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JPRS L/10652

12 July 1982

Worldwide Report

TERRORISM

FOUO 6/82



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

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FRANCE

SYRIA, CARLOS, YUGOSLAVIA, SWISS TIES EXAMINED

Paris LE POINT in French 26 Apr 82 pp 56-61

[Article by Jacques Duquesne: "The Onslaughts of Fear"]

[Text] One dead and 63 injured in the incident on Rue Marbeuf in Paris. Agonizing scenes. This dramatic onslaught of international terrorism again increases the fear of the French people. It makes insecurity the number 1 political issue. This gives new prominence to the Defferre-Badinter controversy.

Here are four scenes from a Black Thursday.

The first is tragic, almost unbearable. At 9 am Thursday morning, a booby-trapped car explodes on Rue Marbeuf in Paris, a few steps away from the Champs-Elysees. There is immediate panic: cars burn, a gas line explodes, a conflagration breaks out in a restaurant, shop signs and windows fall on passersby who are running in every direction, panic-stricken and stained with blood. The damage is considerable, debris is scattered over hundreds of meters; the hand brake lever from the boobytrapped car will be found in the Europe 1 courtyard, far from here.

One woman, Nelly Guilierme, age 30, is dead. Near her a young man of 18 has almost lost a leg, torn off by the explosion. Sixty injured persons will be hospitalized. At this hour, when the office crowd is on the way to work, it is a miracle that there were not more victims. There is also an elementary school of Rue Marbeuf which had just closed its doors.

From all evidence, the instigators of the attack wanted to produce slaughter in the very heart of Paris.

One other reason prompted them to pick this location. The offices of the paper AL WATAN AL ARABI (THE ARAB NATION) are located on the fourth floor of the building at 33 Rue Marbeuf in front of which the boobytrapped car was parked.

AL WATAN AL ARABI is not just any paper. It is located in Paris because it had to flee Lebanon due to Syrian threats during the civil war which ravaged

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the country in 1976. There was a price on the head of its owner, Walid Abu Zahr, a Sunni Moslem Lebanese, in Damascus. Even in Paris, the paper was no longer published in peace: last 19 December, an explosive device made of three sticks of TNT was defused literally at the last minute in front of its premises. This did not intimidate the journalists: they had been the first in the Arab world to dare to run an investigation by Jean-Louis Peninou in LIBERATION in February asserting that the assassination of Louis Delamare, French ambassador to Beirut, on 4 September 1981, had been ordered by Syrian authorities.

The Shadow of Carlos Over the Palais de Justice

The second scene: while the bomb was exploding on Rue Marbeuf, an impressive array of police was falling into place around the Palais de Justice: mobile police, helmeted police wearing bulletproof vests, and even men from the national security force specially trained for hostage situations. This is because the 30th summary court is preparing to sentence three persons of note: they are called "Carlos' friends." Protected by bulletproof glass, there is the Swiss Bruno Breguet, age 31, previously sentenced to 12 years in prison; Magdalena Kopp, the small pale German with curly hair, well known by police who track terrorists; and their French accomplice, Michel Jacquot, a former accountant linked to members of the movement for Corsican independence (see LE POINT No 497). It was to obtain the release of the Swiss-German couple arrested on 16 February for possession of a 5-kilo bomb lacking only a detonator, that Carlos, the orchestrator of many of international terrorism's demented attempts, wrote to Gaston Defferre on 1 March. The letter was signed with his fingerprints and was in the form of an ultimatum: if the government does not let them go quietly (as other governments have already done for other friends of Carlos), France will pay--in the form of deadly attacks, of course.



1. Bruno Breguet and his mother. A 5-kilo bomb.

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As the letter had been revealed by a curious leak, the government was not able to give in. So, there they are, before the judges; but they are not saying anything. Except for Michel Jacquot who, mocking and vehement, intends to free himself of responsibility.

But, now something unexpected and unacceptable happens. While the judge calls for unusually light penalties--3 years minimum for Breguet, 2 years for Kopp--the defendants' lawyer, Mr Jacques Verges, will deliver an astonishing defense, if the term can be employed, in the vehement tone for which he has been known in courts for close to 3 decades. "Whatever your opinion," he shouts to the judges, "my clients will get out of prison and go home. You know it. Their friends will not stop until they are released. And in a day, a week, or a month, it will no longer be possible for the government not to release them."



2. Jacques Verges, interpreter of an ultimatum.

The observation is clear. But, never before has a lawyer been heard to thus interpret a terrorist ultimatum before a French court. Mr Verges' business obviously prevented him from going to Rue Marbeuf to see what an explosion of several kilos of explosives actually means. As it also probably prevented him from going to the Saint-Germain-des-Pres Drugstore one Sunday in September 1974 when a grenade attack commanded by Carlos caused 2 deaths and 34 casualties. That time, Carlos won. He wanted to secure the release of a Japanese man being held by French authorities. They had refused him until then despite the seizure of hostages at the French Embassy in La Haye on 13 September 1974. They gave in the day after the Drugstore attack.

So, would Carlos, the man who said in 1979 in the only interview he ever granted (to AL WATA AL ARABI, deservedly): "The Revolution is my supreme euphoria," the man who calls himself Ilitch in memory of Lenin, and who is

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considered the number 1 international terrorist, would the elusive Carlos be responsible for the Rue Marbeuf incident? On Thursday, no one yet dared to assert this. But no one is excluding the possibility quite to the contrary. Things are not simple, we shall see.

A Syrian Commando in Paris

The third scene: when the boobytrapped car explodes on Rue Marbeuf, Gaston Defferre is in his office with the members of his staff--a routine meeting. But, when the minister learns of the attack, he cannot help but think of the reports that the administration has received in recent days. Memos from the head of foreign security (formerly the SDECE) sent to the Elysee Palace reported on acts of retaliation planned against France by certain Arab countries from the Front du Refus, beginning with Syria, following Francois Mitterrand's trip to Israel. Syria, who no one any longer doubts had the French ambassador to Beirut, Louis Delamare, executed by its hitmen (first, as a warning, some rockets were fired on the embassy gardens).

It took months of investigation to establish this, since at one time the possibility of Iranian or Iranian-Syrian action had been raised, but it is now a certainty. A certainty which was echoed in a TFI broadcast on Wednesday evening, just on the eve of the Rue Marbeuf attack. A broadcast which was widely appreciated by the French colony in Beirut: they have been reproaching Paris authorities for having bristled for too long after the ambassador's death before allowing "escapes" from the Syrian authorities--or organizing them--without at the same time taking any concrete actions toward Damascus.

It must be known that in Beirut 200 French cooperatives and 80 embassy employees are experiencing a concern close to panic. Since a blast of 5 kilos of explosives destroyed the French Cultural Center on 15 March leaving several wounded. Especially since, on Thursday 15 April, the embassy cryptographer, Guy Cavallo, age 28, and his young wife Caroline, age 25 and 6 months pregnant, were killed in their home by two bursts of machinegun fire from a young blonde woman accompanied by two accomplices. Finally since, on Sunday night April 18th, an embassy department head, Gilbert Houze, age 47, seems to have been threatened by another attack.

In all these crimes or attempts, the action of individuals controlled by the Syrians seems obvious.

After Beirut, Vienna. On the night of April 18th, bombs explode in the Austrian capital: they damage the Air France office and the embassy. And on Thursday morning when Gaston Defferre is told of the explosion in Rue Marbeuf, he had just received a report from the French security police indicating that the two bombs in Vienna could bear the Syrian signature.

This is not all. A memo from the police, dated about 15 days earlier, had informed the government that a Syrian commando was going to arrive in Paris to take action against opponents of the Damascus regime, and that an attack would take place precisely on 22 April. Following this memo, police patrols had

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been ordered to watch the residences of the heads of AL WATAN AL ARABI and the paper's headquarters. They were not very effective.

The announcement of the attack therefore does not surprise the minister.

From then on, everything will happen very quickly. Everything is decided in the morning between the Elysee Palace, the minister of the interior and the Quai d'Orsay. And the statement which Gaston Defferre reads to the press at midday has been reviewed by Francois Mitterrand himself. On the one hand, it seems to discard the theory of retaliation by Carlos, in speaking of "settling accounts of which France is unaware." On the other, it implicates Syria by announcing the expulsion of two of its diplomats from Paris and the recall of France's ambassador to Damascus for consultation. "When the government does this," it adds, "it is because it thinks it must." This is the first time that a European government has dared to make such a decision following an act of terrorism.

In the afternoon, Claude Cheysson, minister of external relations, will explain that the actions of these diplomats, even if they are not "necessarily linked" to Thursday's attack, "were not acceptable." One of them, the military attache, had organized a knife and axe attack against Syrian opponents of the regime who were demonstrating in Paris at the beginning of March. In our times, so goes diplomacy. As for the cultural attache, the paper which the bomb found at AL WATAN AL ARABI in December was wrapped in, was purchased by him. But, there has been no success so far in establishing his personal responsibility.

At the Burial of a Minister

Between noon and 1 pm, a solemn Claude Cheysson, with drawn features, was attending a mass at the Church of Saint-Louis-des-Invalides in memory of Louis de Guiringaud, his predecessor at Quai d'Orsay. In the nave, the political landscape seems unreal: in the first row, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and his wife; Raymond Barre and his wife are sitting with the chief ministers of the former administration.

At the end of the service--this is the fourth scene--Claude Cheysson walks up before the altar which is decked with a bundle of tricolored flags. Speaking without notes, distressed by the suicide of Guiringaud, a friend of his for 35 years, he mentioned the missions of the former minister to war torn Lebanon. How, then, could he avoid thinking of his own anguish regarding the hornet's nest in the Middle East to which France is again paying a heavy tribute?

Nations Which Arm Killers

For, from all evidence, everything holds in the terrorist incidents which have followed in succession these past few months. In the Rue Marbeuf incident, of course, at the end of last week the investigators had not established a direct link with Syrian enterprises. They only knew that the boobytrapped car, an Opel registered in Vienna, had been rented 3 days earlier from Hertz

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of Ljubljana (Yugoslavia) by a woman who presented false Swiss papers in the name of Margrit Staedelman. It had been parked at midnight Wednesday by a man with a dull complexion.

But, two facts had really struck the police:

This is not the first time that terrorists have come through Yugoslavia. The perpetrators of the Antwerp attack (a boobytrapped pickup truck had exploded last 20 October in the diamond dealers' district, killing three persons) came via Switzerland and Zagreb.

The use of false Swiss passports, with German Swiss identities, was a specialty of the notorious Baader gang.

Among these facts, the police find a new element which supports one of their convictions. In fact, for 1 year they have been convinced that new terrorist connections were being established in France. And they have proof that close ties have been formed between international networks and French activist movements. The last issue of LE POINT mentioned numerous details supporting the existence of this "dark network of terrorism."

However, this network would not be complete without the addition of some nations as accomplices. The overall configuration is as follows: the terrorists, specialists brought in from the Middle East, land in France to perform punctual missions; the activist movements supply them with hideouts, stolen cars, weapons, and possibly false identification. Some embassies also obtain ammunition for them. The recently arrested German terrorists from the Baader gang went to the embassy of a Middle Eastern country to get their explosives. Explosives such as "penthrite" which are difficult to obtain sometimes seem to come through there. It was penthrite which was used at Rue Copernic, and also as the raw material for the bomb discovered in the car belonging to "Carlos' freinds," Breguet and Kopp. On the other hand, it is not yet known (not all the tests have been completed yet) whether penthrite was used in the attack on the Capitole.

The countries whcih supply terrorists with this kind of logistical support obviously do not do it for free. Quite often they are also the instigators of the attacks. They just go to specialized teams for a "contract," as it is called within the trade. In Beirut, the world capital of terrorism, they are common. There are friends of "sons" of Carlos, of course, but also pro-Iranian groups. Also, last but not least, in Damascus there is the Palestinian rebel Abu Nidal, whose story is worth a digression because it is significant. Abu Nidal, sentenced to die by Yasir Arafat's Fatah organized several attacks on leaders of the PLC, which sentenced him to the death penalty. However, Abu Nidal has been living in Damascus for close to 1 year. Arafat continues to ask the Syrians to render him harmless, but they are being careful not to. For they thus have a major asset in hand for overall negotiations with the PLO. Among "Arab brothers,"...

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Carlos Returns to the Scene--In Damascus

The terrorist offensive against France is perhaps not Syria's action alone. Francois Mitterrand's trip to Israel aroused concern in other Arab capitals. And a man like Hali al-Hasan, one of Yasir Arafat's advisers who is considered moderate, told the Lebanese magazine MONDAY MORNING at the beginning of last week: "France's new position on the Middle East creates grave threats for peace in the area. By being the first European head of state to visit Israel, Mitterrand has put an end to this country's isolation, and the blood which has been shed since then is the result. In fact, this trip gave Begin a freer rein in the occupied territories. We consider Mitterrand's position as actually hostile to the PLO."

But, although Syria (which is currently experiencing the greatest domestic difficulties) is not alone, it does intend to be in the forefront in this battle--to retain leadership of the Front du Refus, and possibly to settle other accounts. Isn't France in the process of rebuilding the nuclear reactor at Tamouz, thus rendering service and prestige to the Iraqi regime, Syria's sworn enemy? Didn't France pass a very harsh judgment on the Iranians who tried to assassinate the Shah's former prime minister, Shapur Bakhtiar, while Syria supports Khomeyni's regime?

With regard to the Rue Marbeuf incident, an informed observer of Middle Eastern affairs also explains: "Its instigators were killing two birds with one stone, since this is a quarter where Arab interests, refugees from the Middle East, and Arab travelers in certain large luxury hotels are very numerous. So, they will be frightened. Possibly, they will be prompted to leave France--which has become unsafe--with their funds." It was the poet Georges Schehade, A Lebanese fittingly, who once wrote: "A man who is afraid is effective and dangerous if you know how to use him."

What role does Carlos play in these subtle and deadly games? Although there is a "Carlos myth," and although any explosion is sometimes too easily attributed to the Venezuelan killer, Carlos is not a myth. Contrary to what is sometimes written, he is not dead. He was identified very recently abroad. The French police seem convinced that although he lives in Tripoli most of the time, he now works for the Syrians, having found the PLO too moderate for some time now. Generally contenting himself with the role of a "professor of terrorism," he trains young rebels who are sometimes called "sons of Carlos"; he even supplies them with blank documents signed, in his fashion, with his fingerprints to give more weight to the threats his troops may issue.

The connection between Carlos and the Syrians in the recent attacks has not been clearly established. But--and this is the important thing--the French Government has become certain that at least 10 attacks committed over the past months were financed by the Syrians. And, in replying to a visitor who questioned him on Thursday on the expulsion of the two diplomats from the country, Francois Mitterrand quoted the Arab proverb: "If you beat your wife, you may now know why. But she, she knows."

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3. Carlos in Algiers in 1976. Two birds with one stone.

A Cancer Feeding on Itself

This presentation of international terrorism carries two lessons. The first is that it is now a matter of a type of cancer which is feeding on itself. In other words, it is growing by always just escaping its instigators. The terrorism which originated in the Middle East has already--the events of past months seem to prove it--partially gotten out of the Palestinian control. Likewise, one day it will go beyond the Syrians. The history of the past two decades has shown that it was impossible for financiers of terrorism to control it for long. It always slips out of their hands. Of course, to survive, it

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needs a favorable environment providing aid and protection. It will always find one because there are always special forces interested in destabilizing some nation or some democracy (for democracies are much more susceptible to terrorist action). And, among secret services, the KGB and Colonel Qadhdhafi's forces are always ready: in their eyes any activity which destabilizes the West is good, even when they do not exercise complete control over its perpetrators.

The second lesson, which must be continuously repeated, is related to the first: it is that terrorism is a major problem for Western governments. Of course, France has been more or less spared (except for Corsican incidents) terrorism which originates domestically. There are numerous reasons for this good fortune: some have to do with the nature of French society itself, others with circumstances of history (in a recent interview with the weekly L'UNITE, Alain Geismar, former leader of May 68, cited the proximity of Leftists "to a certain number of people of very high moral character such as Sartre, Foucault, Clavel and others," among other reasons, but the actions of certain ministers of the interior may also be added to this.

But, this is only relative good fortune, because the borders are permeable: international terrorism can prosper in France as elsewhere and be dangerously contagious.

Indeed, this has been seen these past few months. The sum total of attacks perpetrated in the capital, although not numerically greater than last year, is both more dramatic and bloodier. On 12 November, Christian Chapman, American charge d'affaires in Paris, escaped an attack. And, for a week, bombs were bursting just about everywhere in public places: "Fouquet's," Roissy, the Champs-Elysee Drugstore, the Berlitz cinema, the Lyon station, East Station, and so on. All these bombs, or almost all of them, would have been capable of killing, and it was a miracle that no victims were recorded.

On 18 January, Charles R Ray, United States assistant military attache, was killed. A deed claimed by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, a group which is in fact connected to the Syrians. In February, the FLNC alone made 43 attacks. In March, two policemen were killed in an incident in the Basque region. Finally, on 3 April, Yacov Barsimantov, secretary of the Israeli Embassy, was assassinated in his home. There again, responsibility was claimed by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, in other words the Syrians.

We see that the process is clear: international terrorism, which causes many deaths, grafts itself onto domestic terrorist activity which until now has fortunately been less bloody. But, between the two, a complicity is formed. In the past few weeks, connections between Carlos' friends, the FLNC, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, and Direct Action (which reappeared in December, making attacks on luxury stores in Paris), have been demonstrated (see LE POINT Nos 499 and 500).

For, terrorism, whether national or international, has an incredible exponential effect on the French people's feeling of insecurity. In fact, the

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important thing--politically--is what passes through the minds of France's citizens. The fear caused by attacks such as the one in Rue Marbeuf, of which the media immediately broadcast frightful images, revives the fears and anguish aroused by ordinary crimes--thefts, assaults, burglaries--of which the French people are informed daily by word of mouth and with which they are obsessed. This contributes to making safety their primary concern.

Why wouldn't they be obsessed when the number of offenses in the Paris area increased by 25 percent between the first quarter of 1981 and the first quarter of 1982? And, this rate would be even higher if they hadn't decided between these two dates to stop including certain offenses in the statistics; and especially if all crimes were reported.

And Delinquency Added to Fear

Why wouldn't public anxiety increase when the number of complaints filed in a city like Nice had doubled in 1 year? Between the 1st quarter of 1981 and the 1st quarter of 1982, house break-ins increased by 80 percent in Nice, 150 percent in Cannes, and 172 in Antibes. Violent theft (mostly street assaults without weapons) increased by 86 percent in Nice, 11 percent in Cannes, and 152 percent in Antibes. In this area, all records for increases in petty crimes or larceny have been smashed.

How could the French people help being obsessed with safety when they tell each other unbelievable tales? Here, they are emptying the pockets of all the passengers on a subway car. Somewhere else (it was outside Marseille last week), a railcar was forced to stop by a pile of stones and boards placed on the track by youths who then, as if in a bad Western, assaulted the car and rushed in to insult and threaten the passengers, without touching or robbing them.

Somewhere else, when a young delinquent was arrested by the police, he was saved by a mob of his friends: he took off, handcuffed behind his back; three policemen were injured. Everywhere in the big cities, stores are robbed, windows are broken, women don't dare to go out at night, apartments are burglarized, bags and briefcases are stolen right up to the office door, and these are no longer reported.

More than ever, fear is part of daily life. And, it is to this atmosphere of fear, of obsession with fear, that the terrorist assaults are being added. Now everything takes on another dimension. Now security becomes the number 1 issue. And, the Defferre-Badinter controversy, eclipsed for a moment by the Rue Marbeuf incident, regains its disturbing prominence.

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FRANCE

MARBEUF: IDENTITY OF WOMAN WITH SWISS PASSPORT SOUGHT IN YUGOSLAVIA

Paris LE FIGARO in French 4 May 82 p 13

[Text] Police of the crime squad investigating the Rue Marbeuf attack last week went to Ljubljana, where the boobytrapped vehicle had been rented. However, they have now returned to Paris without having found out anything to identify the perpetrators. It appears, therefore, that this trip did not come up with anything new to help identify the members of the terrorist network which carried out the attack.

The main objective of the French police officers, assisted by their Yugoslav colleagues, was to try to identify the young woman who rented the orange Opel on 19 April from the Hertz company at Bernik-Ljubljana airport. She had presented a Swiss passport under the name Margit Staedelman, born in 1950 in Zurich, and resident of that city. It was evidently a false identity.

The investigators, who had brought with them to Yugoslavia photographs and identification sheets provided by Interpol of young women identified by judicial police of Western countries as members of terrorist organizations, showed them to employees of the Hertz rental office. However, the latter did not recognize any to be the young brunette woman, about 30, who had rented the orange Opel.

The French and Yugoslav police also showed the photographs to hotels in the city. However, the investigation was unsuccessful: No trace of Margit Staedelman was found. The investigations in Ljubljana are not over, however. The Yugoslav police are now going to check the lists of passengers who arrived at Bernik-Ljubljana airport on 19 April and preceding days. The young woman who rented the Opel probably did arrive by plane, and if the check is successful at least her arrival date will be known.

Nevertheless, that will not answer the question that police have been asking ever since the beginning of the investigation: Why did a terrorist group choose Ljubljana in Yugoslavia as the place to rent a car which was to be boobytrapped in Paris? The only apparent explanation is that it was an attempt to confuse the search during the initial hours of the investigation, since checks on a vehicle are more difficult aboard. The police point out that the motorcycle used in the Rue Copernic synagogue attack had been bought in Paris, and this enabled identification of the terrorist, who was carrying a false Cypriot passport under the name Alexander Panadryu.

The association of co-owners of the building at 33 Rue Marbeuf, as well as the neighbors of the paper AL WATAN AL ARABI, had filed suit for the eviction of the paper from the two apartments it had rented. However, the suit was dismissed by Marcel Caratini, presiding judge of the Paris civil court. The applicants were concerned at being next to the paper which had been the target of the 22 April attack which killed one and wounded several. However, the ruling stated: "Since the attack on the paper AL WATAN AL ARABI was by a third party, one cannot on the basis of this association assign to the intended victim of the attack responsibility for the abnormal risks of proximity. Though the ruling judge can order the eviction of a tenant under exceptional circumstances, even when there is a continuing lease, this can only be done when it is the fault of the tenant himself that his presence has become a cause for concern."

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FRANCE

SAVASTA RELATES RED BRIGADE TIES WITH PLO, FRENCH NETWORK

Paris LE FIGARO in French 4 May 82 p 13

[Text] In Rome yesterday, "converted" terrorist Antonio Savasta referred to the "French network" maintained by the Red Brigades as part of their presumed contacts with the PLO.

Savasta was in the third day of his lengthy testimony at the trial of the terrorists who first kidnapped, then assassinated, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, Aldo Moro, in 1978. Savasta, whose revelations had made possible the breaking up of the core of the Red Brigades, expanded on the accusations he had made on Friday.

He confirmed, despite the vehement denials his statements had elicited in Beirut, that the PLO on two occasions delivered significant quantities of weapons to the Red Brigades, after contacts had been established in France.

The first delivery was reportedly made by sea from the Middle East, the other via the Italian-French border, and both were managed by Mario Moretti, the leader of the Red Brigades, who was arrested a year ago and is also one of the accused in this trial.

Though without providing any new names, Savasta corrected the presiding judge, who had used the term "agency" in the course of questioning him about this network: He said, "I have never used that term because what there was in France was only a network of comrades and not a central organization like the CIA."

He explained that the "French network" ceased to exist after the arrest of Moretti a year ago. "The break in the movement which followed was decisive. It was no longer possible to obtain the telephone number of the PLO representatives in France or to contact them."

He said that the French network had also made it possible to help in the escape of members of the Brigades being hunted by the police. He added that the relations between the Red Brigades and the PLO were "equal to equal."

Savasta denied that there had been any contact between the Red Brigades and either the Israeli secret services or Libya. A Palestinian offer to train Brigade members in camps in North Africa was declined by the Red Brigades, saying that the border crossings would be too difficult.

Finally, Savasta denied any formal relationship with the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group [ETA]--military, which the Red Brigades regarded as "too nationalistic." He had, however, known a certain "Diego" of the Communist Fighting Formations (close to the Red Brigades) who had received military training in the Pyrenees. (AFP)

(These statements at the trial of Aldo Moro's murderers, as reported by AFP, give details of the former ties between the Brigade members and the PLO representatives assigned to Paris. A "comrades network" established in France around 1978 would have made it possible to establish a supplies and arms channel and a fallback network for the Red Brigades members. The statements also revealed that the channel for arms from the Middle East and the support network was run by Palestinians led by an Italian. There is no indication of French participation. However, during this same year, 1978, six Italian terrorists were arrested in France, including Olga Girotto and Marco Donat-Cattin, leaders of Prima Linea [First Line], a dissident branch of the Red Brigades. In the same period, about 20 members of the Action Directe movement were also arrested, and at Brusac, in the Var, two Italian members of the Red Brigades, accompanied by Mohand Hamani, a member of Action Directe, were arrested. The latter, who had been promptly released, was picked up again at the beginning of this month in a garage containing an arms cache. An automatic weapon seized in this batch intended for terrorist use had already been used in an anti-Israeli attack in Paris. Some documents found in the garage mentioned the Red Brigades. Thanks to a number of supporters operating in Paris, the PLO-Red Brigades "French network" reportedly still exists in 1982.)

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ITALY

ROLE OF PARIS LANGUAGE SCHOOL IN ITALIAN TERRORISM

'Hyperion' School

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 29 Mar 82 pp:6-10

[Article by Marcella Andreoli]

[Text] Vanni Mulinaris, one of the executives of Hyperion, the famous Paris school of languages, has been charged by police with a crime. The carabinieri charged him with having supplied the Red Brigades with weapons and protection from France. Michele Galati, ex-leader of the Veneto Red Brigades column, turned over information to the carabinieri. (He is the brother of Paolo, who, in conversations with UCIGOS [Central Office of General Investigations and Special Operations], made possible the discovery of the prison where Gen James Lee Dozier was held.) The information given by Michele Galati seemed to throw unexpected light on the Red Brigades and their decade-long adventure.

Yes, unexpected light: All the old Hyperion story now acquires new weight and an undoubted credibility but not only because of Galati's revelations. It is a story that deserves to be told, starting with its last chapter, which began on 3 February this year at Udine, when the carabinieri arrested Vanni Mulinaris under a procedure that was really unusual: they picked him up on the street in a faked kidnapping. And for 4 days--another singular event--his lawyers could learn nothing about him, nor were they able to locate the jail in which he was being held. The only thing that happened was that a carabinieri contacted the Mulinaris family, old pasta manufacturers, to tell them tersely "that Vanni was not kidnapped but arrested." Nothing more. But was this news reassuring or alarming?

In those 4 days Vanni, 37, friend of Renato Curcio and Mario Moretti in the early 1970's, was interrogated without letup in a carabinieri barracks that was protected by a secret classification. There was nothing strange in this. The strangeness was perhaps that the carabinieri who interrogated him appeared clothed in hooded capes: evidently so that they might not be recognized. But why? Because they are carabinieri of the Secret Service or because they consider Mulinaris "very dangerous"? In any case, the object of the interrogation was clear: relations between Hyperion and the Red

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Brigades. The warrant under which Banni was arrested spoke of an armed gang and subversive association, but behind this formula there's another chapter of the story.

Two months earlier, on 2 December 1981, a couple of secret service agents intercepted Mulinaris in the company of his girl friend, Pia Serafin. They were returning to Paris after a brief trip to Udine, Vanni's hometown. Naturally, he was followed: it seemed a choice morsel, also because Vanni had left his Friuli hometown about 10 years earlier and for many years the family had heard nothing from him. Between 1972 and 1973, his father had thought of selling his pasta factory to finance a search for his son and to get some information on his mysterious disappearance.

On that 2 December 1981, secret service agents got onto Mulinaris' tracks, followed him to Italy, and then on the train for Paris where they continued to shadow him, carefully noting the names of persons whom he contacted. That's how they learned that on the evening of 3 December Mulinaris met with two persons at the Popular Culture Club in Rue De Nanteuil. It was a sensational discovery. After a rapid search, one of the two persons turned out to be no less than Lanfranco Pace. The other was a certain Ippoliti.

For those who might not remember, Lanfranco Pace is the man arrested by Judge Pietro Calogero in the investigation of "7 April" Autonomy [Autonomia]. He was later turned over to the Roman judiciary who accused him of kidnaping Aldo Moro but later suddenly absolved him of any wrongdoing whatever. According to the original charge, Pace, together with his friend, Franco Piperno, acting on behalf of the Red Brigades, had tried to begin negotiations with the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] which, through a countervailing exchange, was to lead to the release of the Christian Democratic leader.

When they arrested him, the carabinieri charged Vanni Mulinaris with complicity in the affair, but he denied it. He claimed he never knew Pace. In his defense, he maintained that after all there would be nothing wrong if Mulinaris had met Lanfranco Pace, even though Pace, after having been released, once again became the target of investigations into the affairs of the Red Brigades.

But in the meanwhile, the carabinieri and even the prosecutor's office charged Mulinaris with a series of increasingly more serious misdeeds. In reality, it was a crescendo of accusations that was completed toward the end of February when the Venice Assistant Prosecutor charged Vanni Mulinaris with a new crime that was fully documented: traffic in arms that, according to the magistrates, was centered in Hyperion. It was a serious crime, which put an entirely new face on the famous Paris school of languages.

It was Michele Galati, who said in a statement to the police: "I know that Mario Moretti, when he went to Paris, met Vanni Mulinaris at Hyperion." The Red Brigades member told a tale that was rich in details. He explained that beginning in May, 3 years earlier, he had suspected that Hyperion might be tied to the Red Brigades. His suspicions were aroused on that very day when for the first time (it was May 1979) Hyperion was linked with the

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investigations of terrorism. If what he says is true, Galati was in Venice in the company of Mario Moretti.

Hearing the word Hyperion on the radio, Moretti was shocked, and betrayed great concern. He said, "Wow, they reached Paris." Clearly, he feared that the investigations of Hyperion could go further. In view of the prosecutors' activities, Moretti perhaps had never revealed as much anxiety as he showed on hearing the news that the "7 April" investigation had penetrated the Paris sanctuary. Was it then a sanctuary that must remain among the Red Brigades' mysteries?

Perhaps it was. The fact is that according to Galati, Mario Moretti went to Paris every time he had to make an agreement for the purchase of weapons. Even Antonio Savasta, the terrorist accused of the General Dozier kidnapping, explained that Moretti regularly went to Paris. "He met persons whose names he never wanted to reveal. I know that he made those trips in order to make agreements for the shipment of weapons. The weapons were supplied by the PLO, the Arafat group which, when it denied its relations with us, caused extreme discontent with the Red Brigades. The impact of this was lessened only by statements made by Moretti, who was always ready to maintain that it was politically correct and understandable that Arafat would deny even what could not be denied."

Savasta went further: in his deposition to the authorities in the Moro case, he also explained that Lanfranco Pace was, to all intents and purposes, a Red Brigades member and that Franco Piperno and the other Autonomy leaders represented a link in the ties between the Red Brigades organization and Autonomy. The most sensational aspect of this revelation was in the new personality it attributed to Pace: for a long time he had been believed to be a member of Autonomy, and was treated as such at the semiofficial meetings in the Moro case, but in reality was a Red Brigades member, and had been so for a long time.

When on the evening of 3 December Vanni Mulinaris met Lanfranco Pace at the Paris Popular Culture Club, was it a meeting between old friends or a summit meeting between executives of terrorist organizations? Even though he was accused of serious crimes such as trafficking in arms, being a member of an armed gang and subversion associations, Mulinaris still had not cried scandal or set off a witch-hunt, and his defense attorneys still had not asked for his release on bail. That is, they did not follow the conduct adopted by Franco Piperno and Toni Negri. Why the silence? Because the charges were well-founded, or because at times silence is golden, that is, more useful to the plans of the defense?

The efforts made by the secret services covered a long period of time. But beginning when? One step backward: in 1979, investigations of Hyperion began under very tight security, but one day the news came out in Italian newspapers--and it was supplied by one of the high officials of the services--that an investigation of the language school was being conducted in Paris. This leak completely wrecked the collaboration between the Italians and the French because the latter pulled back in an angry outburst. More

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than incautious, the disclosures seemed to be intentional, that is, a move to stop the investigation. Was Hyperion being protected from high places? The fact is, in any case, that in the early 1980's, our 007's went back to work. A report of the Rome Police Flying Squad dated 3 January of that year confirms this. In fact, the report states that "Cooperation with French authorities was resumed." Cooperation was resumed from the point at which it had been interrupted, that is, with the discovery made by Judge Pietro Calogero of the unusual circumstances that three founders of the CPM, the Metropolitan Political Collective, and of the Proletarian Left--the two organizations which later were to result in the creation of Red Brigades--now were together in Paris directing a luxurious language school.

The three persons were Vanni Mulinaris, Corrado Simioni and Duccio Berio, all of whom were very well-known, particularly in Milan, at the end of the 1950's. They disappeared between 1971 and 1972 when the nascent Red Brigades began to engage in the first kidnappings. What had happened to them? They were in Paris, covered with gold, surrounded by success and the prestige of a cultural association that was very much appreciated by the rich French bourgeoisie.

That is not all. The Italian secret services discovered also that the famous trio Mulinaris-Simioni-Berio lived under the same roof in Paris. Behind the Hyperion symbol were an additional seven persons, all formerly militants of the CPM and the Proletarian Left. So this was another big scene. And it was all the more sensational because the president of the school was Francoise Tuscher. She, too, came from that old revolutionary source. Then, as though that were not enough, who should appear at Hyperion but Roberto Ropelato, who had been investigated but cleared in the Superclan (that is, super-clandestine) affair, a meteor in the revolutionary firmament of the early 1970's whose protagonist was Simioni and others of that clique.

The record of 007 was enriched by other stories. Hyperion had large amounts of money available (see box) and its monthly expenditures went into the thousands of francs. Where did the money come from? Certainly, Hyperion had income from various sources. The Milan provincial administration sends groups of students there, for courses in languages. Fiat and Total also send their employees, and even the Pompidou Center has ties with the school. The Paris elite are present at every Hyperion activity.

Is all this as it should be? Investigation followed investigation; our 007's discovered that some collaborators of Hyperion spent time without remuneration for work that had nothing to do with teaching languages. However, that work permitted them to leave Paris and return to Italy, to contact professional offices, to knock on the doors of police authorities, prefects and presidents of local administrations. The work consisted of selling subscriptions to people on that level to the Italian magazine NUOVA POLIZIA [NEW POLICE], a magazine aimed mainly at policemen. Thus even employees of Hyperion publicized the magazine in Italy. They said it was profitable work. Were they to be believed? And how did it happen that ex-revolutionaries of 1968 were so busy, and from Paris, with a police who, even though new, was

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still the same hated police of those not-too-distant years? Were the ghosts of the 1968 revolution returning, but in a different guise?

It may be hard to believe, but the word ghost is written in the record of our 007's. In fact these three words appear: the kindly ghosts. Just like that. In reality, this is the symbol for a collateral activity of Hyperion which, although it is named a language school, is also involved in household services. The kindly ghosts in fact offer silent help in the houses of Parisians who leave them empty over the weekend or during vacations. That is what is stated in the leaflet that EUROPEO dug up. A short time ago, however, the business went bankrupt.

Who managed the kindly ghosts? It was the Hyperion bookkeeper Innocente Salvoni, 32, also a participant, like all the characters in this story, in that famous meeting at Chiavari. Renato Curcio and Mario Moretti, who were out on bail, laid down the rules of underground activity and the green light was given the Red Brigades. Salvoni, despite the fact that he described himself as an artisan, married Francois Tuscher, the president of Hyperion. During the Moro case, this artisan-wedded-to-culture went through some grueling moments because of the Christian Democratic leader. But perhaps it was a ghost, or an error made by the investigators.

In any case that picture was the reason why no less than Abbe Pierre, powerful founding abbot of the Emmaus Community, left Paris for Rome where he had "important talks." The prestigious abbot has a favorite niece, the ever-present Francois Tuscher, and, at least until some time ago, never failed to officiate at the baptism of every Hyperion initiative in order to impart a kind of lay benediction on these ex-1968 revolutionaries.

Secret agents discovered at Rome that Abbe Pierre had a meeting with Benigno Zaccagnini, then Christian Democratic secretary. In fact the investigating magistrates rushed to Zaccagnini for confirmation of that meeting. But Zaccagnini denied the 007 reports.

In the investigators' notebooks there still remains, unsolved, another question: why did those in Hyperion open two branch offices, one in Rome and the other in Milan, just a few days before the Moro kidnapping, and close them immediately after the kidnapping? Or was this a coincidence? Or what else?

Concerning the Hyperion branches throughout the world there is almost an entire police literature that has the overtones of a detective story. Branches included one in London, an apartment of 40 rooms mostly empty, and another at Brussels. Not only that: Duccio Berio, the one of the prestigious trio, had created a theater company that specialized in "Commedia dell-Arte" and had called it Scalzacani [paupers; indigents]. Its headquarters was on Boulevard Beaumarchais. It participated in the Rennes theater festival, in Brittany, received financing totaling tens of millions of francs from the Paris Cultural Council.

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The police literature on Hyperion branches has a hint of the detective story in London where two secret agents went to focus in on it. One day they nearly had heart attacks when they found that their rooms in the hotel had been thoroughly searched. Any policeman would have interpreted that event as a warning to desist.

The 007's almost had a second heart attack another time when in France, near Rouen, they did not even succeed in getting close to an office of Hyperion because it was very heavily guarded. It was the villa where Corrado Siminoni and a few of his intimates were spending the weekend.

And now, Targeted, suspected, investigated, Hyperion performs its final miracle. It clones itself. At the moment of danger, rather than disappear, it creates another twin school that is called Kiron and its headquarters is established in a building that had been used to manufacture brassieres, on Rue Faubourg Poissonnier. Kiron accepts applications for courses in mosaics, theater and "sciatzu." If Hyperion, according to Greek mythology, was a sun word meaning "higher," Kiron is instead the centaur which saves Peleus from the "scheming of the courtesans of Acasto." Since Simioni, Mulinaris and Berio are educated people who understand the meaning of words, do they perhaps think that Kiron will save them from some "scheme"?

The minor literature of 007, under the chapter entitled Michaele Galati, recalls that Mario Moretti, when he was to make agreements to import arms from the Middle East, went first to Paris, and perhaps concluded his agreements under the Hyperion sun. Was the top leadership of the Red Brigades located there? Would Hyperion perhaps be the mythical "grand old man"?

If the revelations made by the ex-head of the Veneto column turn out to be well-founded, it could be a short step to the identity of the person who for 10 years has directed Red subversion. At that point it would be necessary to discover who really runs Hyperion: The Multinaris-Simioni-Berio trio, or some intelligence service?

Rome Police Report on Hyperion Business Affairs: School's Books Do Not Balance

On 3 January 1980 the Rome Police Flying Squad sent Judges Achille Gallucci and Pietro Galogero a report on the Hyperion language school. The report began with details of a "business report":

"Somewhat luxurious offices were the subject of a rental contract for 25,000 francs per quarter. Professors' salaries: average of 2,000 francs for 15 professors. Two thousand francs for the cook; 1,500 for the governess, in addition to the salary of secretary De Roux totaling 3,400 francs per month and part of the rent totaling 1,600 francs per month for the apartment of Duccio Berio.

"It was learned that the Hyperion debts totaled 30,000 francs per month not counting the expenditures for food for about 15 persons. Income came from

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"the tuition of 180 students reported by the school (from 20 to 30 francs per hour), and the lessons for the Commedia dell-Arte students (15 francs per hour). It is unlikely that this income can account for the luxurious furnishings of the offices.

"Furthermore, it was somewhat difficult to accept some statements by Hyperion officers. Particularly: Berio, in charge of public relations, who affirms that he receives no salary and states that he contributes 3,500 francs annually out of his own pocket. Francois Tuscher, Hyperion president and French language teacher, says she receives no salary and that her support comes from handicraft work done by her husband Innocente Salvoni. The latter also works at the school with no pay.

"Corrado Simioni, the person who rents the two apartments (2,400 and 3,000 francs per month) says he receives no remuneration for his duties as a cultural adviser for Hyperion, although he must support a family.

"The teachers reportedly are content with a salary equal to 2,000 francs on the average, while the secretary and the cook receive 3,400 and 2,000.

"The persons who interrogated those involved (ed. note: They were questioned by the French police in the late spring of 1979) confirmed that the great majority of them in 1968-1969 were members or founders of the Italian Proletarian Left. They included: Francois Tuscher, Innocente Salvoni, Duccio Berio, Vanni Mulinaris, Corrado Siminoni, Donatella Zotta, Claudio Agular, Alberto Pinotti, Giulia Archer, Attilio Galli, Pia Serafin.

"The officers of the organization have made many trips in Europe, most of them in Italy and Great Britain. Expenditures for the trips lead to the assumption that there are further financial sources.

"Finally it is interesting to point out that lawyer Michel Tubiana, born in Algiers and residing in Paris, according to testimony by Sartorio Cristiane, was present when the Agora Association was established from which Hyperion was created. The aforementioned individual was the secretary of the International Defense Committee of West European Politician Prisoners and above all of the members of the Baader gang, and of lawyer Klaus Croissant.

"Tubiana, who is presently a member of the European Defense Association, an organization that will oppose the European Anti-terrorism Convention, on 2 May 1979 participated in a press conference organized by the Information Committees on the Italian situation in favor of Antonio Negri and of the other persons investigated in the 7 April incident."

As Bettino said: According to Craxi, the Grand Old Man was in Paris.

Bettino Craxi once more surprised and aroused the curiosity of everyone. In the no-confidence debate regarding the second Cossiga government, he had launched the idea of the Grand Old Man: the hidden brains behind terrorism. It was 18 March 1980, 2 years after the Moro kidnapping.

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In the Montecitorio "Transatlantico" [meeting place for newsmen in the parliamentary building] Craxi took this newspaperman by the arm with that distracted air of indirection he assumes when he wants to strike a blow without giving the impression that he is doing so. And he returned to the subject.

The Grand Old Man: Was he an elderly person? Not necessarily a single person, rather, probably, it might be a group of persons. And certainly not elderly: it was necessary to go back into memory, Craxi said, to seek among those persons who had begun their political career with us, who had demonstrated intelligence, political talent and then suddenly disappeared; he recalled, for example, a name, a certain Corrado Simioni, ex-socialist, later a comrade of Renato Curcio....

And where was it necessary to search? Abroad, naturally. But east or west, near or far? Not very far. In Paris? Right, in Paris, why not? This Simioni was in Paris. And recently, Craxi added, he changed his place of residence, who knows why...?

Shortly afterward Craxi's bald head was surrounded by numerous colleagues. The next day all the newspapers spoke of the trail being followed in the search for the Grand Old Man. Was it merely a hypothesis that flashed from the mind of a very imaginative politician? Or was it prophetic intuition?

[Signed] Pasquale Nonno



Hyperion's insignia

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Vanni Mulinaris, one of the Hyperion executives

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
Francois Tuscher, president of Hyperion with Duccio Berio, in the school's offices

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Insignia of the Kiron School, one of the Hyperion affiliates; offered courses in mosaics and the theater



Abbe Pierre, founder of the Emmaus Community

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'Hyperion' Reply

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 10 May 82 p 150

Hyperion, Culture and Terrorism

The article by Marcella Andreoli entitled, "It Is Spelled Hyperion; It Means Grand Old Man" (EUROPEO 13) is extremely defamatory and irresponsible. It mixes truths about the activities of the Hyperion school and the life of some of its employees with lies and fantasy-politics inventions. There is nothing to hide about what we do and, rather, since what we do is cultural, our work depends on gaining a reputation. That's why the school's literature even reached you.

I emphasize that the French police 3 years ago, following false conclusions by Italian newspapers, carried out a long and thorough investigation of us. At its conclusion, the French Interior Ministry declared it had no grounds for any accusation either against the Hyperion school, or against its individuals.

It is true and widely known that: (1) In 5 years it had about 2,000 associates, most of them French; (2) Some persons who work with or have worked with the Hyperion school became acquainted in 1967-1970 in the Proletarian Left group and therefore are veterans of 1968. The famous Chiavari conference was a public meeting and the subjects discussed were all those of the meetings of 1968; (3) Those of us who later joined in working at the Hyperion school already at that time shared a common sensitivity to the cultural and community themes of the 1968 movement rather than to strictly political aspects. So, when 2 years later the Red Brigades was created, none of us joined in this political radicalization which grew out of theories advanced by Renato Curcio; (4) The Hyperion school teaches languages, and after 6 years of hard and unceasing work, including Sundays and holidays, often paying a minimum guaranteed wage, has succeeded in making its pedagogical value and its cultural studies recognized by public and private institutions which have profited from our courses; (5) In order to establish this school which is of a cooperative type, and not having initial capital, each one rolled up his sleeves: Some became housepainters, some sold magazine subscriptions, and some did translations....

It is absolutely false that: (1) "The school's accounts do not balance." Its books are always available to anyone with the appropriate authority and are perfectly clear. Even the figures which were cited with considerable sensationalism can be reconciled as between expenditures and outlays [as published], and are sufficient to figure out the total: 180 x 30 francs x a minimum of 10 hours per month--this already adds up to 54,000 francs against 30,000 francs in expenditures; (2) We are supposed to be "submerged in gold." Unfortunately that is not true; (3) "The offices are furnished luxuriously"; all the furniture was built by associates; (4) "Hyperion has branches abroad"; Hyperion has never had any other branch but the one in Paris; (5) Moretti "was supposed to have come to Hyperion"; we explicitly deny that this person has ever set foot in our offices, and he has not even

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telephoned; (6) Hyperion has never publicized Italian police magazines; I think it would be enough to ask for confirmation of this from the editor of the magazine.

It is also false in reference to Vanni Mulinaris: (1) "That on 3 December he was in Paris." Everyone knows him in Udine and it would be easy for anyone who wants to establish the truth to verify that on the day he was in Udine. Thus he could not have met anyone in Paris on 3 December, and much less that certain Pace, or that certain Ippoliti; (2) "That Pia Serafin was in Udine on 2 December"; in effect she was in Paris from November, having returned from medical care in Italy; (3) "That Hyperion was put on trial in the charges against Mulinaris," and still less for traffic in arms.

On the other hand the following are unfounded insinuations: (1) To cite as a "serious" fact and the sole prosecution evidence, the "suspicion" born in the mind of a Brigade member when he heard the Hyperion school mentioned on the radio when Hyperion had been cited by the press in 1979; (2) To create the idea that the Hyperion school, targeted by newspapers for 3 years, could calmly continue its subversive activity behind the "protection" of half the world: Italian, French and British police; secret services; the French Government which earlier was center-Right and now Left; the Church, the French upper bourgeoisie; the Theater Festival; etc.; (3) Using accusations that the Italian police themselves had immediately recognized as false, for example, the alleged "participation" by Innocente Salvoni in the Moro kidnapping.

It is therefore ridiculous as well as despicable that a newspaperwoman should once again stir up this witch hunt which does an irreparable wrong to innocent persons, and whose final effect would be to sully the 1968 movement in its aspects of cultural-existential renewal, of what here in France is called "changer la vie."

[Signed] Francois Tuscher, President of the Hyperion Association, Paris.

Andreoli, NUOVA POLIZIA Replies

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 10 May 82 pp 150-151

[Marcella Andreoli Reply to Hyperion Letter]

We owe Hyperion a reply. It will be brief, but necessary in order to clear up its thinking. In one regard above all: Hyperion wrongly addressed its replies and even its insults ("ridiculous," "despicable") in every case. In any case, we hope they will be able to recognize at all times to whom those words belong.

Regarding the rest. Which after all is what counts most, Hyperion dumps upon us a series of denials that should have been addressed to the Italian police from whose reports were deduced the subjects upon which the contested article was based. Or, it should unload them on the terrorists who, when they

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were arrested, spoke of Hyperion. Or, upon the facts, if that ever were possible.

Or is it not a fact that Vanni Mulinaris, founding member of Hyperion, is today in jail charged with belonging to an armed gang and trafficking in arms? It is expected, perhaps, that this should not be discussed? In any case, it is the carabinieri who charged Mulinaris with the meeting of 3 December 1981 with Lanfranco Pace and a certain Ippoliti at the Popular Culture Club in Rue de Nanteuil, and asserting that it was able to get onto his trial thanks to Pia Serafin.

And it is Michele Galati, a repentant terrorist, who sustained that Mario Moretti, Brigade leader, met Mulinaris at the Hyperion offices when he went to Paris.

And it is the idea of the Italian police that "the figures don't add up" in the Hyperion budget: The report of the Rome police dated 3 January 1980 published in EUROPEO 13, says so clearly on the basis of cooperation with the French police, incidentally, (and in addition to the contested stories), where does Corrado Simioni, another founding member of Hyperion, "who at one time rented two apartments in Paris," (as that report says) get his money since he now lives in the luxurious dwelling of the Dukes of Grammont, 50 kilometers from Paris?

It is denied that Hyperion has branches abroad: in London, Brussels and in Italy. According to Italian records, the men of Hyperion opened two in Rome and Milan, and precisely during the kidnapping of Aldo Moro. Records also show that they had another in London in 1978 where the students of the school could be housed, enjoying mess facilities where there was much discussion. Finally, records show that the Hyperion men had a lodging at Brussels, in Rue de Tervueren 46.

Hyperion, finally, confesses that it has certainly forgotten some of its protectors. Yes, it is really true. When last summer the theater group "the Scalzacani" directed by Duccio Berio, another founding member of Hyperion, was given several tens of millions for a performance, but not the kind of stage required, it went over everyone's head to the French Ministry of Culture and obtained nothing less than the Palais Royale. The show opened on 22 August 1981.

Police and Magazines [NUOVA POLIZIA Comment]

Regarding the article entitled "It Is Spelled Hyperion and It Means Grand Old Man," we state that none of the persons you indicated on Page 8 collaborate in the distribution of the magazine NUOVA POLIZIA. Instead, we believe it is useful to inform you that in August 1979 we reported to the Savona Attorney General that a certain "Dr Gallil" as is shown by our proven documents, was selling subscriptions for a competing magazine while claiming that he was working for the NUOVA POLIZIA circulation department.

The Management of NUOVA POLIZIA
Rome

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[Marcella Andreoli Replies of NUOVA POLIZIA]

I don't know whether Dr Galli is the same person, that is, Attilio Galli, who in the report of 3 January 1980 by the Rome police (published in EUROPEO 13, on the Hyperion investigations) is indicated as one of the members of the Paris school and founding member of the Proletarian Left group.

I can, however, affirm that in order to check on the facts in my possession before writing the article in question, on Thursday 11 March, I telephoned the French headquarters of Hyperion and asked to speak with Bruno Ropelato. He was investigated in the early 1970's for the Superclam (the so-called super-clandestine workers of Red terrorism). Mr Ropelato called me back the next day and in the course of the conversation he confirmed that he had carried out a promotion campaign for the magazine NUOVA POLIZIA.

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SPAIN

TERRORISM IN SPAIN--CHAPTER I

Barcelona EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA in Spanish 1982 pp 9-47

[Text] Chapter 1--The Shadow of Cain

"These are lands for the eagle, a bit of the planet crossed by the roving shadow of Cain." (Antonio Machado, "Through Spanish Lands")

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The Concept and Meaning of Terrorism

It is very often stressed that the democratic regimes in Spain have always had to deal with adverse socioeconomic circumstances. In this connection, a parallel is frequently drawn between the experience of the failure of the Second Republic--burdened from the very first by the consequences of the so-called Great Depression which overwhelmed the West beginning in 1929-1930, and the democratic regime established on the death of Franco by the monarchy of Juan Carlos I and, from many points of view, the victim of the crisis which began in 1973 due to the oil problem and the subsequent escalation of the price of this strategic raw material.

There is obviously some truth in this description of the hardly favorable but historic record of our democratic experience. But some distinctions are needed, because the economic problems were not the cause of the failure of the Second Republic, since that economic crisis did not have the effect on our country it

did elsewhere. Nor, although the problems of unemployment are very serious, has the economic situation been the main problem to be dealt with by our present effort to consolidate a pluralistic and democratic regime in Spain capable of ensuring the coexistence of all Spaniards in peace and liberty.

It has become a cliché in our country in recent times to speak of three major problems: one indeed is unemployment, inflation and the resulting impoverishment; the other two are terrorism and the autonomy issue, which on the slopes of the Basque territory have occurred together and even interdependently in many sections of the historical and political path covered since 1975.

In this book we will deal with this problem of terrorism, and what it has meant to the collective life of Spaniards.

With its drama and its heart-rending obviousness, terrorism has been at many times in this decisive 5-year period the main problem with which Spain has had to deal. On many occasions, it has been the most overwhelming concern of our government leaders. It has too often preoccupied the most notable personalities in our mass media. And, since democracy dawned here, it has been the favorite weapon and pretext of those who have tried to bring about the failure of this latest effort at pluralistic coexistence in freedom.

However, it should be made clear at the outset that terrorism did not develop here with democracy, nor has it been exclusive to our country. Political violence is a historical constant which has been manifested in widely different forms. One trait precisely which has been common to different doctrines and philosophies has been the definition of the state or the legitimate political authority as the "monopolizer of violence." Thus this subtle link appears very soon relating politics to violence and justifying, that is to say attributing a just nature to, the violence in which a legitimate authority engages. Also quick to appear is the idea that political power may be illegitimately exercised, leading to tyranny. Its violence, then, is not just and may be resisted. And then this old idea emerges, justifying a certain violence "pursued from below," when resistance to authority exercised without legitimacy, that is to say a tyrannical regime, is presumed. And it is here that a whole series of subspecies of political violence seek to find their legitimacy--revolution, tyrannicide, coups d'etat, active opposition, guerrilla warfare, resistance fighters and terrorism in its various manifestations.

Therefore, despite the fact that many authors stress the concept of regarding terrorism as a phenomenon typical of modern society, others have sought to find precedents for it. They often cite two ancient examples, the first being the Sicarii, the religious sect referred to by Flavius Josephus in his "History of Judea," and also Tacitus, who were active in Palestine in the last third of the first century. They were ultranationalists and anti-Roman, and in particular they attacked the Jews who were advocates of peace and compromise with the Romans.

The other terrorist organization often cited is the Hashishin (from which the word assassin comes), who in the era of the crusades (11th to 13th centuries) fought against the established regime by means of personal assassination,

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operating in strict secrecy. This sect, part secret society and part terrorist organization, has been the subject of many analyses. Its members were known as "fedayeen," a term, as is known, now used to designate the Palestinians fighting for a state of their own.

In this scheme of the early history of terrorism, another important era must be added: the French Revolution. There we find the term "terror" used for the first time to define the political period of the Convention, of which the most representative figure is Robespierre. It is no accident, therefore, that in the 1798 supplement to the "Dictionary of the Academie Francaise" the term "terrorism" is already to be found, defined as a "system or regime of terror." As can be seen, it is a question here of "terrorism carried out from above," that which is commonly called now "institutionalized violence," rather than "terrorism against the regime," to which we will basically be referring here.

Since we are dealing with a semantic question, let us make two specifications. The first is that there is no agreement as to what should be termed terrorism. T. Perry Thornton has defined it as "a symbolic act designed to influence political conduct through extranormal methods implying the use or the threat of violence." But as C. Leiden and K. M. Schmitt note, this is a narrow concept, and they prefer to describe it as "a whole series of actions...which contribute to creating an atmosphere of fear and desperation: deaths, assassinations, sabotage, subversion, destruction of public records, spreading of rumors, persecution of churches, seizure of property, interference with the normal application of criminal laws, prostitution of the courts, poisoning of the press...."¹

In any case, it does not seem that an agreement will be reached soon on what terrorism is. We have, for example, the discussions of this subject at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Madrid (1980-1981), at which the Soviets insisted on excluding the "struggles for national liberation" from the consideration of terrorism. In this shifting political terrain, it seems impossible to find and acceptable and certain standard for differentiating "terrorism" from "national liberation struggles." The same deeds could be called one or the other, depending on the trench in which one is located and the political position one adopts.

From what we have just said it is evident--and this is the second specification--that terrorism is burdened with a pejorative implication. It is a word which evokes and implies a negative evaluation, and has done so since it was first used, as early as 1795, when the famous British thinker Edmond Burke, the father of conservative thinking, referred to "these thousands of monstrous infernal terrorist appeals."

Therefore, those who sympathize with the terrorists or with their causes prefer to give them other names such as "guerrilla fighters" or "strugglers," which seem to imply an element of nobility. A group of terrorists will not be called a "gang" but a "commando unit," and its activity will be termed "armed or military actions," not "criminal or terrorist acts." The death of an individual will be described as an "execution," not an "assassination," and the "theft" of an automobile, for example, will be termed simply a "confiscation."

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It should be remembered that the criticisms aroused by the pastoral letter which the Basque bishops published on 1 April 1981 were based precisely on the terms used in describing the terrorists and their activities, which were seen as revealing a latent sympathy and a comparison with the "repressive" actions of the state.

Terrorism in Modern Spain

Terrorism did not appear in Spain suddenly; rather, there is evidence enough to state that it has been an endemic phenomenon in our modern history. The "bands" into which the Carlist forces, the "blusterers," the "matiners" prominent in Catalonia at the middle of the last century, the typical banditry in which often political motivations were not lacking, can be regarded as the direct antecedents of the modern terrorist command units. Therefore, it is no surprise that many of them have seen in the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] the 20th-century manifestation of Carlism, and in the situation created by that terrorist organization, a new "war of the north," like the fourth or fifth--depending on the method of calculation--Carlist war.

Later, beginning in the last third of the 19th century, a new form of terrorism inspired by certain anarchist considerations appeared in Spain, and if it was sometimes of an organized nature, as in the famous Andalusian Mano Negra action, it was often seen in the form of the isolated terrorist, represented graphically in the newspapers of the era as "the man with the burning torch." Another well-known manifestation of terrorism is the so-called "gangsterism," involving gangs in the pay of certain trade unions, the owners' organizations for the public authorities themselves, who "intervened" in that fierce class struggle, in operating what we know today as the "dirty war." What gangsterism meant in Barcelona, especially in the years following World War I, is well known. When those paid gunmen ceased to receive "commissions," they began to act on their own, becoming common armed bandits. Here we have another problem in modern terrorism: the difficulty of social reintegration of those who have made a way of life of violence.

Terrorism experienced a new period of resurgence in Spain in the period between the "Popular Front elections" in February of 1936 and the military uprising of 18 July in that year. This was like a dramatic prelude to the civil war which foretold the continuation of political violence as a constant on a large scale. We believe that not only on the battle fronts, but in the rear guard areas too, tragic records of violence were surpassed.²

The Franco regime had to deal with terrorist manifestations from the very first.³ The underground, made up of the remains of the units defeated in the Civil War and individuals who returned from France, took a long time to be eradicated, and not only the Civil Guard, but also the army itself, had to be used against it.^{3b} Later, although it lacked any special virulence, due to the rigor of the repressive measures, terrorism never disappeared entirely, as the persistence of special legislation to penalize this type of crimes demonstrates.

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It is not our purpose here to undertake the history of terrorism during the Franco regime. It suffices to note that after some efforts to invade via the Pyrenees or the Cantabrian region in 1944-1946 by anti-Franco troops who on occasion eliminated some thousands of men, a certain stabilization was achieved in this area. Sporadically there were terrorist attacks, almost always perpetrated by anarchists, and clandestine armed groups occasionally clashed with police or Civil Guard forces. What the republicans in exile called the "resistance" has been long drawn out in time. As late as January of 1960, the famous anarchist Francisco Sabater, heading a commando unit which came from France, clashed with the Civil Guard in the Banolas (Gerona) zone. Four anarchists and a lieutenant from Benemerita were killed there. Sabater, who was wounded, escaped, but he was found the following day and killed. That same year the Iberian Revolutionary Liberation Directorate (DRIL) appeared and carried out various activities involving the placement of bombs. In March, a bomb exploded in the Madrid town hall, and another exploded in the hands of a terrorist, who was killed. In June, several typical terrorist attacks designed to sow terror among the population occurred, with the explosion of artifacts in railroad stations or trains. A young woman died in San Sebastian from the wounds caused by a bomb which exploded in the station.

In 1961, a year later, the ETA terrorist organization was to make its appearance. Although it was founded in 1959, as we will see later on, it did not begin "armed struggle" until 1961. Its first act was the placement of a bomb on a railroad line on 18 July, the main holiday of the Franco regime. The bomb was discovered shortly before the scheduled passage of a train carrying veterans bound for a ceremony to be held in San Sebastian. On that same day and in that same city the national flags were burned. Thus emerged what was to become the most dangerous terrorist organization in our country, that which was to cause Spanish government leaders the most worry, that which would prove most difficult to eliminate, and finally, that which would come to be the most serious challenge to the democracy which would be inaugurated 14 years later.

But Franco's state was speedy and harsh in its response. In connection with those criminal attempts, a number of persons were arrested, 23 of them being tried in a drumhead court-martial at which they were sentenced to 5 to 10 years imprisonment, except for 2 of the defendants, who received sentences of 15 and 20 years, respectively.

The placement of bombs continued to occur in the years which followed. In 1962 a number of anarchists belonging to the Libertarian Youth Movement were arrested on charges of placing explosive artifacts. At the court-martial, the prosecutor asked for the death penalty for one of them, Jorge Conill. This trial gave rise to a wave of protests abroad and some much publicized petitions for clemency, such as that made by Cardinal Montini, then archbishop of Milan, who was to be the future Pope Paul VI. The anarchist Conill was sentenced to 30 years in prison, and the other outlaws were given lesser penalties. Simultaneously, another court-martial was held in Madrid, and the defendants, charged with terrorist deeds, were sentenced to prison terms. In all, in only 2 months, five courts-martial were held, involving mainly anarchists.

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At about that same time (29 September 1962), the Spanish vice consul in Milan, Mr Isu Elias, was kidnaped. His kidnapers, young anarchists, also asked for clemency for the defendants in the court-martial. Two or three days later, the consular representative was freed. This was the first kidnaping carried out by terrorists in connection with Spain. The kidnapers were arrested and their trial in Varese had all the characteristics of a trial of the Spanish regime.

This series of events, so closely interrelated, developed the awareness of Spaniards concerning the problem of terrorism, perhaps for the first time. It must be remembered, however, that the strict press censorship which existed filtered information and commentaries such as to show exclusively the version and the approach serving the government's interests. In these circumstances, the regime made use once again of the idea of internal conspiracy, indicating that the terrorists who placed the bombs had received training in a presumed terrorist school located in Toulouse, said to be located 40 rue Point. The bulletin which the Basque Press Office in Paris put out denied the existence of any such school, although it said: "There are hard-line factions among the exiles, especially in the CNT [National Confederation of Labor], and the terrorist outrages committed in Spain cannot be denied. But there is no proof," it added, "that they are not isolated actions or actions by isolated groups."

To judge from the newspaper reports, it was also at the end of 1962 that another of the protagonists in terrorist action made its appearance: the plastic bomb, which had played such an important role in the Algerian war as a terrorist weapon of the FLN [National Liberation Front] and, later, the OAS [Secret Army Organization]. Between 2 and 5 December, plastic bombs exploded in the residence of the military governor of San Sebastian, in the Valencia Palace of Justice, the Royal Currency Comptroller's Office in Madrid and the Spanish consulate in Amsterdam. The fact that these explosions were simultaneous (two more artifacts had exploded in Lisbon) led the ABC to conclude that "the terrorists are marching to the same beat and are synchronizing their offensive actions."

Terrorism at the End of the Franco Era

The final years of the Franco era were already marked by the existence of terrorism, and specifically ETA terrorism. The Basque organization, to the historical development of which we will refer later on, had already overcome its initial hesitation and had clearly opted for "armed struggle." In June of 1964 the ETA published a pamphlet bearing the title "The Rebellion in Basque Territory." The governing concept of this outline was that against the repression of the Franco regime, there was no other option. Consistent with the ideas set forth by Federico Krutwig in "Vasconia" (The Basque Land), a book to which we will also refer later, the ETA adopted a "third world" line which had as its axis a "revolutionary war" viewed as "a complex of actions of all kinds (political, social, economic, psychological, armed, etc) oriented toward the defeat of the established regime in the country and its replacement by another regime, order or system."⁴

The turning point would have to be placed in 1968, a year which was so important in the political and social development of the whole Western world. As has been so often said, that year produced a crisis in revolutionary utopianism

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which had inspired such hopes throughout the decade of the sixties. The events of May 1968 in Paris marked both the zenith and the beginning of the end of the hopes of those who aspired to overcome the limitations of the consumer society denounced by Marcuse. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies in August of that same year marked the end, on the one hand, of the illusion of a "communism with a human face" embodied by Cubcek and his famous "Prague springtime." In the limited field of terrorism, 1968 was also a key year. In that year, in typical terrorist actions, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King were assassinated; the extremist Palestinian leader Habash sent a commando unit to Rome, where they hijacked an aircraft, thus "exporting" their terrorism to Europe for the first time; the terrorist Carlos, who was to become famous, began his "studies" at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow; the first IRA contingent began training in a Palestinian camp; the Japanese Red Army began its activities; a Frenchwoman traveled to Guatemala using the false name Isabelle Chaumet, and shortly afterward the U.S. ambassador was assassinated. Also in 1968, the thesis of "world guerrilla warfare" developed by Che Guevara and Debray failed in Latin America and the "urban guerrilla warfare" of the Tupamaros and the Montoneros began. Finally, the ETA committed its first two assassinations in 1968: the victims were the civil guard Jose Pardines Arcay (7 June) and police commissioner Meliton Manzananas (2 August).

In Spain, 1968 was a typical year of "developmentalism." Tourism and the remittances of emigrants led to substantial reductions in the balance of payments deficit, and foreign trade increased by very considerable percentages. It was announced that a nuclear plant would be built in Lemoniz, Biscay, with an annual production of 7 million kilowatts. At the end of the year, the total reserves in gold and foreign exchange reached \$1,151,500,000 and, according to National Statistics Institute figures, national income was up 4.4 percent and the cost of living had gone up by 2.93 percent.

However, there was a harsh political counterpart to this picture of prosperity. Those who had naively thought that the constitution approved by a referendum in December 1966 marked the beginning of a liberalizing and even democratizing stage had had to yield to the evidence. Carrero Blanco, the man who enjoyed the confidence of the already aged Franco, was the key figure in this situation. Persecution of all political opposition intensified and the Court of Public Order worked tirelessly. The press was under rigid controls, despite the fact that the 1966 "Fraga law" had created the possibility of freedom of expression previously unimaginable. Seizures of publications became more frequent, an Official Secrets Law was approved and the daily newspaper MADRID--which was at that time the standard bearer of "liberalization," as the effort to get the regime to move forward in a more open and democratizing direction was called--was shut down for 4 months.

Terrorism put in an appearance against this background. And it can be said that since then, it has constituted a basic element in political life. Since that time also, the actions of the ETA, which prior to that time was a practically unknown organization, became something usual. Its struggle against the forces of law and order continued, and the speed with which it rallied from the blows dealt it and the arrest of its members proceeded to create a certain mythical aura about this organization. Many democrats saw in ETA terrorism the most gallant way of opposing a dictatorship which was proving itself

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increasingly incapable of evolving. The care seemingly taken by the members of the ETA to ensure that their attacks affected only representatives of the "repressive" bodies of the regime created an attitude favorable to it in certain sectors of the population, and not Basques alone. Their violence was forgiven because it was directed only against the representatives of the dictatorship. A legend similar to that of the traditional "good guy bandits" was almost woven about the ETA. Thus a dangerous step was taken, because with democracy already established, the campaign against ETA terrorism was to encounter serious problems of a psychological nature. The ETA terrorists who had experience tacit and almost overt approval during the long final stage of the Franco regime seemed not to understand why they were suddenly condemned, since they had not changed and were continuing to do the same things as before. The democrats, non-Basque Spaniards in particular, who had more or less openly approved of the ETA actions, believed that once the Franco era was over, there was no longer any justification for any form of violence. But the ETA saw things in another way, because its campaign against Franco was only incidental, since its primary goal was to combat "Spanish domination." The official magazine of the organization, ZUTIK (September 1964), said the following: "The struggle against Franco was pursued as if there had been no Spanish oppression of the Basque territory. We are combating Spanish oppression in the Basque Country as if there had been no Franco."

Although during 1968 various attacks were carried out by the ETA and there were some clashes between the terrorists in this organization and the forces of law and order, the most important, both in terms of the political and news impact it had and in terms of its later repercussions, was the assassination of Inspector Manzananas. On 2 August in that year of 1968, the chief inspector of the San Sebastian Political Social Police Brigade, Don Meliton Manzananas, was shot and killed as he was entering his home. The inspector's wife, who was just then opening the door, struggled with the assassin, who managed to flee, and whom she was to identify later, during the Burgos trial, as Francisco Javier Izco de la Iglesia.

A few days later, on 5 August, the state authorities promulgated a decree law declaring a state of emergency in the province of Guipuzcoa, "in order to avoid recurring violations of public order and deeds of a criminal nature." The state of emergency was declared for 3 months, but at the end of October it was extended for 3 more. On 24 January 1969 a state of emergency, also for 3 months, was established for the whole of Spain, in view of the "minority but systematically directed activities designed to disturb the peace of Spain and public order therein...clearly related to an international strategy which has spread to numerous countries."

The state of emergency was then extended in Guipuzcoa until, on 22 March 1969, it was raised for the whole of the national territory. Based on the emergency measures involving the suspension of certain rights guaranteed by the Spanish code of law and, specifically, the possibility of extended detention of persons arrested, the police made a number of arrests and this, moreover, continued after the state of emergency was lifted.

The harshness of the repression was such that the city council of San Sebastian itself (in the hands, obviously, of individuals supporting the Franco regime)

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agreed on 27 November to send a written appeal signed by the mayor and all of the council members "to the higher authorities" asking for mitigation of the status of the citizens of San Sebastian being held because of the state of emergency. A broad sector of the Basque clergy supported the cause of those suffering reprisals and a group of Bilbao priests, ignoring the appeals of Monsignor Gurpide, the bishop of the diocese, who supported the regime in power, locked themselves in the seat of the bishopate. On the other hand, a few days later, the bishop of San Sebastian, Monsignor Bereciartua, ordered that a document denouncing the abuses committed by the civil authorities in connection with the state of emergency and describing them as violations of the Concordat be read in all the churches of the diocese. That same prelate refused to authorize 66 priests in his diocese to appear before the court of public order. Elsewhere, incidents developed in certain Biscay localities in view of the refusal of a parish priest to allow the display of the national flag in the church, despite the exhortations of the bishop, the pro-Franco Monsignor Gurpide, who died on 18 November. As of that date, a group of 40 priests had already been locked in the Derio seminary for 12 days in protest against the pastoral line of the bishop.

The above events reveal the profound links between a substantial portion of the Basque clergy and Basque nationalism. The problem was not a new one, because the theocratic and clerical nature given to his doctrine by Sabino Arana, the father of Basque nationalism, is well known. This explains the confessional nature of the early PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and the large number of priests and others with a religious calling in its ranks. It is true that the ETA was to abandon this clerical aspect, but despite everything, priests, monks and former seminarians are numerous in its membership.

The Burgos Trial

The Burgos trial, which continued throughout almost all of the month of December 1970, was another great landmark in the history of terrorism in the final phase of the Franco era. Its tremendous national and international repercussions contributed decisively to this mythicization of the ETA to which we referred above. From many points of view, what was being judged there was not 16 ETA activists, but the Franco regime. No one viewed the defendants as separatists fighting against Spain, but rather as heroic fighters against the brutal dictatorship which, after torturing them cruelly, subjected them to a farcical court-martial.⁵

Among those tried in Burgos were two priests, a fact which gave rise, still in the month of November, to a polemic between the authorities who wanted the trial held behind closed doors, in accordance with the Concordat, and the defendants and their sympathizers who wanted it public. This also was the pretext for a joint pastoral letter from the bishop of San Sebastian, Monsignor Argaya, and the apostolic administrator of the Bilbao diocese, Monsignor Cirarda, in which, after justifying a public trial "to avoid prejudice to the other lay defendants," reiterated their desire to have the trial held in the regular court, and asking in advance for the commutation of any possible death sentences and condemning "any kind of violence--structural, subversive or repressive." This pastoral letter provoked a harsh response from the minister of justice, Mr Oriol. Distant as it is, one cannot help but see in this document an early

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precedent for the joint pastoral letter published by the Basque bishops in 1981. On 26 November of that year, 1970, ABC said: "Sadly, disconsolately, we regret that we cannot recall appeals similar to those which are the reason for this commentary when the taxi driver, the police inspector and the traffic policeman died, all of them very certainly baptized and members of the church in the two dioceses where the document was signed."

A few days prior to the beginning of the trial, scheduled for 2 December 1970, 19 members of the opposition who had met to draft a letter of protest were arrested in Madrid. In response to this, 100 lawyers took over a hall in the Madrid Palace of Justice, which they refused to leave until those arrested were released. The universities of Madrid and Barcelona decided to join in the strike, and, again in Madrid, 500 women tried to demonstrate, carrying a placard bearing the inscription "long live the young Basque patriots." The agitation continued during the following days with demonstrations and strikes in various cities. There was also a demonstration in Paris.

On the very eve of the trial, it was learned that ETA members had abducted (the press at that time called it kidnaping) the honorary consul of Germany in San Sebastian, Mr Beihl. LE MONDE concluded that this action was designed to block death penalties, but "activist circles in the province of Guipuzcoa" reiterated that the purpose of the kidnaping was "to point up the irreducible nature of the battle and to inform international opinion, believed to have previously been insufficiently informed, of the profound reasons underlying their cause."

It is not our intention here to describe the development of the court-martial which began on 3 December to the accompaniment of great tension and which was plagued by incidents involving members of the court, the accused and their defenders. The protest movements in the Basque provinces and elsewhere in the national territory increased as the trial went on. The Spanish Episcopal Conference held in Madrid sent a note to the government asking for clemency for the defendants. Another state of emergency in the province of Guipuzcoa was declared by the government on the 4th of the month for a 3-month period.

The culminating moment in the trial occurred on 9 December, when in the course of the interrogation of defendant Mario Onaindia, he claimed status as a prisoner of war and invoked the application of the Geneva Convention. He shouted "Gora Euskadi Askatuta," which was echoed by the other defendants, who then broke into the Basque anthem, "Eusko Gudariak." Two of the members of the council unsheathed their swords, and in the midst of a tremendous disturbance, the president ordered the defendants removed from the courtroom. The defendants then turned to their lawyers and rejected their defense. The president also ordered the audience cleared from the courtroom, and the council continued its proceedings behind closed doors.

The council suspended public hearings from 10 to 27 December, but the agitation and protests did not die away. A movement which was international in scope was spreading to large and smaller cities in Europe and elsewhere in the world where Basque colonies were to be found, for example in Argentina and Venezuela. On 14 December, the government suspended article 17 of the Spanish Code of Law for 6 months for the whole of the national territory.

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This was a state of "mini-emergency" which made it possible to hold those arrested beyond the 72-hour limit.

On 18 December, a huge demonstration was held in Oriente Square in Madrid in support of the regime and against terrorism. Similar gatherings were held in other cities. This reaction on the part of the sectors supporting the Franco regime did not suffice to conceal the discrepancies to be found among its various "political families." The Falangists, who had been ousted from the government in October of the preceding year (1969) following the so-called Matesa affair, profited from the opportunity to voice their criticisms of the technocratic sector of Opus Day, which controlled the key posts. Carrero Blanco, the patron of this faction, did not escape the attacks of the critics who demonstrated within the sphere of the Spanish Cortes itself. Prince Juan Carlos, who had been declared the "rightful successor to the king" in July of 1969, was also the target of the anger of those who saw no other solution to the situation but a return to the source and a harder line. In the army itself indications of unease could be detected, since many of the military, in addition to complaining of the lack of authority they saw in the Burgos trial and in the other events which had occurred, felt bothered by the "dirty work" which had been entrusted to the army by the courts-martial.

On Christmas Day, Consul Beihl was released "without asking absolutely anything in exchange, as Telesforo Monzon, president of the Anai-Artea, a society to aid Basque refugees with headquarters in San Juan de Luz and close affiliation with the ETA, made a point of stressing. The kidnap victim himself attributed his release to "humanitarian reasons," and the ETA published a statement in which it said that its purposes in kidnaping the consul had been "to save the lives of our compatriots who are defendants in the Burgos trial" and "to see that the whole world knows of the existence of our people and our indestructible desire to fight for its full liberation, national independence, reunification of the Basque north and south and establishment of a modern, democratic and socialist Basque nation. They said that "we have sought to demonstrate, to our people first of all, and then to the whole world, that the ETA is not an irresponsible, fanatic or bloodthirsty gang the main pleasure of which is killing anyone falling into its hands, whether or not a direct opponent of our cause." There could be no doubt that these goals had been achieved and that the kidnaping, like the whole of the Burgos trial, had as its result an impressive propaganda and psychological victory for the terrorist organization. In later years, even after the establishment of democracy, the ETA was to derive enormous profit from the Burgos trial. The most notable aspect of this triumph is that it occurred at a time when the ETA had for all practical purposes been dismantled, not only by the repressive actions of the Franco regime, but as we will see farther on, due to its own internal dissension as well. The Burgos trial thus became something like a phenomenal oxygen tank which saved the life of an almost moribund ETA. Paradoxically, the Franco regime became against its will the great savior of the terrorist organization.

The last incident in the trial began when the sentencing was pronounced on the afternoon of 28 December. The sentences even exceeded what the prosecutor had asked. Six of the defendants were sentenced to death, three of them with two death sentences each. An atmosphere of great tension continued for the following 2 days and incidents occurred. Various European and Western Hemisphere

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governments and the Vatican urged clemency. Colleges of lawyers and other Spanish institutions added their voices to these appeals. Even the conservative archbishop of Barcelona, Monsignor Marcelo Gonzalez, sent a telegram to the chief of state asking for "a generous and Christian pardon." On the 30th of the month, after the pertinent meeting of the council of ministers, Franco exercised his right to grant clemency, commuting the death sentences "to less harsh penalties," i.e., long-term imprisonment. The sympathizers with the regime saw this as a proof of his strength. The sectors close to the ETA and international public opinion saw Franco's clemency as a triumph won "thanks to the activity of the people's masses...an international mobilization," as a French weekly which often served as a spokesman for the ETA stated. It should not be forgotten that up until that time, the ETA had only committed three assassinations: the traffic policeman Pardines, Inspector Manzananas and the taxi driver Monasterio, killed in January of 1969. The ETA was, then, far from bathed in the blood of the subsequent years.

We have analyzed the Burgos trial in some detail because it was not only an important landmark in the development of the last years of the Franco regime, but also the dividing line marking the beginning of what we might call the "adulthood" of the ETA, and as we said before, its greatest propaganda success and its real ticket to salvation. Thanks to the Burgos trial, the ETA gained a certain respectability which was to prove very advantageous to it in the years to come. Many misunderstandings which developed in the early days of democracy with regard to the ETA and even certain government decisions which later proved erroneous had their roots, their reason for being and their explanation in the Burgos trial. It would be no exaggeration to term that even an authentic triumph for terrorism. In it the ETA found itself legitimized and was given a kind of letters of marque for continuing its "armed actions," the organizational slang for its terrorist activities.

The Burgos trial was also of importance because it was the first time that the Spanish state revealed that it had become aware of the terrorist phenomenon, and specifically, of the meaning and importance of the ETA. The Burgos trial indictment contains what we believe was the first official definition of the ETA: "For more than 15 years, the secret ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna, or Free Basque Fatherland) organization, a clandestine group of a separatist-terrorist-communist sort, has been operating in the provinces of Biscay, Guipuzcoa, Navarre and Alava. By means of its armed groups, surreptitiously established in urban and rural centers, it has held a multitude of illegal meetings and unlawful demonstrations, distributing subversive propaganda and placing inscriptions on walls and engaging in thefts of weapons and explosives, armed attacks--nine in the course of these last 3 years, assassinations--three in number, the placement and activation of explosive artifacts--in 46 officially recorded instances, also in the course of these last few years, all with a view to altering the domestic order, public safety, social peace and national unity, attacking the prestige of the government, our institutions and authorities and effecting reprisals of a political-social nature. In these activities, carried out most assertively between the spring of 1968 and the month of May 1969, the defendants present in the courtroom have played the following role...."

The final judgment also described the ETA as an "illegal and clandestine organization seeking to disturb the domestic public order, discredit the Spanish

nation and its basic historic institutions, effect the violent destruction of the state organization and dismember a part of the national territory through subversive actions of various sorts, terrorism, armed struggle and social revolution....As methods of implementing this separatist revolutionary program, the ETA has been using all of the modern procedures of subversive warfare...."

The authorities of the Franco regime realized with concern that the terrorism with which they had to deal was no longer made up of sporadic actions by isolated individuals or those belonging to ill-structured organizations. Note that reference was made to "modern procedures" and to "subversive warfare."

The same concern and identical terminology can be seen in the speech which the No 2 man in the regime, Admiral Carrero Blanco, delivered to the Spanish Cortes on 21 December, in the midst of the tension caused by the Burgos trial. The main part of his speech dealt with subversive warfare. "The Western world," Carrero said, "is becoming the victim of the progressive escalation of the subversive action of communism, which affects us to an even greater extent if we remember its defeat on our soil in 1939." Within the framework of this activity, "communism recruits gangs of merciless, paid mercenaries who engage in sabotage, crime, piracy in the air and the kidnaping of diplomatic representatives. And the frequent pretext for all of these criminal activities," he went on, "is often, in a tragic paradox, a demand for freedom." Farther on, he spoke of the ETA, "which beneath its apparent political affiliation with Basque separatism, conceals the reality of its real function as a terrorist agent in the service of communism." Those who saw the hand of the Soviet KGB behind all of the terrorist demonstrations 10 years later were not to differ very much from this view expressed by the power behind the throne and strongman of the Franco regime.

The Origins of the ETA

But what is the ETA? How did it originate? What were its initial goals? How did it develop?

In the introduction to an interesting recent book on the early days of the ETA (Gurutz Jauregui Bereciartu, "The Ideology and Political Strategy of the ETA: An Analysis of Its Development Between 1959 and 1968," 21st Century Publishing House, Madrid, 1981), the author, after expressing the view that the ETA "is one of the phenomena provoking the greatest concern and interest not only within the scope of the Spanish state, but even, although to a lesser extent, beyond our frontiers," says that this is "one of the least known aspects of the recent history of the Franco and post-Franco eras." In fact, the very clandestine and the illegal nature of this organization has been the reason that cliches and ignorance concerning the ETA have been more abundant than has responsible information. This is the reason for the importance of books such as that mentioned above, which we will follow for the basic purpose of tracing the main lines in the development of the ETA in these early years.^{5b}

Basque nationalism, nurtured basically by the PNV, had entered into a weakened period when, with the crisis experienced by the Franco regime at the end of World War II dealt with, the various ideological sectors which had opposed Franco from exile realized that the Western allies would never go beyond mere verbalism in opposition to the dictatorship.

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Despite this disordered situation, some organizations survived and others were established. One of these was the youth organization of the PNV, the Eusko Gaztedi (EGI), which began to operate in the Basque territory of Spain beginning in 1952. In that same year, another group, the EKIN, made up of young university students who decided to hold weekly meetings on Basque issues, was established. The EKIN established a relationship with the EGI, i.e., with the PNV, which helped it in its activities, and the two organizations merged in 1956. A disciplinary problem in 1958 was to lead to the schism of a group made up of the former EKIN faction and some former members of the EGI. In 1959 this group created a new organization, the ETA, which did not, however, break entirely with the PNV.

The ETA, in this first stage, was basically engaged in information work, offering short courses and publishing pamphlets and leaflets. Its program coincided with the traditional nationalism of Sabino Arana, although it rejected confessionalism and adopted a more nondenominational approach apparently derived from the Basque Nationalist Action group. Despite everything, the religious influence, references to pontifical doctrine and a certain mysticism clearly rooted in the beliefs of Sabino Arana are perceptible in its early texts. It is not difficult to find here the influence of the training of many of the members of the ETA in religious institutions, and more concretely, the weight of the Jesuit alma mater in Deusto. This provided the basis for the saying which developed to the effect that "the ETA was born in the sacristy." We have also referred above to the number of priests and monks in its ranks. This entire problem can be placed within the framework of the link, also previously mentioned, between broad sectors of the Basque clergy and nationalism. This early ETA showed absolute unawareness of the problems of the workers, and within it, the same primary anticommunism which has always characterized Basque nationalism could be perceived in it. In these early formulations, there was however already present the ideal of absolute independence for the Basque nation, although autonomy was accepted as a possible first step. The ETA in fact was the incarnation of the line of intransigent nationalism, opposed to intervention in "Spanish" politics and hypothetical alliances with non-Basque forces, represented previously by the Aberri and Jagi-Jagi groups.

Beginning with the first ETA attack on 18 July 1961, to which we have already referred, that organization moved ever farther apart from the other Basque political forces and in particular from the PNV, whose leaders, Leizaola above all, were harshly criticized. At about that time, "the references to armed struggle began," but as Jauregui says, "this was seen as a very distant possibility...because the number of its members was still very small, and the majority of them were better prepared for giving lectures than striking physical blows."⁶

In May of 1962, the ETA held its first assembly, at which some principles were set forth, serving as its first complete self-definition. The ETA defined itself as the "revolutionary Basque national liberation movement created in the patriotic resistance." We cannot go into an analysis of its ideology here, nor into the foundation established for Basque nationalism, which was moving ever farther away from the nationalism of Sabino Arana, but without entirely breaking with it. Along with the absence of confessionalism mentioned above, it should be stressed that the role attributed by Sabino Arana to race was attributed by the ETA to the ethnic group, a more flexible concept. In this

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and other respects the ETA owed a great deal to the previously mentioned book by Federico Krutwig entitled "The Basque Land--A Dialectical Study of a Nationality." This work was published in Argentina in 1963 under the pseudonym F. Sarrailh de Ihartza, often cited in quotations of it. It should be noted that Krutwig (born in Guecho in 1921 of a German father and a mother who was born in Biscay, but who came of an old Venetian family) was not at that time a member of the organization, despite which his work "was to become the true ideological framework of the ETA for a number of years," as Jauregui states.⁷ In another place this author says that "The Basque Lands" served as a real tool of deliverance for the undisciplined and disoriented ETA of 1963.⁸

Immediately after the first assembly, a discussion began within the ETA about violence. Against those who, taking their inspiration from Gandhi, urged non-violent resistance, Julen K. Madariaga, one of the founders, in charge of the sixth, or military, branch, adopted an attitude in favor of violence. There was, however, no final decision, and Madariaga returned to the attack early in 1963, profiting from the arrests of ETA militants which occurred in October 1962. In an article published in issue No 17 of ZUTIK, entitled "Dialogue or Violence," he said that "we Basques have not ourselves chosen violence: it has been imposed on us," and he went on to say that the Basque country was in a state of war against Spain and France "which will not end until the last inch of our national territory has been liberated."

As we have already said elsewhere, a pamphlet entitled "Rebellion in the Basque Territory," which marked a change in the attitude of the ETA and its decision in favor of armed struggle, was published in June of 1964. The most serious terrorist problem in modern Spain was about to come into being. This pamphlet, the true bible of the ETA activist, described the ideal activist as "impossible to follow or catch, slippery as an eel in water, moving like a butterfly in space (sudden and unexpected shifts to the left and right, to the north and south) and fast as a hungry tiger." And it even provided combat instructions with meticulous precision:

"The march toward our objective is begun at dusk, and our forces approach it in small groups and by different paths.

"The best hour for attack is usually midnight (12 or 1 o'clock) when the enemy is sleeping. Darkness is our best friend.

"After the attack, we have the entire night to move speedily away from the zone in which it took place.

"We can attack with great cries paralyzing the enemy with fear, or in absolute silence, like cats, as the case dictates.

"It is necessary to advance silently, without speaking, without smoking and without light."

As another historian of the ETA said,⁹ "these instructions had that same imaginary and unreal character in the specific conditions of the Basque territory, from the geographic as well as the geopolitical, military, social or economic points of view."

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Kurtwig, in his book, also provided arguments in favor of armed struggle, and his influence on the ETA was to be decisive. "The Basque people," he wrote, "not only have a right to rise up in arms to oppose denationalization by Spain and France, but have a moral duty to oppose the dehumanization carried out by the oppressor state. It is an obligation for every son of the Basque nation to oppose denationalization, even though revolution, terrorism and war must be employed to do so."¹⁰ Kurtwig quoted not only Clausewitz, the great theoretician of modern warfare, but also the theoreticians of revolutionary warfare, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh and the professionals in counter guerrilla tactics such as the French Colonel Trinquier. Kurtwig leaned toward urban rather than rural guerrilla tactics, since the Basque territory is heavily industrialized, and he pointed out some of the objectives on which guerrilla action should focus, such as communications, electric lines, the administrative facilities of the oppressing power, the courts and the executive bodies of the civilian or military authority.

Kurtwig already accepted the principle of spiraling violence, in other words, "the response in every case to any enemy action should be a stronger counter-measure, in order to force him to accept our will." This gave rise to the theory of action-repression-action which the ETA has retained throughout its whole history.

The second assembly was held in 1963 but was of no importance, because it brought about no change in the ideological structure. Nor was the third assembly (1964), held as Garmendia says "under the hegemony of the old guard," decisive, although it did produce the institutionalization of "los liberados" and the pamphlet "Rebellion in the Basque Country" to which we just referred was officially approved. It was also in this period (mid-1964) that the definitive break with the PNV came about, with rejection of its "bourgeois nationalism," since "the Basque bourgeoisie is incapable of achieving the aspirations of the Basque people" (ZUTIK, No 21). "And in asking that the oppressive mental dictatorship cease in the Basque territory, we are asking for the disappearance of all of these capitalist myths and fetishes which have developed in our fatherland through bourgeois domination" (ZUTIK, No 23). In other issues of ZUTIK in that period, more or less similar texts are found, showing the development of the "socialist nationalism or nationalist socialism" which was to become the clearest definition of the ETA.

At the beginning of 1965, a Navarrese terrorist organization called Irache, which the preceding December had attacked the Pamplona Monument to the Fallen, merged with the ETA. That same year the fourth assembly was held, a very important one because although "it did not immediately produce any break, it nonetheless contained implicit within it the germ of later schisms."¹¹ At that assembly also, one of the most important ETA documents, the "Letter to the Intellectuals," was approved, as well as the famous theory, basic to its terrorist activity, of the spiral. It was necessary to wait, however, until 1968-69 before this theory was deepened. It was Zalvide, one of the most important leaders of that era, who published his work "Toward a Basque Revolutionary Strategy" in IRAULTZA, under the pseudonym K. de Zumbeltz.

The decisions of the fourth assembly, and especially the "Letter to the Intellectuals," faithfully reflected the balance of forces existing in the

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organization, Jauregui says,¹² revealed specifically in two dominant lines, the Third World faction, whose main representative was Zalbide, and the labor faction, represented by Iturrioz. A third trend, the ethnolinguistic, had Alvarez Emparanza, better known by the pseudonym Txillardegi, as its most typical exponent.

Shortly after the fourth assembly ended, the executive committee decided to initiate a series of armed actions for the purpose of collecting funds. Before launching into this activity, a statement, published in issue No 32 of ZUTIK, was addressed to the Basque people, explaining the need to undertake what in the ETA slang was called "the confiscation of the means necessary for the revolutionary struggle. It is curious that since the ETA was not certain that its followers would understand these procedures, which represented an important step in the conversion of the ETA into a simple terrorist organization, it reasoned out this move carefully, because as Garmendia writes, "this decision presumed that the doubt as to whether the people were prepared to understand and undertake armed actions could be eliminated." The first attack took place on 24 September 1965, when a collector for the Bank of San Sebastian was intercepted in Vergara.

A few days later, as a result of the police action undertaken because of this robbery, Zalbide was arrested. Other leaders were therefore forced to go into exile, among them Escubi, one of the most outstanding individuals in the leading cadres. The result of this was that Francisco (Patxi) Iturrioz remained in charge of the political office. A group which was to place its imprint, typically prolabor and hardly nationalist at all, on the subsequent issues of ZUTIK, formed around him. During this period the organization moved closer to the Union of Basque Socialists, or Eusko Sozialisten Batasuna (ESPA), the Basque section of the People's Liberation Front (FLP), commonly known as "Felipe," as well as the Workers Commissions. This sector, as Garmendia himself says, "began to draft the general lines of what was called the new revolutionary socialist strategy." This same author goes on to say: "There was much talk about the fact that it (the line) was 'eliminating' the national effort, by basing the whole of the policy on the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat."

This faction, which was promptly labeled "pro-Spanish," and "liquidationist," by the discontented militants, who called its members "Felipes," only accepted "the use of limited violence as a consciousness-raising factor and a demonstration of force to the established authorities." On the other hand, "unlimited violence (that directed toward the destruction of human life) is only justified in the first phase of the armed rebellion." It was insisted, moreover, that "this violence does not alienate or polarize the organization, and is one activity among many."

The reaction of the nationalist sectors to this "pro-Spanish deviation" was not long in coming, and it was to be Txillardegi who led this movement opposing the theses of the political office, which was headed by Iturrioz. From Brussels, where he was living in exile, Txillardegi sent the executive committee three reports (26 November 1965, 19 December and 6 March 1966). In these reports, the leader of the ethnolinguistic faction, which had joined with Krutwig's Third World group, harshly criticized the Iturrioz line reflected in the issues

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(beginning with No 35, and Nos 40 through 44 in particular) of ZUTIK. In Txillardegui's view, "our national liberation struggle cannot in any case be presented as a struggle for purely social emancipation." Instead of the class front suggested by Iturrioz, Txillardegui proposed a national front, calling for the expulsion of the pro-Spanish faction who had made the ETA into a "northern communist organization." To counteract the influence of ZUTIK, the ethnolinguistic and Third World factions launched a new magazine called BRANKA (Prow), in the pages of which the battle against the political office headed by Iturrioz and the proworker faction was continued. Many militants, such as Escubi, who returned secretly from exile, and the Echevarrieta brothers, joined in this battle against the political office. It ended with the expulsion of Iturrioz and his "pro-Spanish" supporters.

The fifth assembly, certainly the most important in the development of the ETA, held its first session in December of 1966 to ratify the expulsion of the members of the labor faction after the reading of a report entitled "Analysis and Criticism of the Social-Chauvinist Pro-Spanish Deviation."

Iturrioz and the others expelled established a group called ETA Berri (New ETA) and continued to public ZUTIK, such that from then until August 1969 there were two magazines called ZUTIK. At that same time, the ETA Berri took the name Kommunistak, and some years later it joined the Communist Movement of Spain.

This important schism confirmed Garmendia's statement to the effect that in the ETA crises, "it was the group which urged and put into practice armed action which in the end gained control of the organization."¹³

Until the second session of the fifth assembly was held (March 1967), new tension developed, now between the ethnolinguistic and Third World factions. Once the common enemy had been defeated, the two factions vied for hegemony. Victory was clearly won by the Third World supporters of revolutionary nationalism and revolutionary war. Although they were not expelled, Txillardegui, Benito del Valle and Javier Imaz submitted a document in April of 1967 announcing their decision to leave the organization. In this way, after the holding of the second session of the fifth assembly, "the Third World group became the legitimate heir of the ETA," as Jauregui says. The ethnolinguistic faction, now outside the ETA, rallied around the magazine BRANKA and was therefore to be called the Branka Group. Like Garmendia, Jauregui too says that "the victory of the nationalist wing within the ETA, and within that group, the faction supporting armed struggle, represented a development which from that time on was to become a constant in each and every one of the successive crises which would occur within the movement."¹⁴

At the fifth assembly, the ETA decided to organize itself in terms of four fronts: political, economic, military and cultural. Kurtwig had defined two different types of guerrilla warfare, with three or four fronts, depending on whether or not a cultural front was included. The need or lack of it for a cultural front depended on whether the struggle sought national liberation, in addition to social liberation, or had only the latter as its goal. In three-front guerrilla warfare, the military would be subordinate to the political, but in four-front guerrilla warfare, the cultural front would be supreme. It goes without saying that in Kurtwig's view, the Basque situation demanded four fronts.

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The fifth assembly also approved the principle of the action-repression spiral, which moreover would be immediately put into practice, since as we have seen, the terrorist action began on a regular basis in 1967, and was to come to the foreground of public attention in 1968, the year in which the ETA committed the first assassinations. It was in that year also that the state action against ETA terrorism began, with a court-martial at which Inaki Sarasketa was given a long prison sentence (15 June), but the commander in chief of the Sixth Military Region (Burgos), which includes the Basque territory, disagreed with the verdict, and a new court-martial (28 June) sentenced him to death. "An intensive popular mobilization developed," Jauregui writes, "and appeals were made to states and political and trade union forces abroad. Under this pressure," he goes on to say, "the chief of state found himself forced to grant a pardon."

Shortly afterward, as we know, the assassination of Inspector Manzananas occurred (2 August). The action-repression-action spiral began to operate. Throughout 1968, the activities of the state against the ETA produced 434 arrests, 189 prison sentences, 75 deportations and 38 banishments. Torture also began to become a regular method of repression used by the Franco regime. When the time came for the Burgos trial (December 1970), the ETA was to be practically dismantled. But that trial was to win the organization real recognition and to constitute the culminating moment of its prestige, as we have already said.

But even earlier, another important internal event occurred, the outcome of which proved to be another schism. Early in 1970, after a period of internal peace following the fifth assembly, there could be distinguished at least four factions in the ETA. First of all, there was the new leadership, unrecognized by a number of sectors in the organization, which wanted to make of the ETA a party of the workers class which would be the leader of the Basque revolution. One of the first decisions of this new provisional leadership was to halt all armed activity or that related to activism. Secondly, mention must be made of the so-called Red Cells, also pursuing a very prolabor line and the product, in large part, of the study groups formed in exile (Paris, Louvain, Brussels) "in the leftist intellectual environment following May 1968,"^{14b} and concerned with the application of Marxism to the Basque problem. This group did not view armed struggle sympathetically either. A third group was made up of the supporters of the colonialist theses (Krutwig, Madariaga, Beltza), who were also divided internally. Finally, in fourth place, there were the "milis," whose best known leaders were Madariaga and Juan Jose Echave. This group, which supported radical nationalism, did not recognize the leadership as such and "waged war on its own account."

To these four groups, Jauregui adds that there were the Branka Group, "ideologically aligned with the 'milis,' and acting as the guerrilla force defending Basque purism, with Txillardegi as its most notable leader, and the Anai-Artea association, devoted to aid to Basque refugees, headed by Telesforo Monzon, and with views very similar to those of the Branka Group."¹⁵

The sixth assembly was scheduled by the leadership for the summer of 1970. By a majority vote, and at the urging of the Red Cells, the "milis" were expelled. They and the colonialists challenged the validity of that sixth assembly, and thus a schism came about, resulting in an ETA-Fifth Assembly, known as the ETA-V, and ETA-Sixth Assembly, or ETA-VI, which insisted that the assembly

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in dispute was valid. Thus the ETA had come to one of its most critical moments, but as Jauregui writes in discussing the Burgos trial, "the Franco regime was to come, involuntarily, of course, to the aid of the ETA."

The ETA-V was to be the "legitimate" ETA which succeeded in merging with the EGI Batasuna organization, made up of an important sector of the PNW youth, which was to give it new impetus. There was a certain adoption of labor programs, and with regard to activism, some kidnappings of industrialists, such as Zabala (1972) and Huarte (1973), were carried out.

The ETA-VI, for its part, began its independent life in an internal atmosphere of intense polemics as well, in search of its own identity. In this internal debate, the partisans of Trotskyism won out, with the result that this organization joined the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR). For some time, the organization called itself the ETA-VI-LCR. But later it was called simply LKI. The "minority" groups in the ETA-VI ended up by joining the ORT [Revolutionary Organization of Workers] or the Basque Communist Party. Thus the ETA was the quarry which produced a number of cadres for various workers parties. These individuals, in their personal development or the collective development of the groups of which they were members, when faced with the nationalist-socialist choice, opted clearly for the latter. We have already seen that the "armed struggle" element also played a basic role: In the dilemma opposing armed action to mass action, the workers faction always inclined toward the latter, while the nationalists chose the former. It is not difficult to see a confirmation here of the aggressive nature which nationalism always has. The great nationalist movements have usually led to imperialism, while those of a minor nature have not infrequently led to terrorism.

From the Assassination of Carrero Blanco to the Correo Street Attack

The ETA-V, or simply ETA, as it has come to be called, continued to have serious problems in cohesion. Txikia, one of the key leaders at that time, succeeded in keeping the organization united thanks to his leadership capacity. When he died in a clash with the police forces in Algorta (19 April 1973), the struggle between the two sectors in the organization, the military front and the workers front, broke out once again. The debate was not between armed struggle or mass action as such, but on the subject of the proper means and times for the former. The sixth assembly was held in the midst of this atmosphere of tension (since the validity of the other sixth assembly, held in 1970, was not recognized). The crisis was obvious and a split seemed inevitable. However, before the umpteenth schism occurred, the ETA was to carry out one of its most important deeds, and one of those which had the greatest influence on Spanish politics. We are referring to the assassination of the prime minister, Admiral Carrero Blanco, on 20 December 1973.

It is not our purpose here to describe how that crime was committed, nor even to analyze its influence on the development of the last months of the Franco regime. The very complete "success" of the spectacular attack which resulted in the death of Carrero, a driver and a police guard gave rise at the very outset to consideration of the hypothesis that the ETA had received some type of aid in carrying out its plan. In this context, the intelligence agencies of the major powers, the CIA and the KGB, appeared on the scene. Some years

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later news reports were still referring to this possibility. No conclusive proof, however, was ever offered.

The ETA, for its part, produced its own version of the attack, code named Operation Ogre. The terrorist organization published a book by that name (Julen Aguirre, "Operation Ogre--How and Why We Executed Carrero Blanco," edited by Mugalde, Ruedo Iberico Publishing House, Paris, Hendaye, 1974).

This terrorist act was without a doubt the most accurate blow struck against the Franco regime by the ETA, since it destroyed the keystone of its continuity after the death of the general, which, in view of his age, could be expected within the next few years. On the other hand, it put an end to the concept of an ETA which was about to disappear, the victim of its own contradictions and police pursuit. The assassination of Carrero Blanco was the first important action carried out by the ETA outside the Basque territory. It had been necessary to establish an entire intelligence system and a minimal infrastructure in a foreign environment in which it was not easy to find sympathy. The ETA members themselves admitted that "the people outside the Basque territory do not generally understand the Basque problem....They are not at all clear about the problem of armed struggle, for example....There is a great inability to see that the Basques are a people and that as such they have a right to their national freedom." On the other hand, "the organization does not extend to the rest of the Spanish state, nor do we have people in Spanish organizations prepared to help us in armed activities."¹⁶

These difficulties made it necessary for the ETA terrorists to engage in lengthy preparations, which began a year before the attack was mounted. Specifically, in December of 1972, a commando unit sent to Madrid began collecting data for the planning of the operation, which in an initial phase was planned as a kidnaping to "get the militants out of the prisons of the Spanish state." According to ETA estimates, there were more than 150 members of the organization being held, although their purpose was to demand the release of all political prisoners.

The ETA was at a crucial point in its opposition to the Franco regime. "The regime does not want more 'Borgos' cases, and it prefers to eliminate the officials of the ETA one by one, rather than capturing them alive and taking them to trial." This was the reason for the importance of the goal and even for the decision to assassinate Carrero Blanco instead of kidnaping him, since "execution in itself also has very clear scope and certain political objectives."¹⁷

The death of Carrero initiated the final stage of the Franco Era, with Arias Navarro heading the government. A few weeks after the assassination, the new prime minister gave an address of a clearly liberal nature to the Cortes. Thus, on the date of that speech, the so-called "spirit of 12 February" was launched. The movement toward liberalization had many ups and downs, and those who had hoped for democratization of the regime were soon disillusioned, particularly when, at the end of October 1974, Minister of Information and Tourism Pio Cabanillas, regarded as one of the most determined defenders of the more open approach, was dismissed. This led to the immediate resignation, out of solidarity with him, of Minister of Finance Barrero de Irimo and many other officials on various levels, all of them known for their liberal inclinations.

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But before this end to hopes of democratization came about, the most important terrorist attack, not only in all of 1974, but at any time in the history of the regime, occurred.

A little before 2:30 on the afternoon of 13 September, an explosive device went off in the Rolando cafeteria located on Correo Street, opposite one of the side doors of the General Directorate of Security. Among those killed were a female government employee, while 13 others were among those wounded. There was no doubt that what had been attempted was to strike a blow against the police. CAMBIO 16 reported that "this incident...was the bloodiest and most spectacular to occur in the country since the end of the Civil War." On the other hand, this was "mass terrorism, traditionally ultraright-wing," the same weekly magazine said, making mention of the bomb which exploded at the Bank of Agriculture in Milan in December of 1969. (In this last incident, which was first attributed to some anarchists, neofascist groups later seemed to be involved. It was the beginning of a series of incidents in Italy in which the so-called "black plots" and "red plots," in other words extreme right-wing groups along with extreme left-wing groups, seemed both to be involved.)

The police attributed responsibility at the outset to the ETA, and specifically to one member, Juan Manuel Galarraga Mendizabal, alias "Zaldivi" or "Pocholo." His photograph was widely publicized, and a million pesetas was offered to anyone providing information leading to his capture. The press reported that this was the first time that a reward of this type had been offered.

Another reason for blaming the ETA was that a notebook found in the possession of ETA member Arruabarrena, alias "El Tanque," who was arrested on 28 August along with another member of the organization, Garmendia, contained a note which read "Rolando 2:15-2:45." This evidence persuaded almost no one, and people saw the attack rather as an act of provocation on the part of the extreme right wing, irritated by the moderate liberalism of the Arias government. It was also so viewed by various French media agencies, such as LE FIGARO, L'AUREOLE and the ORTF [Office of French Radio Broadcasting and Television]. It was also hard for some Spanish periodicals to point to the ETA. They preferred to attribute this deed to the FRAP [Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front], which on Saturday, the 14th, published a statement in Paris denying any connection with the incident. The Madrid chief of police, Federico Quintero, insisted that "everything points to the ETA," although the doubts were not dissipated.

In fact, the Basque terrorist organization had accumulated "prestige" from the Burgos trial and the assassination of Carrero Blanco, and had developed a very favorable image, as a result of which the ETA terrorism was regarded as "selective," having as its target specific persons in the police apparatus or the state administration, but incapable of an act of "mass terrorism" lacking discrimination as to the victims. "The ETA has broken out of its pattern, destroyed its image in the eyes of the people. It has committed an atrocity," wrote CAMBIO 16. And the head of the political-social brigade himself, Jose Sainz, who until a short time before than had been commander in chief of the police in the Basque territory, and was one of those who knew the ETA best, seemed hesitant, saying: "This is the most unfortunate act of any the ETA has carried out, and it speaks very poorly for it." Nonplussed, he added that

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"perhaps this was not ordered by the organization, but by a commando unit." In the eyes of this expert on the ETA, who had said on leaving his post in the Basque country that the police resources for eliminating it were lacking, this incident did not fit with what the ETA had been up to that moment.

In the subsequent days, a large number of individuals were arrested, including Eva Forest, the wife of the writer Alfonso Sastre, who seemed to be the ETA link in Madrid. Another of the persons arrested, Lidia Falcon, who spent several months in jail, as did her husband, Eliseo Bayo, recently wrote a book entitled "Friday the 13th on Correo Street" (Planet Publishing House, Barcelona, 1981) in which she accuses Forest of informing on the others arrested. In the homes of almost all of them, secret compartments of the kind called "people's prisons," some of them very tiny, were found. In some of the houses members of the ETA had been hidden on various occasions, specifically a pair of young people, a Basque-French girl and a young man from Alicante, who according to police investigations seemed to be possible perpetrators of the crime.

Only after some years did it come to be obvious to all that the ETA was responsible for the Correo Street crime. But at that time, the extreme right wing was being accused by democratic circles, and the police were even thought to be involved, since it was known that a few days previously, DGS [General Directorate of Security] officials had been warned to stay away from the Rolando cafeteria. The police explained that this was due to the suspicions aroused by the notation in Arruabarrena's notebook, to which we referred above.

These doubts were still further confirmed when on 29 October the ETA issued a statement denying its participation in the attack, and accusing "ultrafascist cells closely linked with certain policy and political circles in the Spanish state," whose goal they said was "to provoke a crisis within the regime in order to strengthen their internal unity in support of the hardest and most intransigent sectors." It would seem that there was a bitter argument within the ETA concerning the incident, about whether or not to acknowledge authorship of it. Persuaded that it had been a mistake, the members decided to deny responsibility specifically in an attempt to rescue the very positive image they had enjoyed up until then.

However, the internal differences within the ETA led some to think that "the future of this illegal organization is in question."¹⁸ Within the organization, the dominance of the military front, which advocated extremist activism, was evident, while the other groups made different analyses of the situation. Moreover, the continuing police pursuit, which culminated in a number of shootings (three killed and several wounded in the year 1974 alone, and more than 100 arrested within the same period) had "upset and short-circuited some of the elements in the organization, which seem to be disturbed and made nervous by the police harassment."¹⁹

This difficult situation within the ETA led to schism once again. The workers front, irritated by the domination of the so-called "milis," withdrew from the organization, and the majority of its members established the Laugile Abertzale Iraultzailien Alderia, or Revolutionary Party of Patriotic Workers (LAIA).

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The withdrawal of the workers front was consummated at the third meeting of the Biltzar Txikia (BT), or the small assembly of the organization, which was held in June of 1974. When the fourth meeting of the BT was held in October of that same year, the last ETA schism thus far occurred. The majority of the factions in the BT agreed to eliminate the structure based on fronts, establishing instead a separation between political and military activities. In the political sphere, the establishment of a Basque leftist front with a program based on national independence and reunification, a Basque orientation and the establishment of socialism and proletarian internationalism was supposed. In the military sphere (separated at the base but linked with the political sphere at the summit by having the same officials responsible for the various geographic zones), the special commando units (Bereziak) responsible for broad-scale actions were created. This majority sector is that which we know today as the ETA Political and Military Assembly (p-m).

The minority sector did not agree to this plan, and in its statement (Agiria) published in November 1974, it chose to leave political action to other organizations. As a result, it separated and formed the present ETA Military (m).

These two organizations are separate both in terms of strategic guidelines and ideological concepts. While the ETA (p-m) tries to reconcile the mass struggle and the political and military struggle, assigning the workers class a protagonistic role, the ETA (m) limits its role to serving as a clandestine group dedicated exclusively to armed struggle, and it does not participate in the struggle of the workers class, which in its view should be separately organized. In the view of this sector which created the ETA (m), an armed group cannot intervene, without breaking the established rules, in the interplay of bourgeois democracy, the regime it regards as the most probable immediate alternative in Spain. That role should be left to a front made up of patriotic and antioligarchic forces which does not engage in armed struggle.²⁰

The two ETA organizations propose and engage in armed struggle, but while this is the exclusive method for the ETA (m), for the ETA (p-m), although it is a priority method, it is combined with other types of action.

This dual ETA existence was not to change throughout the early years of democracy. The position of the two branches with regard to the various problems which developed--autonomy, statutes, referendum, etc--were to be as different as the political organizations which served in one way or another as their support.

Other Kinds of Terrorism

It is sometimes forgotten that the last years of Franco's regime were marked by the imprint of terrorism. Naturally, this was the era of the Italian Red Brigades, of the Red Army Faction in Germany--an almost worldwide spread of terrorism. It was not without reason that Claire Sterling, in her now classic book "The Terror Network," referred to 1968 as the year in which the universal spread of the phenomenon began.

Terrorism in Spain, on the other hand, was not limited to the ETA. Various groups appeared during the final phase of the Franco regime, both on the left and on the right, some of them destined to continue pursuing their activities under the democratic system.

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Most frequently, leftist terrorism has had an anarchistic connotation. In the 1960's, however, terrorism proceeded to rely on Marxist-Leninist concepts. Within the ETA itself, Marxism-Leninism frequently appeared as an ideology at the end of the 1960's, and at the Burgos trial itself, a number of the defendants declared themselves to be Marxist-Leninists. The curious thing is that the sectors of the ETA which have, one after the other, claimed to be Marxist-Leninists, from the ETA Berri headed by Iturrioz to the founders of the LAIA, have always come into conflict with the nationalist sectors and those advocating armed struggle. Within the ETA, in short, terrorism and Marxism-Leninism have not always coexisted happily.

However, in those final years of the Franco era, we will find some groups which combined Marxism-Leninism and armed struggle, a phrase which as we already know is the euphemistic term given to terrorism both by those who theorize about it and those who practice it.

The remote origins of many of these groups lie in the Sino-Soviet conflict. After the break between the USSR and People's China, schisms and splits occurred in the communist parties of the Western countries, with the emergence of the "Maoist" groups claiming to be adherents of Marxism-Leninism and opposed to the pro-Soviet communists they regard as revisionists.

In Spain, the "national reconciliation" policy initiated by Santiago Carrillo-- which can be interpreted as the first step toward what has come to be called "Eurocommunism"--also provoked rejection on the part of the ultraleftist sectors which on occasion had, at least verbally, urged armed struggle.

One of the groups which regarded itself as Maoist was the Spanish Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), which was formed in 1964. Some years later it decided to organize a "mass front" which would include other related ideological sectors. In January of 1970, a coordination committee was created, and in 1974 the Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front (FRAP) announced its existence. It was made up of a number of Marxist-Leninist groups and others which were not, such as the Spanish Democratic Republican Action (ARDE).

The first armed action of the FRAP was undertaken in Madrid in connection with the unauthorized 1 May 1973 demonstration. A deputy inspector of police, Juan Antonio Fernandez Gutierrez, was attacked by a group of demonstrators, who stabbed him to death. In the days that followed more than 100 persons were arrested and many of them were charged with membership in the FRAP.

In the following months, arrests continued to be made, and on a number of occasions various weapons, as well as propaganda material, were confiscated. In November of the following year, FRAP groups distributed leaflets and threw Molotov cocktails at various locations in Barcelona, to demonstrate their solidarity with the SEAT [Spanish Passenger Car Company, Inc.] workers. A few weeks earlier, the FRAP, as we have already said, had denied any role in the Correo Street crime.

During 1975, the terrorist activity of the FRAP increased. During the summer of that year, it assassinated an armed police agent (Lucio Rodriguez Martin) on Alenza Street (Iberia Computer Center) in Madrid (14 July); a civil guard,

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Casimiro Sanchez, in the Carabanchel neighborhood of Madrid (2 August); and a lieutenant in the Civil Guard named Antonio Pose Rodriguez, in the El Batan neighborhood (16 August). Those presumed responsible for this last assassination, the first involving an officer of the forces of public order, were arrested early in September. During that summer other criminal attacks were made, including two stabbings also attributed to the FRAP, which claimed responsibility for some of the incidents. The police undertook a very intensive campaign against the FRAP, which "seems to have escalated indiscriminate attacks upon the police and, unlike the other armed group operating in the country, the ETA (military front), its actions are neither carefully planned nor do they involve certain individuals in the forces of public order, but instead are directed against any uniformed individual in the service of the Spanish state."²¹

As this quotation shows, the terrorism of the ETA was still in the middle of 1975 regarded as "selective" as compared to that of the FRAP, which was much more crude and elementary when it came to choosing its victims. Soon the ETA (m) would also pursue the line of indiscriminate or "systematic" terrorism, as Quintero, the then commander in chief of police in Madrid, termed it. In a statement made by Quintero to explain the actions undertaken against the FRAP, he spoke of the tremendous importance the mass media had for the terrorist phenomenon, and he said that they could have a multiplying effect, or the opposite, on the goal of dividing the people and the authorities, which, he said, terrorism was seeking to achieve.

In these final months of the Franco era, other organizations of anarchist inspiration made their appearance. One of them was the Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL), which became active in the early months of 1971 and operated above all in Catalonia, engaging in robberies at credit institutions. In September of 1973, its key leaders, including Oriol Sugranyes, who had previously been arrested 2 years earlier, and Puig Antich, were arrested in Barcelona. The latter was sentenced to death by a court-martial and was executed in March of 1974. In the view of the police, the MIL was nothing but an organization of common criminals who used political motives as a cover.

Also, the Armed Struggle Organization (Organitzacio de Lluita Armada--OLLA), formed on the basis of the Solidarity with Puig Antich Committee (Comite de Solidaritat con Puig Antich), had a brief life. This group carried out certain terrorist actions, such as blowing up the monument to the fallen in Mataro, the theft of explosives from the Santa Creu d'Olorde quarry, the theft of wigs in Barcelona, the hold-up of a telegraph office for 2.6 million pesetas, the placement of explosives in various places, and other crimes. The police arrested 10 presumed members of the OLLA, who were tried at a court-martial held in Barcelona in September of 1975.²²

In passing, we have mentioned the Catalan Liberation Front (Front d'Alliberament Catala--FAC), regarded as a kind of Catalan ETA because of its separatist ideology and its use of armed struggle. According to the police, its members committed a total of 41 crimes and subversive actions in 1971 and 1972, and the death of a civil guard was attributed to them.

The same police sources confirmed that the FAC maintained permanent relations with the ETA and the IRA. The FAC ceased to exist in June of 1972.

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Also at about that time, fleeting notice was taken of other organizations, generally of a more or less specifically anarchist nature, which were active from time to time, above all in France. This category includes the Internationalist Revolutionary Action Group (GARI), which operated beginning in 1974 and came to be a kind of liaison committee for other groups of an anarchist sort, such as the Autonomous Internationalist Groups (GAI), the Autonomous Combat Groups (GAC) and the Anarchist Revolutionary Organization (ORA), in all of which the execution of Puig Antich served as a catalyst.

During 1974, the GARI pursued extensive activities in France, including robberies, sabotage of the railroads and communications with Spain in general, attacks upon and robberies of Spanish institutions in France, and most widely publicized of all, the kidnaping of the director of the Paris office of the Bank of Bilbao, Mr Suarez.

Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism

The existence of extreme right-wing terrorist groups under a regime termed fascist as often as that of Franco was may seem paradoxical. The fact is that throughout the lengthy life of the Franco regime there were always sectors which, in the name of a certain doctrinal purity said to have been "betrayed," maintained a critical attitude, one of real opposition. The history of the various Falanges beginning as early as 1937 offers good evidence that there were "those more Francoist than Franco."

When the regime began its long and zigzag process of liberalization, these groups developed and began to make their presence felt. The first extreme right-wing group which undertook the use of violence as a political argument was University Defense, which was created in 1963 on the basis of other small pre-existing groups. This was an effort to slow the domination which leftist sectors were gaining in the universities, and which it had been impossible to halt since the events in 1956. Falangists, Carlists, certain sectors of the Catholic integrist movement and some monarchists joined in the University Defense organization and began to employ the famous "dialectics of fists and pistols" which Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera had urged.²³

The University Defense group disappeared in 1969. According to some reports, what happened then was that a certain Official Intelligence Service took the group under its wing and reorganized it, giving a new name which was also to become famous: the Guerrillas of Christ the King (GCR). This group began its activities in 1969 during the trial of a well-known "leftist" priest, Father Gamo. From then on its activities were constant, being focused above all on attacks against and robberies of bookstores and art galleries regarded as "progressive," the tossing of molotov cocktails or attacks on persons regarded as "red."²⁴ Later it turned to attacks on demonstrations by democratic movements or parties, especially those of the left wing. In addition to its tax upon priests involved in the defense of labor interests, or who provided parish premises for trade union meetings, it also appears that its members carried out actions against churches and centers of non-Catholic religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses.

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The GCR had as its most outstanding leader Mariano Sanchez Covisa, an individual who was constantly involved in the secret activities of the ultraright wing. Sanchez Covisa has denied in statements to the newspapers that the GCR were an organization, properly speaking, representing them as "a group of patriots ready to defend the Spanish tradition against progressive factions." It seems that these activities were also pursued outside Spain, for example in Rome, in October of 1969, in connection with the Assembly of Protesting European Priests, and that this group maintained relations with similar groups in other European countries, with the Triple A in Argentina and extreme right-wing elements in Lebanon.

On 30 March 1973 the Atlantic Bank of Madrid was attacked, and it developed that a number of members of the Association for the Defense of Hispanic Thinking were responsible. This organization had been legally inscribed on the General Register of Associations since the preceding year, and was better known as the Iberian Cross. The director of the association, Fernando Alcazar de Velasco, was convicted and sentenced for this crime.

Shortly afterward, the Friends of Europe Club (CEDADE), also well known in the extreme right-wing sphere, appeared in Madrid, although it had been in legal existence since 30 September 1966. The CEDADE had been active mainly in Barcelona, where its leader, Jorge Mota, lived. It was closely related on the international level with groups of a neo-Nazi nature.

The Trade Union Action Groups (GAS), which engaged mainly in attacks on bookstores, publishing establishments and parish centers, were mainly active in Barcelona as well. The Spanish National Trade Union Party (PENS) also operated in that city, although it carried out one of the most widely publicized actions in Madrid--the attack on the home of the singer Massiel, in August of 1975.

The repertory of the activism of the extreme right wing does not end here, since the list is much longer.²⁶ What was called "white terrorism" by some, and "black terrorism" by others, more accurately consistent with international usage, remained until Franco's death within the limits of threats, beatings and attacks on cultural or religious establishments, just as we have indicated. As of that time there was a hardening and "they began to use truncheons, chains and baseball bats, pistols and knives."²⁷

The history of the international links among the ultraright-wing groups to which we have briefly referred remains to be written. Claire Sterling referred to the Black International, also known as the New European Order, and she includes Francoist elements in it. She discusses the contacts between the European Black International and the Red International through the Palestinians, with whom the Nazis and fascists shared antisemitism.

Claire Sterling says that the First Summit Meeting of the Black International in support of the Palestinians was held in Barcelona on 2 April 1969, and she states that "Franco...gave it his blessing." Farther on, she speaks of the presence of Palestinians in the (training) camps of the Black International in the Spanish Pyrenees.²⁸ It is possible that certain reports which appeared in Spain in 1977, referring to firing practice in that area, have something to do with this. "The Italian press has repeatedly insisted," CAMBIO 16 wrote

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in March of 1977, "on the importance of Barcelona as the center of the black web functioning in Italy and Spain. The majority of the Italian fascists in fact went to Ciudad Condal (Barcelona), where Alberto Royuela, national secretary of the Brotherhood of the Franco Guard, and in particular, Luis Antonio Garcia Rodriguez, a notorious activist tried in Turin in May of 1976 as one of the officials of the Black International, and also a ringleader in the Franco Guard in Barcelona, were the hosts." Farther on there is reference to an estate located in the swampy zone of Camarasa and called "Castell del Remei," where "dangerous firing practice was held," beginning in January of 1976, and it is stated that the civil governor of the province, Luis Mardones, "sent trusted police officials to the site, where they could see how Italians and Spaniards were engaging in daily training with machine guns and hand grenades."²⁹

Some months later, EL PAIS took up the subject again, even providing a map of the area. Reference was made there to an estate, presumably the same as in the earlier report, owned by the then mayor of Camarasa, Jose Ramon Urcola Diez de Unzurum. EL PAIS said that "Camarasa is surrounded by a series of villages...in which a number of extreme right-wing organizations have operated in recent years." Mr Urcola denied to EL PAIS that "groups of young people with extremist ideology stayed at his estate, and said he had never been a sponsor of extreme right-wing action groups."³⁰

It is impossible to discuss the ultrarightists and their violent actions without mention of the New Force, the organization founded by Blas Pinar with the periodical of the same name as its focus. A legal organization, which was converted into a party as soon as possible after the death of Franco, it theoretically had nothing to do with "direct action," but members of it or its youth branch, Young Force, were often arrested for aggressive acts or involvement in altercations of various kinds.

Terrorism in the Last Months of the Franco Era

The Correo Street crime marked the beginning of a period of several months in which terrorism, especially that of the ETA, faded away. The two branches of the organization devoted themselves to organizational tasks and ideological clarification. The ETA (p-m), which came into existence as such in October 1974, held the second session of its sixth assembly in January of 1975. Where armed struggle was concerned, it definitively rejected the Third World program based on the intention and determination to win a military victory over the enemy through a prolonged confrontation. Instead, the choice of a war of attrition was made, in order to force political negotiations the terms of which would be determined by the balance of forces.

Beginning in April 1975, however, the situation with regard to public order became worsened. It is true that since the end of 1974 there had been innumerable labor clashes, such as the famous Navarre Potash strike, and that the ETA was much involved in some of these conflicts, as it was in the activities carried out in December of 1974 to express solidarity with Basque prisoners, almost all of them ETA members, who had begun a hunger strike at the end of November. But terrorism did not become notorious again until the eve of Aberri Eguna, when a policeman named Diaz Linares was assassinated in

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San Sebastian.⁴ This last Aberri Eguna of the Franco era was to have been celebrated in Guernica, but the police prohibited access to that locality. Beginning at that time, the action-repression spiral began again.

On 22 April a policeman, Juan Ramon Moran Gonzalez, was assassinated in Algorta. On 24 April the police arrested an ETA leader, Goiburu, and killed his companion, Gardoqui. On 25 April, the government declared a state of emergency for the provinces of Biscay and Guipuzcoa for 3 months. Beginning then, police repression hardened. According to Letamendia's estimates, some 3,000 persons were processed through the Civil Guard and police stations over a period of 3 months.

The ETA response was to step up the incidents. On 6 May, civil guard Andres Segovia Peralta was assassinated in Guernica, and on 8 May, Inspector Llorente was murdered in Bilbao. According to Letamendia,³¹ "beginning at that moment, repression became a general phenomenon. Innumerable Basques were arrested, beaten and tortured, and the whole of the Basque people became conscious of their identity." In fact, the repressive brutality to which the Guerrillas of Christ the King were subjected had repercussions in the rest of Spain. Among other outrages, they attempted to kidnap Pedro Ibarra Guell, a lawyer who had defended ETA members on various occasions, and who was, specifically, one of the defense attorneys at the Burgos trial. Shortly afterward an attack was made on his office.

At the same time, these uncontrolled ultrarightist commando units carried their action into French territory, where they placed bombs in certain bookstores, such as the Mugalde bookstore in Hendaye and the Nafarrea bookstore in Biarritz, or in homes occupied or connected with Spanish Basque refugees. The Anti-ETA Terrorism Group (ATE), a shadowy organization Letamendia defined as "a body of paid mercenaries, recruited above all in the international underworld and from the colony of Pieds Noirs living in Spain,"³² usually claimed credit for these actions.

The concern about this outbreak of political violence began to be visible. CAMBIO 16, a periodical representing the anti-Franco opposition, wrote: "Various press organs in which the criminal attacks have been condemned--a condemnation shared by all those who want a more democratic, just and free country--have called attention to the looming danger that armed individuals, whatever their affiliation, may take justice into their own hands."³³

In the middle of June, a Civil Guard lieutenant, Domingo Sanchez, was shot and killed in a clash with the ETA. The Augustinian priest Father Erquia was tortured almost to death by the police. A sensation of terror overwhelmed certain sectors of the Basque population, and it is estimated that in the first month the state of emergency was in effect, some 150 young people fled to France out of fear of being arrested or becoming the victims of ultrarightist activities.

The controversial bishop of Bilbao, Monsignor Anoveros, met in Madrid with the apostolic nuncio in Spain, Monsignor Dadaglio, to whom he reported the violence occurring in his diocese, "violence about which I have written for publication on more than 25 occasions, and concerning which I have spoken hundreds of other times."

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But the Franco regime did not want discussion of violence, and on 22 June, the official secrets law went into effect for all information pertaining to the activities of the ETA in Biscay and Guipuzcoa, and the actions carried out by the forces of law and order.

That which was not yet called "the war in the north" continued, however, despite the news blackout. On 5 June, an ETA commando unit failed in its attempt to machine-gun a pair of civil guards who were on duty on a Basque Railroad train traveling between San Sebastian and Bilbao. One of them, Mariano Roman Mayoral, was killed when he fell from the train. He was the 33d member of the forces of law and order to be killed by the ETA or in clashes with commando units of that organization.³⁴

When the state of emergency ended on 25 July, the ETA launched a new phase of its terrorist activity. Until that time its main targets had been members of the forces of law and order, whereas beginning then, the ETA would also assassinate or "execute," in its terminology, civilians, whether holding public office or not, whom they accused of "collaborating with the occupier." Letamendia³⁵ explains it as follows: "During the state of emergency, a handful of informers had become known to the people...Three of them were killed by the ETA: Arguimberri, a council member of the movement and mayor of Itziar-Deva; the taxi driver Exposito in Usurbil; and the guard at the Orbeagozo factory in Hernani, Demetrio Lesmes."

But also, at the end of July, the police were to register one of their most important victories over the ETA, specifically the ETA (p-m). The success was apparently due to police infiltration, which was to be the first and perhaps the only one in its history. On 29 July, after an exchange of fire in Barcelona in which a number of passersby were also wounded, Jose Ignacio Perez Beotegui, alias Wilson, and Juan Paredes Manotas, alias Txiki, both key leaders of the organization, were arrested. The former was accused of having taken part in the attack which cost Carrero Blanco his life.

On the following day, the police clashed in Madrid with another ETA commando unit, resulting in the death of ETA member Jesus Mugica Ayestaran and the arrest of Felix Eguia; alias Papi, and Jose Maria Lara Fernandez. It would seem that this commando unit had the task of organizing the escape of the ETA members being held in the prison in Segovia, of whom there were about 40. The escape was planned for 4 days later, and the escape route through the sewer pipes had not only been perfected, but had also been "tested," since some of the prisoners had emerged and then returned to await the scheduled moment.

But yet other incidents were to occur in that summer characterized by terrorism. On 27 August, the Decree Law on the Prevention of Terrorism was promulgated. The provisions of this law extended the period during which those suspected of terrorism could be held and made house searches easier. On the other hand, the procedural methods were made more flexible, giving them an emergency nature in the ordinary courts and calling for drumhead courts-martial in the military sector. Other norms increased the harshness of the penalties and reiterated the criminal classification of membership in the

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groups defined therein. Special emphasis was placed on certain journalistic practices for which penalties were imposed, including criticism attempting to minimize the responsibility for the deeds listed in the decree law. This was a warning to the mass media, to the legal advisers of press organs as well as the authors of the texts involved.

The following day, 28 August, the court-martial of ETA members Garmendia and Otaegui, charged with the murder of the corporal first class in the Civil Guard and head of the information bureau at the Azpeitia station, Manuel Posadas Zurrón, began in Burgos. The prosecution asked for the death penalty for both, and the tension increased moment by moment in the Basque country. Garmendia's lawyer, Juan Maria Bandres, asked for his acquittal since he showed signs of mental deterioration after a long period of illness due to the head wounds he suffered at the time of his arrest a year earlier. The military doctor himself said he suffered from "personality decline." A few days later, after the court-martial ended, the two defendants were sentenced to death. The military supreme court decided to hear the appeal filed by the defense. Meanwhile, the strikes and street disturbances in the Basque country continued. On 31 August, a number of people were wounded in San Sebastian, and one young man, Jesus Garcia, died. Bombs were also placed and certain establishments were fired upon, the incidents being attributed to the Guerrillas of Christ the King.

Also in the first half of September, two other courts-martial in Madrid and yet another in Barcelona were held. In the Madrid courts-martial, the defendants were three members of the FRAP in one case and five in the other, charged with the murder of a national policeman on 14 July and Civil Guard Lieutenant Antonio Pose Rodriguez on 16 August. In the Barcelona court-martial, the death penalty was also asked for ETA member Paredes Manotas, alias Txiki, charged with the murder of a corporal first class in the armed police in an exchange of gunfire after a robbery on 6 June of that year.

In all, 11 death penalties were awaiting completion of the final court procedures and, specifically, the possibility of a pardon, which the chief of state could decree, on recommendation of the Council of Ministers. This highest government body was to meet on Friday, 26 September.

Meanwhile, there was no interruption in the pursuit of terrorism. On 14 September, armed policeman Juan Ruiz Monoz, the barber for his unit, was assassinated in Barcelona.

Throughout Europe, a very broad movement against the 11 probable executions developed. Petitions for clemency multiplied and Spanish offices and establishments in various countries were the object of attacks and attempted robberies. In the view of CAMBIO 16, this was "one of the most worrisome international situations in recent years," and there was "a climate of greater expectation than during the Burgos trial in 1970." This review noted that "a wave of concern is sweeping over Europe and foreign press organs are devoting pages and pages to the study of the Spanish situation."³⁶

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In addition to the ETA members Garmendia, Otaegui and Parades, alias Txiki, mentioned above, the prosecution in the Madrid courts-martial asked for the death penalty for the eight FRAP members: Blanco Chivite, Fernandez Tovar, Baena Alonso, Canaveras de Gracia, Maria Jesus Dasca Penelas, Ramon Garcia Sanz, Jose Luis Sanchez-Bravo Gallas and Concepcion Tristan Lopez.

Following the court-martial on 26 September, pardon was granted to ETA member Garmendia, because of his deteriorated mental condition, the two women members of the FRAP (Concepcion Tristan and Maria Jesus Dasca), who were, moreover, pregnant, and also FRAP members Blanco Chivite, Fernandez Tovar and Canaveras de Gracia. Six of the 11 sentenced to death were pardoned. But five others remained under death sentence, and after the mandatory Council of Ministers "report," they were executed in the early morning of 27 September: Paredes, alias Txiki, in Barcelona; Otaegui, in Burgos; and Francisco Baena Alonso, Ramon Garcia Sanz and Jose Luis Sanchez-Bravo in the outskirts of Madrid.

The shots fired by the five execution squads had broad international repercussions. Not even during the "siege" in 1946 had the Franco regime had to deal with such wrath in international public opinion. The president of Mexico, Luis Echeverria, asked for UN sanctions against Spain and for its expulsion from that international organization. Fifteen ambassadors from as many European countries were withdrawn from Madrid, anti-Franco demonstrations intensified in many countries, the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon was practically destroyed, and various Spanish establishments in other countries, such as the tourist office in Paris, suffered a fate almost as bad.

The Franco regime reacted to the "foreign interference" with a monstrous demonstration held in Oriente Square. Franco emerged on the main balcony of the Palacio Real to express his thanks for the support and to speak of "amends for the actions of which a number of our Spanish offices and establishments in Europe have been the victims." No one could imagine that only 50 days of life, of which more than 30 would be a long agony, remained for that man.

But on that same day, 1 October 1975, when the Franco regime celebrated its last mass rite, terrorism made its diabolical presence felt again with the murder of three armed policemen in Madrid (Antonio Fernandez, Agustin Gines and Joaquin Alonso) and the serious wounding of another (Miguel Castilla), who died on 8 October. Initially the FRAP was blamed, that terrorist organization being responsible, as we already know, for the recent attacks on members of the forces of law and order in Madrid. But some months later, it was learned that those assassinations represented the baptism of terror for a new organization, the GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group], which along with the ETA was to be one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the transition to and the first years of the democratic regime.

In those last weeks of the Franco era, many other crimes of lesser importance were committed. Toward the end of August, on the 21st, an FRAP commando unit wearing land army uniforms, after taking the guard by surprise, entered the Engineers Electronics Center. They were certainly searching for weapons and, finding none, they left the military premises. The following day, the FRAP also claimed responsibility for the shots fired at a U.S. sailor in the Valencia maritime district.

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In addition to the Guerrillas of Christ the King, other extreme rightist groups such as the GAS, which claimed responsibility for various attacks on Barcelona bookstores, such as Documenta, and newspapers, such as the DIARIO DE BARCELONA, were also active.

Our country was also the scene of activities by foreign terrorist groups. One such was the kidnaping of the Egyptian ambassador, Mahmud Abdel Ghaffar, who was seized on 15 September by members of a Palestinian group in the diplomatic headquarters in the Spanish capital itself. Mediation by the ambassadors of Iraq and Kuwait made possible the uneventful settlement of the incident, which led to an impressive deployment of Spanish police, with the release of the kidnaped diplomat. The Palestinians, as the compromise specified, left Madrid by air.

But if terrorism did not slacken, the police did continue to register notable successes. On 18 September, in a joint operation undertaken simultaneously in Madrid and Barcelona, the ETA (m) was dealt a harsh blow by the death or arrest of its most outstanding members. In Madrid three "safe houses" were located and raided by the police, and the most notorious ETA (m) leader, Mugica Arregui, alias Ezquerria, and three other ETA members, Uzurrunzaga, Gabicagogeascoa and Ibagurren, were arrested. Also, Jose Ramon Martinez Andia, alias Moncho, died, apparently a suicide. Two other ETA hideouts were also raided by the police in Barcelona, resulting in the arrests of three ETA members, Jose Ramon Martinez de la Fuente Inchaurregui, Antonio Gonzalez Terron, alias Gaizka, and Francisco Javier Ruiz de Apodaca, alias Apolonio. The last mentioned was wounded. In the exchange of fire, another ETA member, Antonio Campillo Alcorta, alias Andoni, was killed.

The police successes were not limited to the ETA alone. In the week of 15-21 September, 75 persons were arrested in various Spanish cities. In great part, these were members of the FRAP which was from that time on practically nonfunctional. In the course of this antiterrorist operation, other individuals belonging to extreme leftist organizations, which in some cases showed terrorist inclinations, were also arrested. These organizations included the Catalan Liberation Front (seven arrested) and the Murcia Workers Commando of Revolutionary Action (four arrested), which was Marxist-Leninist in its ideology and, according to the police, had planned to engage in activities of a terrorist nature. But other extremist organizations without any clear penchant for terrorism were also affected by these steps taken pursuant to the Decree Law on the Prevention of Terrorism. This was the case with the Revolutionary Organization of Workers (ORT), the Spanish Labor Party (PTE), the Spanish Libertarian Movement, the Revolutionary Party of Spain and the Communist Movement of Spain (MCE).

October too was a month filled with terrorist activities. On the 5th, a Civil Guard vehicle, a Land Rover returning from the Aranzazu sanctuary, near Onate in Guipuzcoa, was attacked. When it passed a certain point on the road, an explosive charge went off, scattering parts of the vehicle over several hundred meters, killing three guardsmen (Esteban Maldonado Llorente, Juan Moreno Chamarro and Jesus Pascual Martin Lozano) and wounding two others (Corporal Jose Gomez Castillo and Juan Garcia Lorente), who died later. A few hours

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hours afterward, Ignacio Echave, the brother of Juan Jose Echave, one of the historic leaders of the ETA who went into exile in France along with his brother, Joaquin, was assassinated in the bar he owned, the Echavenea Inn, near Mondragon. The fourth brother, Luis, who had left the family bar that night, miraculously managed to escape with his life by hiding in another part of the premises. This incident was attributed to the extreme right-wing organization known as the ATE, to which we have already referred. A war of vengeance, of coups and countercoups, which to last for many years, covering the Basque territory with blood, then began.

The terrorism which had affected Spain in one way or another made itself felt even beyond our frontiers. On 8 October, a Spanish captain, Bartolome Garcia-Plata Valle, who was assigned to the Spanish Embassy in Paris, was the victim of an attack in which he was seriously injured while entering his home in Boulogne-Billancourt, very near the French capital. It was initially thought that the authors of the deed were members of some Spanish terrorist group, but this hypothesis had to be discarded. The Spanish opposition sectors in Paris heartily condemned the attack, "especially since it was committed against a military officer;" the ETA denied any role "because we have never committed nor will we commit attacks in the countries which give asylum to our political refugees. The FRAP also denied any responsibility, and the French police themselves excluded the GARI anarchist groups, which had been for all practical purposes dissolved.

Despite everything, it was evident that the Spanish terrorist groups had their most solid and secure bases outside Spain. The fact that France, and in particular the departments on the Spanish frontier (Pyrenees-Orientales, in particular), provided a sanctuary for the ETA, which maintained its most outstanding ranks and the headquarters of the organization there, was well known.

The FRAP was also firmly established outside of Spain, and specifically, it was said that Geneva was the city where its main headquarters were located. It was believed to be no accident that the former president of the FRAP, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, lived in Switzerland, a country which, moreover, offered all kinds of conveniences for the transfer of the funds which nurtured the coffers of the terrorist organizations. It was also pointed out that Swiss television, in connection with the campaign against the Franco regime in that era, interviewed members of the FRAP and the ETA.

All of these factors led to the suspicion that terrorism had major international connections. The location of the "networks of terror" was still far off, but the people were already wondering, as CAMBIO 16 said, if the "Iberian Peninsula is not currently becoming the testing ground for European urban guerrilla warfare."³⁷

Meanwhile, the ETA continued its terrorist activities, which could no longer be regarded as sporadic, but were systematic and constant.

Not a week passed but that the Basque terrorist organization served up its quota of blood. On 12 October, the taxi driver German Aguirre Izauregui was found dead in Villarreal Alava, near a Civil Guard barracks. On 18 October, a civil guard, Manuel Lopez Trivino, was assassinated in Zarauz as he was returning home for the night.

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The extreme right wing, particularly in Catalonia and the Balears Islands, continued its attacks on newspapers and newsmen. Molotov cocktails were thrown at the premises of the DIARIO DE MALLORCA, and journalists of the Logos agency, CORREO CATALAN and MUNDO DIARIO were threatened. In all cases responsibility seemed to lie with the GAS, which had earlier attacked the DIARIO DE BARCELONA. This newspaper, through its editors, again became the victim of attacks. The GAS made it known that it had a list of professionals in the field of journalism that it intended, through threats and attacks, to prevent from attending to their work for some months.

On 21 October, the final agony of the Franco era began when the chief of state fell ill. Terrorism was also a factor during these dramatic days, but it was above all extreme right-wing terrorism which seemed to be preparing for the long-awaited "Francoism without Franco." During the afternoon and evening of 25 October, a self-styled "death squad" made threatening telephone calls to 21 Catalan leaders in the political and cultural spheres, ordering them to "leave the country within 24 hours of the death of the chief of state." Those first weeks of the term and the last of the Franco era were filled with incidents in the university sector, with incidents perpetrated by the Guerrillas of Christ the King and other extreme right-wing groups at various universities, including those in Zaragoza, Valencia and Seville. Some of these groups identified themselves as "national trade union" or "national revolutionary" organizations. In Galicia, a Galician Regional Committee Against Terrorism made itself known and threatened a number of journalists. Some appeals were also made in the name of the Iberian Cross organization. In Catalonia, "unidentified groups" made a number of attacks on neighborhood associations.

On 5 November, an extreme right-wing commando unit burst into the office of lawyer Jose Manuel Munoz Salvadores, at No 40 Claudio Coello Street, and savagely attacked the people gathered there to hold a political meeting concerning the future of Spain.

The irritation of the extreme right-wing sectors and their aggressive actions were explained by the fact that it was indeed obvious that the future of Spain was about to begin. And that in one way or another, the past, of which the extreme right wing was the emanation and representative force, was coming to an end.

After a prolonged final stage, marked by all kinds of clinical developments which made of Franco's illness the longest news story of that autumn, the aged dictator died in the early morning hours of 20 November. With him, a long chapter in the history of Spain, which had begun with the drama of the Civil War and ended among the outbursts of terrorism, which seemed to augur violent days ahead, came to an end.

As the legislation of the regime provided, the prince of Spain swore allegiance to the constitution before the Cortes on the 22d of the month, and became king, taking the name Juan Carlos I. A broad national clamor demanded freedom and democracy. But it also called for peace. What the young monarch wanted to or could do was in doubt. But from the very first, the fine instinct of the people had confidence in Juan Carlos. Thanks to his definite ability, Spain would be capable of carrying off the historic feat of transition from

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dictatorship to democracy with far fewer incidents than had been feared. But along the complicated path of transition, the most cruel and stubborn enemy of Spanish peace and democracy was to be terrorism. It was to become the story of how the people of Spain learned to live their daily lives with this monster, like Ulysses with Polyphemus.

FOOTNOTES

1. For these questions of a general nature, one can consult Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmidt, "The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World," Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968, and Walter Laquez, "Terrorism," Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1980.
2. The subject of the deaths which can be attributed to the Civil War has been dealt with by Gabriel Jackson in his "The Spanish Republic and the Civil War," Grijalbo Publishing House, Mexico, 1967, p 433 et seq.
3. A summary of the main terrorist activities during the Franco era up until 1962 can be found in the work by Ignacio Fernandez de Castro and Jose Martinez (presentation and compilation), "Spain Today," Ruedo Iberico Publishing House, Paris, 1963.
- 3b. While the book mentioned in the preceding note is an assessment from the "republican in exile" viewpoint, the books by Lt Col Francisco Aguado Sanchez, "The Underground in Spain" (San Martin Publishing House, Madrid, 1975) and "The Underground in Some Documents" (San Martin Publishing House, Madrid, 1976), are of interest from the "pro-Franco-nationalist" point of view.
4. See Gurutz Jauregui Bereciartu, "Ideology and Political Strategy of the ETA (Analysis of Its Development Between 1959 and 1968)," 21st-Century Publishing House, Madrid, 1981. In particular, the chapter devoted to "The Debate on Violence," p 204 et seq, may be of interest.
5. Concerning the Burgos trial, see Kepa Salaberri, SUMARISIMO, 31/69, "The Basque Trial in Burgos," Ruedo Iberico Publishing House, Paris, 1971, and also Gisele Halimi, "The Burgos Trial," Gallimard Publishing House, Paris, 1971.
- 5b. The study of the history and ideological development of the ETA is at any rate much easier now thanks to the publication by the Hordago Publishing House in San Sebastian of "Documents," a work which is "an exhaustive compilation of the publications and internal documents of the ETA organization since its early days." To date 12 volumes have been published, covering the development of the Basque organization up to 1974. The Hordago team, moreover, has written some explanatory notes which contribute to a better interpretation of "Documents." For the purposes of this book, which is absolutely not designed to be a history of the ETA, we have only referred incidentally to "Documents," above all for the purpose of comparing references.

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6. Jauregui, op cit, p 128.
7. Ibid, p 154, note 6.
8. On the subject of Basque nationalism, see Antonio Elorza, "The Ideology of Basque Nationalism (1876-1937)," Haranburu Publishing House, San Sebastian, 1968.
9. Jose Jaria Garmendia, "History of the ETA," Haranburu Publishing House, San Sebastian, 1980, Vol 1, p 115.
10. Quoted in Garmendia, op cit, p 30.
11. Ibid, p 165.
12. Jauregui, op cit, p 295.
13. Garmendia, op cit, p 190.
14. Jauregui, op cit, p 310.
- 14b. The Hordago team described the Red Cells in these terms in the prologue to Vol 9 of "Documents." They add that its organ of expression was the magazine SAIOAK.
15. Ibid, p 469.
16. Julen Aguirre, op cit, p 11.
17. Ibid, pp 20 and 21.
18. CAMBIO 16, No 150, 30 September 1974.
19. Ibid.
20. See Francisco Letamendia (Ortzi), "A Brief History of the Basque Country," Iberico-Iberica Publishing House, 1980, p 328 et seq.
21. CAMBIO 16, No 160, 28 July 1975, p 10.
22. "Terrorism and Justice in Spain," Madrid, 1975, book published by the government but not distributed.
23. See GUADIANA, 10 February 1977, p 22.
24. Among their crimes were the fires at the Alberti and Machado bookstores, in Madrid, Tres i Cuatre in Valencia, and the Theo galleries in Madrid. The also made an attack on the life of a bishop, Monsignor Iniesta, in Madrid.
25. See CAMBIO 16, No 76, 30 April 1973, "The Return of the Nazis, p 11.

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26. See "A Guide to Spanish-Style Extremism," in CUADERNOS PARA EL DIALOGO, 19 February 1977, pp 23-27.
27. See EL SOCIALISTA, 13-19 May 1980, "The Names of the Blue Terrorists," pp 12-14. This same article goes on to say: "In the most recent attacks individuals have been observed carrying submachine guns similar to those used by the army or police force." It also contains a list of "fascist assassinations," the first victim being Arturo Ruiz, on 23 January 1977, with the total coming to 21 as of the date of the article. A report on the attacks on bookstores between 1971 and 1976 is found in CAMBIO 16, No 254, 18 October 1976, p 38.
28. Claire Sterling, "The Terror Network (The Secret War of International Terrorism)," Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Reader's Digest Press, New York, 1981, pp 115-116.
29. CAMBIO 16, No 276, 27 March 1977, "The Sharpshooters," pp 12-15.
30. EL PAIS, 18 October 1977, "Important Fascist Connection in Various Lerida Towns."
31. Letamendia, op cit, p 332.
32. Ibid.
33. CAMBIO 16, No 180, 19 May 1975, p 20.
34. CAMBIO 16, No 184, 16 June 1975, p 18.
35. Letamendia, op cit, p 333.
36. CAMBIO 16, No 199, 29 September 1975, pp 6-7.
37. CAMBIO 16, No 201, 13 October 1975, p 27.

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SPAIN

TERRORISM IN SPAIN--CHAPTER 4

Barcelona EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA in Spanish 1982 pp 145-213

[Text] Chapter IV: The Response

"You do not use a tank to hunt down a field mouse. A cat can do the job better." General Grivas, head of the terrorist organization EOKA, Cyprus, 1956.

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The Major Maneuvers Against Terrorism

In this chapter we are going to discuss the developments in terrorism from the approval of the constitution in December 1978 to the middle months of 1980. Throughout this period terrorism, by spilling blood, became the major factor in public life. The number of terrorist attacks, which had reached a chilling record in 1978, increased even further in 1979, declining slightly afterwards until 1981, when with two or three spectacular attacks the terrorists maintained their high profile even though they were not launching as many assaults. As we pointed out at the close of the previous chapter, it was not until 1981 that we could state that in one way or another terrorism was yielding its dominant role to the coup movement. Together, they were like a pincers against

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democracy, seriously endangering the continuity of the system, which was being subjected to the shocks of the two antidemocratic forces that were enemies of the freedom that the Spanish people were just then trying out.

What could be termed the "objective complicity" of terrorism and the coup movement had been suggested much earlier, however. On the eve of the constitutional referendum, the editorial writer of CAMBIO 16, Juan Tomas de Salas, wrote: "ETA has ceased to be a spearhead in the struggle against the dictatorship and has become a spearhead in bringing back the dictatorship."¹

The government was also perceiving with growing clarity the dangers posed to the stability and continuity of democracy by a terrorism that ranged about as it pleased without being dealt an appropriate response by the police, which had lost the initiative and seemed incapable of developing a minimally effective strategy against an increasingly aggressive terrorism, especially ETA's.²

In early November 1978, General Gutierrez Mellado made public a report that broached "the impact of terrorism on the Armed Forces." This report, which was distributed in all barracks, asserted, voicing an optimism that did not coincide with actual developments for quite some time, that ETA was also in a bind. "In order to halt the democratic avalanche, it must engage in clear-cut, sufficiently intense terrorist efforts. However, if it does so without achieving its objective, it will heighten its isolation to a degree that could mean total failure." These words turned out to be prophetic, because over the 2 long years that followed ETA made the "efforts" that the report spoke of and, by means of the coup, was on the verge of achieving one of its indirect objectives: the establishment of a military dictatorship that would once again lend credibility to its arguments, based on the idea of "national liberation" and the "struggle against the occupation."

The danger posed by terrorism, which had become a destabilizing factor for the democratic system, had been worrying the government for some time. It seemed increasingly necessary to implement a strategy that could, by making use of the required resources, achieve success in the struggle against terrorism.

The first step in these "major maneuvers against terrorism" had been taken during the summer when on 28 June the government approved the decree-law on emergency measures against terrorist activity, which later became a law after debate in the General Cortes. In the previous chapter we discussed this law and Martin Villa's trip to Germany to study how the antiterrorist struggle was organized there. We also talked about the appointment of the famous and controversial "superagent" Conesa as the supreme head of police action against ETA.

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If as we pointed out, Conesa's performance was initially criticized because he seemed to be restricting himself to battling GRAPO, he clearly intensified his activities in the Basque Country during the final 4 months of 1978. About 50 specialized police agents thoroughly familiar with ETA were stationed in the Basque provinces and Navarre, at the disposal of Conesa, who visited the "theater of operations" frequently. These men were under the direct command of Manuel Gomez Sandoval.

One of the tactics that Conesa and his men employed was to methodically examine the much overlooked files from 2 and 3 years back. They systematically monitored and studied the members of the Herri Batasuna coalition, especially the ones who belonged to the illegal parties HASI [Revolutionary People's Socialist party] and LAIA [Basque Workers Revolutionary Party], as well as the members of the pro-amnesty groups. Many of these activists were detained and interrogated, though in many instances no contacts with ETA were uncovered. Thus, much of this activity was inevitably futile, largely because the files were not kept up to date. This was the reason why former members of ETA were interrogated, individuals who had left the terrorist organization long before and were active in other totally legal parties whose stands were far removed from ETA's.

One of the most important arrests was Jose Antonio Torre Altunaga, alias "El Medios," who was regarded as the head of the special action commandos and the right arm "in the interior" of Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, alias "Txomin," who in turn was considered the supreme leader of the ETA (m) armed commands.

When Torre Altunaga was arrested on 15 December, the police found in his possession a large amount of weapons and explosives and 48 million pesetas from the robbery of Altos Hornos de Vizcaya. He was charged by the police with being the organizer of the attack on the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant, which caused two deaths. His arrest provided the police with valuable information, which led to the identification of the commando group that assassinated Judge Mateu and to very important data on other attacks such as the one on Basauri and the slaying of Araluce.

In late 1978 the police made public a message listing the results of its action against ETA from 1 September to 25 December.

Estimates were that at the beginning of this period the two branches of ETA comprised some 70 armed commands, each consisting of 4 or 5 persons, and as many information and support commands.

Forty-six of these commands were broken up, 38 of them "legal" (25 action and 13 information) and 8 illegal, all of them, logically, engaged in the "armed struggle." Of these commands, 30 belonged to ETA (m) and 6 to ETA (p-m), 7 were autonomous commands and 3 belonged to other organizations. Some 200 persons were arrested, 132 of whom were placed in judicial custody before the end of the year. The police message gave a lengthy list of the weapons, explosives and other items that were seized.³

In this connection, Jose Oneto spoke of a "major offensive." "As we know," he wrote, "in addition to requesting information on ETA from President Carter and the counterespionage services of Germany, France and Italy, Suarez has personally pushed the program under which Spanish police agents would take special intensive intelligence and training courses in several European countries. He has also reportedly been a strong supporter of the creation of special Armed Police and Civil Guard brigades, which are reportedly already receiving training on the outskirts of Madrid. All of these programs are designed to effectively combat a terrorism that current government intelligence services are totally incapable of coping with..."⁴

The Struggle for the Statute

Once the constitution was in force, having been signed by the king on 27 December and published in the Official State Gazette on the 29th, the struggle began for the objective that embodied all of the aspirations for home rule among Basques and Catalans. In one way or another, terrorism influenced the process leading up to the Basque Statute.

The first problem was finding out what stand ETA was going to take, or rather, each of its two branches, ETA (m) and ETA (p-m). The Basque pre-autonomy institution, the Basque General Council, published a statement in Vitoria on 18 December in which it "categorically condemned all violence, demanded that the right to life be respected" and offered "to meet with ETA (m) and ETA (p-m) to analyze the political situation, violence and the conditions for normalizing life in the Basque Country, as well as questions relating to law and order."

Once again, then, there arose the issue of negotiations with ETA, which we have already broached and which had so far always failed. There were still many who felt that even proposing talks was useless. The PCE's mouthpiece, MUNDO OBRERO, wrote: "Either serious thought is being given to this possibility, which we would call a major mistake, or else it is a pose so that they can say later: 'See, they're the ones who are unwilling.' If the latter is the case, it will only have been a waste of time, helping to prolong the disarray." It also spoke of "the Basque friend who told us yesterday morning: 'Sure you can negotiate with one ETA, but there will always be another popping up on you with fresh machine-gun fire.'" The response it advocated was "political isolation, the common front of the majority."⁵

Hedging to the point of ambiguity, EL PAIS felt that "the General Council's proposal to meet with ETA is something less than negotiations and something more than a mere exchange of opinions," adding that "contacts with the terrorist organization carry the political risk (other risks are taken for granted) of manipulation by ETA to continue its criminal offensive in a better situation and with an enhanced image." After going on to say that "the government's refusal to negotiate with a group that tries to imitate two basic attributes of State sovereignty (the army and the treasury) is reasonable," it concluded by stating

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that "it would, however, be unwise to reject any path that could increase the chance of a peaceful solution to the Basque conflict, without strengthening ETA's position and without undermining the authority of democratic institutions."⁶

ETA's stand was not clear, and according to reliable sources, there were profound differences of opinion within it. "It is hard to predict," these sources asserted, "whether the approach of halting armed action at least for a while is going to prevail or whether some factions will not abide by such a decision and continue carrying out attacks."⁷

That things were not at all clear in the terrorist organization was confirmed by the continuation of the attacks. On 9 December, ETA (m) killed Vicente Rubio Ereno, a retired member of Franco's Guard. Vitoria industrialist Saturnino Sota Arg aiz and Pasajes (Guipuzcoa) municipal police chief Juan Jimenez Gomez were hit on the 14th, and on the 17th retired Colonel Fernandez Montes was slain in San Sebastian.

On the 19th in Guecho (Vizcaya) ETA (m) killed Joaquin Maria Azaola Martinez, alias "Jokin," a former ETA member who in 1974 had divulged a plan to kidnap Juan Carlos de Borbon, then Prince of Spain.

The so-called "dirty war" against ETA dealt its most telling blow on 21 December in the French town of Anglet. Early that morning, Jose Miguel Benaran Ordenana, alias "Argala" ("El Flaco"), one of ETA (m)'s top leaders, was killed when a bomb planted in his car went off as he turned the ignition key. Argala, who was also regarded as an ideologist of the military branch and open to "political" solutions, had played a major role in "Operation Ogre," which took the life of Carrero Blanco.⁸

A few days later, on 13 January, another major ETA leader, Jose Maria Pagoaga Gallastegui, alias "Peixoto," was also the target of an attack. Seriously wounded, he almost miraculously managed to survive. Peixoto was ETA's "minister" of finance, and it was up to him to collect the so-called "revolutionary tax."

On a strictly political level there were several hopeful signs. The Herri Batasuna coalition, which had been set up in April 1978 by several of the parties that had signed the KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] alternative, organized a demonstration that, among other demands, called for negotiations with the government. This coalition, which eventually acquired legal status even though some of its components (HASI and LAIA) had not, was regarded as ETA (m)'s "political arm." Hence the interest in its positions. The most important piece of information was that in calling for "the start of negotiations with the government," it added "on some of the points in the KAS alternative." This was the first time that this major change had been included, which indicated greater flexibility, because until then the KAS alternative had been presented as a whole.

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For its part, the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], which regarded the statute as the priority objective, took advantage of the police offensive that we have been talking about to stress the need for "political measures" as an indispensable complement to police action. To the PNV "political measures" meant a statute that would not be far removed from the extremist first draft that had just been drawn up and that was beginning to be known as the "Guernica Statute." To get an idea of the nature of this version, we could point out that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] termed it "too nationalistic" and refused to sign the preliminary draft. Surprisingly, the UCD [Democratic Center Union] did accept it.

Many months passed before the text of the draft statute was finally approved by the Constitutional Commission of the Congress of Deputies on 18 July 1978. Throughout this period there was a curious correlation between terrorism and statute negotiations. Every time that a stumbling block arose in the negotiations, a terrorist attack would "remind" the negotiators not to get bogged down. The most striking thing about this strange relationship was that ETA (m) never accepted the statute, unlike ETA (p-m), but with its attacks it contributed to a "terror blackmail" that all nationalists, beginning with the PNV, benefited from.

Carlos Garaicoechea, the chairman of the EBB [Basque Executive Committee], the PNV's top body, declared in December 1978: "The approval of the statute could do away with the ETA problem...but unfortunately I don't know whether it is going to or not. I think that if the statute is unsatisfactory, it could stiffen their stands, or if the Navarre problem is not resolved..." As we can see, there was a not so subtle threat that terrorism would continue if the statute were not "satisfactory." But to whom? To the PNV? To ETA?⁹

The antithesis of this position was argued by CAMBIO 16 editorial writer Juan Tomas de Salas, who wrote shortly thereafter: "There can be no neutral people in this war. The neutral people are the angelic little fellows who say that the response to terrorism must be political measures. Unfortunately, the response to terrorism must be to fight fire with fire [...] Political measures will have absolutely no effect on the terror experts. There is no appropriate policy for this plague; the only cure for this plague is rat killer." After noting how successive political measures (two amnesties, free elections, the constitution, autonomy) had not prevented a continuation of terrorism, he warned about the possibility of a political regression by again underscoring the objective common ground between terrorism and pressures for a coup: "Don't fool yourselves, gentlemen, if democracy does not respond implacably to ETA violence, there are more than enough forces in this country to implacably destroy both democracy and ETA."¹⁰

An awareness was growing of the danger that rampant terrorism posed to the future of democracy and its consolidation. And with good reason, because in late 1978 and early 1979 ETA had given the lie, by spilling blood, to its hypothetical willingness to dialogue or seek political

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solutions. From 27 December to 3 January, a toll of six dead bore witness to ETA's decision to continue its escalating violence.¹¹

A striking development was that as the new year began, ETA was again aiming its provocations at the Armed Forces, in an attempt to trigger a military intervention, as we analyzed in the previous chapter. For example, on 2 January Commander Jose Maria Herrera Hernandez, an aide to the military governor of Guipuzcoa, was slain in San Sebastian. On that same day, Armed Police agent Francisco Berlanga Robles was killed in Pamplona as he was trying to defuse a bomb.

But the early 1979 attack that brought tensions to a peak took place on 3 January and took the life of Maj Gen Constantino Ortin Gil, the military governor of Madrid, who was shot down at the door to his house as he was returning home for lunch.

This slaying confirmed the intelligence gathered by police, which for several days had suspected that an ETA (m) command was in Madrid. ETA thus confirmed its ability to operate in Madrid, which it had already demonstrated in the summer of 1978 when it attacked two other ranking army commanders. Thus, far from its natural bases, ETA (m) possessed an effective intelligence network, which was needed to prepare and carry out this kind of selective attack, a proven logistic capacity and an infrastructure sufficient to perform its mission with perfect precision. The police checkpoints that were set up on routes into Madrid in the wake of the slaying and that would be repeated on many other occasions yielded no tangible results. They served only to highlight a certain degree of citizen cooperation. Little by little Spaniards were beginning to realize that the struggle against terrorism was everyone's business and at least tolerated the nuisance of the checkpoints in good spirits.

Amid the tensions throughout the country because of the latest violence, the interior minister appeared on television on the night of 3 January. In a plodding, far from brilliant speech, Martin Villa spoke an unfortunate sentence that was much criticized: "If we do not do away with ETA, ETA will do away with us." The effect of his speech was very negative in the highly charged atmosphere in Spain at the time. "His words," Jose Miguel de Azaola wrote, "have given the impression that Spain is without a government, and when a country has that feeling, it can be neither confident nor calm, nor can it feel secure."¹²

General Ortin's funeral was capitalized on by the Far Right to provoke incidents at which "Government by the Military!" was shouted. The uneasiness of extremist sectors was visible. The headline of EL ALCAZAR read: "Marxist ETA, Responsible; the Government, to Blame." After stating that General Ortin's slaying "is the last straw," it called for "the ouster of this administration and the establishment of a neutral administration that could right the ship's course and give a minimum of hope to a tormented nation that they are trying to distract by the ploy of ballot boxes and elections."¹³ Let us not forget that on 29 December

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President Suarez went on television to announce his decision to dissolve the Cortes and call general elections to be held on 1 March. Clearly, by calling for a neutral government and belittling elections, EL ALCAZAR was already dreaming about the coup caper of which it would be the leading defender 2 years later. The mouthpiece of the National Confederation of Combatants (the "former" had disappeared a few years before to show their resolutely aggressive determination) said in another editorial the same day: "[The government] must be replaced with the utmost urgency by /another government that can take the emergency measures consistent with an emergency [...]. The problem must be resolved peremptorily by those whose ultimate institutional duty is to defend Spain from the enemies who are attacking and assaulting the State and from those who become de facto collaborators of the enemy by showing that they are incapable of defending the nation whose integrity has been entrusted to them."/ (author's emphasis)

After this clear-cut call for a military uprising and a crackdown on democratic politicians, EL ALCAZAR repeated its appeals, in case it had not made itself clear, by once again demanding "emergency measures that would give back to the State the only resources and means that are effective against terrorism" and by stressing its thinly veiled pleas to the army: "The institutions that have not yet been affected by the political degradation that prevails throughout Spain have a duty to confront an extremely grave situation through the emergency resources that are inherent to them."¹⁴

The blind interrelationship between terrorism and a coup movement could not be expressed better. Like a scavenger hyena, the latter feeds on the blood spilled by the former. The president of the PNV, Carlos Garaicoechea, put it thus: "We can clearly see now that the aim is to force a destabilization of and military action against the Basque Country at all cost."¹⁵ In a lengthy editorial, EL PAIS said, among other things: "But there is indeed a political mind in the ETA leadership, and an extraordinarily capable one too. It is this mind that is fueling the desire to push the Armed Forces into another Operation Galaxia, albeit limited in terms of responsibilities in the Basque Country, or into a lasting 'Ulsterization' of the Basque Country."¹⁶ The next day, referring to General Ortin's funeral, the same paper mentioned "the actions yesterday by a handful of men in uniform, applauded in the street by fascist agitators." Although it pointed out that "what happened yesterday does not reflect the general feeling among officers" and that "the very spirit of the army is bruised the most in its own eyes by actions such as the one we reported on," it concluded by noting the danger that such actions pose: "But the government must, once again, not downplay these worrisome signs of pockets of insubordination, and the military command must act accordingly."^{16bis}

A few days later, on 6 January, came the celebration of the traditional Military Epiphany [Pascua Militar], at which high-ranking Armed Forces delegations were received by the king. In his address, the vice president

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for defense, Lieutenant General Gutierrez Mellado, talked about "the legal privilege, granted by the rest of the citizenry, to use force. But let us remember," he continued, "that the force of the military is delegated, not its own. It is something that we are entrusted with and that we can make use of only in obedience to the desire and will of those who entrusted it, in other words, the rest of the nation, as expressed through the leadership and authority of a legitimate government." This democratic theory of the military was the antithesis of the coup-advocating doctrine that EL ALCAZAR voiced daily.

At the same ceremony, Juan Carlos spoke directly about the incident 48 hours before at General Ortin's funeral, stating: "The spectacle of indiscipline and disrespect prompted by momentary hotheadedness, when one's nerves snap in disregard of the serenity that every member of the military must possess, is frankly disgraceful. A military man, an Armed Forces that has lost discipline cannot be saved. He is no longer a military man, and it is no longer an Armed Forces."

In light of the developments 2 years later, especially the unsuccessful coup of 23 February, from late 1978 on we were witnessing the prelude to a coup d'etat. The problem had been identified and diagnosed, but on the one hand, effective preventive steps were not taken, and on the other, terrorism, the coup plotters' major pretext, did not let up in its efforts to blow everything sky high.

On the early morning of 6 January, Twelfth-day and, as we mentioned, a day of military celebration, ETA killed Civil Guard member Antonio Ramirez Gallardo and his girlfriend Hortensia Gonzalez Ruiz in Beasain (Guipuzcoa). The day before, in Llodio (Alava) ETA had seriously wounded another Civil Guard member, Ciriaco Sanz Garcia, who died 3 days later. On the 8th an ETA command attacked the Civil Guard barracks in Renteria, hurling a Molotov cocktail and letting loose a burst of machine-gun fire. In addition, for several weeks it had been engaged in a new sort of activity: warnings that bombs had been placed along railways in Greater Bilbao. Thus, in the already tense Basque atmosphere, these threats, like the ones also conveyed to numerous schools, helped to create a collective psychosis and to terrorize the populace, the frequent initial aim of terrorist groups.

But ETA was not the only active group. On 9 January GRAPO reappeared, slaying Judge Miguel Cruz Cuenca, the chief justice of Division IV of the Supreme Court, as he was leaving his house in Madrid. It was less than 2 months before that ETA had murdered Judge Mateu in Madrid also. It seemed as if the two terrorist organizations had made the State's major institutions the targets of their criminal activities. The military and the system of justice were being systematically attacked. The resurgence of the odd Marxist-Leninist organization thus forced the police and the government, which had just begun developing a strategy to strike back at terrorism, to open up a new front. To EL PAIS, we were being hit by "the Italian strategy of Spanish terrorism, operating day after

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day with precision and rapidity that are as astonishing as they are cruel. Continuing their escalating campaign of indiscriminate attacks, the terrorists are now striking repeated blows at our institutions. The military and the system of justice are the first victims of this qualitative intensification, and as has been the case in Italy, other components of society will be targets as well unless the government can curb this phenomenon and unless the emotional response of the military is as elemental as the one that we have envisioned."¹⁷

Meanwhile, various political parties and, at times, union and employer organizations continued issuing public denunciations every time a terrorist attack went beyond its regular, evil routine of what someone called "our daily dead person." When the victim was a prominent individual, as in the case of General Ortin or Judge Cruz Cuenca, the papers were filled with summaries of these denunciations, which were almost always identical.

One especially significant denunciation was approved by the Basque General Council after a 2-day session. The document, which was regarded as "courageous" and was felt "would create an opinion trend favorable to the struggle against ETA," specifically referred to "the situation prompted by the recent spiral of terrorist violence by ETA (m)" and asserted that "this declaration is not just another condemnation of terrorism." The document agreed fully with the aforementioned idea that terrorism and pressures for a coup were objectively interrelated, by pointing out "the manifest aim on the part of the perpetrators of violence to trigger a coup d'etat, which would mean the cutting off of the democratic process and the thwarting of the aspirations of the Basque people." The declaration also stressed that "all of this political action must lead to a Statute of Autonomy as the sole framework for the development and consolidation of peaceful coexistence and for the economic recovery and social progress of our people."

Stirred by the insane upswing in terrorism, the PNV gradually took firmer stands. Andoni Monforte, one of the PNV's representatives on the Basque General Council, did not hesitate to assert, for example: "Regrettably, the objectives of the coup forces and ETA (m) are the same, though the motivations are different." He was also opposed to the continually reemerging idea of negotiations, stating that "ETA (m) had rejected dialogue, and thus a solution along these lines seemed impossible."¹⁸

To CAMBIO 16, this stand represented a major shift. "Accused up to now of maintaining an ambiguous posture and of not wanting to break its sentimental ties to ETA, the PNV now seems to be trying to permanently distance itself from the ETA organization."¹⁹

Even more categorical, if that is possible, was the position of Roberto Lerchundi, the secretary general of the Basque Communist Party, who voiced the need to "raise the consciousness of the people" to show that "ETA is not what it says it is, nor does it pursue the objectives

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that it says it does." Lerchundi added: "We must shatter ETA's ties with the Basque people as a whole and remove it from politics in our country."²⁰

In spite of all this, a rejection of terrorism was not a spontaneous, normal position in the Basque Country. In an extremely harsh editorial, EL PAIS asserted that "the indifference with which certain segments of the nationalistic Basque population, in spite of their obvious political differences with ETA, look upon the murders committed by the terrorists, is, in any event, terrifying. But if to this we add that a good many of the rank-and-file nationalists regularly attend church and receive the sacraments, confession included, and that, in striking contrast, they always seem prepared to protest angrily when the victim has several Basque family names, we can only begin to think that this emotional illness is indeed serious and that at least some of its viruses have their origin in racism." The editorial also referred to a document from the bishops of Bilbao and San Sebastian in response to another note from the Interior Board of the Basque General Council asking the Church to take a clear-cut stand on the issue of violence. The bishops denied that their mission could "be reduced to condemnations," inasmuch as they were endeavoring above all "to create convictions, to educate individuals and groups and to change the hearts of men." The bishops therefore asserted that they would rather not "denounce specific acronyms or groups." EL PAIS called on the two bishops "to leave the fantasy kingdom of self-complacency and empty words so that they could confront the concrete problems of the kingdom of this world and pluck up the courage to mention ETA by name." The paper concluded by saying that in order to make "violence impossible, it does not seem as if the best way is for the bishops of Bilbao and San Sebastian [...] to engage in an exercise of moral metamorphosis and join the party that Pontius Pilate founded 2,000 years ago."²¹

ETA's attacks continued to focus on the members of State Security Agencies. On 13 January, two civil guards, Francisco Gomez Jimenez and Miguel Garcia Payo, were killed on the stretch between Azpeitia and Azcoita (Guipuzcoa). On the 15th, another civil guard, Francisco Mota Calvo, was slain in San Sebastian. On the 27th and 30th, respectively, two civilians, Jesus Uleyar Lizeaga, a former mayor of Echarri-Arauz (Naverre), and Anzucla (Guipuzcoa) businessman Jose Artola Goicoechea were murdered. January's tragic toll was rounded out by Felix de Diego Martinez, a retired civil guard who was killed on the 31st in Irun.

The French Front

The role played by France has emerged repeatedly during the lengthy struggle against ETA. The French authorities' tolerance towards the ETA's Basque activist "refugees," which was explained in Franco's day as a form of political exile, had become, once democracy was established in Spain, a resounding political scandal that no arguments could justify. The Spanish Government's irritation occasionally reached the level of indignation over the stubborn hypocrisy that French government leaders

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were displaying. Clearly, without the French "sanctuary" the battle against ETA would have been much easier, but the French hardly moved a finger to rectify this scandalous situation.

Early January 1979 provided an example of this stubbornness, leading to a series of minor incidents. In a bid to resolve the problem, Spanish Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja made an unscheduled trip on 12 January to Paris, where he met for an hour with his French counterpart Jean Francois Poncet. Oreja was carrying a list of 127 presumed ETA members who enjoyed political refugee status in flagrant violation of the Convention on the Refugees Statute, under which individuals responsible for certain types of crimes (against peace, war crimes or crimes against mankind) and the perpetrators of felonies cannot benefit from this status. It also stipulates that refugee status will no longer apply when the circumstances that gave rise to it no longer exist.

At the same time, Marcelino Oreja gave Poncet a dossier specifying the activities that Basque "refugees" were engaged in on French territory. It pointed out how the terrorist organization's staff and its incipient administration had a comfortable base in the department of the Pyrenees-Atlantiques, specifically in a few square kilometer area between Bayonne, Biarritz, Saint Jean de Luz, Hendaye and Guetary.

It was in France, which the ETA people entered and left with great ease, that new members were brought in, ideological instruction given, training in the use of weapons and explosives provided, propaganda distributed, information analyzed [...] etc. As CAMBIO 16 pointed out, the French "sanctuary" was "a permanent center for refuge, retreat and reorganization."²²

In this squabble between France and Spain the semiofficial LE MONDE threw all of its weight behind the French position without making the slightest effort to analyze Spain's arguments. After describing the situation in Spain in the bleakest of tones, referring to the practically en masse insubordination of the Spanish Armed Forces, LE MONDE devoted a third editorial to our country in a little over 2 weeks. It accused Spanish authorities (in connection with the attacks on Argala and Peixoto, who were not expressly mentioned) of "lapsing into the Francoist error of looking beyond the country's borders for a satisfactory response to a tragic situation a political solution to which depends exclusively on the Spanish Government." As far as the French paper was concerned, the solution was not to send more policemen to the Basque Country, but to hasten the home rule process as much as possible. This piece of advice, coming as it did from the semiofficial mouthpiece of a highly centralist country, though not without its own autonomy problems (Corsica, Brittany and the French Basques themselves), was an example of the monumental hypocrisy that LE MONDE has so often wallowed in. At the same time it termed Oreja's talk with Poncet "routine."²³

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To EL PAIS this editorial resulted from "a simplistic analysis of complex issues" in a bid to "relieve the Quai d'Orsay" of "the slightest responsibility for the explosive situation in the Basque Country." The Madrid daily underscored that "the members of ETA [...] looked beyond the border not only for asylum for themselves but also offices for their headquarters, depots for their weapons and banks for their money," and it asserted that "the desire [of the French authorities] to export the entire Basque problem to Spain and not to seek out complications in the so-called 'northern Basque Country' is one of the causes of a highly complex and strongly divisive situation. France's move to let itself off the hook in the Basque affair," it concluded, "is not only far from credible but also and above all, immoral."²⁴

Spaniards were not the only ones who saw the hypocrisy of France's stand. IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA wrote: "It is a fact that if ETA did not have sanctuaries beyond the Pyrenees, it could not operate with such impunity. Oreja is going to remind Paris that the friendship between the two countries cannot be limited to what is written in treaties. A Basque Government in exile still has its headquarters in France [...] What would France and the French people say if Madrid harbored a Breton Government in exile?"²⁵

The attacks on Argala and Peixoto, moreover, served as a pretext for several protest demonstrations in Saint Jean de Luz, which prompted closings of the border and a number of incidents.

As far as the Spanish police were concerned, the fact that ETA's "master-minds" were in France prevented a successful conclusion to the extremely intense struggle that was being waged against the terrorist organization. In the view of Manuel Ballesteros, the Bilbao police chief, the struggle was "at its zenith, at its high point." During the first 50 days of the year, 31 arrests had been made, 3 information commands, several support commands and one armed command had been broken up, and 3 "people's jails" had been uncovered. But the police had been unable to get to the group's leadership, which had taken refuge in France, even though the French Government had temporarily deported several ETA leaders to the town of Valensole in the department of the French Alps.

Second General Elections

February was a month of intense political campaigning, leading up to the general elections scheduled for 1 March.

In a way, the terrorists were running in the elections, because the two Basque "abertzale" [patriotic] coalitions supported, respectively, the views of ETA's two branches. Officially, the organizational ties were lacking, but the platforms were identical. Euskadiko Eskerra (EE) [Basque Left] represented the stands of ETA (p-m), which was completely logical because we know that its main component, EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party], was a product of the Seventh Assembly of ETA (p-m). For its part, Herri Batasuna represented the positions of ETA(m). The famous

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Telesforo Monzon, a former minister of the Basque Government, who was Herri Batasuna's number one congressional candidate from Guipuzcoa, was jailed on charges of "justifying terrorism" in Nanclares de Oca. Many thought that he was being given free campaign propaganda. But could the government let a barefaced, insane defense of violence go unpunished?

In any event, the terrorists did not declare an election truce. ETA continued its killings throughout February,²⁷ including a victim in uniform, in this case a lieutenant colonel, Sergio Burrajo Palacios, in Vitoria. For its part, ETA (p-m) got involved in the labor conflict at the Michelin plant in Vitoria by kidnaping its manager Mr Abaitua on 19 February. Although the union federations initially denounced the kidnaping because "it harmed the interests of the workers," dissent later arose within the Shop Committee. A week later, on the 27th, the PNV, PSOE and PCE issued a joint declaration opposing "the existence of supermen who set themselves up as representatives of the workers." Mr Abaitua was finally freed on 1 March, election day.

His kidnaping was a good example of ETA (p-m)'s tactics of direct and coercive pressure to assert labor grievances. Abaitua, who was regarded as a sympathizer of the PNV, was interrogated to ascertain his involvement in certain employer actions, in the style of the Tupamaros. Photographs of these interrogation sessions, along with several shots of Abaitua in the "people's jail" where he was being held, were sent by ETA(p-m) to the Basque media.²⁸

For its part, ETA (m) stressed in statements to the Paris daily LE MATIN that it was going to continue the struggle, "regardless of the outcome of the elections," but at the same time it asserted that the vote for Herri Batasuna "will give us an idea of how many strong supporters we have." They also emphasized that they did not believe that their actions would trigger a coup by the Far Right and they asserted that they regarded themselves as "an example for the other peoples of Spain."²⁹

But the two branches of ETA were not the only active groups during the election campaign. GRAPO also gave indications that it was alive and well: On 15 February a civil traffic guard was killed in Madrid, and on the 19th another civil guard was slain in Hospitalet (Barcelona).

The Far Right also boasted of its own violence. A few days before the general elections, on 26 February, the secretary general of the Young Red Guard, the youth organization of the Spanish Workers Party (PTE), Pina Lopez Gay, was attacked and injured by a group of extremists. But this was by no means the only thing that the Far Right did during the campaign. Assaults on people putting up posters, Molotov cocktails hurled at the headquarters of leftist parties and many other typical extremist actions caused the UCD, PSOE, PCE and PTE to issue a communique denouncing the National Union (a coalition grouped around New Force) "for the aggressive activities of its members."³⁰

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The election results were in many ways surprising. We are especially interested here in the outcome in the Basque Country, which put the parties of the abertzale Left in a magnificent position. The two coalitions covering this segment of the political spectrum garnered 17 percent of the registered voters in the Basque Country. Herri Batasuna, the political "face" of ÉTA (m), got 137,000 votes, which was much more than expected. EL PAIS acknowledged that "this kind of election result invalidated the de facto assumptions on which several of our assessments of the Basque issue rested. Our repeated assertions that ETA terrorism had less and less grassroots support have now, unfortunately, been proven wrong, and our prediction [...] that radical nationalism could not garner more than 10 percent of the total vote in the four provinces has also been refuted by the facts." To EL PAIS, the results "call for further thought as to the significance of a populist movement and as to the conditions that have prompted not only organized murder but also the social support that it is getting." After stressing its well-known stand of rounding out the required police measures with political steps, which meant that "the Basque Country Autonomy Statute must be taken up on an urgent and priority basis by the new Cortes," it concluded by asserting that "we refuse to acknowledge the possibility that the irrationality, emotionalism and doctrinal rigidity of that movement (Herri Batasuna) could not be rechanneled, for the benefit of democracy and a peaceful solution, by a true system of self-government for the Basque Country."³¹

The outcome of the elections in the Basque Country continued to cause worries in the ensuing days, especially when it was learned that the Herri Batasuna legislators, three deputies (Telesforo Monzon, Pedro Solabarria and Francisco Letamendia) and a senator (Miguel Castells), were prepared to use their status as members of Parliament as a sounding board to "speak out against the situation in the Basque Country, even in international forums such as the International Court of The Hague."

A spokesman for the coalition declared proudly that "we are the most important national liberation movement in Europe and other regions of the world," underscoring that "the Basque Country is, of course, completely unique and has a movement that can in no way be compared with other national revolutionary movements [...] We have here," he concluded, "more revolutionary possibilities than anywhere else in the world."

To others, Herri Batasuna's relative but important and significant victory meant that ETA was going to be in Parliament, no more and no less, even though the coalition's legislators were not going to take their seats in the Spanish Cortes "because we are not Spanish."

The concern was perceptible both in the two major nationwide parties, UCD and PSOE, and in the PNV itself, which felt that "the solutions being sought by Herri Batasuna are not at all realistic and frankly demagogic."³²

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These so-called solutions were simply the KAS demands, which we have discussed in previous chapters and which consisted of a six-point election platform:

- 1) Democratic freedoms, with recognition of the right to self-determination and the legalization of all political parties.³³
- 2) Recognition of the full-fledged sovereignty of the Basque nation and of its territorial integrity (including Navarre) in an autonomy statute.
- 3) Institutionalization of and priority for the Basque language.
- 4) The prompt democratization of local government.
- 5) Improvements in the living conditions of the working class.
- 6) Total amnesty, with the gradual withdrawal of the forces of public order.

The concern of political circles was also reflected in the press, which returned again and again to the issue. Through its editorial writer Juan Tomas de Salas, CAMBIO 16 voiced the view that Herri Batasuna's sole objective was to provoke "a civil war situation in the northern part of the country." It talked about the "sad spectacle of freedom and democracy turned into rubbish by a minority of visionaries" and proposed that "the government's objective in the Basque question should be to isolate the extremist Basque visionaries and to lessen the number of desperate people who have given them their votes out of sheer irritation over what they regard as the extremely slow process of autonomy for the Basque Country. The only way to achieve this is by coming to terms with Basque moderates on a wideranging autonomy."³⁴

EL PAIS kept raising the problem of the "remarkable emergence of Herri Batasuna on the Basque election scene." After pointing out that "the conjecture that a minority of immigrant workers supported one or another factions of the abertzale Left seems plausible" and that "Herri Batasuna benefited greatly from the newly enfranchised 18-year old voters," it stressed "Herri Batasuna's unequivocally populist nature." It also wondered why such a major segment of the electorate supported a coalition "that endorsed the objectives of ETA (m) and regarded its violent methods as justifiable. We have no answer to this question," it conceded, "but we do know that the answers given to this question before 1 March, including the ones voiced by this paper, are inadequate."

EL PAIS gave a positive assessment of the role of moderate nationalism as represented by the PNV, stating: "The hypothesis that the PNV was playing a 'two-faced game' by straddling the fence in order to turn ETA's actions to its own account, is false [...] It erred in its campaign tactics, because its silence and caution did it no good. But it did not engage in double-dealing."

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With regard to the Basque Left, it asserted: "Its reluctance to denounce ETA (m) and its ideological links to ETA (p-m) did not do it much good either." It concluded solemnly: "Something very serious and grave is happening in the Basque Country, something that neither the government nor the opposition have yet succeeded in understanding."³⁵

LA VANGUARDIA felt that the outcome on 1 March "has confirmed a desire for peaceful coexistence," which the Barcelona paper explained thus: "The fact is that public opinion, no doubt deeply pained by the series of crimes perpetrated by the agents of terror, has realized that we are witnessing a struggle by extremist, antidemocratic organizations that cannot be eradicated easily in the near term." With regard to the attacks that occurred right after the election, it stated that "the vote of indignity and bloodstained gangsterism has once again been cast [...] The murderers have reappeared with their deadly onslaught."³⁶

On 6 March, Brig Gen Agustin Munoz Vazquez was murdered in Madrid, and GRAPO claimed responsibility. On the same day, ETA (p-m) stole 1,000 kilograms of "goma-2" from an explosives depot in Pamplona. Two armed commands with submachine guns and pistols carried out the raid after storming the home of the depot guard. At the same time, at the other end of the country, in Ceuta, a bomb went off, wounding 16 persons. The Moroccan Patriotic Front, a group that was unknown before, claimed responsibility. Because of the incident the border with Morocco was closed for several hours.

The terrorists were making themselves felt everywhere, and the successive steps in the process of democratic normalization (such as the 1 March elections) seemed to be of no use in swaying them from their daily mission of hatred and destruction.

This grave situation was not altered by the municipal elections on 3 April, 1 month after the legislative balloting. Although the UCD was victorious (30,214 councilmen versus 12,194 for the PSOE), the municipal vote had to be interpreted as a triumph for the Left, because in provincial capitals and towns with more than 50,000 inhabitants it was the clear winner, especially the PSOE (906 councilmen for the PSOE, 802 for UCD, 422 for the PCE and 74 for CD).

In the Basque Country, the municipal elections confirmed the consolidation of Herri Batasuna, which won 260 council seats. Jose Oneto wrote that "although the abertzale victory that has made Herri Batasuna the arbiter of the Basque political situation has inspired true terror in certain government circles in Madrid, we cannot overlook the positive side of the fact that men who used to be in the underground and have supported an armed struggle now hold positions of responsibility at the local level." The editor of CAMBIO 16 felt that "the very mechanics of politics will force the abertzales to make realistic political proposals that will gradually move them away from ETA's extremist stands."³⁷

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The evolution of events did, in fact, moderate the stands of the Basque Left (85 councilmen) but achieved nothing with Herri Batasuna, whose representatives continued to engage in the most insane radicalism.

Meanwhile, ETA (m) demonstrated with deeds that it still intended to continue the armed struggle. On 9 March in Beasain (Guipuzcoa) it killed Municipal Police Sargeant Miguel Chavarri Isasi, on the 16th Iberduero employee Jose Maria Madoral Olegaga in Bilbao and on the 23rd in Vitoria police inspector Antonio Recio Claver. On 6 April two civilians were slain: Pedro Fernandez Serrano in Pamplona and Juan Diez Roman in Tolosa (Guipuzcoa).

The fear of a terrorism that seemed to be everywhere mounted still further when on 15 March, the police published a lengthy note in which it reported the arrest of the alleged murderers of Catalan industrialist Jose Maria Bulto and Mr and Mrs Viola. The police indicated that the group's creator and ideologue was an old separatist, Josep Batista i Roca, who had died a few months before. He had lived in exile in Great Britain for many years and from the time of the European war had been involved in paramilitary groups working for Catalan independence. The charge leveled at this strange but well-known figure caused an enormous stir in Catalonia, but no one was able to convincingly refute the police version. Their report mentioned the existence of a Catalan People's Army, seen as an attempt to create an ETA in Catalonia. Other reports also mentioned three small groups, People's Alert, Catalonia and Liberty and the Catalan Red Brigades, that were prepared to undertake an "armed struggle" to further separatist nationalism.³⁸ Fortunately, none of these groups gave later evidence of its existence. A little less than 2 years later Terra Lliure appeared, showing signs of activity though not, for the moment, doing any killing.

New Government, Old Problems

Three days before the municipal elections, on 30 March, Suarez was selected as government president, thanks to the votes of Democratic Coalition and the Andalusian Socialist Party, in a heated session in which debate on the program that had been presented was voted down. The makeup of the new government was announced on the 5th. There were no major changes; it was another Suarez administration that had to tackle the same old problems.

One of these problems was the Basque Country, to which, in turn, there were various facets: the statute, replacement of the forces of public order (FOP), terrorism...etc. It was unquestionably the most serious issue facing the government that emerged from the 1 March elections, and it was only very slowly that the administration was able to develop a suitable strategy in the struggle against terrorism.

Martin Villa was replaced as interior minister by a military officer, Gen Antonio Ibanez Freire. The thinking was that the presence of a military man would give the struggle against terrorism the momentum it lacked. But the ensuing months were to prove that the new minister would be a failure, as he made several very unfortunate public appearances.

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In May there was another major personnel change in the battle against terrorism when Conesa, the famous and controversial "superagent," was replaced as the head of the extremely important General Headquarters of Information by Manuel Ballesteros, who until then had been chief of police in Bilbao and a leading expert on ETA, which he had been studying at least since 1974, when he was stationed in San Sebastian. Two years later, Ballesteros became the head of the Single Antiterrorist Command.

The persistence of the same old problems was borne out when on 8 April in Bilbao a demonstration attended by more than 100,000 persons was staged by all the Basque political parties except UCD and AP [Popular Alliance]. Its purpose was to protest not terrorism but, as its banner proclaimed, "Errepresioaren Anorka" (against repression). The specific demands were a return of Basque prisoners to the Basque Country and the withdrawal of the FOP from the Soria jail, where many convicted or alleged ETA members were being held. At the same time, France's half-hearted measures against the "Basque refugees" were protested.

A few hours before this demonstration "against repression," National Police Sargeant Gines Pujante Garcia and National Police First Lieutenants Miguel Orense Villamon and Juan Bautista Peralta Montoya were shot and killed as they were returning to the Loyala barracks in San Sebastian. At the same time, a number of French establishments, such as the consulate in San Sebastian or businesses, were being bombed. This was a way to pressure the French authorities into not agreeing to the extradition of two ETA members, Miguel Goicoechea and Martin Apaolaza, who were to be tried a few days later. As was to be expected, they were not extradited, though they were kept in preventive custody.

The Basques were getting ready for "Aberrri Eguna" (the Day of the Basque Fatherland) on Easter Sunday the 15th. As part of its bloodthirsty preparation, ETA (m) killed Dionisio Imaz Gorostiza, the owner of a small machine shop, on Monday the 9th in Villafranca de Ordizia (Guipuzcoa).

The situation was tremendously confused, and the confusion was reflected in the press, whose analyses ranged from ambiguity to blind lashing out. Such was an editorial in EL PAIS entitled "The Basque Country: Only Negotiations Remain." In it the paper asserted that "frustration is becoming widespread in the Basque Country, where the people feel that they were singled out for punishment by Franco and are misunderstood by the democratic government." After this peculiar diagnosis in which terrorism did not seem to count, EL PAIS placed all the blame on the Madrid government, which "unforgivably kept falling into all of the traps laid for it by ETA terrorism, the equivocation of the PNV and the thunderous shouts from the Far Right, which considers negotiations with Basque political forces synonymous with the crime of treason. It also talked about "the stupidity [of successive Suarez administrations] of trying to arrange secret truces with ETA (m) for specific periods of Spanish politics" and asserted that "Mr Bandres has become a stabilizing

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element, more or less, vis-a-vis the general situation in the Basque Country." After solemnly proclaiming that "as far as the Basque Country is concerned, the time for playing politics has passed, and the opportunity is there for those who would and can make history," it wrote: "Making up for lost time in the Basque Country necessarily hinges on the government's vigorously retaking the initiative, to which the only backdrop is negotiations, but negotiations viewed 'historically' and undertaken without fear [...]. All of this obviously carries a risk, but an even greater risk is entailed in the inhibition, silence and paralysis in which the government is wallowing."³⁹

Aberri Eguna was celebrated in Bilbao with a demonstration attended by some 200,000 persons grouped by political party. They called for "autonomy today" but "independence tomorrow" as well. There were also some shouts of support for ETA, and a national flag was even burned.

Gerardo Gomez Chaos, a Falangist, was murdered on Monday morning in San Sebastian, and the following day a civil guard, Juan Bautista Garcia, was found dead near Ikastellieta (Guipuzcoa).

An incident that took place on 20 April in Madrid prompted a controversy regarding the police methods in the struggle against terrorism. GRAPO leader Juan Carlos Delgado de Codex was killed during a confrontation with police, which apparently had information on his movements. He was well-known to the police, inasmuch as he had been arrested in mid-1976, but "inexplicably," due to an unforgivable mistake by judicial authorities, according to the General Directorate of Security (DGS), he had been granted amnesty and released in 1977. No one understood how he could have lived in the underground, and as an exiled leader of Colombia's M-21 told CAMBIO 16, "it's even harder to believe that he was able to continue engaging in armed struggle, and it was absolutely absurd for them to give him total control of the military apparatus. That's like putting the entire organization in the hands of the police, unless the police was interested in keeping the organization going."

Thus, doubts arose once again in connection with the real nature of GRAPO, whose alleged revolutionary character was not consistent with its actual deeds. The Colombian revolutionary leader mentioned in the paragraph above could not understand, for example, "why a judge with such a democratic track record as Cruz Cuenca [who had voted to legalize the PCE] or a liberal military officer like Gen Agustin Munoz Vazquez had been selected as targets by an armed leftwing organization."⁴⁰

Delgado de Codex's death could only be viewed as the typical elimination of someone who "knew too much," and as a friend of his stated, "there are people who would like to keep a lot of things quiet."

EL PAIS said something similar in its edition of 22 April, the same day that the slain terrorist was buried in a private family ceremony in Segovia. In an editorial entitled "A Man, A Terrorist, A Witness," it cited "the cloudly circumstances" surrounding Delgado de Codex's

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death, which it termed "untimely for the justice system and for the increasingly difficult unraveling of the terrorist networks developed in our country during the years of the political transition." EL PAIS also brought up the question marks regarding GRAPO and stressed that the struggle against terrorism "requires, in contrast to suspect approaches, large amounts of information and public trials to throw some light on who is pulling the strings (or having them pulled) behind the kind of terrorism that GRAPO practices." It concluded by asserting: "Police chief Conesa's men [Conesa was replaced less than a month later] have shot down a terrorist. An enemy of society is dead; so is a valuable witness."⁴¹

But this blow was not fatal to GRAPO. Two days after Delgado de Codex was buried, it announced that it was planning an unprecedented upsurge in violence. At least 15 GRAPO terrorists were at large, which made any precautions impossible. Once again the police had to play "wait and see" without being able to take any precautionary measures except to protect the individuals who were on the "hit lists" found in GRAPO "safe apartments" that had been uncovered and searched in March in Valencia. Nevertheless, in a little over a month, GRAPO was to undertake one of its most famous actions: the bombing at 47 California.

The defenselessness of our democracy was again brought to light when it was learned that one of the individuals implicated in the murders in Atocha, Fernando Lerdo de Tejada, had not returned to Ciudad Real Prison after he was given a pass for Holy Week. The man who had granted the leave, and to an inmate with serious charges pending against him, was Judge Rafael Gomez Chaparro, the former head of Courtroom Number 1 of the Francoist Court of Public Order, who was the presiding judge at the trial in connection with the multiple slaying in Atocha.

Irritation over this barefaced mockery of democratic institutions became even greater when shortly thereafter the magazine BLANCO Y NEGRO published an interview that the fugitive had granted in France to journalist Alfredo Semprun, who claimed "to have found him by chance." The Audiencia Nacional, in conjunction with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, decided to replace Judge Gomez Chaparro as trial judge and even began proceedings against him to ascertain contingent liabilities.⁴²

We should stress here that in spite of the endemic nature of terrorism on the Far Right and the erratic nature of GRAPO terrorism, the number one worry for the government, for political circles and for public opinion was ETA terrorism, because it was systematic and persistent and, above all, because of the social support that it unquestionably continued to enjoy.

There were still many who strongly believed that "political measures" were needed to do away with ETA violence, although in contrast to 1976-1977 and almost all of 1978, more and more people felt that the "political measures" ought to be accompanied by "police measures."

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The political measure par excellence was supposed to be the statute on which home rule for the Basque Country was to be based. The draft statute, the so-called Guernica Statute, was encountering serious difficulties, however, which suggested that its final approval would inevitably be delayed.

As a stopgap measure that would enable the Basques to enjoy real autonomy as soon as possible, a plan emerged in late April to immediately reestablish the 1936 Statute, with the necessary minimum of reworking. The administration had a dossier on this plan that was warmly supported by the minister of territorial administration, Antonio Fontan. It was felt that this move would get the Basque issue out of the dead-end to which it had come. Moreover, this quickening of the pace in dealing with the most serious problem in Spanish politics would enable the king to visit the Basque provinces, which, as we knew, was one of his fondest ambitions. Such a visit could be an opportunity for what CAMBIO 16 called "the Guernica embrace" that would make peace a reality in the Basque Country.⁴³

The return to the former statute was backed by the president of the PNV, Carlos Garaiceochea. "A reestablishment of the 1936 Statute would be much less controversial among the Basque people than the proposed new statute, which contains contradictions...[inasmuch as] the 1936 Statute, as a purely provisional arrangement, could command broader support as a result of the weight of history and all of the fond memories."⁴⁴ Even though, as the PNV leader also said, "the situation is deteriorating fast" and "radicalization is more obvious every day" and many were becoming "convinced that there was no basis for a political solution," the 1936 Statute was never reestablished as planned, and the country had to wait until late July for the new Guernica Statute to overcome the final stumbling blocks.

General Terrorist Offensive

There was a general terrorist offensive from late April 1979 practically to the end of that summer. The two branches of ETA, as well as GRAPO and the Far Right, carried out a series of activities that made these middle months of 1979 one of the most trying periods in the brief history of democratic Spain.

GRAPO immediately launched its announced offensive on 24 April in Esplugas de Llobregat by killing independent Councilman Manuel Florentin Perez, who although not affiliated with any party, was acknowledged as a New Force sympathizer by the party's delegate.

On 28 April, while ETA (m) was slaying Municipal Police officer Pedro Ruiz Rodriguez in Durango (Vizcaya), GRAPO was murdering a national police officer in Barcelona.

The following day, 29 April, a young communist, Andres Garcia, was knifed to death on Goya Street in Madrid by a young man belonging to one of the many Far Right groups that operated with impunity in the

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Madrid district that Nazis and fascists considered a "national zone." A few days later, 17-year old Jose Luis Martinez Merino was arrested and charged with the crime. According to Martinez Merino's statement, the only reason for the slaying was the "brazen look" on the face of the victim, who had seen the young rightwing extremist pound on and destroy a briefcase with a sticker of "Che" Guevara that another student was carrying.

The murderer turned out to be a member of the Youth Front, a group that had split from Young Force, New Force's youth branch. This was a highly radical, national syndicalist group that had been legalized in September 1978. Its 800 members (400 in Madrid and 400 elsewhere in Spain, approximately) were organized on a paramilitary basis and carried out many actions in the ensuing months. Its leader, Juan Ignacio Gonzalez Ramirez, was killed on 12 December 1980 on the doorstep to his home, and the group's activities have waned considerably since then.

This incident showed that terrorism from the Far Right was deadly too, giving the lie to those who thought that the fascist youth were just a bunch of troublemakers.

It was a known fact that the members of these fascist groups could be detected quite easily, as was shown by the prompt arrest of Jose Luis Martinez Merino. What no one could understand was why these individuals were allowed to move around practically without restraints. Government circles felt that these rightwing extremist organizations were the breeding ground for the individuals who in the months to come "would organize armed gangs and begin what could turn out to be a real upsurge in fascist terrorism if action were not taken against them." The same circles called for "the implementation of a plan to prevent a fascist uprising, which threatens [...] the complete consolidation of Spanish democracy."⁴⁵

But the crackdown against the fascists always fell short of the mark. "It's odd. We all know who they are, except those whose duty it is to know," said the humorist "Forges" in his cartoon on page 2 of INFORMACIONES on 2 May. After underscoring the upswing in Far Right terrorism over the past months, the same paper asserted: "The fascist gangs do exist; we can see them wearing their armbands. The fascist gangs enjoy a true dispensation, an immunity 'granted' by precisely the individuals who are supposed to be battling them."⁴⁶

The next step in this springtime upsurge in terrorism was taken by ETA, which on 30 April killed Civil Guard officer Juan Diez Roman in Onate (Guipuzcoa). The following day, it slew another two members of the Guard, Jose Maestre Rodriguez and Antonio Pena Solia, in Villafranca de Ordicia (Guipuzcoa).

A few days later, on 5 May, a well-known ETA leader, Chomin Iturbe, survived an attack on his life in the French city of Bayonne. The Basque-Spanish Battalion was presumably back in action.

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GRAPO once again proved that its announced escalation was for real. On the 8th it attacked and seriously wounded the former director general of security, Rodriguez Roman. Two days later, as the king was opening the legislative session of the Cortes, it attacked a pair of National Police officers, killing one and wounding the other.

A Bloody Week in May

This sort of terrorism, which could almost be termed trivial were it not so tragic [on the 17th ETA (m) killed Antonio Perez Garcia, a bar owner, in Lemona], continued until the last week in May, which marked one of the bloodiest periods in the ongoing terrorism, to the extent that London's DAILY TELEGRAPH wrote that "Spain is facing its most serious times since the Civil War."

This critical week, which could without exaggeration also be called tragic, began like the last week in January 1977, with a plenary session of the Congress of Deputies on "citizen security," a session that would be dealing primarily with terrorism. We should recall that just 6 months before, in November 1978, the Lower Chamber had held another session on terrorism. The fact that the Parliament was putting so much emphasis on this issue bespoke how heavily terrorism weighed on public life in Spain, to the point that it conditioned all other factors. It would not be going too far to speak of a genuine obsession with terrorism.

Furthermore, the dangerous notion that terrorism was unstoppable and invincible was becoming increasingly widespread. No matter what it did, the State seemed powerless to counter it. Neither police nor political measures seemed capable of coping with the forces that by dint of violence were trying to achieve their nonnegotiable objectives.

The session that we mentioned began on the 23rd with a report from the interior minister, Ibanez Freire, reiterating the government's standard views. He placed special emphasis on the need for cooperation from the courts, the citizenry, political parties and associations in general. The government was giving the impression that it was being overwhelmed by terrorist persistence. The measures he proposed, in what was considered a plan of action against terrorism, were threefold: legislative (consisting of amendments to laws relating to terrorist crimes), encouraging citizen cooperation and police operations. The minister, who defined terrorism as "a frontal attack on society in total disregard of the most elementary individual and community rights," felt that unlike common crime, this piercing assault on the social fabric had to be halted through short-term measures.

The representatives of the various parliamentary groups then had the floor. Fraga, the leader of AP, called for a ruthless four-point attack on terrorism: 1) No more revolutionary war in the Basque Country; 2) The country is fed up with those who are promoting or tolerating terrorism from outside Spain; 3) Changes in general legal provisions, rules of

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procedure and prison regulations; and 4) support and funding for the forces protecting society. He talked about "the criminal pressure of ETA, complemented by an intolerable hodge-podge of parallel activities, Pro-Amnesty Advocates, investigations committees, municipal action groups, marches for freedom and political fronts that have wound up in Herri Batasuna." This coalition was the target of particularly harsh attacks by Fraga. "The war against ETA," he said, "is going to be won or lost, like other wars. To win it, we have to take it seriously, and that means using all of the means at our disposal, as Italy is doing right now by resorting to the army itself."

On the other extreme there was the speech by Basque Left Deputy Juan Maria Bandres, who referred to the constitution as "institutional violence against the Basque people." Once again, this was a direct way of legitimizing ETA's political crimes.

This lack of understanding of the problem facing Spanish democracy was also reflected, albeit at a different level, in the address by the spokesman of the PNV, Marcos Vizcaya. He complained that the traditional concept of law and order as order in the streets was still in force and gave a rundown of the violence in the Basque Country in 1978: 92 armed political holdups, 61 attacks by the Far Right and 255 by the Far Left, with a toll of 87 dead and 87 wounded. In patent contradiction to these terrifying statistics, he described "the objective reality in the towns and cities in the Basque Country today" in terms of the following five features: 1) The oppressive presence of police forces, with more than 10,000 agents on the streets "with weapons cocked and ready"; 2) A network of stringent police checkpoints that cause enormous bottlenecks, annoyance and irritation; 3) the psychosis of a country in a state of emergency and occupation, on the one hand, and being used as a testing ground for revolutionary war, on the other. 4) The belief that the situation in which the Basque people find themselves is hopeless as long as the government persists in using police methods exclusively while the revolutionary violence continues; and 5) The radicalization and hardening of the majority segments of the population in view of the absence of real political solutions.

As we can see, the PNV harped on "political measures," meaning "the statute, immediately, with all its consequences," and in fact rejected police action to an extent that seems incredible. Underlying its spokesman's speech is the notion that the "revolutionary" activities are just a response to "police methods" and that, as a result, when the statute is enacted, the revolutionary violence will disappear. The course of events would demonstrate quite soon that the situation was much more complex.⁴⁷

To LA VANGUARDIA, the debate was "a dialogue of the deaf," although it added this qualification: "The responsibility is not only the administration's; it must be shared by the various bodies, as well as by all political forces. Remedying the situation, however, is above all a matter for the State."⁴⁸

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On Friday 25 May, just a few short hours after the aforementioned debate concluded, an attack for which ETA (m) claimed responsibility took place in Madrid and claimed the lives of Lt Gen Luis Gomez Hortiguela, Cols Agustin Laso Corral and Jesus Avalos Gomariz, who were with him in the car, and the driver of the car, Lorenzo Gomez Borrero. News of the slaying caused tension so great that it could be felt in the air.

On the same day in Seville, a police inspector, Damian Seco Fernandez, was killed during a shootout with a GRAPO command. A stray bullet also took the life of young Antonio Civico Mendoza. The terrorists fled but were sighted the following day in Ademuz (Valencia) by police. GRAPO members Maria del Carmen Lopez and Raul Calero were killed in the confrontation, and the other two members of the command were arrested. This took place on Saturday the 26th shortly after noon.

As we mentioned, the slayings of the military officers had an enormous impact. The atmosphere in military circles was described as an "uneasy calm," and several members of a theoretically defunct extremist military organization, the Patriotic Military Union, were placed under discreet surveillance. Furloughs were canceled, and the troops were put on alert.

"Armed Forces Day" was to be celebrated on Sunday the 27th in Seville, the seat of the Second Military Region, and homage was supposed to be paid to the flag in the same city the previous Saturday. ETA (m) and GRAPO had apparently planned a joint operation to provoke the Armed Forces by attacking them in their most sensitive spot and at a time when the entire country had directed its attention to the military. The funeral of the slain officers was held on Saturday the 26th at Army General Headquarters, and as in July of the previous year and January that year, rightwing extremist groups provoked incidents and shouts of "Government to the military!"; "Long live Franco!" and other similar ones were heard.

On that same Saturday, however, the citizenry, whose nerves had already reached the breaking point, was dealt another terrible blow. A little before 1900 hours a bomb went off in the crowded downtown cafeteria at 47 California in Madrid. Leaving a toll of 8 dead and some 50 wounded, the attack prompted disbelief, terror and a feeling of total powerlessness among residents of Madrid. The terrorists seemed to own the country, moving around as they pleased, escaping and hiding out without the police being able to cope with them. Many remembered the words of Minister Ibanez Freire 2 days before in the Cortes: "The forces of public order are more than capable of putting an end to terrorism."

The bombing at 47 California heightened tensions to an unprecedented level. The cafe, located close to the main headquarters of New Force, was quickly surrounded by groups of rightwing extremists shouting slogans like the ones that morning, adding "We want another 36," as well as others denouncing the king. These groups then tried to attack the headquarters of leftwing organizations.

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With the news of the bombing already out, the king and queen and members of the administration attended the ceremonies honoring the flag in Seville. The tension could be seen on everyone's face; it was one of the most serious moments in the history of terrorism in Spain.

That night, Suarez and his ministers held a meeting in Moncloa after returning from Seville. It was a Saturday night, but neither in Madrid nor in many other cities around Spain were there people in the streets. Terrorism was achieving its objective of terrorizing the populace.

It was initially thought that ETA members were responsible for the bombing of the cafe at 47 California. Others saw major signs pointing to the Far Right. Only later was it learned that GRAPO was the culprit.⁴⁹

All political parties denounced these attacks without qualifications. Only the abertzale Basques in Herri Batasuna maintained a suggestive silence.

For the first time since he became president, Suarez was being held responsible by the press. There was talk of the "Suarez paralysis," and he was criticized for his isolation in Moncloa. A CAMBIO 16 editorial entitled "Mr President," signed by Juan Tomas de Salas, harshly rebuked Suarez. "Mr President," it said, "either you lose your fear of the Chamber, of public opinion and of the country or, frankly, the next wave of terrorism will do away with you. The sizable political capital that you accumulated during the recent difficult years [...] is on the verge of disappearing during these bleak days of terror and the silent days afterwards, in which the only thing we know about you is that you have once again stopped sleeping."⁵⁰

EL PAIS, under the headline "The Strategy of Tension," wrote: "Spain, like Italy, seems to have begun the diabolical chess game of the strategy of tension, which is being played by utopian revolutionaries, renegades from industrial society, mercenaries and international agents. The thread running through this confused medley will for a long time, if not forever, be an unfathomable mystery in which at best we can glimpse shadowy interests centered on the perpetuation of weak regimes on the Iberian Peninsula and, in general, in the western Mediterranean basin."

"The fact is," it continued, "that with this bloodthirsty terrorist strategy, the democratic philosophy has not, for its part, developed any strategy of containment, aside from the elementary refusal to 'take the bait' of provocation that the terrorists now routinely offer." Further on it talked about the "irritating political inertia [of the administration], which is particularly damaging to the search for an autonomy solution for the Basque Country." It concluded by asserting that the continuation of our democratic system "is conditioned by the efforts of a political team that can wrest the country from its bewilderment and incipient despair."⁵¹

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If we analyze it carefully, we will see that this is a symptomatic editorial that has completely abandoned the former idea that democracy would put an end to terrorism. It also concedes a certain degree of powerlessness in dealing with a phenomenon that it labels an "unfathomable mystery," while stressing the need for progress on the Basque home rule problem. It also rebukes government leaders suffering from an "irritating political inertia."

Entitling its editorial "Democracy Is Not the Culprit," DIARIO 16 referred to the recent debate on terrorism, saying: "Not even the most conservative political leaders attributed this state of affairs to democracy. This must be made clear: Democracy is not the culprit. Parliament is battling terrorism with the only weapons it has. It must be supported."⁵²

Under the title "Before Democracy," ABC wrote: "Democracy has arrived, and terrorism has not waned [...] Meanwhile, in one way or another our executive and legislative leaders continue to assert imperturbably that they will not fall into the trap that terrorism has set for Spanish democracy."

"We do not want to make this commentary a forum of charges against democratic freedoms, but we do not want it to be an exoneration either [...] Nevertheless, we Spaniards must not endorse or accept imperturbability as a guiding principle, as a watchword, as the key to responding to the terrorist assault on our peace and on our lives.

"What democracy in the Free Western World would have tolerated and not immediately done something about the bizarre and immoral spectacle of political parties that say they want democracy but that shirk their commitment to defend it in the war against terrorism." It then termed terrorism a "State problem," accusing the "leadership class," however, of not being of the "mind and spirit" to see it that way. It concluded by stating that "democracy exists for freedom and security; security and lives do not exist for democracy. We demand courage and order because we want democracy, security and freedom."⁵³

As we can see, the tone in ABC is different. It categorically rejects the traditional assertion that "we will not fall victim to provocation," which EL PAIS seems to still accept. In comparison to DIARIO 16, which sees democracy as an untouchable premise, it places the freedom and security threatened by terrorism "before democracy."

LA VANGUARDIA wrote the following: "Something is going wrong deep down in the system, because careful, vigorous and reasoned action must be taken before disaster strikes [...] Peace is not a blessing that comes free." It concluded by making an appeal for harmony.⁵⁴

As we can see, all of these commentaries, written under the impact and amid the emotion of the awful bombings, are highly dramatic. Never before had the country felt so strongly about terrorism, and the authorities

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were being called on to do away with it at all costs. The phrase "at any price" was almost, but not quite being uttered. Terrorism was thus paving the way for a coup.

INFORMACIONES, speaking out against the rightwing extremists who were declaring the administration unfit to rule, noted that: "Democracy is being put to a harsh test, but there is no reason for democracy to be weak. We must dispel the false but all too often repeated notion that freedom and authority are incompatible." However, it also spoke out against the administration, stating that "even at the risk of sounding monotonous, we must reiterate that it is giving the impression of paralysis, of being swamped, which is, frankly speaking, worrisome."⁵⁵

Another EL PAIS editorial 2 days later graphically described the gravity of the situation that had arisen. "Irresponsible jokes are being made about the possibility of a coup d'etat; the slightest move by the sleeping military lion is carefully watched; there is talk of war among Spaniards and of a return to the past. In a word, the country is giving in to fear, provocation, dejection [...] The far rightwing papers are, as always, stirring up passions and are being unexpectedly echoed by the spokesmen of 'civilized conservatism' [...] This is the just the atmosphere for some sort of coup. The government remains silent."

It went on to say: "But the temptation to combat terrorism with State terrorism is the most dangerous trap into which public opinion could fall. We cannot exchange one kind of violence for another, one kind of fear for another, one kind of insecurity for another [...] There is only one possible response to the kind of situation we find ourselves in: a political response."

Then came harsh criticism of the government. "This is not a political team," it said; "this is a group of self-willed friends [...] who have taken hold of power but do not know how to use it except for their own self-satisfaction." It then asked: "What hope can thus be held out to the Basques who do not agree either with ETA or the abertzale groups or the PNV? Is their any cause for optimism among these Spaniards?"

The Madrid paper returned to the obsession with a coup: "At worst, another Operation Galaxia is in the works. But even if it were to succeed, which we doubt, would it really be a valid solution?" It closed with a grave warning: "The fact is that a cloud of skepticism, if not despair, is enveloping this society and that the government is mainly to blame for it. There are even those who theorize that Suarez has consciously engaged in crisis politics to strengthen his grip on power. We would rather not believe that [...] The UCD, with its president in the lead, ought to offer Spaniards some sort of solution. The only other possible alternative entails the destruction of the government itself. The terrorists have unquestionably picked the right time to act."⁵⁶

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The French press also evinced concern. "Even the president regarded the new Spain of Juan Carlos and his prime minister, Adolfo Suarez, as an amazingly sound entity suffering from a superficial localized ill that could not, therefore, undermine the rest of the country [...] Unfortunately, things have not turned out as logic and reason would indicate. Logic and reason are not the only components of Basque psychology [...]" It mentioned, in conclusion, the danger that "a fascist right wing will rear its head, stirring all of the lovers of law and order, especially the military."⁵⁷

After assessing the situation and accusing the Suarez administration of do-nothingism, LE MONDE said: "But what seems certain is that Saturday's bombing will take Spain into the unknown."⁵⁸

The Congress of Deputies met again in plenary session on 30 May to discuss the issue of terrorism. In the course of the session, during which Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez delivered a speech, a Congressional Declaration on terrorism was passed.

The declaration was signed by all of the parliamentary groups except Democratic Coalition and the Mixed Group. It contained six points, denouncing the recent bombings, pledging aid in the antiterrorist struggle and condemning the attempts to prompt a lack of confidence among the citizenry in democratic institutions.

For his part, Suarez stressed that the recent terrorist attacks coincided with the start of preliminary studies on the first autonomy statutes, a few hours after Congress passed the security plan submitted by Ibanez Freire, and with the beginning of work on the constitution.

The spokesmen of the various parliamentary groups took the floor after Suarez, and particular mention should be made of the categorical denunciation of terrorism by the PNV's representative, Javier Arzallus. "All killing, whether in a war or in an isolated attack, is barbaric," he said, stressing the need to have the total support of the people in the struggle against terrorism and noting, in this regard, that "the Chamber has perhaps not been equal to the occasion." The latter reservation notwithstanding, PNV had never before been so unqualified in its condemnation of terrorism.

The speech by the spokesman of CD, Manuel Fraga, was particularly harsh. He criticized the prime minister's speech, terming it "a pious address of fine-sounding words." He went on to say: "The Spanish people have been told something that infuriates them: that this and only this is the way it is."

The bottom line on this tragic last week of May was politically very significant. For now we can say that Suarez's political standing began to decline at this point. From then on, the prime minister's performance was marked by awkwardness, paralysis and confusion. The country got the feeling that the top echelon of government was not in control and losing its way. Suarez holed himself up in Moncloa and lost his ability

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to take the initiative. His former capacity to rise to the occasion when he was against the ropes was vanishing, and "Suarez's silences" became almost proverbial. It is true that Suarez also seemed powerless to deal with the other major problems plaguing the country (the economic situation, autonomies, etc), but it was terrorism that knocked him out of the ring.

The second consequence was the emboldening of the rightwing extremist groups and newspapers, which brazenly kept calling for a coup d'etat that finally came on 23 February 1981. The combination of the two elements could not have been more negative and worrisome. In fact, nothing could be more ill-suited to stem the mounting pressures for a coup than a government and a president that gave continual evidence of being overwhelmed by events.

The Guernica Statute

The major political issue that the government had to tackle during the spring of 1979 was the Basque statute. The draft version, called the Guernica Statute, had finally been signed and accepted by all of the Basque political parties except UCD. But doubts about the possible unconstitutionality of the draft persisted, doubts that were underscored at the meeting of the joint Congress of Deputies-Basque legislators committee. The difficulties between Madrid and the Basque Country were, in fact, heightened by a decree that declared that there was a conflict of interest involved in being president of a pre-autonomy body and a member of another such entity. This was a direct attack on Carlos Garaicoechea, who had just been elected president of the Basque General Council and was, at the same time, a member of the Foral Parliament of Navarre. In any case, Garaicoechea did not resign from either post.

These misunderstandings between the central government and the Basque pre-autonomy institutions were heightened by a seriously worsening law and order situation in the Basque provinces and Navarre and by the persistence of terrorism.

The starting point of this deteriorating situation was an antinuclear demonstration on 3 June in Tudela (Navarre) during which a Venezuelan woman, Gladys de Estal, died as a result of gunshot wounds caused by the forces of public order. From that point on, in what ABC called the "terrorist logic," there were numerous incidents, barricades were erected and strikes were staged first in Navarre and then in the Basque Country as well. The FOP became the target of a campaign calling for their withdrawal ("Get them out!") and replacement by an autonomous police force.

For several days terrorist actions were interspersed with FOP crackdowns, both leading to deaths. On 6 June in Vergara (Guipuzcoa), ETA (m) killed Luis Berasategui Mendizabal because he was thought to be a police informer and an extreme rightwinger. On the 7th, ETA (m) murdered

a retired infantry commander who worked in the San Sebastian city hall, in Tolosa (Navarre). On the 8th in Renteria, a plainclothes policeman, firing at pointblank range, killed a transvestite, Antonio Badillo. The Far Right waded into the deadly chaos too, and on the same day the ANE [Spanish National Action] planted a bomb in a bar in Zarauz (Guipuzcoa). The incidents continued in Renteria, and the police entered city hall. There were further incidents and strikes, and in response, more crackdowns with smokebombs and rubber bullets. A few days later, on the 13th, ETA (m) managed to get into the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant and plant a bomb in the turbine room that killed blue-collar worker Angel Banos. Meanwhile, bombs continued exploding all over the Basque Country, sometimes causing very serious damage.

Banos's death did not trigger any protest campaign, which showed that the abertzale groups were against violence only when it came from the FOP. LA VANGUARDIA pointed this out in an editorial entitled "Second-Class Deaths [...]": "To judge by the examples, the dead do not warrant consideration in and of themselves, but rather by virtue of who killed them. When in an unfortunate incident that has not been suitably explained, an antinuclear demonstrator lost her life as a result of a gunshot in Tudela, enormous protest demonstrations were organized, culminating in a general strike, and simply because the bullet had come from the weapon of a policeman. However, when shrapnel tore apart the body of a man whose only crime was that he was working, there was no visible mourning or protests, or strikes or demonstrations, nothing, because his murderers were terrorists, the people who are trying to impose their ideas by scorching the earth and bathing it in blood and hatred."⁶⁰

ETA (p-m), which had been engaged in minor activities until that time, set in motion in the summer of 1979 a battle plan along several fronts that had all the earmarks of pressure tactics in connection with the statute negotiations that were under way in Madrid.

The first move was to level threats at all central government officials stationed in the Basque Country. They were being asked "to resign or leave the Basque national territory immediately." Otherwise, they should consider themselves "condemned to death by the organization, regardless of their degree of responsibility and independently of the field in which they performed their functions."

Weighing the extent of this threat, the editor of CAMBIO 16, Jose Oneto, wrote in his column: "ETA is winning the psychological battle against the State. The first victims of the Basque terrorist organization were, so they say, well-known torturers under Franco. Subsequent victims were mere policemen or civil guards, then individuals with links to the Far Right. After that, citizens without any specific political ties and even worker activists have been biting the dust. Now, all central government officials who do not leave the Basque Country have been sentenced to die. Even so and even if the Guernica Statute is approved as is, the ETA offensive will continue until the complete independence of the Basque Country and the establishment of a socialist regime."⁶¹

Perhaps never before had a democratic mass medium stated so categorically that terrorism would not be halted or eradicated by means of any "political measure," regardless of what it was. There would be no reason for terrorism to cease before achieving its ultimate goal: an independent, socialist Basque Country. It was becoming evident that the policy of continual concessions was not going to achieve anything in return.

On the opposite extreme there were those like Mario Onaindia (who was reelected secretary general of EIA at its First Congress from 14 to 17 June) who thought that "with the statute will come peace." Some days before the press had published a item according to which the EIA would return to the armed struggle if the Guernica Statute did not get through. Onaindia asserted that "the EIA's process of birth is irreversible. EIA will continue to exist and is not going to return to ETA (p-m)." He stressed that "ETA (p-m) operates with complete independence. Our only common ideological thread has to do with how the revolutionary process must be brought about." With regard to the statute, Onaindia was categorical: "The punctuation or terminology can be changed, but the substance cannot be altered in the least." The statute meant democratization. He saw the alternative this way: "This is degenerating into something like Algeria, albeit with all of the differences, but with the added danger that certain Basque forces lean towards a kind of fascism that regards everything Spanish as bad."⁶²

In the meantime, the statute negotiations were running into serious stumbling blocks. On 25 June UCD presented a thick document containing "its reasons for disagreement" with the Basque Statute. A few members of the party (Ministers Joaquin Garrigues and Antonio Fontan and Miguel R. Herrero de Minon) recommended a more flexible "political reading" to overcome the obstacles. Gabriel Cisneros, a member of the Constitutional Committee, responded on behalf of the majority faction: "To set politics against the law is tantamount, in the last analysis, to accepting the supremacy of the jungle over a state of law." Certain political circles predicted a permanent breakoff of the negotiations and then some sort of military intervention. This gives an idea of the gravity of the situation.⁶³

The Basque parties launched a pro-statute campaign beginning on 27 June with a massive demonstration in Bilbao. But ETA did not let up. For example, during a sniper attack on the National Police barracks in Basauri, ETA (m) killed a commercial agent, Diego Alfaro Orihuela, and ETA bullets took the life of a CCOO [Workers Commissions] member, Francisco Medina Albala, in San Sebastian.

At the same time, the purely political pressure reached an extremely high level. DEIA, the semi-official mouthpiece of the PNV, said in a 26 June editorial entitled "The Last Car in the Last Train" that if Madrid whittled down the draft statute, "the collective frustration of a people would reach its limit, and the Basque Country could become another Ulster." If this should come to pass, it continued, "there will be those of us who would defend civil disobedience to its ultimate

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conclusion. Others will have even more reasons than they have so far had to reaffirm their choice of a grassroots armed struggle. The Basque people [...] are prepared to once again stand up to those who are bent on denying them their rights as a national community." To DEIA, "direct responsibility for our 'Ulsterization' will lie with those whose emphasis on what is Spanish ignores the reality of a multinational State of nationalities, peoples and regions that have joined together in solidarity of their own free will." Further on, the PNV mouthpiece mentioned those who "as a pretext" allude to the "possibility of military intervention in the Basque Country." This rumor, which has been "disproved as on other occasions, always crops up on the eve of events connected with the Basque Country. If this were to happen, the 'Ulsterization' would be caused not by the Basque people's reaction to unjust measures but by the application of a military solution."⁶⁴

This ultimatum-like tone, which makes it so hard to tell exactly what mere civil disobedience would consist of and how it would be different from armed struggle, was partially toned down the following day, when the Guernica Statute was described as "the watchword of the Basques who are wagering on a free, peaceful Basque Country" and as a "rational offer of peace by the Basque people to the rest of Spain. The Basque Country has spoken; Madrid now has the floor."⁶⁵

ETA (p-m) Against Tourism

As July drew near, ETA (p-m) began activities on a new front, tourism, making the summer of 1979 a bloody one.

The ETA (p-m)'s summer campaign began on 26 June when the police set off a bomb containing 15 kilograms of gunpowder in Torremolinos, right on the Costa del Sol. Another bomb went off before the police were able to intervene, though it claimed no victims. The following day, another explosion in Fuengirola interrupted electric service. In Marbella on the 28th, there were three explosions in just 3 hours. ETA (p-m), which claimed responsibility for these bombings, provided leads in some cases so that the police could detect the bombs before they went off. It claimed that it did not want to cause any deaths.

This campaign against tourism, which continued through early July, had been announced for some time and, according to the British weekly NEWS OF THE WORLD, was part of a plan that had been prepared by the IRA and the Baader-Meinhof gang in addition to ETA. The German police denied any such links. There was also speculation, albeit without proof, that German terrorists who had entered Spain as tourists were involved in these attacks. Later on, it was learned that several French women were acting as ETA agents. Inasmuch as amonal (compressed powder) was the explosive used in almost every case, instead of ETA's traditional "goma-2," the Spanish police did not rule out the possibility that ETA (p-m) was making use of "action groups that might be close to anarchistic communist views."⁶⁶

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On 30 June, a bomb that went off at a beach near the Nueva Andalucia Casino in Marbella's Puerto Banus, seriously burned a Belgian tourist couple. The following day, the headline in the German Sunday paper BILD AM SONTAG read: "Tourists Bathed in Blood." Monday's BILD ZEITUNG, with an almost five million copy edition, bore the headline "Spain uuf" and these two subheads: "Vacation train amid a hail of bullets" and "Gas attack, 80 Germans robbed at camp site." Another giant headline read: "Mallorca: Five Slain at Hotel," referring to an accidental fire at a Palma hotel. The ETA (p-m) campaign was beginning to achieve its goals.

On 3 July in Madrid, Gabriel Cisneros, a UCD deputy and a member of the Constitutional Committee was the object of a attempted kidnaping as he got out of his car. As he fought free and fled, he was hit by several rounds of bullets that left him gravely wounded. ABC spoke of the "all-out war" by ETA and stated: "If the presence of Gabriel Cisneros on this committee [the one working on the Basque Statute] was the sole reason or one of the reasons for this attack, then the terrorists are also trying to influence the content of the autonomy statutes. To put it another way, violence such as this could raise doubts as to how uncoercedly and cleanly the statutes are being approved."⁶⁷

MUNDO OBRERO, which is still the PCE's daily mouthpiece, concluded: "They wanted to kill Gabriel Cisneros so that the Guernica Statute would not be passed, so that no statute would be passed."⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the bombs kept going off on the Costa del Sol, the Costa Brava, in Castellon and in Benidorm. The ETA (p-m)'s goals were spelled out in one of its communiques: "If in the 24 hours following this communique the FOP are not withdrawn from the Soria jail and the decision not made to return all prisoners to the Basque Country, this organization will continue planting bombs throughout the tourist areas of the Spanish State." Clearly, ETA (p-m) had shifted from the publicity and propaganda coups that had characterized it so far to patently terrorist activities.

The connection between this campaign by ETA (p-m) and the debate on the statute was obvious, moreover, because another communique in June said: "ETA (p-m) is prepared to attack Spain's entire setup in the Basque Country until such time as the Guernica Statute is approved ... [which] along with the incorporation of Navarre and a decree of amnesty for all Basque prisoners and exiles, will be what will halt its armed struggle."

In the meantime, debate continued in Madrid on the Guernica Statute. The discussions were taking place on two levels, inasmuch as the Cortes was hashing over the joint working document while at Moncloa the real negotiations were going on between the administration and UCD, on the one hand, and the PNV on the other.

An agreement was finally reached on 17 July, and early the next morning the committee put the final touches on its report, the news being made public on the morning of the 18th. "We now have a statute," was the

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full-page headline in DEIA. It also published a front-page editorial in Basque ("Egun gogoangarri bat") and in Spanish ("La primera piedra de la paz" [The Cornerstone of Peace]) in which it stated in a joyful, hopeful tone: "All indications are that the spirit of the Guernica Statute has not only been maintained in the text of the agreement (including mention of Navarre) but in some instances has also been enhanced. The Basque people are on the verge of regaining their national rights." Then, after pondering the virtues of dialogue, it asserted that "Now is the time to bury 'goma-2' and killings as a method of dissuasion," adding immediately thereafter, however, that "though we can never forget that institutional violence is still at times present in our land." It also went on to say: "At this happy hour it would not be fair to forget those who died without having seen this day or those who are still in exile or in prison." It concluded by warning that "no one, under any pretext, should try to frustrate our people's hope for peace." Any comment would be unnecessary.

But these ambiguous words of peace were obviously not meant for ETA. Once agreement on the statute had been reached, the military branch, which had let up for almost a month, murdered Jesus Maria Colomo Rodriguez, a waiter that it accused of being an informer, on 21 July in Villafranca de Ordicia (Guipuzcoa) and on the 28th fired machine guns at a National Police vehicle in Bilbao, killing 1st Lt Miguel Saro Perez and police officer Emilio Lopez de la Pena. The following day in San Sebastian, two civil guards, Sgt Maj Moises Cordero Lopez and recruit Antonio Pastor Martin, were victims of another attack.

These actions were proof that, as suspected, ETA (m) did not accept the statute. Herri Batasuna, ETA (m)'s political voice, also expressed its rejection of the statute through several prominent members. Miguel Castells declared: "This statute has been signed behind the people's backs. We cannot understand how forces that consider themselves leftist could have signed a rightwing pact." Telesforo Monzon told EGIN: "You will see happier faces on the Boards of Directors in Vizcaya and in the ministries in Madrid than in the factories in Euskalherria and at the modest gatherings of true Basque patriots." Nothing had changed in the eyes of Herri Batasuna, which unlike other Basque parties, had still not condemned the latest ETA (m) attacks.

DEIA had this to say about the most recent assaults: "People in large working class areas had the impression that the agreement on the Guernica Statute could spell the end of armed violence or at least the start of a long truce. Others who are more realistic about politics were not only not expecting a cease-fire but even felt that the armed violence was going to increase. Unfortunately, realism has asserted itself. The police officers who were machined-gunned to death yesterday are the first victims of the statute." It later wondered: "Is there any way to understand violence and murder at this particular moment in time? What justification is there for a tiny group to arrogate representation of an entire people and to impose the law of death just a few weeks before the referendum? Are they afraid of losing the battle at the ballot box? How effectively can one struggle and call for amnesty when death is claiming new victims?"⁶⁹

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On the very same day, ABC came out against any new amnesties: "All possible amnesties or all amnesties with potential political grounds have already been granted. The time has past when we can ignore the shedding of blood and the commission of crimes. To grant the new amnesty that Leizaola and Monzon are calling for would be tantamount to proclaiming [...] that the future of Spain and its democracy is going to be determined not by the law but by the dictates of violence and terror. It would be the same as [...] handing the country over to the atrocious and abominable dictatorship of extremist groups."⁷⁰

Dashed once again was the hope that a "political measure" (and the statute was a compendium of all desirable political measures) would put an end to terrorism. Signing with its bloodstained initials, ETA (m) was communicating its decision to continue along the path of violence.

In contrast, things seemed to be on a better track with ETA (p-m). In a document the organization stated that the statute "is an important step towards the independence of the Basque Country." adding: "We denounce the irrational, sectarian stand by Herri Batasuna and certain so-called Pro-Amnesty Groups, which are denying the Basque working people one of the most important gains in their history."

The shift from the summer campaign of terror to this constructive attitude was due to negotiations between ETA (p-m) and the government. The terrorist organization was said to have promised the government to halt its violence if the FOP were withdrawn from Soria Prison and if Basque prisoners were transferred to the Basque Country. Apparently involved in the negotiations was Mario Onaindia, the secretary general of EIA, a party whose ties with ETA (p-m) we are already familiar with. Around that time Onaindia was in Madrid, where he entered the Congress of Deputies and made a comment that stirred up controversy: "ETA is waging a holy war with Madrid." He was accompanied on this trip by another member of EIA, Garayalde, alias "Herreka," who, it was said, might have been the person who actually negotiated with the government. "Onaindia misleads and Herreka negotiates," went the saying.

Although the government later denied, though its official spokesman, that negotiations took place, something must have happened because on 9 July the National Police left Soria Prison, and in the wake of rumors, it was announced on the 24th that the ETA members being held there would be transferred to Nanclares de Oca Prison in Alava beginning in early 1980.

There was a harsh confrontation on 14 July in Soria Prison between the 30 or so political-military branch members and the more than 80 military branch members. The bone of contention was the statute, and this outbreak of violence among ETA personnel forced the National Police to enter the jail once again to separate the two sides and restore order.

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It was also learned that a dozen political-military branch members moved over to the military wing because they disagreed with their former branch's acceptance of the statute. Outside the jail as well certain (p-m) people, such as the 14 members of the so-called "zone team," joined ETA (m). ETA was once again being torn apart.

At the same time, a war of words that occasionally became physical was going on between the political equivalents of ETA's two branches, Herri Batasuna and the Basque Left.⁷¹

But just when it seemed as if some progress had been made in neutralizing terrorism through the pact with ETA (p-m), the unexpected happened. On Sunday 29 July in Madrid, three ETA (p-m) [!] bombs went off at Barajas Airport and at the Atocha and Chamartin railway stations, causing 5 deaths and more than 100 wounded.⁷² A genuine climate of terror spread throughout the country, which was taken aback by criminal acts whose targets were railway stations and airports at a time when millions of people were going on vacation. This was indiscriminate, widespread terrorism, the most odious version of a blind violence that seeks only to terrorize the masses and cause the collapse of life in society.

As could be imagined, the press and political parties reacted strongly. ABC set forth five principles: "When a group of people, be it large or small, finds that another group has declared all-out war on it, it has to realize the following facts:

- 1) It is of no use to engage in the rhetoric that almost nothing is happening [...]
- 2) Campaigns of verbal dissuasion are of no use [...]
- 3) Condemnations and rebukes are of no use [...]
- 4) Political concessions are of no use in dealing with terrorism [...]
- 5) In a word, in dealing with an all-out aggressor, the only choice is between total political victory or total physical defeat. It concluded by calling on everyone to mobilize.⁷³

LA VANGUARDIA was just as forceful, attributing ETA's latest moves to its isolation. It commented on the remark by the old Basque socialist Ramon Rubial, who had recalled the "dirty war" tactics that De Gaulle used to do away with the OAS. "He went on to say," LA VANGUARDIA continued, "that 'Of course a democrat shouldn't say this.' This moving comment reminds us that democracy is something fragile and delicate that must be defended tooth and nail. The provocation of all-out war that now seems obvious demands radical surgery if an assessment of the situation shows that there is no other way to regain our health."⁷⁴

CAMBIO 16's editorial writer, Juan Tomas de Salas, wrote: "There are no political measures against ETA, only police measures. No statute

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will ever satisfy these apprentices of crime, and the high-minded or fearful should not fool themselves because independence would not put an end to ETA either."⁷⁵

DEIA reiterated its well-known line: "We are in favor of all the noble objectives of our people (amnesty is one of them), but we cannot accept that these banners be monopolized by those who believe that the only valid language is machine-gun fire or bombings, with or without telephone warnings."⁷⁶

The following day, ABC came out strongly against this call for amnesty, which was also voiced by EGIN, terming it an "undermining [...] of the principle of State authority." It went on to say that "unfortunately, the PNV mouthpiece is providing evidence that the agreement on the statute was not even of any use in mitigating the moral equivocation of the Basque nationalist Right. The irresponsible call for a new amnesty when Spain is being bled by ETA madness is a very dangerous complement to the terrorist aim of cutting the Basque people off, on a gut level, from the rest of their countrymen." It concluded with:⁷⁷ "Amnesty, yes, for the future victims of the grim terrorist reaper."

ETA (p-m), represented by three hooded individuals, called a meeting with newsmen in early August "somewhere" in the Basque Country to try and explain its stunning and lethal moves on 29 July in Madrid. In a communique read to the newsmen, ETA (p-m) "deeply regretted the deaths in Madrid" and asserted that the campaign of attacks was resumed "after the breakdown of negotiations with the government." It was on that very day that the administration's official spokesman, Josep Melia, roundly denied the existence of such negotiations. At the same time, ETA (p-m) announced that even if the statute went into effect, it would not halt its armed struggle, "which will be tailored to the new political conditions." "There will be no spectacular moves," the ETA communique said, "but there will be incisive involvement in factories, the citizen movement, neighborhoods and culture, for example." It was the political-military branch's same old doctrine, the only change being the acknowledgment of the statute."⁷⁸

For its part, ETA (m) kept up the trickle of slayings throughout August; eight murders showed that it was continuing along the same path of terror.⁷⁹

A Blow To GRAPO

GRAPO, the other terrorist group battering the democratic regime, was dealt a harsh blow in late July 1979.

As we have mentioned, the police attributed the bombing of the cafe at 47 California to GRAPO even though it denied in an issue of GACETA ROJA, a mouthpiece of the PCE (r), that it was involved. Many of the mass media had been emphasizing, moreover, that the Far Right could have been responsible for the attack, which killed 8 and wounded 40.

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The police had mounted the appropriate surveillance and learned that GRAPO members frequented the National Periodicals Library on Zurbaran Street in Madrid. On 26 July the Antiterrorist Brigade of Madrid Police Headquarters succeeded in arresting two of GRAPO's most wanted members, Alfonso Rodriguez Garcia and Maria del Carmen Lopez, Anguita, as they were leaving the library. They were identified as the pair that has planted the bomb at 47 California on 29 May.

This was a major police success. Nevertheless, law enforcement agencies were unable to capitalize on it fully because the news leaked out prematurely and thus prevented the arrest of Jose Maria Sanchez-Casas, a top GRAPO leader whom Alfonso Rodriguez was supposed to meet in Barcelona the day after his arrest. According to the police, Sanchez-Casas had given the orders to plant the bomb at 47 California. Remaining at large with him were Pedro Tabanera Perez and Manuel Parodi Munoz, who also managed to escape because of the same leak.

The brains behind this police operation was Francisco de Asis Pastor, the Madrid police chief, whose success contrasted with the ineffectiveness of the Operational Brigade, which was specifically in charge of combating terrorism. The new commander of the brigade, Manuel Ballesteros, Conesa's successor, "does not yet seem to have gotten control of his crew of at least 100 men, who have all sorts of equipment but who must look on helplessly at the successes scored by others with less equipment and using different methods." This was the criticism leveled at the brigade by the Jose Oneto, the editor of CAMBIO 16, on the cover of whose 401st issue appeared Francisco de Asis Pastor, with the caption "This would be the man to do away with ETA and GRAPO." "He would be the ideal man," Oneto emphasized, "to take charge of the battle against terrorism."⁸⁰

The arrests of GRAPO members provided the police with important information. It learned, for example, that Alfonso Rodriguez and Maria del Carmen Lopez had planned to attack, 2 days after their arrest, the director of State Security, Luis Alberto Salazar Simpson, and Maribel Lorenzo, Miss Europe 1979 and a member of New Force whose picture had appeared on the rightwing extremist group's posters advertising its 18 July rally. They had also planned to attack a general on 17 August and a National Police vehicle the following day.⁸¹

The police continued their search for the GRAPO people at large. On 14 August, the police managed to capture Manuel Parodi as he was waiting to meet with a PC (r) liaison. Thanks to his arrest, police agents headed the next day for Escorial to apprehend Tabanera, who was waiting for his comrade. Tabanera was killed during the ensuing shootout. GRAPO's "Madrid" command was thus broken up, and in the opinion of police, its major figures were out of the way. Only Sanchez-Casas remained at large.

Parodi's arrest enabled the police to round out its information on GRAPO's plans. Not one but three generals, residing on Alenza, San

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Bernardo and Glorieta Ruiz de Alda streets, as well as Angel Escudero del Corral, chief justice of the Supreme Court, Juan Manuel Fanjul Sedeno, the nation's attorney general, and Francisco Ruiz Jarabo, a former minister of justice, were going to be the terrorist organization's next victims.⁸²

As we have already mentioned, the drive against GRAPO provided quite a bit of information on this strange terrorist group, and some of it appeared in the press. For example, commando pairs, even including children, were very common. After these arrests, however, no one dared claim, as on other occasions, that GRAPO had been broken up for good. People feared that it was going to reappear. CAMBIO 16 clearly stated this: "Nevertheless, GRAPO is going to be on the loose again within a few months. The police know it. After they are arrested, they are inexplicably released, and after the police says that it has dealt them a severe blow, they manage to reappear. As the Madrid Regional Intelligence Brigade says, we would like to know who is behind all this."⁸³

Officially, the PC (r) was behind GRAPO, providing the terrorist group with personnel when others were arrested or "informed on," the police claimed. The PCE (r) denied that this kind of systematic organized link existed. The police also pointed to two other organizations, People and Culture and ODEA [Organization of Antifascist Students], as breeding grounds for GRAPO.

Based on these theories, the police continued its drive against GRAPO by investigating the PC (r) and related groups and on 12 September arrested 14 individuals in Madrid, Zaragoza and Barcelona, 7 of whom were members of the PCE (r) Central Committee.

Separately, issue 51 of BANDERA ROJA, the organ of the PCE (r)'s Central Committee, which appeared in September, contained an interview with GRAPO members in which they reaffirmed that they were not involved in the bombing at 47 California and claimed that their actions were not directed against the Armed Forces as an institution.

In the interview the GRAPO people said that they were very pleased with their armed action, which has succeeded in "shattering the siege that the regime was trying to impose on the Basque Country." Among their goals they cited "the overthrow of the regime" and "gaining the sympathy of the masses." "We can state," they continued, "that in spite of the disinformation activities of the press and other mass media, we have fully achieved this goal."

At the same time they brought up their "Cease-Fire Program," stating that their laying down of arms was conditional on compliance with it. The program contained these five points: 1) A complete general amnesty; 2) A purge of high-ranking officers; 3) unrestricted political and union freedoms; 4) rejection of NATO membership, and 5) dissolution

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of the current Parliament and the holding of genuinely free elections. This was the "GRAPO alternative," parallel to the "KAS alternative" that ETA supported.

Moreover, they denied that "formal relations" existed with ETA, in spite of the coincidences of dates and even of hours in a number of "armed actions." They acknowledged only "a current of mutual sympathy," though they did not rule out such relations in the future.

They stated that GRAPO was part of a Liaison Committee that also included People and Culture, Red Assistance [Socorro Rojo], PCE (r) and ODEA, all of which backed the same program: "Self-determination for the Basque, Catalan and Galician peoples, as well as [...] independence for the African colony of the Canaries."

The police drive against GRAPO was brilliantly capped off on 12 October when Jose Maria Sanchez-Casas, "the most wanted GRAPO member," was arrested in Valencia. The police knew that he and his wife were still very close and by keeping her under surveillance succeeded in nabbing Sanchez-Casas at a cafe rendezvous with her and their two children (ages 4 years and 16 months).

Sanchez-Casas's arrest led to the capture of 19 other persons, as a result of which GRAPO could well have been considered finished. However, two well-known members of the group, Isabel Llaquet and Rafael Alvarez Fernandez, were still at large.

Moreover, the police learned that for the first time in its history GRAPO had managed to get hold of weapons overseas, though most of them did not make it across the border into Spain."⁸⁴

ETA and the Basque Referendum

Now that the Guernica Statute, which had kindled such hopes, had been hammered out, the mandatory referendum was called so that citizens in the three Basque provinces could express their approval, which everyone took for granted.

We already know that whereas ETA (p-m) and the Basque Left were for the Guernica Statute, ETA (m) and Herri Batasuna were against it. This disagreement between the two branches of the terrorist organization and their political counterparts raised fears that the campaign leading up to the referendum, which was scheduled for 25 October, could turn into another opportunity for "armed action by the military faction."

We have already seen that ETA does not really need "opportunities" to launch its attacks. Specifically, we have already talked about the slayings that ETA (m) was responsible for in August. Except for one killing in 1968, another in 1975 and three in 1978, ETA did not usually do any killing in August, until 1979, of course, after the Guernica Statute had been drawn up.

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Demonstrations in support of the Basque refugees, which the civilian governments had expressly banned, were staged during the last weeks of summer in the Basque capitals.

During one of these demonstrations, in San Sebastian on 1 September, young Inaki Quijera was killed. This triggered the usual protests against the FOP, fresh demonstrations, a heavier crackdown, people wounded or perhaps killed, general strike. People were protesting because the law enforcement agencies used firearms, unlike in other countries. "They're not up against ETA there," responded the civilian governor of Guipuzcoa, Joaquin Argote. All parties except UCD and the PCE were calling for the governor's resignation.

Lerchundi, the secretary general of the Basque Communist Party, felt this way: "Terrorism and police action are creating a dialectic of violence. This climate of violence could inhibit people and lead to a psychosis of fear vis-a-vis the referendum."

Incidents took place all over the Basque Country, creating an extremely grave situation. The Far Right made the situation even worse by continuing its attacks on democracy. The entire front page of EL ALCAZAR on 3 September was filled with the headline "Choas in the Basque Country" and the following subheads: "Victory Without Judges," "Barricades, Fire and Terror in San Sebastian and Bilbao," and "General Strike Today in the Three Provinces." Its headline the following day again took up the whole front page, "Anti-Spanish Rage," above which it put "Grave Developments in the Basque Provinces." For different reasons, the Far Right seemed to be pursuing the same goal as ETA (m): cancel the referendum on the statute.

The confrontations continued to divide the Basque parties. Herri Batasuna organized a press conference in Madrid on 4 September. Miguel Castells and Francisco Letamendia spoke on behalf of the abertzale coalition with ties to ETA (m). To them, the responsibility for what was happened lay with the PNV, which "keeps trying to straddle the fence, because although it has now denounced the action taken by government authorities, we must bear in mind that it never supported the grievances that have given rise to the demonstrations [...] Its stand continues to be equivocal."85

In the midst of these confrontations between differing conceptions of Basque nationalism and against the peaceful institutionalization of Basque autonomy under a statute that went far beyond the 1936 version, the abertzale radicals resorted to an expedient that had yielded them such fine results up to then: terror. ETA (m) decided to once again attack the State at one of its sensitive spots, the Armed Forces, no doubt reckoning that by so doing it would be putting the PNV in an awkward position, since it had taken a permanent seat on the fence.

If in fact the slayings of military personnel on 25 May in Madrid had contributed to the success of the Basque cause by paving the way for

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negotiations on the statute that were ultimately very successful, then there was every reason to believe that fresh attacks on the same spot could further the abertzale cause. This seemed to be the thinking of the terrorists.

Therefore, ETA (m) decided to renew its attacks on the Armed Forces. On 19 September in Bilbao, Cavalry Col Aurelio Perez Zamora and Staff Comdr Julian Ezquerro Serrano were machined-gunned down as they were riding in a military jeep. A few days later, on the 23rd, the military governor of Guipuzcoa, Brig Gen Lorenzo Gonzalez-Valles Sanchez, was killed in San Sebastian as he was strolling with his wife on La Concha. That same evening, Suarez met for 8 hours with the most prominent figures in the military, officially to study the security measures needed to prevent these attacks, but no doubt also to check on the mood of the Armed Forces, which were being so persistently provoked. Garaicoechea, the president of the Basque General Council and of the PNV, spoke of a coup d'etat and asserted that ETA wanted a military occupation of the Basque Country. He also talked about the danger that terrorism posed to democracy.

MUNDO DIARIO of Barcelona saw things differently, however, and this makes for an interesting analysis because it shows the seemingly inconceivable link between terrorism and the push for a coup. "Its [ETA's] actions do not pose a direct threat to democracy. Terrorists have been on the loose in Northern Ireland for even longer, but democracy in Britain is not thought to be in danger; on the contrary [...] The threat to democracy comes when certain individuals who are apparently respectful of the law and free of any blame attempt to take ideological and political advantage of the actions of the extremist groups. Here lies the real danger to democracy: not the actions themselves, regardless of how serious they are, but the fact that they are capitalized on to serve certain very specific and well-known interests [...] There are individuals who are prepared to launch the strategy of destabilization [...] ETA's actions can be as dangerous and criminal as it chooses and will warrant the unanimous condemnation of the citizenry, but they are an attack on democracy and represent a real threat to the new regime only to the extent that the opponents of democracy situated in key posts choose to exploit them to undermine democracy and mislead the public, which wants peace in the streets above all and has unequivocally indicated at the ballot box what its preferences and aspirations are."⁸⁶

With the hindsight provided by the events of 23 February 1981, we can clearly perceive here the threat posed by the advocates of a coup, who were ready, like vampires, to suck all the blood shed by ETA and the other terrorists groups and turn it to their advantage.

These warnings were all the more important because the restless uneasiness of several ranking Armed Forces officers had become quite evident by this time. In statements to ABC, Milans del Bosch, the field marshal of Valencia, drew a very negative picture of the 3 years of democracy.

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Milans had been called to Madrid by his superiors. During a ceremony honoring the legion, another field marshal, Gonzalez del Yerro, serving in the Canary Islands, had delivered, in the presence of Gabeiras, the army chief of staff, a disturbing speech complaining about the impunity of the attacks on military personnel and other "public attacks on institutions that are sacred to them and that they have sworn to defend." "It seems as if Spain is dying on us," said Gonzalez del Yerro. And Gabeiras himself talked about the "remedies that are not yielding the wholly satisfactory results that we would like." The field marshal of Seville, Merry Gordon, also delivered a tough public speech in Ceuta.

With a highly controversial timing that triggered a lengthy debate on his "Third World" leanings, on 13 September Suarez received the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, whom many considered a terrorist, a leader of terrorists. At the same time, Palestinians and Arabs in general were assumed to have aided ETA by accepting its activists at its training camps and by providing them financial assistance and weapons. A photograph of Suarez embracing the Palestinian leader was seen around the world and prompted much commentary. It was being said that Suarez had reached an agreement with Arafat that ETA activity would be halted in exchange for recognition of the PLO.

As Claire Sterling says, the British had also made a similar offer to Arafat in connection with the Provisional IRA, "but Arafat is man to respond in either case." The reason allegedly is that aid to both ETA and the IRA was coming basically from Habash, Arafat's leadership rival.⁸⁷

The Basque abertzales took advantage of Arafat's visit to criticize the PNV, which was starting to state openly that it could not accept a Basque "terrorism" that they, the abertzales, put in quotation marks. The abertzales felt that the PNV's opposition to the "terrorism" of "their own brothers" concealed its fear of "the socioeconomic liberation of the ETA program." "Obvious proof of this," read an article in EGIN, "came recently with the official arrival in Madrid of Yasser Arafat, who is universally recognized as the number one terrorist. The UCD administration invited him and received him officially. Its protege, the PNV, which was certainly informed of this, shut its eyes. They are both whispering: "Terrorism is not terrorism if it smells like oil." And Suarez told Garaicoechea: "Let's all shout: Arafat, yes; ETA, no [...] Arafat, yes; ETA, no [...] Let the Basque people be the judge."⁸⁸

Meanwhile, the attacks continued in the Basque Country, this time against civilians. On 22 September in Renteria taxcab driver Sixto Holgado Agudo was found dead, killed by a shot in the back of the neck. On the same day, a police station in Baracaldo was machine-gunned, with one officer wounded. On the 30th, ETA (m) murdered the municipal police chief of Amrebieta, Alfonso Vilarino Doce.

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Other groups, presumably on the Far Right, kept at it too. On 28 September in Astigarraga, an Herri Batasuna city councilman from San Sebastian, Tomas Alba, was killed. The organization "Spanish Armed Groups" claimed responsibility for the slaying over the phone. Tomas Alba had some differences with the Herri Batasuna coalition, and thus certain circles questioned the above group's claim and eventually thought his death was part of a settling of accounts. EGIN, which is close to the abertzale coalition, denounced the manipulation (so did ETA [m]) and referred to the aforementioned differences as "a factor to be explained in depth in the ceremony of confusion." In spite of everything, Herri Batasuna councilmen from several towns refused to sign documents from all the parties condemning Alba's murder.

In the meantime, the Madrid government was trying to avoid being overwhelmed by the situation. The attacks on military personnel had hardly been a surprise, because according to information gathered by intelligence services, it was known that ETA, supplied with new weaponry from Belgium, was going to launch a broad offensive in September and October against both military figures and units and barracks. It was even thought that the offensive might begin in Madrid, and therefore certain security measures had been implemented.

At this juncture, Jose Oneto wrote, "the government does not want to go it alone against ETA (m) and needs the cover of total support from the Basque Nationalist Party." The editor of CAMBIO 16 thought he saw a more cooperative, determined attitude in the PNV leader Carlos Garaicoechea.⁸⁹

The murder of Tomas Alba had thrown Herri Batasuna into confusion. The coalition was on the defensive and showed little enthusiasm in its campaign of "active abstention" for the referendum. Meanwhile, euphoria reigned in the PNV, which celebrated Alderdi Eguna (The Day of the Party) on 30 September.

ETA (m) made itself felt in its usual way during the referendum campaign. It killed Luis Maria Uriarte Alzaga, the former mayor of Bedia, on the 5th in Bilbao and police inspector Carlos Sanz Biurrun on the 8th in Pamplona. On the same day, in San Sebastian, it machine-gunned a restaurant, wounding 11 customers, 8 of whom were members of the National Police, the other 3 being workers.

The Basque and Catalan statutes were thus both put to a vote of the people on 25 October. Abstention in the Basque Country averaged 40.23 percent (Alava, 36.77; Guipuzcoa, 40.18, and Vizcaya, 40.98), almost the same as in Catalonia (40.52 percent). "Yes" votes totaled 89.14 percent, and "no" votes, 5.76 percent, representing, respectively, 53.96 and 3.08 percent of registered voters. The Basques had thus achieved one of the objectives for which they had struggled so hard.

But peace was not to return. On the very eve of the referendum, ETA (m) held a news conference in San Sebastian with Spanish and foreign journalists

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at which it reaffirmed its intention to "continue the armed struggle" as long as there was one Spanish policeman in the Basque Country, until a total amnesty was granted and until there was a chance of reuniting the two Basque Countries.⁹⁰

The call for an amnesty was voiced again and again in the weeks following the passage of the statute, and not only by ETA. The permanent pacification of the Basque Country, a thoroughgoing solution to its political problems, seemed to be drifting further and further away, as if it were part of a tragic game in which the bar over which the government had to jump was placed higher and higher. The Madrid government was continually being called upon to make greater concessions, which frustrated those who were most receptive.

At a press conference, Suarez denied any possibility of new amnesties. Now then, Jose Oneto wrote, "in all probability the alternative will be to grant partial pardons, which would mean releasing individuals who have refused to respect the democratic order and who have continued their killing under democracy."⁹¹

Violence After the Statute. The Autonomous Commands

Events were to demonstrate right away that when groups supported by certain segments of society and encouraged by certain irresponsible courses of conduct get used to "resolving" problems with weapons and coercion, it is highly unlikely that they will change their methods. The case of the Basque Country, viewed in the perspective of 5 years of democracy, shows conclusively that terrorism and everything that revolves around terrorism and capitalizes directly and indirectly on it, causes such corruption in a society that straightening out people's attitudes becomes difficult, costly and slow. When all social and political life turns into a monstrous machine based on blackmail, it is almost impossible to escape such a hell.

On 27 October, 2 days after the referendum on the statute, German Gonzalez Lopez, a photographer affiliated with PSOE and UGT [General Union of Workers], was shot and killed in Villarreal de Urrechua (Guipuzcoa).

While Spaniards in general viewed it as just another death, though all the more incomprehensible because there no longer seemed to be any pretext for killing now that the Basques had gotten "their" statute, discussion began in the Basque Country as to who might have been responsible. The Autonomous Commands, one of the haziest facets of Basque terrorism, claimed responsibility for the deplorable incident. These murderers considered German Gonzalez "a collaborator with the forces of repression," and given his membership in the Socialist Party, which reacted immediately, they mentioned that this and other parties were collaborating "with State terrorism."

The UGT and CCOO called a general strike. It was the first antiterrorist general strike. Socialist leaders reacted strongly. Chiqui Benegas

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spoke of the "new terrorist fascism" and asserted: "We are not going to sit idly by." Enrique Mugica stated that "ETA is going to shudder when it remembers the day it killed a socialist in the Basque Country" and used the word accomplices to refer to "the individuals and groups that remain silent about or share in the results in terrorism." Nicolas Redondo said that there was going to be no alternative other than "fighting violence with violence."⁹²

ABC referred to "several statements by leaders of Basque parties, which we would rather not comment on" and which, together with the "overwhelming response of the general strike [...] have baffled us to the extent that we feel ashamed as human beings and as Spaniards. Businessmen and workers, generals and chairmen of delegations, policemen and civil guards, mayors and taxicab drivers have been killed in the Basque Country, and the reactions (How can we forget the savage cries of 'Kill them, ETA' or 'More machine guns, ETA'?) were never as stirring and harshly condemnatory. The storehouse of cynical journalistic phrases," it continued, "has given everyday language the expression 'third-class deaths' [...] Can anyone, personally or as a member of a union or party, consider deaths, murders as being of different classes?" In conclusion, it commented on the pacifying impact that some felt the statute would have: "But this new slaying is not an encouraging sign. Nor is it an encouraging sign for our national coexistence when the murder of some Spaniards is regarded as more unjust than of others."⁹³

But the Basques continued hedging. Garaicoechea found it hard to believe that "this kind of political stupidity could come from ETA (m)," as if the terrorist group had been distinguished by its peace-loving, instructional or academic activities. With the murder of the UGT photographer, the untainted image that the PNV president and future "lendakari" of the Basque Government apparently had of ETA until then seemed to be falling to pieces.

EGIN, the paper with ties to Herri Batasuna and, hence, to ETA (m), published a front-page insert that same day (30 October) under the title "The Autonomous Commands Are Not ETA." It mentioned separate communiques from ETA (m) and ETA (p-m) "in which they denounced the political and media manipulation of German Gonzalez's death and disclosed that they had no organizational ties with the autonomous commands." ETA (m) specified that "the PSOE-UGT's and PCE-CCOO's identification of our organization with the so-called 'autonomous' group is clearly part of a policy to confuse the Basque people and the working class." As far as ETA (p-m) was concerned, "the perpetrators of this indiscriminate terrorist act have not been and are not members of ETA." It also attacked the union federations and reformist parties "that are trying to take advantage of this regrettable incident to launch a campaign against ETA and the revolutionary 'armed struggle.'"⁹⁴

As we can see, practically all nationalists in the Basque Country, regardless of their degree of radicalism, had what we could call a

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"rose-colored" view of ETA. The nationalists, from the PNV to HB, described ETA as a likable, heroic and even glorious (as Bandres once said) organization that they claimed had rendered a priceless service: having roused Basque nationalism from its slumber. This is why their condemnations were aimed at terrorism in general, almost never referring to ETA, and their accusations often had an air of justification about them. This explains why ETA was always on the prowl.

Speaking out against the aforementioned comment by Nicolas Redondo, DEIA wrote that "Fighting violence with violence, in addition to placing its advocates at the same level as the killers, means heightening the spiral of violence [...] It would be infantile and tragic to copy the anti-OAS methods." And incredibly it went on to say: "Now more than ever we need a political solution rather than a police solution." What additional political measures could the PNV mouthpiece want? The rest of Spain definitely did not understand what was going on.

Barcelona's MUNDO DIARIO, like ABC, urged that "we not distinguish between classes of deaths," adding: "Nor should we make a distinction when the perpetrators of a crime belong to an 'autonomous command,' to 'crazy groups' or to more radicalized factions. Such a drawing of distinctions would mean giving our blessing to what perfectly controlled and ideologically homogeneous groups do."⁹⁵

The controversy prompted by German Gonzalez's death continued. Through its Standing Committee, Herri Batasuna itself expressed "its frank condemnation" of the PSOE member's murder. But it also took the opportunity to lash out at parties and unions, denouncing "the foul opportunism of the PSOE and PCE." ESB [Basque Socialist Convergence], one of the groups in the coalition, accused leaders of these parties and of their union federations of having adopted "a fascist attitude by blaming ETA (m) and the entire abertzale Left for German Gonzalez's death, in spite of all the contrary evidence." To ESB, his death was "another link in the 'dirty war' strategy being pursued by Spanish special paramilitary services starting with the unsuccessful attacks in Renteria, Hernani and Amorbieta and with the murder of Tomas Alba." It also accused Ramon Rubial, the old socialist leader, of having "called several times" for this strategy, which consists of using "uncontrolled groups" or "autonomous commands."

As we can see, the radical Basque patriots, by carrying their cynicism to incredible lengths and bandying about lies with inconceivable brazenness, managed to turn the tables so that the PSOE, of which the slain man was a member, was transformed from the accuser into the accused. Needless to say, EGIN, the daily paper that represented these raving patriots, published all these views on front-page inserts, thus effectively contributing to a propaganda campaign modeled exactly after the Nazi methods advocated by Goebbels.⁹⁶

The true nature of the Autonomous Commands was another issue that came up around that time. We have already seen the comments by the two

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branches of ETA. At a press conference in Madrid, Chiqui Benegas, advocating an Antiterrorist Democratic Front, asserted that his party "does not have enough information to ascertain exactly what the Autonomous Commands are." He also recalled that "the first group that claimed responsibility was an autonomous command 'of' ETA, which proved that it came under and belonged to the organization. Jaime San Sebastian, the secretary general of the UGT in the the Basque Country, had similar thoughts. He asserted that "ETA hides itself behind the Autonomous Comamnds to do its dirty work, like this recent slaying." For their part, the mysterious Autonomous Commands published a communique in which they confirmed their responsibility for "the action taken against German Gonzalez," whom they once again termed "a collaborator with the forces of repression." In the communique they stressed "our organizational independence from the various armed groups in the Basque Country (ETA m and the 'liquis' known as the p-m's)." The front page of EGIN read: "Autonomous Commands: We Are Not ETA."⁹⁷

In other ideological circles, including, of course, factions of the Left in Parliament, the Autonomous Commands were merely ETA (m) in disguise. Thus, a few days later, when civil guard Manuel Fuentes Fontan was killed and ETA (m) claimed responsibility, MUNDO OBRERO, the mouthpiece of the PCE, published an editorial entitled "ETA (m) Without Its Ski Mask," in which it said: "It [ETA (m)] is claiming responsibility openly, without putting on the ski mask of the 'autonomous commands.'"⁹⁸

According to sources consulted by CAMBIO 16, the "Autonomous Commands [...], like the 'Berezis' in the times of 'Apala' [...] could come from a new splinter group in the organization." Regarding this possible crisis the magazine also said that "it was recently learned that some of ETA (m)'s historic leaders had been removed from their posts and that several of them, who are now refugees in France, intended to seek exile in Venezuela soon." "The autonomous commands," it continued, "which the leadership has trouble controlling, seem to be acting on their own lately [...] Organized as small independent groups, consisting mostly of very young people, the autonomous commands are ideally trained to carry out any sort of terrorist activity. Many political observers," CAMBIO 16 said, "felt, nevertheless, that a new permanent split had not yet taken place within ETA and that the struggle for power or strategic approaches, as in the times of Argala, was between the advocates of negotiation and the supporters of armed struggle at all costs."⁹⁹

Josep Melia, the secretary of state for intelligence, felt that the Autonomous Commands were getting logistical support from ETA (m) and that, therefore, "the Basque organization is not cleared of responsibility, inasmuch as autonomy is part of ETA's strategic operations."

According to a controversial report from military intelligence services that was apparently drawn up in April 1979 and published some months later by DIARIO 16, the Autonomous Commands were part of the "ETA Complex,"

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in other words, the network of terrorist groups, political parties, labor unions and mass media that were pursuing the same goals as ETA and collaborating with it.

The report said that the Autonomous Commands claim to be nationalistic, pro-assembly, antiparty and anticapitalist. They say they are prepared to take action in the future against members of the Basque autonomous police. Their origins go back to 1976, when members of the ETA worker front who did not join LAIA joined with people from ETA (p-m), berezis, ETA (m) and other independents.

Each command is free to select and explain its actions, but some coordination does exist. They claim to have no links with Herri Batasuna and the KAS alternative and regard the "armed struggle" as one of many elements in their battle. They are critical of ETA (m) and ETA (p-m) stands and feel that such actions have to be "made comprehensive."

The report concludes by stating that the members of these commands have not been identified by name.

Later on, in 1980, after the elections for the Basque Parliament, CAMBIO 16 published an account "from a reliable source" claiming that "ETA (m) has begun a wideranging investigation into the autonomous commands, which on occasion have taken action independently of the terrorist organization. A certain ETA faction is worried about the lack of coordination in the armed groups, especially in light of the new political situation in the Basque Country."¹⁰⁰

ETA (p-m) Strategy. The Kidnaping of Ruperez

ETA (p-m) continued to base its strategy on the same principles, though what it actually did was marked by incomprehensibly wide swings. In this connection, we are already familiar with its "summer campaign," in which it strangely alternated negotiations with murder.

As far as the Basque political situation was concerned, its stand was quite clearly in favor of the statute.

Three "high-level representatives of the Basque organization ETA (p-m)" explained their stand in an interview with CAMBIO 16 shortly before the 25 October referendum. As far as they were concerned, the stage of interclass struggle against the central government was over, and the time had come to "clarify who is serving the interests of the bourgeoisie and who is serving the interests of the working classes of the Basque Country." It so happened, however, that the leftwing Basque political forces "have not been able to plug into the new situation and are maintaining the same old methods and policies as under fascism."

In contrast, ETA (p-m) has begun "to get involved in the new situation, because it is also revolutionary to coordinate our struggle with the struggle inside bourgeois institutions. Thus, we have supported forces

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that are taking advantage of all the mechanisms and loopholes in this 'democracy.'" The allusion to Basque Left is obvious.

They then explained their reasons for supporting the statute, which "has established a national framework." "If we want to arrive at socialism and independence," they said later on, "we will have to wring the statute for all it's worth, because it represents a broader framework of freedoms." Within this framework they saw the possibility of "forging unity [on the Left] in the form of a single party for revolution, as well as a powerful armed organization under this party." In light of these ideas, we can readily understand the subsequent course of action on the part of Basque Left and especially EIA, the main party in the coalition. Two years later began the process of merging the already greatly thinned out Basque Communist Party with EIA, an operation that was portrayed as a step on the road to leftwing unity.

This political strategy did not mean that ETA (p-m) was going to abandon terrorism, which made its approach somewhat irrational and, therefore, inconsistent. "The Basque armed struggle is going to continue," they said. "The Seventh Assembly anticipated that under bourgeois democracy the forms of domination were going to change and that the forms of political and armed struggle had to change too, but this does not mean their abandonment. Within the context of the mass struggle," they explained, [...] "there might be cases in which [...] just grievances cannot be fulfilled. At this point the armed organization steps in to guarantee their fulfillment and to teach the masses, to show them in practice the usefulness and necessity of armed struggle as one more element in the class struggle."

They then went on to say: "We feel that there will be no revolution without an armed uprising, and since we do not believe in the tooth fairy, we realize that we have to begin right now to train our military personnel and get our equipment and supplies ready so that when the masses decide to make the leap, they have the means to do so."

ETA (p-m) stressed the need to "exhaust the statute," raised the possibility of military intervention and asserted that although they did not think it would happen, in the event that it did, "we would not hesitate to attack the government where it might hurt the most, and not necessarily in the Basque Country." They accused ETA (m) of taking an approach that "could trigger such an intervention," which "would take place in a context totally unfavorable to the Basque revolutionary forces, inasmuch as there is no armed organization prepared for victory, nor an organized working class. Blowing up Parliament," they added, "or killing the king would turn the clock back 40 years, and we would have to begin from square one again. If there are factions in the military branch that are after this, we want to tell them that it is totally counterrevolutionary."

They then talked about the issue of negotiations with the government, reiterating that "sure there have been; the transfer of several prisoners,

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the withdrawal of the repressive forces from Soria Prison and the content of the statute itself are the fruit of these negotiations and of the armed struggle." When asked about who did the negotiating for the government, they replied: "We would rather not say, but the fact is that President Suarez himself was directly involved in them after the campaign on the Mediterranean coast [...] and the attack on Gabriel Cisneros, whom we initially wanted to detain and get information from."

They also asserted that they had not negotiated with the French Government but that ETA (m) was, in fact, "negotiating residence papers." Their comment was: "And people say that they are the 'hardliners,' the ones who refuse to negotiate." It also became clear that relations with the "milis" were not exactly cordial. "At the moment, some people are interested in opposing us," and they talked about the use of their customary munitions in attacks such as the one on Tomas Alba or the munitions used by the military branch (Geco) in the attack on Emilio Guitia from Basque Left. "For our part, we are not going to engage in provocation and we hope that they do not either."¹⁰¹

In the above interview ETA (p-m) demonstrated that it, much more so than ETA (m), was a model of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, filtered through the experience of guerrilla warfare in Latin America, especially that of the Tupamaros in Uruguay.

In this context, the "armed struggle" is nothing more than the class struggle carried to its ultimate consequences. This principle had already been clearly expressed by Mao Tse-Tung, who wrote the following in 1938 in "Problems of War and Strategy": "The central task and highest form of the revolution is the conquest of power through armed struggle, resolving the problem of war. This revolutionary principle of Marxism-Leninism is valid everywhere, both in China and in other countries."¹⁰²

The Tupamaros, who have had unquestionable influence on ETA, fully accept this principle, which appears in their best-known texts. "In order to preserve its character at the culmination of the struggle, every vanguard movement must take part in it and be able to technically channel grassroots violence against oppression so that the objective is achieved with the fewest sacrifices possible."¹⁰³

But terrorist acts must not be divorced from the political approach. Here is where we find a more marked difference between ETA (p-m) and ETA (m). Whereas the military faction engages in a sort of spontaneous armed activity, the political-military group, probably thanks to the theoretical work of "Pertur," which we will take up in another chapter, incorporates the "armed struggle" in a broader political strategy. This is what the Tupamaros had been talking about: "I think that every armed apparatus must be part of a mass political apparatus at a certain point in the revolutionary process, and in the event that such an apparatus does not exist, it should help create it." This Tupamaro text could well have been written by Pertur, and after reading it we can understand

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why EIA was created at the Seventh ETA (p-m) Assembly in the fall of 1976. The above quote is followed almost immediately by another that could help us to understand the smooth and much-debated relations between ETA (p-m) and EIA or Basque Left: "We must combat the petty idea in vogue in the party that identifies it with a headquarters, meetings, a newspaper and rules concerning everything around it."¹⁰⁴

We find similar statements being made by Brazilian terrorist groups. Moss states that the controversy that divided the various groups as of 1967 could be boiled down to this question: "Was revolutionary war possible without a 'vanguard party' to whip up the support of the masses and coordinate military operations?" Whereas the famous Marighella (one of the best-known theoreticians of modern terrorism) advocated initiating the "armed struggle" with the hope that things could then be played be ear (this is more or less the approach of ETA-m), "the leaders of Revolutionary Armed Vanguard-Palmares (VAR-Palmares) [...] and the Leninist school considered it suicidal to return to isolated terrorist assaults without trying to build a revolutionary party at the same time."

A little later on, commenting on the kidnaping of the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Burke Elbrick, in September 1969 by Marighella's National Liberation Action (ALN) group, Moss cites the observation of communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes: "A dictatorship cannot be done away with through spectacular actions, without the participation of the masses. Violence makes no sense in the revolutionary process if it does not help to enhance the political awareness and organization of the masses."¹⁰⁵

The same problem of different terrorist approaches exists in the Irish Republican Army. Whereas the Provisionals, who are the equivalent of ETA (m), "firmly believe in the use of force to achieve their objectives," the Officials, who are more like ETA (p-m), "have tried to infiltrate civil rights groups to form an alliance with the entire Left," regarding the "support of the people" as their indispensable premise because "as long as they have [this support], guerrillas will be able to defeat any army, no matter how large."¹⁰⁶

We can see that some other ETA (p-m) positions, such as the "armed struggle" to further "just grievances," have also come from the Tupamaros, who in one of their basic documents, the "document found on 11 January 1967," talk about the revolutionary army's mission of "providing armed cover for strikes."

Pursuing this line, which could theoretically be defined as "soft, qualified terrorism," ETA (p-m) kidnaped Deputy Ruperez in November 1979, an action that had wideranging repercussions.

Javier Ruperez, a UCD deputy and its secretary of international relations, was kidnaped on Sunday 11 November by ETA (p-m) as he was leaving his home on the way to the closing session of the First Ibero-American Round Table of Democratic Parties.

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After the initial hours of confusion, when it was even thought, as DIARIO 16 reported, that the kidnapers could be "Latin American groups" such as the Argentine Montoneros, Algerians, members of the Polisario Front or the MPAIAC [Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Islands], a communique claiming responsibility was received from ETA (p-m). The ETA's action was part of its "Estatutoarekin presoak kalera" (Under the statute, the prisoners in the street) campaign, and specifically it marked the beginning of the "third phase" of the campaign. The first phase, the bombings along the Mediterranean coast, had ended, according to them, with partial success: the withdrawal of the FOP from Soria Prison. The second phase had been the bombings at Barajas, Atocha and Chamartin. The third stage was now beginning with Ruperez's kidnaping. "It is not by chance," they said, "that we have decided to attack the ruling party once again (an allusion to the attack on Gabriel Cisneros), inasmuch as it is most to blame for the recent crackdown in the Basque Country [...] [where] the government is responding with torture and murder to the people's demand for amnesty under the statute."

Indeed, 3 weeks prior to this, Basque Left and, specifically, its deputy, Juan Maria Bandres, had begun a protest campaign against torture, which they claimed was still practiced in the Basque Country. Bandres had submitted a dossier on torture to the interior minister on 23 October, kicking off a controversy marked by charges and denials.

The suspicion was that there was a connection between the kidnaping and the torture, to which the first ETA (p-m) communique referred. As a result, Bandres was subjected to harsh criticism, and in the Basque General Council itself, the UCD's Viana and the PSOE's Benegas asked him to "clarify his links with ETA (p-m)." The abertzale deputy repeated his well-known answers that his only link with ETA (p-m) was that he had defended some of its activists in court.

But the press was not about to believe Bandres. The cover of issue 416 of CAMBIO 16 read "ETA, Heads and Tails" with pictures of Bandres under "heads" and of Ruperez under "tails." In the editorial, Juan Tomas de Salas talked about "the campaign [...] by Deputy Bandres and his followers in connection with alleged torture in the Basque Country," stating that "no one believes that first they learned of the torture and then decided to kidnap Javier Ruperez in protest. Everything points to the reverse. First they decided to kidnap Javier Ruperez and then they kicked off a short and noisy antitorture campaign to heat up the atmosphere." Further on he asserted that apparently "in certain frenzied sectors of Basque opinion, he who does not kill does not make the grade, and ETA (p-m) was in a hurry to commit its shocking crime to atone in terrorist circles for its pacifist crime of having voted yes on the Autonomy Statute." He also attacked Bandres, stating: "A person cannot be a member of Parliament and at the same time of a 'political-military' front with the terrorists. Parliament should get involved, set up an investigatory committee respected by all and dissolve and prosecute the political parties and figures that are involved in the institutional system, on the one hand, and play along with barbarians, on the other."¹⁰⁷

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Mention was also made of the case of the three Herri Batasuna legislators, Monzon and Letamendia (deputies) and Castells (senator). Some time ago, the courts had asked Parliament for permission to begin proceedings against them, but the government wanted any decision postponed so that they would not be made "heroes" on the eve of the statute referendum.

Concern over Ruperez's possible death became very intense after a few initial days of optimism. As it had announced, ETA (p-m) issued a second communique on the 15th setting forth two specific conditions for Ruperez's release: the release of five ETA prisoners who, according to them, were ill and an investigation by the Basque General Council into torture.

Hopes were rudely dashed when, on the 17th, a third communique ruled out negotiations of any sort: "Don't get your hopes up. Javier Ruperez will not be released unless our two demands are met." It concluded: "We hope that the government gives in soon, at least before our possibilities for holding the prisoner longer run out."

We must bear in mind that ETA (p-m) had carried out two types of kidnappings: brief ones, in which the individual was held for a short while, just a few hours even, and freed unharmed, except in several cases when they were shot in the legs, and long-term ones, of which there were essentially three instances (Arrasate, Berazadi and Ibarra). As we know, the kidnappings of the latter two ended in their death.

Moreover, when the kidnaping of Ruperez took place, the Basque Country had been experiencing a practically uninterrupted surge of terrorism since the murder of socialist German Gonzalez on 27 October. As we have already mentioned, ETA (m) killed civil guard Manuel Fuentes Fontan in Portugalete on 31 October and police chief Antonio Mesa Portillo on 2 November in Bilbao. On the 7th, ETA (p-m) kidnaped industrialist Jose Luis Calvo and wounded him in the leg, apparently for not paying the revolutionary tax. On the 8th, the "milis" machine-gunned the Civil Guard Barracks in Portugalete, wounding two civilians and a guard. On the 10th, two more civil guards were gravely wounded in Salvatierra (Alava). On the 12th, a day after the kidnaping of Ruperez, ETA (m) assaulted a factory doing repair work on the generator for the Lemoniz powerplant, blew up one section of the building, briefly kidnaped 11 individuals and robbed 3 cars. The "milis" killed an ICONA [National Institute for the Preservation of Nature] forest ranger in Oyarzun (Guipuzcoa) that same day too.

As was to be expected, this terrorist onslaught heightened fears for the fate of the UCD deputy, even though a harassed Bandres publicly expressed his confidence about Ruperez's personal safety since, in his opinion, ETA (p-m) was in charge of the kidnaping, which meant that the hostage was not in the hands of any "crazy command."

Because Ruperez was a well-known figure in international forums, an extremely broad-based movement arose denouncing his kidnaping and calling

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for his immediate release. From the U.S. State Department to Radio Moscow and the Palestine Liberation Organization, voices throughout the world spoke up for Ruperez. Of particular significance were the appeal for his release from Amnesty International and the plea of Pope John Paul II during one of his regular homilies to the public audiences on Wednesdays. In Madrid, moreover, a Solidarity Committee for the release of Javier Ruperez was formed; it was chaired by Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez and attempted to contact ETA (p-m).

The strong worldwide reaction and the fact that individuals and organizations of consequence were calling for Ruperez's release were a harsh blow to the the terrorist group. On the 19th ETA (p-m) issued a fourth communique that was much more moderate in tone than the previous one and that expressed indirect acceptance of a negotiated solution.¹⁰⁸

Logically, the press also reacted to the kidnaping. EL PAIS wrote: "As has always been said, it is impossible to choose between the plague and cholera. Both are fatal diseases. It is also impossible to choose between ETA (m), ETA (p-m) and the autonomous commands. They are all criminal. We can only analyze the different attitudes that are behind the pulling of triggers and the kidnaping operations. In this regard, the violence of ETA (p-m) stands out as the sinister result of a confused assimilation of the manuals that combine Leninism with adventurism. In a recent editorial we indicated that ETA (p-m) is futilely striving with its bloodshed to reconcile in practice the struggle of the masses with the armed struggle, [...] the complementarity of which is an enormous fraud." It went on to say: "Furthermore, the terrorists have placed Onaindia, Bandres and their fellow members of Basque Left in their most ethical political light. Thus, Mr Bandres has acknowledged that Mr Ruperez has his previous democratic efforts in his favor and has called for his release. This highlights what has seemed obvious for some time now: that Basque Left is as powerless to control ETA (p-m) and Herri Batasuna is to influence ETA (m)."¹⁰⁹

A few days later the same paper returned to the issue of ETA (p-m)'s inconsistencies and pointed out that "it is locked into a vicious, blood-stained, hellish circle. On the one hand, it disapproves of the 'foolish acts' of the 'autonomous commands' or the 'milis,' points out that their actions are irresponsible, provocative and prejudicial to possible amnesties and tries to place its own armed struggle in a political perspective. On the other hand, however, its grim-faced competition with its terrorist rivals, the fear of losing its leading role and the uncontrollable internal logic of resorting to violence to attain political objectives, leads it inexorably to the savage bloodletting at Barajas, Atocha and Chamartin, to the apparent dead-end of Javier Ruperez's kidnaping and to the boomeranging of their own harsh description of German Gonzalez Lopez's murderers."

After noting that ETA (p-m) had been influenced by "the Leninist practices subsequent to the revolution of 1905," it continued: "But we should not overlook another factor, its revolutionary infantilism,

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which has two facets. One has to do with an immature single-mindedness, and the other involves reading all of the comic books and seeing all of the movies with avenging heroes (from Juan Centella to Superman, the Coyote, the Masked Warrior and Captain Thunder). This legacy of the youthful Lenin, on the one hand, and of Roberto Alcazar, on the other, explains the inconsistency with which the 'poli-milis' advocate the 'unity of the Left' and, at the same time, hurl into the rubbish heap of history the socialist and communist workers who denounce their crimes and assaults."¹⁰

Ruperez's kidnaping dragged on, and his jailers allowed him to write to his family and sent photographs of him that were published by the press. Most likely in an attempt to take a firm stand against terrorism and its accomplices, at its plenary session on the 27th Congress approved four petitions paving the way for the long-delayed prosecution of Telesforo Monzon and Francisco Letamendia on charges of justifying terrorism and resisting arrest. The PNV and Bandres, from Basque Left, voted against the motion, even though, according to Basque communist Lerchundi, "a short while ago they called Monzon and Letamendia fascists. I think," he added, "that they were afraid of the campaign leading up to the elections for the [Basque] Parliament."¹¹

The very day before, Bandres had sent a letter to the president of Congress in which he complained about the "public slander" directed against him ("while no authorized voice spoke up in my defense in the chamber"), about other attacks on Basque Left and about police conduct in the Basque Country, and declared that "the time has come for me [...] to take a break from my activities in Parliament and again become what I have always been: a defense attorney."¹² To Bandres, the approval of the petitions for prosecution was a "disaster" and represented "a harsh blow" to those of us who still believe in the Parliament, while it will heighten the distrust of the sectors that no longer believe in it, such as the ones represented by Letamendia and Monzon." The deputy-defense attorney's interpretation of the law and of a State law is incomprehensible.

The issue of negotiations was up in the air during the entire time that Ruperez was being held hostage. Official spokesmen always denied that any were under way, while on other occasions sources that seemed reliable confirmed them. Professor Ruiz-Gimenez, the chairman of the committee for Ruperez's release, said afterwards that there had not been negotiations but there had been dialogue. ETA (p-m) itself said something similar. There were unquestionably contacts, and Ruiz-Gimenez himself was a key participant. Others were involved as well, such as attorney Ruiz Balerdi, who was to become famous some months later, in 1981, as a result of his role in securing the release of another ETA (p-m) hostage, industrialist Luis Suner.

There was also talk of negotiations in a letter that Ruperez sent to President Suarez and that was made public only after Ruperez was freed on 12 December. This is what Ruperez wrote: "The choice is a very

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simple one: my life versus the government's refusal to negotiate. What ETA wants, deep down, is just to hold negotiations, and it would not be the first time this happened." He says later that his death "would not help to calm down the mood in a region without whose peace we will never have peace or harmony in the rest of Spain." Ruperez also told Suarez: "Your decision making negotiations possible, negotiations that in no event will entail impossible or heavy demands, will, I am sure, pave the way for rational approaches in the grave situation that has us all paralyzed."

The fruits of this negotiation or dialogue soon came to light. In its 12 December session Parliament established, by acclamation, as did the Basque General Council, a committee to investigate allegations of torture, and once Ruperez was freed, several ETA prisoners were discreetly released from jail.

EL ALCAZAR angrily raised its voice over what it regarded as the "kidnaping" of Spain. "Not a single voiced was raised against the investigation begun into allegations of 'torture' by the police and Civil Guard," and in an insert entitled "EL ALCAZAR Backs Forces of Public Order," it said that "in the face of the submissive assent of the Congress of Deputies and the profound silence of the so-called representatives of the Spanish people, we join with the unsullied honor of the Civil Guard, the General Police Corps and the National Police and we repudiate all of the vile attitudes that have made our people the saddest and most distressed people in Europe." In another insert the paper pondered "the price of [Ruperez's] freedom" and ended up by stating: "We demand the immediate resignation of this administration and the formation of a Cabinet of National Salvation."¹³ Once again EL ALCAZAR was calling for a coup d'etat.

Pressure from the Far Right was also felt, as they took advantage of the situation to secure the release of Civil Guard Lt Col Antonio Tejero Molina and Infantry Capt Ricardo Saenz de Ynestrillas from the prison in which they were awaiting trial for their involvement in "Operation Galaxia." The coup plotters were out on the street on 8 December and were thus able to begin planning the next coup on 23 February 1981, which had such repercussions on national political life."¹⁴

A few days later, ETA (p-m) granted one of its customary interviews, in which it asserted that the "execution" of Ruperez would not have created any trauma for them. They stressed that negotiations had not taken place and expressed satisfaction with the results of their operation. "We can say that we know the inner workings of the ruling party better than we used to, and this enables us to combat it more effectively." They reaffirmed their determination to continue the "armed struggle." "As long as there is a single prisoner in jail, regardless of his political beliefs, we will continue to engage in armed intervention." Furthermore, they did not feel guilty of coercion: "We think that Ruperez has spoken out quite freely, much more freely than our activists held at police

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stations, much more freely. Ruperez has not been subjected to any sort of physical or mental torture." Ruperez saw things differently: "The feeling that you might lose your life is a truly anguishing experience," he declared shortly after his release.¹¹⁵

Many questions and doubts remained; ABC summarized them thus: "The word that has been brushed aside, especially in the hours following the kidnaped deputy's release, has been 'negotiation.' The government has officially denied that there was any sort of negotiation, a quid pro quo clearly involving blackmail. We would like to think so, even though people around us keep pointing to signs that might prove the opposite [...] President Suarez himself has expressed his conviction that this outcome has preserved the dignity of the State. We would like to think so."¹¹⁶

EL PAIS addressed the issue in a much more complex and ambiguous manner. After having questioned the timing of the prosecution requests ("Let us hope that that yesterday's vote is not remembered as an irrevocable political mistake," it said on 28 November after the requests were granted, in an editorial opposing the campaign against Bandres) and having opposed the extension of the Antiterrorist Law of 4 December 1978 (its 5 December editorial), it commented on Ruperez's release, noting several "pessimistic signs" such as "the persistence of a bloodthirsty, absurd terrorism in the Basque Country [...] the authoritarian regression reflected in the offensive against Deputy Bandres, the unconstitutional Decree-Law to extend the Antiterrorist Law and the requests to prosecute Messrs Monzon and Letamendia [...]" It also remarked that "why not come out and say it [...] the decision to release a hostage safe and sound without a police encirclement that would have made it inevitable, gives us some small, though not trifling, hope that some day ETA (p-m) might (a remote possibility that we cannot, however, rule out) abandon the insane premises of its terrorism, violence and armed struggle and accept the ground rules of negotiations, pacification and democratic freedoms." Showing an enormous understanding for the terrorists and sounding almost like Saint Francis, the Madrid daily went on to say: "We know that it is very difficult to dismount from a tiger and that an attempt to do so probably exposes the rider to the risk of being devoured by the beast or shot down by the hunter." Further on, applying the old saying that every cloud has a silver lining, it asserted: "In his hazardous, involuntary and reprehensible voyage, Ruperez has probably seen not the true face of the moon, but the sincerity, which is no less real by being warped, with which a few desperate boys experience, from their own peculiar and errant angle, some of the effects on the Basque Country of a government policy that has all too often been irrelevant, timid and simply following in the wake of events."¹¹⁷ We could say that as far as EL PAIS is concerned, the only one to blame is the government, while the terrorists are the result of "the force of events" and, therefore, condemnable but, however, pardonable and even understandable.

Meanwhile, ETA (m) kept reminding people of its existence through its usual methods. On 15 November it seriously wounded a lieutenant colonel in San Sebastian. On 28 November, three civil guards (Pedro Sanchez Marfil, Angel Garcia Perez and Antonio Ales Martinez) were murdered in Azpeitia (Guipuzcoa), and on 18 December the janitor at a school in Vitoria, Juan Cruz Montoya Ortueta, became another victim of the military faction's machine guns.

But terrorism was not alone in charging the atmosphere in the country. On 13 December, two youths were killed in Madrid, apparently by police gunfire, during a demonstration against the Workers Statute that Congress passed that day, a demonstration that was joined by groups of students protesting against the university autonomy bill.

Furthermore, on 17 December five of GRAPO's most dangerous activists (Cerdan Calixto, Hierro Chomon, Collazo Araujo, Brotons Beneyto and Martin Luna) escaped from Zamora jail in one of the most spectacular and inexplicable breakouts ever attempted from a Spanish prison. EL PAIS took the opportunity to again refer to "the continuing suspicions that "the GRAPO activists are the cover for a more than elaborate setup subject to all sorts of manipulation and infiltration [...] All of the efforts by official agencies," it added, "to convince the public that GRAPO was indeed just a leftwing terrorist group not susceptible to the sinister manipulation that certain parallel intelligence agencies are striving to engage in in this country, have been fruitless, perhaps unreasonably or unfairly, but in any event, fruitless."¹¹⁸

Their escape shattered the tranquility that GRAPO's breakup had brought and raised fears that the strange and mysterious terrorist group would rise up again like a sinister phoenix. It was, in fact, difficult to understand how a 25-meter tunnel could have been dug over a period of 6 months without raising suspicions. Moreover, all indications were that they had gotten outside help. GRAPO continued to prompt many unanswered questions.¹¹⁹

ETA Against Basque Autonomy

When the Guernica Statute took effect (as well as the Sau Statute in Catalonia), it set in motion the process of establishing Basque home rule institutions. The elections for the Basque Parliament represented the major landmark for which Basque political parties began to prepare. The future Basque Government would be formed on the basis of the outcome of these elections, which were scheduled for March.

The terrorists got involved in the process too, demonstrating for the nth time that progress towards autonomy did not mitigate ETA's determination to engage in violence. ETA (m), which unlike ETA (p-m), had not accepted the statute, began 1980 with a new upsurge in violence that took 8 lives in January, 10 in February, 5 in March and 6 in April. Of particular significance was the murder on 10 January in Vitoria of Comdr Jesus Maria Velasco Zuazola, the head of the Alava "border

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guards," a kind of foral police that prefigured the future home rule police force. Commander Velasco had, in fact, been considered a candidate for the chief of this police force, which was one of the Basques' most persistent demands. His murder was interpreted as an attack on the future Basque institutions.

He was the third person killed that year. On the 5th, Jesus Garcia Garcia was slain in Baracaldo. He was a rightwing extremist who owned a bar that had been the subject of an article in the magazine INTERVIU a few weeks before that, based on the statements of a former national police officer, implicated him in the activities of the "uncontrolled" rightwing extremist commandos. Three days later, on the 8th, a former civil guard, Sebastian Arroyo Gonzalez, became another victim of ETA (m)'s machine guns in Alsasua. On 23 January, another Baracaldo bar owner, Alfredo Ramos Vazquez, whom an article in INTERVIU mentioned as another rightwing extremist, was killed after being kidnaped.¹²⁰

All of these incidents brought the atmosphere in the Basque Country to the flash point. ETA (p-m) announced that it would go on the counter-offensive, and the Far Right, which had already killed Herri Batasuna activist Carlos Saldiza in Lezo (Guipuzcoa) on 15 January, announced that it would respond to any killing with more killing. GAE [Spanish Armed Groups] claimed responsibility for the above murder. The same group also claimed responsibility for the attack on the Aldama Bar in the Baracaldo district of Alonsotegui, where 4 persons died and 10 were wounded. This was on 20 January. The same rightwing extremist organization carried out a series of attacks on and burnings of newspaper stands that sold the magazine INTERVIU.

On 1 February, the same day that six civil guards were slain in Bilbao, the Council of Ministers appointed Maj Gen Jose Saenz de Santamaria, who was also a National Police inspector, the government's special delegate in the Basque Country for the battle against terrorism. This renowned military officer was being relied upon to boost morale in law enforcement agencies that were showing signs of discouragement in the protracted and tough battle against terror. Commenting on his appointment the next day, ABC called for a "plan for the Basque Country, which we believe is indispensable, including emergency measures commensurate with the emergency situation."¹²¹

After so much wavering in its editorial line on terrorism, EL PAIS returned to one of its original approaches by stressing the qualified need for political measures, thus agreeing with the PNV and other Basque parties that "lending substance to the statute" was a prerequisite for and would even suffice to put an end to terrorism. It expressed its trust in the PNV and was confident that Basque Left would "detach itself" from ETA (p-m). "The PNV's denunciations of violence in general and of ETA violence in particular are so numerous and clear-cut now that its former equivocation in this regard has been left far behind," it said on 2 February. "The Basque nationalists' rejection of the criminal and counterproductive 'dirty war' operations carried out by

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rightwing extremist groups on either side of the Pyrenees does not only not invalidate their condemnation of ETA murders but legitimizes it morally, politically and historically [...] Furthermore, although it is true that Basque Left's break with ETA (p-m) is open to misinterpretations and cannot yet be regarded as irreversible, the prospect that violence might be put to an unequivocal and definitive end should be encouraged by all those who desire democracy and peace in the Basque Country. Terrorism," it went on to say, can be eradicated by police action only when it is an exclusively police-related problem, but terrorism will continue to be immune to such action as long as certain sectors of the population, for whatever reason, support it, remain neutral or simply do not combat it." In this vein, it had the following to say about the appointment of Saenz de Santamaria: "Let us hope that this new post helps to bring about the difficult combination of a police struggle against terrorism and the loss of the terrorists' political bases."¹²²

The "dirty war" being waged by various rightwing extremist groups was once again causing concern. On Saturday 2 February, the Basque-Spanish Battalion killed Basque Left activist Jesus Maria Zubikarai, and the body of a leftwing activist who was born in Bilbao, Yolanda Gonzalez Martin, was found in Madrid. Thus ended another bloody weekend; in addition to the six civil guards and these two slayings, two ETA members were killed in the attack on the civil guards: 10 deaths in less than 48 hours.

The dread of an interminable war between gangs of varying political persuasions spread throughout political circles, and there was talk of Spain turning into another Argentina or El Salvador. Some observers, whom we could almost call optimistic, saw this upsurge in ETA (m) terrorism as a last-ditch offensive because it realized that when the Basque autonomy institutions started up in the near future, it would be out in the cold. ETA (m)'s latest attacks, which the old "beretis" apparently pushed the hardest for, were viewed as an attempt to force negotiations that would enable them to secure a spot on the new Basque political scene.

The ETA (m) communique claiming responsibility for the death of the six civil guards stressed, in fact, that "ETA, as well as the overwhelming majority of the Basque people, is not motivated by a desire for war, but rather by a desire for a peace [...] that will give the Basque people back the sovereign framework of democratic freedoms that was forcibly taken away from us." They then stated that a cease-fire was possible if the government accepted the "KAS alternative."

With the 9 March elections for the Basque Parliament drawing near, the situation was very precarious. What was regarded as a "shutdown" by Madrid of the autonomy process, especially with regard to transferring powers, had caused people to lose confidence in politicians, which, in the opinion of many, encouraged the violent solutions advocated by ETA.

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Moreover, the fact that the elections for the Basque Parliament were the fifth in just 2 years seemed to promote voter abstention.

None of this, however, was beneficial to the Herri Batasuna coalition, which was experiencing internal strife. While the majority faction represented by HASI was arguing against running in the election, the other three members of the coalition (ESB, ANV and LAIA) wanted to compete.

A poll taken by the Abaco Institute on the Herri Batasuna constituency came out around this time, and the numbers it showed were cause for concern. Some 65 percent of the coalition's voters were in favor of independence, and if independence were not granted, 69.2 percent (some 119,100 of the 172,000 people who voted for HB) said they would back an armed struggle.¹²³ Findings such as these explain the perdurability of terrorism.

The climate of violence that prevailed in the Basque Country, together with the opinion polls on voter preferences, which evidenced gains for the nationalist parties and losses for the federalist parties, caused profound concern in Madrid in circles close to the administration. Some even thought that it would be a good idea not to hold the elections, and in fact the leader of Popular Alliance, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, had been calling for just such a postponement.

In addition to the individuals slain by ETA, as listed in footnote 120, which shows how army officers continued to be targets of ETA terrorism, there were other killings that evidenced the gravity of the situation. During confrontations in the Madrid district of Vallecas between law enforcement agencies and rightwing extremist groups that were protesting the Civil Government's calling off a demonstration organized by the rightist National Labor Force, one young man, Vicente Cuervo Calvo, was killed, apparently by rightwing extremists. A municipal police officer was slain in Hospitalet de Llobregat. Moreover, the fact that the alleged murderers of Yolanda Gonzalez had close ties to New Force prompted a loud outcry against the party, which various political groups wanted declared illegal. EL PAIS had this to say: "New Force must clarify its background and state clearly where it stands, in light of the latest murders by the Far Right. It can then define its MSI [Italian Social Movement]-like approach without being the object of justified suspicions that it has gotten one foot in Congress to secure parliamentary respectability while keeping the other mixed up in shady European machinations. Otherwise, it will continue to be an abhorrent party."¹²⁴

A member of the National Police was found to be tied in with the murder of young Yolanda Gonzalez, which triggered even louder protests by the leftwing parties, which were calling for investigations into the roots of rightwing terrorism in certain institutions in which Francoist elements had taken refuge. Interior Minister Ibanez Freire told the Congress of Deputies that the country could not make a distinction

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between offensive, "evil" terrorism (ETA) and defensive, "good" terrorism (the Far Right). He denounced "without qualifications or exceptions, those who preach or practice terrorism, even if they claim that it is merely in response," because "terrorism against terrorism is just more terrorism."

ETA (p-m) made itself felt in the Basque election campaign with a daring stroke in Madrid: On 21 February, the "poli-milis" hurled a grenade at Moncloa Palace, the residence of the government president, and although it caused no major damage, it showed the terrorist organization's capabilities. A few days later, in an unusual press conference "somewhere in the Basque Country," ETA (p-m) claimed responsibility. As was to be expected, once again the issue arose of how to defend against terrorists who seemed to have total freedom of movement and action.

One of the most talked-about terrorism-related trials in Spanish history also took place during the second half of February, and the defendants in the so-called "Atocha case" were sentenced to lengthy jail terms totaling some 500 years. The judges did not accept the motive of "patriotism" that the defense attorneys tried to establish, ruling that "they acted out of hatred and a desire for vengeance." Oddly enough, from a legal standpoint, the verdict rejected the charges of terrorism that the attorney general's office had argued for but accepted the claim that crimes of murder were involved.

The political situation grew precarious in February not only because of the climate of violence but also because the lack of firm, resolute political leadership on the part of President Suarez was becoming increasingly obvious. The referendum on home rule for Andalusia was held on the last day of the month, and it proved to be one of Suarez's and the UCD's most flagrant mistakes. It was becoming more and more evident that the government was not governing and that Suarez was proving sadly inadequate. "First failure," cried CAMBIO 16 on the cover of issue 452. Thus began an 11-month period that would conclude with the president's resignation and during which Suarez was totally unable to react. The administration underwent several overhauls, but none of the teams was equal to the occasion. It was the president who was lacking.

Voting took place for the Basque Parliament on 9 March, as scheduled. Abstention ran high (40.7 percent in Alava, 40.6 in Vizcaya and 42.1 in Guipuzcoa), and as expected, the big winner was the PNV with 25 deputies, followed by HB with 11, PSOE with 9, UCD with 6, EE with 6, AP with 2 and PCE with 1. It was obvious that the nationwide parties had slipped and that the nationalists, whether moderate or radical, had won. The outlook was not exactly bright.

The election results did not hold out much hope that terrorism would cease. EL PAIS commented on "the unstoppable rise of abertzale nationalism" and came to the conclusion that "grassroots support (probably largely from the youngest segments of the electorate) for the professional killers, thieves and machine-gun toters is not on the wane, quite the

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opposite." On the other hand, it felt that "the voter abstention at this election shows dramatically that enormous segments of the Basque population are fed up with the quagmire of daily violence and civil strife in which they are caught up."¹²⁵

According to some reports, the PNV wanted a "cease-fire" at all costs and to secure one was willing to hold talks with ETA (m) and ETA (p-m), but the military faction in particular continued its "armed actions."

The Honorable Taradellas, who is still president of the Catalan Legislative Assembly, went much farther. In statements to the Portuguese paper O TEMPO, he said that he was convinced of the inevitability of a fearsome, violent military intervention in the Basque Country, and he advocated as a solution "the sort of negotiations that General de Gaulle held with the Algerians." A short while later, he partially recanted in EL PERIODICO, saying that that was not exactly how he had put it and voicing confidence that a Suarez-Garaicoechea pact could resolve the ETA problem.

What some newspapers were calling an ETA (m) truce, starting on 20 February and extending through the Basque elections, was shattered on 18 March in Madrid, when the terrorist group tried to kill General Esquivias. Although the general emerged unharmed, Military Police soldier Jose Luis Ramirez Villa was slain.

Shortly thereafter, from 24 to 29 March, ETA (m) murdered four persons in the Basque Country, including the Count of Aresti and 14-year old Jose Maria Piris Carballo, who innocently picked up a gym bag containing an ETA bomb.

Around the same time (25 March), the police culminated a major operation with the arrest of 22 ETA(p-m) activists, one of the heaviest blows dealt to the organization. These arrests helped to clear up many of the ETA attacks in recent months, such as the attack on Deputy Cisneros and the kidnaping of Deputy Ruperez, and the police also discovered the house in Hoyo de Pinares where Ruperez had been held. The bombings during ETA (p-m)'s 1979 summer campaign were also explained. Among those arrested were several women, some of them French citizens.¹²⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. CAMBIO 16, No 363, 19 November 1978, editorial, "ETA Assassins," p 19.
2. In the same issue of CAMBIO 16 cited in the above footnote, Jose Oneto, in his column "The Major Offensive" (p 21), talked about President Suarez being "promptly informed about everything relating to the Basque Country and obsessed with a terrorism that could wreck all political plans, including his own continued residence at Moncloa Palace."
3. Concerning this police action, see CAMBIO 16, No 370, "The Big Dragnet. Conesa Against ETA," pp 18 and ff.

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4. See CAMBIO 16, issue cited in footnote 2; also see in that same issue the article "The CIA Against ETA. Madrid Asks Washington for Help," p 25. This article did not go over well in Washington and even prompted a diplomatic protest, submitted by the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, expressing the Carter administration's displeasure "over the leak." See CAMBIO 16, No 368, 24 December 1978, "The CIA is Furious with the Spanish Government," p 31.
5. MUNDO OBRERO, 20 December 1980, editorial, "The Vitoria Declaration," p 5.
6. EL PAIS, 24 December 1978, editorial, "The Basque General Council's Pacification Program," p 6.
7. CAMBIO 16, No 368, 24 December 1978, "Basque Country: Steps Towards Peace ETA Seeks Political Solutions," pp 22 and ff.
8. CAMBIO 16, No 369, 31 December 1978, "The Death of Argala. Five Years Later," p 40.
9. See article cited in footnote 7.
10. CAMBIO 16, No 371, 14 January 1979, editorial, "Don't Lament."
11. Those killed in late December were Jose Maria Arrizabalaga Arcocha, head of Carlist Traditional Youth of Vizcaya, slain on the 27th in Ondarroa; Lisardo Sampil, a taxicab driver in Yurre (Vizcaya), killed on the 30th, and Jose Luis Vicente Canton, retired, murdered in Llodio (Alava) on the last day of the year.
12. EL PAIS, 10 January 1979, Open Forum, "Regrettable Reply," p 13.
13. EL ALCAZAR, 4 January 1979, p 1.
14. Ibid., editorial, "Guarantees for Spain," p 3.
15. EL PAIS, 4 January 1979, p 9.
16. Ibid , editorial, "The Lights of Provocation," pp 1, 6.
- 16 bis. EL PAIS, 5 January 1979, editorial, "The Traps of Provocation," p 6.
17. EL PAIS, 10 January 1979, editorial, "Brigade Against Terrorism," p 8.
18. DEIA, 10 January 1979, p 12.
19. CAMBIO 16, No 372, 21 January 1979, "The Basques Against ETA," pp 18 and ff.

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20. Ibid.
21. EL PAIS, 12 January 1979, editorial, "The Church of Pontius Pilate," p 6.
22. CAMBIO 16, No 373, 28 January 1979, "ETA Members in France. All Names," pp 16 and ff. Also see Jose Oneto's column "Storm Over France," p 15.
23. LE MONDE, 16 January 1979, "Overseas Bulletin," p 1.
24. EL PAIS, 17 January 1979, editorial, "A False Alibi," p 8.
25. IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, editorial, "Spain's Anguish," p 1.
26. CAMBIO 16, No 377, 25 February 1979, "The Basque Country: Policies Even in Soup," pp 26 and ff.
27. The following were the ETA murders in February 1979:
 - Jose Diez Perez, civil guard, 3 February, Andoain (Guipuzcoa)
 - Esteban Saez Gomez, civil guard, 4 February (Tolosa (Guipuzcoa)
 - Jose Antonio Vivo Undabarrena, mayor of Olaberria, 6 February, Olaberria (Guipuzcoa)
 - Vicente Irusta Altamira, civilian, 8 February, Ibarri (Guipuzcoa)
 - Cesar Pinilla Sanz, municipal policeman, 12 February, Munguia (Vizcaya)
 - Sergio Burrajo Palacios, lieutenant colonel, 14 February, Vitoria
 - Benito Arroyo Gutierrez, civil guard, 23 February, Deva (Guipuzcoa)
28. CAMBIO 16, No 379, 11 March 1979, "Kidnaping With a Happy Ending. Abaitua Returns Home," pp 36, 37.
29. Ibid.
30. CAMBIO 16, No 379, 11 March 1979, "A Clean Slash," pp 23, 24.
31. EL PAIS, 4 March 1979, editorial, "The Elections in the Basque Country."
32. With regard to all these positions, see CAMBIO 16, No 381, 25 March 1979, "What the Basque Radicals Want," pp 16 and ff.
33. We should recall that of the four components of Herri Batasuna, two are legal parties, Basque Nationalist Action (ANV) and the Basque Socialist party (ESB), and the other two are not, HASI and LAIA.
34. CAMBIO 16, No 381, 25 March 1979, editorial, "The Ayatollahs of Spain."
35. EL PAIS, 17 March 1979, editorial, "Some Questions About the Basque Country," p 8.

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36. LA VANGUARDIA, 6 March 1979, editorial, "The Vote of Violence," p 5.
37. CAMBIO 16, No 384, 15 April 1979, "The Left's Triumph," by Jose Oneto, p 13.
38. CAMBIO 16, No 382, 1 April 1979, "Bombs in Catalonia," pp 16 and ff.
39. EL PAIS, 11 April 1979, editorial, "The Basque Country: Only Negotiations Remain," p 6.
40. CAMBIO 16, No 387, 6 May 1979, "The Buried Secrets of GRAPO," pp 31, 32.
41. EL PAIS, 22 April 1979, editorial, "A Man, a Terrorist, a Witness," p 10.
42. CAMBIO 16, No 387, 6 May 1979, "Lerdo de Tejada: Prison Leave and Flight," p 29.
43. CAMBIO 16, No 388, 13 May 1979, "The Guernica Embrace," pp 16 and ff; also see Juan Tomas de Salas's editorial with the same title, p 3; Jose Oneto's column "A Peace Plan," p 15, and the statements by the PNV president, Carlos Garaicoechea, "Peace Hinges on the Statute," pp 30, 31.
44. Ibid.
45. CAMBIO 16, No 389, 20 May 1979, "Children Who Kill. Nazi Outbreak in Spain," pp 18 and ff.
46. INFORMACIONES, 4 May 1979, editorial, "Halting the Fascists," p 2.
47. With regard to the debate, see EL PAIS, 24 May 1979, pp 14 and 15.
48. LA VANGUARDIA, 25 May 1979, editorial, "Law and Order: Premise for Freedom," p 5.
49. CAMBIO 16, No 392, 10 June 1979, "Days of Horror," pp 22 and ff.
50. Ibid., editorial, "Mr President," p 3.
51. EL PAIS, 27 May 1979, editorial, "The Strategy of Tension," pp 1, 6.
52. DIARIO 16, editorial, "Democracy Is Not to Blame," 26 May 1979, p 4.
53. ABC, 27 May 1979, editorial, "Before Democracy," p 2.
54. LA VANGUARDIA, 27 May 1979, editorial, "Words Are No Longer of Any Use," p 7.

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55. INFORMACIONES, 28 May 1979, editorial, "Democracy Put to the Test."
56. EL PAIS, 29 May 1979, editorial, "The Government Remains Silent," pp 1, 10.
57. LE FIGARO, 28 May 1979, editorial, "Antidemocratic Terrorism."
58. LE MONDE, 29 May 1979, editorial, "Spain's Anguish."
59. ABC, 5 June 1979, editorial, "The Terrorist Logic," p 2.
60. LA VANGUARDIA, 15 June 1979, editorial, "Second-Class Deaths..."
61. CAMBIO 16, No 395, 1 July 1979, "The Big Pact," by Jose Oneto, p 19.
62. CAMBIO 16, No 396, 8 July 1979, "With the Statute Will Come Peace," interview with Mario Onaindia, p 25.
63. CAMBIO 16, No 396, 8 July 1979, "Here Come the Federals!" pp 20 and ff.
64. DEIA, 26 June 1979, editorial, "The Last Car on the Last Train," p 2.
65. DEIA, 27 June 1979, editorial, "A Meeting for History," p 2.
66. CAMBIO 16, No 397, 15 July 1979, "ETA Goes to the Beach," pp 14 and ff.
67. ABC, 5 July 1979, editorial, "With Pained Indignation," p 2.
68. MUNDO OBRERO, 5 July 1979, editorial, "Against UCD and Against the Basque Country."
69. DEIA, 29 July 1979, editorial, "For the Guernica Statute, for Peace and Against Violence."
70. ABC, 29 July 1979, editorial, "An Impossible Amnesty," p 2.
71. CAMBIO 16, No 400, 5 August 1979, "ETA Negotiates with the Government," pp 14 and ff.
72. Those killed were Jose Amaya at Barajas, Dorotea Ferdig (German) at Chamartin, Guadalupe Redondo Villa, Jesus Emilio Perez Palma at the Atocha station.
73. ABC, 31 July 1979, editorial, "It's a Small All-Out War," p 2.
74. LA VANGUARDIA, 31 July 1979, editorial, "Counterattack in Every Way," p 5.
75. CAMBIO 16, No 401, 12 August 1979, editorial, "A Blow to ETA," p 3.

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- 76 DEIA, 31 July 1979, editorial, "Amnesty Without Bombs or Innocent Victims," p 2.
77. ABC, 1 August 1979, editorial, "Amnesty, Yes: For the Victims," p 2.
- 78 DEIA, 3 August 1979, "ETA (p-m) Suspends Bomb Campaign," p 1, and CAMBIO 16, No 402, 19 August 1979, "ETA: There Will Be More Goma-2," p 22.
- 79 ETA (m) killed the following persons in August:
 - Juan Tauste Sanchez, civil guard, 4 August, Eibar (Guipuzcoa)
 - Antonio Nieves Canuelo, civil guard, 8 August, Sondica (Bilbao)
 - Manuel Ferreiras Simois, municipal policeman, 13 August, Portugarate (Vizcaya)
 - Antonio Lopez Carreras, 16 August, Sondica (Bilbao)
 - Jose Manuel Boix, athlete, 18 August, Madrid
 - Jose Maria Perez Rodriguez, national policeman, 30 August, Zumarraga (Guipuzcoa)
 - Aurelio Calvo Valls, national policeman, 30 August, San Sebastian
80. CAMBIO 16, No 401, "The Inoperative Brigade," by Jose Oneto, p 13; also see the interview with Francisco de Asis Pastor, "This Would Be the Man," pp 14 and ff, and the article "GRAPO Wanted a Bloody Summer. Terrorists for Hire," pp 17 and ff.
- 81 See the articles cited in the previous footnote and CAMBIO 16, No 402, 19 August 1979, "From a Reliable Source," p 5.
- 82 CAMBIO 16, No 405, 9 September 1979, "From a Reliable Source," p 5.
83. CAMBIO 16, No 405, 9 September 1979, "GRAPO at Home. Direct Reports and Testimony," pp 12 and ff.
84. CAMBIO 16, No 412, 28 October 1979, "How Sanchez-Casas Was Caught," pp 51 and ff
85. INFORMACIONES, 5 September 1979, "Herri Batasuna Blames PNV for Latest Developments," p 4.
86. MUNDO DIARIO, 25 September 1979, editorial, "A Threat to Democracy," p 3.
- 87 See Claire Sterling, "The Terror Network," Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1981, pp 199, 200.
88. EGIN, 29 September 1979, "The PNV and Terrorism," by A. Zupide, p 13.
89. CAMBIO 16, No 408, 30 September 1979, "Black September," by Jose Oneto.

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- 90 CAMBIO 16, No 413, 4 November 1979, "A Tunnel Against the Statutes," p 30.
- 91 CAMBIO 16, No 414, 11 November 1979, "Amnesty," by Jose Oneto, p 21.
92. INFORMACIONES, 29 October 1979, "Strong Socialist Reaction Against ETA," pp 1, 4.
- 93 ABC, 30 October 1979, editorial, "Denouncing Another Crime," p 2.
94. EGIN, 30 October 1979, p 1.
- 95 MUNDO DIARIO, 30 October 1979, editorial, "Another Murder," p 3.
96. EGIN, 31 October 1979, p 1.
97. Ibid.
98. MUNDO OBRERO, 3 November 1979, editorial, "ETA (m) Without Its Ski Mask."
- 99 CAMBIO 16, No 414, 11 November 1979, "ETA Against the PSOE," pp 35 and ff.
100. See CAMBIO 16, No 419, "The ETA Complex," pp 27 and ff, and DIARIO 16. "From a Reliable Source" was published in CAMBIO 16, No 434, p 5.
101. CAMBIO 16, No 411, 21 October 1979, "ETA (p-m) Speaks," pp 14 and ff.
102. The quote is from Volume II of "Obras escogidas de Mao Tse-Tung"; also see "Citations du president Mao Tse-Tung," Seuil Publishing, Paris, 1967, p 41.
103. Antonio Mercader and Jorge de Vera, "Los Tupamaros (Estrategia y accion)," Anagrama Publishing, Barcelona, 1970, p 71.
104. Ibid., p 72.
105. Robert Moss, "The Urban Guerrilla," Editora Nacional, Madrid, 1972, pp 253 and ff.
106. Ibid., pp 129, 130.
107. CAMBIO 16, No 416, 25 November 1979, editorial, "Ruperez in Chains," p 3.
108. Concerning the kidnaping of Ruperez, see the following issues of CAMBIO 16: No 416, 25 November 1979, "ETA, Heads and Tails," pp 22 and ff; "The Third Phase Is Here," p 26 and "Torture: Someone Is Lying," pp 27 and ff; No 417, 2 December 1979, editorial, "In Ayatollah Style," by Juan Tomas de Salas, p 3, "A Lengthy Kidnaping," pp 25, 26.

109. EL PAIS, 13 November 1979, editorial, "The Kidnaping of a Deputy," p 10.
110. EL PAIS, 18 November 1979, editorial, "The ETA (p-m) Labyrinth," p 8.
111. CAMBIO 16, No 418, 9 December 1979, "Three Basques Out of Commission," pp 22 and ff.
112. EL PAIS, 27 November 1979, complete text of the long letter, p 15.
113. EL ALCAZAR, 13 December 1979, p 1.
114. CAMBIO 16, No 420, 23 December 1979, "The Man Who Returned From Hell," pp 22 and ff.
115. CAMBIO 16, No 421, 30 December 1979, "Why We Did Not Kill Ruperez;" pp 16, 17.
116. ABC, 13 December 1979, "The Release of Javier Ruperez," p 2.
117. EL PAIS, 13 December 1979, editorial, "Javier Ruperez, Through the Looking Glass," p 10.
118. EL PAIS, 19 December 1979, editorial, "The Escape of Zamora," p 8; EL PAIS, 20 December 1979, "Hazy Points in the History of This Armed Group. GRAPO on the Verge of a Return After the Escape of the Five Leaders," p 14, and EL PAIS, 13 January 1980, "The Big GRAPO Jail Breakout," pp 16, 17.
119. CAMBIO 16, No 422, 6 January 1980, "New Year, Old GRAPO," pp 16 and ff.
120. The following is the list of ETA murder victims over the first 4 months of 1980:

Jesus Garcia Garcia, civilian, 5 January, Baracaldo
Sebastian Arroyo Gonzalez, retired civil guard, 8 January, Alsasua
Jesus Maria Velasco Zuazola, army commander and head of the Alava border guards, 10 January, Vitoria
Francisco Moya Jimenez, civil guard, 14 January, Elorrio
Jose Manuel Palacios Dominguez, commercial agent, 19 January, Guecho
Alfredo Ramos Vazquez, civilian, 23 January, Baracaldo
Luis Dominguez Jimenez, sexton, 25 January, Vergara
Juan Manuel Roman Moreno, national policeman, 27 January, Basauri
Jose Martin Perez Castillo, civil guard, 1 February, Bilbao
Antonio Marin Gamero, civil guard, 1 February, Bilbao
Jose Gomez Martinan, civil guard, 1 February, Bilbao
Jose Gomez Trillo, civil guard, 1 February, Bilbao
Victorino Villamor Gonzalez, civil guard, 1 February, Bilbao
Alfredo Diaz Marcos, civil guard, 1 February, Bilbao
Miguel Rodriguez Fuentes, infantry commander, 8 February, San Sebastian
Angel Astuy Rodriguez, municipal policeman, 8 February, Oñate

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Ignacio Arocena Arlageli, civilian, 16 February, Oyarzun (Guipuzcoa)
Eugenio Sarasibar Gonzalez de Durana, retired infantry colonel,
20 February, San Sebastian
Jose Luis Ramirez Villa, military policeman, 18 March, Madrid
Damaso Sanchez Soto, civilian, 24 March, Bilbao
Jose Artero Quiles, civilian, 24 March, Escoriaza (Guipuzcoa)
Enrique Aresti Urien, Count of Aresti, 25 March, Bilbao
Jose Mario Piris Carballo, 14-year old student, 29 March, Azcoitia
(Guipuzcoa)
Francisco Pascual Andreu, civil guard, 6 April, Orio (Guipuzcoa)
Florentino Lopetegui Barjacoba, civilian, 6 April, Orio (Guipuzcoa)
Eugenio Lazaro valle, army commander on special duty and head
of the Municipal Police, 13 April, Vitoria
Jose Torralba Lopez, civil guard, 16 April, Irun
Luis Martos Garcia, civil guard, 16 April, Irun
Rufino Munoa Alcalde, civil guard, 28 April, San Sebastian

121. ABC, 2 February 1980, editorial, "A Plan for the Basque Country,"
p 2.
122. EL PAIS, 2 February 1980, editorial, "The Gallows of Violence," p 8.
123. CAMBIO 16, No 427, 10 February 1980, "This Is What the Herri Batasuna
Voters Are Like," pp 27, 28.
124. EL PAIS, 12 February 1980, editorial, "Abhorrent Force," p 8.
125. EL PAIS, 11 March 1980, editorial, "The Basque Labyrinth," pp 1, 8.
126. CAMBIO 16, No 435, 6 April 1980, "The Spring Strike," pp 26 and ff.

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SPAIN

ASSASSINATIONS BY ETA-M MAY SLOW WORK AT LEMONIZ

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 May 82 pp 22-26

[Article by Ander Lanaburu: "Either Lemoniz or ETA"]

[Text] The fear of finding death the way that engineer Angel Pascual found it last week has caused his colleagues at the Lemoniz nuclear plant to hide beneath the rocks. Almost literally the 90 Iberduero engineers will live, they announced, clandestinely, in permanent evasion of ETA terror.

The fear, that fear that the ETA is so fond of provoking, will continue in force and the attacks against Lemoniz and its employees will continue, according to persons in that terrorist organization. In the face of the fear, the Madrid government and the enterprise Iberduero faced the consequences, announcing that they are ready to hire foreign technical personnel, at whatever the cost, so that the plant does not remain paralyzed. In the early morning of Wednesday, terrorists again exploded the "goma-2" and blew up the distribution tower of the Errondo substation in the proximity of Ayete, leaving 60,000 San Sebastian inhabitants without light.

Despite the tough words against ETA by the lendakari [president] Garaicoechea, the firm proposals of the PNV [Basque National Front] through its National Assembly, and the support of thousands of people who demonstrated in the streets of Bilbao, for the time being the Lemoniz technicians will not return to their work places.

Insecurity and uncertainty, fear and at times panic have clearly taken hold of these 90 workers. The conditions in which they have lived these past 2 years have created an intolerable family, personal and professional situation for them, forcing them to make that drastic decision.

After long hours of discussion, last Monday afternoon the technicians assigned to the Lemoniz project went to the Iberduero director with "the firm decision to no longer participate in the said project."

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The assassination a few days earlier of the engineer Angel Pascual was an enormous step backward in a possible solution to the controversial subject of Lemoniz, and, dangerously, returns to a previous situation. Fifteen months after the death of the engineer Ryan, the ETA has carried out what seemed impossible for many: assassinate another Iberduero technician, this time the director of the Lemoniz works.

Numerous politicians, as well as some observers, were mistaken in their somewhat optimistic analyses, believing that the general rejection of the assassination of Ryan and the creation of a "Lemoniz management society," an organization under the Basque government, would prevent the ETA terrorists from striking again and killing another technician.

This analytic error was also recognized by the PNV, which, through its daily newspaper DEIA and in its editorial "With ETA or Against ETA" last 6 May, indicated: "We were not mistaken. In an editorial on Wednesday, 28 April we pointed out that as things now stand at Lemoniz (new management formulas, an offer to negotiate, the moral guardianship of the plant by the Basque government), a new case like that of Ryan seemed unthinkable. Lemoniz has already cost too much blood--we wrote at the time--for the Basque Country to tolerate another victim. The Lemoniz technicians are not alone. There are thousands and thousands of persons who support them and their families. Let no one forget it."

The hundred technicians assigned to the project seemed to be convinced of that. In effect, most of them had managed, within their personal drama, to get used to the nightmare of the thought of Ryan or of the threatening letters by the ETA. Thus, in responding to the call of their company on Monday, 26 April, they decided to return to their places of work, but not without a certain fear of attack and also of losing their jobs. All, with the exception of six, believed in a political protection and in the guarantees offered by the tripartite agreement. In effect, "ETA members had still attacked neither the government nor the PNV."

Nevertheless, once again the ETA took it upon itself to repudiate any rational hypothesis. A few hours after the assassination of Pascual, a technician friend of the victim declared to CAMBIO 16, "In the face of this new attack we feel that we are toys of fate, without really knowing what we can do. We believed that we had political protection, and even in the possibility of negotiations with the ETA."

After 15 months of forced absence, he, as well as his colleagues, had begun work in Lemoniz last 26 April. It lasted only 1 week. Involved in a true family drama during recent days, on Monday our anonymous speaker met with his enterprise colleagues, many of them definitely disenchanted with their profession. A few hours later in his house in Algorta, and together with another enterprise technician, he talked about that life full of anguish that he has been suffering the last couple of years. Fear and incertitude are reflected in his face and in that of his colleague. Both confessed to this journal that many of them have a progressive ideology and that their election choice would shock more than one commentator: "Certainly, some of us favor

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independence and Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity], but they recognize that it was a mistake for the ETA to become involved with Lemoniz."

Middle-aged, most married with children, the Lemoniz technicians who have been with the enterprise long are now again terrified. In these long months they have not dared to widen their circle of friends. They feel that the population is treating them with suspicion. They have gone from a situation of social prestige with a high standard of living to increasing isolation from their environment with a loss of social influence.

During recent months the two engineers from Algorta have covered the 15 km that separate them from Lemoniz almost on a daily basis, following a very fixed route, and almost always dressed in a carefree and even slovenly manner. One of them, with the heavy beard of a "progressive," is far from appearing to be a serious company representative.

"We are obsessed by this subject, and we talk about it day and night. At home with our families, in the bars or restaurants where we come only with our most intimate friends or our relatives, always, of course, with an eye on our surroundings."

In the last 2 years they have become taciturn, uneasy and nervous. They live almost hidden in a sort of forced clandestineness. This abnormal life forces them to keep their names in total secrecy outside of the enterprise. A recent report published in the San Sebastian DIARIO VASCO reveals that the list of technicians that the ETA has was obtained by the terrorist organization using a list of telephone numbers within the enterprise.

One fact verifies the credibility of that information. Indeed, in that list, together with several dozen technicians, are found the names of three persons not part of this group. Nevertheless, they also received the macabre threat.

Some even received a photograph of Ryan's dead body.

The fear associated with Lemoniz has also had a tragic effect on the wives of these technicians. Tense and preoccupied, the wives "drug themselves" daily with tranquilizers so as not to succumb to depression or a nervous breakdown. A good many of these engineers, feeling the need to be among familiar people, have come to the plant daily, or in the Bilbao offices they involve themselves in studies or in taking courses or even in playing cards. "Nevertheless," they admit, "we have not read a novel in these last months. We cannot."

This unaccustomed and abnormal life style has caused serious stomach disorders in the two with whom we spoke. They too, in the same way as their wives, are addicted to pills or medication.

"We do not believe that we committed a crime in choosing our career. One can discuss the location of the plant, its reconversion, the referendum or stopping it, but what we are asking is that the matter be cleared up once and for all. We do not want to be toyed with. The politicians do not understand that

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however much they may insist on our not submitting to ETA blackmail, we cannot work under these conditions. We fear for our lives and we are frightened."

In fact, what they have wanted up to now is a political umbrella to give them permanent protection, that will return them to a normal professional and family life in society, that will allow them to abandon this secrecy that threatens them with the specter of paranoia and family problems. They do not want to move again, send their families away for a time, hide at home behind double locks, suspect strangers or tremble whenever the telephone rings.

What they all want, including these two technicians from Algorta, is to return to their hobbies, such as chess, mineralogy and excursions to the mountains on the weekends, after 5 days of normal work in Lemoniz.

Some of the colleagues with whom we spoke, caught in an understandable panic, have fled again after the last assassination. Others will seek work outside of the enterprise or abroad, and most are again hoping that the authorities can solve this grave problem.

The ETA thrust, with this execrable assassination, was interpreted as a direct challenge to the Basque government and the PNV. This ETA attack, again paralyzing Lemoniz, contradicted the rumors of an infamous alliance between the ETA and Garaicoechea's party on the subject of the nuclear plant. Also, until then some ingenuous nationalists preferred to believe that when the Lemoniz plant, a key energy resource in the Basque Country, was in nationalist hands the ETA would not dare to attack the lives and homes of those responsible for it. The new ETA crime repudiated all of these hypotheses and confirmed that even in the case of a referendum the ETA would not respect even the will of the people.

Nevertheless, in this dramatic dispute the Basques not only have the future of the nuclear plant and their energy resources at stake, but also the continuity of their autonomous government.

It was in this sense that the political chronicler of the nationalist daily DEIA, Eugenio Iberzabal, asked himself if an autonomous government, after the last ETA attack, can subsist in this manner. "It is evident that it cannot," affirmed Iberzabal. "Lemoniz, in this sense, is a symbol. If the Basque parliament in its majority has decided to put it into effect under certain circumstances--those of the agreements--then the institution that has opted for a solution without being able to carry it out is playing with its own survival."

Indeed, today it is Lemoniz. Tomorrow it can be any enterprise, entity or institution. In the face of this danger, nationalist Representative Marcos Vizcaya asked for the Basque people to oppose the closing of Lemoniz, which, in his opinion, "would be the ETA's greatest triumph in its entire history."

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The enormous political danger that this triumph would cause was immediately understood by Basque political leaders. For Txiki Benegas, secretary general of the PSE-PSOE, "we face a new form of fascism, fascism by Basque terrorists, which must be eradicated before it destroys us all."

For his part, the lendakari Garaicoechea accepted the ETA challenge: "Today," he said, "what began as a struggle against dictatorship is a direct conflict with democracy and authentic self-government. It is clear that the assassination of Angel Pascual had some clear connotations for our energy problem, since it was on that same day that the entity Basque Energy was put into effect, along with the public gas companies and the management of Lemoniz."

The disgust was immense and the PNV could tolerate no more. It definitely was intransigent with Herri Batasuna and was eager to confront the ETA. "Evidently," indicated Xabier Arzallus, PNV president, "this ETA action is a very clear threat to the Basque executive and autonomous institutions, and we accept the challenge with all its consequences."

Saturday morning the PNV had an urgent meeting in extraordinary national assembly (the first meeting of this sort since its foundation) with the purpose of undertaking a forceful repudiation of ETA terrorism.

PNV leaders considered the last transgression to be a direct frontal attack on their government's policy. The PNV, which up to now on several occasions had worked for an approach, dialog or negotiations with the ETA, threw in the towel.

Their leaders, headed by Arzallus, no longer believe that the terrorists want to negotiate. They are prepared for a confrontation and they are on the brink of war with the ETA organization.

At 10:37 am last Saturday, the 65 members of the PNV National Assembly locked themselves in the first floor of the sad gray Artea Building in Castillo Elejabeitia, a Basque locality situated 35 km from Bilbao.

After 6 solid hours of talks in this old house used as a seminary and retreat, the nationalist burukides (leaders) approved important resolutions.

During the meeting more than one participant shouted for "dirty war" against the ETA. Others asked what means the party had at its disposal. For this reason leaders had to make an effort to calm the very heated tempers.

The meeting, which lasted until 4:00 pm, approved, among others, the resolutions to exclude from the party all militants who yield to ETA blackmail with the revolutionary tax. It was also resolved to demand from Madrid police authority and to ask for the resignation of Robles Piquer. Although the measures to be taken in the struggle against the ETA were not made public, sources in this party assured CAMBIO 16 that the PNV will seek to proceed with this confrontation in an isolated manner, without counting on the rest of the political forces. On this occasion the PNV decided to throw itself into battle alone.

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In one of the rare breaks during the 6-hour meeting, two PNV leaders confirmed the government crisis with a change in posts within the Basque executive. A PNV spokesman indicated a possible formula for fighting against the ETA: "It is easy," he said, "if they kill someone for not paying the tax, we will do the same with one of their leaders or of the Herri Batasuna coalition."

This affirmation, possibly due more to a moment of tension than to a formal decision, nevertheless demonstrated the new orientation of the majority party in regard to the ETA, and the emotional state of many of their militants.

In the face of the last ETA assassination and the later resolutions adopted by the PNV, Onaindia fears that "inexorably the existing dynamics of events may lead to a Basque civil war, and every effort should be made to avoid this. Now more than ever it is necessary to seek democratic, negotiated, public and open solutions. And the Basque Parliament is the most appropriate framework."

Once again, the absence of Herri Batasuna in this institution and the ETA provocations take away from the efficacy of Onaindia's proposal.

At this time, when the assassination of the Lemoniz nuclear plant project director isolates the ETA even more by causing a strong feeling of rejection among the Basques, it is also clear that any person who does not agree with the terrorists runs the risk of being killed.

Faced with this situation, PNV leaders have finally become convinced that police and political measures within a constitutional framework, along with the collaboration of responsible citizens, are the best antidotes to ETA terrorism.

"Not to go any further," commented a Basque socialist delegate to CAMBIO 16, "would perhaps have been sufficient a year ago when Juan Alcorta decided to act alone, without obtaining satisfactory PNV support."

More somber and preoccupied than usual last Saturday afternoon following his party's national assembly, PNV President Xabier Arzallus assured that "either the ETA comes to reason, or it would have to be eradicated. There is a growing 'church register' in our bases against its actions."

These assertions provoked a surprising and rapid ETA response. As if to guard against all dangers, 24 hours later the terrorist organization announced that it would again attack the plant, while it sought to avoid any direct confrontation with the government and the PNV. Meanwhile, the Basque Government as well as the government in Madrid and the Iberduero company have met numerous times in order to avoid the dramatic paralyzation of the Lemoniz nuclear plant.

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