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(FOUO 40/82)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

NAVAL FORCES IN NORTH INDIAN OCEAN INCREASE

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Chief Surgeon Paul Ring, chief medical and personnel staff officer, French naval forces, Indian Ocean: "The Navy in the Indian Ocean"]

[Text] The size of the FMOI [maritime forces, Indian Ocean] shows French concern with that immense zone where vital interests may be threatened. The Navy provides a permanent presence made possible by the deployment of many combat and logistical support vessels.

The Forces

The preponderant part taken in recent decades by Arabian-Persian Gulf states in world energy supply has given the Indian Ocean a capital economic and strategic importance. Protection of merchant commerce has always been an essential task of navies. The importance of our possessions in the Indian Ocean had led France solidly to establish its naval forces in the region, centered on the base at Diego Suarez. The revision of the Franco-Malagasy agreements and abandonment of that dockyard have entailed major shifts in deployment of our military and maritime forces. The operational ships of the ZMOI [Indian Ocean Maritime Zone] have thus been constituted an independent maritime force.

The FMOI is commanded by a rear admiral embarked with his staff aboard the command ship La Charente. Besides that vessel, which is also a supply tanker, the force has assigned to it four corvettes, the multi-mission repair ship Jules Verne, a light transport vessel, and two patrol vessels; more recently the supply tanker Isere was assigned to it, and the missile-launching escort vessel Kersaint attached as a permanent reinforcement. In addition, an Atlantic type patrol aircraft and a marine commando unit complete the permanent reinforcements. These forces have been periodically strengthened by units from metropolitan France, either singly or in groups constituted like the Mousson and Saphir missions.

The deterioration of the geopolitical situation resulting from the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, and the danger of individual or coordinated actions capable of affecting petroleum traffic, have led maritime nations to strengthen significantly their forces in the northern Indian Ocean.

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In the first days of the conflict the French navy placed in the area a patrol intended to intervene without delay in the event of any threat to our merchant ships. The capability was needed to face a triple threat: from the air, from the surface, and from mines. The air threat is significant because of the confined waters which place the theater of operations within range of land-based aircraft; the surface threat is represented essentially by patrol boats armed with sea-to-sea missiles; and the geographic context lends itself perfectly to mining. The Sea of Oman patrol and the DAMOI Indian Ocean Anti-Mine Division are intended to counter that triple threat. The submarine threat, on the other hand, is very weak in the Arabian-Persian Gulf, owing to both the shallow depths and to the characteristics of the forces deployed there.

At the Gates of the Gulf

The Sea of Oman patrol is permanently constituted by a group of three vessels, that is, at least:

One vessel with high anti-aircraft capability (missile-launching escort vessel or frigate);

One vessel with high anti-surface capability equipped with MM 38 missiles;

One supply tanker.

The constraints imposed by length of patrols, ship maintenance, and operational requirements--particularly for anti-aircraft defense--have required a considerable reinforcement in ships.

As for the DAMOI, it consists entirely of ships which have come from metropolitan France: two minehunters, one ocean minesweeper, two coastal minesweepers, and the logistical support vessel La Loire. It has in addition a team of mine disposal divers.

Some 20 vessels today are part of the FMOI, some assigned and some attached as temporary reinforcements. Most of them operate at sea more than 200 days per year.

The facilities provided by the Republic of Djibouti to the French armed forces under the defense agreement between the two countries make available a very useful strong point relatively near the theater of operations. It is in fact at Djibouti that the logistical support ships are most often stationed, that the DAMOI is based, and it is from there that relief personnel is sent to units. From there, ships leaving on patrol have 4 or 5 days' transit to the Sea of Oman. After the hot moistness of the Gulf of Aden, the turbulence of the monsoon is met in the Arabian Sea; then, having weathered the now familiar Ras al Had, we meet in the Sea of Oman a climate once again like that of the Gulf of Aden. The relieving ship takes its place in the group and makes contact with its predecessor, to which it brings mail, spare parts, and at times personnel. The patrol then begins. An attentive watch, contacts with French merchant ships, traffic study, and keeping track of the situation in the zone are the essentials of this extended operational activity. Fuel economy dictates slow

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steaming, at times with a single screw. The distressing heat must cause no drop in operational efficiency or slowing of reactions: individual or group training, daily action stations, and resupply at sea serve to break the seeming monotony of "the rounds at sea." At mid-patrol, a short call at Karachi often allows--while remaining on 6 hours' sailing alert--the taking on of fresh stores, which are not indispensable, but welcome in the mess.

In Southern Waters Too

Its responsibilities in the Sea of Oman have brought a reduction of other FMOI activities. However, even though the inherent mobility of these naval forces, and their availability, has allowed them to make their weight felt at those points where the course of events required, a presence south of the Equator is not on that account neglected. In addition to the support and transport missions carried out by the flagship? Champlain, the patrol vessels Altair and Epee, and a corvette in rotation, continue to keep watch over our economic zone. The recent interception of Formosan trawlers has fully shown the usefulness of this mission.

Vigilance and Endurance

By its prompt deployment of the Oman Sea patrol the French navy showed its capacity for rapid response to an overseas threat. By maintaining that patrol continuously for 18 months it affirmed its role as a full-time oceanic navy able to keep the sea. The crew of the corvette Commandant Bordais, which made a 42-day patrol without putting in to port, can testify to that. If guns have not spoken in these sensitive seas--and who would complain of that?--our naval forces are there, and by their very presence reduce the probability of combat.

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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

FALKLANDS CONFLICT A TEST FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 31 May 82 pp 34-37

[Article by Stefano Silvestri]

[Text] "The winning weapon is the nuclear submarine." This is the conclusion drawn by David Owen, Britain's former minister for Foreign Affairs, now one of the leaders of the new British social democratic parliament. The Falkland war has many aspects--historical, political and moral--but what counts most in the long run is the fact that it has become the first real test of naval war technology. The problem is the confrontation between ship and missile.

In 1973, after the Yom Kippur War between Arabs and Israelis, Ian Smart--then vice director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies--said: "It was like the battle of Crecy in the 100-year war between the English and the French. At that time the English archers massacred the French armoured calvary using long and powerful bows. Today the Egyptians' antitank anti-aircraft missiles have massacred the Israeli armoured troops and bombers. We are on the threshold of a technological revolution."

An Exocet missile launched from an airplane 60 km away sufficed to destroy a modern destroyer. A little earlier, an MK24 Tigerfish torpedo sank an Argentine cruiser, the General Belgrano. Is this the end for large surface ships?

This question, which affects Italy directly too, has stirred up heated arguments in our armed forces. We are about to launch our new through-deck cruiser, the Giuseppe Garibaldi, whose design more or less resembles that of the small British aircraft carriers Invincible and Hermes now engaged in the South Atlantic. It is supposed to carry helicopters to combat submarines, but it can also carry fighter aircraft which take off vertically or on a short runway, like the Sea Harrier. Is this a good choice or a mistake? In the event of war, should we resign ourselves to the idea of seeing the Garibaldi sink during the first minutes of the war?

This is an important question for the navy. It would not be the first time we did everything wrong. During the last war our surface ships--which seemed very powerful--didn't manage to sink a single enemy ship.

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At that time our errors were mainly technological: we didn't have radar, and a major portion of our communications were intercepted by the enemy. But it was also a question of the strategies we chose; we had no effective air cover or support for our navy.

Today Admiral Angelo Monassi, chief of staff of the navy, is explicitly asking for "reliable and rapid air support" and for "close integration of operations, and therefore of command, between aircraft and ships;" he calls this "the key element of feasibility and success for military operations at sea." The aeronautic branch says the navy wants to get its own private air force this way.

Admiral Franco Micali-Baratelli, former chief of staff of the navy and one of the DC's main military experts at present, says that in fact the navy should have the power to make autonomous choices, within the framework of its budget, as to whether it should acquire one or two new ships or buy some airplanes. But this obviously puts an end to any idea of common defense planning (and therefore to any hope--however vague--of ever rationalizing expenditures).

The lesson to be learned from the battle of the Falklands is naturally ambiguous. Many people say that the sinking of the British destroyer Sheffield could have been avoided.

But in fact the Sheffield's problems had been known for a long time. In the latest yearbook of the British Royal United Services Institute (the famous Brassey's, which has been published for the past 92 years), naval weapons expert Roger Villar pointed out the defensive weaknesses of the missile system on that fighter. The Sheffield was armed with Sea Dart missiles; these are rather large, almost 4.5 meters long, weighing half a ton, and have a range of more than 30 km and a velocity of about Mach 2. Due to their limited range they could not hit the French-Argentine Super Etendard fighter from which the Exocet missile was fired.

They should have hit and struck down the missile. But to do this, the Sea Dart (relatively "slow," even though it is faster than the French antiship missile, which had a velocity of almost Mach 1) needed more warning. According to reports, it had only about 25 seconds' warning; this, as Villar points out, is because the radar on British ships is not rapid enough or powerful enough, as is the American AN/SPY-1A, for example--the core of the Aegis antiaircraft and antimissile defense system. But AN/SPY-1A radar, besides being very expensive, weighs at least 60 tons by itself and is built for a type of U.S. ship that is about twice as heavy as the British destroyer.

These may be good reasons. But not having radar means not being able to defend oneself. The British have tried to offset this vulnerability by developing the Sea Wolf, a brand new missile which is smaller than the Sea Dart (a couple of meters long with a weight of only 78 kg), faster, and can hit an attacker with a much shorter warning period. Its purpose is to enhance what is called "point defense," in other words defense close to the ship, after an attack has already been launched.

The Sea Wolf missiles have certainly downed some Argentine Skyhawk fighters, and maybe some antiship missiles too, in the Falklands war. But what use is a defensive device that flies at a speed of little more than Mach 2 against a Soviet SS-N-19 antiship missile, which flies at the same speed? Or--still worse--what hope does a surface ship have of surviving an attack by a Soviet Charlie submarine, which can fire without any warning--while submerged--a volley of eight supersonic SS-N-7 missiles, all aimed at the same target, from a distance of about 50 km, without giving the target ship any time at all to react, for all practical purposes?

The U.S. answer to this threat has been to develop further the idea of the task force--a naval squadron built around a large nuclear aircraft carrier like the Nimitz, which has a tonnage of almost 100 thousand tons and carries about a hundred airplanes. Obviously these ships are also vulnerable to large-scale missile attack, but they broaden their defense perimeter enormously by using coordinated submarines, escort ships and airplanes.

These squadrons use every means to increase their effectiveness, even satellites, which provide information about the movements of enemy surface ships and trace the exact trajectory of missiles having a longer range. But the need for defense runs the risk of undermining the very concept of the U.S. task force. The Nimitz, cruisers like the Ticonderoga--equipped with the Aegis system--and the new fighter atomic submarines like the Los Angeles, coordinated among themselves thanks to the Navstar satellite network and the Jtids navigation system, operate more like a defensive structure than an offensive task force.

The United States, with its enormous technological and financial power, is about to attain its goal of having a complete and continually updated map of everything moving on and below the surface of the sea. But it will use this map above all to defend ships.

In other words, the task force can extend a protective shield having a radius of about 200 km around itself, mainly based on the use of Hawkeye radar airplanes, F-14 interceptor fighters, and offensive submarines. But to do this it uses 70 percent of its military capability. The Soviets, on the other hand, have developed a formidable offensive capability, likewise based on satellites; apparently the Argentine attack on the Sheffield was facilitated by information provided by Cosmos satellites which the USSR had launched into orbit in the South Atlantic.

At sea the Russian fleet is deploying its new 32-thousand-ton Kirov-type cruisers equipped with SS-N-19 antiship missiles that fly at a speed of Mach 2.5 for about 500 km (well outside of the defensive range of the task force); they defend themselves with antiaircraft and antiship SS-N-6 missiles which attain the considerable speed of Mach 5. These are complemented by the new Oscar-type submarines, which are armed with SS-N-19s, and Alfa-type fighter submarines which can travel faster than 42 knots (about 80 km/hour) at a depth of 700 meters.

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All this cannot help but worry NATO. The experience of the Falkland war is already indicative; the pro-Western Argentines have been able to give the British fleet serious trouble even though they lack modern Soviet weapons. They have purchased weapons from France, Great Britain and the United States: three NATO countries which have adopted a "philosophy" that is more defensive than offensive. The Argentines' missiles have a much more limited range than the Soviets', and they fly at much lower, subsonic speeds (less than Mach 1). And yet they were able to sink the Sheffield. What would the Argentines have done if they had had Soviet weapons?

This is a serious matter for Italy. We certainly cannot set up an American-type task force. The tonnage of our entire fleet is equivalent to that of the Nimitz and a couple of escort cruisers alone. The Garibaldi is not meant to be any bigger than the British Invincible (in fact it should be even less than 20 thousand tons). It was conceived as a ship to fight submarines. But what is the sense in building a ship for defense against submarines that is so large and vulnerable it is an ideal target for enemy attack, if we can't defend it?

The usefulness of these aircraft carriers is undeniable, but it is mainly an offensive usefulness; they serve as mobile platforms to transport offensive aircraft far from their bases of operation. Without their two small aircraft carriers, the English would not have been able to attack the Falklands. The Dutch, who have no aircraft carriers, keep a battleship, a regiment of marines, and a whole group of fighter bombers in their possessions in the Antilles to defend them from Venezuelan claims.

The Italians, to defend their new aircraft carrier, should create a naval air force, including some very expensive radar airplanes. But then they could only use the Garibaldi within the range of land-based aircraft, and that would obviously greatly reduce its value as an offensive ship.

Of course it would still function against submarines thanks to the use of helicopters. But once again, a vicious circle is appearing from which there is no way out: the defensive weapon must be defended.

Thus we come inevitably to David Owen's conclusion: everything that is on the surface, and is therefore visible, is vulnerable. The defense of such surface craft ends up paralyzing all available military capabilities, thus diminishing offensive potential. That which remains invisible, however, like the nuclear submarine, doesn't need such sophisticated defenses and can concentrate all its potential on its main task: attack.

The whole British blockade of the Falklands was based, in fact, on three or four nuclear submarines. They have proved to be practically invulnerable, and by themselves have forced the large Argentine fleet to stick to its bases. Italy has no nuclear submarines, nor has it developed the technology for them. It missed an opportunity to do so twice: once at the beginning of the 1960s, when it suspended studies for the development of a naval nuclear engine; and again, more recently, when a project came to light for a joint Italian-French nuclear fighter submarine.

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TERRORISM

FRANCE

CARLOS' ACTIVITIES, FRIENDS, KGB TIES EXAMINED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 14 May 82 pp 51, 52, 74

[Article by Jean Cau: "Carlos, and the High Life"]

[Text] It is beginning to become clear why a bomb exploded on Rue Marbeuf.

The Carlos Mystery

Still dazed from the shock of the Rue Marbeuf explosion, the French are realizing to their horror that their country is caught up in the complicated intricacies of inter-Arab politics. And, since the darkness which descended that morning, they know that now they are the target of killers from the "Mysterious East." Since it is always necessary to find an individual to blame, they think they see behind the smoke of the massacre the mask of a certain Ilitch Ramirez, tragically famous under the name "Carlos." But who is this Carlos and who is providing him weapons so he can attack, in Paris, both a Lebanese newspaper and passers-by? A merciless struggle is taking place in the Middle East; it has split the Arab world in two. On one side there are the Lebanese Shiites, the very special movements which have brought a reign of terror to Syria under the control of Rif'at el Asad, the brother of the president of the Republic and the Iranians. On the other side: the Lebanese nationalists who refuse to be gobbled up by Syria, the Iraqis and the majority of the PLO. WATAN AL ARABI, the Lebanese newspaper on Rue Marbeuf, belongs to the second group. And France is proposing a policy in the Middle East which does not suit Syria's game. That is why the passers-by on Rue Marbeuf were targeted at the same time as the Lebanese weekly. Carlos is one of the close associates of Rif'at el Asad, who wants to poison at any price relations between France and his country. After the assassination of Ambassador Delamare and two French officials in Beirut, the gangrene was exported to France.

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Son of a millionaire, trained in terrorism in Cuba and Moscow, fanatic about revolution, and crazy about girls.

He is never seen. He is feared everywhere. He is thought to be behind every bomb that explodes. He has already killed many people. Perhaps he organized the attack on Rue Marbeuf. He is certainly very dangerous. But he has also become a myth. Who is this stubborn and invisible madman who was named Ilitch by a very wealthy father, a kind of "conservative" of the Revolution, and who, under the name Carlos, today terrifies the whole world?

I. Education

When a child was born into the household of Jose Ramirez and his wife Maria Sanchez, on 10 October 1949, there was a joyous outburst: It's a boy! "We will call him Ilitch, like Lenin," said his father who, after almost having become a priest, during his adolescence, abandoned his faith and adopted another one, Stalinist communism.

How he managed to reconcile this new faith with a sharp business sense in real estate, which made him a millionaire with a prosperous business in his native Venezuela, remains one of the mysteries known only to the dreamy idealists of the Western middle class.

But that is the way it goes: the fathers eat the green grapes of ideological fanaticism and the sons develop an appetite for it and become activists. One day Ilitch Ramirez y Sanchez will be called Carlos. Still, at least his two younger brothers, baptized Vladimir and Lenin, have been better able to cope with their names and have not followed in the footsteps of their older brother....

At 17, Ilitch was sent to school abroad. His father thought this would help him overcome his shyness and would get rid of his complexes. Actually, (O.K. Dr Freud?) this young man was somewhat pudgy, both his features and his body, and suffered from the nickname "muchacho gordo," (the little fat kid). He ended up in Cuba and, as with other "well-born (etc.) souls," here he was in Campo Matanzas, the pupil of Comrade General Victor Simonov (of the KGB) who was instructing his large flock in the art of subversion. In 1967, the Cubans landed small rebel groups on the coast of Venezuela, to stir up trouble in Caracas. Twice Carlos landed. Twice he was arrested by the police. Twice he was released. At that point, his parents got divorced and his mother, accompanied by Lenin and Vladimir, went to live in London and--she was much younger than her husband--to live her own life.

II. The Road to Moscow

Ilitch, however, took the road to Moscow and, more precisely, to Lumumba University (called officially, in all seriousness, "The University of Friendship Among Peoples"...) which accepts students from the Third World and where the KGB selects, as from a fish hatchery, the best students to be trained

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for subversion and its numerous variants, running from terrorism to assassination. But, surprise! Ilitch was expelled, in 1969, for "anti-Soviet provocations and dissipated living." Later, Carlosologists who will go over his career with a fine tooth comb, will wonder if this expulsion was not trumped up with the help of Carlos himself so as to give him the reputation of an unimportant playboy troublemaker with whom the KGB would not want to compromise itself. A mere war strategist. Whatever the case, the wayward student, after being "expelled," went on to East Berlin and then to London to see his mother and then to the Middle East where, according to him, he asked Palestinian groups in Jordan to train him in guerrilla warfare. The proposal was accepted and Carlos studied in the training camps at Mount (Gilead) and Um-(Juraysat) before going into combat. Then, he was once again in London where he killed some time waiting for an assignment.

III. How To Become Carlos

A green light. He returned in 1973 to Beirut where he expressed his impatience. Then he was given a green light to kill Lord Seif (president of Marks and Spencer stores), an outspoken Zionist. He went to his house on 30 November 1973 and fired three shots at him. Lord Seif survived. In an interview with the newspaper AL WATAN AL ARABI, Ilitch calmly explained his failure: "A comrade had given me an old revolver and five rounds of ammunition. Well, to bring off an assassination successfully, you need two pistols, one with a silencer, the other a very powerful one to defend yourself in case of surprise. You also need two grenades and a driver. That is what is considered the strict minimum if you want the operation to succeed. So you can see what a position I was in with only five rounds and a single pistol that I had not even tried out." Put yourself in his place. In any case, on that day Ilitch became Carlos. One month later, once again in London, he tossed a bomb into an Israeli bank. It exploded but only slightly wounded a typist. No luck, he explained, "the bomb had slid over the floor."

Then he hopped over to Beirut. And then on to Paris to dynamite the ORTF [Office of French Broadcasting and Television] (it did not go off) and to conduct an operation against three newspapers: L'ARCHE, MINUTE and L'AURORE, accused of being Zionists and fascists. Another quick trip, to Holland this time, to take hostage the ambassador of France in order to negotiate the release of a member of the Japanese Red Army. That ended in gunfire. Two policemen and one of the terrorists were wounded. Actually, it was only a partial failure, because of poor coordination, and Carlos left hastily for Paris where he learned that the Japanese had succeeded in taking the ambassador ("I don't know why they didn't kill him," he said later) but that the French were refusing to give in to the terrorists' demands. So then Carlos threw two grenades into the Drugstore, at Saint-Germain-des-Pres. That resulted in 2 dead and 30 injured--and he warned the French Government that he would resort to even bloodier acts if the Japanese terrorist was not released. Since the Drugstore incident suggested that these threats not be taken lightly, the slant-eyed comrade was put aboard a Boeing and landed somewhere in the Middle East. "A complete success," claimed Carlos.

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IV. A Wild Guy, Full of Fun

This is the most difficult section of the article to write because now I have to come to some conclusions. Who is Carlos? He is nothing like, for example, the Russian anarchists at the beginning of the century, with their drawn faces and wild eyes, slouching along walls, hiding under their coat a bomb which they are planning to toss into the car of a grand duke. He has nothing in common with these passionate mystics. His style, Carlos' style, is rather that of finding in the Revolution a kind of euphoria, a kind of "high." Life, which he considers unimportant for others, he loves. Drinking, eating well, smoking big cigars, strumming the guitar, playing cards, dancing, that is his "Olé" side. This wild guy really loves to kick up his heels and knock someone around with his claws drawn, as if he were only a nice stuffed tiger. Unfortunately, the tiger is made up of real flesh and blood, with claws and fangs. When he strikes, he kills. But what goes on in his head? "I am not a professional killer," he says. "It is not easy to shoot point blank someone who is looking at you...." He fires, however, in the name of the Revolution, as if shaken by a calm orgasm, and the "guy who is full of fun" becomes a cold angel of death. Then, life begins again, between raids, and the girls, lots of girls, comfort the terrorist. There was Angela Otoala, the young waitress at a Spanish restaurant, 23 years old, and pretty, whom he seduced in 1973 in London. There was Maria Romero, also in London, a Colombian lawyer, older (39 years old) and a former member of the Secretariat of the Colombian Communist Party, who fell for his charms. In Paris, there was Nancy Sanchez, a Venezuelan studying anthropology at the Sorbonne, and Angela Armstrong, the very young English girl born in South Africa. On Rue Toullier, the Fifth Arrondissement, a few steps away from the Pantheon where Nancy was renting an apartment, it was a nonstop party. Everyone had a good time. The students living in the maid's rooms on the sixth floor were always welcome. They were offered a drink and permitted to use the shower or to wash their jeans. Very nice, these Americanos. You couldn't ask for better hospitality. Did the girls know who their boyfriend was? No. Probably not. But why ask questions? Carlos, a virtuoso of fake identities was only for them a Venezuelan friend, funny and cosmopolitan, who was working for an "international company" and had plenty of money. If he was using their studios or apartments as hideouts, he obviously refrained from admitting it to these young women. Other questions: for whom was Carlos working during those years? Officially, if we can use the term, for the Palestinians, alongside the PLO. Unofficially, to find that out you have to zigzag your way through a labyrinth of international terrorism, bumping up against artificial mirrors, having to retrace your steps 10 times, going around in circles, going from the Red Brigades to the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], to the RAF [Red Army Faction, Germany], from the RAF to the Japanese, etc.... If you don't let yourself get caught up in this mare's nest, one fixed point remains, around which are centered the "trips" of Carlos: the services (and among them the most special ones) of the KGB. Thus, and according to the most reliable information, the famous terrorist is said to be in Damascus, in Syria, close to Rif'at el Asad (the brother of President Hafez el Asad), the head of a militia composed of 50,000 men in political police work so serious that it often worries his own brother. And everyone in Damascus knows that Rif'at "is playing for" the Soviets....

V. Hecatombs

The further adventures of our man. In 1974, the attempt to launch a rocket attack at Orly against a plane belonging to the Israeli airline El Al. A failure. In December 1975, the stakes were raised. In Vienna, during a meeting of OPEC, a terrorist group led by Carlos and made up of two Germans, a Palestinian and two Lebanese, attacked the building where the oil ministers were meeting. Three were left dead and one wounded. And the ministers were held captive. The Austrian Government capitulated and the DC 9 which they boarded as hostages, along with their captors, ended up, after a wild odyssey, landing in Algiers, where the right of asylum was granted the terrorist group in exchange for the hostages. Why this "action," as Carlos called it? So that the rich oil states do not forget, under the shower of dollars they are receiving, that they must serve the Palestinian cause. All right. It's as good an explanation as any.

But it was 5 months earlier, on 27 June 1975, in Paris, that Carlos carried out, if not his bloodiest exploit, at least his boldest. The police, acting on information from an informer, a certain Mokarbel, who was the contact between Carlos' team and the FPLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] raised (unarmed!) Rue Toullier, where the terrorist was living. Mokarbel, had stated to the police that a certain Maya Lara, a Venezuelan, in whom they were interested, was there; the police went in. They were also carrying in their pockets a photograph in which, next to Mokarbel, appeared... another man. He is the one who opened the door. They politely asked him if he knew Mokarbel. He politely answered that he did not know anyone by that name. They politely told him that this man claimed to know him and they showed him the photograph. He politely asked where Mokarbel was. They politely told him that he is over there in a car. He politely asked if he could see him. Of course. The police went to get Mokarbel. When they came back, it was to meet their death. Two were shot dead and a third wounded. Mokarbel, lastly, got a bullet between the eyes and was finished off with a bullet in the temple for good measure. And from one building to the next, Carlos, leaping like a deer, got down to the street and finally made his way to a hideout on Rue Amelie, rented by a friend, Sylvie Masmela. From that hideout, he left, once more, to disappear in the wilds of the other side of the Mediterranean, from which he did not reappear, as we said before, until he showed up in Vienna. Since then....

VI. Fingerprints

Since then the trail of Carlos has become vague and is lost. Did the real man fly off into the heaven of myths to repose in his frightening glory? Is he in Libya, in Yemen, in Lebanon, in the East, in Syria? Everywhere and nowhere at the same time? Has he become a professor or doctor of terrorism, given his vast experience and is he planning acts of terrorism or is he putting a stamp of certification (seriously) on those who are carrying them out? Recently, we know, and this is his most recent sign of life after a long absence, he threatened Mr Deferre, leaving fingerprints to authenticate his message, if two of his terrorist friends arrested in France were not freed. They were not. LE CAPITOLE blew up. Carlos? Not Carlos? Who knows or will know?

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VII. A Business and a War

Unquestionably, Ilitch Ramirez has created a famous nickname and has succeeded in raising himself up to terrorism, is highest rung and he is the number one world star. That being said, as the saying goes, one lends only to the rich, which is sometimes a mistake, as Carlos is now being credited for what has been done by someone else. Actually terrorism is not limited to a single man, a kind of bogey man, present everywhere and everywhere invincible. Terrorism is a business. Deliberate. Calculated. Perfected. Terrorism is a war. In the limelight, Carlos is only the most famous footsoldier. It remains to be seen who are the officers who, in the shadows, order the disorder of this army of terror.

And that, more frightening than Carlos, is the real question.



[Photo caption] Behind the tragic smoke on the rue Marbuef emerges the shadowy figure of Carlos, but more than he, it is his "protectors" who have declared war on France.

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TERRORISM

TURKEY

ARMENIAN ARRESTED FOR SMUGGLING, ASALA CONNECTION

London AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 May 82 p 27

[Article: "Turks Arrest Lebanese Armenian Connected with Smuggling Operation, ASALA"]

[Text] It's been determined that the process of arming the secret Armenian army is being carried out by a smuggling organization in Turkey that is being managed from Cyprus by a Lebanese Armenian called Fahe Ohanes Koligian who lives in the Turkish sector of the island.

Turkish police investigations have led to the arrest of 1,000 persons suspected of belonging to the aforementioned smuggling organization. Some of them admitted that they were using Turkey as a base for smuggling various weapons, munitions and equipment to various countries of the Middle East, especially Lebanon and some countries of the Gulf.

It's been determined that the organization actually began operations 18 years ago and that the value of the weapons, goods and merchandise that it smuggled exceeds 2.5 billion dollars. Fahe had gone to Istanbul in 1965 to direct the organization, but then he soon moved his office to Cyprus after forming friendships with various Turkish and Greek organizations on the island. These friendships placed some Cypriot customs representatives at his disposal.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that when a police force in the Turkish sector of the capital, Nikosia, raided the office of the Import-Export company Fahe manages, the aforementioned businessman was able to escape arrest and fly back to Lebanon on a private airplane. It was established that that import-export company was the actual command post for the secret smuggling operation that included weapons, narcotics, electric and electronic equipment, pharmaceuticals and surgical supplies.

In Istanbul Turkish police arrested Ahmed Tenir who is considered the "godfather of the Turkish Mafia" and Fahe's major partner.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

JOURNAL VIEWS CDU/CSU 'SHADOW CABINET'

Hamburg STERN in German 19 May 82 pp 236-237

[Article by Werner P. D'hein]

[Text] For the sake of a Christian-liberal government in Bonn, CDU-chief Kohl must give up important cabinet posts. FDP and CSU insist upon influential government posts.

The prize is not yet in the bag, and they are already fighting over the spoils. Opposition leader Helmut Kohl boasted that "without any difficulty," he could "practically overnight" present a complete government cabinet, if the FDP were to switch over to a center coalition. In the CDU, however, irritation is growing over Kohl's quick cabinet sleight-of-hand. Only 8 of the 16 ministerial posts are reserved for the CDU, the rest--and particularly the attractive ones--the CSU and FDP will share.

Prominent Christian Democrats are murmuring about "betrayal." Kohl supposedly has sold out the interests of his own party in order to finally become chancellor. The critics are doing him an injustice there. Truth is that the influential government posts were already spoken for by the time Kohl started making up his list. CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss had directed the show from behind the scenes.

When the Bavarian minister-president, first of the opposition leaders to publicly announce at the beginning of the year that the FDP, in a coalition with the Christian Union, could "of course" retain its present ministerial posts, the CDU leadership had at first no misgivings. No one considered taking the Foreign Ministry away from Hans-Dietrich Genscher if he helped Kohl attain the chancellorship. Despite his involvement in the contributions affair, Otto Graf Lambsdorff was to retain the Ministry for Economics, Gerhart Baum of the liberal left the Ministry of the Interior, and old liberal Josef Ertl the Ministry of Agriculture.

The CDU was alerted only when the clever CSU chief demanded "at least the same representation" for his Bavarian party in the Kohl cabinet. According to Strauss, the CSU, with 10.3 percent of the votes in the last Bundestag

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elections and 52 seats, has almost the same parliamentary strength as the FDP with its 10.6 percent and 53 seats. For himself, Strauss claimed the Finance Ministry which is of special importance at the present critical time. His second-in-command in Bonn, CSU state party chief Friedrich Zimmermann, he put in charge of the Federal Armed Forces [Defense Ministry] and filled two other influential ministries with Oscar Schneider (Housing) and Hans Maier (Education and Science).

One of Kohl's advisers excuses the empty hands with which his boss now faces his own people by saying, "one can hardly object to treating the CSU no worse than the FDP." For high-powered CDU politicians, such as the respected economic expert Kurt Wiedenkopf, or defense expert Manfred Woerner who in the past pitched in for the CDU in the security policy discussions, there are no appropriate cabinet jobs available. Hesse's CDU prince, Alfred Dregger, if he does not become Minister President in Wiesbaden this fall, would hardly have a chance for an important cabinet seat in Bonn.

Kohl can place only three shining lights in the CDU part of his cabinet. The Ministry for Social Affairs is planned for Berlin senator Norbert Bluem, chief of the CDU employees' organization "Social Committees." CDU Secretary General Heiner Geissler, for a long time at loggerheads with Kohl, is to exchange his party job for the Ministry for Youth, Family and Health. And the Ministry of Justice is to go to a man of the new CDU generation, Walter Wallmann, mayor of Frankfurt.

The rest of his team remains colorless--a council of technocrats from the Bundestag: Dieter Schulte for [the Ministry of] Transport, Christian Schwarz-Schilling for Post [and Telecommunications] (because he made a specialty of the new media), Heinz Riesenhuber for Research and Technology, and Volkmar Koehler for Economic Cooperation.

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MILITARY

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DOUBT OVER FRENCH-GERMAN PAH-2 HELICOPTER LINGERS AT HANOVER

Firms Show Helicopters

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22 May 82 pp 26-27

[Article by Jacques Morisset: "Helicopters: In the Shadow of the PAH-2"]

[Excerpts] Six helicopter manufacturers were directly represented at Hanover: Agusta, Aerospatiale, Bell, MBB [Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Bloehm], Sikorsky and Westland. Real novelties were relatively rare, of course, but not totally absent.

With Agusta, the emphasis was mainly in the IFR [Instrument Flight Rules]-equipped A-109: the Milanese builder has now sold 304 A-109's, including a good 15 of the A-109 Mark II, an improved version which is now the only one being marketed. The rate of production is four machines per month. Four A-109's have been sold to the FRG, and the number will soon be six, because of two contracts on the point of being finalized.

On the other hand, no new information was given on the A-129 Mongoose, one of whose basic missions is antitank warfare and which could quite obviously be one of the candidates for filling the German needs (PAH-2 program)--but on condition, of course, that the Franco-German program (MBB-Aerospatiale) is not launched, which would open the doors of the German market to the American, British and Italian industrialists. The situation, in this area, remains "open," despite the efforts of MBB, Aerospatiale, the French and German engine manufacturers and the equipment and missiles industries of the two countries to find a solution offering the best possible cost-effectiveness ratio.

The same discretion prevails at Aerospatiale and in MBB; but Euromissile has taken a strong stand for a Franco-German program (see following article, by Pierre Langereux).

Contrary to what had been announced, Aerospatiale did indeed present, in addition to an Ecureil, an Ecureil-2 (AS-355E, No 5027) and a Daupine-2N, a Super Puma--AS-332B, No 2005--which had just come back from a series of tests in freezing conditions north of the polar circle, conducted from Tromsø, Norway. The machine left Hanover for Bretigny in the afternoon of 18 May. We shall come back to this test program, which will constitute an important element in

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the integral all-weather certification (flight in freezing conditions) of the AS-332, as was the case also for the certification already obtained by the AS-330 Puma.

MBB presented the new Bo-105 LS, of course, and the BK-117. The Bo-105 LS has two Allison 250-C28C turboengines of 550 HP, as against 2 X 425 HP; the extra power thus provided enables the machine, which has been undergoing tests since last October (it has 35 hours of flying time), to be usable with better conditions in hot weather or at altitude. It is hoped that certification of the Bo-105 LS will be obtained by the end of this year, and the first deliveries are planned for next year.

The BK-117 presented was the lead machine of the series and has been flying since 23 April; a first lot of 100 of them has been launched (71 for the MBB marketing zone and 29 for the marketing zone reserved to Kawasaki).

MBB has also published the first data on the bench tests of a new rotor without any mechanical articulation (including pitch), which is the material result of the studies and research carried out in cooperation with Vertol in recent years. This new rotor should fly on a Bo-105 quite soon.

PAH-2 Seen to Be Vital

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22 May 82 p 34

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "The Future of Franco-German Cooperation Rests on the PAH-2"]

[Text] Franco-German cooperation in armaments, launched by the two governments 20 years ago and conducted for the last 10 years within the framework of the Euromissile group, was an important theme of the 1982 Hanover Exposition.

Euromissile is showing very positive results. The order book currently stands at more than Fr 20 billion, 55 percent of it for export, it was announced by Marcel Morer, president of Euromissile, who anticipates a turnover of about Fr 5 billion for 1982.

Aerospatiale and MBB are producing each month 1,900 Milan antitank missiles and 70 firing posts, 1,000 Hot antitank missiles and 15 firing posts, and 350 Roland ground-to-air missiles and 6 firing posts, it was stated by Sepp Hort, chairman of the Euromissile members' assembly.

Thus, Franco-German cooperation in these three programs is providing work for about 13,000 persons in the two countries, including the subcontracts, which are sizable (80 percent for Roland). Furthermore, the cooperation was recently extended also to Great Britain, which is associated with Euromissile in the new EMDG [expansion unknown] group for development of the future medium-range and long-range third-generation antitank missiles (cf AIR ET COSMOS, No 900, p 43 [See JPRS L/10496, dated 6 May 82, No 28/82 of this series, pp 31-32]). EMDG is also to be the cooperation structure for development of other missiles and eventually for artillery rockets, Mr Hort declared.

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However, some shadows are creeping over Franco-German cooperation. Last year, defense-budget compressions led the FRG to "defer" the orders for Roland (installments 3 and 4) for the Luftwaffe and the Navy and also those for the Milan (installment 4). Mr Hort considers, though, that Milan installment 4 and the Roland installments for the Luftwaffe could be reinstated.

But the essential problem is in fact that of the Franco-German cooperation on the new HAC [Antitank Helicopter]/PAH-2 antitank-helicopter project.

"It is important for France and the FRG to reach an understanding rapidly in order to launch this program, which is necessary for the future of Franco-German cooperation," Roger Chevalier, vice president of Aerospatiale, declared unambiguously. The FRG is, of course, experiencing financial difficulties in its more than Fr 2 billion participation in this program. But it is also tempted toward trans-Atlantic cooperation with the United States for development of this new helicopter and its weapons system.

But there is no doubt that such an attitude, which would in fact lead to the introduction of an American competitor into the European market, would sound the death knell of Franco-German cooperation. Therefore, this is not only a technical choice but a political one!

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

ADAPTED EXOCET IN TESTING--Adaptation of the Exocet antiship missile, AM-39 air-to-surface version, to the Atlantic New Generation (ANG) maritime-patrol airplane is in progress. The first phase of adaptation of the AM-39 to the ANG began in March 1982 with the dropping of three mockups of AM-39 missiles at the Flight-Testing Center (CEV) of Cazaux in the Landes (France). We recall that adaptation of the AM-39 missile to the Navy's Super Etendard carrier-based plane was completed on 2 February 1982, with the success of the last qualification firing, made on that date against a towed Trimaran marine target. Four out of five AM-39 firings from Super Etendards of the French Air Force were successful, one having failed for a reason independent of the weapon system. Certain firings were done by a Super Etendard of the French aircraft-carrier Clemenceau in the presence of Argentine flyers. Since then, as is known, AM-39 missiles have been fired by Argentine Super Etendards in combat, and one of these missiles destroyed the 4,100-ton British destroyer "Sheffield." Validation firings of the MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co] Magic air-combat missile have also been done by a Super Etendard of the aircraft-carrier Clemenceau at the Mediterranean Testing Center (CEM), in cooperation with the teams of the CEV and of the manufacturer. [Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22 May 82 p 47] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982] 11267

FIBER OPTICS GUIDE TORPEDO--The ECAN [Naval Arms and Construction Establishment] of Saint-Tropez and the Thomson-CSF company have just begun development of the New Light Torpedo (NTL) for the Navy's submarines. Thomson-CSF expects that it will take 4 to 5 years to complete development of the new NTL torpedo, which should go into mass production in 1987, it was recently declared by a representative of the submarine-activities division of the company. The NTL torpedo is the first French wire-guided torpedo using optical fibers. It is considered to be a competitor of the British Sting-Ray light torpedo, but faster. Thomson-CSF has specified that the NTL torpedo would have a limited range of 20 to 30 km by the wire-guidance technique. But the NTL torpedo would nevertheless have a greater range than that of the new French F-17 torpedo that has just been placed in service, in January 1982, in the French Navy and several foreign navies. In addition, it was decided in 1979 to modernize the F-17 torpedo to make it multipurpose, so as to equip the Navy's conventional-propulsion and nuclear-propulsion (SNA) attack submarines with it. [Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22May 82 p 47] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982] 11267

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ANTI-AIRCRAFT DECOY—The Navy has finally chosen the French company CSEE [Electrical Entreprise and Communications Company] to build the new Sagaie decoy-launching system to equip the antiaircraft corvettes. CSEE was in competition with Creusot-Loire, Thomson-CSF [General Radio Co] and Thomson-Brandt for this contract, which constitutes the first application of the Sagaie decoy-launcher. The Sagaie will be used for protection of surface vessels against attacks by antiship missiles, to decoy the dumbo radars before enemy firing and the self-guidance systems of missiles fired against ships. The electronic-warfare action of the Sagaie system will be joined with that of CSEE's Dagaie decoy-launcher and of the close-self-defense weapons systems. Each Sagaie system will comprise two carriages, each with 10 decoy-launching rockets (electromagnetic and infrared), as well as the cases for the control mechanisms, aiming, power supply, processing, supervision and maintenance. The designing of the Sagaie munitions has been assigned by the Navy to the French company Lacroix, which is already making the munitions for the CSEE's Dagaie decoy-launcher and for the new Magaie (cf AIR ET COSMOS, No 902). Some 50 Dagaie decoy-launching systems have been ordered by 10 countries. It is planned to equip initially, in 1985, four Navy corvettes with the Sagaie, which is also offered for export. [Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 8 May 82 p 42] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982] 11267

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GENERAL

SPAIN

DETAILS OF RECENTLY UNCOVERED AEROFLOT SPY NET RECOUNTED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 10 May 82 pp 23-29

[Text] The Soviet commercial airline company in Spain has another business besides flying. In the past 3 years four of its employees--two last week-- have left the country after being linked with espionage activities, with their pilots suspected of being more than just operators of planes. This story tells about the life of the two Aeroflot men in Madrid, where as in any sinister tale, the sordid underground work or spying is mixed up with a still unexplained death.

At the beginning of this year, Esther, a British air hostess, who was trying to buy a bottle of brandy in the Barajas airport, lost a heel off her shoe. So as not to fall, she grabbed onto a pilot, whose briefcase fell from his hand onto the floor, spilling out its contents.

The stewardess, somewhat upset and embarrassed, apologized to the owner of the briefcase, and set about helping him to gather up the papers which were scattered on the floor.

At that moment, two men who were dressed in the same uniform as the pilot pushed her roughly aside, hurriedly gathered up the papers, and put them into the briefcase again.

Incredulous and suprised by the rude behavior of the crew members, Esther looked for the broken off heel of her shoe and went away. Then she remembered two things. The crew members were wearing the Aeroflot emblem, and the papers which they had not allowed her to touch were made up of strange combinations of numbers and ciphers. They were undoubtedly coded messages.

A few months after this episode, two colleagues of the strange Aeroflot crew were expelled from Spain for carrying on activities harmful to the national security. The two spies, Vasilii Nikolayevich Fedorin and Vladimir Lukich Tirtishnikov, director and assistant director, respectively, of the Soviet airline company, left Spain for good last Thursday, after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave them a week to collect their belongings and get out.

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Agent of Influence

Vasiliy Fedorin, age 48, was born in Olguino, Saratov Province, in the Soviet Union. He studied engineering in the Patrice Lumumba University, that great Soviet center of higher education where so many Russian agents and revolutionary leaders have served their apprenticeship; and he married Yanna Petrovna Fedorina, a young woman of Eurasian appearance, born in Polotsk, Belorussia, in October 1940.

After spending several years working in Spanish-speaking countries, Fedorin was assigned to Morocco in the mid '70's as an agent of the GRU, the military branch of the KGB, using the cover of a representative of the Aeroflot company in Rabat. In April 1980 the Soviet authorities transferred him to Madrid.

Tall and thin, with a wide face, high cheekbones and blue eyes, Vasiliy Fedorin arrived in Spain as director of Aeroflot, replacing its former head, Oleg Suranov, who had been expelled from the country after having been accused of carrying on espionage activities. This made him a suspicious person from the start.

Subjecting him to strict surveillance, the agents of the Ministry of Defense's counterintelligence service, who began to follow him from the very day he arrived in Barajas, soon noticed that under the cover of the director general of Aeroflot and of a prosaic Soviet aeronautical engineer, there was concealed a person of refined culture, with courteous and educated manners, who dressed with a certain elegance, spoke Spanish and French perfectly, and who had come to Spain for something more than selling airline tickets.

However, there was something that did not fit in. After months and months of being followed and watched, Fedorin had not decided to reactivate the network of Soviet agents which his predecessor, Oleg Suranov, had set up in the country.

One day things changed. The pretended director of Aeroflot suddenly left his office and proceeded to a centrally located Madrid cafeteria, where he had a meeting with a journalist from a mass circulation daily newspaper.

There was nothing strange about the meeting. On the other hand, there was something strange about Fedorin's behavior. Too many precautions for it to be an ordinary meeting.

A 'Fully Trained Field Man'

Before keeping the appointment, the sham Aeroflot director had made two calls from a phone booth, had changed taxis twice, had gotten out 300 meters away from the place of the meeting, crossed the street twice before going to the pedestrian crossing in order to see if he was being followed, and then went into the cafeteria, where for an hour two Russians had been setting up a discreet system of counter-surveillance.

After this first meeting, which was followed by many others, Spanish counterintelligence found the key to the problem: Fedorin was not an operations agent. He was an agent of influence, and his mission in Spain was to set up a network of journalists who would write under the orders of the Soviet Union.

All Spanish counterespionage operations then were centered around unmasking him. For several months agents of the CESID [Higher Center for Defense Intelligence] and the fake director general of Aeroflot played a cat-and-mouse game. Every time that someone laid a trap for him, Fedorin sniffed it out. Finally, last March, Vasilii Fedorin, one of the most astute men in Soviet military espionage in Spain, fell into the snare of the national security services.

"In the murky and stormy world of spies," a specialist told CAMBIO 16, "when someone discovers a network belonging to the opposite side they can only do two things: either liquidate the agents, or force them to work for their captors. Anything but put them into prison." That was what happened to Fedorin. The CESID "turned around" one of his spies, made him into a double agent, and used him to dig the grave for his boss.

Something similar happened to Tirtishnikov, "assistant director general" of Aeroflot, who accompanied Fedorov on his journey "into the cold." One of the men from his own network, captured by Spanish counterespionage, sold him out unceremoniously.

Vladimir Tirtishnikov was born in North Korea 34 years ago. The son of a Soviet father and a Korean mother, he studied engineering in the USSR, and joined the military branch of the KGB. He carried out several missions in the Middle East, and during one of his stays in the Soviet Union for recycling he married Tat'yana Mikhailovna Tirtishnikova, a Muscovite 4 years older than he, by whom he has a young child.

The KGB took 6 years to prepare the ground for putting him into Spain. As an inspecting engineer from the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Tirtishnikov travelled to the country with some regularity, and began to make friends with several people. Fifteen months ago he was finally posted to Madrid with the cover of assistant director general of Aeroflot.

Gifted with a special talent for outwitting the vigilance of Spanish counterintelligence, Tirtishnikov was a "fully trained field man," interested in all kinds of information, but especially in anything related to the plans of the Spanish Armed Forces in regard to Spain joining NATO, and the supplies of military material which the United States was prepared to sell to the Madrid authorities; as well as the training and capabilities of the Spanish military men who were going to fill positions of responsibility within the Western military bloc.

Fedorin and Tirtishnikov are not the only spies who have been detected in Aeroflot. Nor are they the first to be expelled for taking advantage of their cover in the Soviet airline company to carry on their nefarious work.

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On Friday, 15 March, 1980, Oleg Suranov--age 41, tall, with a robust build, partly bald and baggy-eyed--left Spain after the CESID found proof of his covert espionage activities when he was "sold", by means of a double agent, some plans of the electronic system of the French Mirage aircraft, in which Suranov had shown interest.

Born in Leningrad, married and with two children, Suranov was also an aeronautical engineer and director of Aeroflot in Spain, a position that allowed him to be on good terms with the pilots of the Western airline companies--many of whom had previously been military pilots--and to keep informed about some of the secrets of NATO.

Another Soviet GRU agent who was detected by Spanish counterintelligence was Gennadiy Katychev, a heavy individual, of medium height, with rosy cheeks and an oblique expression, who in 1979 was the commercial director for Spain of the Soviet airline company.

At the end of 1980 Katychev was promoted to assistant director general of Aeroflot in Spain; and the Western secret services, who had thought he might be a Soviet agent, detected some links in what could be his network of informants.

The KGB, which had set up a discreet countersurveillance system to protect him, then noticed that he was "blown," and in order to prevent the collapse of the network of agents, they decided in January 1981 to transfer him to another "rezidentura" (the KGB station in a country).

A couple of years before, Enrique Lopez Alcantara had suffered a worse fate. He was a former Spanish military man aged 58, a personal friend of the former director of Aeroflot in Spain, and former sales manager of the Soviet commercial airline company.

On 19 March 1979, 2 days after having made a trip to the Soviet Union, Lopez Alcantara was found dead in the seat of a "Citroen GS" at no. 3 Canillejas Street in Madrid.

Three years after it occurred, his death is still surrounded by mystery. He was apparently attacked by some criminals, who assaulted him for the purpose of robbery, but none of his possessions were missing, and his car was still parked in the garage.

The wound that caused his death was also very strange. A simple cut on the back of the knee ended his life. The cut, which severed the femoral artery of the former Aeroflot sales manager with diabolical precision, either happened by sheer chance, as the family thinks, or was the work of an experienced professional.

Shortly before his death the Russians had named to the post of Aeroflot sales manager a person whom they trusted completely: Nieves Cuervo Elizalde, a relative of Vicente Cuervo, the "Russian boy" who heads the Hispanic-Soviet Friendship Association, one of the two associations for friendship with the

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USSR which exist in this country, and which receives direct support and funding from the KGB.

Everything seems to indicate that Aeroflot, whose activities in Spain began before the death of Franco and the opening of diplomatic relations with the East, has been the most important center of the GRU, the military branch of the KGB, ever since the first Russian Tupolev landed at the Barajas airport.

Western military intelligence sources think that more than half of the staff of this company--made up of four Soviets and two Spaniards--are using their positions as cover for carrying out espionage activities.

They also believe that the crews of the Russian planes, which have been landing uninterruptedly at Barajas on Mondays and Saturdays for about a dozen years, are working for Soviet military intelligence as couriers and as agents in charge of securing information inside the country.

During the 24 hours that they usually stop over, the two Aeroflot pilots and the four air hostesses which make up each crew usually spend most of their time outside the hotel, dressed in civilian clothes and almost without police surveillance.

The government suspects that some of the pilots or air hostesses have already set up their own networks of informants, although there is still no information to prove it.

One thing that seems clear, though, is that the seemingly harmless Soviet Tupolevs which travel to Spain are taking advantage of their arrivals and departures from Madrid to photograph the military installations of the Torrejon de Ardoz base, and to compare the material that they obtain with the information sent by Soviet spy satellites.

Foreign political observers find it strange that Soviet aircraft are allowed to land at an airport like Barajas which is situated barely 20 kilometers from the most important Spanish-U.S. base in the country, when normally they would be forbidden to come within 100 kilometers of it.

But that is not the only thing that is strange. On Princessa Street, in Madrid, where the Aeroflot offices are located, the Soviet spies work at night and sleep during the day. And it is this not-so-strange predeliction for dark, silent and patient work that makes Aeroflot a company that does its flying in low places as well as high ones.

Aeroflot Personnel in Spain

Vasiliy Fedorin, director general. Expelled. Sergey Sesikov, assistant director general and commercial director. Suspected of espionage. Vladimir Tirtishnikov, assistant director general. Expelled. Valeriy Smirnov, field director.

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Nieves Cuervo Elizalde, head of programming and reservations. Nationality:
Spanish.

Antonio Modesto Diaz, head of promotion. Nationality: Spanish.

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