment of funds for the purpose of modernizing the materiel in the hands of the troops and to have caused a rapid and strong improvement in the quality of the units kept active to take place which would have produced a pronounced improvement in combat capability. And, in actual fact, the Parliament, with a perceptibility which is to its credit, launched a promotional law (No. 372) in 1977, as it had already done for the navy, and had extended to include the air force immediately afterwards, which allocated 1.115 billion lira to the army to be spent in annual installments whose amount had been fixed by the budget legislation.

Unfortunately, the shortage which had accumulated during years of scanty attention paid to the military institutions by the politicians was a great deal larger than the appropriation which was allowed. Added to this was the fact that they did not have the farsightedness to index the financing, and consequently it was consistently eroded by inflation and the continuous deterioration of the value of the lira in exchange for foreign currency.⁶

The fact is that, since installments amounting to a total of 916.5 billion lire had been appropriated and expended from 1977 to 1981 and since an appropriation of 198.5 billion lire was anticipated for 1982, the special law can be considered invalid at the end of 1982, while on 31 July 1981 the cost of the new ten-year modernization program worked out by the general staff of the army was estimated at 4,374.5 billion lire, or four times larger than the allotment previously granted by Parliament. To this must be added the fact that the ordinary budget, which is chronically insufficient, is almost completely consumed for training expenses, the funds for which also turn out to be less than what is required, with a deficit which amounts to approximately 200 billion lire for the 1981-1982 two-year period, thus making it necessary to reduce expenditures drastically, to spend every last lira for supplies and to defer larger and larger numbers of acquisitions from one year to the next. Consequently--modernization aside--if the ordinary appropriations are not increased by at least 100 billion lire a year at 1981 prices, the critical situation in which the army is struggling could expand into genuine paralysis. And love of my country persuades me to pass over the cuts made in the armed forces' budget this year with the truly praiseworthy intention of reducing the public deficit, but the suspicion that it would be easier to make cuts in the areas in which the responsible people at the top, although resisting strenuously, are accustomed to be compliant in the end and a base provided with means of producing pressure and the ability to conclude contracts does not exist, is a legitimate one. And the matter is all the more deplorable in that we occupy one of the very lowest places on the list of NATO countries where the amounts allocated to defense are concerned, whether one calculates in terms of the percentage of the nation's overall budget or in terms of the gross national product.

In the face of these deficiencies, the following requirements can be listed briefly:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The "Personnel" Component

It is necessary to raise the strength levels and increase, with appropriate incentives, the number of long-term volunteers needed to operate the modern and sophisticated weapons systems.

The "Fire" Component

For antitank defense, which is an area of vital importance on the future battlefield, which will be dominated by armored vehicles, we must integrate the action of the recently-acquired TOW with a shorter-range missile system, which might be the French-German Milan, and fill the minimum-range gap with an individual weapon which, it is to be hoped, will be one of Italian production--if the Folgore is completed (but it is said that it will take more than 15 years)--but it may be one of foreign origin.

For antiaircraft defense, with the operational capability of low-altitude Hawk-Helip system extended to 1993-1995 by a series of improvements, it is now necessary to think of a light missile system, a conventional weapons system for defense against low-altitude and very-low-altitude targets and a self-defense weapon.

Studies are going on in regard to all three of the requirements listed above which are expected to culminate in the furnishing of prototypes, and those studies are financed, in part, by means of contracts. And here, although it is not my intention to get into an argument with the general staff of the army, I should like to call for a display of prudence.

Poverty sometimes pushes us to use our money poorly, in the sense that, in trying to economize, we end up acquiring equipment which has been outstripped by technological progress and which, all things considered, costs as much as, if not more than, equipment which is a great deal better but whose only defect is the fact that it came from abroad although it could have been co-produced in Italy.

I am referring, as some readers will already have realized, to the so-called "self-propelled twin antiaircraft" weapon which, since it is of rather modest caliber and was not provided with search or guidance radars in the initial version (and I do not believe, objectively, that the chassis that was selected--that of the No. 113 VTT, which originated in the United States and was coproduced in Italy--makes it possible to do any better), would only partially solve the vitally important problem of defense against low-altitude and very-low-altitude targets. Although I regard the desire to use only Italian technologies which was the basis on which the choice was made as a commendable motive, I would suggest that, before making an irreversible decision to move on to series production, the prototypes be subjected to a rigorous program of experimentation, while also comparing them with foreign systems designed for the same purpose and seeming to be superior in performance. There is plenty of time to do it.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

For artillery on the ground, since the FH-70 program concerned with the 155/39 howitzer on wheels has been completed, we are moving ahead, on a trilateral basis (Italy, the FRG and Great Britain), with the development of the SP-70, which is the tracked version of the FH and which, it is calculated, will be operationally effective until the year 2000 and beyond. We would also like to get into a quadrilateral program (United States, the FRG, Great Britain and France) for the production of a saturation weapon on a self-propelled chassis and with a range of 35 to 42 kilometers.

The Combat Vehicle Component

Tanks

No new acquisitions are programmed in this area, although our line of tanks was in need of some quantitative expansion, but it would be a serious mistake not to provide for the following:

--A general overhauling of those vehicles which have reached the limits of acceptability (10 to 12 years of service or, as an alternative, 10,000 kilometers of operation), to prolong their life of reliable service for a second ten-year period.

--Increasing the operating capability for all, or most of, the Leopard tanks, bringing to the maintenance facilities the most important improvements suggested by the club consisting of the countries which use that type of tank, among which improvements--as was emphasized earlier--the introduction of a modern firing system, or at least its principal components, is a basic requirement.

--Participation in the French-German agreements concerning the decision as to what tank is to replace the French AMX-30 and the German Leopard 2 in approximately 1990 to 1995. I have reason to believe that a request in this regard given to the FRG by us on the governmental level would be given serious consideration since we use the Leopard tank and that could be converted into great advantages for Italian industry, as well as--obviously--for our army.

Vehicles for the Mechanized Infantry

Now that a considerable number of tracked M-113's have been modernized, partly by civilian industry (the VCC-1 version) and partly by the motor vehicle transportation installations (the VCC-2 version), which made it possible to transport the infantry accompanying the tanks (although they could not fight from the vehicles), a successor for them is already under study.

It is natural to wonder why advantage has not been taken, and is not being taken, of the opportunity to acquire a wheeled, protected vehicle to serve alongside the future VCC and satisfy the requirement in question. An army of limited size, like ours, not only needs tactical mobility--that is, the ability to move and fight away from roads--but also strategic mobility--that is, the ability to travel long distances on roads in a short time in order to transfer units from one operational sector to another, distant one.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Wheels, which always have been synonymous with strategic mobility, have made enormous progress even on diversified terrain, and the cost of acquiring and maintaining them is less than it is for tracks. There is no serious basis for the objection that using vehicles of a larger type increases the logistical burden.

The Vision and Night Fighting Component

Taking into account the importance the night environment has assumed because of the protection it offers men and vehicles, there is a desire to acquire substantial quantities of apparatus for the intensification of light for guidance and firing and at the same time to become familiar with thermal infrared technology, whose effectiveness for long-range weapons systems is recognized by everybody.

The cost of the required items mentioned above, not including the overhauling and modernizing of the Leopard tanks, which, in view of what the other countries which use that vehicle are doing, I regard as an indispensable step that cannot be postponed, is estimated at approximately 2,600 billion lire, to be financed in annual installments through 1991, provided that the assumption of an annual 3% increase in real terms in the ordinary budget, as agreed upon at the 28 January 1981 session of the Supreme Defense Council, becomes operative.

Let us hope that Parliament and the government will take the army's fate to heart, as they did in 1977 (but the situation of the other two armed forces is no better) and act accordingly.

If they do not, it would inevitably be necessary to take another look at the role assigned to us within the orbit of NATO, together with our operational possibilities. That would be a review of the situation which, although initiated by the highest-ranking military commanders, must inevitably be referred back to the highest-ranking political decisionmakers, who are the ones responsible for the fundamental choices concerning national defense.

Conclusion

It is time to conclude this article.

We are of the opinion that the conviction that the employment of nuclear weapons would not do anybody any good will soon gain a good deal of ground and that consequently they will be interdicted and destroyed. In the meantime, it is necessary that we should remain alert and give maximum cooperation to the United States so that it will move ahead with the European theater's nuclear program.

If there is a war in Europe, it will be necessary to respond to an attack, which in all probability would take the form of conventional warfare (unless, if NATO's present condition of inferiority continues and becomes more pronounced, the Soviets want to succeed by strong-arm methods by appropriating the idea of limited and selective nuclear strikes to themselves) with a defense which also was conventional, without waiting for some nuclear assistance which is not going to be provided.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Naturally, if we wish to resist aggression, it will be necessary to strengthen and improve our conventional forces to bring them to a level which, with the help of the factors which traditionally work in favor of the defense (depth, knowledge and organization of the terrain, planned firing, etc.), will make it possible to confront a quantitatively superior fighting force successfully.

The European countries must realize the need to make that effort as soon as possible, closing ranks and endeavoring to bring about a military cohesion which, added to the existing economic cohesion, will endow a unified policy which, ensnared in national interests, finds it difficult to make the right decisions, with a more tangible significance.

Western Europe possesses the means it needs to be able to play a role of its own in the world if it does not think it can take up an intermediate position and oppose either the Soviet Union or the United States. Our position is and will be beside the Americans because the material and moral ties which unite us with them are too numerous and too solid.

The Americans, in their turn, are not unaware that our respective fates are linked together and, once they have put their own economy in order, will help us, in their own interests, to get out of our current difficulties. And if, then, to regain prestige in the world, they should decide to draw up their general strategy in global terms and, consequently, to renegotiate, on a new basis which was profoundly different from the present one, their participation in the military organization of NATO, no one can doubt that they will be at the side of the free nations in their hour of need, just as they were in World Wars I and II, although without previously having located bases and expeditionary forces on their territory.

We have already spoken of the obligation Parliament has, for us Italians, of allocating to the armed forces the funds which are absolutely indispensable to make them credible in carrying out their principal mission--that is, guaranteeing Italian independence and Italy's republican institutions. Let us remember that even a great thinker who died recently, a man who was firm in his Catholic faith and a pacifist by conviction and not out of opportunism, the French philosopher Jean Guitton, wrote⁸ that "to make sure that there will never be a war, it is necessary for it to be possible that one will take place at any moment."

A paradox, certainly, since Guitton, like any other man of good sense, would have preferred, in a free world finally free of ideological, political, economic and social tensions--thanks to the efforts of all people of good will--for the funds which today are invested in armaments to be employed for the material and moral elevation of mankind.

FOOTNOTES

1. "La Difesa avanzata" [Advanced Defense], RIVISTA MILITARE No 5, September - October 1980.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. The minister was referring to the greater frequency, by comparison with the past, with which the top military leaders and the head of the department, himself, speak in public.
3. For a thorough discussion of this subject, see "Alcune correlazioni fra tattica e strategia" [Some Correlations between Tactics and Strategy] by the same author, RIVISTA MILITARE Nos 7 - 8, 1973.
4. "Spunti per una nuova concezione difensiva" [Points of Departure for a New Defensive Concept], RIVISTA MILITARE No 3, 1976; "Difesa avanzata" [Advanced Defense], RIVISTA MILITARE No 5, 1980.
5. Some combined-arms brigades, quite different from the single-branch brigades (that is, composed exclusively of infantry units), which performed epic deeds during World War I, were already present in our army for particular purposes (brigades of alpinists for use in mountainous environments, infantry brigades for territorial defense and brigades of parachutists for strategic maneuvers).
6. The Italian war industry, although it had gained leading positions in some areas, depends upon foreign countries (the United States of America, the FRG, the United Kingdom and France) for a large number of licenses and component parts.
7. In this connection, see:

Clifford D. Bradley: "Confronto ruota - cingolo" [Comparison of Wheels with Tracks], ARMOR, May - June, 1981;

G. Avelli: "Mazzi corazzati" [Armored Vehicles], RIVISTA MILITARE No 1, 1982.
8. "La pensee et la guerre" [Thought and War]. Ed. Desclee de Brouwer, 1969.

COPYRIGHT: RIVISTA MILITARE PERIODICO DELL'ESERCITO ANNO CV NUMERO 2/1982

9258
CSO: 3104/230

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

INTERNAL DISSENSION AMONG PCF LEADERSHIP EXAMINED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 22 May 82 pp 44-45

[Article by Irene Allier]

[Text] In their quest for a new party line, Communist leaders and militants are searching, hesitating and groping--unconvincingly.

"Its successive changes have discredited the entire party leadership," exclaims Jean-Michel Catala, co-director of REVOLUTION and a member of the Central Committee, speaking before the entire political bureau.

"The party's foreign policy is, if I may say so, outside our policy," Felix Damette, another Central Committee member, remarks ironically, in front of Maxime Gremetz, head of the foreign affairs section. "It is repeatedly aligning itself with the USSR, while neglecting our participation in the government."

"In organizing our struggles," suggests economist Philippe Herzog as he addresses members of the CGT, "there is no need for workers to fight a government of which we are a part, while fighting against the management of their companies!"

Where are we indeed? In the social hall of the tiny village of Saclas (Essonne) where the PCF has moved from 11 through 13 May to lend an unprecedented atmosphere to a Central Committee session, broadened to include the first secretaries of the federations. An odd session, without agenda or general resolution. This time, no high priest has been privileged to officiate at the usual high mass. Even Georges Marchais did not ascend to the pulpit to deliver the Word. In a few words--but what words!--he restricted himself, as an introduction, to report the heavy toll of disasters. "Where are we? Well, we are in the government, but after losing one million voters, and with a party that is not in gear. Obstacles are everywhere: internally the majority of comrades have not grasped the significance of the 24th Congress, nor that of the lag which we experienced in 1956 and which is still affecting our actions today. Outside the party, public opinion equates us with the USSR. Our image is tarnished in the areas of liberties and democracy. What is to be done? Comrades, it is your turn to share your experiences."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Evidently the comrades are ill at ease and tense. Will the federal secretaries dare to say that the leadership has lost all credibility, that it is being whispered in the halls that the leadership does not convince anyone when-- after having waged its well-known battle against the Socialist Party--it now claims to join that party in leading France towards Socialism through limited, progressive and democratic reforms? Some venture to say so, without daring to open the issue of participation in government. "It is all right to echo the words of those Communists who still come to cell meetings," Catala says, ironically. "But it would be better still to be concerned with the opinions of those who no longer attend them..." A pregnant pause.

The leadership had organized this session to feel the party's pulse. First diagnosis: the pulse is weak and irregular. Those attempting to offer this drifting party some politico-social prospects compatible with its role in government are opposed by the uncontrolled reflexes of those who are reluctant to change their ways. One of these, for instance, is Etienne Fajon, who, pretending not to hear that the PCF is in the government, stubbornly states: "If we are having troubles, the reason is that neither the Communists nor public opinion are sufficiently aware of our own position, and of party policy," (as opposed to that of the government, of course.) Later, Maxime Gremetz lets the cat out of the bag. As is known, the PCF officially advocates a French policy of steering clear of both blocs. This does not prevent the man in charge of PCF foreign policy from forgetting that imperative in favor of his own deep-down preference: "The international scene," he states, "is characterized by a counter-offensive on the part of imperialism in order to restore the military supremacy it had lost." Better still, now Gremetz announces a major decision (made, of course, with the political bureau's blessing): a decision to lend support to a powerful "peace march" in Paris on 20 June. To be sure, the idea will not originate with the PCF, but with some 100 "well-known person," whose signatures it is presently collecting (they are said to include the inevitable Aragon and Edmonde Charles-Roux, Gaston Defferre's wife, as well as Herve Bazin.) To be sure, slogans would be worded in such a way as not to embarrass the government: "Neither Pershing nor SS 20," for instance, and the PCF has been invited to take part in it. Still, the PCF has decided to send 100,000 Communists into the streets for the occasion. Who could be fooled? "There is indeed some contradiction there," a Central Committee member concedes.

Second diagnosis: the Party is having doubts. The leadership is only partially successful in its attempt to show a united front when facing the militants who are balking at the PCF's participation in government. "Insofar as it is capable of conviction," says one member of the political bureau, "the leadership is gradually convincing itself that the Socialist experiment can succeed" and that the Communist Party must play its part in it. However, it is still being torn apart whenever, in foreign policy, it must take the inescapable consequences of its choices in domestic policy. The Fiterman affair is a glaring demonstration of this fact.

What happened? In early May, Yves Moreau, foreign policy columnist for L'HUMANITE, publishes a series of articles concerning the Malvinas, violently directed against Great Britain. Without hesitation and without

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

any rhetorical hedging, he, like the USSR, sides with Argentina. On 10 May, in a lengthy interview, Georges Marchais does attempt to establish a precarious sort of balance between "the murderous madness of the British prime minister, the Argentine forces' military coup, and the manipulations of the United States," but it is an arduous path that leads him to his conclusion: "Weapons must be silenced to make way for negotiations."

And, then, on 16 May, a dramatic turn of events: on the French television program "Le Grand Jury--Le Monde," Charles Diterman, minister of state--and of transportation--declares, out of the blue: "In the few major articles published in the paper (L'HUMANITE) I felt that their authors (sic) were extreme in their positions and that their argumentation was somewhat excessive. Argentina committed an armed coup; this is a fact that cannot be ignored." Astonishment and anger at L'HUMANITE. This is the first public indictment of the Central Committee's newspaper by a Communist leader. "This is an attack against Leroy, against Marchais," people whisper in the hallways. Fiterman had not stopped there: in the same breath, he had implicated the Communist group in Parliament which just the day before, had abstained from voting on the bill concerning audiovisual matters. "I do not wish majority groups to come up with different votes," he said. "I prefer them to vote together. I believe that, if they don't get together, with exactly the same position, it's unfortunate."

Saving the Mayors

What was the director of L'HUMANITE to do? Defend the journalist, one of his trusted men? Protest the "attack"? Not at all. Questioned on 18 May on France-Inter, Roland Leroy creates a new sensation: "My opinion is exactly the same as Charles Fiterman's, but I was not there when the articles were published." And, to everyone's astonishment, he adds: "From now on, the Communist must put an end to their habit of being so cocksure of everything, at every moment, and of settling every case once and for all, as if they possessed revealed truth."

In a news conference, a few hours later, Maxime Gremetz himself, disconcertingly matter-of-fact, will declare himself in total agreement with Charles Fiterman's criticisms. "We do much arguing in the Party," he concludes, satisfied.

Completely disoriented, the general membership sometimes wonders if its leadership has gone mad, and whether all this does not conceal some double-cross. There is indeed a rumor that the leaders are divided and may be keeping a foot in both camps: one group, apparently in the minority, would be on the failure of the socialist experiment and would suggest that the PCF prepare to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. How? By keeping a few free spots for itself within governmental solidarity: by abstaining in certain secondary votes, by criticizing certain decisions, by pointing out the PCF's own positions. Then, at least, should a failure of the Left occur, the PCF could say: "We were right in stating that the PS had taken a turn to the right. We did all we could. The failure is not our doing..." Such an attitude would explain the PCF's stubborn refusal to do its self-criticism for the 1977-81 period, which ranged from the breakup of the Leftist Union to participation in government.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Nonsense," reply those whose thesis is held by the majority. "If the Left is removed from power, the PCR is lost, along with the Left, and eventually doomed to disappear. It is therefore to its advantage to do everything in its power to insure the success of the Left. Its very survival is at stake..." This second line of argumentation is the one officially developed by the Communist leaders, regardless of tendencies. At any rate, this is the thesis followed by the two leading Communist ministers, who are undertaking to use their government experience in deriving from it a new line that would be coherent and would have long-term workability for the party.

However, that thesis is not enough to mobilize a party that has been sluggish for more than 4 years, inhibited by its 1981 failure at the polls and paralyzed by fear, should it stir, of disturbing the government. Furthermore, in what direction should it stir? In Saclas, some people have tried to find their bearings through the fog, to offer some anchoring points and some sort of future to failure-weary militants. First of all, through unity, which is becoming fashionable again, as municipal elections are approaching. In her speech on that essential point, Madeleine Vincent recalled the PCF's starting position: "We want proportional, one-round-only elections, and joint Socialist-Communist lists everywhere. We are not going to get them, however," she warned. "Therefore we must prepare ourselves for a compromise." For the PCF this compromise involves saving its big-city mayors. The party wants to keep them, even where the PSF has got ahead since the 1977 municipal elections. Such is the case in Saint-Etienne, for instance. To save a [mayor such as] Sanguedolce, the PCF would even be prepared to let the PSF have the majority of municipal council seats (although until now the PCF had held the majority there). Will the PSF accept?

Some twisted minds have glimpsed a vulgar tactical intent in this "unity at any price" order of the day, and in the compromise being contemplated. Wasn't this a betrayal of the strategy of the 24th Congress, which provided for a permanent affirmation of the PCF's personality and identity? The party as a whole still needed to be presented with an outline of the long-range policy. This task was entrusted to Paul Boccara, the unforgettable inventor of the theory of "capitalism monopoliste d'Etat" [monopolistic state capitalism], (dubbed CME), that not so long ago led the PCF into some unfortunate avenues. No matter. Today Boccara is developing prospective theories which, while lacking contact with immediate reality, do not lack interest. According to the substance of his explanations to the Central Committee, the world will have emerged from this crisis in 20 years. Perhaps capitalism will, too; we must not delude ourselves. However, the expansion of the public and nationalized sector and the total nationalization of credit will have turned France into a country with a mixed economy, neither a state capitalism nor a socialism after the Eastern bloc, and in that economy the workers--provided they have been able to seize their opportunity--will also have been able to gain managerial powers and give the economy some motives other than profit alone. Is this complicated? "I may be the only person able to demonstrate this, but I am demonstrating it," replies Boccara, amid the indulgent smiles that greet this theory, which may be complex but has the rare merit of existing.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In a Spot

At any rate, on 18 May, L'HUMANITE has a page one headline reading "Management Is Your Business." In other words, 30 years after the Italians, the French Communists are contemplating a take over 10 or 20 years from now of civilian (and economic) society from within, in order to transform it. "This is how we'll manage the solution to the crisis," a militant remarks ironically. Still, Cabanes, in his report in L'HUMANITE, enthusiastically writes: "Let's become financiers to control the use of public aid programs." Can such ambitious--and remote--objectives overcome the inertia of a party that has been idle for so long? Paul Laurent who, in his capacity as secretary of the organization, hasn't until now been able to overcome it, presently has his remedies: in simple, straight-forward terms, he suggests that the Central Committee replace the leaders of inactive cells and sections.

In short, there are changes in the air for useless cadres. For his part, Guy Hermier, who is in charge of intellectuals, is getting ready to set aside those he has been using for the past 3 years: they have become unusable for the PCF's "new practice"! Can all this create an illusion? "The Party is in a spot, and will remain there for a good 10 years to come." Emanating from a member of the political bureau who is not known for his lack of orthodoxy or for indulging in moods, that diagnosis counts heavily.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"

11936

CSO: 3100/717

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

ARON, FONTAINE ON DETENTE, POLAND, GERMANY, NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES

Paris PARADOXES in French Apr 82 pp 43-54

[Discussion with Raymond Aron and Andre Fontaine by Eric Roussel: "Detente: Myth or Reality"]

[Text] In its Spring issue, PARADOXES is presenting a rather exceptional document. An informal discussion between two first-rate personalities, the authors of equally authoritative works, Raymond Aron and Andre Fontaine, chief editor of LE MONDE.

For the benefit of our readers, these two clear-sighted observers of international politics have accepted to converse, to compare their views on the present state of the world and especially on the burning questions of the hour: the end of detente, the Polish crisis, German neutralism, as well as North-South relations. As will be seen, their analyses of all these problems sometimes differ. However, it will also be noted that their views on essential points concur, which only goes to show that there is only one possible strategy against the Soviet threat and the state of economic war in which we find ourselves.

One more word about our guests before we get to the heart of the matter. Not to introduce them, of course, since they are well known, but to mention that Raymond Aron gave us last fall a very stimulating essay, "Le spectateur engage" [The Engaged Spectator] (published by Julliard, see Francois Fejtoc's article in our November issue), and that, soon afterwards, Andre Fontaine published "Un seul lit pour deux rêves" [One Single Bed For Two Dreams] (published by Fayard), a history of detente which is a sequel to his famous history of the cold war.

A major book which has served as starting point for our debate.

[PARADOXES] Raymond Aron, you have read Andre Fontaine's book; what is your opinion?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Raymond Aron] Let us skip the compliments and one single reservation, this is too much of a "pure narrative."

[Andre Fontaine] This is precisely what I intended to do.

[R.A.] In "Republique Imperiale," I thought I had gone too far myself in that direction, but it was a much more abstract and less detailed narrative. This being said, let us get down to the content. You call your book a "history of detente." However, after reading it, it is not clear whether the Soviets considered the detente as a good time to lull the West into a false sense of security and continue their expansion or, on the contrary, as a time of real appeasement. You did not come to a decision on this point of essential importance to understand that period.

[A.F.] Don't you think that, during these two decades, the Soviets have had two conceptions of detente?

[R.A.] Well, no, I don't. I believe that they never had but one, including under Khrushchev.

[A.F.] I wonder whether, early in the period we are talking about, the Soviets did not think that the U.S. lead in the field of armament was such that they would be hard put to catch up. It seems to me also that, in the years 1972-73, the Soviets showed a certain desire to establish an era of coexistence. Of course, later on, events got out of hand because of Watergate... In fact, I think that the Soviet dream is a dream that stretches over an indeterminate period, that it accelerates at times, and at other times, on the contrary, it slows down. I always had the impression, including right after World War II, that there were hesitations and probably several schools.

[R.A.] Men, by definition, often have ambivalent feelings, and it is naturally hard to exclude this theory a priori. As for Khrushchev after the 1962 crisis, it seems certain to me that he became aware of the U.S. military superiority and that he undoubtedly wanted a period of detente. But we must add that an extremely tense situation had been deliberately created by the Soviets because of the Berlin ultimatum. You begin in 1962. But 1962 is the end of the period that started with the Soviet threat of signing a treaty between the GDR and the USSR; such a treaty would have led to a unilateral modification of the status of Berlin. So that, in hindsight, it appears that the years 1958-1962 have been a period of Soviet diplomatic offensive which was not based on military superiority.

[A.F.] But, still, did not at least the illusion of such a superiority follow their sputnik?

[R.A.] Not so. The Russians may have believed that the United States were stupid enough to take seriously either Kennedy's election campaign statements (missile gap) or Mao's formulas such as "the East wind is prevailing over the West wind." And at that time, with the sputnik and the first Russian missiles, some Americans believed that the Soviets were going to produce massive quantities of intercontinental missiles. Soon afterwards, however, we could note that they did not mass-produce these long-range missiles, but medium-range missiles like the SS4 and the SS5.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Therefore, before the period you are dealing with, there was the Khrushchev period with, let us say, a "Soviet brainwashing" of the West. In 1962, this offensive, which was based on a bluff, ended, probably because, in the fall, the Soviets became aware that, after all, Kennedy was to be taken seriously.

[A.F.] Curiously enough, Khrushchev has left the memory of a peace-loving man, whereas he took great risks. He probably was one of the last ideologists: he strongly believed that communism would work. Much more so than his successors.

[R.A.] Yes, he belonged to that first generation who still had an ingrained faith. But, to come back to detente, there is no doubt that, from the fall of 1962, Khrushchev tried to adopt a new style of relations and that, in Kennedy--surrounded by Harvard people who had conceived the theory of arms control (red telephone, etc.)--he found an interlocutor. The result of this change of mind was the July 1963 agreement on the suspension of detectable nuclear tests. At a time when, precisely, the USSR and China made public their historical dissension.

[A.F.] The coincidence of these two dates, besides, is very significant. For the first time, the two giants were signing a treaty which their principal allies--China on one side, France on the other--refused to sign.

[R.A.] Definitely. To summarize, I would therefore say that I believe that detente was sincere in that it was a useful basis chosen by Khrushchev after his 1962 failure. I believe that the Soviets then understood that there was a minimum amount of common interests that should be preserved or, to put it more clearly, that a nuclear disaster had to be avoided. But I would make the reservation that, apart from that, they never taught their people any other theory but that of the unavoidable opposition between the two blocs. Therefore, they accepted a temporary coexistence but, in their mind, it has to end in a final victory of their world.

[A.F.] Yes, with the slight difference that, after 1954-1955, the dogma of the unavoidability of war between the two worlds--which had been in favor under Stalin--was abandoned. With the mental reservation, of course, that the superiority of the so-called progressive forces would be such that the final war could be avoided. Therefore, there was an adaptation.

[R.A.] ... as a function of nuclear weapons. And at the time much more as a function of nuclear weapons than as a function of detente. Stalin's successors did understand that the final war would have to be a nuclear war.

[A.F.] Definitely, but it also appears to me that on all these questions, the Soviet military thought is much less refined than the Western thought.

[R.A.] That is right; first, they do not use the essential concept of the United States, i.e. dissuasion. Like Clausewitz, they say that war is the continuation of politics by other means. They never say that nuclear war would be a joint suicide. They say that it would be a frightening war but that there would be a winner and a loser.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[A.F.] That is true. But in their private conversations at the end of the 1950's, it appears that the Soviets did tell the Chinese: "Your adventurism leads to war." And this has also been at the root of their difference. This being said, it seems to me that a prolonged period of detente started in 1962. From that point, we have arrived at a bizarre situation since the word detente, which initially described a stage, is now describing a situation.

[R.A.] Yes, and I have always considered that the rupture in the style of East-West relations started at the end of the Cuban crisis, at the time when Khrushchev's offensive ended. And one peculiar fact among others is that the long war in Vietnam was associated with a somewhat different type of relation. In a way, it was an accident.

[A.F.] That is it, an accident, a diversion and, at the same time, I think it contributed much to the USSR's strategically catching up with the United States. Indeed, is it not extraordinary to note that in 1962 the ratio of strategic forces was roughly 5 to 1 in favor of the United States and that, 10 years later, the first SALT agreement consecrated a certain Sovietic superiority?

[R.A.] Yes, but only for intercontinental missiles; a characteristic of the United States is that, periodically, they will design great plans (Kennedy's 1,000 Minuteman in 1962); nevertheless, it is true that their apparent military superiority as far as arms are concerned dates back to these years during which the United States were obsessed by the Vietnam war. This also explains why the United States no longer want to intervene in the world.

[A.F.] The best illustration of this attitude is Central America, where the United States are intervening less and less, whereas for a long time they considered this part of the world as a private preserve.

[R.A.] Yes, and to this must be added the fact that the U.S. military budget has continued to decrease after the Vietnam war. Finally, we realize now that the United States cannot rearm massively without profound changes in their economy, and Reagan is now unable to get out of the contradiction into which he has placed himself: to reduce taxes and, at the same time, increase military expenditures. The USSR, on the contrary, is rearming as much as it can, which is a threat to detente. In fact, the inequality between non-nuclear forces is increasingly in favor of the Soviet Union and it is not sure that the Russians will always resist the temptation not [as published] to take advantage of it since, contrary to the Americans, they are acutely aware of the ratio of forces.

[A.F.] And I believe we can say that the Soviets, who never use the word dissuasion, are often practicing it to protect what they have. It is certain that, in the case of Poland, dissuasion has been given full play.

[PARADOXES] Could we now briefly and seriously discuss the Polish crisis?

[R.A.] In this respect, I think we can say that, over a surprisingly long period, a phenomenon very uncommon in the Soviet world has taken place in Poland: a popular revolt with an alliance of the intellectuals and the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

proletariat. This, in my opinion, has been the cause of the Poles' illusions which, paradoxically, were still reinforced by the attitude of the Soviets who, certainly, wanted to avoid as much as possible a direct intervention that would have been in contradiction with their great European policy, the objective of which is to get Germany out of the Atlantic alliance.

[A.F.] Yes, a peculiar fact in Poland is that the revolt actually started in 1956, at the time of the Poznan riots. Little by little, a certain liberalism had been instituted in Poland. Besides, Gierek had understood that the Poles were deeply opposed to communism and that the only way to make them put up with it was to improve the standard of living of the people. This is why he wanted Poland to become a large exporting power, another Poland, which implied a formidable indebtedness at the start--although the results appeared positive for a time--and a de facto sharing of the power with the Church.

Already then, however, Gierek was worried about the future and I well remember his telling me during an interview that everything would go well as long as the crisis of capitalism did not worsen too much. Already then, he felt that Poland would have trouble exporting to markets suffering from a recession.

This said, the second aspect of the Polish crisis which I find interesting is that dissension took months to develop, whereas, in Hungary, the intervention had been more brutal. The main difference between what happened in Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and in Poland on the other hand, is that, in the first two countries, the party apparatus escaped Russian control--which resulted in the arrest of Dubcek and the execution of Imre Nagy--whereas in Warsaw the party apparatus remained faithful although it had lost control of the situation.

Another extraordinary fact is that the military coup took place before anybody on Solidarity's staff had been informed of it, whereas it was believed that the union had many sympathizers, including in the Army.

[R.A.] I agree with you to recognize the illusions of the Poles, but when it comes to a comparative analysis of the three countries, I would not put it exactly as you do. I do believe that we must make a distinction between these three cases: Czechoslovakia, where everything came from the top since, after a change of majority inside the party, a wave of liberalism occurred--without any troubles and without much popular enthusiasm either--Hungary, where there also was a crescendo, as well as a violent revolution. And, finally, Poland, a case very different from the other two since what occurred was a sort of diffuse revolution supported by loose structures--the unions--which brought about a disintegration of the party.

The surprise for us, as you said, was to find that Solidarity--which was everywhere--had not anticipated all this. As far as I am concerned, during the last few weeks it seemed obvious to me that a "normalization" was about to take place.

[A.F.] It was unavoidable. I think that from the moment Solidarity's congress appealed to workers in socialist countries to follow the Polish example, provocation had gone far enough. It was impossible to imagine that the Soviets

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

would let that happen. Also, the demand for free elections was another great risk for, according to the polls, if such elections were to take place in Poland, only 3 to 4 percent of the people would vote for the communist party. Moscow could not accept such a repudiation. And, paradoxically, I believe that the successive retreats of the power did in fact encourage such an escalation.

[R.A.] Yes, but we must say that these extreme forms of provocation happened after the coup had been organized. Those who prepared the coup played a sort of comedy by pretending they would accept all this.

[A.F.] Certainly. But we do not know, and it will take some time before we know, when the limit of the tolerable was reached. Because, in practice, when we went to Poland we still had the impression of a certain liberalism.

[R.A.] Yes. Before the troubles began, I had in fact been invited by the "Flying University." The lectures, which were tolerated, took place in apartments and there was an atmosphere of true liberalism; an atmosphere which, by the way, was very different from that which can be noticed in Hungary where this phenomenon is due to the party. Now, unfortunately, I believe that we are going toward a process similar to what happened in Czechoslovakia. In time, I believe, the regime will harden.

[A.F.] It will harden, but it will have great difficulties in putting the people back to work, and it is still difficult to imagine what compromise could be acceptable both to the Russians and to the Polish masses.

[R.A.] On the other hand, if the West does not help Poland, the USSR will have to. This means that, actually, the Poles should be given a minimum amount of foreign currency and raw materials. But the economy is now in such a state of disintegration that no one can tell which way things will go.

In fact, if the Poles should ever wish to feed themselves, they will have to reexamine the principles of communism, they will have to assure the farmers that their land will not be nationalized; they will have to give them permission to enlarge their properties, in other words, they will have to do the exact opposite of what has been done until now, since individual property was respected and, at the same time, the regime's inefficiency was ensured by the suppression of all encouragements to production. This is really the height of absurdity!

For the time being, thanks to the black market, the limit of what is bearable has not yet been reached, but it could soon be. In fact, it is hard to imagine how a true normalization--i.e. the accession to power of a government truly backed by the people--could take place.

[A.F.] At any rate, for the time being, the situation is certainly worse than in Czechoslovakia...

[R.A.] Yes, for, in Czechoslovakia, material conditions are relatively good. And, besides, the Czech are more passive or, rather, they have adapted to despotism better than the Poles. For, in Poland, the striking fact during the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

recent period, has been that, for the first time since the war, the Poles rediscovered their romanticism. Whereas, in 1956, they had been extremely "good," this time they allowed themselves to be carried away, and that was the result of the party's tolerance. It is in fact paradoxical that the unions wanted to launch "normal" union activities against a power which appeared to exist no longer. They "stepped onto an eiderdown" and went too far.

My Polish friends were surprised when, a few months ago, I wrote in L'EXPRESS that normalization was unavoidable and that the only question was to know who would take care of it. Unfortunately, facts proved me right.

[A.F.] I wrote about the same thing in LE MONDE and, like you, it made me unpopular. But I do not regret it because, when you know you are not going to do anything, you have no right to push others to an escalation. In my opinion, this is irresponsible.

[PARADOXES] Do you think that, in Moscow, it was the army or the party who decided to intervene?

[R.A.] As for me, I believe that, in the Soviet Union, the party is always in charge and plays a decisive part. The ties between the party and the army are, I believe, extremely strong.

[A.F.] Then, you do not agree with Castoriadis's analyses?

[R.A.] Castoriadis has developed a theory. He has never studied the USSR. He has discovered what we had known for a long time, viz. that the power of the USSR lies essentially in the Red Army. This is nothing new. As for the relations between the party and the army, he does not know them any better than we do. It is also not possible to forecast with certainty what the war policy of the Kremlin or the army would be.

[PARADOXES] What do you think of international reactions to the Polish crisis?

[R.A.] There is not much to say. Emotional reactions varied depending on political situations and, especially, on traditions. To the French sensibility, Poland means something and, in my opinion, the French reaction has been largely sincere. It has of course been intensified by political interests: that of the socialists, to place the communists in a difficult position; that of the opposition, to place the socialist-communist coalition in a difficult position. As a result, I believe that, in France, there has been a certain amount of political manipulation, as well as a considerable sincere reaction.

In the FRG, whose interest it is to maintain tolerable relations with the Soviets, popular emotion has of course been less strong. But, now that it is clear that the French are not willing to use the economic weapon, it appears, as a German university professor recently said, "that the French and the Germans are now in tune."

[A.F.] All you say is perfectly true but, as far as France is concerned, I think we should mention the fascination exerted by Solidarity on CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], and especially on its general secretary. To them, it was a self-management movement...

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[R.A.] ... that did not manage anything...

[A.F.] Right, but there certainly was a deep sympathy on their side and their reactions were very quick. In this respect, it is highly significant that Edmond Maire was one of the first to protest against the signature of the gas-supply agreement with the USSR.

[R.A.] All that is true; nevertheless, we can still ask ourselves whether it is reasonable for the West to arm themselves against the Soviet threat and, at the same time, to grant their potential enemy low interest rate credits. As far as I am concerned, I have been thinking for years that this was unreasonable, but I must admit that, on this point, the positions of the government and of the opposition are similar.

[A.F.] That is right, and we can be sure that, if the opposition were still in power, the agreement would have been signed... and denounced by the opposition.

[R.A.] All we can say is that the draft prepared by the former majority, at least, involved a smaller amount of gas. But, in fact, the results would probably have been roughly the same. It is just that the present government has had the weakness of shouting much louder than Giscard would have. As a result, the discrepancy between words and deeds appears more striking.

[PARADOXES] And Germany? Are you not worried by its present evolution?

[R.A.] On that subject, I would like to submit my latest definition of Germany. Its first national interest is to maintain its alliance with the United States, which gives it some security.

Its second national interest is to maintain tolerable relations with the Soviet world. The first national interest is a prerequisite to enable Bonn to discuss with Moscow. The second interest requires that the human benefits gained by political concessions not be followed by excessively strong tensions between the East and the West. These two interests are hardly compatible under extreme circumstances. When circumstances become extreme, the Bonn government does its best not to clash with either party.

[A.F.] I believe that the question of human benefits is very important, because Bonn leaders feel that, ultimately, it is up to them to preserve the relative improvement in the relations between the populations of the two Germany's which resulted from the Ost-Politik. And they know that the Russians are going to react, should they exert the slightest reprisal. After Schmidt was reelected 18 months ago, he did call Honnecker to order when the latter tried to impose a unilateral increase of the foreign currency allocation which West German visitors must procure. H. Schmidt interrupted his vacation but, in the end, did nothing...

[R.A.] Which also shows the existence of a trap which can be summarized as follows: all concessions from the East are temporary; all renunciations from the West are permanent. This is characteristic of our negotiations with the Soviet world. It still does not mean that the Germans are neutralistic,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

since they need the American alliance to enable them to have tolerable discussions with the East. All the same, the danger of a strong reaction from Washington is always present, and the German position certainly does not promote the will to resist in Western Europe.

[A.F.] In fact, I do not think that those in power are neutralistic. That phenomenon can be perceived at a different level. I recently went to Tuebingen to present a lecture and I was struck to see to what extent the university community--faculty and students--is pacifist. With the very naive idea that the development of a pacifist trend in the FRG could have a contagious effect on the East.

[R.A.] Actually, all this is a way to hide a deep-seated feeling, fear of the Soviet Union. From then on, you can find very good reasons, but everyone knows that, at the root of all this, there is the transformation of the ratio of forces between the two blocs. Those who lived during the 1930's know very well what it is like to be afraid of a powerful neighbor. Here, we can show off because we are farther away and because we have been told that we would have security without war...

[A.F.] But, at the same time, we can say that the whole French policy during the past 20 years developed under the protection of a German-U.S. wall which we thought was impregnable. Now, from the moment these two words, U.S. and German, are uncoupled, it is obvious that events present themselves in a very different light.

[PARADOXES] What is now, in your opinion, the future of North-South relations?

[R.A.] In this respect, I do not think that there can really be any great policy between developed and developing countries as long as the schism between the communist and the capitalist worlds exists. As long as this schism will oppose two blocs of industrialized countries, such a policy will remain paralyzed. The USSR has a policy of "liberation" which, actually, consists in overthrowing moderate regimes and regimes favorable to the West; it does not have a policy of aid to poor countries. And when it grants aid, it is often in the form of weapons and to regimes which are more or less converted to Marxism-Leninism.

[A.F.] Yes; this being said, we are all fully aware that the East-West logic is leading nowhere and that East-West relations must of necessity have a North-South component. During the past few years, the USSR progression has indeed taken place mainly in Third-World countries and has consistently been aimed at depriving the West of its sources of raw materials. Therefore, if Saudi Arabia should one day go over to the other side, that would be a disaster. This is why it is obvious to me that the interest of the developed North is to achieve a minimum of consolidation of the economies of the South.

[R.A.] I agree with you, but what means of action do we have in Saudi Arabia?

It is a traditionalist country and, in addition, a rich country that resists foreign pressures. As for Africa, I believe that even if we give a lot of money to Zaire, we will never create a stable economy there. The same is also

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

true of South Africa: I do not see how we could replace the present regime, which we condemn, by another that would not be revolutionary and would give the country such a flourishing economy. Certainly, the most solid in all of Africa.

[A.F.] This is also the reason why governments are often more violently opposed to this regime in words than in deeds. All the same, I do believe that the problem of North-South relations is of capital importance, since the South is experiencing a formidable population growth which, moreover, is accompanied by a rapid deterioration of its standards of living.

[R.A.] Yes, but, again, what can we do? Take Mexico for instance. What action can we have in a country with an apparently stable regime, a lot of money and oil?

[A.F.] I know that this is very complicated, but I do not see how we can provide some sort of purpose for our societies if we neglect this problem. Besides, if we do not do anything, many poor countries will certainly fall into the Soviet sphere of influence.

[R.A.] I am not so sure of that. Look at what happened in Southeast Asia: in India, in Pakistan, in Indonesia. These countries have experienced serious crises, but they did not go over to the other side. And besides, I must say it again, the countries which are of vital importance to the West are those of southern Africa and those of the Near East. Both here and there, our means of action are limited.

[A.F.] I still believe that, basically, people need hope. They want to be given objectives. Now, in our western societies, we no longer have a purpose and I believe that this situation is dangerous in that it can lead to revolutionary troubles as a result of the governments' inability to offer an ideal.

[R.A.] Maybe, but you could also conclude, like certain ill-disposed individuals, that nations need war. Obviously, this is not your conclusion, but the idea that the Europeans could be appeased by telling them that they must send money to Bangladesh seems unrealistic to me. Certainly, we can aid the poorest countries but, first, I do not believe that this project will enthuse the Europeans and, second, we cannot expect a great strategic benefit from such an aid for, once again, our means of action on the countries that are vitally important to us are very limited.

[A.F.] I still believe that the concept of a purpose is fundamental, especially for the young. And I do not see what other objective we could offer but a world economic order.

[R.A.] Yes, but was the victory of the socialist party, one year ago, determined to any extent by the prospect of achieving the world economic order you are mentioning?

[A.F.] Certainly not. France remains a very self-centered country. However, it is much less indifferent to the Third-World ["cartieriste"] than it used to be.

[R.A.] At least, that is something!

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Compagnie Europeenne d'Editions et Publications Periodiques

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

FRANCE

RECOGNIZING ENEMY, COMMUNICATING, IN EUROPEAN THEATER

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 82 pp 58-60

[Article by Colonel Claude Delbos: "Information on the Battlefield in the European Theater of Operations"]

[Text] In wartime, knowledge of the enemy through operational intelligence is an absolute necessity. Some new techniques have been perfected in support of this search. Used by the combatants and the specialists, they should make possible a continual updating of the situation of the enemy. But in order to be usable, the information thus obtained must be transmitted rapidly to the decision centers, where it is exploited in real time.

Operational intelligence can be defined as intelligence making it possible to conceive and conduct war operations. Its aim is the best possible knowledge of the enemy. Obviously, such knowledge always remains imperfect, for the enemy is maneuvering and he makes a strong effort not to reveal either his exact situation or his intentions. It is for this reason that operational intelligence is a search activity that seeks, beyond what the enemy lets us see, to discover what he is hiding from us. It is a matter of forming the most exact idea possible of the nature, position and volume of the enemy, but also of anticipating his initiatives or his reactions. That is why the military leader--whatever his level, tactical or strategic--must see to it that a search is made on the battlefield itself for everything that can enable him to know his present enemy and to predict his future enemy.

Intelligence has always been one of the components of war activity, and modern conflicts do not escape this law; but one must take care not to be content today with the methods inherited from the past. The evolution of the techniques employed in modern conflicts necessitates an "updating of intelligence."

This updating concerns all combatants, for all, to varying degrees, have a role to play in the matter of battlefield intelligence; but it concerns particularly the specialists in the intelligence function, those whose responsibility it is to discover what the enemy is hiding from us. They have to make resolute use of all the resources of the available techniques, so as to increase the depth of their search and accelerate the exploitation of their information.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Battlefield

The battlefield, as it can be imagined today in Europe, has characteristics that must be taken into account.

The first characteristic to be taken into consideration for the engagement of our forces is the numerical superiority of the potential adversary and his possibility of using this superiority by manning the battlefield in such a way as to maintain a strong rhythm and leave us no respite. For us, the only way to respond to this is to localize and destroy by fire the maximum amount of the enemy means of combat before they come into contact with our own forces. This brings out an aspect of intelligence that takes on importance: intelligence about objectives. It should be noted here that the employment of nuclear fire, within the framework of an air-land combat, acquires all its deterrent force only if it is capable of inflicting massive losses on the adversary. It is therefore important to be able to strike at the right place, and to this end, to have means available that make it possible to localize objectives in the heart of the enemy formation.

Motorization, generalization of four-wheel-drive and cross-country capacities, and the development of amphibious equipment give the formations great mobility. Simultaneously, the nuclear danger makes for dispersal. The result of this is a great difficulty in finding the enemy in an emptier landscape and over expanses more vast than in the past. The task is all the more arduous in that the traditional means of in-depth intelligence, aviation, finds more and more difficulty in flying over a battlefield that contains formidable antiaircraft capacities.

Because of their mobility, the reserves kept far in the rear are capable of intervening in shorter times. The generalization and perfecting of transmission facilities, added to the mobility of the forces, make possible sudden changes of posture and almost immediate reactions. This speed of posture change imposes shorter reaction times on intelligence. The ideal would be to be able to exploit target intelligence in real time.

Another characteristic of the battlefield is the ubiquity of the enemy threat. The combat is in the air and on land, and aviation and helicopters enable the enemy to intervene with fire at any point in the formation and in the rear. Taking advantage of the intervals and voids created by dispersal, he can suddenly pin combatants down, infiltrate units, and create a threat capable of throwing us off balance.

In the face of these threats, safeguarding will depend on the speed and correctness of reactions, which themselves are a function of the speed and precision of the command's intelligence.

There are doubtlessly a good many other factors to be studied in order to review the question completely, but limiting oneself to what seems essential, one perceives several imperatives that intelligence has to take into account today when envisioning the conduct of operations in Europe:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- search for intelligence in depth, by means complementary to aviation;
- reduction of times for treatment of information and real-time exploitation of target intelligence;
- centralization of items of information that are numerous but of a detail nature and related to more extensive zones.

The Combatant as a Source of Intelligence

This last-mentioned point--the centralization of information relating to the entirety of the zone of responsibility--is in reality a condition for the safety of our forces. In effect, it is essential not to be ignorant of anything that may occur in contact, within the formation or to the rear. This is the first function that the intelligence system has to take on, and it concerns all combatants. Thus, no matter what his station, the combatant must have received training that makes him capable of identifying and localizing any manifestation of the enemy that he may observe, so as to get an idea of it in a form that can be exploited. And the leaders, at whatever level, must be concerned to orient their subordinates toward the intelligence to be sought.

The generalization of optical and infrared equipment, of low-light devices, telemeters, radars, to cite only the essential things, gives another dimension to the possibilities of observation by the combatants on the battlefield. One must know how to use this modern equipment to the advantage of safety and intelligence; the transmission facilities of the units, and even more, the facilities that will go into service in the coming years, have possibilities that have to be taken advantage of in order to transmit information rapidly.

All combatants are therefore potentially sources of intelligence through their observations. Nevertheless, it must be realized clearly that an intelligence system that contented itself with these sources would be condemned to knowing about the enemy only what he chose to show. If one wants to know what he is hiding, one has to use particular means designed for the search for intelligence, and specialists who, on the basis of the enemy's visible manifestations, considered as indications, will know how to discover his hidden potentials. There is indeed a battle of intelligence.

Search in Depth

Henceforth, this intelligence battle is to be carried on with the three imperatives taken into account that result from the characteristics of the battlefield:

- search in depth;
- reduction of exploitation times;
- centralization and treatment of information items that are numerous but of a detail nature and scattered.

In-depth search is a necessity connected with the extensiveness of the zone in which the enemy can keep means capable of playing a role in maneuvering. The objectives to be found are first of all the combat units--dispersed, camouflaged, awaiting orders to relieve those of the first echelon--but also the firing materiel, the launching ramps, the CP's [Command Posts], the logistics.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Everything that can be localized and destroyed in depth will constitute a lightening of the task of our direct-combat forces. Our aviation, despite the ground-to-air defenses and the enemy aviation, will doubtlessly gather intelligence. But it will be largely absorbed in the tasks proper to it, in great depth, on the scale of the theater of operations. Other means are necessary for meeting the needs of the big ground-forces units.

The Army's means of intelligence are therefore intended to be developed. Observation is making considerable progress, as we have seen. Radars are progressing also--ground surveillance radars and trajectography radars--but the interesting progress in this area will be the flying radar that will make it possible to observe beyond 30 km. There has been progress in electronic intelligence, but means of localization by radars, infrared devices and lasers can still be envisioned. The effectiveness of deep patrols should be increased by the use of pickups adapted to their missions.

Finally, besides the images obtained by an observation satellite that are definitely exploitable to the benefit of the ground forces, overflight of the enemy with drones that can be sent out on programmed flight and with RPV [expansion unknown], remote-piloted mini-airplanes, represents a further opportunity for obtaining images. These machines can overfly the enemy zone and bring back photos of it or transmit televised images. Intelligence is thus obtained in real time, and the second imperative required of intelligence--reduction of the time taken--is thus fulfilled in part.

Cutting Down Time

How is the problem of time posed in the area of intelligence? Three factors play an important role. The first is the forwarding of the intelligence. If this forwarding is done by a hierarchical route, with each level studying and deciding whether to transmit or not, one sees that there will inevitably be delays, which would be eliminated by addressing the information directly to the recipient concerned. This presumes, at the regimental level or the intelligence-unit level, the competence of an intelligence officer to decide on the forwarding of the intelligence. The second factor is the necessity of a continually available means of transmission. The intelligence may be a notice of alert, and it has to be able to be passed on. Specialized communication links are therefore necessary between the intelligence officers responsible for obtaining the information and putting it in proper form, the intelligence-exploitation units, and the CP's for the available means of fire. The third factor in cutting down time is the exploitation as such; but this involves the problem posed by the centralization of intelligence for the processing of it.

Centralization of intelligence is indispensable. Each observer, each means of search, has, if something is found, only a piece of a puzzle, and these pieces have to be gathered together to make the complete picture. If one imagines the centralization of an army corps' intelligence, one sees the difficulty, at this level, of processing, within an adequate time frame, the information coming from the combat units and from the intelligence-search units, with each giving its limited view within an immense zone of army-corps responsibility.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The teams responsible for this work in our present CP's are still doing everything with ballpoint pen and grease pencil: recording, filing, sorting, comparing, interpretation, visualization. These operations take time. At times of saturation, it is not impossible for an item of information to be lost. But this work typically amounts to data-processing, and the computer should be able to improve matters.

In conclusion, operational intelligence is involved today in an evolution that has to be kept on top of, accelerated perhaps, so as to maintain in our forces a sufficient credibility in the face of their possible adversary.

This adversary, who counts on numbers and tempo, so as to overwhelm us with his mass, has to be countered by effective intelligence action that makes it possible to anticipate his initiatives and hit him as far away as possible. This intelligence action involves all combatants, considered as potential sources of intelligence. The collection and centralization system has to be based on qualified intelligence officers and must have specialized means of transmission available. All the means that technology can furnish for increasing the effectiveness of in-depth investigation of the enemy formation must be put to use. Finally, computerized means must be used for forwarding and processing intelligence, in order to reduce the time needed for exploitation of it.

Such a system, putting varied modern means into action, has to be sparked by specialists trained in the techniques of intelligence acquisition and in the methods of exploitation and, especially, possessing in-depth knowledge of the adversary. That is why it could well be that an updating of our operational-intelligence system depends first of all on better training of the people who serve it.

Col Claude Delbos, a graduate of Saint-Cyr (class of 1954), served in Algeria and in the FRG before becoming an instructor at the ESM [Higher Military School] (Saint-Cyr). He has commanded a battery of the 35th RP [Parachute Artillery Regiment] and has been chief of the training section of the 16th RA [Artillery Regiment]. He holds the DEM [General-Staff Diploma] and the BEMS [Certificate of Higher Military Studies], and after holding various general-staff positions and commanding the 8th RA at Commercy, he is currently in the EMAT [Land Forces Staff or Military Academy for Communications?]

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui"

11267
CSO: 3100/714

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

UNITED KINGDOM

'THE TIMES' QUESTIONS VALIDITY OF DEFENSE CUTS

PM011447 London THE TIMES in English 1 Jul 82 p 13

[Editorial: "Too Much on the Rhine"]

[Text] The defense white paper which is to be debated in the commons today is the final product of that hurried defence review which was set in motion eighteen months ago when Mr Nott went to the Defence Ministry. It was brought to a preliminary conclusion by the end of last summer. It was never explained what caused the hurry, and certainly the review suffered from the need for such haste, since a whole raft of essential strategic questions was swept aside and left unanswered in the process.

Mr Nott's financial task seems to have been to cut forward costings by about eight billion pounds over the next ten years, saving half of that sum in the process, and reserving the other half in a central uncommitted fund. His political task was to leave our continental European forces effectively untouched so as not to disturb Britain's relationship with her European allies at a moment of sensitivity in the EEC. Militarily this left virtually only one option, which was to let the main burden of cuts fall on the navy, since both the army and the RAF were featured more specifically in the formal force commitment to NATO. The navy, by its very nature, deals in a less precise operational environmental than the geographical sectors of West Germany or the provision of that country's air defence.

As a result of his review Mr Nott proposed to cut the navy by twice as much as the army and by seven times as much as the RAF--to the tune of some five billion pounds over ten years. This was to be achieved by reducing the active surface fleet of frigates and destroyers from a current figure of about 65 to one of 42; selling the carrier invincible to Australia; eliminating the need for warships to undergo mid-life modernization which normally helps long-life hulls to accommodate changes in more rapidly obsolescent weapon systems; and the closure of naval dockyards. The fleet of frigates and destroyers would ostensibly be backed by another eight ships on stand-by--not the kind of stand-by which this summer enabled ships to be quickly activated for service in the South Atlantic, but one in which the ships would be unable to put to sea without substantial refits--a state nearer stand-down than stand-by.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

There was some laudable cost control in these decisions, taken against the background of lamentable strategy. The strategic effect of concentrating so much of our military effort in the north German plain is that the military machine becomes obsessively concerned with that area, to the exclusion of the rest of the world. The "short war" enthusiasts in the army and Royal Air Force, dedicated to the territorial trip wires of NATO military planning, seem once again to have won the day in the Defence Ministry. Just because our ultimate security lies with the preservation of peace in Central Europe, it does not follow that the main threat to that security will come in Central Europe. On the contrary, most strategists now accept that the very stability of the force-jam each side of the iron curtain has led Soviet strategists to pursue an indirect approach through massive naval expansion and the encouragement of indirect threats to the Western position through proxies far from Central Europe, in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. With all that going on there is no need to ask why things are so quiet on the Rhine.

Mr Nott should be asked two questions. The first is to explain why he did not fully examine the financial consequences of a military alternative to his programme of savage naval cuts--by saving on the cost of our peacetime commitment to maintain force levels in Germany. The second would be to explain why, given that great savings could be achieved without impairing our war-time commitment to the defence of Germany, there is such coyness about initiating discussions with our allies to bring about a more equitable sharing of the defence burden.

Britain maintains 60,000 soldiers and nearly 11,000 airmen in West Germany. They are accompanied by as many wives and children. The Defense Ministry rents or owns some 45,000 married quarters, educates 28,000 children and provides medical services for the lot. The cost of education, health and housing for these service families is at least 450 million pounds a year which would not fall on the defence budget at all if those troops were stationed in Britain, with adequate plans to deploy them in Germany whenever it was necessary both for operational training and for real emergencies. On top of that Rhine army employs nearly 25,000 local people in servicing its peacetime establishment, costing probably another two hundred million more.

The purpose of our troops in Germany is to deter an attack and be ready to fight should such deterrence fail. The existing strength of sixty thousand soldiers is barely half what Rhine army would comprise on a war establishment, and even now is often nominally below our treaty level of 55,000, with units serving in northern Ireland though listed on the strength of Rhine army.

It would be possible militarily to bring home many of our army and air forces from Germany, while equipping them with the capacity for rapid redeployment. After the initial capital cost of refurbishing barracks, and arranging for new married quarters, it would save hundreds of millions of pounds on the defence budget. Some of that could go to repair the damage which Mr Nott's plan will

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

progressively, and seriously inflict on the fleet from 1986 onwards, with fewer ships at sea, fewer hunter-killer submarines on order, and the prospect of a further savage contraction in the early 1990's when the full effects of this year's decisions will be felt.

These matters should be put fairly to our allies with a request for an adjustment to our treaty commitments. Perhaps those who have misgivings about such a transfer of resources would have a stronger case if they spent as much per head on defence as Britain does; but none of them does. Before that can happen, however, the British defense establishment itself must reach a concerted view. Mr Nott may have successfully split the chiefs of staff committee, so that he can claim he is not ignoring their concerted advice. Certainly the army and RAF chiefs seem to have sat back--like shadows "yawning at the mass"--and watched, indeed connived at, the axe falling on the navy, with no apparent concern for the unbalanced way it was done.

They should consider the possibility that they are wrong. The certainties of the "short war" theory--which lead to such an obsession with Central Europe--are an unsound basis on which to calculate future strategy. Any British Government must consider that the possibilities for harassment or minor aggression are infinitely more varied and numerous at sea than they are on that frontier in West Germany. It is vital, therefore, that Britain should be able to deploy forces at sea which could match each phase of a potential escalation, and that must include an adequate fleet of surface vessels as well as submarines, and carriers. That is not preparing forces to fight the last war (in this case, the Falklands); it is preparing, as best we can, for the unforeseen.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982

CSO: 3120/69

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY