

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10637

6 JULY 1982

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 779

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10637

6 July 1982

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 779

CONTENTS

ANGOLA

Renewal of Trade Ties With Brazil Discussed
(AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Jan 82) 1

CHAD

Kamougue Reportedly Undertaking Secret Negotiations With Habre
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Apr 82) 3

Goukouni Said To Be Seeking Alliance Between FAT, FROLINAT
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE 26 Apr-9 May 82) 4

CONGO

French-Congolese Trade Increases in 1981
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 May 82) 7

French Aid to Agricultural Research, Mechanization
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 May 82) 9

Briefs

Regulation of Public Markets 11

Office of Industrial Development 11

Canadian Cooperation 11

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

President Hopes for Increased Spanish Aid
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 May 82) 12

French Economic Cooperation Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 May 82) 14

Briefs

Discovery of Quality Petroleum 16

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ETHIOPIA

Solidarity Committees With Cuba, DGR, Vietnam Formed
(Victor M. Carriba; PRELA, 12 Jun 82) 17

GABON

Political Crisis Said To Be Persisting, Worsening
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 Apr-9 May 82) 19

President Lays Cornerstones for Mayumba Development Projects
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 May 82) 20

Cacao Cultivation To Be Revived
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 May 82) 22

GAMBIA

Gambians Accept Formation of Senegambia in Principle
(David Sharp; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Apr 82) 24

GHANA

Tribalism Issue Analyzed, Accepted Concepts Modified
(AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Jan 82) 26

GUINEA

Accomplishments and Prospects of Economy Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 May 82) 28

Briefs

Sekou Toure's Visit to France 32

Presidential Election Results 32

IDA Industrial Sector Credit 33

IVORY COAST

Role of Scientific Research in Economic Recovery Examined
(Koffi Mamane; AFRIQUE ASIE, 10-23 May 82) 34

MOZAMBIQUE

Campaign Against Police Abuses Produces Results
(AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Apr 82) 37

NIGER

Kountche Apparently Moving Toward Restoration of Civil Rule
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Apr 82) 39

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

Proposed Shipping Line Will Aid Exports (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 May 82)	41
Briefs	
Two New Parties	42
Agreement Signed	42
Belgian Cooperation Program	42
Rice Stalls Set Up	43
Argentine Hydraulic Equipment	43

- c -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

RENEWAL OF TRADE TIES WITH BRAZIL DISCUSSED

London *AFRICAN AFFAIRS in English* Vol 81, No 322, Jan 82 pp 15-16

[Text] The end of the slave trade between Brazil and Angola in 1860 practically severed trading links between the two countries for over one hundred years. There remained an intermittent circulation of Portuguese capital from Brazil to Angola and Mocambique, which involved a few wealthy Portuguese families. In the other direction, profits from colonial banks were used to finance banking operations in Brazil. In the 1970s there has been a renewal of trade between Brazil and Angola, and Brazilian capital has begun to enter Angola. Brazil's economic links with Angola have developed more rapidly than those with Mozambique, partly because Brazil wished to diversify her oil imports. The presence in Mocambique of Brazilians, who opposed the military regime and assisted Frelimo in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism may also have been a factor. The Angolan government, on its part, does not exclude economic relations with countries like Brazil, whose regimes are ideologically opposed to its socialist model, since it needs technology and capital from these sources.

Brazilian exports to Angola have grown from negligible amounts in the early seventies to \$89 m in 1979. A breakdown of Brazilian exports for the years 1978 and 1979 shows that vehicles make up over half the total. Since 1979, a wide variety of food items have been imported from Brazil (\$28 m in 1979). Agricultural output fell after independence and food now accounts for about a quarter of Angola's import bill. In the wake of the Portuguese withdrawal, the food distribution system collapsed. The food processing industry is also in poor condition. In addition large scale immigration to Luanda has forced the government to increase food supplies and other services to the city. The Brazilian supermarket chain Pao de Acucar has a management contract to assist state supermarkets in Luanda, and food is distributed through people's shops and a huge jumbo supermarket. A private Brazilian construction and consultancy company, Sisal, has contracts of \$210 m with the Angolan National Directorate of Tourism and Hotels for the construction and improvement of hotels.

Brazilian imports from Angola are small, but an agreement signed between two state oil companies has long term implications for the expansion of bilateral trade. Petrobras, has a contract to buy 7,000 barrels of oil a day, and the value

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of oil exports in 1980 was \$85 m. Petrobras, has a 17.5 per cent stake in one concession and another is being negotiated. Petrobras is also to provide technical assistance for Angola in all aspects of the oil industry. One way in which Brazil has actively pursued closer relations with lusophone countries in Africa is through technical assistance. Here the Portuguese language gives Brazil a first class advantage. Brazil is a leading exponent of South-South relations and advertises her 'tropical technology'. The Brazilian government has supported technical cooperation between developing countries (TCDC). In 1980, Brazil set up a fund for the promotion of TCDC activities. Such activities involve Africans visiting Brazil on study tours and training programmes to familiarize them with Brazilian technology and know how. In the longer run this serves to promote Brazilian technology and consultancy services. In 1979, UNIDO contracted a Brazilian consultancy firm to carry out a survey of food processing plants in Angola, and a large scale project to assist these plants will, if accepted by the Angolan government, be carried out by Brazilian companies.

COPYRIGHT: The Royal African Society and Contributors 1982

CSO: 4700/1415

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

KAMOUGUE REPORTEDLY UNDERTAKING SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH HABRE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1112, 28 Apr 82 pp 26, 27

[Text] What is Lt Col Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue looking for? Vice president of the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) and, as such, number two in the Goukouni Weddaye regime, the southern leader never loses an opportunity to evoke the need "to crush Hussein Habre's rebellion." Logical. But this same Kamougue, when he leaves the capital (where, it is true, his appearances are rather infrequent nowadays) to reach his stronghold of Moundou, curiously multiplies statements that are strictly opposed.

Thus, he stated, on 17 April, that "everyone is tired of the war," and that it was urgently necessary "to work for peace." As early as 4 March, the "Standing Committee responsible for administering the southern zone" (political administrative headquarters of the south, over which he presides), had advocated, in a memorandum, a "general cease-fire." No more, no less.

At Ndjamen, where Guy Penne, Mitterrand's adviser for African and Malagasy affairs, just made a flying visit on 18 April, Kamougue's attitude is considered pretty demoralizing. Those on Habre's side, on the other hand, are rubbing their hands, but without building up any excessive illusions. For no one is unaware in Chad that Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue, even if he rules as uncontested master in three of the five southern provinces (the two Logones and Moyen-Chari), is very much opposed in Tanjilet and especially in Mayo-Kebbi.

Moreover, his most recent stands have provoked a general outcry on the part of several southern personalities, such as his former companions Naiambaye, Ngangbet and Kassire, who do not hesitate to advance the hypothesis of secret dealings between him and Hussein Habre. Lastly, it would be wrong to believe that Kamougue, who carefully avoids participating directly in the clashes between the GUNT troops and those of Habre, represents the only military force south of the Chari: in fact, he controls directly only the forces of the gendarmerie, the former members of the Chadian National Army (ANT, formed under Tombalbaye and Malloum) having preferred to keep themselves, for the moment, "in reserve."

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982

9434
CSO: 4719/896

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

GOUKOUNI SAID TO BE SEEKING ALLIANCE BETWEEN FAT, FROLINAT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 264 26 Apr-9 May 82 p 32

[Article by Ginette Cot: "Kamougue's Conspiracy"]

[Text] The vice president of the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] broke unanimity on behalf of a rapprochement with Hissein Habre. But the FAT [Togolese Armed Forces] deny him any right to speak in their name.

While urgent threats are once again building up against Chad, Colonel Kamougue, who claims to represent the south of the country, has just broken the unanimity demonstrated by the GUNT in its rejection of Nairobi's dictate, in which, last 11 February, a group of African states had called on him to negotiate with Hissein Habre.

On 4 March, the GUNT vice president, without even informing his government in advance, issued a memorandum which he addressed to the OAU and the United Nations, calling for a cease-fire and an "overall political settlement." He thus agreed with and supported the wishes of an OAU pressure group favorable to the return of the chief of the FAN [Northern Armed Forces] to the Chadian political scene and, ultimately, the installation of a "muscled" dictatorship in Ndjamen. For, in spite of the sidestepping and contradictory explanations of the GUNT vice president, no one is deceived as to the meaning of his operation. Everyone knows that supported by the United States, certain French business and financial circles, as well as by the most reactionary African states, and considerably enriched by the revenue coming from the economic activity in the southern region of the country, which he has largely diverted to his own benefit, Colonel Kamougue is in the process of negotiating with the FAN, with a view to an economic alliance, and is working to destabilize, from within, the coalition forces of the GUNT.

It goes without saying that these maneuvers have had serious consequences in the field, without creating confusion or sharpening the contradictions within the government forces.

It is known how, while new arguments were thus furnished Hissein Habre's supporters, the last government offensive launched against the FAN turned sharply at Oum Hadjer. At the same time, if the resolutions of Nairobi III

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

were for the moment kept in the dark, the OAU nevertheless is still continuing, through its present force on Chadian territory, to "work" in the same direction. The staffs of the pan-African force would reportedly be indulging in dangerous blackmail. It might thus have been decided that the government forces would no longer have the right to launch military offensives from places where OAU soldiers have established themselves. At Ati, some 30 kilometers distant from Oum Hadjer, occupied by the FAN, Zairians and Senegalese from the pan-African force might threaten to leave the locality if government forces did not leave the field.

Lastly, while, in spite of financial aid from France, the state coffers--still deprived of the revenues from the south--are hopelessly empty, the hypothesis of an economic blockade is far from being set aside. Everything is happening as if it was the intention to drive the president of the GUNT and the patriotic forces of the country to the brink of a fatal impasse.

However, paradoxically, the backwash provoked by the Kamougue affair has laid the foundations of a possible clarification of the situation. Far from having a following, as he expected, in his region of origin, the GUNT vice president, whose initiative was immediately denounced as a "betrayal" by political and military personalities from the south of the country, appears to be a man more and more isolated and discredited.

At the conclusion of a meeting held from 31 March to 3 April last, the officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men of the FAT--on behalf of whom Kamougue signed the various Kano and Lagos agreements in 1979, and was named vice president of the GUNT--made public a resolution in which they deny the latter any right to represent them and to act on their behalf or in their place.

In this document, the FAT states, in particular, that the standing committee, a deliberative and executive body set up in the south following the first Ndjamena war in 1979 and of which Kamougue still claims to be chairman, is doing a bad job of managing the public finances of the state, that it has become unpopular and, in addition, no longer has any representativeness. The FAT stresses, at the same time, the need for "an energetic takeover by men" to meet the situation prevailing in the east of the country, occupied by the FAN.

In conclusion, the FAT advocates a series of measures whose implementation might facilitate a spectacular rectification of the situation. It states, in particular, that the standing committee should be forbidden to use public funds and calls on the GUNT to set up, in the southern zone, a joint territorial administration composed of soldiers and civilians.

Lastly, it demands representation within the GUNT by a military man other than Kamougue.

Like an echo, the FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front], politically reunified, published a statement on 3 April in which it denounced Kamougue's initiative as part of a long-ongoing attempt to undermine the GUNT's authority. At the same time, the FROLINAT welcomed the position taken by the FAT, which, it pointed out, should serve as an example to all the forces not yet integrated into the national army.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is in this context, in which anything may yet happen--the worst as well as the best--that President Goukouni Weddeye was willing to grant us an exclusive interview in Ndjamena last 3 April. As will be seen, the GUNT president insists, in the course of this interview, on the need during this phase, in which it is a question of saving the country from the complication of war and the threat of dismemberment, to promote a solid alliance between the patriotic forces of the FAT and the progressive-leaning forces of the FROLINAT. Indeed, only such an alliance may make it possible to foresee a positive outcome.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie.

9434

CSO: 4719/897

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO

FRENCH-CONGOLESE TRADE INCREASES IN 1981

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1346

[Text] French-Congolese trade increased spectacularly in 1981: 137.5 percent in one year (2.89 billion French francs, compared with 1.21 billion in 1980).

It was Congolese exports to France that rose the most in value in a year (up 486 percent), from 121.4 million French francs in 1980 to 711.7 million in 1981.

French exports to the Congo rose 98.9 percent at the same time, going from 1.09 billion francs to 2.18 billion.

The trade balance remained favorable to France in 1981 and Paris' rate of cover became much more reasonable than in the past (306 percent compared with 904 percent in 1980).

Congolese Sales

The enormous growth in Congolese sales to France is explained by the overwhelming predominance of oil (78 percent). Uranium also reappears in Congolese exports, but these are actually re-exports, with the metal coming from Gabon (Moanda mines).

In contrast, the other exports dropped 15 percent in 1981 (103 million French francs, compared with 121.4 million in 1980). The value of wood exports dropped 6 percent in 1 year, totaling 69.4 million French francs. However, the relative share of wood increased, making up 67.4 percent of all exports, excluding uranium and oil. Wood sold abroad mainly includes rough timber and some re-exports from the Central African Republic.

French Exports

The doubling in value of French sales is not linked to any modification in exports. In 1981, France sold the Congo machinery (388 million French francs, up 150 percent on an annual basis); iron and steel (387 million, up 100 percent); ocean and river navigation equipment (186.2 million, compared with 6.5 in 1980); electric machinery and apparatuses (180 million, up 183 percent);

■
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

automobiles and cycles (154 million, up 110 percent); pharmaceutical products (101 million, up 28 percent). All these products make up 70 percent of French exports.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11,464
CSO: 4719/1037

CONGO

FRENCH AID TO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, MECHANIZATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1346

[Text] On page 1286 of our 14 May 1982 issue, we briefly mentioned the granting of French aid to Congolese agriculture: two financial grants of 2 million French francs (100 million CFA francs) each, given through the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund).

The first agreement just signed in Brazzaville concerns the first phase of agricultural research completed in 1981. It has made it possible to equip the Loudima power plant and to set up two regional branches at Kindamba and Odziba. Above all, it made it possible to rebuilt the genetic resource pool for food production and also to obtain better yields and thereby better meet the food needs of the population. From 1977 to 1981, French participation in the project amounted to 285.5 million CFA francs.

The project has two phases: The first, totaling 94 million CFA francs, should make it possible to set up the third regional branch at Ewo, develop programs undertaken in recent years and complete the training of national research workers called upon to take the place of expatriots. It therefore involves technical assistance, training, equipment and certain operating expenditures (mainly analyses), the latter generally borne by the Congo. The second phase will make it possible to complete equipping of the CTFT [Technical Center for Tropical Forestry] in vitro laboratory in Pointe-Noire, to be used for forest research.

The second agreement has to do with development of small-scale mechanization. In 1980, the diagnostic results of the experimental phase of the mechanized farming project in the Congo, a project lasting a total of six years (1974-1976, training phase; 1976-1978, experimentation phase essentially based on government farms; 1979-1980, pre-extension phase in rural areas and for which the FAC financial aid was 320 million CFA) were drawn up. Their conclusions made it possible to launch a mechanization program in rural areas. This grant, following the opening of a 100-CFA-franc credit in 1981, is for the second year of the development initiation program.

The economic advantages of mechanization have been understood in the rural areas, which have for 2 years borne part of the expenses involved in operating machinery. In its current phase, the Small-Scale Agricultural Mechanization

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Operation (OPMA) involves the sectors of Mindouli and Kindamba in the region of Pool and Bouenza and Mouyondzi in Bouenza. A study will be undertaken to redefine the role of mechanization within the framework of a regional development program so as to set up cooperative structures based on mechanization (cultivators or small tractors).

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11,464
CSO: 4719/1037

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO

BRIEFS

REGULATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS--Within the framework of measures accompanying the Congo's 5-year plan, three presidential orders have just been published in Brazzaville, the CONGOLESE INFORMATION AGENCY (ACI) announced on 12 May. According to the ACI, these orders concern regulation of public markets, the powers and operation of the central management of markets, contracts concluded with the government and the establishment of a central committee for markets and government contracts. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1346] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

OFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT--At the request of the People's Republic of the Congo, the UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization) representation in France to strengthen industrial cooperation and the promotion of investments has since 24 April 1982 hosted Franck Fernand Dibas. Dibas, who was industrial adviser in the Ministry of Industry and Fishing, has just been entrusted with the responsibility for setting up the Industrial Development Office of the Congo, of which he has been named director. During his stay, Dibas was to make the necessary contacts with the French institutions and organizations concerned and become familiar with techniques of promoting investments used in France. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1347] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

CANADIAN COOPERATION--Following the visit of a Congolese mission to Quebec and that of a Quebec mission to the Congo in 1981, Canada and the People's Republic of the Congo have decided to take measures leading to the establishment of assistance projects in the mining, petroleum, drinking water, forests and forestry industry sectors. To give concrete shape to the wish expressed by the Congo, Hydro Quebec has also provided its expertise in evaluating, selecting and planning the layout for a transportation line, an electric power distribution network and the adaptability of certain materials on African terrain. The Quebec Ministry of Energy and Resources has also offered its Congolese counterpart assistance in preparing the 5-Year Plan for mining exploration. Finally, SOQUIP [expansion unknown] has accepted into a training program a high Congolese official who is a hydrocarbons expert. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1221] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,915

CSO: 4719/863

11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

PRESIDENT HOPES FOR INCREASED SPANISH AID

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 pp 1344-1345

[Text] During the official visit which President Theodoro Obiang Mbazogo made to Madrid from 12 to 15 May, the discontent resulting from the deterioration in relations between Spain and Equatorial Guinea since 1979 was closely examined by the two partners.

According to the AFP correspondent in Madrid, the visit made it possible to clarify certain misunderstandings, without thereby solving basic problems hindering relations between the two countries.

President Obiang, who was received by King Juan Carlos and the head of the Spanish Government, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, met with his hosts to discuss the continuation of Spanish aid. Estimated at nearly \$110 million (in the form of gifts or loans at very low interest) since the ouster of Macias Nguema in August 1979, the aid should remain at the same level for the next two years to come.

Bilateral discussions made it possible to clarify the status of Spanish technical advisers and to emphasize the desire of the government in Malabo to attract private investments.

The precise role of the Spanish technical advisers, long suspected by Malabo of getting in the way of the authority of the Equatorial Guinean administration, remains the main stumbling block between the two countries, the AFP says. Malabo recently refused the appointment of three Spanish experts who would have had broad executive powers in the economic and financial fields.

Nevertheless, at a conference held on 14 May in Madrid, President Obiang recognized that Spain "cannot send money to Guinea for its development if it has no guarantees concerning the use of that money." The Equatorial Guinean chief of state therefore accepted the presence within his country's administration of Spanish officials who are to "study the country's economic situation."

This concession was actually indispensable, given the desire of the Malabo government to see private Spanish firms contribute to the reconstruction of Equatorial Guinea.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Spain does a great deal in Guinea, but it can still do much more," President Obiang said at his press conference, while giving assurance that it would not be replaced by France. Nevertheless, diplomatic circles in Madrid do not totally rule out the possibility of a return of the Soviets to the forefront, despite the role played by Moscow under the Macias regime.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11,464
CSO: 4719/1037

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

FRENCH ECONOMIC COOPERATION DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1219

[Text] As part of the economic cooperation between the two countries, the governments of the French Republic and Equatorial Guinea have drawn up a draft agreement for the mutual promotion and protection of investments. The agreement will be concluded for an initial 10-year period and is renewable unless canceled by either party.

Under its laws, each country recognizes and encourages the investments made by the other country's nationals and companies within its territory and maritime zones. Such investments are assured of fair and equitable treatment, in accordance with the principles of international law. Such investments, and their associated activities, are also granted the treatment granted to most-favored-nation nationals and companies. However, such treatment does not extend to privileges granted to nationals or companies of a third country by virtue of its participation or association in a free-trade zone, a customs union, a common market or any other form of regional economic organization.

Investments made by nationals or companies of either contracting country shall enjoy, within the other country's territory and maritime zones, full and complete security and protection. Neither country shall take measures for expropriation or nationalization or any other measure resulting in direct or indirect dispossession, except for reasons of public interest and provided that such measures are neither discriminatory nor contrary to a particular commitment.

The dispossession measures which could be taken must provide for payment of prompt and adequate compensation for an amount calculated from the real value of the investments in question and based on a normal economic situation prior to any threat of dispossession. Such compensation is freely transferable.

The agreement guarantees the free transfer of interest, dividends, profits, earnings, fees for use of patents and trademarks, repayment of loans, proceeds from assignment or total or partial liquidation of the investment, including appreciation of the capital invested; transfers shall be made at the official exchange rate.

Nationals hired or authorized to work within the other country's territory shall also be entitled to the free transfer of an appropriate percentage of their remuneration to their country of origin.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In the absence of an amicable settlement of differences regarding investments, the agreement provides for recourse to arbitration by the International Center for Settlement of Differences Regarding Investments (CIRDI), established by the Washington Convention of 18 March 1965.

The agreement is intended to create favorable conditions for French investments in Equatorial Guinea and Equatorial Guinean investments in France by encouraging transfers of capital and technology between the two countries.

Since 1979, trade between France and Equatorial Guinea has had a positive balance in favor of France. Its development since 1978 can be summarized as follows, in millions of francs:

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
French Purchases	4.3	2.5	1.5	5.4
French Sales	3.7	3.1	11.6	17.7
Balance	-0.6	+0.6	+10.1	+12.3

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11915
CSO: 4719/863

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

DISCOVERY OF QUALITY PETROLEUM--According to reports circulated in Madrid on 28 April, the petroleum from the nearby deposits on the island of Bioco, in Equatorial Guinea, is of excellent quality, similar to that of Libyan oil, based on seismic and geologic surveys conducted by GEPESA [Guineo-Spanish Petroleum Company], a mixed Spanish-Equatorial Guinean company. This field was discovered at a depth of 70 m and is located within a sandy zone with an area of 1,600 km², extending toward the northwestern part of the island. However, the size of the reserves has not yet been calculated. According to GEPESA, the continental shelf near the Muni River, where prospecting is being conducted, also contains a deposit of high-quality petroleum. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1219] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915

CSO: 4719/863

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ETHIOPIA

SOLIDARITY COMMITTEES WITH CUBA, DGR, VIETNAM FORMED

PA121950 Havana PRELA in English 1850 GMT 12 Jun 82

[Report by Victor M. Carriba]

[Text] Addis Ababa, 13 Jun--The Ethiopia-Cuba Solidarity Committee was constituted here in a ceremony held in the Ethiopian Committee for Peace and Solidarity.

The new organization is chaired by Maru Tesfaye, minister of housing and urban development, and made up moreover of the dean of the law faculty of the University of Addis Ababa, the managing director of the national air line (Ethiopian Airlines) and a member of the International Relations Department of the Committee To Organize the Working Party of the People of Ethiopia (COPWE).

The executive board of the new solidarity committee is also made up of two representatives of the Youth Association of Revolutionary Ethiopia, and another from the Ministry of External Relations.

In the founding ceremony of the Ethiopia-Cuba Solidarity Committee, its chairman expressed the new entity's satisfaction due to the setting up of "this between both countries" and he stressed its importance for expanding relations between Cubans and Ethiopians.

For his part, the Cuban ambassador in Addis Ababa, Buenaventura Reyes, expressed the gratitude of the Cuban Government to the Ethiopian people for the constitution of the committee.

The diplomat also referred to the threats that Cuba is subjected to by U.S. imperialism and to the Cuban people's decision to stand up to those attacks.

"Ethiopia's support to Cuba, expressed through the constitution of this committee, encourages us to continue the struggle and to construct socialism in our country," said the Cuban ambassador.

He added that "Cuba will always be at the side of Ethiopians and that an example of that solidarity is the recent opening of two roads built by Cuban internationalist workers in the western part of this African country."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Ethiopia-Vietnam Solidarity and Ethiopia-Democratic Germany Solidarity Committees, which are chaired by the ministers of public health and information, Tefari Wonde and Yilme Girma, respectively, were also constituted in separate ceremonies.

CSO: 4700/1418

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GABON

POLITICAL CRISIS SAID TO BE PERSISTING, WORSENING

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 264 26 Apr-9 May 82 p 40

[Text] Despite President Bongo's soothing statements, the political crisis is persisting and worsening in Gabon, while concern is growing in Libreville's upper circles. Proof of this is seen in the tour--the first of its kind in more than 10 years of rule--which Omar Bongo agreed to make to the interior of the country, where in 3 weeks, last February, he visited the chief towns of all the country's provinces. Officially this tour was aimed at enabling the chief of state to ask directly about the grievances of the Gabonese citizens. Indeed, what was going on, at one and the same time, was a flashy, demagogic operation and an enterprise of intimidation. For, as always, the Gabonese president's speeches were punctuated, on that occasion, by generous promises mixed with threats against those "degenerates" who dared to take the risk of abandoning the right road.

In reality, Omar Bongo is aware that his regime is increasingly losing speed, and he is so panic-stricken that he distrusts his own shadow. Everything works toward demonstrating that the disturbances which broke out last December in Libreville were far from constituting a cyclical mishap. The politico-social climate is becoming more oppressive, and repression is continuing to strike blindly, even in the ranks of those who, until now, could have been considered faithful allies or servants of the Bongo regime.

Only very recently was the attention of public opinion focused on these faithful allies, with the arrest, between 11 and 16 March, of several persons, among them, Samuel Nguema Mba, editor-in-chief of the Libreville daily L'UNION; Francois Ondo Edou editor-in-chief of National Radio; Jean-Baptiste Asse Bekale, journalist from Radio-Africa No 1; Mr Ekoh, former national education minister; Michel Ovono, mining engineer; and Marguerite Eya Nkeme. According to some testimony, several of these prisoners were horribly tortured.

Even though the Gabonese Ministry of Information has stated that this testimony was born in "fertile and one-sided imaginations," it nevertheless confirmed that these arrests had taken place within "the framework of the investigation opened following the disturbances in December 1981." Disturbances caused, according to the Gabonese authorities, by "manipulated" students. As if to believe that the "manipulators" were particularly numerous and that they benefited from wide and deep ramifications in the system.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 AFRIQUE-ASIE.

9434
CSO: 4719/897

19

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GABON

PRESIDENT LAYS CORNERSTONES FOR MAYUMBA DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1345

[Text] On 5 May, President Bongo traveled to Mayumba in southern Gabon to lay the cornerstones for a barytine plant, a tourist complex, water and electricity supply programs and a microwave relay telecommunications system.

ELF Gabon [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France], which has major oil operations offshore from Mayumba, will contribute through PID (Diversified Investment Program) to the financing of these different projects.

With respect to the tourist project, the choice of Mayumba is justified by its setting (50 kilometers of beaches). In July, the call for bids will be issued, constituting the effective startup of work, as the feasibility study was satisfactory.

The establishment of a microwave relay system will cost 6 billion CFA francs and financing will be provided by the Gabonese Government, ELF Gabon and Shell Gabon within the framework of the PID.

The SEEG (Gabon Power and Water Company) projects include completion of an electric power plant (three generators), as well as a 13-kilometer-long medium-tension network and a 14-kilometer low-tension system. The water supply will be provided by a processing plant and nine outlets.

Working the barytine will require an investment of 4.5 billion CFA francs and CODEMIN (Nyanga Mining Company) will be set up by the Gabonese Government, ELF Gabon, COMILOG [Ogooue Mining Company], the BRGM [Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office] and an American mining firm.

The breadth of the Mayumba development programs and their symbolic launching at the same time are explained for partially political reasons, as Nyanga Province has recently turned out to be one of the most turbulent in Gabon. In his 5 May speech in Mayumba, President Bongo spoke out against those in the province who criticized this series of projects.

With respect to the Mayumba tourist projects, the Gabonese newspaper L'UNION pointed out that Georges Rawiri, first deputy prime minister of Gabon, minister of transport, tourism and development of the territory, had met with

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Jean Snoeck, director of marketing and foreign relations of Sabena, in Libreville to discuss the role which the Belgian company could play in the transport of European and American tourists for the Mayumba vacation and resort village." The joint operation of a Brussels-Libreville line by Air Gabon and Sabena was also reportedly discussed in Libreville.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11,464
CSO: 4719/1037

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GABON

CACAO CULTIVATION TO BE REVIVED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 pp 1220-21

[Excerpts] As we noted briefly in our issue of 30 April 1982, p 1159, a conference held in Oyem recently examined current problems of growing cacao in Gabon and ways to revive national cacao production, which has only declined since 1971, when maximum production of 6,000 tons was recorded.

Gabon's Third 5-Year Plan, which could not be carried out because of the financial crisis which developed in 1977 and the ensuing austerity policy, provided for raising Gabonese cacao production to 15,000 tons annually. A more realistic goal has now been set: According to participants in the Oyem conference, this goal will be 10,000 tons in 1992, due in particular to the extension of cacao cultivation to provinces other than Woleu-Ntem, to which it is presently limited.

Cacao growing has declined again today for reasons identical in principle to those which caused it to decline for the first time more than 50 years ago.

The population of Woleu-Ntem, where there are no forestry operations, was formerly sizable in comparison to other regions of Gabon. A dynamic farming population, backed by constant government support, knew real prosperity thanks to cacao.

Presently, following the economic predominance of timber and then of petroleum, the ensuing urban prosperity and the related rural exodus and the educational effort, a disturbing decline in Woleu-Ntem's farming population can be observed. Cacao plantations have become outdated and the average age of planters has also risen, currently 55 years old, since the vast majority of men between the ages of 20 and 35 are drawn to the cities.

The action taken, at government prompting, by SONADEC (National Company for Development of Industrial Crops) several years ago seems to have had only very minor results, based on the remarks made during the Oyem conference: According to some, SONADEC has suffered a partial failure. However, it was acknowledged that the company had completed a good number of works, infrastructures in particular, and that its actions would have to be backed with new investments.

In the compendium document which will be submitted to the Gabonese Government, the conference participants pointed out two kinds of measures apt to increase production: the creation of industrial blocs (6,500 hectares), within which the wage-earning system would be practiced, and integrated zone operations (village blocks of 3,000 hectares and 500 hectares of traditional plantations)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

utilizing groups of farmworkers in cooperatives. These two types of action, assigned to SONADECI, are expected to attract and keep young people on the land, since raising the purchase price from the producer and various grade-classification measures appear unable to bring about an increase in production, which is stagnating at around 3,000 tons, although in 1981-82 the purchase price of "superior" grade cacao is 320 CFA francs per kg (as opposed to 115 francs for "scrap" grade).

Pricing is today considered the way to keep young people on village plantations and the Oyem conference participants considered various types of aid (for pulling, planting, housing) as well as indirect assistance for pulling, field maintenance and fungicides. Farm loans, repayable when the cacao is sold, are also recommended.

In his speech, the representative for Woleu-Ntem planters, Mr Samuel Anla, noted that aid to planters should be granted directly, at least in the case of those who are recognized to be owners of large plantations. He also hoped that the planters would now be included in certain missions undertaken by the general directors and experts in the case of visits to state-owned or cooperative plantations in countries such as the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. They could thus learn from the experience of planters in those countries, which are large producers of cacao.

In sum, the conference participants recommended the following basic measures: the creation of agro-industrial blocs and village blocs; maintenance of current assistance as well as strengthening the Center for Propagation of Superior Cacao Trees (CMCE) and ways to improve quality. Significant measures regarding the creation, improvement and maintenance of fields and roads, as well as socioeconomic infrastructures, were also requested.

Looking over the list of Gabonese exports, cacao's contribution seems minuscule. But Gabon is currently rediscovering its agriculture, which has been neglected for too long and which now appears to be a basic factor of socioeconomic balance and of the country's real development. This is why the Oyem conference, which could mark a turning point in the development of cacao growing in Gabon, will have to be followed with measures which will be a test of the national ability to manage the agricultural problem.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11915
CSO: 4719/863

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GAMBIA

GAMBIANS ACCEPT FORMATION OF SENEGAMBIA IN PRINCIPLE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1112, 28 Apr 82 p 31

[Article by our special correspondent David Sharp: "Scenes from Confederal Life"]

[Text] "When the Senegalese want to annoy us, they speak French."

"The curfew." My wife finds it fantastic. It has been months since I came home after midnight!" Stretched out on a bench, the man looks at the lights of the little Gambian city of Jenoi approaching slowly in the night. The antiquated ferryboat which ensures the crossing of the Gambia River at Farafenni--and which, accordingly, links Casamance to the rest of Senegal--labors in the current with its load of trucks, beasts and passengers. "Ten-thirty. We should arrive in time at Banjul. Not that they would fire on us, but it is annoying to be taken away to the station by the Senegalese soldiers. There is always a penalty: cutting the lawn in front of the chief's house or jumping in place for an hour at a stretch."

Not too bad, apparently, this curfew. Nor very menacing, the three or four young soldiers seated beside us in the ferry, who are obviously fighting sleep. I ask them: "Are you far from home?" "Indeed not. We are from Kaolack, a little further down the road. And then we all belong to the same ethnic groups and speak the same languages as the Gambians."

To see these young Senegalese, disciplined, but also very relaxed, talk with the local people, it is indeed ridiculous to believe that Senegal and Gambia are two different countries. "Not that the Senegalese don't bother us sometimes," explains my Gambian friend, who complains in particular about the behavior of some customs officers: "When they want to annoy us, they speak to us in French. Now they know very well that we all speak Wolof!" But the majority of the Gambians certainly do not feel, as an occupation, the presence of some hundreds of Senegalese soldiers sent to Gambia at the end of July 1981, following the attempted coup d'etat against Sir Dawda Jawara.

For Mbaye Mbengue, Senegal's jovial ambassador to Banjul, the problem, if there is one, would rather be on the part of the civilians. "Some of my fellow

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

citizens seem to have decided that the confederation had already become a fact," he tells us. To put it plainly, the taxes and customs duties imposed on either side of the border are even less respected than in the past. "That shows that the people are often ahead of government plans," Mbaye Mbengue adds, with an amused smile.

Should we conclude from this that the confederation agreement, which became official on 1 February, has passed through like a letter dropped in the mail? "No," numerous Gambians explain. "We are entirely in agreement with the principle of confederation," affirms a young student from Brikama, who readily admits to being an opponent, "but we would have wanted to be consulted beforehand."

With the approach of the Gambian presidential and legislative elections, envisaged respectively for 4 and 5 May (J.A. [Jeune Afrique] No 1111), the handicap of the tragic events of July 1981 seems far from being lifted. Obviously, for Sir Jawara's compatriots, it is much more a question of a Gambo-Gambian matter than a Gambo-Senegalese problem.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982

9434
CSO: 4719/896

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GHANA

TRIBALISM ISSUE ANALYZED, ACCEPTED CONCEPTS MODIFIED

London AFRICAN AFFAIRS in English Vol 81, No 322, Jan 82 pp 67-69

[Text] Since Independence, Ghanaian governments have faced a series of economic and political problems which have threatened to undermine their legitimacy and power. One response, employed even by those governments like the present one which claim to have no use for ideology, has been to identify 'enemies' on whom the blame can be put, or who can be used to divert attention from the problems and provide a rallying point for national unity. The governments have had real choices as to the identification of these enemies. The theme of 'external sabotage' has been frequently employed in the form of, for example, attacks on foreign intervention, neo-colonialism, and the activities of alien minority groups in Ghana, notably the Lebanese and Nigerians. 'Internal subversion' has also been repeatedly identified, both in the form of cultural traits like corruption, self-interest and ideological misguidedness; and in the form of attacks on particular groups like the civil service, 'middlemen', market traders, and 'the politicians'. The employment of ideological attacks on communalism and tribalism, and the identification of particular communal minorities as the main agents of these threats, is thus only one of several options available to governments.

There has been a tendency in recent literature on African politics to blur the distinction between the political and the social. Political tensions and policies are assumed to reflect the 'underlying' social structure; and the area of government choice, options and initiative is thereby underplayed. By the same token, it is frequently assumed that social cleavages must somehow naturally emerge as politically salient, and if the evidence is not there, then the political manifestation is said to be either latent, emergent, or imminent.¹²⁵ The literature on Ghanaian politics has not in fact seriously examined the role of communalism in government ideologies, but to the extent that it has been discussed, the political salience of the 'Ewe threat' has been explained as a government response to the Ewes' own political behaviour, deriving from their 'persecution complex', or their character as a 'close-knit clannish group' and a 'latently suspicious sort of

125. The tendency has been evident in both the pluralist and the 'political economy' literature. One of the more obvious manifestations has been the frequency of assertions that the progressive immiseration of the masses must 'surely' pose a threat to the continuation of bourgeois elite rule in Africa, without the evidence of trends in this direction. There are signs of this in the chapters on Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Liberia in Dunn, *West African States*. Also see Ake, *Revolutionary Pressures*.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

people'. This is indeed the message of government propaganda, but it is not supported by the research which has been done. It seems likely that the Ewes are if anything less 'tribalistic' in their perceptions of themselves and others than, for example, the Akans. More importantly however, it might be argued that it is amongst the Akan groups rather than the Ewes, that a 'persecution complex' may be found, and that it is the emergence of discontent amongst these economically and politically dominant groups which provides the key to the development of tribalism in government ideologies.

In an article published in 1979, Fred Hayward attempted to measure 'perceptions of well-being' in Ghana by comparing objective and perceived position and status.¹²⁶ He found that the objectively wealthiest and politically dominant groups, the Akans and the Ga, felt the most deprived; while the Ewes and the most disadvantaged group, the northerners, felt reasonably satisfied with their lot. His explanation was that the dominant southerners had higher expectations of benefits from government and economic growth, and thus became most disillusioned when successive governments encountered political and economic problems. This conclusion seems to be supported by the findings of Donald Rothchild, which showed the more disadvantaged northern communities to have the lowest expectations of, and be the least disillusioned with, central government.¹²⁷

If indeed it is the Akan and Ga who have felt the most disillusioned and unfairly treated in the 1970s, it would seem likely that it has been their attempt to find explanations for the failures of the governments and the economy which lies behind much of the ethnic scapegoating which has occurred and been promulgated by the predominantly Akan governments. Despite their apparent disregard for northerners, the Akan groups could hardly isolate them as the major threat since their very 'backwardness' belies the credibility of such an allegation. Thus, if communal hostilities were to be employed at all, the Ewes were the obvious target; not because of major objective disparities between the two groups, but more because of their very visibility and similarity to the Akans, which lent credence to allegations that they were disruptive rivals.

This particular target has been so frequently employed because, compared to other ideological enemies, it has the virtue of performing multiple functions at apparently low political cost. It promotes national unity (and thence regime support) against both a minority group and an alleged threat (secessionism) to the nation's territorial boundaries. It serves to apparently explain, and thus to either defuse or promote, elite rivalries; depending on how it is employed. Finally, it has moral force because of the pejorative connotations of 'tribalism', which all may safely condemn. The political cost appears to be low in that the use of the 'Ewe threat' has not provoked a united hostile response from the target group; partly because of an Ewe sense of weakness which has engendered disappointment and apathy rather than hostility, and partly because of the very extent of Ewe integration into Ghana's social and political life which has both muted the communal hostilities and inhibited the alienation which might otherwise have developed.

126. F. M. Hayward, 'Perceptions of Well-being in Ghana, 1970 and 1975', *African Studies Review*, 22, 1, 1979, pp. 109-26.

127. D. Rothchild, 'Comparative Public Demand and Expectation Patterns: The Ghana Experience', *African Studies Review*, 22, 1, 1979, pp. 127-48. Rothchild's data does not cover an Ewe area of Ghana.

COPYRIGHT: The Royal African Society and Contributors 1982

CSO: 4700/1415

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROSPECTS OF ECONOMY DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 pp 1208-1209

[Text] During 1973-1980, the Guinean economy recorded, in current terms, an average annual growth rate of +3.4 percent, which exceeded the increase in population (+2.8 percent).

The recovery of the Guinean economy, beginning in 1973, was exclusively the result of the exploitation of two deposits of bauxite (Guinea Bauxite Company and Kindia Bauxite Office, the latter under Soviet control), which provides nearly 96 percent of export revenues. At the same time, exportable agricultural production has collapsed.

In 1979, the agricultural sector (80 percent of the population) accounted for 40 percent of the gross domestic product (as opposed to 66 percent in 1968), while mineral exploitation contributed 18.5 percent (4.2 percent in 1973), industry and construction-public works accounted for 7 percent and the tertiary sector provided 31 percent.

Growth has slowed since 1978 due to the peak reached in mineral production, the restriction of public investment expenditures for lack of adequate contributions of foreign capital and the necessity of allocating increased resources to offset the balance of payments deficit.

Foreign Trade

With the development of its mineral production, Guinea became the leading world exporter of bauxite: 11.2 million tons in 1980, not counting ore converted into aluminum locally: 0.7 million tons in exports.

For several years the balance of trade had a surplus balance. The development of trade can be summarized as follows, in millions of dollars:

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
Imports	264	233	303	347
Exports	253	293	328	390
Deficit	-11	--	--	--
Surplus	--	+60	+25	+43

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The estimated value of exports for 1980 was \$457 million. Bauxite and aluminum accounted for more than 96 percent of Guinean exports and 78 percent of sales were in convertible currencies, with the remaining 22 percent represented by the production of the Kindia Bauxite Office, operated by the Soviets, who are entitled to set aside shipments for themselves under a clearing agreement.

Imports have increased sharply since 1972, from 3.8 billion sylis (\$190 million) to 6.6 billion in 1979 (\$347 million), corresponding to 24.5 percent of the gross domestic product assessed for 1979.

In value, petroleum products represented more than 20 percent of imports in 1979, while capital goods needed for Development Plan operations and for mining companies declined somewhat; consumer goods represented a significant item because of the inadequacy of agricultural production (100,000 tons of rice and 20,000 tons of flour were imported in 1980).

Among suppliers, France is first (nearly 45 percent in 1980), followed by the United States, USSR, China, Great Britain, etc. (In its issue of 12 March 1981, p 734, MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS published a study on: Franco-Guinean Economic and Financial Relations.)

Officially stopped in 1975, the exploitation of diamond mines (which seems to have continued clandestinely) was resumed in 1980. About 6,000 carats were exported in 1980, representing \$1 million in value.

On the whole, exports of agricultural produce have declined considerably, being limited to cabbage-palm almonds (15,500 tons in 1980), coffee (2,880 tons) and pineapples (1,430 tons). Bananas, which Guinea supplied to the French market before 1960, have completely disappeared.

The United States is Guinea's leading customer, followed by the USSR, France, Canada, Spain, etc.

Deterioration of Balance of Payments

Although foreign trade, as a result of bauxite and aluminum exports (equivalent to \$450 million in 1980), showed a surplus, since 1975 the balance of payments has shown a deficit of more than \$100 million, reaching \$120 million in 1980.

Thus in 1982, Guinea finds itself facing the problem of foreign exchange resources. At the present time and until 1985, when mineral production should register new growth, net foreign-exchange revenues are estimated at approximately \$220 million, with \$195 million from bauxite and aluminum sales and \$15 million from exports of agricultural produce.

For the same period, annual foreign-exchange expenditures, which cannot be reduced, represent approximately \$250-270 million, with \$100 million for petroleum products, \$100 million for imports of capital goods and \$30 million for imports of foodstuffs.

The deficit resulting from revenues and expenditures approximately corresponds to debt servicing, two-thirds of whose coverage is provided by renewal of matured loans and one-third by short-term loans.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In late December 1980, the total outstanding foreign debt was estimated at \$1.5 billion, with an available margin of \$0.2 billion not yet paid. The foreign debt includes contracted commitments with Eastern countries, mainly the USSR, whose percentage is estimated at more than half of the total indebtedness.

During 1980, Guinean use of available foreign loans was estimated at \$70 million, while servicing (interest and amortization) represented \$95 million, including clearing operations with Eastern countries. Excluding such clearing operations, Guinea's drawings in 1980 amounted to \$65 million, as opposed to \$35 million in payments.

The deterioration of the balance of payments appears to be long-lasting as a result of increased debt servicing, due to greater indebtedness to Western countries since 1976, granted in the form of medium-term commodity credits.

Starting in 1979, the Guinean Government took various measures to get the economy back on its feet: official authorization of private trade, formulation of an investment code to encourage the establishment of semipublic corporations with foreign partners, monetary reform by changing the monetary system without devaluation, 1981-85 5-Year Plan totaling \$4.5 billion.

Rich Economic Potential

At the present time, no semipublic corporation has yet been established and the plan's measures imply extensive use of foreign credits and a large increase in international aid.

However, Guinea's economic potential is one of the greatest on the African continent: agriculture, livestock breeding, fishing, hydroelectricity, mineral resources, etc. But Guinea seems unable to utilize such potential before many years because of limitations deriving from its net available foreign-exchange resources and the nature of its economic system.

The shortage of foreign exchange constitutes the major obstacle to development. The Guinean economy cannot presently manage to save any foreign exchange for investment, whose financing can be provided only by further indebtedness, but a higher and higher percentage of new indebtedness (estimated at 25 percent) is used to pay for current imports and to cover the balance of payments deficit.

Exportable agricultural production apparently will not be able to grow before several years, grain imports will still be necessary (rice and flour imports in 1981 represented about 10 percent of all imports, in addition to free food assistance), imports of petroleum products are becoming burdensome despite aid from several Arab countries and new development of the mining sector cannot be considered before 1984-85.

Favorable factors include the renewed exploitation of diamond mines (diamond exports should be significant starting in 1984) and the Mount Nimba iron-ore extraction project (15 billion tons of high-grade reserves of as much as 60 percent), whose implementation, under the auspices of U.S. Steel with financial aid from the World Bank, should produce results only beginning in 1986.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The nature of the economic system also constitutes an obstacle to development. The Guinean economy is presently a juxtaposition of various airtight compartments, without any connection or coordination. Thus the official government sector, mining companies, the parallel commercial market and the rural self-subsistence economy exist side by side with each other. The country is underadministered, the public sector must be reorganized at various levels and become morally responsible in a spirit of awareness of the national interest. Moreover, the state of existing infrastructures would not allow rapid expansion of economic operations.

The strategy reaffirmed by the Guinean Government also does not encourage foreign investment in semipublic corporations benefiting from a certain economic liberalism.

Eventually, around 1990, a better overall balance can be expected with the launching of major new mining projects. For the 1982-85 period, the burden of debt servicing constitutes a major problem.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11915

CSO: 4719/863

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA

BRIEFS

SEKOU TOURE'S VISIT TO FRANCE--Ahmed Sekou Toure, president of the Republic of Guinea, recently hinted during an interview granted to special correspondents from the French press that he would make an official visit to France this year. Such a visit, Sekou Toure essentially said, would be the best opportunity for dissipating all misunderstandings, while restoring and strengthening trust between our two governments. The Guinean chief of state emphasized that after a year of socialist government in France, "nothing important" has been done about relations between the Guinean and French parties. "However," he said, "we still have hope for a better future because we believe that the president of the French Republic intends to invite us for a visit to the French people." The Guinean chief of state hoped in particular that "relations of sincere and lasting cooperation would be established and solidified" between the French and Guinean governments and between the French Socialist Party and the Democratic Party of Guinea. Relations between the two parties deteriorated 5 years ago following criticisms against Conakry regarding respect for human rights. Previous to that time, relations between the Socialist Party and Guinea had been good. Francois Mitterrand has gone to Guinea four times since the country's independence in 1958. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1338] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS--On 14 May, the Supreme Constitutional Assembly (ACS) of Guinea officially proclaimed the final results of the 9 May presidential elections, confirming the reelection of Ahmed Sekou Toure with 100 percent of the votes cast. According to the ACS, Ahmed Sekou Toure obtained 100 percent of the votes cast, representing 98.82 percent of the 3,100,110 persons registered. In the last elections in December 1974, he also obtained 100 percent of the votes, but the figure then was 99.84 percent of the 2,436,129 persons registered. The ACS, recently set up in Guinea, has 600 members. It is responsible for proclaiming the final results of the presidential elections and for swearing in the elected chief of state. Sekou Toure began his fourth 7-year term by clemency measures for a number of persons held in Guinean prisons. However, neither the number nor the names of those chosen are known. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1338] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IDA INDUSTRIAL SECTOR CREDIT--Guinea will make use of a credit from the International Development Association (IDA, an affiliate of the World Bank) for \$19 million to revive its industrial sector by strengthening industries of the private sector through the supply of credits, equipment and technical assistance, improvement of the results of certain public industrial enterprises and increasing the capabilities of certain government agencies to establish a policy for the industrial sector. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1209] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915

CSO: 4719/863

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IVORY COAST

ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC RECOVERY EXAMINED

Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 10-23 May 82 pp 30-31

[Article by Koffi Mamane: "Scientific Research: Driving Power for Development"]

[Text] The Ministry of Scientific Research is playing a key role in the economic recovery policy being implemented by the Ivory Coast Government to lift the country out of its economic crisis (AFRIQUE-ASIE No 264, 26 April 1982). Established in 1971 and headed by Dr Balla Keita since February 1981, the ministry has become one of the prime movers of what is being called the "Ivorian economic miracle."

Under Balla Keita, who for a long time performed the duties of director general of scientific research, the ministry is on the way to becoming a true super-ministry, whose activities reach into many sectors as varied as agriculture, education, health and planning. In short, as Dr Keita himself puts it, this ministry "is playing the role of coordinator between several departments."

This young veterinarian, who was born in 1938, after outstanding studies in the FRG, was appointed director general of scientific research in the ministry of the same name. Bella Keita was not long in bringing attention to himself. For some, he is an innovative spirit; for others, he is an enfant terrible and an authoritarian. In any event, shortly thereafter he went to New York to the Ivorian office of UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Recalled to Abidjan in November 1980, he was appointed by Chief of State Felix Houphouet-Boigny to become a member of the political executive committee of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI-RDA [African Democratic Rally]) before being named to head the Ministry of Scientific Research.

Breaking what was becoming a tradition, Dr Balla Keita traveled through the Ivorian bush, visited institutes and worked to make his department a house of glass: this eloquent man is open to the press of which he is the darling in Abidjan. Recently, he was asked to appear on "The Great Debate" program on national television and was a huge success.

If scientific research is being called upon to play a pace-setting role in economic recovery, that is because it is giving priority consideration to the pillar of the Ivorian economy, agriculture, which is founded on scientific and technical bases. This prompted Dr Ball Keita to say: "In the cacao-coffee

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

sector, we have obtained fabulous results, considering the time it has taken us to arrive at that point. Production is currently about 500,000 tons per year." A total strategy was implemented to end the stagnation which has been threatening production for close to 2 years. Thus, instead of annual growth of about 7 percent which characterized cacao-coffee production in the past decade, the 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan anticipates an annual growth rate of 5.5 percent. On the other hand, new varieties of products are under study and, according to the authorities, promise satisfactory results. A hybridization of Ivorian robusta coffee and arabica, which produces notably arabusta, should have a good future, as its yield per hectare and its quality surpass by far those products now being grown.

The Ministry of Scientific Research has also developed lush varieties of manioc and yams which now have a longer period of preservation and are processed on site.

If, in a few years time, the Ivory Coast has stopped importing rice as the result of rising production, according to Dr Keita it was because: "The quality of river rice has been improved as well as its resistance to drought. There is also reason to be satisfied with the results obtained in such varied sectors as aquiculture, pisciculture and the fight against bilharziasis and rabies.

On another subject--new kinds of energy--peasants are being initiated into the use of biomass." (Biomass consists of vegetable and animal matter which can be transformed into fuel.)

Peasants, a not unimportant factor, are showing increasing interest in the ministry's spearhead activities in rural circles, namely the "technical committees" which bring together both technicians and agriculturists who do not hesitate in criticizing and formulating solutions.

"We have shattered the myth according to which the African peasant has no feeling for progress and science, which, I might add, is a racist myth," Dr Keita emphasized.

Of course, if this ministry conducts research in all sectors, it is because the state is giving it the funds to do so. Thus its budget was raised from 4 billion CFA francs to 15 billion CFA francs in 2 years. However, there is above all a philosophy which transcends all national political choices. When, 11 years ago, Houphouet-Boigny decided to establish the Ministry of Scientific Research, his action was greeted by a shrugging of shoulders. "A gadget for the rich," "a privilege of the industrialized countries," were the comments at that time in Africa, where to this day there are no ministries of scientific research per se, as this sector is generally placed under the ministries of industrial or rural development. At present, in the Ivory Coast, this ministry is making every effort to a large number of African researchers from other countries. "For us scientific research is a way of lifting the Ivory Coast out of the charlatanism represented by the construction of development through improvisation and obscurantism," Dr Keita said. Thus, some 60 research institutes are attached to as many development companies to improve vegetable products and to do the pre-familiarization work before moving on to "really large-scale" production.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Rural Exodus

It is true that this research is doing great things for Ivorians and, according to Dr Keita, "aims to create the conditions for the scientific legitimatization of the African continent so that we will lose our complexes vis-a-vis the whites."

It is also true that research has benefited from political stability and, above all, from the coherence of political choices, which in other respects are much debated. These political choices have resulted in the production by fewer than 6,000 rich planters of all Ivorian coffee and cacao, while small planters, victims of unequal--and often unfair--competition are forced into rural exodus, which is one of the results of national policy. This exodus basically affects young people and results in an average age for planters of 50 years.

Keeping the young people in the countryside is certainly one of the objectives of the ministries of agriculture and scientific research; however, their success is not guaranteed. This is a general policy question!

COPYRIGHT: 1982 AFRIQUE-ASIE

8143

CSO: 4719/957

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLICE ABUSES PRODUCES RESULTS

London AFRICAN AFFAIRS in English No 128, Apr 82 pp 31-32

[Excerpts]

BECAUSE of public complaints, 406 members of Mozambique's security police have been sacked and 18 arrested. The sackings have not come all at once, but have been spread over more than a year. They are part of a unique 'law and order' campaign. In Mozambique, the phrase means that the police and army must obey the law, just like anyone else.

Every country seems to have 'bent coppers' and soldiers who use their guns and uniforms to abuse people. But the response to that problem tells a lot about a country. In Britain and many other countries, for example, when the public complain about corrupt or brutal police, the Government often just jumps to defend the police and suppress the evidence. Calls for civilian reviews of the police are vigorously opposed.

In Mozambique, the response has been just the opposite. President Samora Machel has publicly castigated the police. Civilian control is to be increased, and the public are being encouraged to denounce acts of corruption and disrespect for the people. In most countries it is the secret police who usually become a law unto themselves. Machel is open about both the need for a special security police, and about its dangers.

Mozambique's security police, SNASP, was created 'to correspond to the needs of the new phase of our fight, the intensification of the class struggle within our country,' the President said.

But the President recognized that some members of SNASP reproduced the style and methods of work of the

capitalist secret police in an attempt to intimidate and terrorize the population.

Following complaints from the public, the Government felt the urgency to bring the security police under public control. This was done partly through the 'Office of Control and Discipline' (OCD). All ministries were required to establish such offices two years ago. They serve as ombudsmen to investigate public complaints. Some people must have doubted, however, if the SNASP OCD would really function. But its recent report makes it clear that it has.

After investigating complaints from the public, the OCD ordered the sacking of 406 members of SNASP — most in the past year during which the 'law and order' campaign has been in full swing. The offences cover a wide range: abuse of power, lack of respect for the people, misuse of vehicles, falsification of evidence, abandoning a post to deal with private matters, corruption, drunkenness, and destruction of property. Eighteen have been arrested and will be tried — most for mistreating prisoners or members of the public.

24-hour service

SNASP's OCD has now established a 24-hour telephone number for people who wish to make complaints in Maputo. Perhaps equally unusual, the Government is not simply waiting for people to come to it with complaints — it is actually going out into neighbourhoods in Maputo,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Beira, and other cities holding public meetings. These are chaired by high officials, and the public is encouraged to denounce corrupt or abusive members of the police, security police and army.

The meeting in the crowded workers' suburb of Polana Canico in Maputo recently was probably typical. It was led by the National Police Commander, Althiado Siteo, who stressed that the colonial police had beaten and persecuted people, and that this cannot be allowed to happen now. It can only be prevented, he said, if people speak out against the police and soldiers who abused their power. Then, in a strong statement, he assured the audience that anyone who spoke out would be protected from reprisals. People did speak. The meeting went on for more than four hours. Darkness fell, but people talked on.

Meetings like this have taken place all over the country, and are effective. A number of policemen have been arrested or dismissed and presented to the public at follow-up meetings. But even meetings are not enough. The Government has announced a whole range of measures to increase civilian control. Some are quite simple. For example, any policeman or soldier must show his identity card if asked. This will be an important control. Perhaps most important, local and county councils are to form police committees, and local branches of the police, security police, and army must report regularly to them. These committees are expected to present and follow up public complaints, and to keep a general check on the security forces. ■

COPYRIGHT: 1982 African Journals Ltd

CSO: 4700/1431

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

KOUNTCHE APPARENTLY MOVING TOWARD RESTORATION OF CIVIL RULE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1112, 28 Apr 82 p 75

{Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Soon Civilians?"

[Text] Toward a constitution prepared by all citizens.

Niger has taken a small step toward the "civilization" of power. In the traditional speech he made on the eve of the eighth anniversary of the taking of power by the army (15 April 1974), President Seyni Kountche announced a political decision which breaks with the practices current since the fall of Hamani Diori. The National Development Council, a body grouping all social levels in the country, from country people to senior executives, by way of youths and city workers, will not be a corporatistic type of chamber. Crowning the institutions of the Development Society (J.A. [Jeune Afrique] No 1110), it will be set up as a Constituent Assembly.

"The aim," the chief of state recalled, "is to associate all compatriots with the responsible management of Niger's affairs." In this spirit, precautions have been taken to avoid having the new institutions become the monopoly of city dwellers (intellectuals, tradesmen, etc.), with regard to whom the military remains somewhat mistrustful. Thus, to allow for strong representation by the masses, the country people in particular, 50 percent of the seats will be occupied by members of the Samariya (youth associations) and of cooperatives, which constitute, it should be recalled, the two pillars of the Development Society.

What are the broad lines of the draft constitution which the CMS (Supreme Military Council, the highest state body) is getting ready to place before the future Constituent Assembly? Is the CMS itself destined to disappear? What will be the major organs of power? These are some of the questions we have the right to ask, the day after the chief of state's announcement.

All the more since the authorities have always stressed their intention to set up "an original type of society, authentically Nigerien in its values, its foundations and its practice." What is certain is that Col Seyni Kountche is a supporter, undoubtedly prudent but convinced, of the normalization of power, to say nothing of its return to civilians.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Started scarcely 2 years after the army's accession to power, this process appeared with even greater clarity in February 1981.

The eighth ministerial reorganization which took place on that occasion was not without significance. It marked the departure of important members of the CMS; only two out of the 10 who had taken power remained in office. A sharp preponderance of civilians was assured at the same time. Col Seyni Kountche would have wanted to go even further and entrust to a civilian the prime minister's post, a decision which would have, more than any other, sanctioned the wish to give civilians a share in power.

But, although commander in chief of the army, President Kountche is obliged to take into account the resistance he encounters in the barracks. Being unable to oppose directly those in the military who, having tasted power, no longer intend to share it, he is bypassing them, by mobilizing the sans-culottes and giving them the possibility of expressing themselves within the framework of legal and representative institutions. Will he be better understood by proceeding in that manner? It will not be easy. Nevertheless, the setting up of a Constituent Assembly 8 years after the army's accession to power, is a step in the right direction.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982

9434
CSO: 4719/896

SENEGAL

PROPOSED SHIPPING LINE WILL AID EXPORTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 1982 p 1335

[Text] On 12 May, Senegalese Prime Minister Habib Thiam presided over a Cabinet meeting for the second time in 6 months, a meeting devoted to the establishment of a single shipping company. At the meeting, he recalled the reasons behind such a move, emphasizing the need to promote Senegalese exports in order to save on foreign exchange, revive foreign trade while ensuring its security, and create jobs.

The prime minister confirmed the establishment of a single shipping company, to be responsible for operation of the two lines, the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and made the following decisions: to ensure effective startup of the new firm by 30 September at the latest; to open up the stock in the new entity to all companies in the sector recognized before 30 November 1980, dissolving shareholding companies; to grant shareholder status to any Senegalese firm whose participation in the capital is at least 15 percent; to see that all shareholders in the single shipping line have previously liquidated their debts and balanced their books; and to use as the framework for constitution of the company's capital the following proportions: government, 10 percent; national owners, 65 percent; related companies, 15 percent; and private parties, 10 percent.

National shipping company owners and related companies will fairly divide up the proportion of capital reserved for them.

In setting up the capital of the single company, priority will be given to contributions in cash, while not excluding those in kind whose appraisal must be fair. A foreign company will be designated as technical partner of the new firm. It will not compete with it and the foreign firm's experience will be profitable for entering other lines. The Ministry of Equipment will update the profitability study of the new line, based on the 40-40-20 rule and on bulk transport. The guidelines of the new line on equipment must be precisely spelled out and include only that which is useful and effective. Future activities of the new unit must be reviewed and the line's capital must be established based on them.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11,464
CSO: 4719/1037

41

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

TWO NEW PARTIES--Two new political parties will be recognized in Senegal and will bring to 14 the number of political groups in this country. They are the Communist League of Workers (Trotskyist) and the Socialist Party of the Masses (which claims to be based on "scientific socialism"). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1206] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915

AGREEMENTS SIGNED--The Senegalese chief of state, Mr Abdou Diouf, returned to Dakar on 28 April following a 12-day tour which took him to Niger (accompanied by his wife), Oman and the Federation of United Arab Emirates, with two stopovers in Paris. During his Parisian stopover, Mr Abdou Diouf held talks with French officials, in particular Mr Jean-Pierre Cot, minister for cooperation and development, and Mr Guy Penne, special adviser to President Mitterrand on African and Malagasy affairs. In Oman, the two chiefs of state decided to negotiate and sign agreements for cultural and economic cooperation, for despite excellent relations between the two countries, there was no formal legal framework until now. Mr Abdou Diouf said that the Senegalese delegation has submitted proposals to the Omani delegation and with the next visit of the sultanate's foreign affairs minister to Dakar, the two delegations will be able to sign the two agreements which will constitute the legal framework for cooperation between the two countries. In the case of Abu Dhabi, the legal framework already partly existed, since Senegal had signed a cultural agreement with that country. Thus it was a matter of proposing a plan for economic cooperation and a plan for preliminary implementation of the cultural agreement. The principle of concluding the agreement and the preliminary agreement was approved. In this instance as well, Senegal submitted proposals to the Federation of United Arab Emirates and discussions will begin soon to make it possible to negotiate and conclude such agreements as quickly as possible. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1207] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915

BELGIAN COOPERATION PROGRAM--A 3-year program for cooperation between Belgium and Senegal was approved on 29 April during a meeting in Dakar of the Mixed Commission for Cooperation, which the two countries have established. It was also decided that Belgium would make 16 drillings in Senegal as well as provide a refrigeration system and processing installations for small-scale fishing at Joal. According to the meeting's final communique, Belgium will also provide scientific and technical assistance to Senegalese agricultural, livestock-breeding and renewable energy sources sectors. In the area of health care, cooperation will continue under the basic health-care projects of Pikine and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Matam. With regard to training, Belgium will continue to provide assistance to the following projects: Advanced Teacher Training School, Institute of Sciences and the Environment, Basic Institute of Black Africa (IFAN). A Belgian expert will also be assigned to the future National Institute for Rural Development, which should be opening its doors soon. Belgium has also pledged to provide scholarships to Senegalese, who will thus be able to gradually take over Belgian technical assistance. In the industrial sector, finally, a line of credit will be granted to SOFISEDIT [Senegalese Financial Company for the Development of Industry and Tourism] to enable it to continue its policy of support for small and medium-size businesses (PME). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1207] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915

RICE STALLS SET UP--The Senegalese Government has given the National Distribution Company of Senegal (SONADIS) the task of setting up rice stalls at the main markets in Cape Verde and throughout the rest of the country on a gradual basis. According to Tafsir Ibnou Diop, assistant administrator of SONADIS, the move is part of "the fight against hoarding and speculation on basic commodities." Future expansion of the number of stalls will complete the action of the 12 wholesale and small wholesale outlets and the 114 retail branches which SONADIS has been opening up in Senegal since 1965. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1335] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

ARGENTINE HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT--On 3 May, the "Rio Gualaguay," from the Argentine ocean shipping line Elmu, arrived at the port of Dakar from Buenos Aires, carrying the first 400 tons of hydraulic equipment purchased by Senegal from the Argentine Republic within the framework of the \$15-million line of credit granted to Senegal by the Argentine Government. The equipment includes windmills, water pumps, water tanks and other accessories. The rest of the equipment will come in two more shipments, with complete delivery scheduled by the end of June. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 pp 1335-1336] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

CSO: 4719/1037

END