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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 776



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ROLE OF FRENCH SPIES IN AFRICA REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Apr 82 pp 22-25

[Article by Francois Soudan: "French Spies in Africa"]

[Text] To some extent, every secret service has its own specialty, its own "game preserve": Latin America for the CIA, the Middle East for the British Intelligence Service and Africa for the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service], or rather, the DGSE, the General Foreign Security Directorate, as Francois Mitterrand's services were renamed on 4 April. The identification of French intelligence with the continent is so complete that the invisible hand of the honorable correspondents of Paris has been imagined behind every plot and coup d'etat that has happened in Africa in the past 22 years. "There are several hundred businessmen, big shots in cooperation (lodged in the African ministries), military men and agents fairly well known to the SDECE who have had African nationalism under surveillance since 1960. Their trade, if I can call it that, their role, is to keep Black Africa in the neocolonial fold," Bechir Ben Yahmed wrote six months ago (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1092). Consequently, the actors in this neocolonial lobby play complementary, perfectly coordinated parts. When a spoilsport, whether it be a newspaper -- and we know what we are talking about -- or a president, tries to mix up the play, then the players get their backs up.

For the past year, Francois Mitterrand has had this bitter experience, whose main stages we outline here. There can be no doubt that this dossier, the dossier of the "betrayal" of his services in Africa, will figure prominently among those he takes with him on his first presidential trip to Africa from 20 to 25 May.

What goes on in the head of an agent when a regime passes or a presidency changes hands is a state secret. This is undoubtedly why, in the tiny community of spies, secret police and other fairly honorable correspondents, there has been as much talk since the election of Francois Mitterrand a year ago as at the entry to General Headquarters. This does not mean -- quite the contrary -- that the most famous of them, at the Tourelles Barracks (General

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Headquarters, at the corner of Boulevard Mortier and the Rue des Tourelles, of the SDECE, newly named the General Foreign Security Directorate since the beginning of April), does not close each evening on a day replete with rumors and corridor conspiracies.

Privileged Disagreement

At the center of all the gossip, today and every time the French services have been in a crisis in the past 20 years, is Africa, the private reserve and place of privileged disagreement. Or more precisely, of the strange side-slipping, manipulations and other diversions in which, in the shadow of their African branches, the agents convinced that a socialist government in Paris represents the absolute evil were engaged. A fake coup d'etat in N'Djamena, a musical comedy putsch in Bangui, the "Patasse affair," the succession of Houphouet, French-Gabonese tension: "We are misinformed," is the Elysee's caustic remark to the Ministry of Cooperation. "They don't trust us anymore," is the unanimous sigh of the 2,500 civil servants at Tourelles. Is it a premeditated betrayal or a mere ritualistic crisis of adaptation? One thing is practically certain: For the first time in 24 years of the Fifth Republic, a French government is facing a situation comparable to the one that existed between the White House and the CIA under Carter: divorce.

Everything began on a day in June 1981, with the arrival of Pierre Marion at the headquarters of what was still called the SDECE (Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service). He was immediately viewed with suspicion. During the month of transition following the departure of his predecessor, Alexandre de Marenches, embarrassing documents were feverishly shredded, compromising dossiers stuffed into incinerators and truckloads of memorandums shifted around behind the walls of the barracks. The SDECE did not vote for Mitterrand, to say the least. There will be a witch hunt, the rumor went, and already, the black lists of the new team were formulated in everyone's minds. Furthermore, Pierre Marion's look was disturbing. The Service had finally grown used to the whims, the cigar and gourmet figure of Alexandre de Marenches, Pompidou's Porthos, that touchy taskmaster responsible for several massive purges: a total of 915 agents dismissed or driven out during his 11 years in power. And now the "Pool" would be headed by an old Mendes-France follower, a Marseillais and graduate of the Polytechnical School with the look of a piano mover who had become a leftist Gaullist before shifting to the movement of Francois Mitterrand. In short, for the "Giscardized" agents of the SDECE -- by far the majority -- he was the worst possible type of director, an ideologist who would lop off heads, given responsibility for cleaning out the stables.

Socialist-Gaullists

When the silhouettes of his "technical advisers" appeared in his wake, panic ensued: From university officer Pierre Dabezies to Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti (Alexandre's brother), from Colonel Passy to Fernand Wibaux (formerly ambassador to Senegal and formerly chief of staff of Gaston Defferre), all are "socialist Gaullists" to some extent. In other words, the enemy.

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African Section

Nor did it take long. Under the baton of gendarmerie officer Michel Roussin, formerly staff director for Alexandre de Marenches, and Col Jean-Albert Singland, formerly head of counterespionage, it was a veritable game of musical chairs: Some 40 loyal servants of the previous director, such as Rene Dalmas, Jean Bontoux, Yves Beccuau (psychotechnical adviser) or Gen Rene Crignola (head of the Information Service branch in the Research Directorate), disappear from the new setup, while Col Georges Grillot, who was a close aide to General Bigeard during the Algerian war, and Gen Jacques Sylla Fouilland, an "intellectual" much criticized within the SDECE, were kept on or promoted, against all expectations. The former went to the head of the famous Action Service and the latter became the No. 2 man at Tourelles.

This atmosphere of purges -- limited purges, it is true, but which Pierre Marion, manifestly surprised by his appointment, mistakenly left to deputies sometimes anxious to settle their accounts -- joined with the profoundly anti-socialist feelings of many agents, would bring about a rapid deterioration in the quality of the information supplied, to such a point that Marion was forced to have reported submitted to him systematically verified by competing services. Even more serious was that after the banishment of General Crignola, who maintained privileged relations with the Moroccan DGED [Directorate General of Studies and Documentation], the Egyptian Moukhabarat and the South African NIS [expansion unknown], the entire African section of the SDECE went over to the active opposition, with the militant complicity of a neo-colonial lobby that ranges from the Chadian and Central African cotton industry to the Gabonese oilmen.

"Gabonese Clan"

The first serious symptom of this "mutiny" came precisely from Libreville. From Maurice Robert, French ambassador being dismissed and former aide to Crignola, to Colonel Daniel (ELF-Gabon [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France]), and including General Martin and Colonel Marion (officers in the presidential guard), Andre Casimir and Lieutenant Colonel Casterane (security services) or even Jorge Jardim (former potentate of the Portuguese settlers in Mozambique, who became head of Interbanque) and Paul Bory (owner of the Multipresse-Gabon publishing house), what at Tourelles is commonly called the "Gabonese clan" would orchestrate a veritable antisocialist campaign with Libreville authorities. From June to October 1981, until the arrival of the replacement for Ambassador Maurice Robert, Robert Cantoni, they would try to persuade President Bongo that Mitterrand wanted to "drop him," while stepping up the calculated rumors and articles in the slick periodicals (such as the major interview with Maurice Robert published in PARIS-MATCH). Nor were they totally unsuccessful because, in order to reassure a worried Omar Bongo, Elysee adviser for African affairs Guy Penne would have to make more trips to Libreville (see the article by Siradiou Diallo in JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1090).

There was some nervousness in Paris and Marion met with Francois de Grossouvre (adviser to Mitterrand for information affairs) and Minister of Defense Charles Hernu several times. The subject of their discussions: The American CIA was

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reportedly at the root of this strategy of tension. At the end of August, two of Marion's aides went to Langley (Virginia) to the headquarters of the CIA and returned half convinced by the virtuous denials of William Casey's deputies.

It was in Bangui on 1 September, when General Kolingba ousted David Dacko, that the second act of the divorce was played. The coup never actually was one; this can now be stated with certainty. With the consent of President Mobutu of Zaire and President Bongo of Gabon, David Dacko, who was increasingly criticized in Paris -- where he was labeled the "awkward legacy of the Giscardian era" -- and who was convinced that the "return" of Ange Patasse had to be avoided at all costs, turned over the reins to Andre Kolingba. "I entrusted him with a mission," the former president now hints: "Restoring order and cleaning out the 'Patassists'."

Local SDECE officials (Colonel Dulaurence and Major Mansion) were undoubtedly aware that something was afoot. Did they "forget" to inform Paris? The transfer of power from Dacko to Kolingba took place at 2000 hours in the evening on 30 August, at Camp Roux.

"Counterforce"

The Elysee would not be informed until the following day at 0830 hours and the French ambassador to Bangui was not told, through Dacko's personal physician, a young Frenchman, until two hours later, at 1030 hours. There was general amazement at the Tourelles General Headquarters. Marion, that unflappable polyglot with the impeccable manners, exploded, especially since he had just learned that the American Embassy in Bangui was very active in the weeks preceding the "coup" and that it had to be involved in what happened. He wanted to take aggressive action but his assistant, Gen Sylla Fouillard, Francois de Grossouvre and Louis Sanmarco (a friend of Gaston Defferre who was at one time governor of Ubangi-Chari), advised caution. If they wanted to scotch the SDECE for Africa, they would have to have a replacement system, as De Gaulle had done at the beginning of the 1960's, in reviving the Foccart networks. The idea of a "counterforce" was born. It was said to have the backing of Francois Mitterrand. A discreet work group immediately set to work at informal but regular meetings between the Elysee and the Ministry of Defense, setting up the "Grossouvre networks."

Forcing Paris To Intervene in Chad

Wednesday, 28 October: Act 3. The imagined coup d'etat in N'Djamena. A week after the "Cancun appeal" of Francois Mitterrand evoking the "urgent need" to send an inter-African force to Chad -- it was, in fact, a matter of protecting President Goukouni from the vacuum created by the imminent departure of the Libyan contingent -- an AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE dispatch citing "witnesses coming from the Chadian capital" announced a pro-Qadhafi coup in N'Djamena and the disappearance of Goukouni. On 29 October, several Parisian dailies featured the coup in their headlines. However, as we would learn several hours later, there never was a coup d'etat, not even an attempted one. French authorities, feverish, to say the least, immediately spoke of manipulation, deception and misinformation and promised an investigation. The purpose of the maneuver,

it was stated, was to force Paris to intervene directly in Chad once again. Possibly. The fact remains that six months later, the promised investigation into this strange dispatch has not yet yielded tangible results. The name of an AFP newsman close to the Gaullist opposition and certain military circles was discreetly mentioned, but nothing irrefutable supported the possibility that he was actually at the root of the deception.

Whatever the reasons and motives for that October manipulation -- and they must still be clarified -- it is obvious that the atmosphere within the French services is not the better for them; on the contrary. For the first time, in fact, the officers at the Operations Center of Military Information, the Second Bureau, were directly suspected by the government. And, since the SDECE "mutiny," it was on this second pillar of French information that responsibility for the collection of information rested. Gaullists for the most part, these officers had previously been very careful not to join up with the SDECE "Giscardians." However, outraged at having been accused of disloyalty, the most politicized among them would also topple.

November 1981: The work group of six officials made responsible, two months previously, for working out on paper a new system of information directly under the Elysee filed its first conclusions. It categorically recommended against the use of benevolent militants such as leftist technical assistants or members of nongovernmental organizations: no French-type Peace Corps. On the other hand, it did emphasize the importance of Masonic-type solidarities previously neglected. In Africa, men such as David Dacko or Omar Bongo are Free Masons and Guy Penne, the Elysee African specialist, is also. The work group therefore attached to its report a complete list of African presidents, ministers and high officials who are Free Masons: all potential "collaborators," it states. A rapidly operational system still has to be set up.

Reviving Foccart Systems

The conclusions of the officials on this subject are surprising, to say the least: nothing other than reviving the old Foccart system. Naturally, one would not use the most dubious secret police, those most highly marked and the least reliable politically, but only those who "loyally" did their work and that can be classified in the leftist Gaullist movement. Prominent persons such as Roger Barberot, former ambassador to the Central African Republic, or Dominique Ponchardier, formerly head of the services of order of General de Gaulle and now head of the French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CFDT) -- a joint public and private company -- could also provide useful advice. The anti-Giscardianism of these men, whom De Marenches had cast aside, in a sense, and many of whom had turned to managing hotels and night clubs from Abidjan to Libreville, would be a pledge -- at least temporary -- of their loyalty. It would be a risky choice, without a doubt, but unfortunately, there was no other.

However, at the beginning of March 1982, a fourth "affair," once again in the Central African Republic, would point up the inanity of such a solution and demonstrate to what extent the divorce between Paris and its African services is total. On the night of Wednesday, 3 March, a group of rebel officers tried

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unsuccessfully in Bangui to oust President Kolingba on behalf of Ange Patasse. It was elements of the old Foccart networks linked to the cotton lobby who had promoted Patasse in France and encouraged him to take power in Central Africa (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1106). It is now known that it was officers in the Second Bureau posted in Bangui, Colonel Joubert and Colonel Faire, who helped, through their reports sent to the minister of defense and then the Elysee, to give credit to the thesis of a desirable return (in the name of regional balance) of Ange Patasse. Moreover, the villa of Colonel Faure, military attache to the French Embassy, was searched by Central African soldiers on the very day after the abortive coup. Finally, according to reliable sources, Major Mansion (head of the presidential guard with the rank of lieutenant colonel), No 2 man in the SDECE branch in Bangui, reportedly deliberately allowed General Bozize, co-author of the putsch, to flee, with this military comment: "You are an ass; get the hell out of here!"

A few days later, the anecdote reached the ears of Pierre Marion and Charles Hernu. Major Mansion, already called back to Paris a few months ago "for explanations" following a "confidential" report published in JEUNE AFRIQUE describing his excessively zealous police activities at the Bangui airport, will very certainly be transferred....

Information Services Against Elysee

Foccart systems, the SDECE, the Second Bureau: It is now clear that it is the entire French intelligence community -- whether active or dormant -- that now plays, in varying degrees, against or without the Elysee. Nor will any change in name for the SDECE, made public on 4 April, or the new missions to be assigned to it (intensification of economic and scientific information research, "all-points" strategy without any privileged targets), much less the great reorganization announced -- actually, a mere dismantling of the directorate of the infrastructure and means -- be able to remedy the situation. It is not enough to change the life guard in order for the water in the "Pool" to become clear.

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ANGOLA

OIL PROSPECTS AND SOVIET ASSISTANCE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 926

[Text]. Even though it is not a member of OPEC, Angola paid close attention to the special OPEC conference held in Vienna 19-20 March (see MTM No 1898 of 26 Mar, pp 827-828). Luanda counts on oil to provide most of its purchasing power (80 to 90 percent), and a lowering of the price of crude on the world market is bound to have serious consequences for its economy, which is currently going through a difficult phase.

Mr Erminio Escorcio, managing director of the Angola National Oil Company (SONANGOL), has talked about his concerns in this area with AFP, emphasizing among other things that Angola, as a small producer, was not affected either directly or indirectly by the decisions on cutting back production.

In 1981, Angola's oil production was lower than expected--only 6.8 million tons, as opposed to 8-9 million tons--"because of technical problems in Cabinda province." In early 1981, the official price was \$38.75 per barrel.

Normally, Angola's oil is priced to conform with Arabian light except for some necessary adjustments. Presently, Angola is negotiating prices separately for each customer. Production of 10.5 million tons is scheduled for 1982.

It may well be helpful to describe the structure of Angola's oil operations. The majority of prospecting and operating contracts have been signed with Western companies--on the basis of 51 percent interest for SONANGOL, 49 percent for the foreigners. These contracts deal with offshore deposits, all along the Atlantic coast from Cabinda in the north to the middle of the country the areas in the south have not yet been awarded.

Though Washington and Luanda have not normalized diplomatic relations, Angola's main oil partner is an American company, Gulf Oil, which established itself in the country before independence in 1975. The French company Elf has made two promising discoveries with its first two drilling projects.

Current conditions are not such as to encourage Angola to rest on its laurels. The country has just signed an agreement with the Italian company, Agip, for exploration and production at a deposit south of Cabinda (see MTM No 1898 of 26 March, page 865) and is moving to sign a new contract with Gulf "that will be beneficial to both sides."

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Also, Mr Pedro Van Dunem Loy, the country's energy and oil minister, left 22 March on a trip to West Europe that is to take him to France, Belgium, Austria, Italy and Great Britain--accompanied by Mr Erminio Escorcio.

The latter has been putting emphasis lately on the training of Angolan technicians, stating that the long-term objective is to create a petroleum university. Angola, he added, is also interested in increasing onshore exploration and exploiting its natural gas.

As for construction of a second refinery with Soviet assistance, he indicated that this possibility was not yet being considered, as officials are still considering the possibility of increasing the capacity of the Luanda refinery that was shut down for 3 months as a result of sabotage.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

SOVIET DAM AID--Three Portuguese companies late in March signed an agreement with the Soviets for the construction of a dam on the Cuanza River at Capanda, south of Luanda. The cost of the dam construction, buildings, roads and the hydroelectric generating station will be borne by the Portuguese firms and will be on the order of 16 billion escudos (1.4 billion French francs). The Soviet side is to provide equipment for the production and transmission of the electricity produced. Installation of a high-voltage line connecting the towns of Quibala and Gabela (215 km) is also a part of this trilateral project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 982] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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CHAD

BRIEFS

CANADIAN AID TO REFUGEES--Canada will give the UN High Commission on Refugees \$750,000 in response to its appeal for a program to assist in the repatriation of Chadian refugees. The funds will come from the Canadian International Development Agency via the International Humanitarian Aid Program. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 916] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

INTERNATIONAL AID MEETING--In preparation for the international conference on aid to Chad, postponed to late summer, UNDRO [Office of United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator] held a preparatory meeting in Geneva 5-6 April for donor countries and organizations. The meeting focused on Chad's needs for emergency and humanitarian assistance. The Chadian Government was to be represented by Mr Taher Souleymane, minister of planning and reconstruction. A high-level delegation from the OAU was also expected. After describing the current situation in the country, including its needs for debt and budgetary support, UNDRO was to explain the emergency assistance program and report on the status of contributions received to date. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 971] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FAC AID FOR EUCALYPTUS--Three blocks of financing, totalling 410 million CFA francs, have been opened to the Congo by the French Fund for Aid and Cooperation since 1978 in order to increase the area planted in eucalyptus from 3,000 to 8,000 hectares. A special organization, the Congo Industrial Afforestation Division, has been created which, in addition to the FAC grant, has received around 800 million CFA francs from the Congolese budget over the past 3 years. The 1982 sum will enable planted areas to be increased to 9,000 hectares and will provide maintenance for the 8,000 hectares already planted with eucalyptus and pine, with the Congo's 1982 share amounting to 300 million CFA francs. The FAC financing will cover the cost of technical assistance and durable goods. According to the French cooperative mission in Brazzaville, all elements seem to be united on the scientific agricultural level to assure an effective contribution to the establishment of a cellulose pulp plant beginning in 1985-86. By then, thanks to the financial efforts of the Congo, the FAC and probably the French CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation], the planted area will exceed 30,000 hectares. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French no 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 917] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

PRC AID--A protocol for agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Congo dealing with the construction of a 200-bed hospital in the Loandjili-2 district near Pointe-Noire has just been signed in Brazzaville. The work will begin in 1984. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 917] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

CONGOLESE-CUBAN COOPERATION--Congo and Cuba have reaffirmed their desire to continue to join forces to expand and strengthen cooperation between the two countries, according to a final communique published following the work of the third Congolese-Cuban Joint Commission just held in Brazzaville. According to the text, the fourth session will be held in Havana next year, and the date will be set through diplomatic channels. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 973] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEF

FINANCIAL DISPUTE WITH SPAIN--Spanish judicial authorities in Madrid froze Equatorial Guinea's accounts in the Banco de Espana and the Banco Exterior on 30 March. The decision to freeze the assets came in response to legal action filed by one of the Equatorial Guinea Central Bank's creditors, the Sociedad General Hispano-Africana de Comercio, headquartered in Alicante, for nonpayment of a 15-million-peseta bill. A similar freeze, imposed last February because the Equatorial Guinea Central Bank had failed to honor an 80-million-peseta credit note in the time allotted, was lifted 14 March after the note was paid. According to Mr Manuel Ferri, managing director of the above-mentioned firm, which specializes in trade with Equatorial Guinea, the Malabo government still owes it 863 million pesetas. Mr Ferri, who is being represented by a law firm headed by former Spanish president Adolfo Suarez, said that he was disturbed by this indebtedness because political relations between Malabo and Madrid are deteriorating. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 971] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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GABON

EXPERT DISCUSSES PROBLEMS FACING DEVELOPMENT OF FISHING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82, p 916

[Text] According to Mr Rene Ondo Nguema, Gabonese specialist on marine affairs, quoted by the daily L'UNION in Libreville on 26 March, small-scale or pirogue fishing supplies 31 percent of the fish consumed in Gabon, compared with 33 percent supplied by the commercial fishing industry. Nevertheless, Gabon imports 36 percent of what it consumes, primarily in canned form.

Freshwater fishing, specifies Mr Ondo Nguema, yields an average of 500 tons annually. It is confined to lagoons and rivers. Freshwater fishing's low yield is due to the fact that it takes place for only 3 months during the year, in the dry season.

As for coastal fishing, it yields 3,000 tons. Coastal fishing activities are geographically widespread, but they are undergoing more intensive growth in the Cap Lopez area.

In the deep-sea sector, according to the same source, the difference between the catch and the potential catch remains significant; total consumption can be estimated at 10,000 tons per year. In any case, consumption is related to an effort to modernize the fishing infrastructure. Lack of an appropriate infrastructure is still the major factor in the discrepancy and results in an average yield per fisherman of approximately 4 tons per year, or 40 kg per day based on 100 working days. It would be desirable, Mr Ondo Nguema feels, to encourage fishermen to consolidate to make fishing a full-time activity. It is felt in Gabonese fishing circles that such consolidation would make the granting of credit for fishing equipment, particularly for improvements to existing refrigerating plants, easier in areas where small-scale fishing is experiencing significant growth, chiefly in the southern coastal region. All this presupposes a satisfactory evaluation of the small-scale fishing effort.

On the other hand, development of fish breeding remains a priority objective of the Gabonese Government. This program involves the provinces of Woleu-Ntem, Ngounie, Nyanga, the Estuary, Ogooue-Lolo and Haut Ogooue. L'UNION stresses that small-scale fishing, like fish breeding, has an advantage in that its development requires a relatively small investment compared to the commercial fishing industry, which is still very localized.

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GABON

EXPERT CONTINUES DISCUSSION ON INDUSTRIAL FISHING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 972

[Text] In our 2 April 1982 issue, page 916, we published a piece on Gabon's small fishing industry. The same source quoted in the daily L'UNION--Mr Rene Ondo Nguema, a Gabonese expert on marine matters--has also provided some information on industrial fishing in the country.

The fishing industry has been declining gradually since 1973. The industrial catch has declined from 4,400 to 3,300 tons per year. This decline is mainly due to imbalances in the utilization of fishing zones.

The only sustained activity still going on is in the Libreville region, while the real potential for optimum yields, especially in terms of trawler fishing, is in the southern part of the Gabonese littoral. This is related to problems in preserving and transporting the fish products found in that area.

Nevertheless, industrial fishing accounts for 33 percent of the fish consumed in Gabon and involves both coastal trawler fishing and open-sea fishing further out.

Trawler fishing is possible over an area of 1,800 square kilometers north of Cape Lopez and in theory could yield as much as 140 kg per hour. South of Cape Lopez, trawler fishing is possible over a larger area covering 4,500 square kilometers, with yields up to 330 kg per hour.

The region is suitable for both trawler and trawl-line fishing. The latter technique is complementary to the former, as it can be practiced on the rocky sea-bottom that is inaccessible to the trawlers.

The current fishing area, which remains limited to the Libreville region, provides 3,400 tons per year. Some species are the subject of much more trawling than others. Some, in fact, are being overfished. Some 1,400 tons of shrimp are being taken, for example, even though it is not rational to take more than 900 tons a year.

There are prospects for annual trawler production to reach between 5,000 and 6,000 tons. But the country as a whole probably needs some 10,000 tons more of fishing products than it produces. Considering only the regions where

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fresh fish can be obtained from Libreville, the shortfall might be reckoned at 1,000 tons, to which should be added another 1,000 tons to account for the growing needs.

In 1978, 27 percent of industrial fishing sector employees in the group of coastal countries that are members of UDEAC (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa) were Gabonese. Fishing is now a leading employment factor on the maritime scene, and its role is destined to increase as the fishing sector grows.

Insufficient production of ice (20 tons per day) causes interruptions in the supply of Gabonese fish. The result is zigzag production, reinforced by seasonal vagaries that inhibit normal growth of small fishing on the mainland during the rainy season. Thus, a period of abundance can follow on the heels of a period of shortage, and the repercussions on prices are immediate.

All things considered, the price of fish sold at offloading points is relatively low, especially for the coastal population. This does not always lead to profitable investments. The fisherman, lacking ice, is in fact often constrained to sell his fish at a ridiculously low price. This is true at wholesale and retail levels as well.

The distribution system is another impediment. Its defects only reinforce the disparity between consumption in the urban centers and the rural regions. The fact that certain key roads are impassible in the rainy season means that the lack of facilities for the storage of fish results in considerable losses.

As for solutions to the problems in Gabon's fishing sector, Mr Rene Ondo Nguema believes that they lie primarily in improvements in the facilities for icemaking, to bring ice production up to at least twice the current level. At the same time, it is essential to reorganize facilities for freezing and storage and to make them available wherever needed. This would make it possible for centers far removed from the fishing sites to be regularly supplied.

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GABON

BRIEFS

ARREST OF OPPOSITION MEMBERS--The AFP correspondent in Yaounde has provided the following information on the arrest of more opposition members in Gabon, following those of last December. Three journalists were brought in for interrogation between 11-16 March and have been detained in the main prison at Libreville. They are Samuel Nguema Mba, editor-in-chief of the national daily L'UNION; Francois Ondo Edou, news editor at the Gabonese national radio station; and Jean-Baptiste Asse Bekale, a journalist with AFRICA NO. 1. Also arrested, according to the same source, were Jean-Marc Ekoh, former minister of education under President Leon Mba and inspector of Protestant private schools; Michel Ovono, ministry of mining engineer; and a secretary, Miss Marguerite Eyaa Nkeme. Mr. Ekoh was in Makokou when he was apprehended. So far none of these people has been formally indicted. Their domiciles have been searched. The search carried out at the home of Mr Samuel Nguema Mba was under the direction of a "Frenchman in civilian clothes" and found nothing, according to the reports of the journalist's relatives who arrived in Yaounde on 5 April. The same reports also speak of "brutalities" and "bullying" inflicted on some of those interrogated. Mr Samuel Mba was reportedly made to strip and sleep on the earthen floor of his cell for the first 8 days of his detention. Mr Michel Ovono was reportedly tortured with electric shocks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 971] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

SOVIET SCIENTIST'S VISIT--Dr Anatoliy Gromyko, director of the USSR's Africa Institute and Academy of Sciences, left Libreville at the end of March following a visit of about 2 weeks in Gabon. The son of the Soviet foreign minister, Mr Anatoliy Gromyko was touring of Africa on behalf of UNESCO, and Gabon was the last stop on the tour. The Africa Institute and Academy of Sciences which he heads in Moscow is planning to carry out scientific research on the traditional art of the peoples of tropical Africa. Gabon, because of its artistic and cultural diversity, will have a prominent place in the research project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 971] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

PETROLEUM DISCOVERIES--The Gabonese minister of mining and oil has announced that the Elf-Gabon company has just made two oil discoveries offshore from central Gabon on drilling sites it holds jointly with Elf-Aquitaine (SNEA). The first discovery involves the Nord Marine 1 Gonelle extension well, near

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the Conelle field, where the Batanga sandstone was found to contain oil at a depth of 43 meters. The second involves the West Marine 1 Mandaros well, near the Mandaros field, where the Batanga sandstone was found to contain oil at a depth of 11 meters. On the basis of production tested so far, it is estimated that each of these wells has the potential to produce 100 cubic meters a day. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 972] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

ARRESTS FOR BANDITRY--The Gabonese criminal investigation department succeeded at the end of March in arresting a group of criminals (including Nigerians, Cameroonians and Gabonese) who committed two dramatic thefts in Libreville several months ago: 48 million CFA francs from the Banque Centrale and 13 million CFA francs from Air Gabon. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 916] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN--On 16 March, in Libreville, 1st Deputy Prime Minister Georges Rawiri, minister of transport and heavy industry, presented the National Plan for Gabonese Public Highway Transportation, prepared by Jean-Claude Ziv, director of the association for technical studies in planning and urban development at a Paris university. With the exception of certain points to be reviewed, the plan has received the approval of the 1st deputy prime minister, who will submit it to the next Council of Ministers meeting for study. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 917] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

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MADAGASCAR

MALAGASY SOCIALISM ON VERY BORDER OF COMMUNIST SYSTEM

Paris POUVOIRS in French No 21, 1982 pp 108-116

[Article by Pascal Chaigneau: "A Mode of Socialist Orientation on the Border of the System: the Remarkable Case of Madagascar"]

[Text] The Malagasy political structure, taken in the context of the world communist system as a whole, clearly shows that this country belongs to the states oriented towards socialism operating at the very border of the system. The ideological beliefs, the institutional and economic choices, the option establishing the foreign policy all contribute to this statement. However, a political and sociological analysis based on the very realities and vicissitudes of the regime tends to show some non-negligible brakes on the irreversibility of the Soviet influence and on the durability of the present structure. Nevertheless, the true problem consists in perceiving that the concessions already made to the USSR must be analysed basically in military and strategic terms.

After 12 years of militant anticommunism (1960-1972) and an especially troubled transition period (1972-1975), the Great Island [Madagascar], under the leadership of Commander Didier Ratsiraka, was to see the advent of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, extolled as being "resolutely socialist" in its concept.

In order to clarify the nuances and consequences of such a choice, we must therefore ponder first over the phenomena which allow us today to place Madagascar in the category of states oriented toward socialism and, second, over the durability of the system and what safeguards may exist against the irreversibility of the Soviet presence.

Considering that the world communist system can be divided¹ into "socialist party-states" which form the "community of socialist states," parties forming the "international communist movement," and "states oriented toward socialism," an intermediate stage usually leading to a party-state, two different approaches allow us to integrate Madagascar into the latter category thus placing this country on the border of the world communist system: the choices made by the political decision-makers, and the elements of the Soviet presence and influence.

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As far as political choices are concerned, three essential factors contribute to give credibility to a Malagasy socialism that would be more Marxist than specific: the determinants of a fundamental theorization, the economic measures taken, and the data which condition the country's foreign policy.

Thus, in spite of multiple references to authenticity and specificity, the ideological-doctrinal support of the regime, the "Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution" (also called "Boky Mena," i.e. little red book), appears to be a melting pot of ideologies, the true originality of which is that it brings side by side the traditional principles of Marxism-Leninism, loans from the Chinese doctrine (as far as agricultural development is concerned), and legacies from Kim-Il-Sungism (especially the theory of the three revolutions), all to provide appropriate reference to the societal background of the country.

Also, institutionally, whereas the Malagasy constitution of 29 April 1959 offered extensive similarities to the French model of October 1958 (apart from the fact that a unicameral system had been chosen), the operational mechanism of the Malagasy constitution of 31 December 1975 will be best understood with reference to the Algerian structure and the Soviet constitution of 1977. Indeed, the legal philosophy of the author of the constitution is especially clear when it comes to strengthening the state and introducing a distinction between state power and state administration; the only major deviation from the traditional socialist concept resides in this case in a presidentialism which gives to the head of the state the powers which, in the Soviet Union, are given to the praesidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Along the same line, where economy is concerned, we should also note that the country has taken all the measures characteristic of traditional socialist countries, viz. nationalization of key sectors, centralized planning and creation of a ministry to that effect, and the drawing up of "charters" designed so that, by the year 2000, the national economy should be ruled only by socialist enterprises, state farms and socialist cooperatives which, in their final version, will be directly related to the kolkhoze model.²

Finally, apart from ideological determinants and economic data, the foreign policy choices made confirm the impression of an alignment--at least a partial one--on the East, in spite of a political discourse officially advocating a multidirectional orientation.

Thus, the Malagasy leaders have joined the "progressive camp" of the OAU, supported the PLO and the POLISARIO, and actively aided movements as strongly committed as Militant Africa,³ African Progressive Countries and the World Peace Council.⁴ In addition, the most obvious materialization of North-Korean influence on Malagasy political thinkers was to be the convening of the Third International Seminar on Djoutche's (Kim-Il-Sung) Ideas, at Antananarivo on 29-30 September 1976. Simultaneously, the Conference of Nonaligned Countries (Havana, 1979) showed that the Great Island had placed itself in the block which was taking sides with the Soviet and Cuban, and 1980 was to see an intense diplomatic activity along the line of "the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace."⁵

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Finally, in the test UN vote on Afghanistan, Madagascar clearly aligned itself on the Soviet position.

In addition, the key elements of a Soviet-Korean presence and influence in the country now allow the observer to place Madagascar on the border of the international communist system.

Three major approaches to the study of these problems should be considered: the military and strategic approach, the use of "relays" aimed at controlling the state apparatus and the military, and internal partisan support.

In this respect, whereas the Soviet-Malagasy diplomatic relations established on 29 September 1972 have, economically speaking, not produced much except in the mining sector (in spite of the creation of a Joint Cooperation Commission in 1979), the situation has been entirely different in the military sector since 1977. Thus, as of this writing, and apart from the land forces and the army service corps regiment budgets, the Malagasy air force consists of 8 MIG-17, 13 MIG-21, 6 MIG-23 and a YAK-40 carrier, respectively supplied by the Korean Democratic Republic and by the Soviet Union, and still piloted and maintained by military personnel delegated from Pyongyang and, to a lesser extent, from Hanoi.

In addition, since the USSR almost always links underlying conditions to the supply of equipment of this type, the MIG 21 and 23 aircraft were accompanied by another present that could not be refused: three radars designed to cover the Mozambique Channel and the Southwest Indian Ocean.

As a result, from the giant natural aircraft carrier which Madagascar constitutes, the Soviet Union is now in a position, should the occasion arise, to launch a large-scale action on South Africa, an essential consideration when one realizes that the South-African problem (especially in view of the situation in Namibia) is to become a preferred line of the USSR policy on that continent.

Indeed, while the Diego-Suarez naval base is not yet under Soviet control,⁶ the problem of that area should essentially be viewed in terms of air bases. In this respect, however, apart from the radar stations which we have already mentioned, the Soviet already have at their disposal the Ivato airport and the former NASA base at Arivonimamo which provide them with the means for a first class airlift in this western part of the Indian Ocean, through which close to two thirds of Western Europe oil supplies must pass on their way to rounding the Cape.

Simultaneously, the past 5 years have seen the beginning of a dual attempt to control the military institution and the security services where military personnel, Soviet "technical advisors" (some 100) and Vietnamese and North Korean "relays" (approximately 400) are working side by side.⁷ In this respect, in addition to training and supervising the army proper, North-Korean nationals are now infiltrating the DGID [Directorate General for Information and Documentation]--an essential organization of the state apparatus, in charge of investigations, security and intelligence--and they have established themselves in the most strategic organs of the internal mechanism of the government.

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Finally, among the Malagasy political forces, the USSR can rely on a non-negligible political party to support its implantation process: the AKFM [Congress Party for Malagasy Independence].⁸ A party of cadres, representative of the Antananarivo bourgeoisie, this organization is directed by protestants in a way which does not conform very much to Weberian analysis, and for 23 years now it has remained faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and intrinsically pro-Soviet; it appears to be the political core on which the USSR is counting. Actually, to influence Malagasy policy in favor of the "brother country," this party has assets which range from its infiltration of state organizations and its influence on political decision-makers⁹ to its leadership in associations which have joined the world communist movement, not to mention brain training, either through scholarships at the Patrice-Lumumba University in Moscow (900 Malagasy students are now studying there), or through its control over the protestant college at Antananarivo (through the president of the party, the Rev Richard Andria-Manjato).¹⁰ In this perspective, the AKFM is a privileged asset and the privileged place for the political and intellectual penetration of Soviet ideas in Madagascar.

However, although the above-mentioned elements allow us to classify Madagascar typologically--both with respect to its choices and to the degree of influence--among the states oriented toward socialism and acting on the border of the system, we should now consider what safeguards may exist against the irreversibility of the line it is now following.

From this point of view, it seems that two categories of determinants, socio-political and economic, will interact.

From a socio-political point of view, the problems that arise are that of a non-receptive societal ground, the existence of a complex multiparty social fabric, and the inefficiency of the regime structures.

In this respect, the Malagasy population, imbued with an insular nationalism evidenced by its rich history, proud of its specificity (reinforced by a single linguistic vehicle) and for whom the concept of national independence has a powerful connotation, certainly does not offer the most propitious conditions for a Soviet-Korean-Vietnamese presence on its territory, as is evidenced by many pamphlets published in the capital by university circles.

Nevertheless, it is within the parties and political organizations that the main inadequacies can be observed. Thus, if one assumes that a communist party, or a single party structured along the fundamental principle of "democratic centralism," is a prerequisite to the materialistic procedures of a power leaning toward socialism and to its perpetuation, then Madagascar is far from filling the bill.

In fact, the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA)--the presidential party originally seen as a stillborn oligopoly resulting from an improbable merger of existing parties--is now experiencing an obvious scission as it breaks down into a series of smaller groups and networks. A catch-all party, beyond the simplistic idea of the absolute domination of a party, the AREMA bears the scars of the almost total ideological competence of its cadres, of

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its excessive weakness at the organizational level, and of divisions following which an entire fraction of the party (the so-called "isoraka," i.e. right-wing, AREMA of Antananarivo) appears to be virtually antagonistic to the trend gathered around the president of the Republic.¹¹

Moreover, in the case of Madagascar, the institution of a party monism clashes with a powerful multiparty tradition which goes back to the eve of World War II, or even, in certain of its aspects, to the period 1910-1915. This, and the fact that temporary structures tend to perpetuate themselves, accounts for the survival of a "Front" which brings together seven groups with widely different ethics and political philosophies, all of which--except for the AKFM and certain elements of the presidential AREMA--are crossed to a greater or lesser degree by anticommunism, antisovietism and self-centered nationalism, the adoption in principle of the current ideology being perceived only as a prerequisite for survival.

Also, the army has gone far beyond the purely corporatist stage and must now be considered in terms of "military parties", in which the leadership remains monopolized by elements trained in France before 1972, and all the less pro-Soviet as the introduction of foreign members inside a military institution on which the regime must rely to a large extent to ensure its survival has sometimes caused ill-concealed reactions of rejection.

Faced with this situation cnsubstantial to the political fabric, the actual penetration of socialism is furthermore complicated by the fact that the operational and administrative skeleton of the system, the "socialist Fokonolona," an ancestral socio-anthropological institution adapted to the needs of an ideological orientation, is going bankrupt and undermining the very bases of state interventionism. Indeed, the "decentralized communities," which were advocated as the spearheads of Malagasy socialism, have in practice found themselves emptied of their conceptual substance to such an extent that the actual ability of the state to relate to the people is now being questioned.¹²

Finally, in addition to socio-political facts, the present economic difficulties of the country (less than one day's worth of foreign currencies in reserve on 1 January 1982), the global failure of the production system (identical choices will produce identical effects, no matter under what latitude), the almost total shortage of staples in urban centers, the rise in inflation and the collapse of agricultural production which led to the rationing of rice (a staple food of the people), have brought the public to question the validity of a doctrine presented in the political discourse as designed to ensure happiness, and producing a diametrically opposed effect in real life.

Simultaneously with the saturation of society as a whole, the increasing role played by France in the economic survival of the country and the development of a climate of permanent tension and latent crisis are beginning to cause the bourgeoisie--although it has been pampered by the regime--to question the objective value of the orientation chosen and the possible inadequacy of a way leaning toward socialism for Malagasy socio-cultural realities.

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In view of these many problems, and in the absence of operational results at home, the "progressive" foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar must above all be perceived as an alibi intended to give credibility to an assumed importance abroad, the better to hide a domestic failure.

We should then note that the price of ideology has been first rate military and strategic concessions which have strengthened the Soviet presence in a zone as vital as the western part of the Indian Ocean.

In spite of all, and contrary to the situation in Congo, none of the underlying conditions which would make it possible to go from a socialist orientation to a socialist "party-state" is now present in Madagascar. Also, the threshold of irreversibility has not been reached, and it is significant to note that no validly constituted political take-over has yet been ensured.¹³ Therefore, if the present regime were to succumb under historical vicissitudes, it is important to note that the Soviet Union does not yet have an "alternate solution," since the AKFM itself--because of its "Merina" ethnical coloring--does not appear ready to assume control of the state apparatus. There remains the military institution, the last recourse in case of an open crisis, and one which twice already has had to assume the power; at present, in its most representative trends, it does not favor either ideological interferences in politics, nor the creation of privileged links which would place Madagascar on the border of the world communist system.

Nevertheless, we should recognize the difficulties of a prospective analysis and, in this respect, distinguish between what is possible and what is probable¹⁴ in a global strategic context in which the USSR is becoming increasingly interested in the Great Island as was shown, after President Ratsiraka's visit to Moscow in September 1981, by the reception of a Soviet delegation headed by the first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, last November in Antananarivo.¹⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. See the typology established by Annie Kriegel in "The Dimensions of Soviet Expansionism," a paper presented on 6 January 1982 at the EHESS-IFRI [expansions unknown] Symposium on "The Form of Communist Expansionism."
2. Charter of Socialist Production Cooperatives, Official Gazette of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, 16 July 1977; Charter of Socialist Enterprises, Official Gazette of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, 1 May 1978.
3. Let us recall that Militant Africa represents the "hard-line block" on this continent, and that it now counts most states oriented toward socialism among its members: Algeria, Angola, Benin, the People's Republic of Congo and Mozambique. Soon, Madagascar became one of the spearheads of the movement, and the organization has been headquartered in Antananarivo since 8 July 1976.

4. Meetings of both movements were held in the Malagasy capital, respectively on 17-19 May 1978 and 23-27 January 1981.
5. On the problems resulting from Malagasy diplomatic activity likely to favor Soviet tactics which would tend to include the Gulf in the Indian Ocean zone, see among others: LADOJSKI, A., "The USSR Struggle to Make a Peace Zone out of the Indian Ocean," LA VIE INTERNATIONALE, August 1981; Admiral LONG, in INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 April 1981, pp 1-2.
6. Until now, the Malagasy government has rejected Soviet overtures in this respect, the international (and domestic) opinion being sensitive to this question.
7. North Korea is to be considered here as a "specialized contributor" according to the terms of the last of the three criteria defined by Annie Kriegel to analyze the relative originality of the states belonging to the world communist system: (1) conformity to the dual Soviet model; (2) conformity in foreign policy; and (3) general or specialized participation in the operation of the communist system.
8. The Congress Party for Malagasy Independence created on 10 November 1958.
9. The AKFM is one of the seven parties belonging to the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution which cooperate in supporting the regime.
10. College of the Madagascar Federation of Protestant Churches.
11. Under the leadership of the minister of Finances, Mr Rakotovao-Razakaboana, this "opposition AREMA" also shows the blocks which exist within the state apparatus itself, along with tactical and doctrinal rivalries which can be seen from the fact that, in spite of the president's instructions, Mr Razakaboana refused to sign the Soviet-Malagasy military agreement at the time of his visit to Moscow in 1980.
12. It is quite unlikely that elections at the various levels of the decentralized communities will take place, as scheduled, in 1982.
13. Contrary to the situation in Brazzaville where the leadership has been duplicated through the Central School of the Congolese Labor Party.
14. Methodological approach borrowed from Prof Jacques Vernant.
15. The attempted coup disclosed by the authorities on 24 January 1982 (and essentially based on the divisions of the military institution) and the cabinet reshuffle operated by President Ratsiraka after this article was written, confirm the analyses presented here.

Far from questioning the doctrinal and behavioral bases of the regime, the third government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar--which was installed in mid-January--reflects in fact, through personnel transfers, the dual care of the head of the state: to marginalize the AREMA "opposi-

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tional" faction, and to introduce more "disciplined" elements into the apparatus, or elements more in favor of his personal opinions.

In addition, the rivalries and internal struggles characteristic of the deeper physiognomy of the regime have not been eradicated, since they still find ground for their expression and formalization in the Supreme Council of the Revolution (into which Mr Rakotovao Razakaboana has now been integrated) and in the political bureau of the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution.

The problem is now that the recent attempt at a putsch will of necessity contribute to strengthen the radical tendencies both of the authorities and of the opposition forces (31 January 1982).

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

CAHORA BASSA ELECTRICITY--Countries in southern Africa may soon benefit from hydrogenerated electricity from the Cabora Bassa dam. Returning from a trip to Lisbon the second week in March, Mr Antonio Branco, Mozambique's energy minister, said that this issue had been discussed with Portuguese officials. It should be recalled that Mozambique and Portugal are jointly in charge of the dam's operations. We have information to the effect that two of the countries that share borders with Mozambique--Zimbabwe in the west and Malawai in the north--are to be the first beneficiaries of the new policy. Hydroelectric power generated by the Cabora Bassa dam--some 11,000 megawatts--is presently dedicated almost exclusively to South Africa; Mozambique consumes only 7 percent of it. We note that Mr Branco's talks in Lisbon also dealt with possible exports of coal to Portugal and the latter's involvement in oil prospecting in Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 982] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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NIGER

FIRE IN NIAMEY MARKET GRAVE BLOW TO NATIONAL ECONOMY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 966

[Text] Mr Garba Katanbe, mayor of the capital city of Niamey, in an initial assessment of the fire that ravaged the city's market the night of 30-31 March, said an estimated 5 billion CFA francs in merchandise and installations were destroyed.

The figure does not include the social costs of the disaster. In fact, the market constituted the hub of the country's commercial activity, and its destruction could well lead to major disruptions in trade.

In addition, thousands of businessmen have been ruined and are without a source of income. The great market of Niamey was considered the real "economic heart" of the Nigerien capital.

Extending over several hectares in the center of town, it was the place of business for thousands of merchants and also the site of the city's main road transport depot.

Beyond its economic role of the highest importance to Niger, it was a veritable melting pot, where one could find an amalgamation of national ethnic diversity. Haoussa, Djermas and Songhai, Touareg and Peul came together in a buzz of incessant activity.

In a communique on 2 April the Nigerien Government noted the "extent and gravity of the disaster in the current economic environment" and termed the event a new "tribulation for the national economy." It also launched in "appeal for national solidarity" and decided to build a new market quickly, so that the ruined merchants and vendors can be reestablished.

An interministerial committee comprising the ministers of finance, commerce, mines and industries and interior has been ordered to study the situation and with the shortest possible delay propose steps to insure the normalization of commercial activity. The decision has already been made to build a "modern marketing center" on the site of the razed market.

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NIGER

BRIEFS

NATIONAL DEBATE ON EDUCATION--A 10-day national debate on Nigerien education opened in Zinder on 22 March. The aim of the debate, in which six ministers, high level representatives of other ministries, department heads, the traditional chieftainry and community and professional associations are participating is to define new directions for the national educational system to make it "socially integrated and economically accessible." As expressed by the head of state, Col Seyni Kountche, this debate, which has been prepared for over the past few months, should enable the drafting of "the bible on which the state will rely in implementing the educational program." Among the questions on the agenda, lightening the educational system's burden on the state, reforming the boarding and scholarship system and adapting education to the social fabric of the country figure prominently. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 910] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

JAPANESE EQUIPMENT--The 50-ton crane that NIGELEC [Niger Electric Power Company] ordered from the Japanese company Tadano within the context of the cooperative agreement signed with Japan in September 1981 will be delivered to Niamey next June, with construction on the new thermal power plant scheduled to start at the beginning of July. Remember that the total Japanese-Nigerien contract was for some 5 million French francs, including 1 million for the new crane, which is computer controlled. One of the other major pieces of equipment in this contract is a gas turbine generator from the Japanese company Hitachi Ltd. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 911] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris.] 9693

UNDP AID--Mr Michel Doo-Kingue, deputy administrator of the UN Development Program (UNPD) and regional director for Africa, was received recently by the Nigerien head of state, Col Seyni Kountche, with whom he reviewed progress on a cooperative UNPD-Niger program for 1982-1986. UNPD assistance to Niger over that period will go from \$20 million--the total aid provided during the previous program period--to \$45 million, he indicated. Also, Mr Doo Kingue was in Niger to hold follow-up discussions with the government on the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LLDC's), which was held in Paris last September. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 966] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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NIGERIA

NIGERIA TO REMAIN FIRM ON PETROLEUM PRICES DESPITE PROFIT LOSSES

Fall in Shipments

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1031

[Text] In Lagos petroleum industry circles at the beginning of the month it was generally felt that Nigeria would not reduce its crude oil prices again.

Faced with a difficult economic situation due to the drop in sales that has continued since the last OPEC summit in Vienna (the import bill for February would amount to \$2.5 billion compared to revenues barely equal to half this sum), Nigeria in fact is still the "weak link" in the OPEC chain.

The drop in shipments of Nigerian crude oil, which is the root of the concern in Lagos, is not due to the petroleum companies but rather to the trading companies, it is felt in the same petroleum industry circles. The producing companies who have been accused of putting pressure on Nigeria to bring about a drop in OPEC prices in fact indicate that their purchasing level has remained the same these past months but that the "traders" to whom the national company, NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Company], is selling part of its oil refuse to pick up petroleum that they can resell on the spot only at a loss.

"We are currently in a period of a worldwide reduction of stocks whose speculative character is not obvious," indicated the manager of a petroleum company in Lagos, and if OPEC holds to its strategy of maintaining price levels, "the market should restabilize, even if it means establishing new lower production ceilings." According to the same source, it is obvious that Nigeria, which has no more options, should not be affected, and if OPEC wants to "save" its prices, reductions in production of around 2 million barrels per day should basically be borne by the "haves," especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These countries should also lend money to Nigeria to enable it to "hold out" until the recovery, which should occur between June and August, according to the same source.

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"We feel that the petroleum industry still has good days ahead of it, but we must hold on until then, even if we are currently losing more than \$5 per barrel," says the manager of Elf-Nigeria, who also feels that this effort by the companies on the country's behalf will be rewarded in the long run.

There is currently no conflict between us and the NNPC, they add in the same circles, except for the problem of profit margins, which is being negotiated at this time. Nigerian profits are currently around 50 cents per barrel, whereas they approach \$4 in certain South American countries.

With President Shagari having recently reconfirmed his country's total commitment to OPEC, it then seems, as noted earlier, that Nigeria will not lower its prices again, which would isolate it from OPEC and even, it is felt, cause a world slump.

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Production Trends

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1031

[Text] Company-by-company analyses of production figures shows that with the exception of Elf, whose production increased slightly compared with the month of February, the four other large companies (Shell, Mobil, Gulf, Agip) have all reduced their production significantly (down 270,000 barrels per day for Shell, which produced only 357,000 barrels per day in March).

According to a high-level executive of a company located in Nigeria, examination of these figures also shows that Mobil, Gulf and Agip clearly resumed production at the end of March--close to a 100-percent resumption for Gulf, which produced 277,000 barrels per day in February, with mid-March production estimated at 80,000 barrels per day and actual production at the end of March at 153,000 barrels per day. The same is true of Mobil (195,000 barrels per day in February, 100,000 barrels per day estimated in mid-March and 153,000 barrels per day produced at the end of March) and Agip. But the source did not indicate whether OPEC "threats" with regard to companies operating in Nigeria are the cause of this resumption of activity.

According to the same source, only Shell, which produced 630,000 barrels per day in February and only 357,000 barrels per day in March, did not increase its pumping volume at the end of the month.

Rumors circulating in Lagos still mention the possibility of a Saudi loan to Nigeria to "hold them until sales recover," and it is indicated in this regard that several officials from the Nigerian Ministry of Finance recently went to Vienna to negotiate the terms of this loan.

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RWANDA

KIGALI BANK REPORT ON RWANDA ECONOMY IN 1981

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 pp 1040-1041

[Text] The report of the Bank of Kigali for the fiscal year 1981 (1 January-31 December), presented to the 30 March 1982 regular shareholder's meeting, provides some interesting information on the development of the Rwandan economy over the past year.

Despite the drop in coffee, tea and ore exports, the trade balance reveals a deficit of only 800 million Rwandan francs. The net currency position at the end of 1981 amounted to slightly more than 13 billion Rwandan francs (1 U.S. dollar = 92.84 Rwandan francs).

As for business itself, it experienced a visible decline: businesses' sales volumes sagged, and some frequently resorted to credit. Ground and air transportation were very stable: few problems arose in this area. The paving work on the Kigali-Butare highway, which provides a link with Burundi, has been halted and is not to resume until the end of the year.

On the other hand, a Chinese road construction company has begun work on the Kigali-Ruhengeri highway. The cost is 3.5 billion Rwandan francs. The same company has been commissioned for the Ruhengeri-Cyanika section, providing a link with Uganda, for the amount of 450 million Rwandan francs.

The Butare match factory began production at the beginning of 1981. It produced 16 million boxes of matches during the year; studies are under way to increase the capacity to 60 to 80 million boxes per year.

As coffee has been and continues to be Rwanda's chief export, it must be admitted that the low prices recorded at the beginning of the Rwandan coffee harvest, in other words around May-June, aroused some concern. Fortunately, prices gradually recovered, reaching an average of U.S. \$1.1385 per pound, with prices for the most recent contracts exceeding U.S. \$1.33 to \$1.35 per pound. Production increased from 26,000 metric tons for the 1980-1981 harvest (May to December) to 26,662 metric tons for the 1981-1982 harvest (same period). The quantity exported dropped from 33,430 metric tons in 1980 to 22,185 metric tons, a 33-percent decrease, which leaves a very large

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amount of coffee to export. The export quota originally established by the International Coffee Organization [OIC] at 21,600 metric tons was increased to 28,800 metric tons for the OIC 1980-1981 year (1 October to 30 September). For the OIC 1981-1982 year, the quota has been set at 22,500 metric tons.

Tea production is at a slightly lower level than in 1980--5,591 metric tons compared with 5,717 metric tons. Exports fell by about 14.5 percent, or from 6,130 to 5,245 metric tons. This drop is due in part to a shortage of tea chests during the year. Plant construction continues in tea-growing regions. The Mata (Gikogoro) tea plant, financed by the European Development Fund, opened in July 1981; it cost 520 million Rwandan francs.

Sugar production remained stable at 2,367 metric tons compared with 2,364 in 1980. The country continues to import sugar to cover its needs.

Quinine production fell about 61 percent, from 646 metric tons in 1980 to 250 metric tons in 1981. Exports decreased proportionately; they totaled 246 compared with 673 metric tons.

In the mining sector, production and exports experienced a general decline. The trend is summed up as follows:

<u>Product</u>	<u>1981</u>		<u>1980</u>	
	<u>Produced</u>	<u>Exported</u>	<u>Produced</u>	<u>Exported</u>
Tin ore (m. tons)	1,869	1,435*	2,069	2,058
Wolframite (m. tons)	535	415	678	675
Colombo-tantalite (m. tons)	61	47	59	59
Beryl (m. tons)	60	60	107	100
Gold (kilos)	40	30	29	20

* Exports were slowed to establish the stock required to launch the foundry planned for February 1982.

As for the activities of the Bank of Kigali itself, for the 1981 fiscal year, it showed a business volume of 4.3 billion Rwandan francs and a profit of 62.5 million. The Bank of Kigali Ltd, with 250 million Rwandan francs in assets, is headed by Mr Jean-Marie Visnney Nyalihama; Mr Leandre Degroot is the managing director, and Mr Aloys Bizimana, the executive director.

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SENEGAL

DIOUF PROJECTS FAVORABLE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS IN 1982

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 pp 961, 962

[Text] Mr Abdou Diouf, speaking to the Senegalese Economic and Social Council late last March, said Senegal's economic prospects for 1982 appear better than in 1981, a year of drought and decline in domestic production, external trade and the government's financial condition.

The groundnut harvest, the primary source of peasant income and government hard currency, will approach 700,000 tons (compared with 190,000 tons in 1981), according to President Diouf. He emphasized that the marketing of this harvest will make it possible to inject more than CFA Fr 50 billion into the rural sector and lead to a recovery in domestic demand. The upsurge in exports of groundnut products--projected to be more than CFA Fr 40 billion (compared with 8-9 billion in 1981)--will reduce the (136 billion) trade deficit, he added.

The Senegalese head of state also predicted a heavy wave of investment over the next 2 years, with completion of the Senegalese Chemical Industries (CFA Fr 70 billion for the production of phosphoric acid and its derivatives), expansion of the Mbao refinery and the Rufisque cement-works (20 billion) and the start-up of construction work on the Koalack textile company and the Dama dam on the Senegal River.

President Diouf also announced the creation of a rural credit bank to finance the equipment and machinery needs of growers, fishermen, stock-raisers and craftsmen, the completion of a program of water works costing CFA Fr 10 billion and including the drilling of wells in the regions and preparation of a plan for the renovation and modernization of the stock-raising sector.

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SENEGAL

1982-1983 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION GOALS SET; LATEST RESULTS NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 906

[Text] Senegal's agricultural production goals for 1982-1983 have been set at 822,000 metric tons of peanuts, 47,550 metric tons of cotton and 690,000 metric tons of millet, according to Mr Abdou Diouf, Senegalese head of state, addressing his party's (the Socialist Party) national council meeting in Dakar on 28 March.

President Diouf felt that the results of the last agricultural campaign were good on the whole, thanks to good rainfall and to measures taken to promote agriculture (raising producer prices and absorbing farmers' debts over 20 billion CFA francs).

According to estimates by the Senegalese minister of rural development, production amounted to 878,365 metric tons of peanuts for oil, 5,342 tons of peanuts for consumption, 35,521 tons of cotton, 736,412 tons of millet and sorghum and 25,809 tons of beans. As for marketing, as of 8 February of this year, it had sold 633,748 metric tons of peanuts and only 12,116 tons of millet.

The Senegalese head of state indicated that the same producer prices will be maintained for this year's agricultural campaign, despite the drop in world prices for peanuts, Senegal's chief export product.

The Senegalese president also revealed that the production goal for fishing will be 400,000 metric tons of fish in 1985; the 1980 catch totaled 359,000 metric tons, or 36 million CFA francs, worth. Basic efforts in the fishing sector, he said, will deal with infrastructures as well as with cooperation with neighboring countries.

In stock breeding (23 million head of cattle, 3.2 million sheep and goats, 500,000 horses, donkeys and camels, 300,000 pigs and 9 million fowl, according to the minister of rural development's estimates), the emphasis will be on extending and improving pasture land and protecting it against brush fires and on creating small feed plants, as well as on promoting rural water resources. Finally, the 165 breeders' cooperatives will be activated.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

FOOD RESERVES--In other matters, According to the local press, Senegal will be provided with a food security stock of 70,000 metric tons of millet. Thanks to the National Solidarity Fund's 1.86 billion [currency denomination not given], financing has been acquired for 30,000 metric tons. Senegal is going to make an appeal to the international community for the remainder. The food stock should put an end to fluctuations in production due to rainfall conditions, correction of regional disparities in millet distribution, and also regulation of the millet market which varies greatly depending on production. The storehouses intended to receive the millet have already been completed. There are 54 located throughout the country. Their capacity is 74,000 metric tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 907] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

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ZAIRE

ACTIVITY OF BANK OF KINSHASA NOTED IN REPORT FOR 1980

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 pp 1159-1160

[Text] The report for 1980 of the Bank of Kinshasa emphasizes that the most important event of this period was no doubt the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the bank. On this occasion, the management committee published a brochure reviewing the evolution and the activities of the company in the course of its first decade (1970-1980).

In 1980, the course of the bank's business was marked by an increase in the demand for credit from bank customers. In the first 9 months, credits outstanding increased noticeably. From January to October 1980, the level of the use of credits went from 96.8 million Zaires to 163.8 million Zaires. The credit ceiling of 120 million Zaires, established by the Central Bank, was exceeded by 33.25 million Zaires on 30 September 1980.

However, exceeding the credit ceiling was not limited to this bank, because as a whole the credits granted by the banks to companies and to private persons on 30 September 1980 totaled 1,237,900,000 Zaires, as against an authorized ceiling of 888,800,000 Zaires. The relative portion of the Bank of Kinshasa in this overall excess of credit amounted to 9.5 percent. Faced with this situation, to put a brake on the expansion of credit, the Institute of Emission [of the currency] ordered commercial banks to reduce their outstanding credits to within the established credit ceilings before 31 December 1980 and warned that any new excess of credit would be subject to monetary fines. Also, exceeding the credit ceilings would involve suspension of the rediscounting of commercial paper by the central authorities and the suspension of a bank's accounts.

During the last 2 months of the year, the Bank of Kinshasa had to make a special effort to obtain repayment of certain loans outstanding, particularly agricultural credits on coffee that could not be exported on time because of difficulties in transportation and speculation involving export prices, which have been declining since 1 January 1980.

The Bank of Kinshasa continued to take an active part in coffee matters. However, it was able to become involved in the export of only 8,250 tons of coffee, compared with 9,000 tons in 1979. This decline is due to fraudulent export transactions and the difficulties referred to above.

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In the course of the first 6 months of 1980, measures associated with the demonetization operation of 25 December 1979 continued to have a major, negative effect on the resources of the bank and to disturb its activities. In effect, after the end of this operation, which did not develop as desired, certain problems arose over a period of weeks, in particular concerning reconstitution of the cash holdings of the banks, disturbances to commercial transactions and the financing of agricultural activity. The banking system, which was no longer subsidized, as had been the case, by the Institute of Emission, was unsuccessful in arranging for the freeing of all of the funds demanded by depositors. For a number of weeks the banks had to make use of a certain rationing of cash withdrawals so as not to deplete their stocks of cash, which were reconstituted with great difficulty. On the other hand, the almost total unavailability of demand deposit accounts and the shortage of means of payment favored the establishment of a market for funds outside the banking system, which handicapped banking activities. Demand deposit accounts were not entirely freed again until September 1980.

Customer deposits increased from 61.2 million Zaires, or 22.8 percent, a total of 268 million Zaires. The increase in interest rates, however, clearly made itself felt with regard to term deposits. Interest and commissions paid into term deposits went up from 2.8 million Zaires to 3.7 million Zaires in 1980.

International interbanking transactions intensified following the resumption of GECAMINES [General Quarries and Mines Company] operations and the participation of the bank in imports of petroleum by the Zaire-Sep Company. External assets recorded an increase of 49.6 percent, while the debt position with correspondent banks abroad also increased, going up from 3.5 million Zaires in 1979 to 13.8 million Zaires in 1980. The extent of this increase is also related to banking needs arising from commercial transactions.

The securities portfolio of the Bank of Kinshasa at the end of 1980 was valued at 362,677 Zaires, or 77 percent above the level at the end of 1979. This increase is due to new subscriptions for stock valued at 144,350 Zaires with the Development Finance Company (SOFIDE).

Net profits for 1980 increased by 36.3 percent and totaled 5.2 million Zaires. This increase is evidence of the major activity the bank was involved in, particularly as a result of its involvement in the financing of agriculture and other forms of essential local production, as well as in import transactions. This result reflects the net development of the total balance sheet, which stood at 433,100,000 Zaires on 31 December 1980, an increase of 120,600,000 Zaires, or 38.6 percent, compared with the end of 1979.

Regarding the expansion of the bank to the interior of the country, the management committee took the necessary action to open branches at Kananga and Mbujiayi in the Kasai area. The management committee, moreover, is carrying out studies with a view to opening agencies in Bandundu and Equateur Provinces. Construction activity to expand the building of the bank agency in Matadi was actively continued and was to have been completed in 1981. The bank agency in Boma was officially inaugurated on 14 June 1980.

The Bank of Kinshasa has a capital of 4.9 million Zaires. Its president and director general is Dokolu Sanu.

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

1981 GECAMINES PRODUCTION--According to the annual report of SOZACOM [Zairian Company for the Marketing of Ores], the General Quarries and Mines Company (GECAMINES) in 1981 produced 468,000 tons of copper compared with 425,616 tons in 1980 and 11,159 tons of cobalt compared with 12,408 tons in 1980. GECAMINES surpassed its projections for zinc by producing 57,600 tons compared with 44,056 tons in 1980. As for cadmium production, this amounted to 230 tons in 1981 compared with 165 tons in 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1160] 5170

1981 SOSIDER STEEL PRODUCTION--The Steel Exploitation Company (SOSIDER) processed in its smelter 12,930 tons of scrap iron in 1981 compared with 12,600 tons in 1980 and 11,425 tons in 1979. The president of the management committee of the company, Mbangu Tshirut-Binen, has commented that SOSIDER is currently operating at only 10 percent of its productive capacity due to problems involving its finances, raw materials and spare parts. These problems have led to the closing of its cold rolling mill. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1160] 5170

SOUTH KOREAN TECHNICAL COOPERATION--The delegation from the National Association of Companies of Zaire (ANEXA), which last March visited South Korea MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 12 March, p 704), had meetings with several ministers, with the Korean Foreign Trade Promotion Company (KOTRA), the Federation of Korean Enterprises and the Daewoo Group, the largest Korean commercial and industrial group. The delegation also visited a number of factories belonging to the Samsung Group. Possibilities for the use of Korean technology in Zaire and the financing of trade between Zaire and South Korea were examined in the course of this visit. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1160] 5170

REFUGEE STATISTICS--There are currently 350,000 to 400,000 refugees in Zaire, where UN High Commission for Refugees [HCR] spent some \$15 million in 1981. In a communique published in Geneva, the HCR estimates 1982 requirements at \$10.5 million. These financial needs are in the process of being revised to take into account the continuous arrival of Ugandans in the country. In fact, there are some 130,000 Ugandans in Haut-Zaire; elsewhere in the country, approximately 11,000 refugees from Burundi, 20,000 Rwandans and some 1,800 Zambians are recorded. Small groups of refugees of various origins are also found in Kinshasa. The HCR continues to assist in the voluntary repatriation of Angolan refugees, 21,000 of whom are benefiting from its assistance. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1036] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9693

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