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17 June 1982

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 23/82)



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

INSUFFICIENT TRANSLATIONS INTO ARABIC SAID TO BE FUNDAMENTAL CULTURAL PROBLEM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 82 p 61

[Article by Amir Iskandar: "So That We Are Not Hurt by the Drought"]

[Text] One of the fundamental problems facing contemporary Arab culture is the problem of translation. It may not be offensive to say that this fundamental problem has not yet received the interest, the follow-up, the observation and the support it deserves from official or non-official cultural organizations in our Arab countries. [Nor has it received such interest and support] from those who are employed in the field of culture in general.

In the years that followed the 1967 setback some factions that reject the West assumed a position on the question of translation; it was a kind of negative intellectual reaction to the setback. The least that can be said about that position is that it was harmful to the question of Arab culture itself.

Attitudes rejecting western colonialism on political and national grounds became confused with a rejection of the West in general, including a rejection of its cultural heritage and all its intellectual gifts in all their varied forms and substances.

Suddenly interest in the question of ancient Arab heritage became intense to the point that some schools of thought were inclined to see in that heritage what would be sufficient for our present. They thought that ancient Arab heritage would satisfy all our impulses for development and progress and would enable us to catch up with the nations that had outstripped us in contemporary universal civilization.

In many instances nervous emotionalism prevailed in both positions.

It is not true that all the West's cultural and intellectual heritage, that of the past and of the present, is colonialist or imperialist. And it is silly to say that our heritage, notwithstanding its historical worth or its past intellectual fecundity, would be sufficient and that we can do without the surprising developments in our world that are taking place in the sciences, in the arts and in literature.

If it is silly to imagine that we can turn inward amidst this ferment all around

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us, it is no less silly to imagine that we can separate ourselves from our own identity, subsume it under that of others or lose it altogether.

Such delusions appear to be more like deceptive maelstroms which force those who deliberately or inadvertently fall into them to flounder and lose their sense of direction.

There is no need then to repeat the statement that has become hackneyed because of overuse or misuse. This statement is that we must be true to our origins and, at the same time, contemporary [in our outlook]. We must have an informed knowledge of our heritage; we must also have an informal and a thorough knowledge of the world around us. We must stop talking day in and day out about the importance of heritage. We must either go ahead and familiarize ourselves with our heritage or rediscover it, or we should stop talking every minute about the importance of catching up with the age and go ahead and find out about it and actually try to comprehend it.

Moving ahead toward knowledge, rediscovery or the attempt to comprehend [any subject] is a phenomenon that means first and foremost knowing the fundamentals.

So far, despite all these stages during which translation flourished, the Arab reader or Arab intellectual who does not speak or read foreign languages has not become familiar with these fundamentals. Most of his knowledge has been confined to the small branches, the explanations, the marginal notes, the commentaries or the explications of these rudiments. There are numerous examples of this. In fact they are too numerous to mention them here.

It may be enough for one to recall a few of these. What principal works can we read in Arabic by major philosophers who influenced the course of human thought, such as Descartes, Kant and Hegel? And yet, how many people talk about dialectics and occasionally about Hegelian dialectics in particular? How many people even include in their works one "text" or another by Hegel despite the fact that they do not speak a foreign language?

The reason for this lies in the fact that people who do that read a book about Hegel [for example], and sometimes [even] no more than an article or a translated article in a periodical. Everything ends after that, and this "reader" then acquires the right "to write" about that great philosopher and even to criticize him.

Another example: What works can we read in Arabic by the great French poet, novelist and critic Aragon? Nothing but a few poems from his volume of poetry, "Le Fou d'Elsa." Nevertheless, many people write about Aragon; they quote him, and they learn from him. Once again the reason may be a study, a research paper, or an article written by a student, a researcher or a critic--or a translation of any of these--in any periodical. Nothing more.

A third example: This time this is the school of thought which is known as Structuralism. What can we read in Arabic about the principles of the philosophers and scholars of that school? There is nothing. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of talk about Structuralism by our intellectuals who do not read foreign languages.

A fourth example: One of the [present] trends in contemporary literature and art research lies in [the school of] the sociology of literature and art. What are the basic works that we can read in Arabic by the philosophers and scholars of that school, such as George Lukash, Lucien Goldman, George Gerwitsch, Michel Zirafa and others? Nevertheless, one finds writers who cannot read one page in a foreign language repeating like parrots, the term, "sociology of literature and art" and the term, "sociology of culture." The good natured reader is taken in by their false claims and considers them experts in these intellectual fields and areas of criticism even though they've read nothing about these areas but a translated article here or there, and they know nothing about this great multi-directional school [of thought] but paragraphs taken from this or the other book, which may have been mentioned in a study or a research work by this or the other author.

Can all this be logical or acceptable? Can the Arab intellectual who does not speak foreign languages or whose education did not provide him with an opportunity to learn a foreign language have nothing more than these crumbs that are left over to him by others? What can this meager diet [of knowledge] produce but shortcomings, weaknesses or tedious pretense? After almost 170 years of the efforts of Rifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi and the school of translation he created in Arab culture after the lengthy ages of decline, how can our store of Arab books remain so impoverished, caring for nothing but images that move about like shadows on the walls of our "contemporary" cave?

Some people are trying to put the blame on Beirut. They are saying that the consumer tendency which gained control over publishing activity there is responsible for this shortage in translations into Arabic, a shortage which has prevailed and is still prevailing. They say it is this that created these distorted figures of pseudo intellectuals.

The truth is that this judgment is as incriminatory as it involves a desire for self-exoneration by putting the blame on others.

It is true that a consumer tendency did assume control of all or some directions in translations in Beirut; it is true that Beirut has sometimes offered what our culture and our cultural evolution does not need; and it is true that Beirut's printing presses and publishing houses refrained from offering what we most urgently need. But Beirut, nevertheless, has offered a great deal. In fact, perhaps had it not been for Beirut, many writers and intellectuals would not have flaunted many of these foreign names which they literally affix to their books and their talks.

In the final analysis Beirut is not responsible for the falsehood of these people. Despite everything Beirut did not claim that it can take the place of others; it did not claim that it was seizing or that it can seize their efforts.

Where then are the ministries of culture in many Arab countries? Where are the official and semi-official organizations that consider culture a service not a commodity? They are non-existent in this regard. There are few, limited and temporary exceptions: these may be referred to specifically in the efforts that were made previously by the Egyptian Ministry of Culture, in the efforts that are being made by the Iraqi Ministry of Culture and Information and in the efforts of the Ministry of Information in Kuwait.

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Without going overboard or being remiss it must be said that all these efforts, as measured by their fruits, fall far short of ambitions. The territory of Arab culture still needs someone who would break forth its rocks and unleash numerous rivers to protect it from searing thirst and drought.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

MUSCAT, ADEN MEDIATION EFFORT--Official Gulf sources told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the coming few weeks will witness, for the first time in the history of the conflict between the Sultanate of Oman and Aden, the formation of a joint council, possibly on the foreign ministerial level of the two countries. The council would explore [the possibility of] putting an end to the long conflict between the two sides. Furthermore, the council is considered to be one of the positive outcomes of the mediation undertaken for sometime by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 275, 21-27 May 82 p 18] [COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI]

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EGYPT

NPUG LEADER DISCUSSES POSITIONS TOWARD MUBARAK

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 82 pp 24-27

[Interview with Khalid Muhyi al-Din, chairman of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, [NPUG] by Sa'd Fu'ad Zaghlul in Paris: "I Neither Support Nor Oppose al-Islambuli's Execution; Most Arab Leaders, Beginning With al-Asad and al-Qadhdhafi, Are in Contact With Mubarak; We Are Working for National Regime That Abolishes 'Camp David' and Complete Sovereignty Over Sinai; Whoever Demands Elections in Egypt Now Does Not understand Politics"; date not specified]

[Text] Khalid Muhyi al-Din, chairman of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, [NPUG] is one of those who drew up the Free Officers Movement Program as a leading member of the July revolution. He took part in the armed underground resistance against the British occupation and joined numerous revolutionary organizations in the Egyptian armed forces before confronting al-Sadat. He is a leader who has participated in making the history of revolutionary Egypt. In this role, he has been the leader of the democratic trend.

From his "opposing" democratic position, Khalid Muhyi al-Din talks to Al-Watan Al-'Arabi today to say that he is "reformulating his opposition because Husni Mubarak is not al-Sadat." The distinguishing feature of this interview is that it is a "hot interview" whose spontaneity reveals more than one fact not yet revealed from the start of Muhyi al-Din's experience with the revolution to his experience with the severe opposition and ending with his experience with the "moderate" opposition in which he has been engaging since the bullets of 6 October [assassination of al-Sadat].

The interview, conducted in Paris, can be considered a political document that merits a calm reading in this current historic moment through which Egypt is passing.

[Question] Let us start the interview with a question on the visualization you had for Egypt's future when you were struggling to achieve national independence. What is this visualization?

[Answer] The truth is that man goes through various phases, the most prominent of which are the phase of emotional nationalism and the phase of thinking nationalism.

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I have passed through both phases. In the emotional phase, I loved Egypt. We hated the British and we believed that we had to use every means to expel them. We believed, for example, in striking the traitors who cooperated with the British. We then concluded that we had to unite with the forces who believe in the great spiritual values and are willing to sacrifice. Our entire goal was to urge people to rush to fight the occupation and to seek to make sacrifices. This is why I joined the armed underground national groups. After that phase, I grew older and came to realize that patriotism is both thought and knowledge, meaning that the homeland is not a social unit but that the citizens are divided by classes with different interests and that the meaning of independence lies not just in expelling the occupation army but also in building an independent national economy and establishing social justice. Therefore, to achieve actual independence and social justice, we had to know the forces with an interest in realizing independence and justice, those who wanted national independence to be realized, with its absolute dimensions, and those in whose interest it was to have a superficial independence. I learned a lot in that phase and, consequently, entered the national arena of battle better prepared. As you know, I joined numerous armed underground organizations that had nothing to do with the army and then joined the officers movement inside the army.

[Question] Do you mean the Free Officers?

[Answer] No, that movement was an organized underground military movement connected with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood wanted this movement to be a part of their organization but we refused so that the army could remain independent of the parties and the religious organizations.

[Question] In what year was that?

[Answer] From 1944 until 1947. We then abandoned that movement and formed the Free Officers Movement at the end of 1949.

Meanwhile, I had come to understand scientific socialism and the meanings of independence, imperialism and struggle. By the time formation of the Free Officers Movement was completed, I had matured intellectually. This maturation had been helped by my studies and my college life.

[Question] You graduated from the Business College?

[Answer] Yes. Intellectual maturity developed as a result of the experience with the Egyptian national movement, especially since I had entered it as a product of the labor movement and the leftist movement, which gave the national movement an advanced social content. Therefore, when the Free Officers Organization was formed, we drew up its program.

[Question] Who drew up the program?

[Answer] I and Ahmad Fu'ad al-Qadi wrote it at the time and 'Abd al-Nasir approved it after reviewing it and introducing some modifications. This program was summed up in fighting colonialism and its supporters. We

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inserted the phrase "Anglo-American colonialism" because in the minds of the Egyptians at that time colonialism was embodied in the British. For the first time ever, disagreement erupted among the Free Officers over the phrase "Anglo-American." Some officers believed that we should be content with the phrase "British Colonialism" and should omit the word American. But we were eager to fight colonialism as a whole. To us, the colonialism occupying the country was not necessarily the only colonialism. Colonialism was the new economic interests trying to invade the world and seeking to form military alliances to protect itself. So we focused our goals on fighting colonialism and its traitorous supporters, on forming a strong army that permitted the promotion of soldiers to officers and on realizing social justice and sound democracy.

(Muhyi al-Din paused briefly and then added:) There is a point that people don't understand well, namely, that our program called for the formation of a national front of the national forces and parties to fight colonialism, to liquidate the occupation and to abrogate the 1936 treaty.

[Question] This means that your program did not include the idea of abolishing the parties?

[Answer] Listen, the text said "a front of the national forces and parties." Some [officers] said that some of the parties were not nationalistic. This was a controversial point. Naturally, the revolution did not imagine that it would rule directly. The goal of the Free Officers was to put the popular forces in power, but they did not realize that the achievement of this end would be engulfed in difficulties.

[Question] When you initiated the revolution, did you have the idea of establishing a full democratic life?

[Answer] Of course we had this idea in mind and we agreed with 'Ali Mahir to form the cabinet after conducting parliamentary elections in March 1953 to restore democratic life. But 'Ali Mahir failed to mention restoration of the parliament in his cabinet statement because he was thinking of staying in power, aware that he would not win an election. The same happened with al-Sunhuri, Sulayman Hafiz and the other advisers consulted by the Revolution Command Council. They all thought that any elections would bring al-Wafd back to power. While we were discussing the agrarian reform law, those advisers constantly warned us that if any new elections were held, al-Wafd would return to power.

[Question] What was wrong with al-Wafd's return to power. Wasn't al-Wafd the party that had abrogated the 1936 treaty and permitted the people to carry arms against the occupation forces, and was it not the party of the popular masses?

[Answer] They imagined that al-Wafd would obstruct promulgation of the agrarian reform law, which the revolution considered its backbone.

[Question] This law brought about revolutionary change by liquidating feudalism?

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[Answer] Precisely. But the revolution did not know how to use this law in its favor, to build its party behind it, to wage the elections with this accomplishment, to win the majority and to rule democratically. Regrettably, such an achievement was obstructed by the military character dominating the Revolution Command Council, in addition to the advisers' opposition to the holding of elections. The advisers said to us: Why should the revolution hold elections that will bring al-Wafd back to power? They also said that the revolution had to achieve enormous reforms first and then hold elections in the long run. This was the path that led to a lack of respect for the constitution. At the time, Dr al-Sayyid Sabri and similar theoreticians came up with the theory of revolutionary jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence. Consequently, the revolution decided to rule by itself and not to hand power over to others. Thus the crisis developed.

Najib Was Against Me

[Question] The Muhammad Najib crisis?

[Answer] No, Muhammad Najib supported this inclination. At the outset, he was against me insofar as the democratic inclination is concerned.

[Question] As far as I know, Muhammad Najib was the number one democrat in the Revolution Command Council. Isn't it so?

[Answer] (Here Khalid Muhyi al-Din's voice rose to say:) No, no. Muhammad Najib supported continuation of the Revolution Command Council in power and extension of the transition period to more than 3 years. This was his opinion at the outset of the revolution when the masses supported him and when he had good relations with the council members. Najib called for extension of the transition period and not for the return of democratic life. When differences erupted between him and the Revolution Command Council over the distribution of power, and when he learned that the people were with him, he lined up with the democratic current and turned into a democrat. But before that, he had stood against me and directed his blows at me.

[Question] But (2 days earlier) he had said that he supported democracy as the path to rule Egypt?

[Answer] "That is correct." After his initial position of hostility to democracy, he adopted the democratic trend.

[Question] And you supported him in the March 1954 crisis?

[Answer] He is the one who supported me.

(Muhyi al-Din paused briefly and then added:)

The truth is that at the outset, 'Abd al-Nasir was for democracy. But then he settled the matter and chose the other path when he was told, "You will fail if you want to introduce agrarian reform and establish democracy [at the same time]."

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Concluding this historical part of the interview, Khalid Muhyi al-Din wondered: I don't know why they were so afraid of democracy when the revolution enjoyed strong popularity? Khalid added: Any one [of them] nominating himself in the elections would have inevitably won the revolution's support. Some people made them fear the idea of democratic government. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the Americans were against the return of parliamentary life.

[Question] At the beginning, the Americans supported the revolution?

[Answer] Their relationship with the revolution was good because there was an inclination at the outset of the revolution to establish good relations with Washington. The revolution did not want to get involved in conflicts with both the British and the Americans. At the time, the United States was against al-Wafd and against parliamentary life. The American view was that if parliamentary life were to be established in Egypt, the left would gain strength. The Americans were as obsessed with the issue of communism then as they are obsessed with it now. In a discussion with the U.S. Embassy adviser at the time in the home of 'Abd al-Mun'im Amin, the adviser said: A return of parliamentary life will open the path to the leftist forces to act and flourish. For example, the Americans were against the appointment of Fathi Radwan and Nur al-Din Tarraf to cabinet positions. When I told the adviser that the two men were not communists but nationalists, he said in reply: Radical nationalists agree with the communists. But because the revolution was a nationalist revolution in essence and because 'Abd al-Nasir was a nationalist, he got no results even though he went with them [Americans] to the end of the road. The capital did not come. He issued for them the foreign capital investment law and did a lot for them but the capital did not come. There is no foreign power that will strengthen the economy of another country. 'Abd al-Nasir finally became convinced that he had to rely on himself and that Egypt had to be independent and to play its leadership role in the Arab world. The United States wanted Egypt to be a part of its strategic plan in the Western alliance. 'Abd al-Nasir understood this and his response was that the area would defend itself with its intrinsic strength and that Egypt would not enter into foreign alliances. Here began the battle that brought 'Abd al-Nasir into his historical confrontation with the West and imperialism. This is what 'Abd al-Nasir should be accredited with, this and the fact that he was actually defending Egypt's independence.

Catastrophe

[Question] Did you feel disappointed when national independence was achieved while the Free Officers were still holding the power and while they had wiped out democracy in Egypt?

[Answer] On the issue of democracy, I would like to point out the matter of torture and the related issues surrounding it. The major cases of torture taking place in Egypt involve the Muslim Brotherhood. I am against violence. A group that resorts to violence must not complain of the official reactions. Egypt's history abounds with such examples. We know, for example, "the black soldier" and... Torture always follows assassination and assassination always

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leads to striking the democratic movement in Egypt. An assassin imagines that he is committing a glorious act whereas, in my opinion, assassination is not a glorious act. The result is that the police resort to violent measures, such as torture, beatings, arrest and detention. He who resorts to violence "must not say ouch," meaning that he must not complain about reciprocal violence inflicted on him.

[Question] But this torture of the Brotherhood about which you are speaking has also been inflicted on the communists, the leftists and the entire left?

[Answer] No.

[Question] How? There are detainees who were in Abu Za'bal prison and saw officer Mahuud al-Manashiri, your colleague in the Cavalry Corps, being tortured. Moreover, Shahdi 'Atiyah and Dr Farid Haddad, both communists, died under torture.

[Answer] No. The torture against the left took place in al-Wahat in 1959.

[Question] And also in Abu Za'bal in 1955.

[Answer] During the 1959 torture, the entire left was in al-Wahat. But when 'Abd al-Nasir learned of the news, he dismissed brig Gen Isma'il Himmat, the man responsible for the torture.

[Question] Yes, but the torture included the leftist detainees as it included the Brotherhood detainees, meaning that if there were democracy...

[Answer] Leave this issue aside. We are against torture. What is wrong with you is that you speak of democracy as an abstract.

[Question] Not at all. This is a fundamental and major issue.

[Answer] Yes, fundamental.

[Question] If there had been democracy, it would have been impossible to foil the revolution's accomplishments.

[Answer] It is a grave mistake to throw everything on the shoulders of democracy. We do not approve of torture. But the vast accomplishments achieved by the revolution and 'Abd al-Nasir have no equal in any Arab or European country. I am not defending or justifying but some of the extraordinary measures can be understood in the light of these accomplishments. Moreover, 'Abd al-Nasir did not gain his power through constitutional channels but derived it from sweeping popular support. Any person opposing him would have ended in isolation. Comparatively, the vast social changes realized by 'Abd al-Nasir say that the special measures that were taken in Egypt amount to nothing. The other point is that 'Abd al-Nasir did not liquidate his opponents physically, and neither did al-Sadat. This is a fact. This is attributed to the fact that Egypt is an ancient country in which the rules of state are firmly established.

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[Question] But 'Abd al-Nasir is the one who launched this tradition [presumably of torture] while he was in power.

[Answer] Yes; he used to say: "Blood begets blood."

[Question] Some Revolution Command Council members believed in resorting to physical liquidation.

[Answer] I know this. But the question still concerns the issue of democracy. You are a democratic man and you must insist on clinging to democracy.

[Question] It is my opinion that the Arab world's catastrophe and Egypt's catastrophe are the absence of democracy. What we see in the Islamic world is also surprising. It is surprising that there isn't a single Islamic country with a democratic regime.

[Answer] The third World has its problem with democracy. The middle class constantly drools for the Western system. It does not realize that the Western system is not just economic freedom but also political freedom, respect for the individual, freedom of expression, unionist rights and so forth. It is a complete process. In our countries, this class imagines that if economic freedom is realized and capital is concentrated [in a few hands], the country will advance. This is untrue. Democracy is essentially fundamental and the citizen who feels the state's respect for his dignity and his rights becomes the secret behind the people's progress. This is an issue that needs no debating. So, over what are you arguing with me?

NPUG Is Opposition Party

[Question] Does this mean that you still cling to democracy?

[Answer] Is there any doubt about this? Without democracy and supremacy of the law, the security agencies rule.

[Question] Great. Egypt is without democracy today. So what do you say?

[Answer] What do you mean by "without democracy?"

[Question] It means that there is no "democracy" in Egypt.

[Answer] What do you mean? You must explain.

[Question] Rule is individual, public liberties are banned, there is no parliament and the present People's Assembly is rigged...and...

[Answer] (Here, Khalid interrupted me and said with emotion:) I reject this debate and I am sorry that it is taking place at this level. Listen everything in life is relative. I am a man who, in al-Sadat's time, headed a party that opposed his policy. The head of state considered the opposition traitorous, atheist and infidel, considered whoever attacked the Egyptian-

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Israeli treaty a man attacking the holiest of sanctities, whoever criticized the open-door policy a "Marxist" and whoever spoke against imperialism a "man with a complex." We were surprised to find in al-Sadat's successor a man who considers it natural that some in the country would support the treaty and some would oppose it, some who would support the open-door policy and some who would oppose it, without being unpatriotic. This man has established relations with them [opponents] and through this relationship we have been able to secure the release of a large number of detainees and to reinstate journalists and university professors in their jobs. We do not claim that what has happened is a change or a fundamental solution to the issue of democracy. But a new climate has developed and this climate foretells that the opposition forces can play a better role than before. We do not claim that the issue has been completely solved and we do not imagine that in the climate of the past 3 to 4 years any elections could have been held without ending in favor of the rightist and reactionary forces.

[Question] Are the people rightist?

[Answer] This is my viewpoint: Whoever demands immediate elections does not understand politics. Again, whoever demands elections at present does not understand politics. To hold elections, liberties must be secured for a period of 2 years [before the elections], for example. This does not happen overnight. We will struggle to achieve democracy. We are in the arena exerting pressure and we are struggling to change the conditions so that the elections can take place under new conditions and be real elections in which the popular forces can win.

[Question] But President Mubarak has said: No elections, no constitution, no amendment and no abolition of the suppression laws.

[Answer] Let him say what he wants. How long will he say it?

[Question] Perhaps throughout his presidency, whose duration we do not know.

[Answer] It is obvious that you are against him. Frankly, I am not.

[Question]. Why?

[Answer] Under his presidency, the national forces find a better opportunity to act and to move. The party's movement in Egypt is better under Mubarak's presidency than it was under al-Sadat's. With all the imposed restrictions, I am moving better and I will publish AL-AHALI.

[Question] Will it follow the same line it followed before?

[Answer] This is none of your concern. I will publish my paper and if the public doesn't like it, that's a different story.

[Question] What I mean is" Will AL-AHALI be published as an opposition paper?

[Answer] What else, a supporting paper? An opposition paper, of course.

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[Question] Will Mubarak permit opposition?

[Answer] It doesn't concern me whether he permits it or not.

[Question] Will you attack Camp David?

[Answer] Of course I will attack Camp David. Can a newspaper be issued without a sound line, meaning its own line? I cannot abandon my line and I have not given up by opposition to Camp David. But I am now reformulating my opposition in a manner compatible with the new situation. Today, if the Israeli forces withdraw and you talk to the Egyptian citizen about Camp David, he will not understand you. You must make him understand that what you oppose in Camp David are the restrictions stipulated in the treaty.

What Withdrawal?

[Question] Do you believe that the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai is a real withdrawal?

[Answer] This is an issue that I have already discussed but you want to wrench from me statements that do not serve the national movement. I am sorry.

[Question] This is not true and you are not the type from whom a statement is wrenched.

[Answer] The NPUG position, expressed in all the party's statements, is still against Camp David. But I am not against Egyptian territories being returned to Egypt, even if returned incompletely and at high cost.

[Question] With incomplete sovereignty and under U.S.-Israeli military control. Isn't that so?

[Answer] We understand this. But does your question mean that I should ask them to stay and not withdraw?

[Question] No, it means that you should not give the people the impression that there has been an evacuation and that Sinai has been liberated.

[Answer] No, an evacuation has actually taken place.

[Question] What evacuation is this?

[Answer] The people must struggle to expel the U.S. troops.

[Question] This means that the sovereignty is diminished?

[Answer] But we know that it is diminished.

[Question] Will you tell the people, for example in AL-AHALI when it is published, that the sovereignty is diminished?

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[Answer] We have been saying this repeatedly.

[Question] But it is said that you have supported Camp David and said that it is a fait accompli. Is this true?

[Answer] There is no such a thing as fait accompli and we have never said this.

[Question] Thank God.

[Answer] I am only sorry for the Egyptians living abroad. They don't know how to struggle and "they cling to a few words " We know that sovereignty over the Sinai is incomplete and the government knows, and knows perfectly well, that it is incomplete, they say: Let the Israelis get out "and then I will come and smash..." I want to build a strong and independent national rule in Egypt.

[Question] Is this possible under the current conditions?

[Answer] Yes, it is possible.

[Question] How, when all the state leaders are pro-Sadat?

[Answer] (Once again Khalid Muhyi al-Din gets emotional and says:) You are not politicians. You are not politicians. Go to your homes and we will struggle. We will struggle to build in Egypt a national rule that knows how to deal with the U.S. forces, with Israel and with the world. If national rule is not established, our cause will not succeed.

[Question] And if the regime does not permit you to struggle?

[Answer] Does struggle ask for a permit? Did al-Sadat permit us?

[Question] Then you will embark on a confrontation with the regime?

[Answer] You want to wrench from me the word confrontation!

[Question] This is not true. I only want to understand and you are not one from whom words are wrenched.

[Answer] I am not reassured by this interview of yours.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because I say and stress that Mubarak's situation is different from al-Sadat's situation and, therefore, I must deal with him differently. If I fail to do so, then I am no politician.

[Question] Mubarak has changed the situation from what it was in al-Sadat time only superficially.

[Answer] This is another issue. My opinion is...

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[Question] What I mean is that he is different from al-Sadat only in the veneer but the essence of the policy is the same.

[Answer] (Khalid answers with emotion:) You don't serve Egypt and you don't serve any movement. You only wish to say that Mubarak is al-Sadat, man!

[Question] Not at all. We want true democratic rule through which we can establish national rule. This undemocratic regime will not permit...

[Answer] I have said that we will struggle as we have already struggled. Struggle is not waged with a permit from the ruler.

What Are Your Goals?

[Question] Briefly, what are your goals in the current phase as a political party?

[Answer] Our present goal is to mend the Egyptian economy so that it can stand on its own feet and to establish an independent national government that is not part of the U.S. strategy. It is possible to realize this because the president of the republic has said it and I will hold him accountable accordingly. [We want] a strong national rule that stands on firm grounds and that can make Egypt play a national and pan-Arab role in the area and in the world. Consequently, I will overcome all the restrictions contained in the treaty and beat them with a...

[Question] Good. Do you consider yourself an opposition party now?

[Answer] I am an opposition party. A few days ago, President Mubarak said that the NPUG opposes all of the state's main policies but it is a national party.

[Question] Is this the new thing that you want to point out?

[Answer] What new thing?

[Question] New, meaning different from al-Sadat who did not recognize the opposition.

[Answer] Mubarak deals with us in a new way and we also deal with him in a new way, but he has not asked us to change our position.

[Question] A final question, why have you supported execution of the death sentence against al-Islambuli and his colleagues?

[Answer] I neither support nor oppose. It is not a task of a political party to interfere in a court sentence.

[Question] But this is a military court.

[Answer] But it is a judiciary system. Sentences have been issued for and against the NPUG. It is not the party's task to comment on judiciary sentences.

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If what is wanted is abolition of the military courts, these courts are a part of the country's law. Our party only demands abolition of the death sentence for political crimes. This is part of the party program. However, we do not consider assassination a political crime.

[Question] Political assassination?

[Answer] There is no such a thing as political assassination.

[Question] In the past, you participated in political assassinations.

[Answer] I was wrong and I admit that I was wrong. I am against solving political problems with assassination. Our party condemned al-Sadat's assassination. I respect the court ruling. I don't know what I would have done if I were in the position of the head of the state. This is why I have made no comment. I have neither supported nor opposed. These are court sentences.

[Question] But isn't blockage of all the legitimate outlets through which the people could defend themselves against the dangers of al-Sadat policy a justification for al-Sadat's assassination?

[Answer] When all the outlets are blocked, the people still have a means. Had the Islamic movement acted politically with the political opposition, it would have produced for Egypt results that would have been many times better than the results produced by the assassination. Had the Islamic movement met with the opposition political forces in a real front and had it struggled at a popular level, the meeting would have produced a lot greater effect than that produced by the 6 October bullets. Therefore, I don't believe that bullets change history. Political action is what changes history. If the religious movement replaced violence with organized political action and if it would meet with and open up to the political forces, the results for Egypt would be a lot better than resorting to violence and force.

[Question] But the Islamic forces...

[Answer] I support the view that the Islamic political current must find for itself the channels to express its thought and position because this current is a reality in the country.

[Question] Did you not join this current in entering the national front or coalition?

[Answer] Some of its figureheads did but the organized Islamic political movement is not with us. If the religious political forces would understand the value of political action, if they would understand that no current will impose its opinion on the other currents and if they would turn democratic and admit that their opinion is not necessarily the best opinion and that political action is carried out in the interest of all, then positive results would be achieved.

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[Question] This means that the Islamic organizations have referred to ally themselves with you?

[Answer] I cannot say that they have refused. They believe that Egypt can be saved in one way only, namely, by the rule of the Koran and the Islamic Shari'a, i.e., by the Koran and the Sunna, that anything else is infidelity and that their path to achieving this rule is through force. But they did meet with us on opposing Camp David and some manifestations of corruption. But full political cooperation is nonexistent. Had they cooperated and engaged with us in the political struggle against al-Sadat's policy, the picture would have been different from what it is today and they would not have had to resort to bullets.

This is why our party has condemned al-Sadat's assassination and why it respects the court sentences, without supporting or opposing.

I Am Not Mubarak's Messenger

[Question] As you know, Khalid al-Islambuli's father has been in detention since his son shot al-Sadat. You also know that he was not allowed to see his son for brief moments even at the hour of execution. How would you describe a regime that follows this inhuman and illegal path?

[Answer] I don't know. Why do you want to involve me in these issues? I want to know what it is that you want?

[Question] I want you to denounce the denial of a chance for a father to see his son prior to the son's execution. I even want you to denounce the arrest of al-Islambuli's father, who is being punished for what his son committed whereas the Egyptian and world constitutions and laws say that punishment is personal.

[Answer] This is not part of a political party's work. You can ask the human rights groups.

[Question] Can you mention some of your stands in opposition to President Mubarak's policy?

[Answer] We continue our opposition. An example is the Israeli book fair held last January. We urged the citizens to boycott the fair and distributed 5,000 copies of a party statement urging the boycott. When the Egyptian Government abstained from voting in the UN on the issue of Israel's annexation of the Golan, we issued a statement opposing that position. When President Mubarak announced that he would visit Israel but not Jerusalem, we asked him not to visit Israel and said to him: Your refusal to visit Jerusalem, is a positive act but it is better to refuse to visit Israel. On the issue of the border disagreement and the call for the formation of an arbitration committee, we said that these are sacred borders that no man has the right to concede and on which there can be no arbitration. The gist is that insofar as President Mubarak's regime is concerned, we oppose it in a new way and with a new approach dictated by the new circumstances. People cannot understand that things have changed in Egypt.

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[Question] They have changed in form only.

[Answer] What is wrong with form? Is it better or worse when the head of state meets an opposition party chairman and tells him: I have been compelled to take such and such a position?

[Question] Of course it is better than al-Sadat but perhaps the new formulation and approach in your position are within the framework of political support for the regime?

[Answer] What is it that you want? I am not pleased with this interview of yours. You want to exploit it and force words...

[Question] No. I only want to make sure that you are an actual opponent. People say that you have become a supporter of Mubarak.

[Answer] Let them say it.

[Question] And that he has sent you to a number of Arab capitals on political missions to be discussed with their politicians.

[Answer] He has not sent me and he cannot send me. I am not Mubarak's or anybody else's messenger. I have made a statement saying that I cannot represent Mubarak. I cannot represent him because I don't know what he wants. I told them my opinion of Mubarak. This is what I have said.

[Question] Again, has he sent you as his emissary to some Arab capitals?

[Answer] This has not happened. Even if he has, then what is wrong with this? I would have conveyed his viewpoint without taking the responsibility for it. Mubarak sends his own men. By the way, most of the Arab leaders, beginning with al-Qadhafi and ending with Hafiz al-Assad, are in contact with Mubarak.

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IRAQ

DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF PIPELINE SHUTDOWN ON SYRIA UNDERSCORED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 82 pp 56, 57

/Article: "Shutdown of the Baniyas and Tripoli Lines: Iraq Is Not the Only Injured Party"/

/Text/ What are the economic dimensions of the Syrian government's decision to shut down the two oil lines that transport Iraqi crude oil to the outlets of Baniyas in Syria and Tripoli in Lebanon?

Since shipping in the Shatt al-'Arab was suspended, Iraqi oil has been exported through three ports on the Mediterranean by three pipelines, passing over Turkish territory, Syrian territory to Baniyas and Syrian and Lebanese territory to Tripoli.

About 550,000 to 650,000 barrels are exported daily through the Turkish line. Before they were closed, the other two lines piped about 250,000 barrels a day. If they had been operating at their full capacity it would have been possible to export about 600,000 barrels a day through them. Thus Iraq would have managed to reach the level agreed upon at the latest OPEC meetings in Vienna on 19-20 March 1982, which was 1.2 million barrels a day.

In addition to the volume exported through the ports, Iraq, through the lines, provides Syria with its needs for light crude oil to operate the Hums refinery, and it provides Lebanon with all the crude oil necessary to operate the Tripoli refinery with the objective of supplying the local market with volumes of refined oil.

It is worth pointing out that Syria is an oil-producing country and is a member of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, but that its oil is heavy and low quality.

While it exports heavy crude oil, it imports light oil. Syria's most important heavy oil customer is France. The French oil companies' imports in 1981 came to about 1.2 billion French francs (about \$220 million in 1981 prices). France also imported \$120 million in refined petroleum products (from the Hums refinery). Iraq was the country exporting light oil to Syria.

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These are the data; let us look at the repercussions.

Syria's measure was aimed at striking out at the Iraqi economy in a period when it was bearing the burden of defending the basic national cause. However, Iraq is well known for its planning. The Ministry of Planning in Baghdad is one of the most important, capable and well endowed of ministries; therefore, one need not worry that this country can create alternate solutions.

The first available possibility is to increase exports via the Turkish line. In this manner it would be possible to increase the export volume from 600,000 barrels a day to 800,000.

The second possibility is to conduct oil barter between Iraq and its fraternal Gulf oil states, which are all standing alongside it. This bartering would be aimed at meeting Iraq's commitments to importing countries through quantities of Arab Gulf oil, provided that Iraq repay the bartered amounts when circumstances so permit.

The third possibility is the medium-range one. One aspect of that is that an additional line should be laid alongside the Turkish one. The other aspect is that a pipeline should be laid through Kuwait to the Red Sea coast and another one through Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi minister of petroleum, Mr Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, previously revealed these two plans to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI before the Syrian government declared its measures.

As a result of its government's decree, Syria will lose revenues from the transit of Iraqi oil over its territories; these are estimated at a quarter of a million dollars a day when the two lines are operating at full capacity. Likewise, Syria will lose the light crude oil that it received from Iraq on very suitable terms. The government would like to compensate for this light crude deficit through Iranian oil. The Syrian and Iraqi governments signed a barter agreement when a Syrian delegation headed by Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam recently visited Iran. This agreement stipulates that Syria is to be supplied with the crude oil it requires in exchange for various Syrian exports of a equal value. This need ranges from 140,000 to 160,000 barrels a day, or no more than 8 million tons a year.

Repercussions in Lebanon

One odd discrepancy is that the day the Syrian government announced the decision to shut down the Banyas and Tripoli oil lines, the Lebanese government submitted the draft of an urgent law to the Chamber of Deputies calling for ratification of the agreement it had reached with the Iraqi government on 16 November 1981. Perhaps it would be beneficial to present the verbatim text of the Lebanese official viewpoint as contained in the statement made on the justifications for the agreement:

"On 16 November 1981 an oil agreement was concluded in Baghdad between the government of the Republic of Iraq and the government of the Republic of Lebanon consisting of three appendices, a technical appendix and two exchanged letters

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related to the transmittal of Iraqi oil via the pipes of the oil facilities in Tripoli on Lebanese territory and the provision of Iraqi crude oil to Lebanon for purposes of domestic consumption.

"This agreement resumes the pumping of Iraqi oil to Lebanon and through it to the outer world through the outlet of the oil facilities in Tripoli following a suspension that has lasted about 6 years.

"This agreement will guarantee that the Tripoli refinery is continuously supplied with all its crude oil requirements at appropriate prices. It will guarantee Lebanon additional financial revenues as well as allowing Lebanon to continue to be a basic crude oil export center in the eastern area of the Mediterranean, with the consequent strengthening of its status that will result from that in various levels."

Lebanon will lose all these benefits "thanks to" the latest measures, as if they had not even been willing to let it raise its head a little to take a vigorous breath.

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IRAQ

HOUSING MINISTER COMMENTS ON RECENT PROJECTS, PROGRESS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 82 p 58

Article by Fawzi al-Bindari: "The Iraqi Housing Minister: The Repair Shop Is Active and These Are Our Projects"

Text The Iraqi minister of housing and redevelopment, Mr Muhammad Fadl Husayn, said that no adjustments have been made in the Iraqi development plan in the course of the war; if there have been adjustments, these have been aimed at accelerating some projects.

Minister Husayn replied to five questions from AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI during his recent visit to Rome:

Question What is the volume of housing and development in Iraq today?

Answer The construction, housing and development sector occupies special importance in the current development plans, in three important sectors, which are:

1. The sector of roads, bridges and civilian airports: In recent years, the initiative has been taken to carry out large projects in this area. Currently the expressway project that extends from the Kuwaiti border via Basrah, al-Nasiriyah and Baghdad, branching off to the Iraqi border with Jordan and the border with Syria, is under construction; this is 2,200 kilometers long and its cost is estimated at about \$3.3 billion. Work on it began more than 2 years ago. There are more than 50 bridges now under construction on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries. As regards airports, the Baghdad airport, which has been given the name Saddam Husayn International Airport, is on the verge of being finished while work on the Basra airport will be completed the next 2 years.

2. The building sector: This sector involves the construction of big government buildings such as universities, higher institutes, hospitals and ministry buildings. The construction work on these buildings is active and ongoing and is making progress, in view of their importance in the cultural, health and social fields.

3. As regards the housing sector, the ministry has carried out studies which took many years in which it estimated actual and future housing needs in Iraq. It pursued a policy of reliance on the private sector for the bulk of the

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construction of suitable dwellings for citizens. The government offers material assistance in the form of interest-free loans to be paid off in instalments over long periods of up to 25 years, while the competent government organizations are providing the buildings and services needed for the residential areas at government expense.

The final part of the plan is carried out in the cooperative sector and it enjoys great support from the government in the form of installations or loans to build housing complexes for its dependents in the industrial and oil sectors and the work the ministry's General Housing Organization is carrying out.

/Question/ Most countries in the world are suffering from a housing shortage today; does such a shortage exist in Iraq, especially in the light of the circumstances of the war that is going on?

/Answer/ Yes, but to the point where it does not constitute a shortage. There is a need for housing units at the present time. The revolution is most earnestly striving to cover these needs. The main obstacle is the lack of building materials, because the building materials factories do not have the capacity to cover all requests; also, the Iraqi manpower required for this sort of project does not exist. To counter these obstacles, the government proceeded to construct large cement and other building materials plants some years ago. The government is also seriously seeking to introduce modern technology with the objective of reducing the labor required, on the assumption that it will seek the aid of Arab workers to meet any deficit that occurs.

/Question/ Have you set out any plans for postwar redevelopment?

/Answer/ Once the war ends, immediate measures will be taken to make the necessary repairs in the border towns.

/Question/ You have met with a number of officials of the Italian government here in Rome. Do they have an understanding of the just nature of the Iraqi war?

/Answer/ The Italian officials have a good understanding of the Iraqi position. I have found a sincere desire on their part to have peace reign in this part of the world, in view of the effects this war is having on the international economy.

/Question/ What are the priorities of the 5-year development plan?

/Answer/ Priority is being given to developing the Iraqi economy, especially in the social, health and cultural fields and the transport and communications sectors, as well as to developing and exploiting natural resources in a balanced manner while providing the ingredients for defending the nation's soil and providing an adequate amount for these projects. Two large dams are now being built, the Mosul Dam on the Tigris River and the al-Hadithah Dam on the Euphrates. These two dams will help control water resources and regulate their use, as well as generating electric power. The cost of work on the two dams will come to \$12 billion.

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LIBYA

QADHDHAFI PRESENTS HIS VERSION OF GAFSA INCIDENT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 May 82 pp 52-53

[Statement by Mu'ammur Qadhdfafi to an unnamed Palestinian leader; date and place not specified]

[Text] Qadhdfafi has just confided something very strange to a Palestinian leader who was reproaching him for his changes in attitude toward Tunisia.

Palestinian: Colonel Qadhdfafi, you signed the agreement for a total and immediate merger with Bourguiba in Djerba on 12 January 1974 and then, by returning to Bourguiba the document signed on that date, you agreed 8 years later, on 23 February 1982, to waive your right to go through with that merger.

You armed and organized an expedition--this was the Gafsa incident in January 1980--to overthrow the Bourguiba regime. Two years later--in January and February 1982--you took the initiative of visiting Tunisia twice in 2 months and of concluding cooperation agreements.

Qadhdfafi: I signed the merger agreement with Tunisia in Djerba. But what you do not know--and what no one wants to believe--is that in Djerba, I was not the one who wanted an immediate merger. Bourguiba himself, Masmoudi, and all the Tunisians present, especially those who tried immediately after that to make Bourguiba change his mind, were much more enthusiastic and in a much greater hurry than I was. They persuaded me: it was not I who talked them into it.

As far as the so-called Gafsa incident is concerned, that has been wrongly blamed on us. It is true that the armed Tunisian commandos started out from our country, and the financing and weapons were supplied by Libyans. But our responsibility stops there, and I readily admit that our responsibility was seriously involved.

But it is unfair to say that we were the cause of that incident, because the instigator--the one who wanted it to happen and asked for my help--was Boumediene. He is dead, but his associates who organized the affair with us are very much alive. I am so furious that we are the only ones mentioned in

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connection with that incident that for the first time, I am going to give names and circumstances.

Boumediene went home from Tunis furious one day. That must have been in January 1978.¹ He had had an altercation with Hedi Nouira, who was prime minister at the time, and Abdallah Farhat, the minister of defense.

I think they had rejected his request that they condemn the intervention in the Sahara by French Jaguars² and that they also cancel the visit to Tunisia by the French chief of staff.³

Over the telephone, I felt that Boumediene was in a cold rage. His voice was trembling. What he wanted was to teach a lesson--to show that his will could not be resisted with impunity.

He told me: "I am sending you three trusted associates. Assign people of the same caliber to work with them in setting up an operation. Tunisia must be made to tremble and Nouira must be overthrown. I will take care of the political side of it, and we'll talk about it again."

It was Slimane Hoffmann, Dr Taleb Ibrahimi, and a third man whose name I have forgotten who came to see me on Boumediene's behalf. And I was wrong to agree to provide the supplies for the operation.

Dr Taleb Ibrahimi is the very man, I think, that the Algerian Government intends to send to Tunis as ambassador.

1. Boumediene's last visit to Tunisia took place on 15 and 16 January 1978, and it is true that it resulted in a very sharp exchange between Boumediene on the one hand and Nouira and Farhat on the other.
2. On 12 and 13 December, and again on 18 December 1977, Boumediene spoke of it as "carnage."
3. That would be Gen Guy Mery, French Armed Forces chief of staff at the time. He arrived in Tunis on Boumediene's heels--on 17 January 1978.

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LIBYA

WOMEN IN ARMY ACT AS QADHDHAFI'S BODYGUARDS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 May 82 pp 42, 44-46

[Article by Mohamed Selhami]

[Text] "One, two! One, two!" With their Kalashnikovs held tightly across their chests, they jogged up under the orders of a warrant officer. They were returning in a sweat from target practice, and on some of them the mascara was running. Makeup has its reasons that drill does not understand. I was told: "These are our shock commandos."

So there before me were those "Amazons" from among whom Qadhdhafi chooses his bodyguards! Soldiers like any others: good at marksmanship, agile, and unfailingly loyal to the guide of the revolution.

The impressive women's military academy is located on Omar-al-Mokhtar Avenue, Tripoli's most important thoroughfare. The ramparts were so thick and high that I had the feeling I was in a fortified castle. To enter, I naturally had to obtain ministerial authorization. It was on a Sunday morning in spring when I presented myself at the academy's huge gate. The sentinel, a woman soldier with weapons and a walkie-talkie, gave me a hard look, then peered at my identification card. "Okay, you can go in!" As I was starting my car, she put her mouth to the walkie-talkie. I was greeted by a lieutenant in the Libyan Army, about 1.75 meters tall and stout, with long hair over broad shoulders. On her head was a paratrooper's pink beret. She was wearing a khaki-colored uniform with no insignia to indicate her rank. Nothing but a medallion of Qadhdhafi pinned to her chest. Hayat made an effort to smile: "Are you the reporter brother who works in Paris?"

Chest forward, the lieutenant invited me to follow her, and we made an inspection of the premises under the curious and amused eyes of the residents. The hive was buzzing. Apparently, Hayat was the queen of these rather special bees. I began to daydream as I contemplated those graceful silhouettes. Was I really in Tripoli, where I had become accustomed to seeing only men? What a startling contrast! On my arrival at the airport the day before, I had refused to enter a taxi driven by an imposing Libyan man, a veritable colossus with a chilly smile.

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The "shock commandos" surrounded the mast from which the green flag of the Jamahariya was flying. They sang the national anthem, then dispersed. They were gone long enough to change uniforms, and then those same young women re-assembled under the direction of Lieutenant Hayat. They lined up in columns of two and answered roll call. Strict orders were given not to leave the academy: Colonel Qadhdhafi was going abroad, and some of them might be going along--as bodyguards.

Recruitment standards for those women are very strict. The maximum age is 25, and at least the third year of secondary education is required, but entrance to the academy is by competitive examination. And a real aptitude for sports is demanded.

The academy on Omar-al-Mokhtar Avenue currently houses about 50 residents. Military instruction covers all three branches (land, air, and sea). Qadhdhafi himself chooses his bodyguards, and he is not stingy with pay, which amounts to approximately 5,000 dinars per month (1 dinar = 20 French francs), plus hazardous duty pay and travel allowances.

Tourya, who is a graduate of the Omar-al-Mokhtar academy, has been assigned to the president's office for 3 years. On duty 24 hours a day, she watches over her leader like a hen guarding its chicks. "I don't dislike my job. It was my choice--a fanatical desire that came over me as I was reading the Green Book."

She agreed to meet me in a Tripoli restaurant, but arrived an hour late. It didn't matter. In Libya, as is known, time takes its own sweet time. Tourya had visibly been running. Out of breath, she managed a "Hi" that ended in a sigh. So there she was, the "Amazon" of the green revolution. All Tripoli admires her for her beauty, but above all, obviously, because she is Qadhdhafi's bodyguard. Her uniform fit her like a glove. Tall and brunette, she smiled. I greeted her with restraint: one has to be careful of rumors in Tripoli. And besides, flirting would be playing with fire, since the restaurant was swarming with people. I even noticed about a dozen soldiers.

The restaurant was pleasantly decorated: paneled walls, tables with sparkling white tablecloths, plates of discreet pink, and brass sparkling under the neon. The sea could be seen through the wide windows. The sun lit up the port, where many ships were flying foreign colors. About 50 freighters had been waiting for months to unload their cargo.

Tourya readily listened to what was said to her, but she said little about her activities as a bodyguard. She wore light makeup and a simple hairdo. She did not look her 25 years and in fact has neither the time nor the inclination to play mannequin.

She said: "For me, there is only God and Qadhdhafi."

She could not understand the amazement of her Algerian sisters when the colonel visited his counterpart and "brother," Chadli Bendjedid, in February. The newspaper EL-MOUDJAHID found the presence of those Amazons on a very official visit

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strange. A picture of her even appeared on the newspaper's front page. It was an event to give Algerian women something to chatter about.

But let us go back to October 1979. In that month, an international symposium on the Green Book was held in Benghazi. The participants--about 100 men and women--had come from all over the world to spend 3 days debating Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi's Third Theory. The problem of women occupied a large place in the debates. "We made you man and woman and then peoples and tribes so that you would know each other. The best among you in God's eyes is the one who is most devout." That verse from the Koran was at the heart of the discussions.

One woman attending the symposium claimed: "It wonderfully illustrates the equality of the sexes," and she went on: "This verse is addressed to men and women in general. The promised reward is splendid: the best among us is the one who is most devout, without distinction as to sex."

In other words, Qadhdhafi is not the "phallogocratic misogynist" that Westerners like to imagine. Tourya will not soon forget the symposium in Benghazi, which for her was a revelation. It was reported on television, which broadcast long excerpts from the debates in which a woman, Fahima al-Bittar--a Syro-Palestinian university graduate who had taken refuge in Libya--attracted special attention with these words in particular: "The Third Theory regards equality as a sacred principle. It respects woman's natural role and opens up to women the paths to emancipation."

Qadhdhafi, who presided over the session, was satisfied and warmly congratulated her. He said, "Ordinarily, those who speak present a misinterpretation of the theses in the Green Book."

The symposium was a triumph for the Libyan chief of state. It made him popular with a million Libyan women. So much so, in fact, that on more than one occasion, a number of them demonstrated their attachment to the guide by shouting slogans and applauding. But also by making commitments.

It should be remembered, incidentally, that military training in Libya is compulsory for women and men under 50 years of age. Those concerned register with the people's committees, which assign them to barracks where they learn how to handle weapons and also learn--if they do not know already--the principles of the famous Third Theory. Training lasts from 3 to 6 months, with a refresher course every year. The army general staff claims that the women are more studious than their male counterparts and adopt the Green Book's ideas more easily. Are they as efficient militarily? Unlike the men, many of whom took part in the campaign in Chad, Libyan women have never participated in a war. But it could happen. Qadhdhafi dreams of an army of men and women who can be mobilized in less than 24 hours. It is a major preoccupation with the chief of state to double his army's strength, which currently stands at 70,000. According to Tripoli, that is an excellent means of making the Jamahiriya "a great military power in Africa." Since Libya's population does not exceed 2 million--half men and half women--recruitment of the so-called weaker sex seems to be the solution. "I want an army as strong and disciplined as the one on the other side," confided Qadhdhafi to one of his associates as he stood in the Syrian

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section of Kuneitra facing Israel (on 24 August 1981). He had insisted on visiting the "martyr city" of the October War (1973), despite the reluctance of his host, Gen Hafiz al-Assad. The Syrian chief of state told him repeatedly: "I cannot be responsible for your safety or that of your bodyguards." Surrounded by his women, Qadhafi chose danger. And danger is indeed what seems to go the heads of the Libyan women. Aware then of their importance, they lifted their heads.

When Tourya proudly entered the restaurant beside the sea with her boots banging on the tile floor, the customers who were chatting while listening to a cassette by Oum Kalthoum became quiet. Why should she care, now that she is a soldier? The time of oppression is finished! Patriarchal power is finished! Long live Qadhafi!

Fouzia, another Libyan woman, did her best to prove to me that the type of society wanted by the chief of state is the best possible. Fouzia is also an "Amazon," but her weapon is a ballpoint pen, not a Kalashnikov. She is editor in chief of the weekly JAMAHARIYA and also secretary of the "revolutionary press," and Qadhafi himself suggests ideas for articles to her. Every time the president travels, she goes along. Talking to me in the Hilton Hotel in Tunis during Qadhafi's most recent official visit, she told me: "Many people are mistaken. Libya is presented as a militarized country, and that is false." When I expressed surprise at seeing so many armed people--especially women--on Tripoli's streets, Fouzia lost her temper.

"You think like a European!" And I was subjected to a long speech on the equality of sexes in the Jamahiriya as well as on the pacifism of all those armed women.

On Tuesday 23 February, I was at the Sfaxa Hotel in Monastir, still in Tunisia. Along with others, an "Amazon" with her finger on the trigger of her submachinegun was guarding the leader's apartment. Everyone was all keyed up. The trip from Tripoli by road had been fatiguing for Qadhafi and his party. And especially for the bodyguards, who had had to stay permanently alert to prevent any incident.

The colonel was in his room. Carrying my suitcase, I was heading for my room in the semidarkness and silence of the corridor when a sentry's challenge gave me a start: "Halt!" And I admit that for a brief second, I was afraid. Can one ever be sure with these women? Everyone fears them. Including the ministers!

The barrel of the submachinegun was still pointed in my direction when another bodyguard stepped behind me. I tried to explain why I was there. It was wasted effort. Before continuing peaceably to my room, I had to wait until a Libyan colleague passed by on his way to his own room. "Thank you, sisters," I said in a loud voice. "Sh!" said the woman with the submachinegun, "The 'kaid' (chief) is sleeping." And both of them stayed on duty there until daylight. When do they sleep? And when do they eat?

I was told the next day: "They eat by turns. Among themselves. Never with the other members of the delegation." But it also happens that sometimes they

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are invited to share a meal with Qadhdhafi. What stimulation then! And what joy!

At the Convention Hall in Tunis during the meeting with students (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1105), when Tunisian television cameras kept showing closeup shots of them, they were almost as big a hit as Qadhdhafi.

And at the palace in Carthage, where they guarded the door to the White Room while the Libyan chief of state was talking with his Tunisian counterpart, Mrs Bourguiba was filled with admiration for those remarkable vestal virgins. The president's wife asked them to pose for pictures with her. They hesitated for only a brief second. And then one could suddenly see that they also knew how to smile! Mrs Bourguiba tamed them with small pats on the cheek and little taps on the shoulder. I was very careful not to imitate her. One can never be too cautious.

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LIBYA

OIL REVENUE DECLINE CALLS FOR NEW TREND IN TRADE POLICY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 905

[Text] For some time now, British exporters have been concerned over their increasing difficulties in getting paid for their exports to Libya. Ship-owners and freight handlers report that it is taking them more and more time to get through the administrative formalities in Libyan ports and, more particularly, in Benghazi where, they say, the situation is becoming worse every day. They feel that the only explanation for the slow pace at which the administrative services inspect merchandise and documents is that they are deliberately trying to delay paying for the imports. This is because of the decline in oil revenues. The decisions adopted recently by OPEC and the ensuing price war indicate that one should not expect a reversal of this trend in the near future. In fact, Libya's production of crude oil dropped by 900,000 barrels a day in 1981. This last February it pumped some 600,000 barrels a day, while the ceiling which OPEC set for that country in Vienna is 750,000 barrels a day.

In its monthly bulletin of February-March 1982, the French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce* voices the same concern in view of a recent freeze on payments of import licenses affecting all the suppliers of the Jamahiriya and operating at three levels: at the fiscal administration level (for the release of fiscal quietus receipts), at the level of the Central Bank (which systematically refuses to authorize transfers at amounts even below 500,000 dinars; 1 Libyan dinar is approximately equivalent to 20.5 French francs) and at the level of the bank involved. The French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce ascribes the freeze to the fact that Libyan authorities want to take stock of their imports in terms of goods and money and, based on the results, they want to establish their priorities. Therefore, it is expected that they will soon adopt a policy of austerity which could result in some contracts being canceled or deferred and in Libyan accounts probably being subjected to a rapid auditing.

This financial freeze, the French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce adds, accompanied by the appointment of new officials at all levels as a result of the

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elections to the general People's Congress, reflects the deterioration of the Libyan economy in the second half of 1981.

The trend of Libya's policy is to cut back on imports and contracts concluded with foreign companies and to seek ways of settling its accounts either with payments in the form of crude oil or by other means, such as allocating contracts to companies from countries which purchase oil or giving preferential treatment to countries which grant loans to Libya.

France can hardly increase its purchases of Libyan oil because it has already signed long-term contracts with other countries, because its domestic consumption has sharply declined in the last 2 years (dropping by around 30 percent) and, finally, because its reserves exceed demand.

The French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce goes on to point out that, on the one hand, the Jamahiriya is very firmly determined to turn to other forms of payment which will require its partners to be much more flexible than previously and will involve oil purchases or credit agreements and that, on the other hand, it is going to establish a more strenuous competition between the various countries operating in the Libyan market and eliminate those which do not accept the above-mentioned payment facilities. The French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce continues: "Two sets of measures must be seen as very serious warning signs: 1) a nonmandatory request issued to Libyan agencies by the authorities which supervise them to produce specific technical proof if they want to acquire goods, supplies or services from France during this first part of the year; 2) a request issued to some French companies to postpone their shipments, a measure which will undoubtedly be accompanied by a real and general freeze of payments."

"Over the last few years," the French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce concludes, "French-Libyan exchanges involving consumer goods, equipment goods and technology have increased sharply. It would be very unfortunate if all the accumulated efforts of the French companies were to be lost and France supplanted by other countries."

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TUNISIA

NOUREDDINE BOUARROUJ DISCUSSES COMMUNIST PARTY STATUS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 263, 12 Apr 82 pp 18-20

[Interview with Nouredine Bouarrouj, member of the Political Bureau of the Tunisian Communist Party--7th Congress, by Hedi Dhoukar; date and place not specified: "Legalization: A Fool's Bargain"]

[Text] On 21 March, the Tunisian Communist Party [PCT] held a meeting at the Mutual Benefit Society on the 26th anniversary of Tunisia's independence. Without doubt, the arbitrary ban imposed on that party in 1963 prevented its normal development within society and the maturing of its views through contact with the masses. The ban was also undoubtedly a basic factor that, 20 years later, has operated in such a way that the party's return to legality is occurring under equally abnormal conditions--under various pressures that cannot help but affect the cohesion of the party's ranks and its credibility among the working class and in the popular perception. It is for that reason--and also because we are impelled by our concern to clarify a debate distorted by official organs, whether they belong to Destour or its opposition--that we have asked Nouredine Bouarrouj, PCT--7th Congress leader, to set out for us in an interview his ideas about and analysis of the communist party's situation in the present context of the "democratic opening up of the political spectrum."

[Question] In your opinion, the PCT has become hostage to the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and the liberal coalition. On what do you base this judgment?

[Answer] I continue to think that by recognizing the PCT and making political room for the liberal opposition, the Destourian Party has unfortunately succeeded in imposing on them the thankless task of countering the left-wing opposition on all issues. By dint of wanting at all costs this phoney opening up of the regime, the PCT finds itself naturally led to use methods that start with intolerance in the face of argument and silence concerning the existence of other communist opinions and end with adopting the ways of the Destour itself--that is to say, resorting to brute force, as was the case when I was violently expelled, along with my comrades, from the meeting.

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[Question] Nevertheless, during the meeting Mohamed Ennaffaa brought up the case of the imprisoned Islamists whose release he called for, and he emphasized that there exists another opposition--aside from the MUP [Popular Unity Movement], the PCT and the MDS (Movement of Socialist Democrats, led by Ahmed Mestiri)--even though he did not identify it.

[Answer] Among the liberals and Mohamed Ennaffaa, the demands for the release of the Islamists have become merely a standard piece of discourse, repetitive and ritualistic which has never led to the slightest concrete action on their behalf, whether in the form of a meeting, demonstration, petition or any slightest real step. This attitude is all the more hypocritical since the PCT's current leaders are well aware that the mass arrests of Islamists began the very day of the party's legalization.

One cannot help observing, moreover, the similarity of the contradictory stand of Mohamed Ennaffaa and his liberal friends with that of the government. They have never been embarrassed about pretending to talk about democracy while being silent concerning the events that, about a week before Ennaffaa's coming to Paris, took place in the village of Bkalta. The village was cut off by government forces, and persistent rumors reported several wounded and even dead among the population, which was said to be opposed to the expulsion of a mosque's imam.

With regard to opposition movements, Mohamed Ennaffaa also categorizes them the same way as does the government, and he takes into consideration only the authorized movements such as the MDS and the MUP II (Popular Unity Movement, led by Mohamed Belhadj Amor). When he refers to the others, he maintains an aloofness so as not to be associated with them.

As for the communist party specifically, its present leadership, which is opportunistic, has decided to ignore the existence of a split, however official and widely known it is in Tunisian political circles. This is because that leadership, following the example of the Destour, feels that Tunisian communism must have only a single representative in the country and that all those who have been expelled from the party have nothing left except the duty to remain silent. In this regard, the Destour, which has eliminated several of its members in successive actions, has provided the example for this type of intolerance. Furthermore, the opportunistic leadership of the PCT seems to be legitimizing, as it were, its ignoring of a communist opposition by the fact that the government, which does not agree to freedom of organization, has given that leadership exclusive rights to recognition.

[Question] Is that a reason for speaking of the current secretary general, Mohamed Harmel, in one of your texts as a creature of the PSD and the liberals and for denying the present leadership of the PCT any legitimacy?

[Answer] You will not find that term "creature" in the words we have used for the simple reason that it does not fit the situation. Mohamed Harmel is more the beneficiary of a choice that before becoming the PSD's was that of the MDS liberals prior to their formation into a political movement.

Contacts and talks with the MDS--this is an acknowledged fact--fell exclusively to Comrade Harmel, who was himself chosen as a valid negotiating representative by Ahmed Mestiri and his MDS friends. Other newspapers carried on from the liberals by granting the privilege of an interview to Harmel alone, though at a time when Mohamed Enafaa was still the first secretary of the party. Later, with the appearance of the liberal papers EL-RAI, DEMOCRATIE and LE MAGHREB, Harmel really did take first place in the eyes of a public opinion that was not very well-informed about the PCT's internal profile. And, when the party decided to submit a request for authorization request of a newspaper, it was done by Harmel in his own name.

This marked preference of the government's for Harmel as an individual--Harmel has, it is true, put his energies into saying reassuring things in favor of the system of government, and particularly the presidential system--took concrete form with the authorization to publish a newspaper and, after that, with the lifting of the ban on the party, announced to Mohamed Harmel at the time of an audience that President Bourguiba granted him.

During this period, the liberal press, for a start, put up trial balloons on the rise of Harmel to the position of secretary general of the party. Ennafaa's name was permanently overshadowed. Finally, it was during a press conference that party activists learned that an 8th Party Congress had been held of which the order of the secretaries had been reversed.

[Question] Is that not a reference to a national party conference held in 1980?

[Answer] The national conference question was a proposal we had made in 1977, along with a certain number of comrades, with a view to trying to find a solution to the crisis in which the party found itself as a result of its proliberal tag-a-ong tendency. The conference was to give rise, in theory, to a debate that would have made it possible to find a minimum platform common to all communists. It would have averted the split, which was already emerging, following the repeated power plays against several figures of the expanded Central Committee and the Political Bureau opposed to the proliberal orientation.

Unfortunately, the stubbornness of Harmel and his friends accentuated the harmful aspects of that orientation, leading the party to adopt positions that we had already found very distressing since they labeled as anarchists the young and innocent victims who were trapped by the Destourian militiamen and fell under the army's bullets.

This stance worsened further when the party, at the time the men of the Gafsa commando group were arrested and before there was any trial, called them "mercenaries," as the Destour press was writing. That press was attempting to lay the groundwork for their death sentence.

This stubbornness of Harmel's in leading the party into the fold of the liberals and into consensus with the government definitively wrecked the unitary national conference in which we were meant to participate. The one to which Harmel is referring at present is only a conference, which first

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established the split within the party and which expelled all those who did not follow this proliberal course, including several incumbent members of the expanded Central Committee and Political Bureau.

All things considered, this conference, as important as it was, did not have the prerogatives of a congress, as things stand. How was this conference turned into a congress? There is the real problem, and it remains unresolved. I suppose, for my part, that Harmel, uncertain about his policy and about its adoption by the party, tried to avoid holding a congress, although tradition requires that when a communist party comes out of a period of being underground, it sets itself as a first objective the holding of a regular congress.

The ambiguity maintained in this matter evades the statutory problems, and it sanctions, outside of any rules and outside of a congress, the elimination of several members of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau elected by the 7th Congress.

[Question] Certain communists, who are not all following the line, seem to feel that there is no other answer for the PCT than to ensure its legal existence in order to hope to one day play a more effective role in politics.

[Answer] It is true that certain activists think that legal status, in view of the means it can put at the party's disposal, might initially justify an attitude of flexibility, while waiting for new conditions to be met before asserting firmer opposition stands vis-a-vis the government. That is the view that motivates many activists who have rejoined the party, even if they continue to have great reservations concerning its current line. On the basis of the party's historical experience, however, we should reject in advance the fool's bargain that lies in renouncing our actual political objectives for a course of compromises and self-censorship just to preserve legal status at any price. In fact, during the colonial period, legal status--instead of helping the party to take root as it had thought it would perhaps be able to do--made the party marginal in relation to the masses and the anti-imperialist movement that was stirring. It is that experience that we do not want to repeat.

Moreover, recent events show how harmful formal legality is, because the party, from the start of its legalization, has chosen to retreat instead of affirm its positions of principle. This has led the party to be a mere pretext--supposed evidence of nonexistent pluralism--that the government has made sure to exploit to its advantage. From renunciation to compromise, the party, instead of establishing itself, could not help but lose its credibility and become an objective ally of the government and its liberal allies.

[Question] You seem to accuse the liberals in particular by implicating them in the entire recent evolution of the situation in the country. On what do you base such a judgment?

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[Answer] In the first place, I am thinking of the responsibility that devolved on them in the elimination of the progressive orientation of the 1960's, whatever its errors and inadequacies in other respects. I think that it is liberal pressures, combined with those of the multinationals, that were the origin of the 1969 power play and the adoption of the capitalist orientation that has plunged the country into an economic, social and political crisis the consequences of which were the bloody days of January 1978 and the January 1980 tragedy at Gafsa.

[Question] In his speech at the Mutual Benefit Society, Mohamed Ennafaa pointed clearly to the "new bourgeoisie" as the principal enemy, while declaring that his party was not against the private sector. Do you agree with that strategy?

[Answer] At the start of independence, a watchword was accepted in the party: advance the struggle against the "system of government's newly privileged persons," which included an economic and a political condemnation. For communists and other left-wing patriots, this watchword had an essentially anticolonial meaning: it referred to newly privileged persons in connection with colonialization's men and their collaborators. One must emphasize in this regard that, as in any revolution, when the privileges of the old traditional classes are threatened, those classes pretend to put the people on their guard against the greed for riches and power of the new upstarts.

Experience shows, however, that new and old upstarts are in complete solidarity when one raises the fundamental issue concerning their economic privileges.

It is for that reason that Hedi Nour--a classic representative example of the upstart bourgeoisie that grew a little rich before independence and very rich afterwards--and Ahmed Mestiri--who, beyond his personal fortune, which may well be modest, is still a spokesman for the traditional bourgeoisie which has switched over to the modern sectors--have presented only one solitary liberal economic program.

So, to introduce a distinction as Ennafaa does, is to seek, consciously or unconsciously, to justify the alliance with the MDS which is itself allegedly the representative of a less dangerous bourgeoisie.

Nowadays, it has definitely become necessary to nationalize entire sections of the private sector if we want to embark on a policy of genuine development. We are thinking in particular of the banking sector and of insurance. Without their being really taken over by the State, no serious prospect for development is possible. The problem of the private sector is all the more serious today because it is linked to foreign policy choices that deliberately fit in with a pro-American and pro-Western orientation and are reflected, on the Arab world level, by the building of a Tunis-Riyadh-Rabat axis directly involved in American strategy in the region.

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TUNISIA

COMMANDO OPERATIONS PLOTTED IN LIBYA FOILED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1110, 14 Apr 82 p 30

[Article by Suhayr Belhassen: "Bad Remake"]

[Text] Was there almost a repetition of the unfortunate "Gafsa affair" after a 2-year interval? We recall that on 27 January 1980 a commando group from Libya made up of opponents of the Bourguiba regime attacked a mining town in the south of Tunisia to try to undermine the government.

During the night of 21-22 March 1982, another commando group of six young Tunisians carrying arms and explosives was arrested after entering Tunisia through the mountainous Kasserine region on the Algerian-Tunisian border: the same type of commando's, the same itinerary, the same objective.

This time it was a Bedouin woman who gave the alarm. At dawn on 22 March, she left her hut to attend to her business. On the usually deserted heights she saw men coming out of an abandoned hovel in the distance. Intrigued, she informed her father. He notified the National Guard, which soon intercepted the commandoes and sent them to Tunis. End of operation. It remained to be discovered how it was organized. It didn't take the Tunisian authorities long to find out.

Six unemployed young Tunisians had emigrated to Libya in search of work. They soon realized that Qadhdhafi's country hadn't much to offer them outside of the military training camps set up to train an Islamic Legion made up of immigrants and Arabs opposed to existing regimes. They learn to use weapons in Libya with the Palestinian resistance, or in the ranks of the Polisario, before being recruited by Amara Dhaou Ben Nail. Condemned to death in absentia at the time of the Gafsa commando trail, this 57-year-old Tunisian opponent of the existing regime took refuge in Tripoli, where he directs the Progressive Front for the Liberation of Tunisia (FPLT), also called the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Tunisia (MRLT).

But a lot has changed since Gafsa, both in Tunisia and in Libya. After Qadhdhafi's visit to Tunis on 23 February, the FPLT may have thought it could not longer count on Libya's support. Did Dhaou decide to stake everything on a last effort before things turned against him? He was the

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one who made the contacts with the main participants in the "Gafsa affair," and he knows how to get arms into Tunisia from Libya through Algeria. He has had plenty of weapons since Gafsa, as well as money and men. This undoubtedly explains the fact that several operations resembling the Gafsa one have been hatched in Tripoli. Bad habits acquired in the secret service--which usually has a lot of freedom of action--are not easily lost. At any rate, starting on 13 March, two Tunisians with special access to Qadhdhafi--Abderrahman Tlili (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1107) and the governor of Tunis, M'Hedeb Rouissi--were sent to see the Libyan leader. The latter disclaims all knowledge of the operation.... The Libyan secretary of foreign affairs, Abdelati Obeidi, upon being received by [Tunisian] Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, said the same thing as his head of state. So what happened? At the time of the "Gafsa affair," Algerian complicity was proven. The commandoes arrested on 22 March probably followed the same route used on 27 January 1980. Depressions in the Kasserine Mountains offer easier points of entry than the Tunisian-Libyan border, which the Gafsa commandoes had already judged impractical.

But why, people in Tunis are wondering, is Algerian territory so penetrable?

On the morning of 23 March, Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Beji Caid es-Sebsi asked the Algerian ambassador to call on him. On 24 March, in Algiers, the head of the Tunisian diplomatic corps discussed the affair with President Chadli, who also expressed surprise.

One thing seems certain, in any event: the Tunisian secret service was not completely caught short by this affair; they knew that terrorists pass through Algeria. This is why surveillance has been reinforced at key points along the Tunisian-Algerian border.

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