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(FOUO 4/82)

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CONTENTS

BANGLADESH

- Ershad Pledges Return to Barracks After 'Political Clean-Up'
(THE TIMES, 2 Jun 82) 1

KAMPUCHEA

- Information on PRK and SRV Military Units 3

LAOS

- Information on Lao Military Units 6

PAKISTAN

- Elections Imminent; Time Said To Be Running Out
(John Fullerton; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 4 Jun 82) 9

- Jamaate Islami's Power, Policies Discussed
(John Fullerton; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 4 Jun 82) 14

- Nusrat Bhutto's Bitterness Described
(John Fullerton; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 4 Jun 82) 16

- Cotton and Textile Industry's Problems Discussed
(Mohammed Aftab; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 7 May 82) 19

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BANGLADESH

ERSHAD PLEDGES RETURN TO BARRACKS AFTER 'POLITICAL CLEAN-UP'

PM021517 London THE TIMES in English 2 Jun 82 p 8

[Trevor Fishlock report on undated Dacca interview with Lt Gen Hussain Ershad, chief martial law administrator of Bangladesh: "General's Pledge to Bangladeshis: Back to Barracks After Political Clean-up"]

[Text] A wry smile crossed the face of Lieutenant-General Hussain Ershad. "Unfortunately, yes, Bangladeshis are a very political people. They now realize politics did not pay them much, that they were taken for a ride. They never saw so much chaos. It was anarchy.

"The politicians were fossils, unable to lead. But politics will come back. The question is: What sort of political system? I say, whatever people decide. The government will be elected. We shall have new politics, new men, a new system," he said in an interview at his headquarters here.

The general's promise keeps alive a potent ingredient in the power struggle in Bangladesh.

The army took over four months after the presidential election because it wanted a say in running the country. General Ershad responded to pressure from officers who saw only indiscipline and corruption among bureaucrats and businessmen, and were attracted by ideas of an Indonesian type of regime. Mr Abdus Sattar, the president, stubbornly said the army's place was in barracks. Considering the army's ambitions, its view of its rights and importance, and its contempt for politicians, the president's insistence made a coup inevitable.

Now that the officers have what they want, the effect on them of talk about elections can only be speculated on.

But General Ershad said his army is united as it goes about the task he calls "a big clean-up, putting the house right." When stability and order had been achieved, he said, "We will go back to our own job."

General Ershad's style is low-key and earnest. He talks of not having much time for golf, his great passion, and for his minor hobby, writing poetry. He insists he has no personal ambition, "for as army chief I already have the highest honour. What more could I want?"

1
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He could hardly expect to be popular, but many Bangladeshis say they are impressed by his sincerity. His demeanour is of one convinced of the virtue of an almost holy war as he sets his men to clean up the Augean stables.

He is enthusiastic about the regime's plans for devolving administration to the clusters of villages known as thanas.

"Nine-tenths of our people live in villages and were previously left out of things. Thanas will collect taxes, plan their own development, have all the important services at their doorstep.

His regime works by agreement. He is careful to involve junior officers and men, to give them jobs, and to hear their views, which are fed into the 13-member civilian and military advisory council.

The army is an institution that needs a good deal of attention, the general said.

He has worked hard to mend the damaging bloody feud in the army between the "freedom fighters" who fought in the liberation war in Bangladesh and those who, like himself, were interned in Pakistan and later repatriated. "The unfortunate division between freedom fighters and repatriates is no more."

The future, of course, is uncertain. The army extols its administrative plans and its drive against corruption, appearing to believe that much else, including the appalling economic problems of one of the world's poorest countries, with one of the fastest growing populations will be more easily handled in "the new system."

Meanwhile, General Ershad, the respected chairman of a coterie of senior officers, has to watch a number of pots to see they do not boil.

"Yes, there is uncertainty. There is fear. Martial law is very...but I have not imposed harsh martial law. You don't see soldiers, do you? I have not done so because the aim is different. And the people are cooperating because our objective is noble."

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KAMPUCHEA

INFORMATION ON PRK AND SRV MILITARY UNITS

[The following information has been extracted from Phnom Penh Domestic Service at 1200 CMT unless otherwise noted on the dates indicated, or from Vietnamese materials as indicated. Unit signators and locations are as given. The remarks include a brief summary of the information available in the source.]

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
4th Battalion in Kampot Province	Helped people in daily life. (15 Jun 82)
"KOR" Brigade's 24th Battalion Oddar Meanchey Province	Successful combat conducted against a group of Pol Pot remnants at (Prey Nam Tao) (21 May 82)
31st Regt, B.79 Corps [Binh Doan]	Serving in Kampuchea. A mobile unit. Includes three battalions. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 May 82 p 3)
H.89 Engineer Gp	Serving Kampuchea. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 May 82 p 3)
7th Battalion of Brigade "KOR"	An outstanding unit growing up rapidly through training and self-discipline. (12 May 82)
5th Brigade, Sithor Kandal District, Prey Vang Province	Article introducing Vietnamese cadre (Nguyen Van Tien) assigned an armed task group conducting propaganda work among people. (6 May 82)
B.1 Regt	Serving in Kampuchea. Subordinate units include infantry companies. Dispersed in small units. (QUAN DCI NHAN DAN 14 Apr 82 p 3)

3
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Song Thao Engineer Gp	Photo of floating bridge constructed by unit. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 14 Apr 82 p 3)
2d Gp	Located at Takeo, Kampuchea. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 12 Apr 82 p 2)
91st and 2d Battalions of Koh Kong Province	Station correspondent describing his visit to cadres and combatants, noting progress of training, success of sweep operations and development of these units in training as well as work performances. Also notes close cooperation between Kampuchean soldiers and Vietnamese volunteer troops. (12 Apr 82)
Command of 4th Brigade	In March political course opened for 115 junior and medium-rank cadres to expose enemy's psychological tactics. (9 Apr 82)
Battalion A of Svay Rieng Province	Cited as model unit outstanding in mass agitation work in 1981. (7 Apr 82)
Battalion A of Svay Rieng Province	Successfully assisted people in production. (6 Apr 82)
24th Battalion of Brigade Kor	Crushed 19 enemy elements 27-28 May, 48 enemy elements surrendered to authorities in Srei Snam and Kralanh districts. (5 Apr 82)
3d Company in 4th Battalion of Kampot Province	Article describing outstanding feats made in mass persuasion work. (5 Apr 82)
296th Division Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province	Statement to station correspondent by (Chan Supheahtra), deputy commander which is in charge of defending northwestern border, on his division's feats that enable it to win Defense Ministry's medals, people's trust, rapid development of his unit, good leadership, constant training, grasp of tasks to defend country, care for subordinates. (5 Apr 82 1230 GMT)
91st Battalion along Kampuchean-Thai border	Helped people to harvest 15 ha of rice and build 3 houses. (29 Mar 82)
H.69 Engineer Gp	Serving in Kampuchea. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Mar 82 p 3)

4
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Division [no designator]	Commander: Senior Colonel Nguyen Minh Quang [NGUYEEMX MINH QUANG]. Presently serving in northwestern Kampuchea. Prior to early 1979 served in Tay Ninh Province. (IHAN DAN 22 Mar 82 p 3)
20th Battalion of Siem Reap	Model story carried by revolutionary army paper describing a clash between battalion and a group of Pol Pot remnants which resulted in 18 enemy casualties and large arms haul. (19 Mar 82)
Pursat Province's 37th Battalion	Shines in training. (12 Mar 82)
980th Gp	Serving in Kampuchea. Providing training on antiaircraft guns to Kampuchean army. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 2 Mar 82 p 1)
Tra Khuc Gp	Serving in northeastern Kampuchea. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Feb 82 p 2)
B.56 Gp	Photo of unit patrol at Cheom Ksan, Preah Vihear Province, Kampuchea. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 23 Feb 82 p 2)
Tra Khuc Gp	Located at Chep Village, Preah Vihear Province, Kampuchea. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Feb 82 p 2)
Binh Tram M.79 aka M.79 Gp, Transportation Department, Rear Services General Department	Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Huynh Cao Son [HUYNHF CAO SOWN]. Located within 40 kilometers downriver from Phnom Penh on the Mekong River. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Feb 82 p 3)

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5
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LAOS

INFORMATION ON LAO MILITARY UNITS

[The following information has been extracted from Vientiane Domestic Service broadcasts at 0400 GMT unless otherwise noted on the dates indicated, or from Lao press material as indicated. Unit designators and locations are as given. The remarks include a brief summary of the information available in the source.]

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Battalion "E" in Savannakhet Province	Effectively fulfilled task of maintaining peace and public security while boosting production early this year. (16 Jun 82)
Tank Battalion "A" in Southern Region	Scored outstanding achievements in carrying out tasks including rice farming, repairing houses and vehicles, studying politics and military subjects, and implementing army regulations during past 2 months. (16 Jun 82)
Ground Artillery Battalion "B" in Southern Region	Opened specialized training course for officers and men attached to battalion between March and May. (16 Jun 82)
Air Force Battalion A	Held ceremony 7 June to present certificates to graduates of basic technical course. (15 Jun 82)
Battalion G under Northern Division	Emulating to improve their units and repair buildings. (19 May 82)
Northern Battalion B	Repaired dozens of vehicles and built barracks and other offices. (19 May 82)
Infantry Battalion "A" Luang Namtha Province	Combatants operating to defend fatherland. Gives battalion commander Maj Khamphan's report on battalion's past achievements, saying combatants took part in 979 major or minor attacks during which 312 enemy men were captured or forced to surrender, seized 372 guns and large quantity of other equipment. Also points to consolidation and building of companies attached to this battalion. (25 Apr 82)

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Army Battalion "A" in Vientiane	Party committee held plenary meeting in April to review past work and adopt new plan for 1982. (19 Apr 82)
Army Logistics Training School	Cadres and combatants have, since early March, competed in studying culture and specialized subjects while carrying out activities to maintain security to score achievements to welcome Third Party Congress. (19 Apr 82)
Air Transportation Battalion "E"	Party committee members and combatants have scored outstanding achievements in transporting supplies and carrying passengers and in boosting production. (19 Apr 82)
Regiment E in Southern Laos	Leading committee held meeting to publicize success of conference of army party committees and to launch emulation campaign to welcome Third LPRP Congress. (14 Apr 82)
Anti-Aircraft Battalion "F" in Vientiane	Joined in expanding acreages for sugar cane plantation. (7 Apr 82)
Battalion "A" of Northern Region Military Command	Primary medical students began practical training at command hospital on 3 March. (5 Apr 82)
Battalion "H" of Phong Saly Province	Has stepped up activities to consolidate organization. (5 Apr 82)
Major Battalion "C" of Savannakhet Provincial Military Command	On 28 March held meeting to hail success of army party committee conference. (4 Apr 82)
Anti-Aircraft Battalion "F"	Held meeting on 31 March to hear report on success of conference of party committees within army, confer medals on outstanding cadres and combatants for achievements in past 5 years and launch short-term emulation campaign to welcome forthcoming Third LPRP Congress. (3 Apr 82)
Army Brigade "A" in Vientiane	Held meeting of party cadres members to hail army party committee conference. (1 Apr 82)
Regional Armed Forces Battalion "P" of Houa Phan Province	Organized political and military training courses for cadres and combatants attached to battalion between early January and 20 March. (31 Mar 82)

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Battalion "B" in Vientiane	Enthusiastically performing task of consolidating their units. Their achievements in building living quarters cited. (22 Mar 82)
Army Food Processing School	Fulfilled plan for past 3 months. Achievements in transporting supplies, building kitchens, growing vegetables and so forth cited. (22 Mar 82)
Army Battalion No 2 in Vientiane	Harvested 10,300 kg of crops and raised some animals during 1981 harvest season. (20 Mar 82)
Army Battalion No 1 in Vientiane	Harvested 11,890 kg of crops and 1,359 kg of vegetables in 1981. (20 Mar 82)
Army Battalion "E" in Vientiane	Scored excellent achievements in food production and public service in late 1981. (19 Mar 82)
First Battalion of Army Brigade "A" in Vientiane	Attended political study 15-20 February. (18 Mar 82)
Army Transport Boat Building Factory	Fulfilled production plan by 87 percent by late 1981. (18 Mar 82)
Battalion No 1 in Vientiane	Company "B" has successfully fulfilled task of maintaining peace and public order in Hatsaifong District during past 2 months, capturing four reactionary subordinates. (17 Mar 82)
Combined Military Training School in Xieng Khouang Province	Women's union held celebration ceremony 10 March to mark international women's day. Lt Col (Khamkhouang), deputy director of school and member of provincial party committee, addressed rally. Unidentified Soviet experts working in this province also attended ceremony. (16 Mar 82)
First Battalion in Vientiane	Improves discipline and army procedures. (13 Mar 82)
Armored Battalion B in Vientiane	Held ceremony on 4 March to confer ranks on officers and men. Attending were Brig Gen Ki Thoummala, deputy chief of army general political department. (6 Mar 82)
N.92 Gp, POL Department, Rear Services General Department	Commander: Ha Khac Thuan [HAF KHAWCS THUAANF]. Serving in Laos. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Feb 82 p 3)

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PAKISTAN

ELECTIONS IMMINENT; TIME SAID TO BE RUNNING OUT

Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW in English 4 Jun 82 pp 23-26

[Article by John Fullerton]

[Text] Islamabad: July 5 will mark the fifth anniversary of the generals' takeover in Pakistan which put President Zia-ul Haq in power. And informed sources in both government and moderate opposition circles expect the anniversary to produce the first step towards a return to a degree of civilian rule. They forecast that the authorities will announce regulations governing national elections to be held within 18 months.

Zia could announce non-party elections, a policy to which most banned opposition leaders would be expected to object. But, in the final analysis, these leaders would probably not boycott elections by preventing their respective followers from standing as candidates. However, there are risks in this non-party approach--a last-minute boycott by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)--still the mainstay of the seven-party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) seeking an immediate end to martial law--would put the validity of the exercise in doubt.

As some opposition spokesmen of both the Left and Right have said, a non-party election would mean in effect 300 new political parties in the national assembly. Parochial political interests would dominate the assembly and the very consensus which Zia seeks would be lacking. Alternatively, rules could be drawn up governing the adoption of candidates for an election, barring those who had held office in previous administrations and others lacking what the fundamentalists would regard as suitable Islamic qualifications. This approach seems to have the backing of conservative political groups such as the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan.

The elections would undoubtedly be held on the basis of proportional representation, which would help to ensure that no single opposition party obtained a clear majority. Only political parties which agreed to register with the authorities as required under a military regulation would be allowed to participate and that could shut out the radicals. So far the PPP, the National Democratic Party, the Pakistan National Party and the Pakistan Democratic Party--all members of the MRD--have refused to submit the details of membership and organisation required for registration.

9
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Would Zia succeed thereby in splitting the MRD? Would he be able to tolerate a consensus of conservative and centrist elements only too relieved to contest an election without rivals from the socialist PPP and other smaller parties, some of which champion the cause of provincial autonomy? Or would he face a re-run of 1979 when the PPP's refusal to comply with government directives in the run-up to a general election and the opposition's charge that the election process was being rigged led to an indefinite postponement of the voting?

Then, as now, it was a gamble by both sides with the authorities believing that the PPP could not afford, as a broadly-based movement, to continue its semi-clandestine existence without losing support and the PPP believing that Zia could not survive a postponement of his plan for a return to representative government. Each underestimated the resolve of the other.

Whatever the decision on the elections, the drawing up of a new Islamic constitution or the amending of the presently suspended 1973 Constitution would probably be deferred. Zia is conscious of the fact that constitutions without the consensus needed to make them work are merely short-lived pieces of paper.

This lack of a consensus has been Pakistan's weakness all along and it is one reason why in 35 years the country's two general elections ended in the first instance in civil strife--and the breaking away of the country's eastern wing, now Bangladesh--and the second in a military coup. The nation's constitutional history has been characterised by the rise and fall of larger-than-life leaders--men much loved and eventually much hated, whose colourful if brief fortunes have seen the state lurching from one crisis of confidence to the next.

Zia seeks a way out of the political log-jam, and a change in direction, from the business of crisis management to long-term political management. Apologists for his five years of military rule insist that the man wants to extricate himself from the political process, but that he is not willing to do so as long as a return to the anarchy of 1977 which brought the military to power seems inevitable.

They point out that the authorities have moved some of the way towards the vision they have of a stable, democratic, but essentially Islamic state. The Shariah (Islamic law) is now practised in the courts and it does have considerable popular support (as do military courts because of the expeditious manner in which cases are handled).

The use of an Islamic banking system, following Islam's prohibition of usury or interest, is proving a success and other Muslim nations watch the experiment enviously. Zakat (the Islamic taxation system which provides money for the poor) is a national institution. Gambling and the consumption of alcohol have been banned. national dress has been adopted by the civil service. And on several occasions this year Zia has voiced his thoughts to the press on an evolutionary return to democratic government.

Another move was the establishment of the Majlis-i-Shoora, a federal advisory council (REVIEW, Jan.8). It may well consist of hand-picked people whom the

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banned opposition condemns as opportunists and yes-men, but it functions with all the trappings of parliamentary procedure and, despite the fury of at least one senior minister, the flow of criticism directed at government policy has gone unchecked. In an election its members are expected to be encouraged to stand as candidates and though many of them do in fact represent opinions far to the left of Zia's supporters they will be expected to play a central role in that badly needed consensus.

The same may be said of the local bodies or councils elected in 1979. That exercise was an important lesson for Zia, for the bodies were initially dominated by the very people Zia wanted to manoeuvre out of the political ring--supporters of the PPP, still estimated today to be the most important single force in opposition circles. But these and other elements viewed as undesirable were quickly disqualified under the local election rules. Hence the close attention now being paid to regulations governing the selection of candidates for a potential general election.

Recently, Zia speculated publicly over the future role of the armed forces in the country's political decision-making. He said he was considering the formation of a higher command council which would include the defence minister and representatives of the three armed services, together with the president and prime minister. Such an institution would ostensibly ensure the armed forces a continued stake in the state and would help preclude the possibility of a return to full military rule.

But his more outspoken critics view official and unofficial hints of a return to civilian rule through elections as a Machiavellian campaign of psychological warfare directed both at Zia's domestic opponents and at his external friends and critics. "Zia is a soldier," said the acting president of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal party, Mohammad Ali Kasuri. "He knows the art of camouflage and right now he is busy hoodwinking his enemy--the Pakistani people." This view is common among social democrats and socialists--in fact all politicians left of centre. But the assumption that whatever Zia and his colleagues do is designed to consolidate and legitimise the military's grip on the country could lose the politicians their first opportunity in years to gain at least limited power by going along with any electoral moves by Zia. Zia hopes the politicians will cooperate. With this cooperation he could achieve what he calls "positive results."

All public political activity is prohibited. Yet, on the surface at least, a lively interest in political controversy remains. The press, still partially muzzled by the authorities, refers in often detailed political commentaries to the "defunct" political opposition groups as a way of getting around the regulations. Members of the middle classes will express their often extreme opinions quite openly and observers can be forgiven for concluding that as far as military dictatorships go, this one is remarkably liberal.

Politics remains very much a middle-class preserve. One reason for the relative inactivity of the PPP is that it is still led by a dozen wealthy people, often landowners or successful merchants lacking the common touch of their erstwhile leader; the charismatic, Oxford-educated Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, executed in 1979.

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Also, sporadic arrests of large numbers of opposition activists and the prospect of lashes or lengthy terms of confinement have discouraged grassroots political organisers from defying martial law. Political activity is a shadowy, semi-clandestine affair and this has reduced the MRD to a loose collection of personalities rather than well-defined parties.

There is some truth in the cliché here that there are only two true political parties in Pakistan: the PPP and the army. For the opposition rests primarily on an almost feudal social order, a network of dynastic families which resist change. But society is nevertheless changing--largely under the impact of migrant labour. Streams of people are moving from frontier and rural areas to the major cities. Also hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis are now working abroad, mainly in the Gulf, and are remitting big sums home.

The second constituency is the armed forces. Zia sees himself as accountable to the joint chiefs of staff, the three service chiefs, the army's general staff and to a lesser extent the four provincial governors and the corps commanders. To that extent he is their man and represents the military's views. There is no sign of significant dissatisfaction with his performance or the threat of a sudden putsch by his military peers.

Zia seems to recognise his own limitations--that he lacks the easy informality and personal appeal essential for a general looking for popular support. At any rate, he has rejected appeals by some of his supporters to step down and enter the political arena in his own right. He has also to consider the brutal fact that the opposition is motivated by revenge for the execution of Bhutto. He has his own safety to consider.

If he does step down, he will do so quietly and in favour of another general, probably someone who is thought to have sufficient charisma to attract popular support as president. Several names have been mentioned, but one possible candidate who stands out is Lieut-Gen. Fazle Haq, currently governor of North West Frontier Province, a difficult and key role.

Haq is articulate and has a fatherly image. He has a good political mind and though some Punjabi officers would regard a Pathan as an outsider, his origins could work in his favour. Lacking a natural power base in Punjab or Sindh provinces, he would pose no threat to the military and would have to rely heavily on his colleagues. In short, he could be controlled. He also seems to hold robust, pro-American views in keeping with the hawks in Zia's cabinet.

If the middle ground of the opposition seems soggy, there has been a perceptible polarisation of politics. Zia must walk a tight-rope between the radicals of the PPP on the one hand and the disciplined, Islamic reformers and their armed student supporters on the other. As opposition leaders so often proclaim, without the holding of free and fair elections the country will inevitably become radicalised.

One example is the Al-Zulfikar guerilla organisation operating out of Afghanistan and led by Bhutto's son Murtaza. Reliable sources said that an Al-Zulfikar guerilla fired at the presidential aircraft carrying Zia from

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Islamabad to Lahore on February 7 with a Soviet anti-aircraft missile but missed. Two other squads of alleged assassins have been rounded up recently before they could put their plans into effect.

Zia is under pressure from his friends in the Middle East, the United States and Western Europe to stabilise Pakistan by a return to civilian rule. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 may have ended the international ostracism of Zia's regime which followed the execution of Bhutto, but the invasion is no longer a blessing in disguise. The presence of 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Kabul's efforts to revive latent separatism in border areas threaten the country's territorial sovereignty. Despite hopes of renewed talks with New Delhi aimed at creating a no-war pact, the perception of a short-term military threat from superior Indian armed forces has not receded.

Zia cannot afford to underestimate the strength of his domestic opposition, either. It is most remarkable that the MRD came into being at all and survived the trauma of the hijacking of a domestic airliner to Kabul by Al-Zulfi-kar members early last year (REVIEW, Mar. 20, '81). The hijacking helped Zia to attack the PPP as a subversive organisation because of the involvement of Bhutto's son Murtaza. He used the hijacking as an excuse to round up PPP activists, who were charged with grave offences.

There are reports that the MRD is planning to mount a general strike in urban areas later this year after what is expected to be a tough budget which may not meet the expectations of municipal and railway workers, teachers and bank employees, to name but a few of the sectors clamouring for higher wages.

Expert foreign opinion on the future of Pakistan's economy can be summed up in two words: cautious optimism.

The private sector is actively encouraged, but political uncertainty has meant that the denationalisation of major enterprises has produced mixed results. Although the worldwide economic slowdown has hit exports of textiles, raw and processed cotton and rice in the past six months, many people are still waiting to see whether the cutting of the links between the rupee and the US dollar will have the desired effect (REVIEW, Feb. 5).

While the government devotes much attention to irrigation and rural development, weather is a crucial factor in trying to establish a self-sufficient agricultural base. The rains came late this year, but, despite this there is a sugar surplus and the anticipated wheat shortfall is smaller than originally feared, and can be made up from last year's bumper crop.

The forthcoming budget is expected to follow pragmatic lines. The temptation to pump money into the economy will be resisted while the liberal policy towards imports will continue. Wage demands will be met, partially at least, through an improvement in allowances rather than direct increases in wages and salaries. The growth rate of 5-6% should continue through to 1983 at least and, in political terms, that suits Zia in any attempt to change direction towards democratic civilian rule.

Given all these factors, it is imperative for Zia to be seen to be moving towards elections, and soon. Time is running out for the generals and they appear to know it.

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13
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PAKISTAN

JAMAATE ISLAMI'S POWER, POLICIES DISCUSSED

Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW in English 4 Jun 82 p 24

[Article by John Fullerton]

[Text] Lahore: Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan is the wild card in the country's opposition pack. Proselytising, lavishly funded, disciplined and well-organised, its tiny membership belies the influence of its Islamic reformers who seek to turn Pakistan into what they would regard as the world's first, truly Islamic state.

An ambassador representing a European government tried to explain its nature in his reports home by describing the Jamaat-i-Islami as "an inverted, orthodox communist party." The Left here views it as a small group of fascist bully-boys enjoying the partial protection of the country's military government. One senior police officer said he thought the organisation was "getting carried away" because it thought it had official sanction. It evokes both fear and respect among its opponents, fear because its student wing has a reputation for violence and respect because of its dedication and homogeneity.

Mian Tufail Mohammad, the party leader, explained that the Jamaat-i-Islami avoided confrontation with the military authorities because of the external dangers--in the form of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the perceived Indian threat. Nevertheless the party sought an immediate lifting of martial law and the holding of elections under the suspended 1973 Constitution. He wanted safeguards too: candidates would have to qualify in terms of Islamic principles and the elections would have to be based on proportional representation (thereby helping to ensure that no one party would emerge an outright winner).

Tufail puts the Jamaat-i-Islami's membership at 4,000, but other sources say it numbers 12-15,000. There is an associate membership system and a large pool of active supporters. Cadres can be found in almost all sectors of society, from the armed forces to the civil service. The Jamaat-i-Islami's power lies mainly in the universities, however, and among airline and railway workers. The leader pointed out that in local, provincial or national elections the Jamaat-i-Islami could and would put up candidates who were not members but who were willing to pledge support for the party manifesto.

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Participation in the seven-party alliance known as the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy would have made all the difference to the opposition's ability to provide an alternative to President Zia-ul Haq's policies. But the Jamaat-i-Islami has studiously avoided collaboration with what it regards as leftists--and leftists have been the party's No. 1 enemy. "Its power is largely negative," said a rival political leader. "It has enormous power in terms of disruption, but its popular following is negligible and hence its contribution to forming an alternative system to the military is slight."

Until elections are held, the extent of the Jamaat-i-Islami's backing will not be known. It was founded in 1941 by the Sub-continent's leading Islamic philosopher, Sayed Abdul Al Maududi, whose work in support of a resurgent Islam coincided with the emergence of reformist Islamic societies such as Nursi in Turkey and the Ikwhan, or brotherhood, in Egypt. Jamaat-i-Islami is very much part of a worldwide phenomenon, far from isolated.

Its members are in constant, albeit informal, contact with similarly minded Muslims throughout Asia and the Middle East. The organisation also plays a vital role in foreign policy. It actively supports and funds some of the Afghan resistance groups--notably Hezb-i-Islami. Tufail believes that West European countries and the United States should do far more to help the Afghan resistance and despite his misgivings about the policies of both superpowers, he was more favourable towards the US because of what he saw as its Christian character. Like many Pakistanis he expressed bitterness and bewilderment at what he saw as intransigence by the US in the face of Palestinian demands for a homeland.

On April 23 bus loads of banner-waving Jamaat-i-Islami students broke into two Lahore newspaper offices, ransacked the premises, burned furniture and man-handled members of staff following local reports that one of their leaders had boarded a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft with a pistol and ammunition in his possession. Was this attack in accordance with Islamic principles? Tufail was unrepentant.

"We have been under constant attack from leftist groups, some of which are instigated by the Soviet Union. Our people have been murdered. Now that we are gaining control through elections the leftist parties are clamouring for government restrictions to be placed on students. You must appreciate that in the present crisis in Pakistan the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to cause disruption..."

A left-leaning barrister active in the city's political circles was frank: "The last thing I would want to have to do is to back down in the face of Jamaat-i-Islami pressure or threats. But to be quite honest I'd rather not cross their path at all...They are trouble!"

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PAKISTAN

NUSRAT BHUTTO'S BITTERNESS DESCRIBED

Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW in English 4 Jun 82 pp 26, 29

[Article by John Fullerton]

[Text] Karachi: Opposing the military rule of President Zia-ul Haq can be extremely costly as Nusrat Bhutto knows only too well. The tall, immaculately dressed widow, who gives a misleading impression of fragility, maintains an intense personal commitment to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) which represents the strongest domestic challenge to Zia's government.

The PPP was founded by her late husband, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was toppled in the 1977 coup which brought Zia to power and hanged in 1979. The Bhutto home at the Clifton suburb here has many photographs, paintings and other mementoes of the late leader. And for his widow, now the PPP leader, the fight goes on.

But in personal terms the cost of her commitment has been high. She has spent about 42 months of the five years of military rule in detention. Her two sons, Murtaza and Nawaz, who have opted for violent political change, abandoned their studies in London and moved to Kabul to head the Al-Zulfikar guerilla group. Mrs Bhutto says she has had no direct contact with them since they went to Kabul.

Her fiery and politically formidable daughter, Benazir, is detained at the family home at Larkana near Karachi. Mrs Bhutto herself is under surveillance and the authorities have registered a case in the courts charging the Bhutto family with expropriation of secret government funds during the PPP administration. "I cannot give up the leadership," she told the REVIEW. "My conscience will not let me do so even if I wanted to. I cannot let our people down--people who have languished in jail for years for their support of the party."

She insists that the PPP has survived the waves of arrests which followed the generals' takeover. She describes its progress as slow and steady but conceded that the prospect of indefinite terms of imprisonment, lashes and torture deterred many people from active political life in an environment where all public politics and political parties themselves are banned.

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Mrs Bhutto maintains that Zia has no intention of leaving politics and that any moves by the authorities would simply be a step towards consolidating and legitimising martial law. She rejected any form of what she calls farcical democracy. For the PPP and other opposition groups, the only acceptable elections would have to be held under the 1973 Constitution, which is currently suspended.

In such circumstances she could give an assurance that the PPP would not threaten law and order. "All I would need to do would be to address two political meetings, one in the Punjab and one here in Sindh province and I could promise a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. In fact I think I could speak for the other opposition parties, too."

She holds that the longer it takes to return the country to democratic, constitutional life the more explosive the situation would become. "We don't look for chaos. We hope it would never happen. We are not trained for fighting on the streets. We don't have guns and bombs. The PPP is trained to prepare for elections. We are ready now."

Party committees had contacted groups of students, teachers, lawyers and workers to study what the groups wanted, and what help the PPP could provide. On the day the interview took place Mrs Bhutto had been meeting until the early hours of the morning with about 200 grassroots supporters. She had asked them for their response to Zia's hints of elections based on proportional representation or on a non-party basis. The overwhelming reaction had been a resounding no. "They said it would simply be another Majlis-i-Shoora [the federal advisory council set up by Zia last December]," she said.

"Why would Zia hold elections? For what he calls positive results. And what do positive results mean? They mean that he wants to get himself elected to power."

In May it was Mrs Bhutto's turn to chair the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), the seven-member opposition group seeking an immediate end to martial law. Why was it that the MRD seemed unable to act, reluctant to activate popular opposition to the government? Mrs Bhutto pointed out that the seven parties involved all had different political manifestos. They held in common a desire for the immediate lifting of martial law and the holding of elections under the 1973 Constitution. Even some of the opposition groups which had remained outside the movement had indicated that they were willing to cooperate with the MRD, at least unofficially.

Although Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan--the ultra-conservative Islamic grouping--had not joined the MRD, it too wanted elections to be held now. And Mrs Bhutto had received a message from the Karachi branch of the Jamaat-i-Islami pledging co-operation. She noted that the MRD had only existed for a year and said that its existence and survival was a remarkable achievement.

The PPP leader was clearly upset by reports she had received alleging that people detained for political reasons had been tortured and maltreated. "It's as if Zia is not satisfied with the blood of my husband--he seems to want to crush us..."

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She alleged that people had been burned with cigarettes, and mentioned one young man who she said could only crawl following his release because his spine allegedly had been damaged by beatings. She accused the authorities of arresting young people and accusing them of links with the Al-Aulfikar organisation of which the people detained knew nothing. She alleged: "In some instances the only way for someone to avoid being connected with terrorism was to have his or her family pay a police officer a large sum of money. Where is justice in Pakistan now? Where do we go to find it? Zia seems to treat people as the enemy. But we don't have tanks and armies. How can the people support him in such a situation today?"

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PAKISTAN

COTTON AND TEXTILE INDUSTRY'S PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

HongKong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW in English 7 May 82 pp 52, 54

[Article by Mohammed Aftab]

[Text] **Islamabad:** The Pakistani Government, the textile industry and private cotton exporters are knotted in a seemingly endless controversy. Accusations of mismanagement, losses to the state and pressures on the industry to buy cotton at arbitrary prices are flying.

The seeds of the controversy were sown in the 1973 nationalisation of the cotton trade as a result of the socialisation policies of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The state-owned Cotton Export Corp. (CEC) was set up to buy all cotton from farmers and cotton ginneries. It alone sells lint cotton to the domestic textiles industry and monopolises cotton exports, thereby almost completely eliminating the private cotton traders and exporters — who once had a lucrative business.

The situation has hurt the textile industry and has led to significant losses to the national exchequer because of the inexperience and bureaucratic red-tape of the CEC, which deals with a commodity for which split-second decisions are needed to trade internationally.

The situation has left many buyers of Pakistani lint cotton, textiles, cotton yarn and other cotton-based products exasperated. Among the bigger buyers are those from Hongkong, Japan and China — the latter being the biggest.

The importance of raw cotton to the Pakistan economy is evident from the fact that around 60% of all the country's exports are either of the raw commodity itself or of cotton-based products such as textiles, yarn, garments and hosiery. The textiles industry is the largest employer as well as forming the single biggest group of large-scale manufacturing units.

CEC chairman Nusrat Hussain says the corporation will purchase more than 4.1

million bales of cotton from farmers and ginneries this year. So far, it has purchased 1.6 million bales, of which 625,000 bales were exported up to April 15. The average price of cotton already shipped was about 56 US cents a lb which the CFC terms "reasonably attractive in view of prevailing international prices, following the world cotton glut."

In fiscal 1981, the CEC sold 1.91 million bales of cotton abroad for US\$525.6 million, according to the Ministry of Commerce, which oversees the corporation. Of the 42 countries which bought it the main ones were: China (at 1.2 million bales), Japan, Hongkong, Bangladesh, Indonesia and India. The sale to China, the CEC claims, was "the single largest deal in world cotton trading history." Pakistan has also managed to explore new markets such as Iraq, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Bulgaria, Romania, and some of the European Economic Community nations.

The CEC estimates overseas sales at about 1.6 million bales in fiscal 1982, or all of the estimated exportable surplus. The quantity has declined because at the start of 1982, carry-over stocks from the previous year were almost totally exhausted. The exportable surplus for fiscal 1982 will remain lower than 1981, despite a higher crop in 1982.

CEC claims to have earned a profit of US\$75 million in 1981, mainly due to a large carry-over stock from the previous year. "The sale was made at relatively attractive prices," it says. But private businessmen dispute this claim. The country, they say, suffered huge losses in cotton in fiscal 1981 because of poor marketing. The Karachi Cotton Association (KCA), whose members used to export all cotton in addi-

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tion to selling to the domestic market in the pre-nationalisation days, makes a scathing criticism of the CEC's operations. In a just-published report, the KCA says the CEC managed to export 1.91 million bales of cotton in 1981 for US\$512.1 million — and not US\$525.6 million, as claimed by the ministry. It says the average price per lb fob works out at around 70.56 cents. It contends that during the same period, monthly average prices in northern Europe were "never less than 80.72 cents per lb. and the monthly average prices of the

Taking into account transactions of certain weeks on the Hongkong and Japan cotton markets, the KCA maintains: "Cotton was sold cheaply, and the benefit of high prices during the 1981 season was not transferred to growers in Pakistan."

There appears to be some substance to this. The CEC has been operating in a more laissez-faire manner than the private sector. Prior to the 1973 nationalisation, the KCA says, the State Bank of Pakistan (central bank) exercised an export price check. Under this arrangement, only cotton transactions within 5 cents of the prevailing New York futures price were approved for export.

In 1981, New York futures remained above 85.25 cents a lb, while in August 1980 and January 1981 the quotes went up to 96 cents. On this basis, the KCA alleges, the average invisible loss in foreign exchange comes to around 15 cents a lb. Pakistan's 1.91 million exported bales brought the country a paper loss of nearly US\$10.1 million, it argues.

The KCA catalogues several losses the CEC allegedly suffered because of its mismanagement and lack of foresight:

- ▶ It sold 63,335 bales of cotton in 1981 at an average price of about 60 cents a lb. down from conservative estimates of 70 cents available at prevailing market levels — for a loss of US\$2.4 million.

- ▶ Despite a large stock, the CEC defaulted in fulfilling several export contracts involving 300,000 bales. It had to pay US\$5 million in compensation and rebates.

- ▶ The CEC incurred an expenditure of US\$15.85 million in 1981 on interest to banks on overdrafts, storage of cotton and insurance because of "a lack of prompt marketing."

- ▶ The CEC carried over 786,000 bales of cotton from 1980 stocks, though it could easily have been marketed at around 70 cents a lb during 1980 for US\$206 million, and saved the storage expenses.

The textiles industry accuses the CEC of selling cotton cheaply abroad, but at quite high prices to domestic users. This means Pakistani textiles, yarns and other finished products are hard to market overseas because of the added cost element before costs of production are taken into account.

These issues are all behind the current feud. But the heart of the matter is that the private sector challenges the continued nationalisation of the cotton trade at all. Since the 1977 change of government, private cotton dealers and former exporters have intensified their campaign to get the trade de-nationalised. There is no denying that the bureaucrats-turned-executives of the CEC still lack the expertise of international cotton traders. In addition, the allegations of red tape and mismanagement are disturbing.

The entrepreneurs who handled the cotton trade since the commodity became an item of international commerce were able to respond rapidly to the world market situation and obviously made good profits — earnings which they want again. The government and the growers have often accused them of ganging up against the growers by not buying the cotton quickly, thereby depressing prices. But as soon as the crop came to private-sector traders, prices would start rising. These traders would then sell cotton at high prices to the textile industry, making a good deal of profit.

Some exporters were also accused of retaining abroad part of their foreign-exchange earnings from cotton exports. Another allegation against them was selling cotton of poor quality or not sticking to international specifications. When the government took over the cotton trade in 1973, the main argument was that it wanted to help the poor farmer and improve quality. But the government, in the process, has been making a healthy profit each year itself, and does not want to part with it. That is why government spokesmen have repeatedly ruled out de-nationalisation.

The CEC-KCA feud appeared to be coming to a head on April 23 when the CEC threatened legal action against the association. It served a notice on the KCA claiming US\$10 million in general damages for "allegedly publishing baseless and false imputations against the corporation," and demanded a published retraction.

The imputations referred to concerned, among other things, the allegation that Pakistan registered invisible losses of US\$128.2 million on fiscal 1981's cotton exports as a result of inefficient CEC marketing. The corporation described the allegations as "defamatory." □

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20

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