

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10573

8 June 1982

Worldwide Report

TERRORISM

FOUO 1/82



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

NOTICE

This new JPRS serial, WORLDWIDE REPORT: TERRORISM, is devoted to international terrorism and antigovernment revolutionary violence. It is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and includes material on the organization, objectives and methods of terrorists and the consequences of terrorist actions. Items on terrorism formerly published in other JPRS reports will henceforth appear in this report. It is expected that the report will be published weekly.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10573

8 June 1982

WORLDWIDE REPORT

TERRORISM

FOUO 1/82

CONTENTS

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Briefs	
Forthcoming Trial of Terrorists	1

ZAMBIA

Blast Wrecks Court Administration Buildings in Kitwe (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 11 May 82)	2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

WEST EUROPE

GREECE

Comments on Bombing Incidents (RIZOSPASTIS, 3 Apr 82)	3
----------------------------------------------------------------	---

ITALY

Red Brigades Terrorist Cianfanelli Implicates PLO (ANSA, 20 May 82)	4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

SPAIN

Better Equipped ETA-M Still Effective Despite Isolation (CAMBIO 16, 26 Apr 82)	5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

Desperation Offensive
ETA-M's International Connections Summarized, by
Jose Diaz Herrera et al.
ETA Tactics Deplored, by Ander Landaburu

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Terrorism in Spain
(Alejandro Munoz Alonso; EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA, 1982) ... 17

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

FORTHCOMING TRIAL OF TERRORISTS--The presumed authors of the bomb attempt against a cinema in Bangui, on 14 July 1981, which had caused three deaths and the wounding of 32 people, will be tried by a special tribunal "in the next few days." This trial will be held shortly after the sentencing to death Saturday in Bangui, of Central Africans, members of the Central African Movement of National Liberation [MCLN], admittedly guilty "of making an attempt on the internal security of the state and the depot for explosive devices." Two of the five defendants, including Idi Lala, chief of the MCLN, were sentenced to capital punishment in absentia. [Text] [Brazzaville BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'ACI in French 19 May 82 p A 5]

CSO: 6133/0004

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAMBIA

BLAST WRECKS COURT ADMINISTRATION BUILDINGS IN KITWE

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 11 May 82 p 5

[Text]

CHIMWEMWE local court administration offices in Kitwe were on Sunday blown up by unknown people causing extensive damage to the building.

The offices were blown up in a pre-dawn blast in which the roof and doors were ripped off and window panes shattered.

Mr Noble Dickson Kaminda, the court clerk told the Times of Zambia yesterday that cases for the day had to be suspended because all the case records were still inside the damaged building awaiting investigations.

It was not immediately clear what had caused the blast and efforts to get a police comment by yesterday afternoon proved fruitless.

There was no indication either whether police had been to the blown up court.

No one was allowed into the building for fear of destroying evidence which might help police investigations.

From his assessment Mr Kaminda said nothing had been taken from the ruined office.

He had reported the matter to police immediately he was told of the incidence.

Station headman Mr Edward Mubanga who lives in a nearby court township said he was awakened by a loud bang around 05 hours on

Sunday morning. The bang was so loud it shook the bed he was sleeping on.

At first he thought it was a grocery shop being attacked by gunmen but when he went outside to check he found the roof of the court's administration offices blown up as well as doors and window panes.

The blast woke up residents of Buchi township who also rushed to the court to find out what had happened.

CSO: 6133/0001

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GREECE

COMMENTS ON BOMBING INCIDENTS

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 3 Apr 82 p 16

[Text] For the second time in three days U.S. Ambassador Stearns became the target of "unknown bombers." Despite the strict security measures that were taken, the bombers succeeded in placing a second bomb in the ambassador's residence. The responsibility for the bombing attacks was claimed by the ELA [Revolutionary People's Struggle] "that appears on the scene from time to time." The terrorist activity of the illegal state is not something new on the Greek scene where it often assumes criminal proportions. It is enough for us to remember the incidents of arson of the summer that were stopped only by the mass mobilization of the people. The culprits, however, were not arrested, just as those others were not arrested who evened up their accounts with Bambalis, Mallios, Welch, Petrou and Stamoulis. It is the same wasps' nest, the same centers of trouble that intervene in the political life of the country with acts of terrorism and every kind of provocation to serve the current objectives of local and foreign reaction. Of course, the government of the Right that fostered all these vipers for all these years, did not permit the correct direction of the police investigation to discover the "unknowns". The present government, however, can do it if it wants to. And it has an obligation to take all the measures necessary to quash the illegal state.

9346
CSO: 4621/299

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ITALY

RED BRIGADES TERRORIST CIANFANELLI IMPLICATES PLO

AU201959 Rome ANSA in English 1947 GMT 20 May 82

[Text] Rome, 20 May (ANSA)--A Red Brigades terrorist who turned states evidence after his arrest last year, Massimo Cianfanelli, told Rome judges today that another Brigades member on trial had often travelled to France to contact the Palestinian al-Fatah Organization.

Cianfanelli's testimony on a Brigades-Palestinian connection came at the end of the sixth week of the super trial of 64 terrorist suspects facing charges connected to the 1978 kidnapping and killing of the Christian Democrat Party chairman, Aldo Moro, and 18 additional homicides.

Cianfanelli was the third self-confessed terrorist to take the stand as states witness.

In today's testimony, he confirmed in large part the statements made earlier by the other two "penitent" Brigades terrorists, Antonio Savasta and Emilia Liberal, in the area of links between Italy's most ruthless terrorist band and foreign organizations.

He identified the defendent who maintained contact with al-Fatah in France as Valerio Morucci but said that he could not give information on any Palestinian shipments of arms earmarked for the Red Brigades.

He said, however, that he had heard of sea voyages to the Middle East for picking up weapons and referred to another defendent on trial here in this connection. The same suspect, Maurizio Folini, had marginal ties with members of Soviet security organs who paved the way for the Palestinian contact, according to Cianfanelli.

The trial continues on Monday.

CSO: 6131/503

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SPAIN

BETTER EQUIPPED ETA-M STILL EFFECTIVE DESPITE ISOLATION

Desperation Offensive

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Apr 82 pp 32-38

[Text] Armed to the teeth, the terrorists are gambling everything.

Coinciding with the possible definitive entry of Spain into NATO, with the end of the trial of the 23 February coupists, with the situation of the international crisis and with the call for general elections in the near future, following the Andalucia elections on 23 May, the ETA-M [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group-Military Assembly] seems to have launched what could be a desperation offensive to force the Madrid government to negotiate. While police experts are saying that these are the final death throes of an organization of gunmen on the way to extinction, other observers point out that we are far from being in that final phase of indiscriminate violence which puts an end to alienated groups of that kind.

On Saturday, 17 April 1982, an hour after many Spaniards who had watched Vincent Minelli's "Designing Woman" on television had gone to bed, four men dressed in sports clothes and leather hunting jackets approached the Rios Rosas telephone central, in the heart of Madrid, and knocked on the door.

The security guard of the building, in which all the telephone monitoring services of Basque Country appear to be centralized, saw them through the grilled window. He thought it unusual for anyone to knock on the door at such an hour; however, one of the visitors said:

"Let us in. We are police officers. We have come here to set up a stakeout in this central."

A moment later the guard and the caretaker, who had failed to confirm the identity of the strange visitors, were staring into the muzzle of a 14-shot "Browning" machine pistol.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The unexpected visitors, members of an ETA-m commando group, deactivated the building's alarm systems and fanned out on all floors until they had located and assembled the 13-man guard force.

One quarter of an hour later, when everything was under control, one of the terrorists made a mysterious phone call; and five men, members of the same commando group, showed up at the building.

The nine terrorists then brought about 10 packets of a nitrogenous [exogeno] plastic explosive into the building. This explosive is similar to Plastic No 2 but does not present the same handling dangers and deteriorates less.

The packets were distributed on all floors and several electric detonators were attached to each of them, along with an alarm clock and a 4.5-volt battery. When they had completed this operation, they left the building quickly.

Five minutes later, the telephone installations were a heap of rubble, twisted steel beams, sheaves of wires and transistors, having been blown up in an impressive cloud of smoke and dust.

ETA-m had attained its most important strategic objective since the death of Carrero Blanco. Some 700,000 Madrid telephone subscribers were affected by the explosion; and telephone communications with Avila, Caceres, Ciudad Real, Guadalajara, Salamanca, Segovia, Soria, Toledo, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Santa Cruz de Tenerife and foreign countries lost much of their quality.

The following day, thousands of Madrilenians had to wait long hours at bank windows to cash a check or verify a transfer. The data terminal which was housed in the central had also been affected, and 6,000 banking institutions were deprived of this fundamental service.

The act of violence against the Rios Rosas telephone central, one of the nerve centers of Spanish telephone communications, was the latest in a series of terrorist attacks carried out by the ETA-m in several Spanish provinces in a synchronized combined manner.

The terrorist escalation, about which CAMBIO 16 has reported in earlier issues, began on 14 March 1982 when an ETA-m commando group assassinated two policemen and one woman who were having lunch at the "Rancho Chileno" bar in Sestao, 30 km from Bilbao, and wounded two other policemen.

In that operation, one of the terrorists was wounded by a ricochet from his own weapon; and the ETA-m, as a result thereof, decided to suspend the offensive for 2 weeks to give the Bilbao commando group time to reorganize.

Last Wednesday, at 0750 hours, the ETA-m gave the definitive "fire" order. In the outskirts of San Sebastian, 200 meters from the Bilbao-Behovia highway, eight terrorists unpacked an EPG-7 bazooka of Soviet make and shelled the Inchaurrondo Civil Guard garrison, where over 600 Benemerita families reside.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The surprise attack, with medium-heavy weapons, prevented the civil guardsmen, who had two helicopters and highly efficient armored vehicles in Inchaurreondo, from reacting quickly.

For the second time, the Barcelona ETA-m 2 days later again used medium-heavy weapons. However, in this attack, which took place in the heart of Barcelona against an army vehicle [miembra], the terrorists who used another EPG-7 showed that they did not know how to operate it. The grenade, from which they had failed to remove the safety pin, hit a floor above the minibus and failed to explode.

On the same day, the ETA issued its ultimatum: "If the police and the Civil Guard do not get out of Euzkadi [Basque Country], the ETA will attack the garrisons with medium-heavy weapons."

The government reacted resolutely: "With that would-be ultimatum, the ETA is not telling us anything new," said Ignacio Aguirre, government spokesman. "The government knows what the terrorists' plans are and has taken all the necessary steps."

Qualitative Leap Forward

And yet, before the Ministry of Interior realized that a full-blown terrorist offensive was underway and ordered a general police alert, more incidents were to take place.

In Pamplona, a relatively peaceful city, a commando group made up of eight terrorists attacked a National Police armored car with machine-gun fire and bazooka shells.

It was 1200 hours on 17 April. One of the bazooka shells hit the armored car dead center and blew a 10-centimeter hole in it near the driver's seat. In spite of the fact that only the penetrating charge of the shell had exploded, national police officer Vicente Gareca Lopez was killed and Teodomiro Diaz Fores, another national policeman and an excellent soccer player, lost his left leg.

A few hours later, as the news of the Pamplona attack was being reported by Basque radio broadcasting stations, the ETA's weapons roared again. In Bilbao, the civil guardsmen of the La Salve garrison were attacked with anti-tank grenades and in Algorta (Guipuzcoa) a Benemerita detachment which was guarding the installations of a garrison felt the fragments of bazooka shells in their flesh. It was necessary to amputate the hand of one of the wounded civil guardsmen, Antonio Guerra Fernandez.

The escalation ended on 19 April, a day on which a terrorist commando group attacked a Civil Guard garrison in the Guipuzcoa town of Eibar with hand grenades and rifle fire.

Taking advantage of the dark of night, the commando group escaped; however, during the exchange of gunfire between Civil Guard and terrorist forces, a resident was wounded, 20-year old Felix Cid Cepeda.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In the opinion of observers, the new terrorist escalation means an important qualitative leap forward by the ETA-m. During this offensive, the terrorists not only used medium-heavy weapons, which are more powerful than the pistols and submachine guns employed up to now, but also carried out their activities in a synchronized way and in accordance with a perfectly structured plan.

In 5 days, between 14 and 19 April, the ETA-m carried out eight operations with a toll of one dead and 11 wounded, with simultaneous attacks in Madrid, Barcelona, Guipuzcoa and Navarra.

The terrorists did not use more powerful and destructive weapons but increased the number of members in each commando group from four to eight persons as a minimum.

This emphasizes the fact that ETA-m, in order to carry out these actions, needed at least 50 gunmen brought in from France and a support infrastructure which ranged from 80 to 100 additional persons.

Despite the fact that ETA-m can count upon 452 liberated individuals [liberados], the general impression is that the recent escalation means that the organization had made an unprecedented military effort, to the point that the various commando groups used two different kinds of bazookas, assault rifles of diverse sources and makes--many of them manufactured over 30 years ago--including hunting shotguns.

Specialists on the subject of the ETA also emphasize that the organization lacks technical training in the use of medium-heavy weapons, which almost never hit their targets and when they did they failed to explode because the terrorists had not activated the shells.

Analysts of terrorist activities add another factor to this lack of technical training: the practice of abandoning weapons during flight.

In the opinion of specialists in terrorist activities, all these things permit the conclusion that although the ETA has been able to plan and execute a terrorist escalation on paper, its commando groups, perhaps because they are made up of very young persons, lack technical training and the motivation to take action.

What is more, police sources feel that the ETA can only carry out a series of actions of this scope through general mobilization of its forces and an expenditure of 200 million pesetas once or twice a year.

The most recent escalation, in the opinion of the same sources, was only possible thanks to the fact that the terrorist organization during the last months had accumulated several million pesetas from the collection of the "revolutionary tax," in addition to the money received from the ransom of Bilbao industrialist Jose Liperheide.

With that money the terrorists also have begun to rearm themselves with medium-heavy weapons. Of these weapons, the most important category is the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EPG-7 bazooka, which is of Soviet make and which the ETA-m purchased from Palestinian terrorist organizations a couple of months ago.

The EPG-7, a bazooka which is also used by the Italian Red Brigade and was used in Spain previously by the ETA-pm [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Political and Military Assembly], is a weapon that weighs 8 kilos, is a little over 1 meter long and is capable of sending shells weighing 2 kilos 300 meters in 1 second.

Another weapon which the ETA terrorists feverishly try to get and which probably is now in their hands is the SA-7 (SAM7) rocket, also of Soviet make.

This rocket, which weighs a little over 10 kilos and has a range of 4,500 meters, at one and one-half times the speed of sound, has an infrared guidance system and is almost infallible. It can down low-flying airplanes.

The Palestinian terrorists frequently use this rocket in their attacks; and ETA-m has attempted to get these rockets through Libya or Lebanon, where the Palestinian guerrillas are playing a very important role.

A political statement made by Libyan leader Mu'ammarr Qadhafi a year ago to the effect that he considers the ETA and IRA as the only two liberation movements in Europe demonstrates that Libya is supporting terrorism in Europe, according to very credible sources.

"Final Death Throes"

While Ministry of Interior sources have told CAMBIO 16 that the most recent terrorist escalation is the "final death throes" of the beast mortally wounded by police action, other equally credible sources are evaluating the qualitative leap forward by the Basque gunmen in quite another manner.

The basic and priority objective of the ETA, according to these sources, is to provoke the government by using all available means with a view to forcing the government to take a step backward in Basque Country. "That is the only method they have," the same source told this magazine, "to justify the international campaign they have undertaken to show that there is oppression, lack of freedom and democracy in Basque Country."

This campaign which is being carried out by ETA official spokesmen in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela, Mexico, Brussels and Denmark is going to collapse about their ears during the World Cup playoffs when it is shown that the information ETA is disseminating outside Spain is totally false.

In any event, specialists on terrorism are complaining of the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify the real objectives of the ETA. CAMBIO 16 was told: "When the politicians in the organization went over to Herri Batasuna [popular unity] to devote themselves to the political struggle, they lost control of the organization which passed into the hands of the gunmen." A revealing point in this regard is an incident which took place a month ago at the Anoeta de San Sebastian motorcycle racetrack during a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

nationalist rally when two members of the ETA got up on the platform and burned a Spanish flag in public. The Herri Batasuna leaders were struck speechless. They did not know the intentions of the ETA which had used them to organize the rally.

In its ultimatum to the Spanish state, the ETA, which is threatening to go back into action with a fury on 15 May 1982, 20 days before the World Cup playoffs, is making a maximal demand that even the terrorists know is impossible to grant. Madrid is not going to withdraw its police from Basque Country nor is it going to transfer the functions of the Civil Guard and National Police to the Basque government at this time.

Therefore, it is probable that by means of such an exorbitant and outlandish demand the terrorists are trying to find a way to negotiate with the Madrid government with a view to receiving lesser concessions, such as a new amnesty which could benefit both the terrorists and the "23 February" coupists.

This possibility which is being offered in Abertzale [patriotic] quarters as very viable is being rejected outright by the central government. "There will be no negotiations with the terrorists," CAMBIO 16 was told by a Ministry of Interior spokesman, "so long as Juan Jose Roson Perez is head of the ministry."

"Not only have they lost popular support but no longer have that support and information infrastructure which the terrorists had 2 years ago and which the police dismantled," the spokesman added to justify the so-called "rounding up" of the terrorists.

It is true that the Basque terrorists are now more isolated than ever, that there are over 500 activists in prison charged with being part of information commando groups and another 600 charged with crimes of violence and that the Basque society, principally that segment supporting the PNV [Basque National Party] and the "Left for Socialism" are turning their backs on the group of gunmen whom for years they had supported sentimentally and aided with money, shelter and protection.

However, it is not so clear that this is the end of the ETA. Although many of these vermin are dying while killing, an expert told CAMBIO 16: "So long as there is refuge in France, it will not be easy to put an end to Basque terrorism once and for all."

ETA-M's International Connections Summarized

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Apr 82 pp 38-41

[Article by Jose Diaz Herrera, Jose Manuel Arija, Xavier Domingo, Francisco Caparros and Rafael Cid]

[Text] No one knows more about the ETA today than the French police and intelligence services. Therefore, no one knows more about the Basque terrorist organization than the French Government.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The whereabouts of the 700 ETAists--militants, politico-militants and autonomous commandos--residing in France have been pinpointed and are surveilled; their telephones are "bugged"; all their movements are known, both inside France and outside the French borders.

However, the French police and the SDEC [Foreign Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Service] (which has a good "intelligence apparatus" in Bayonne) are jealously guarding this information about the international contacts of the ETAists and their movements, alleging that the communication of this information to the Spanish police or other interested international services would be "dangerous from the political standpoint."

The Spanish police and other interested services (Italian, German, British or American services) feel on the other hand that knowledge of the material information about the ETA in the possession of the French would in short order facilitate its dismantling.

Both the Spanish minister of interior, Juan Jose Roson, and Commissioner Manuel Ballesteros have repeatedly asked the French to communicate to them the complete file of reports on the international network of support, sympathies and connections available to the ETA in its French sanctuary. The French do not deny, cannot deny, that they have such information. However, every interview has been a disappointment to the Spaniards. And the fact of the matter is that the number one international ETA connection is France.

According to a Secret Police detective assigned to Bordeaux, the reason for this silence is that the French Government does not wish to see the French Basque Country converted into a battlefield between ETAists and organizations such as the Spanish Basque Battalion or others. Another French police source, a supporter of greater cooperation with the Spaniards, gave us another story: certain revelations about the international contacts of the ETA on French soil could be a harsh blow to the foreign policy of Paris.

There is not contradiction between the two versions; and both sources agree in washing their hands of the affair, saying that orders to communicate nothing had come from very high up. In this regard, there has not been the slightest change in policy with the change in presidents.

ETAist Sympathies

In fact the continuation of the French government's complicity and its reasons therefor have brought the ETA an entire gamut of more or less declared sympathies and support which range from militants and elected representatives of the Socialist Party (and now also of the French Communist Party) to Matignon.

For this entire "Left," the Spanish Basque Country is a kind of oppressed colony; ETA is a national liberation movement; and Spanish democracy is the mask of fascism. Such thoughts were expressed to us very recently at the headquarters of the French Socialist Party in Paris, Rue Solferino, by a high

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

official of the majority. Gaston Defferre, minister of interior, had himself spoken in very similar terms in an interview with LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. With respect to the request for asylum of the deputy from HB [Herri Batasuna], Francisco Letamendia, his attorney, Michel Prat, told Miguel Ramos of CAMBIO 16: "Mitterrand's attitude will depend upon normalization in Spain. The French Government cannot fail to take into account the political analysis of the refugees from West European democracies in which there is also persecution."

The ETA presence in France is large and strong. The history of the organization is linked with the border relationship, and from the very first moment the French sanctuary has been increasingly plagued by nationalist groups, some of which, such as Iparraterrak, are also terrorist and separatist groups. Compared with French support, aid and complicity, all the other ETA international contacts are secondary. All of them in fact originate and develop on French soil and involve activities ranging from political relations to arms trafficking.

What is certain is that the ETA is very selective in its international contacts--we are speaking here about the ETA. It trusts no one and in order for there to be a connection an essential condition is that there be some kind of parallelism between the ETA and the other groups; and above all an essential condition for understanding one another is that the other groups share separatist feelings.

The Irish Brothers

Therefore, the ETA has relations with members of the Baader-Meinhoff ring and other groups which do not have a God, master or country to call their own, such as the Red Brigades.

The ETA's best contacts were and are with similar separatist organizations such as the FLQ (Quebec Liberation Front), the Corsican Liberation Front, and above all the IRA. In this case, what is involved are old, solid and privileged relations. An authentic collaboration which endures and intensifies.

Quite rightly we can say in this case of parallel histories that the ETA is acting like the younger brother and favored disciple of the IRA. They have the same Catholic origin, the same ecclesiastic and above all Jesuit support, similar splits, similar languages and simultaneous movement toward pro-Soviet Marxism. They have the same bloody tactics and close cooperation in arms trafficking. There is no difference between them regards the "military" priority. The "Ulsterization" of the Basque Country is a concept which comes to mind and which has often been espoused by theoreticians such as Herri Batasuna. This is a trap which has been avoided up to now in Spain.

It seems that the first contacts between the ETA and IRA were made in 1971 in Algeria and continued in Ireland with the head of the Irish organization, Sean Macstiofain. A report from the Spanish secret service concludes that a mutual aid pact was signed in 1972.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

As a matter of fact, the ETAists and the men of the IRA had already had the opportunity to talk with one another at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966, from which developed the two concrete positions and applications of the "internationalist" doctrines endorsed by Moscow in 1969 at the World Conference of the Communist Parties that are still in force, according to a recent statement by Georges Marchais during the last congress of the French Communist Party.

Since then, the paths taken by the IRA and ETA have been parallel in their "ideological" aspects and Moscow-oriented and have not ceased intersecting one another in arms supply activities. Not long ago, many ETAists arrested in France were transporting arms for the IRA. Similar incidents had already occurred in 1972 when Jose Luis Larranaga was arrested--he was working with the German trafficker, Gunther Leinhausser--and in 1975 when customs officials intercepted Jose Mendizabal on the Paris-Brussels highway.

The Algerian FLN [National Liberation Front] owed a debt to the ETA which was repaid when it won its independence. Before that, during the war with France, the Algerian terrorists had benefited from the skill and knowledge of the ETA border crossers when they were fleeing from the French police and took refuge in Spain.

The Moslem Brothers

Afterward, Algeria made instructors and training camps available to the ETA and also facilitated its relations with other Moslem nationalist groups, particularly with the Palestinians, who in turn opened the Libyan door to the ETAists.

In specialized quarters it is estimated that the information held by the Spanish secret services on the presence of ETAists in Algeria and other countries of the Moslem world is accurate. What is more, as with the IRA, there was a certain amount of ideological parallelism between the ETA and the FLN which for a time was reflected in ETA "doctrine." For a period of time, its "literature" was very much influenced by the Third World social-nationalism of Franz Fanon and by Algerian propaganda.

Relations with Libya and Qadhafi, which were arranged principally through the intermediary of the IRA, are said to have been less intense, although a reliable source reported the presence of Apala in Tripoli last year. We are still talking about the ETA-m. The ETA-pm had more intense relations with the Moslem organizations, particularly Palestinian or Yemeni organizations; but that is another story.

Today the relations of ETA-m with Arab terrorism have more to do with the tangled complex of arms trafficking than with its physical presence in Islamic lands. However, the contacts are continuing, although they are made principally in the "international brigades" on the Salvadoran battlefields or in training bases of the "red mercenaries" in Nicaragua.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Latin American Brothers

The ERP [People's Revolutionary Army], MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left] and Montoneros in their day had close relations with the ETA; however, today, via Paris (Regis Debray) and Havana, the "diplomacy" of the Basque terrorists and separatist organization is being conducted on the ill-fated Central American chessboard, with its capital in Managua.

For a long time the top ETA foreign relations official, Jose Antonio Urruticoechea Bengoechea, alias "Josu Ternera," was there with an office, telephone and almost legal representation and may still be there. The man in the Sandinist capital is his second in command, Jose Larrategui Cuadra, alias "Antxulo." Other terrorists who have passed through Sandinist camps located between Esteli, Matagalpa and Grinatega are Tomas Linaza Echeverria and Justo Ortego Ezquerria. The "mission" also has four or five more representatives whose names have not been determined. Recently, HB representatives, including Castell, paid a visit, which was fully reported by the newspaper EGUIN, to Latin American countries in which the ETA has "colonies": Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Mexico.

It is also known that a group of ETAists up until recently was receiving training in Cuba as medical corpsmen. The Cubans, because of their more or less good relations with the Spanish Government, are reducing as much as possible their visible contacts with the ETA which are conducted through several Spanish persons or groups friendly to Havana or now, more simply, through the French conduit.

The same could be said of ETA relations with the KGB and the Soviets. Up until 3 or 4 years ago, KGBers in the USSR Embassy in Madrid made frequent trips to the Basque Country and personal contacts with ETAists in San Juan and Biarritz were detected.

Those who surveil the movements of such personalities say: "Today they are traveling much less" and the Soviets "are afraid that it can be proved they have some contact with the ETA" which doubtless would prompt the immediate closure of their embassy in Madrid. Nevertheless, the anti-Sovietism of the leftist kind which characterized the ETA's "literature" for years has disappeared. For example, the ETA has not condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan nor has it demonstrated the slightest solidarity with Polish Solidarity.

As a matter of fact, both the IRA and ETA are in the line of "anti-imperialist movements" that accepts and agrees with Moscow's "internationalism," which was defined at the World Conference of the Communist Parties in 1969 and recently redefined by Marchais in Paris.

ETA Tactics Deplored

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Apr 82 p 39

[News commentary by Ander Landaburu: "From Shot to Grenade"]

[Text] To what level of insanity and irrationality has the ETA gone to make public its most recent document, an ultimatum which contains a threat to the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

families living in garrison houses or in their vicinity? It is not enough for them to kill a doctor or engineer and to extort [money] from hundreds of citizens or cause them to flee from the Basque Country in terror; now they want to show us their "revolutionary Abertzale spirit" by killing families, women and children. From a shot in the neck they are moving up to a grenade through the window.

In this leap forward, as a possible desperate effort to seek negotiation through an insane and wrong strategy and to replace their loss of popular support with spectacular actions including the use for the first time of medium-heavy weapons, we do not know whether the ETA is engaged in a "desperation" offensive or, as some sources maintain, whether this is the beginning of the end of the organization.

However, what is being demonstrated is the lack of ethical policy, dehumanization, barbarity, fascism and the messianic and sick minds of the current leaders of the ETA who have absolutely nothing to do with that group of idealists who took part in the fifth assembly back in the year 1967, under the dictatorship.

Leaders who have become skilled in the handling of a pistol instead of ideas, who have no scruples about recruiting beardless youths from high schools, youths who barely knew about and much less suffered under Francoism. Young men who call themselves by the mandatory catchwords "socialists or Marxists" but have not read two books and always substitute training or armed action for intellectual education. Young men who are only motivated by simplistic and at times racist "slogans" and who in many cases unfortunately wind up as cannon fodder or prison inmates a few months after beginning their "revolutionary adventure." Young men, in short, who are promised an idyllic, independent, socialist, etc. Basque Country but who with the dynamism of pistols will only get to know a country in stagnation and ruins and immersed in a wave of madness.

Some time ago the ETA lost the political battle. In Basque Country we are not ready to accede to conditions imposed by force of arms; and ETA cannot set itself up as the representative of our people and much less of the workers because doctors, guards, cab drivers, engineers, merchants and newsman Portell were assassinated by it.

There is no doubt that at this time the ETAists--or those manipulating them--objectively are the allies of Tejero. They have become his best defenders and prefer a coup because they know that sooner or later democracy and the regime of freedom, which is increasingly consolidated, will finally smother them.

In the meantime, the ETA will seek its own justification through the dictatorship which some are longing for and will continue to encourage the climate of a fascist coup. In this way they will be able to present themselves as the saviors of the fatherland in a Basque society anesthetized by the blood which they themselves have spilled. Who will help them then?

It is necessary to isolate the ETA, respond to its challenge, destroy the myth of its power with valor and courage and convince ourselves that the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

struggle is every day. Only in this way will we be able to come out of this situation of stagnation, semiruin and terror. And if the ETA wishes to negotiate let it say so openly but only after it has definitely stopped its terrorist activities.

As for Madrid, it is not enough to finally recognize and applaud the efforts of Euskadiko Esquerra [Basque Left], the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and its government in this struggle; it is necessary--forgetting party electoral pettiness--to help the Basque president to assume his constitutional duties and responsibilities in police matters as soon as possible. We should forget about LOAPAS [organic and harmonization law of the autonomous process] and other gimmicks so long as the priority subject is the struggle for democracy and the status of the autonomies which are today threatened by the ETA and coupism. The rest of the country should understand that here--as Arzallus stated recently--we do not want dictators, not even Basque dictators.

COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.

8143
CSO: 3110/139

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SPAIN

TERRORISM IN SPAIN

Barcelona EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA in Spanish 1982 pp 217-272 and Table of Contents

[Book by Alejandro Munoz Alonso: "Terrorism in Spain," Terror Versus Pluralistic Coexistence in Freedom. Tablero Collection.]

[Text] Tablero Collection

Board of Directors: Rafael Borrás, Victor Mendoza and Baltasar Porcel

Editorial Board: Maria Teresa Arbo, Marcel Plans and Carlos Pujol

Copyright Alejandro Munoz Alonso, 1982

Planeta Publishers, Inc, 273-277 Corcega, Barcelona 8 (Spain)

Collection design and cover by Hans Romberg (Flash Press photo and production by Jordi Royo)

First edition: March 1982

Legal deposit: B. 10041-1982

ISBN 84-320-7314-8

Printed in Spain

"Duplex, Inc" Printing Shops, Ciudad de la Asuncion, 26-D, Barcelona 30

Index

I. The Shadow of Cain	7
Concept and significance of terrorism	9
Terrorism in contemporary Spain	11
Terrorism at the end of Francoism	14
The Burgos trial	17
The origins of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group]	22
From the assassination of Carrero Blanco to the attack on Correo Street	30
The other kinds of terrorism	34
The terrorism of the extreme right	37
The terrorism during the final months of Francoism	40

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

II. The Challenge	49
The Arias-Fraga phase (December 1975-July 1976)	51
Rebirth and christening of GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group]	63
ETA: between the truce and internal problems. The "Pertur" case	65
GRAPO and the extreme right against reform: the winter of 1977-1978	74
The tragic week: the Atocha slaughter	79
From provocation to amnesty	87
A case of marginal terrorism: MPAIAC [Sovereignty and Independence Movement of the Canary Islanias]	96
III. The Escalation	99
The strategy of destabilization	101
The "normalization" of terrorism	111
Negotiating with ETA	120
The provocation of the Armed Forces	125
When ETA acts, GRAPO falls	129
ETA: kill more to negotiate better	136
IV. The Response	143
The great maneuvers against terror	145
The struggle for the Statute	147
The French front	156
Second general elections	158
New government, old problems	163
General offensive of terror	167
A bloody week in May	169
The Statute of Guernica	176
ETA (p-m) [political-military] against tourism	179
A blow to GRAPO	185
ETA and the Basque referendum	188
Violence after the Statute. The Autonomous Commandos	193
ETA (p-m) strategy. The Ruperez kidnapping	197
ETA against Basque autonomy	207
V. The Retreat	215
The failure of the "ETA-State"	217
The incoherence of ETA (p-m)	221
The campaign against UCD [Democratic Center Union]	223
ETA loses nerve	225
The Front for Peace	228
The Madrid-Basque government tension	231
The eternal French problem	234
The Suarez resignation and the king's visit to the Basque Country	237
The extreme right against democracy: from terrorism to coupism	241
The ETA attrition: the truces	247

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The ETA (m) final escalation. The government against terror. the international dimension	251
The tragic week in May 1981. Blow to GRAPO	255
ETA and Socialist France	258
The great ETA (m) truce	260
A blow to ETA	262
The internal debate in ETA (p-m) on "armed struggle"	263
The end of the truce	267
ETA (m): the return to the attack	269

The Failure of the "ETA-State"

When one studies the topic of contemporary Spanish terrorism, what is most striking is the lasting nature of the ETA phenomenon. While the other terrorist groups, particularly GRAPO (its leading competitor in persistence) are marked by their intermittency, taking action, being broken up and disappearing for months, ETA has always shown signs of an extremely noticeable continuity, interrupted only by truces the occasion and duration of which have depended solely on the decision of the terrorist organization. But, in addition, ETA has distinguished itself from the other terrorist organizations for its consistency and entrenchment. Even though on the occasion of the burial of certain GRAPO members, such as Collazo Araujo or Cerdan Calixto, there have been small groups of individuals favoring that terrorist group, these have always been very localized phenomena. Only a very small part of the populace has felt associated with GRAPO throughout that strange organization's 6-year history.

ETA, on the other hand, has always enjoyed enormous popular support, which has fluctuated during the various phases of recent political evolution, but which has been evident from the late 1960's until the present, and might even be described as massive on occasion. Mass mobilizations of large scope have taken place in the name of ETA, and among them there have been demonstrations by many thousands of persons who have hailed ETA, and shouted "ETA Herria Zurekin" (ETA, the people are with you), or that other terrifying slogan regarding the State Security Forces and against all "collaborators" with the "Spanish occupier" in general, "ETA, kill them." The opinion polls taken during recent years in the Basque Country have always reflected large percentages in favor of "armed struggle" among those associated with the ones who back and justify the existence of ETA as a "military organization," in other words, those who view Basque terrorism as an acceptable "national liberation struggle."

During the recent phase, wherein ETA-military and ETA politico-military have appeared quite distinct from one another, there has been little doubt that the popular entrenchment of these two different branches is very closely reflected in the backing given to the two political coalitions, Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity] and Euskadiko Eskerra [Basque Left]. Nevertheless, it is true that since late 1979 or early 1980, this latter organization has shown certain signs of independence from ETA (p-m), at whose Seventh Assembly (1976) its leading component, EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party] had its origin.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This indisputable popular support will lend ETA some of what most of the terrorist groups usually lack: a legitimacy. We are interpreting this term here in the sense given it by political science, that is, a quality enjoyed by certain powers whereby their ambition to impose themselves and to exercise authority is accepted by a populace which justifies it because that ambition coincides with the sociological aspirations or beliefs of that populace. This is the type of legitimacy that the IRA enjoys for the Catholics of Ulster, the Algerian FLN for the Arabs of Algeria, the Mau-Mau for the autochthonous population of Kenya or the EOKA for the Greek Cypriots.

Without that "legitimacy" accepted by a sizable portion of the Basque population the persistence of the ETA phenomenon would have been impossible. Thus, the Basque conflict is presented to us as a "conflict of legitimacies," because within the Basque society there coexist, at least, one sector which has attributed that fundamental political quality ("the temperament of the city" as Guillermo Ferrero called it) to the central authorities of Spain, considering anything that would entail a break with them to be "illegitimate," and another sector which attributes "legitimacy" to those who represent the radical ambition for a break with the Spanish State, even by armed struggle, in other words, ETA. There is still a third sector which would base the legitimacy on a pact between two sovereign and irreducible elements: the Spanish State and the original sovereignty of the Basque people. This contractualist concept constantly crops up in the political literature of the so-called moderate nationalism, the most perfect representative of which is the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party].

This attribute of legitimacy is considered by political science as the foundation of the state. And this explains why a statist aspiration is quite perceptible in the evolution of ETA. In fact, ETA has acted as an embryonic state, particularly since the early 1970's. This ambition to be a state, and to display the authority and powers with which states appear to be endowed, has been fostered by the fact that, especially between 1976 and 1980, the State, the Spanish State, appeared to be relinquishing its power in the Basque Country. The distinguishing traits of the state and the exercise of its authority, ceased to be apparent. There was constant mention of an "absence of the state." And thus there occurred a power vacuum which has been filled to a large extent by ETA. The very legitimacy of the Basque autonomous institutions seems to depend on the ETA's definitive endorsement. A head-on clash with ETA has been avoided and, when violence or terrorism is condemned, it is done in general terms, without alluding specifically to ETA, or else the condemnation of ETA violence is offset by a condemnation of institutional violence or of the FSE's repression.

The first attribute derived from this "ETA legitimacy", from this concept of ETA as an embryonic state, is precisely that of legitimizing its violence. It is well known that the classic theory of the state affirms that the state has the monopoly on coercion, only the state can exercise force, and the violence used by it is legitimized and justified accordingly. Hence, the ETA's violence is "legitimized" for those who back the organization directly or indirectly. In fact, ETA is viewed as a holder of that monopoly on coercion, and this explains, for example, why when a labor dispute is not resolved through the ordinary expedients of negotiation, ETA attributes to itself the "last resort," the use of coercion on behalf of the side considered weakest. This situation, which appears quite evident, particularly in ETA (p-m), means that ETA assumes authority belonging to the army and the police.

OFFICIAL

The second state attribute exercised by ETA is that of creating a certain tax system which takes the form of extortion of businessmen, professional people and citizens who are forced to pay the so-called "revolutionary tax." Although ETA has never lacked voluntary contributions and assistance from sympathizers, at first ETA resorted to holdups in order to "recover" the funds that it needed to keep the organization operating. But gradually, as it felt more "legitimized," it replaced this procedure, which unquestionably entails risks, with the coercive "levying" of the "revolutionary tax" which, moreover, afforded far greater income.

At the outset, it was the "Hispanist" oligarchy often established in the residential district of Neguri which was the victim of the ETA extortion. Many of them left the Basque Country and settled in Andalucia or Madrid. But on some occasions ETA pursued them to their new residences. The letter received by the individuals selected by the terrorist organization as forced taxpayers usually began in this manner: "The Basque bourgeoisie, that social class to which you belong, cooperated in the annexation of part of our country to the Spanish State, forgetting its national origin and its culture, for the sake of its economic interests; a nation and a culture which belonged not only to it, but to all our people as well."

Gradually, however, the "census" of the forced taxpayers was expanded, first in about 1978, to include medium and small-sized business owners and, since early 1980, to include professionals of various types or merchants.

When ETA was divided into two branches, both used the same procedure to collect funds, thereby causing great confusion. Later, the autonomous commandos used extortion as well. And opportunistic elements and criminals, even in other sections of Spain, pretended to be from ETA, almost always unsuccessfully, in search of money from others.

Using this procedure, ETA has managed to collect billions of pesetas. According to certain statistics, in 1979 alone ETA collected 20 billion pesetas. The figure may seem exaggerated when one considers the fact that, in 1977, ETA sent nearly 100 letters (another item of information impossible to check) demanding the "tax" from Basque businessmen, and that the amounts demanded of the businessmen usually ranged between 5 and 20 million, and for professional people between half a million and 5 million. But any estimate in this area is risky and arbitrary.

For some time ETA made use of middlemen to collect the "revolutionary tax," but it gave up the mediation when the Legasa incident occurred in late 1978. The protagonist in the incident was a builder, Jose Legasa Uburia, who refused to pay the "tax" and reported the situation to the French police, who arrested three ETA (m) leaders, including the notorious "Tropa," Javier Aya Zulaica.

In all instances, the ETA letter demanding payment of the revolutionary tax threatened the "capitalists unwilling to contribute" with execution. And, in several cases, the threat was carried out. For example, the assassination of Modesto Carriega Perez, director of the Hispano-American Bank of Baracaldo, on 12 September 1979, was due to his refusal to pay the "tax." And the same motive was involved in the assassination of the Count of Aresti on 25 March 1980.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Many of those required to pay the ETA extortion have resorted to the professional services of lawyers who are "abertzales" [patriots] or close to "abertzalismo," and who have negotiated for some reduction. It is claimed that at times their fees have been on the order of half a million pesetas.

The information which ETA has on the financial status of its forced taxpayers is usually quite accurate, and there is no doubt that it uses the services of individuals who have infiltrated banking establishments, business firms or government agencies. Sometimes this information has been wrong, and ETA has been willing to reduce the amount of the extortion and, it is claimed, even to "exempt" completely from the payment when its victims have been able to prove the real state of their assets.

In early 1980, ETA launched a new campaign for the tax payment, sending letters to certain recipients, as we have noted previously. The front pages of the newspapers featured the case of Juan Alcorta Maiz, a Guipuzcoan businessman who, after having received the ETA extortion letter, refused to pay and sent the entire press a letter reporting the incident and explaining his refusal to pay. It is noteworthy that the entire press published the letter prominently, except for EGIN, another component of the "ETA-State" which printed it as contributed advertising.

In the Alcorta case, there was the fact that one of his sons had belonged to ETA (p-m) and was married to a sister of "Pertur"; while a niece of his was the widow of an ETA member, Miguel Gardogui, who was killed in a confrontation with the police.

In his letter, Alcorta cited the "blackmail which is destroying my country, my town and my people"; and asserted: "It is difficult for me to understand the inhibition of an entire community faced with such a serious and increasingly spreading problem." With a courage praised on all sides, Alcorta confronted the ETA members' death threat. Viana, the UCD secretary general in Euskadi, described Alcorta's act as "a first major seed-planting for a brave collective reaction." But the fact is that it was like a cry in the wilderness. Garaiocoechea had called upon his fellow citizens saying that it was necessary to take risks, but the atmosphere for assuming that kind of position was lacking.

What Alcorta's action represented individually was matched corporatively by the note made public on 1 April 1980 by the Vizcaya Physicians Association, also refusing, in the name of its members, to pay the tax "that runs counter to our human condition and to the dignity and good name of this Basque people, who can neither accept nor be resigned to such a state of savagery." A few months later, in September, the mayor of Usurbil and PNV militant Andres Bueno publicly read in the town hall plenum the ETA extortion letter asking him for "2 million pesetas in the form of a revolutionary tax." Bueno decided not to pay, announcing this at another municipal session at which all the parties except Herri Lan, a local version of Herri Batasuna, backed a motion to condemn the action."

* CAMBIO 16, No 440, 11 May 1980, "Alone Against ETA," pp 22 ff, and No 461, 5 October 1980, "I Will Not Pay Either," pp 27 ff.

The "ETA-State" was beginning to totter, and the explanation was relatively simple. The refusal of the "milis" to accept the autonomous system represented by the Statute of Guernika even as a platform for continuing to progress, as the "poli-milis" had done, was causing it to lose the popular support that it had enjoyed in other times. Its "legitimacy" declined, because in the minds of increasingly larger sectors of people weary of the struggle, bloodshed and terror, the true legitimacy was that of the Statute. This explains why the "political program" of ETA (m), represented by the so-called "KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] alternative," has increasingly lost its mobilizing capacity, because its maximalist nature is no longer tempting to virtually anyone. As opposed to the "KAS alternative" the Basque people have unequivocally chosen the Statute of Guernika.

ETA is being left alone, without "legitimacy," and has embarked upon the insane path of blind terrorism. Its theory of the national, social revolution has declined but, like a machine without controls, ETA continues to kill, because its members do not know how to do anything else.

And when an armed organization is removed from the political area, the inertia of clandestinity and violence as a way of life inevitably prompt it to become a "Mafia." Hence it is not surprising that, since 1980, the Mafia-like features of ETA have become increasingly evident. In this way one can interpret its implication in the world of drugs and a series of assassinations which have all the features of a settling of accounts; such as the assassination in November 1980 of Jose Maria Perez de Urreta, charged with being one of the leading individuals responsible for the distribution of drugs in the Basque Country. But it was not social morality which prompted ETA, but rather a typical problem of market distribution. This also explains why several ETA (m) militants in jail have drug trafficking charges against them.

The Incoherence of ETA (p-m)

ETA (p-m), which appeared to have some more solid and coherent ideological plans, has also experienced the same process of deterioration owing to its inability to extract from its political premises their logical consequences that would have prompted it to give up the "armed struggle." Hence the incoherent features of the "poli-milis" action during 1980.

In June of that year, as during the previous year, ETA (p-m) began a campaign against tourism. The nightmare of the telephoned warnings and the ousters from hotels started on St John's night, 24 June, in Alicante, which was holding its celebrations; and it continued later in other Mediterranean locations.

ETA (p-m) had announced its plan on 20 June in San Sebastian, calling for the release of 19 ETA members, the expulsion of the director of the Soria jail and the setting of a definitive date for the Navarra referendum.

The ETA (p-m)'s goals (announced at a press conference marked by the "ritual" so well liked by the "poli-milis", wearing hoods, with a secret movement of the newsmen (...), etc.) were palpable proof of that process of deterioration which we cited previously.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In an editorial entitled "Terrorist Blackmail and Political Incoherence," EL PAIS described the terrorist threat "in addition to a sinister provocation," as "a notable monument to foolishness and inconsistency, erected, unfortunately, upon an indiscriminate and massive death threat (...)." It went on to say: "The desire that, once the bloody series of incidents began, the responsibility for the deaths would be borne by the Ministry of Interior is a macabre joke, cynically mentioned by Bandres himself a year ago, when he commented that the surest procedure to prevent a bomb from exploding was not to set it." The Madrid newspaper emphasized the "contradictions in the communique (which) attest to the bounds of inconsistency and inability to reason reached by the terrorists"; such as that of considering the lack of "support from the left" a reason not to back a strike or that of considering the strategy of the "militis" to be "aberrant," as if their own actions did not lack the same support from the left and were not as aberrant as those of ETA (m). *

But this time the "campaign" did not catch the government unawares and, through an ETA member arrested in early June, it found out about the ETA (p-m) plan. An unusual deployment of police along the Mediterranean coast prevented the terrorists from moving about easily. The Congress of Deputies joined the antiterrorist battle, passing a non-law bill whereby the state pledged not to agree, in any instance, to the initiation of negotiations with ETA, and the government and citizens were required to adopt all the measures allowed by law to halt the terrorist action. The bill had only one abstention, that of Bandres, according to whom "the one which is the cause of the cause, is the cause of the evil that has been caused"; which was equivalent to accusing the government, as well as ETA (p-m), of the excesses of the terrorists, based on the very odd interpretation by the Basque deputy which contradicted his remarks of a year before.

The ETA (p-m) attacks in various locations on the Mediterranean coast (Alicante, Mijas, Puerto Banus) did not cause any victims, but did bring on an atmosphere of terror which was highly detrimental for tourism. The new interior minister, Juan Jose Roson, showed a determined and by no means compromising attitude toward terrorism. The ETA members held in Soria were transferred to the maximum security jail at Herrera de la Mancha. At the same time, three of the most prominent leaders of Euskadiko Eskerra (Garayalde, Ignacio Mugica Arregui and Ruiz de Apodaca) were arrested.

The loquacious ETA (p-m) terrorists again explained their "reasons" to newsmen. They justified their action claiming that the progress of the statute had been blocked and UCD had not kept its promises to the Basque Country. They also aimed their attacks at PNV, "which will have to count on the armed organizations in order to govern"; reiterating their desire to continue their "armed struggle."**

The deterioration of ETA (p-m), and its definitely criminal nature, which belied its status as a "good ETA" with which some attempted to depict it, was proven not only by this senseless "campaign against tourism" which already

*EL PAIS, 22 June 1980, Editorial: "Terrorist Blackmail and Political Incoherence," p 10.

** CAMBIO 16, No 449, 13 July 1980, "The 'Boom' of the Bombs," pp 14 ff. and No 450, 20 July 1980, "ETA (p-m) Speaks: Let Us Tell Lies," pp 14 ff.

spoke with sufficient eloquence of its true nature, but also by another gory incident: the assassination, on 25 June, of the board member of the Michelin agency in Vitoria, Luis Hergueta Guinea. The myth of ETA (p-m) as a kind of "generous bandit" which never did more than shoot at the legs of the "exploiters" or "collaborationists" that it held in custody, was resoundingly dispelled. Those who had considered the deathdealing bombs in Madrid during July 1980 a regrettable accident were left definitely without arguments to defend "soft" terrorists whom the implacable logic of violence had led to criminal madness.

The Campaign Against UCD

One of the most significant features of ETA (p-m) is its anti-UCD fixation. In its statements, it is strange how it often attributes the government's complete action to UCD as a party. UCD is assigned the blame and the liability. This also explains why ETA (p-m) has on several occasions aimed its action at UCD deputies. We are already familiar with the Cisneros and Ruperez cases. The consolidation of UCD as a target to be destroyed had been made explicit during July in a communique issued by the ETA (p-m) prisoners in Soria in which, after claiming that UCD was treating them as prisoners of war, they added: "We hold UCD as a whole, cadres, militants and members, responsible, and we call upon ETA to consider this so, making the entire weight of revolutionary justice fall upon that party in its entirety. We urge ETA to respond overwhelmingly to any action by UCD."

The ETA (p-m) "summer campaign" was preceded in 1980 by an abortive kidnapping, that of Gabriel Cisneros. In 1981 also, ETA (p-m) made an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap another Centrist deputy. In the latter instance, it was the Galician deputy, Gomez Franqueira, whose presence of mind thwarted the ETA members' attempt. Franqueira put out the light in the room where he was located, grabbed a pistol from the criminals and fired, wounding one of them.

ETA (p-m) continued its emulation with ETA (m), making several attacks on headquarters of the Civil Guard, such as those at Zubiri and Arike, in the area of its "Navarra campaign." It also continued its anti-UCD campaign by assassinating Juan de Dios Doval Mateos, a law professor who was fourth on the UCD slate in the last elections, on 31 October. The third one on that slate, Jaime Arrese, had also been assassinated just a week earlier. On 23 October, in Elgoibar (Guipuzcoa), this time by the autonomous commandos. On 29 September, another UCD militant, Jose Ignacio Ustaran, husband of a council-woman from the same party, had been assassinated in Vitoria.

Doval, the fifth UCD member who was assassinated in the Basque Country since 9 November 1978, when Luis Candendo died in Anzuola (Guipuzcoa), caused an extensive movement of indignation prominent in which was the participation by his students at the University of San Sebastian who, after holding an assembly, demonstrated silently on the street. It was the first student demonstration to occur in the Basque Country condemning terrorism. It was also another sign of the continuing loss of popular support by the formerly "legitimate" ETA.

The Basque political parties held a joint demonstration on 9 November, including PNV, which had been vacillating. Nearly 30,000 people marched "for peace

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and against terrorism," and (something unprecedented until then) reacted courageously against a group of 200 pro-ETA individuals, forcing them to flee. Another unusual occurrence was the fact that the demonstrators applauded the FOP [Forces of Public Order] which withdrew at their request. All of these were obvious signs that something was starting to change in the Basque Country, and that the "ETA-State" was disintegrating. According to the Socialist Benegas, it was "the beginning of a people's reaction against terrorism." At the same time, in the Alava capital's town hall, PNV seemed to be emerging from the ambiguity which had surrounded it up until then, and which the speech on TVE [Spanish Television] by the president of the Basque Government, Carlos Garaicoechea, after Doval's death, had not escaped. The "lendakari" condemned terrorism and cited the moral and economic bankruptcy threatening Euskadi, but did not mention ETA, so that he seemed to be commenting on terrorism as a kind of nameless biblical plague. For this reason, his remarks were received with skepticism.

This assassination also caused serious confrontations among members of the UCD executive body in Madrid, annoyed because Suarez "would not show his face" and because he did not even make the gesture of attending the funerals of his fellow party members. The leaders of what, a few weeks later, was to be the "critical" sector voiced their dissatisfaction. But Suarez kept his silence, behind which was only a complete inability to cope decisively with the political problems; an inability which prompted his resignation 3 months later.

The discontent in the Basque UCD was enormous as well. Many militants left the Basque Country, and others were preparing to do so. The Centrist party's Basque leaders "accused Madrid of abandoning them, of excluding them from the decisions made concerning their region (...), of renegeing and of making a deal with PNV behind their backs." *

The complaint was fully justified. The former minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, a deputy representing Guipuzcoa, who had been appointed "governor general" ** a short time earlier, privately expressed his disappointment at the "State's absence" that was being felt in Euskadi, a power vacuum which the "ETA-State" had attempted to fill with guns blazing.

ETA Loses Nerve

The loss of popular support, the basis for ETA's "legitimacy," has been proven by events and incidents occurring in succession, many of which serve to demonstrate the nervousness existing among the ETA members, who have proven incapable of self-assurance in the new political situation. The attack in Zarauz on 3 November must be interpreted as such. On that day, an ETA (m) commando group shot all the

* CAMBIO 16, No 467, 10 November 1980, "Weeping for a Country," pp 28 ff.

** This appointment, from its formal standpoint, was another sign of the government's bungling, because the Constitution called for the existence of a "government delegate" and not a "governor general." With the passage of time, the reaction from the Basque and Catalanian nationalists and members of other regional parties succeeded in having the name changed.

customers at a bar in Zarauz, assassinating four members of the Civil Guard and a civilian sympathizer of the PNV, and wounding six Basque citizens. In a special session, the town hall condemned the attack, and two councilmen from Herri Batasuna joined in the motion, one submitting his resignation in protest against the violence that had fallen on the Basque Country. This was something highly significant. The next day, over 3,000 people attended a local demonstration.

The PNV took note of this major change in Basque public opinion, and began voicing its position against terrorism in a more consistent manner. In its "batzokis" talks and lectures on terrorism were organized; but everything was not clearcut. For example, the CAMBIO 16 reporters Ander and Gorka Landaburu and Ricardo Herren concluded an article on the Basque situation, citing the anticipated assumption of an active stance against terrorism in this way: "Few doubt that PNV has the capacity to do so. But there is, at the same time, no assurance that it will have the political desire to carry it out." *

Actually, there was information to the effect that PNV did not want a complete break with ETA. On 25 October, when the conservative businessman Jose Garavilla Legaza, a member of PNV, was kidnapped, this time by ETA (m), the party's reaction was forceful. Members immediately began a very harsh negotiation with ETA which included a threat of reprisals and which ended with the release of Garavilla, 3 days later, in exchange for a sum of money "agreed upon" in the talks. Hence, there were reasons not to make a drastic break with ETA. The old bonds which had originally united ETA with PNV had not disappeared completely.

Thus far, we have discussed mainly the terrorist activity of ETA (p-m) during the second half of 1980. But ETA (m) had also made its presence felt with the usual methods. It was learned that heading the "milis" were two of the most dangerous ETA members: Juan Lasa Michelena, alias "Txiquierdi," and Miguel Angel Apalategui, alias "Apala." We have been greatly concerned with the latter subject. Ever since, as we had already reported, "Apala" was released after his hunger strike in the French jail at Baumettes (Marseilles) in July 1977, nothing further was known of him. In October of that year, he was supposed to appear before the court at Aix-en-Provence, but he did not show up. What had happened to him during all this time? Nothing was learned, to the point where he was even considered to be dead. One might have thought that the ETA ringleader took further training in a foreign, perhaps Arab, camp, similar to what he had "studied" in 1975 at the Algiers Police Academy.

"Apala's" trail appeared again in the summer of 1980. On 12 July, in Orio (Guipuzcoa), when three Civil Guard cars were attacked by an ETA commando group, killing two guards and one terrorist, Ignacio Maria Gabirondo, the police learned that the other two members of the commando group were "Apala" and Jose Andres Izaguirre Gorgoza, alias "Gogor," another one of the ETA key men in the subsequent months.

*Article cited in Note 131 of Chapter IV.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Juan Lasa Michelena, alias "Txiquierdi," was regarded as one of the most efficient and dispassionate members of the ETA military branch. In his criminal record the police included the assassination, in July 1978, of Gen Sanchez-Ramos, that of the military governor of Madrid, Gen Ortin Gil, in January 1979, and the May 1980 attack which caused the death of Gen Gomez Hortiguela, and that of Cols Avalos Jimenez and Lasso Corral.

On 22 July, in Logrono, "Apala", "Txiquierdi" and the newly appearing "Gogor" (who had returned on 6 May from South Yemen, where he had taken a training course, procuring a refugee document in France), together with a fourth terrorist named Francisco Javier Pie de Hierro Hormaechea, carried out an attack intended to blow up a convoy of three Civil Guard vehicles in which a total of 60 agents were riding. Nine packages containing 5 kilograms of "gum-2" were placed under a bridge, and three of them exploded, hitting one of the buses. As a result, Civil Guard Lieutenant Francisco Lopez Bescos was killed, and there were 32 wounded. This was the first attack against this corps outside of the Basque Country, and it might have turned out with a real slaughter if the "gum-2" had not been in bad condition.

Two days later, the same terrorist commando group executed one of the most spectacular ETA (m) attacks. This time, the incident consisted of a robbery: no fewer than 7,000 kilograms of "gum-2" were taken directly by the ETA members from the Navy's Soto powder magazine, near Santander. Disguised as Civil Guards, the terrorists had carried out what was considered "the largest robbery of explosive material in history." The newspapers made estimates of all the attacks of different types that could be made with the 7 tons of explosives, and the figures were terrifying. There was no doubt that ETA (m) was planning a new escalation of terror. *

Approximately 1 month later, on 22 August, the editor of DIARIO DE NAVARRA, Jose Javier Uranga, was seriously wounded in Pamplona. The journalist's body sustained 25 bullet wounds, his "crime" having been to oppose the annexation of Navarra by Euskadi, as ETA (m) announced. This attack was related to the assault on the Civil Guard headquarters at Aribe and Zubiri, on 20 August, carried out by ETA (p-m), which this branch depicted as an attempt "to force, through armed intervention, the acceptance of a referendum wherein the Navarrrans must decide on their incorporation into the Basque autonomous community." It was clear that "milis" and "poli-milis" who differed so much on other issues were making common cause in the annexation of Navarra. **

The ETA (m) assassinations continued during the following weeks. Thus, at the end of September, four Civil Guards were killed in Marquina (Vizcaya). On 29 September, as we have already stated, the UCD militant Jose Ignacio Ustarar was assassinated in Alava. On 2 October, the day on which Garaicoechea, president of the Basque government, was beginning a visit to Madrid to negotiate transfers, a taxi driver showed up dead in Renteria, and a retiree, Ramon Coto, gunned down by ETA (m) a few days earlier, died. The next day,

*CAMBIO 16, No 452, 3 August 1980, "The Bridge of Death," p 23, and No 453, 10 August 1980, "Apala in Action," pp 18 ff.

** CAMBIO 16, No 457, 7 September 1980, "The Battle of Navarra," pp 17 and 18, and No 458, 14 September 1980, "The Navarrrans Face Up," pp 20 ff.

in Durango (Vizcaya), the car in which the deputy police commissioner, Sergio Canal, the inspector, Jose Antonio Merenciano, and the driver, National Police member Jesus Hernando, were riding was gunned; and all three were killed. On Saturday, 4 October, when the Garaicoechea visit had ended, three Civil Guards from the traffic group who were preparing to render service at a cycle race were shot and killed. They were Corporal Jose Vazquez, and guard members Avelino Palma and Angel Prado.

During the same period, on 22 September, ETA (p-m) carried out one of its longest abductions. The victim was the Cuban industrialist Jose Abreu, who resided in Orrio (Guipuzcoa). He was not released until 7 November, and it was an incident in which observers saw many obscure aspects.

There is no doubt that ETA (m) has attempted to hamper the negotiations between the Basque government and Madrid: the "lendakari's" 3-day stay in the nation's capital had a toll of eight deaths, and nine in only 1 week. It appears that the "ETA-State" viewed with suspicion the creation of an autonomous Basque political power, and that it sensed that the latter would be a "competitor" in its ambitions to appear as the representative of the Basque people; and therefore, with its crimes, it attempted to detract importance and divert attention from the decisive negotiations which took place in Madrid during the first week of October 1980.

While ETA (m) was killing, unceasingly, the third strange branch of ETA, that of the Autonomous Commandos, seemed to be attempting to reach the same height in the "ranking" of crime. The Autonomous Commandos, who now added another adjective to their name, "Anticapitalist," committed three assassinations on just 1 day, 23 October. We have already mentioned the assassination of the UCD militant in Elgoibar, Jaime Arrese. The second was that of the telephone representative in San Sebastian, Juan Manuel Garcia Cordero who, after being kidnapped, was assassinated. The Anticapitalist Autonomous Commandos stated in a communique: "We executed him because we consider him responsible for, and an accomplice of the government in the telephone bugging."

The third death on that dreadful day (it was also on that day that there was a gas explosion in the school of the Vizcayan locality of Ortuella, which caused the deaths of 49 children and two adults) was that of Felipe Estremiana, accused of being an extreme right winger, who was assassinated in Amorebieta (Vizcaya).

The Front for Peace

The popular reaction against terrorism, and against ETA, was becoming increasingly obvious, to the point where the parties decided to move from the realm of mere verbal protests to that of more effective action. The demonstration of 9 November that has already been cited had marked the beginning of this reaction.

All the leading parties of the Basque Country, with the notable exception of Herri Batasuna (PNV, PSE [Spanish Socialist Party]-PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], UCD, EE [Basque Left], PCE [Spanish Communist Party]-EPK

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Basque Communist Party] and EKA [Basque Carlist Party]-Carlist Party) reached an agreement, and signed a document on 14 November in which they expressed their intention to "continue the campaign for awareness and mobilization among all sectors of Basque society on behalf of pacification and the rejection of violence." In this way, the Front for Peace came into existence. EE left the Front very shortly thereafter.

But that same day, in Eibar, ETA (m) assassinated the National Police member Alberto Lisalde and his friend, the hairdresser Sotero Mazo Figueras. There was a meeting held in the town hall there, and all the parties, with the exception of Herri Batasuna, called on the people to demonstrate against violence.

Two days later, in Elcano's native town, Guetaria, the residents demonstrated in solidarity with the head of the Fishermen's Association, the UCD militant Jose Maria Silveti, who had left the town a few days earlier because of the threats that he had received ("you will be next," they had told him). His neighbors, including militants from Herri Batasuna, called for Silveti's return.

A massive popular reaction was beginning to occur repudiating violence. The attitude of the citizens and parties now seemed to be quite different, and better than on previous occasions. According to Roberto Lerchundi, the Basque Communist leader, "the Basque people are telling ETA 'enough!', they are shaking off the terror, they are upholding their own dignity as a people, they are proving that they have sufficient strength to solve a problem as enormous as that of terrorism in Euskadi." Chiqui Benegas, the Socialist leader, remarked: "Nothing will be easy, quite the contrary. But at least many Basques, among whom I include myself, think that it is now time to start doing something."

CAMBIO 16 did not conceal its doubts: "Let us not deceive ourselves, the Front for Peace may prove to be the effective political instrument for defeating terror, but it could also become another paving block of good intentions on the road to hell." *

On 15 November, the interior minister himself, Juan Jose Roson, reiterated to the press the change in the situation. "ETA is running increasingly against the tide of opinion, and its reaction will be desperate. It is the same thing that happened to Hitler. It will resort to bunkers and try to destroy everything that remains." The minister went so far as to praise even Mario Onaindia, whom he called a "good Spaniard." That same day, EE decided to leave the Front, because it considered any joint strategy with "statist" parties harmful, particularly in view of the proximity of the EIA Congress. "Our condemnation of the latest ETA actions does not mean that we are in the slightest agreement with UCD or with its policy in Euskadi; quite the contrary." Mario Onaindia wrote: "The solution for overcoming terrorism is preeminently political

* CAMBIO 16, No 468, 17 November 1980, editorial, "Front for Peace," by Juan Tomas de Salas, p 3. See in the same issue the feature article "The Euskadi Front," pp 35 ff and the articles by various leaders, including those cited in the text.

(...). Only in this way shall we be able to emerge from that dead end street on which many seek to put us. It is savagery or barbarism: in other words, a choice between backing UCD and legitimizing the armed struggle." *

In these dynamics of ETA isolation, in addition to the elements which we have already discussed, other factors of an international nature had to be taken into account, such as the condemnation by the Socialist International, that of the Council of Europe and the positive results of a visit to Paris by the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, regardless of the latter event's loss of effectiveness as a result fo the so-called Hendaya incident which will concern us subsequently.

All observers were of the opinion that something important was happening in ETA and, although they did not share the optimistic view of Roson's statements, they did, like him, believe in a possible new ETA offensive that would entail a qualitative change in the terrorism carried out up until that time by both branches of the Basque organization.

Some thought that ETA might be planning to move to urban guerrillas, or action of larger scope, such as attacks on military headquarters. In the latest attacks and the most recent documents of ETA, there were elements which could have corroborated this view.

While others continued to believe that ETA was attempting to force negotiations, there were experts on ETA who thought that the organization wanted to cause a standby situation, or even military intervention. In brief, according to this latter view, there would be an attempt to provoke repression, which would facilitate the possibility of again winning over a population the majority of which had turned against ETA.

It was also thought that ETA, especially the military branch, might be attempting to create a situation that would facilitate a coup d'etat. The end of the democratic regime and an authoritarian involution would represent a "return to origins" for ETA. In that dictatorship situation, wherein repression, particularly of the Basque people, would of course have to be anticipated, ETA members would again be able to move about "like a fish in water," just as in what for them were the "good" old times.

In fact, it would not be the first time that a leftist movement tried to provoke a right wing coup. Claire Sterling stresses several times how the terrorist-editor Feltrinelli believed in the feasibility of another dictatorship in Italy, and even once interviewed the fascist conspirator Prince Borghese concerning this terrorist-couplist context. As we have already noted, the "red plots" and the "black plots" always form their intricate scheme wherein it is not easy to distinguish the one from the other. We are not attempting to hint at the existence of any tie between ETA and the Spanish coup plotters, but rather to cite the coincidence of their goals.

*Ibid.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This was no mere speculation, because Mario Onaindia himself stated: "It is an intolerable situation for everyone, and intolerable for ETA; and we are at the point where ETA might attempt something as ridiculous as provoking a military coup."

The strange part about it was that Onaindia not only considered ETA to blame, but also regarded PNV as responsible. He remarked: "I have the feeling that they like dabbling in the blood of the country; one has the impression that they are considering which dynamics would be of benefit to them, so as to prompt Madrid to give them more." *

Hence, the Basque society was greatly divided, with several different ways of interpreting its collective existence countering one another. The blight of terrorism had seriously damaged the roots of coexistence and the curing of the situation involved not only a problem of institutionalization, but also a difficult change in public attitudes.

Everything that we have said about the loss of popular support by the terrorists, with all the evidence of it, does not mean that there were not still groups and sectors in existence for which violence was the key to their political future.

For example, the "abertzale" magazine, PUNTO Y HORA DE EUSKADI HERRIA, on the front page and with a photograph, in its December issue, denounced the editor of CAMBIO 16, Juan Tomas de Salas, depicting him as objective toward the terrorists, or giving that impression. The object of the denunciation replied thusly: "If we denounce as an abominable inquisitor one who preaches 'thous shalt not kill' what is the implicit conclusion to be drawn from that denunciatic.? That killing is good, no more and no less. Killing is good. Of course, of course, killing under certain conditions, behind the back and without risk, indeed yes; but killing is good when my good friends kill. Killing is good when my redeeming friends shoot to save the world." **

The Madrid-Basque Government Tension

The relations between the government in Madrid and the Basque government established after the elections for the Basque parliament on 9 March 1980 have never been excellent, and have quite often been very poor. There was merely a continuation of the same pattern of relations between Madrid and the preautonomous organ, the Basque General Council. And this was simply the institutional translation of the various proposals of UCD (and in certain respects those of all the parties of national scope, or "statist" ones, as the nationalists call them) and PNV which, in turn, agrees in many respects with the radical nationalists or "abertzales."

* LA CALLE, November 1980

** CAMBIO 16, No 472, 15 December 1980, editorial, "Killing Is Bad," by Juan Tomas de Salas, p 3.

ALL USE ONLY

The PNV's ambiguity has been a permanent feature of national and regional political life (we mean the Spanish and Basque). We must interpret ambiguity as meaning its lack of a stand, its equivocal assumption of a position. Despite the fact that the horrid term "positioning" is often used by the Basque nationalists, there are many occasions when both PNV and its leaders are lacking in precisely that "positioning."

On the subject of terrorism, PNV began by giving the impression that it had no awareness of it at times when, nevertheless, it was protesting over repression, the so-called "institutional violence" or "state terrorism." Somewhat later on it began to condemn terrorism, but without a name, without alluding to ETA, and, moreover, pairing it in ritualistic fashion with that "institutional violence" which, in the Basque Country and to the nationalists, means "the violence from them, the Spaniards, against us Basques." Thus, the ETA terrorism was automatically raised to the status of "defensive" violence demanded by the prior attack from the "occupying" state, the "abertzales" would add.

Using this dialectical device (which the most fundamental analysis of content could disclose in all the "taking of a position" on terrorism originating with PNV and the "abertzales"), ETA, even without being named, has been justified. Therein lies one of the factors for its "legitimization." Much later, in 1979, when the PNV members voiced condemnation for terrorism that was surely sincere and at times unconditional (for example, Arzallus in the Congress of Deputies on 30 May 1979), one cannot help but consider the extent to which terrorism has been the creature bred in the heart of the nationalists which has grown and even become monstrous, owing to the silence, if not the collusion and de facto implementation thereof on the part of the Basque nationalist politicians.

PNV has never said "ETA is to blame" because, after all, as nationalists, they consider the final objectives to be the same: the complete sovereignty and independence of Euskadi; even though the method and the time for attaining that objective differ between the two, and even though the ideas that they have about the future Basque society are different as well.

For all these reasons, it is not strange that the relations between Vitoria, established as the seat of the Basque government, and Madrid have experienced many difficulties. And it would be unfair not to state, right now, that the responsibility for these difficulties does not lie with the Basque government alone, because the bungling of the Madrid government has also contributed to them.

In fact, for many months the Statute of Guernica was a continent without content; the Basque government lacked authority to exercise, even though it had been stipulated in the text of the Statute. There was the issue of the transfers. The Suarez government, which had been remarkably generous both when it was time to negotiate Title VIII and Article 2 of the Constitution, and when it was time to negotiate the Statute, later proved to be stingy when it was time to decide on the transfer of concrete authority and of the personal, material and economic resources to make it effective.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The problem was posed particularly when, after the phase of institutionalization (approval of the Statute through a referendum, elections to the Basque Parliament and establishment of the Basque government) had been completed, the aforementioned topic of the transfers came up. We shall not attempt to describe this complex process here but merely to cite certain occasions which, in one way or another, had some type of relationship with terrorism and which demonstrate not only the difficult relations between the Basque government and Madrid, but also, frequently, the bungling of the central authorities. It should be made clear that, in this matter, the blame has not resided with just one of the sides.

We have already mentioned the importance of the visit paid by a Basque delegation, headed by Garaicoechea, to Madrid, during the first week of October. A series of working meetings took place which, as we know, were marked by a savage offensive of ETA terrorism in the Basque Country.

There was a certain amount of cordiality in the talks, but the essential problems remained. On the two most important issues to the Basques, the autonomous police and the economic arrangements, there was no agreement.

On 4 October, the day on which the Garaicoechea visit to Madrid ended, a significant incident occurred. In the morning, at a press conference, when the "lendakari" was asked about the "KAS alternative," which we have mentioned so often, he replied that, "In the realm of principles it could be accepted by any democrat." In the afternoon, Suarez, who held one of his rare press conferences, denied what Garaicoechea had said.

Another difficulty in the relations cropped up when the appointment of Marcelino Oreja as "governor general of the Basque Autonomous Community" appeared in the Official Bulletin of the State, instead of "delegate appointed by the government," as stipulated in Article 154 of the Constitution. Once again an unnecessary affront on the part of Madrid dimmed the picture of relations between Madrid and Vitoria, despite the fact that Oreja's skill in avoiding incidents and his undeniable diplomatic left hand prevented many problems.

The tension, more with the PNV (whose president, Xavier Arzallus, seemed to be jealous of the position attained by someone like Garaicoechea, who was his creation) than with the Basque government, underwent another critical period during the last 10 days of November. On 20 November, Euskadi Buru Batzar (EBB) [Vizcaya Executive Committee of PNV], the supreme organ of PNV, published a note in which were contained assertions as serious as the following: "If any reason backs the support from certain sectors of the Basque people for ETA, it is precisely that of not observing nor believing in the establishment of a real autonomy." There followed a description of the seriousness of the economic situation, toward which the Basque government was defenseless, and it went on to say that that situation was what explained why "there are still young people who feel that they have abundant reasons for accusing us of being naive or hypocritical, and for resorting to methods of violent action." It later called for "the complete UCD and its government" to do what was necessary to "fulfill the Statute." Otherwise, it continued, "PNV might find itself in the act of throwing the towel in this difficult political ring."

R OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The explosive note concluded by criticizing the Front for Peace, which it regarded as being "created for the gallery."

As may be observed, in the note from EBB there was a return to the traditional arguments which implied an indirect justification of the terrorism. In short, it was a monument of ambiguity which justified those who insisted that PNV had not just emerged from its equivocal position.

The government, meeting the next day in the Council of Ministers, acknowledged the challenge from PNV and drafted another note in which it made essentially the following statement: "It is regrettable that a communique plagued with ambiguity should attempt to mix and confuse ETA terrorism with the economic problems besetting the Basque Country (...)." It later asserted: "It is absolutely inadmissible that there should be an attempt to find political justification for the ETA's terrorist activity and other violent action." It subsequently accused PNV of "a lack of solidarity" because of its criticism of the "Front for Peace."

However, on 22 November, EBB published another note in response to that from the government, stressing that "The Madrid government has not yet realized that ETA and its commandos are one thing and the mass of people who back the proposals on which ETA has based its terrorist position or who support its actions with their vote is something else."

A few days later, on 25 November, Garaicoechea, in a press conference, answered his party's EBB rather than the government: "We shall not leave our government task. We shall never throw in the towel from the standpoint of leaving the government. If things do not turn out by way of one path, they will turn out by way of another." He then attached partial value to the "Front for Peace" although he questioned its usefulness, "when there is a definite forum, namely, the Basque parliament." *

During December, on 9, 10 and 11 December, an enormously significant event took place: the first official visit paid by Suarez as president of the government to the Basque Country. This was the immediate commentary: "It was about time!" Contrary to what some had expected, Suarez did not take any special "gift" for Basque autonomy, but there is no doubt that his visit served to unblock the issues of the economic arrangements and the autonomous police, on which progress was made.

The visit was depicted as aimed at "reinforcing the presence of the State" and it was unquestionable that this goal was important. We have already mentioned the "absence of the State" from the Basque Country, a situation for which the one chiefly responsible was, of course, the Madrid government. That is why there was also stress on the dreadful mistake involved in Suarez' failure to go earlier, also preventing the king, by his position, from fulfilling what was regarded as one of his greatest aspirations: that of visiting the Basque provinces.

* See texts of the notes in CAMBIO 16, No 470, in the insets "Suarez: Firmness with PNV," p 23, and "War of Notes," p 24.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Suarez visit was used to advantage by Xavier Arzallus, president of the PNV's EBB, to make a show of power, not so much in opposition to Suarez, as in November, but in opposition to Garaicoechea. On the very day of his arrival in the Basque Country, 109 town halls in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa controlled by the PNV decided to halt municipal activity so long as the Suarez visit lasted, as a sign of protest "for the failure to restore the economic arrangements." Visibly shocked and annoyed, Garaicoechea did not succeed in finding an explanation for that unexpected "rebellion of the mayors." And the PSOE itself appeared irritated, blaming Xavier Arzallus who, in turn, denied that this decision had been made on the high levels of PNV.

So long as President Suarez' visit lasted, ETA maintained a surprising truce, upset only by the strange abduction, for a few hours, of Roberto Lerchundi, secretary general of EPK-PCE, which prevented him from meeting with Suarez at the appointed time, as part of the series of contacts with all the Basque political and trade union leaders.

The visit by the president of the government had no immediate spectacular results, but as we have already noted, there is no doubt that it served to clear the path whereon a solution would be reached for the two most serious disputes between Madrid and Vitoria: the economic arrangements and the autonomous police. *

The Eternal French Problem

The claim that without the French "sanctuary" the battle against ETA would be easier is one of the positions constantly upheld by the Spanish government and the police circles. It has always been intolerable to Spain that the ETA members have been able to take shelter in France, which has been turned into a safe base for their operations and a site for proposing, mounting and preparing their terrorist activities. Spain has never understood nor accepted the fact that the ETA militants have been able to benefit from the political refugee statute, even when the establishment of democracy made the maintenance of that privileged status unnecessary and provocative.

France, for its part, has always rejected its possible implication in the matter, claiming that it is a Spanish "internal affair," and denying any type of responsibility. The French authorities have always condemned the "dirty war" waged on French territory by "uncontrolled groups" close to the extreme right or by elements acting for the Spanish intelligence services, with the most hypocritical exaggeration.

As we have already observed, the pattern of the relations with France in this matter of terrorism has always been identical: agreement between the authorities which eases the tensions, "dirty war" or other incidents which prove the existence of the French "sanctuary," worsening the relations which heightens the tension.

* CAMBIO 16, No 472, "Suarez: Trip to the Center of the Terror," pp 26 ff., and column by Jose Oneto, "The Arzallus Threat," p 25.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

At the end of 1980, another incident occurred which fits perfectly into this mold. The visit to Paris by Perez-Llorca, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, in November had aroused some hopes. A better attitude was found for cooperation by the French police, and it was anticipated that the neighboring country's authorities would give the cases of petitions for extradition sought by Spain the same treatment that was being given to those submitted by Italy and Germany, for example.

But on 23 November a serious incident dashed those hopes and, in fact, led to a freeze on the accords obtained by Perez-Llorca.

On that day, an unidentified commando group in Hendaya gunned down the customers of the Hendayais bar, usually visited by Basque "refugees," causing the deaths of two French citizens and wounding another 10 customers, including several Spaniards. Shortly thereafter, three individuals violently crossed the border at Irun, in the direction of Spain, and were caught by the Spanish services. The presumption that these persons were the members of the commando group which had carried out the attack made its way into the French media and the Spanish as well, particularly after the Spanish police, and the interior minister himself, had noted that these individuals, whom they refused to identify, were "French subjects" belonging to an intelligence network maintained in the south of France by the Spanish authorities.

The French reaction was very harsh, and the Spanish ambassador, Miguel Solano, was called to Quai d'Orsay. Thus, Spanish-French relations reached another cold point again, which jeopardized the accords reached a short time earlier.

Contributing to the same result was the trial observed in Pau starting on 9 December against four individuals accused of assassinating the ETA member Justo Eliazarán Sarasola at Biarritz on 9 September 1979 who, according to the report by the French police, had been sent and protected by the Spanish authorities. *

At the same time, it was learned that ETA was using common criminals, some of them French, to engage in holdups, manufacture counterfeit currency or commit other crimes. We already knew that French youths had been used for the "campaigns against tourism," on the Spanish coasts. And the Spanish police came to suspect something even more serious: "It is not unheard of that, among so many foreign ETA members, there are some infiltrated by the French secret services to guide the terrorist activities outside of their territory." ** Hence there again arose the possibility of an express or tacit agreement among certain elements of the police or the intelligence services of France whereby the ETA members "would pay for" the facilities for their French refugees with the guarantee that they would never take their terrorist activities to "North Euskadi," although, according to the Basque organization's "official doctrine," both France and Spain were to be regarded as "occupying countries."

*CAMBIO 16, No 473, 22 December 1980, "Dirty War on the Border," pp 45 ff.

** CAMBIO 16, No 466, 3 November 1980, "Giscard's ETA," p 33

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The lack of cooperation from France enabled the ETA (m) "high-level staff" which, according to the experts, did not exceed 30 persons, to enjoy a security that allowed it to plan the details of the "armed struggle" without any sudden shocks.

The French position was so incomprehensible that Jean-Francois Revel, editor of L'EXPRESS, devoted to the subject his editorial in the 20 December issue, entitled "France-Spain: the Sanctuary," in which he claimed that "The department of the Atlantic Pyrenees serves as a 'sanctuary' for the members of ETA (...) who, moreover, are also conspiring in complete calmness in Toulouse, Bordeaux or Paris." He then noted that, not only did the Spaniards not receive the slightest cooperation from the French government, but, "on the contrary, they receive a reprimand every time there occurs on our soil, by chance, a settling of accounts among killers, which seems difficult to avoid when they are being taken in in such large numbers." He emphasized: "France continues to allow various embassies to serve as storage places for arms and to feed the European terrorist networks"; commenting that France had granted the extradition of German and Italian terrorists, and asking: "Why not on behalf of Spain, which is demanding the extradition, not of mere accomplices or suspects, but rather of proven perpetrators of many murders?" He went on to say: "ETA terrorism is, in fact, the most death-dealing in Europe at present: 500 killed in 5 years, and 140 of these in 1980. One can understand Madrid's bitterness."

He subsequently discussed the excuse of the political refugee theory, stating: "It is (...) impossible for the French government to act as if it believed that there are at present Spanish Basques being oppressed for crimes of opinion."; and he then cited the "unspeakable reasons" among which he included "the fear of seeing ETA (...) resort to reprisals in France if it is disturbed in our territory (...), that of seeing the French Basques won over by a feeling of solidarity if their 'southern cousins' are hunted among them (...), and the justified fear of discovering behind ETA powerful Soviet and Libyan protectors, and France finding itself caught in a war of secret services waged on Spain's account." *

France's implication in the terrorism had already been hinted by the president of the Italian Republic himself, Sandro Pertini, annoyed by the fact that many Italian terrorists had taken refuge in Paris or on the Cote d'Azur.

On 2 January 1981, in an interview on French television, Pertini again referred to the terrorists' international connections, although on that occasion he accused the Soviet Union indirectly. The fact that he was addressing the French may perhaps have caused France to be spared, because he said: "The central organization is located beyond the Italian borders, but not in France."

A few days later, a "repentant" terrorist, Umberto Mazzola, wrote a letter confessing that he had received training, along with French, Italians and Spaniards, in a camp located near the border between France and Spain. The instructors

* L'EXPRESS, 20 December 1980, "France-Spain: the Sanctuary," by Jean-Francois Revel, p 66

were apparently from ETA and, according to another Italian terrorist, "they were impressed" by the effectiveness of the "ETA members" who conducted the courses: "They gave us kilograms of explosives and taught us how to fire the Stern machine guns, and we learned many important techniques." *

Nor was the easing of tensions between the governments of Spain and France helped by the action of the "uncontrolled" commando groups which were in the habit of using the Spanish Basque Battalion label. On 30 December, a Basque "refugee" and former ETA member, Jose Martin Sagardia Zaldua, alias "Usurbil," was assassinated when a powerful device set in a car exploded.

As a result, the French news media, as well as some local authorities, again voiced their protests over the impunity with which these commando groups that were considered to be linked with the Spanish secret services were acting in France. It was also claimed that the members of these commando groups were French mercenaries from the former OAS [Secret Army Organization], some of whom were said to have established their residence on the Spanish Mediterranean coasts, especially at Alicante.

The Suarez Resignation and the King's Visit to the Basque Country

1981 began with relative inactivity on the part of ETA and with a serious state of internal dispute in the government party, UCD. The so-called "critical" sector was engaged in a very harsh campaign to harass Suarez, in preparation for the party congress which was due to take place at Palma de Mallorca at the end of January.

An air traffic controllers' strike forced the postponement of the UCD congress, only 48 hours before the time planned for its opening. And, on 29 January, Suarez submitted his resignation, to the amazement of the entire country. A few days earlier, it had been announced that the king and queen would carry out their planned visit to the Basque Country during the first week of February.

On the very day that Suarez submitted his resignation, ETA (m) kidnapped engineer Jose Maria Ryan, technical director of the Lemonz nuclear powerplant. The terrorist organization gave a period of 7 days to Iberduero, the company owning the powerplant, to destroy the facilities, otherwise, Ryan would be "executed."

An enormous outcry arose throughout the Basque Country and all of Spain, asking the "milis" to respect the engineer's life. Parties, trade unions and organizations such as Amnesty International and the European Federation of Professional Engineers Associations, and the antinuclear associations themselves, requested that Ryan's life and liberty be respected.

*See CAMBIO 16, No 482, 23 February 1981, "Union of Terrorist Republics," by Julio Alganaraz, pp 49 ff, and No 480, 9 February 1981, "The Terrorism Comes From the East," by the same author, pp 50 and 51.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

On 5 February, an impressive demonstration traversed the streets of Bilbao, in solidarity with Ryan. ETA (m) was even offered a delay in putting the powerplant into operation until a referendum was held. What seemed insane was to explode into the air a powerplant in which 130 billion pesetas had already been invested.

On 6 February, ETA (m) announced the death of Ryan, whose body was found a short time later. At the same time, the terrorists threatened all those who held positions of responsibility in the nuclear powerplant.

The reaction was unanimous, and grief and rage became evident all of the Basque Country. On Monday, 9 February, a general strike paralyzed virtually all activities. Demonstrations were held in Bilbao and San Sebastian. Only Herri Batasuna remained dissociated from this widespread protest.

DEIA, the official organ of PNV, used for the first time the term "assassination" to refer to an ETA attack. "While no death has ever had justification, this one now has exceeded all the bounds of grief, indignation and shock. Ryan's death marks a decisive point in our history." *

On the other hand, EGIN, close to Herri Batasuna and ETA (m), considered the 9 February demonstrations a "management maneuver" and "poisoning of the press."

The Basque Socialist leader Txiki Benegas wrote: "If anyone harbored any doubts about the features of the ETA organization, the repugnant and abominable kidnapping and assassination of Mr Ryan has confirmed, even to those who are kindest in their judgment of the ETA members, that we are faced with an organization of heartless terrorists, lacking in any scruples, and fascist in their concepts and methods, whose only goal is the destabilization of democracy and the destruction of the Basque people." **

While Ryan was still held captive, the king and queen made their announced visit to the Basque Country. With the president of the government resigned, and not traveling with their majesties, and with the government's delegate to the Basque Country, Marcelino Oreja, ostensibly excluded by the Basque autonomous authorities, the visit was marked by the king-Basque government duality, to the point where some viewed in it the restoration of the direct dialog between the king and the Basque traditional institutions so pleasing to the nationalists, updated by the new autonomous regime established by the Statute of Guernika.

We shall take a brief account of the royal visit from a different side:

"But the political event at that time was the visit which their majesties paid to the Basque Country, contrary to the views of civilian and military sectors

*DEIA, 7 February 1981, editorial

** CAMBIO 16, No 842, 23 February 1981, "United Against the Fascist ETA," by Txiki Benegas, p 25; see also in that issue "ETA Trapped," pp 24 ff.

F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

which did not consider it wise. The visit took place on 2, 3 and 4 February and its most prominent function was the meeting in the Guernica House of Juntas beside the traditional tree symbolizing the Basque liberties and privileges of the General Juntas of the "historical territories," that is, of the three Basque provinces, Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya.

"The announced presence of the "junta members" of the Herri Batasuna coalition, close to the ETA military terrorists, who up until that time had been absent from the political institutions, and who had already demonstrated against the king's visit upon his arrival at the Vitoria airport, prompted anticipation of some incident.

"In fact, when the king was about to deliver his address, the 30 Herri Batasuna members present in the Hall of Juntas rose and, raising their fists, intoned the 'Eusko Gudariak' which could scarcely be heard because of the reaction from the other attendees who, with their applause for the king and their shouts of 'out' to the Herri Batasuna members, thwarted the latter's attempt to prevent the king from taking the floor, Juan Carlos I, with amazing calmness, held up firmly and with a slight smile while the incident lasted. Finally, when the Basque government's service to maintain order had expelled the 'Batasuna members' and silence prevailed, the king, with aplomb, made a statement which has become historic: 'As opposed to those who practice intolerance, scorn coexistence and do not respect institutions, I proclaim once again my faith in democracy and my confidence in the Basque people.'

"The scene of the incidents in Guernica, carried by television several times, produced an enormous impact on all public opinion, and enhanced the prestige and popularity of their majesties, who received thousands of testimonials of support at La Zarzuela." *

The visit by their majesties and the extensive popular reaction to Ryan's assassination certainly brought ETA to the worst time in its entire history, at least in the most uncomfortable situation since the establishment of democracy. A guarded optimism was perceived in political and police circles which thought that the time had come to undertake the final offensive that would definitively break up ETA. But an unfortunate event with which we shall concern ourselves later destroyed this optimism.

During the entire month of January, the Central Intelligence Brigade had been engaged in effective action to dismantle the ETA (m) "legal" commando groups, that is, those which resided in Spain overtly. During the course of this action, the members of eight of these commando groups had been arrested, and a large amount of arms was seized from them.

On 4 February (while the king was visiting the Basque Country, and by pure chance) the Madrid police detected a car occupied by suspicious persons. When they attempted to arrest them, the latter started shooting, and two of them managed to escape. Another, who turned out to be ETA member Oscar Arregui Izaguirre, was wounded and arrested.

* HISTORIA 16, No 59, "Brief Account of La Villa y Corte [Madrid]," by Alejandro Munoz Alonso, p 10

F O R O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The police then learned that they had almost caught in their net one of the most dangerous ETA (m) commando groups, the one headed by Jose Andres Izaguirre Gogorza, alias "Gogor," whom we have discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

"Gogor's" commando group had arrived in Madrid a week earlier, from France, apparently with the intention of kidnapping a high-ranking bank executive and asking for a large ransom for his release. The commando group had already established its infrastructure in Madrid, in an apartment and a cottage, which were discovered, with the arrest of a Swedish woman and another Chilean woman who had been collaborating with the terrorists. Once again, ETA was using foreign subjects to carry out its terrorist actions. The Chilean woman belonged to MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), thereby confirming ETA's relations with this Chilean extremist organization. Once more the "Latin American connection" which had begun during the 1960's with the "Tupamaros" was detected.

In this atmosphere, marked by a trapped ETA on the defensive, the event which we mentioned previously occurred on 13 February: Arregui, the ETA member arrested at the beginning of the month, died in the Carabanchel prison hospital, presumably as a result of the bad treatment he had sustained. The scandal, which was major, reversed the situation completely, and ETA was again able to show the image of the organization with its members tortured and martyred. Five policemen were charged with this torture, which was at least partly confirmed by the autopsy, and they were tried and jailed. However, the causal relation between the torture (possibly a brutal beating) and the death of the subject in custody was not proven. Police sources attributed the bronchopneumonia from which the ETA member suffered to the difficulties in crossing the Pyrenees during the harshest winter days, and the "burns" which he had on his feet, not to the results of electric shocks, but rather to the semi-freezing caused by the difficult trip in the Pyrenees.

The affairs also caused deepseated unrest in police circles, and there were signs of concerted action that would have had extensive consequences. Under these circumstances, moreover, the investiture of Calvo Sotelo as president of the government, planned for 18 February, was far more complicated, and no one expected the candidate to attain the absolute majority, which would make a second session necessary.

The topic of the torture returned to the forefront, and those who had made it a cause, like Bandres, appeared to be fully justified. The advocates of "democratization of the State's structures," a phrase behind which was concealed the notion of a purge, particularly of the police, had new arguments. And ETA received the gift of a martyred "hero," thus retrieving an initiative which had ostensibly escaped it after the Ryan case.

The issue of the tortured ETA member, which had been a cause of serious tension between the Ministries of Justice and Interior, was the subject of a specific session of the Congress of Deputies held on 17 February. In this way, it was attempted to prevent this problem from weighing too heavily on the investiture session planned for a day later. The session was long and hard, and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

wearing, not only on the government in office, but on UCD itself and the democratic system per se as a whole. It was no mere coincidence that, 6 days later, the Congress itself was the scene of the abortive coup d'etat which proved to be the most serious threat to democracy in its scant 5-year history.

The Extreme Right Against Democracy: From Terrorism to Coupism

We have had occasion to observe how, from the beginning of the democratic regime, the extreme right played the card of destabilization, using terrorism as a tool. The "Atocha slaughter" was one of the culminating events in this continuous process that has been present throughout the entire transition and in the first stages of democracy.

Closely linked with the extreme right terrorism there has appeared coupism, nurtured to a large extent by the strategy of tension maintained by terrorism of all ideologies, and a natural destination reached by extreme terrorism.

Therefore, it is no mere chance that this extreme terrorism acquired particular virulence during 1980, to the point where 27 assassinations caused by the extreme right throughout that year could be counted. The injuries, explosions and assaults of all types numbered many more.

We are familiar with the features of this type of terrorism, based on forms of organization quite different from those of the other terrorist groups that we have analyzed, such as ETA or GRAPO. "Uncontrolled" commando groups and rather unrestricted groups of young people associated with legal political organizations with an extremist ideology have been mixed in these "sinister plots" wherein the settling of accounts has not been infrequent either.

As we have already noted, this type of terrorism operates with highly diversified initials, used depending on the circumstances. Sometimes the same group uses different initials, and at times the same initials are used by different groups.

We have already observed that the Basque Country, including the French Basque Country, has been one of the locations preferably selected by the extreme right terrorists who, while they used the label ATE (Anti-ETA Terrorism) in particular and the Triple A on occasion, during the early post-Franco period, have subsequently operated almost always with the name Basque-Spanish Battalion. Therefore, it is not at all odd that of the 27 deaths of the extreme right counted during 1980, 16 were victims of attacks perpetrated in the Basque Country. They are Carlos Jaudise Costa, of HB, assassinated in Lezo (Guipuzcoa) on 15 January; Manuel Santacoloma, Liborio Arana Gomez, Pacifico Fica Zuloaga and Maria Paz Armino, killed by the bomb which exploded in the Aldana bar in Baracaldo (Vizcaya) on 19 January; Jesus Zubigaray, of EE, in Eibar (Guipuzcoa) on 2 February; Felipe Segarna, of HB, assassinated in Hernani (Guipuzcoa) on 19 April; Maria Josefa Bravo, raped and assassinated in San Sebastian on 8 May; Jose Miguel Echevarria, alias "Naparra," of the Autonomous Commandos, who disappeared on 11 June and whose death was claimed by the BVE; two gypsy women, one pregnant, and a cleaning employee (Anastasio

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Leal), assassinated on 23 July in Bilbao; Angel Echaniz, HB sympathizer, assassinated in Ondarroa (Vizcaya) on 30 August; Miguel Angel Arbelaiz and Luis Maria Elizondo, HB sympathizers, assassinated in Hernani (Guipuzcoa); Pierre Haramendy and Josep Camio, assassinated in Hendaya on 24 November; Jose Martin Sagardia, alias "Umbil," assassinated in Biarritz on 30 December. There could be added to this Basque list the death in Caracas (Venezuela) of the married couple Jokin Alfonso Echevarria and Esperanza Aranaz, on 14 November.

Immediately following the Basque Country, the city where the extreme right has most persistently engaged in its activities has been Madrid. During 1980 five deaths were recorded in this capital, victims of extreme right aggression. They are Yolanda Gonzalez Martin, of PST, assassinated in Madrid on 2 February; Vicente Cuervo, assassinated in Madrid on 10 February; Jorge Caballero, of CNT, dying on 15 April after an attack perpetrated on 29 March; Arturo Pajuelo, who died as a result of an attack made on 1 May; Juan Carlos Garcia Perez, killed on 6 May (San Bao bar). There occurred a genuine escalation which changed from stabbings to group attacks, such as the one staged in early May at the San Bao bar on Arturo Soria Street, where about 20 persons participated in the attack in one way or another. Of the same type were the attacks on educational centers, such as those perpetrated against the Emilio Castelar Institute (28 April) or the Law School of the Complutense (Alcala de Henares) University (29 April). Not excluded was the sending of letter bombs, such as that addressed to the Friends of UNESCO Club on 25 January 1980, resulting in two serious injuries.

The links of these attacks with the extreme right parties were exposed quite often, although, in the Congress of Deputies, at the session held to discuss this type of terrorism on 8 May 1980, Roson declared that they were "actions decided on by the participants on their own initiative, dissociated from the guidelines of the associations to which they belonged or with which they sympathized, appearing to be acts prompted by emotional states and political passion, without prior planning or reflection."

The representatives of the left expressed their disagreement with this official version, particularly Sanchez Montero of the PCE, who declared: "All the incidents appear to be based on a premeditated plan." He stressed that, "No legalized organization or party can freely express and defend ideas and serve as a shield and cover for terrorist rings"; and hence he concluded by requesting of the government "that the investigation be carried out to its final consequences and expose the connections, if there are any, between those terrorist groups and extreme right political organizations." Roson conceded that, "It is undeniable that those who arouse the most radical political passions cannot later, to excuse themselves, allege a lack or loss of control over those whom such passions prompted to act in a disordered and criminal manner."

The objective connection between extreme right terrorism and coupism proceeds from their identical nature. To paraphrase Clausewitz, we might say that coupism is a method of fighting against democracy, only using other means. Coupism is a type of terrorism wherein the quantitative difference makes the qualitative leap.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In this connection, the coup of 23 February 1981 (which we shall not analyze here) was the site to which the terrorist escalation logically led. We have already had occasion to point out how, at the time of the most serious terrorist attacks, the spokesmen for the extreme right brought up the need for "exceptional measures" or simply called upon the Army to assume power.

The very manner of carrying out the coup of 23-F had, in its concrete implementation, every aspect of a terrorist act: a non-uniformed armed group which attacked a public establishment and abducted those present, exerting pressure to attain certain goals. The only difference from any typical terrorist act lay in the fact that, in this action, the change in the ownership of power was a mediate or remote objective, while in coupism that change in ownership is the immediate or next objective. There was also the fact that many of those present in the Palace of the Cortes believed that an ETA commando group had entered. And it is also known that many Civil Guards participating in the attack were deceived, by telling them that they were going to fight against an ETA commando group.

The essential identity between coupism and any terrorism, whether it be of the right or the left, red or black, is proven by the fact that they share a common objective: the destruction of the democratic order. In commenting on the terrorists of the "Black International," Claire Sterling says that "they are hardly distinguishable from the red ones," and cites "a certain homogenizing training of a Maoist-Nazi type" which both the "reds" and the "blacks" share. According to this author, their aversion to "Zionist imperialism" is another aspect in which they appear to be in agreement. * We have already noted, as Claire Sterling stresses, that the leftist Feltrinelli thought that savage violence would force "an authoritarian shift to the right (...)" which would open up a more advanced phase of the struggle." He added that, "the brutal intervention of the repressive forces would put an end to any dilatory notion to the effect that the socialist revolution is possible without resorting to arms." This proposition of Feltrinelli's, which might well be that of ETA (m), reached the point of becoming, for the strange editor, a "raging obsession," according to Judge Guido Viola, who was the one that investigated Feltrinelli's death. And we have already mentioned his interview with Prince Valerio Borghese which, according to Claire Sterling, took place in Switzerland in 1971. **

The presence of extreme right terrorism in Spain and its connection with the consecutive attempts at coupism have continued to be perceptible since the abortive coup of 23-F. For example, on 28 April, three explosions took place in Madrid, the most powerful of which caused serious damage to the Transalpine travel agency owned by an Italian, Andrea Amieville, associated with the extreme right. The other two explosions, of lesser size, damaged the cottage and a car belonging to the same Amieville. The attacks were claimed by the Revolutionary Armed Groups (GAR), an almost phantom entity known only from several attacks made in Valladolid (another site where the attacks of the extreme right had become most persistent) against persons with leftist links or simply democrats.

*Claire Sterling, op. cit., p 115

** Ibid., pp 38 and 115

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

These attacks upon Amieville were the object of different interpretations, not excluding that of a settlement of accounts. The attackers themselves (who attributed to the GAR an unbelievable "Marxist-Leninist" tendency) even made reference to "certain plans of the Black International to provoke a coup d'etat in Spain." *

At that same time, a press report was disseminated concerning the meeting in Paris, on 2 April 1981, of the European Anticommunist League to study the Spanish situation. Among those present was the well-known Stefano delle Chiaie, who mentioned the failure of the 23-F coup because of the "betrayal and cowardice of certain commanders-in-chief," and who "advocated the need to create armed groups of Spanish youths, for which he proposed the starting of a process of unification of activist members of the Falange, Youth Force and New Force, Traditionalist Communion and National Youth Front."

Also in attendance at the meeting was Sixto de Borbon-Parma, who "sought economic assistance to successfully complete the action aimed at destabilizing the order in Spain, as the only means of stimulating the military to undertake definitive intervention."

The meeting adopted 12 resolutions, noteworthy among which was that to contribute 50 million pesetas for "The Spanish Armed Commandos" (CAE), the one to negotiate for the purchase of arms in Libya and Czechoslovakia and the one to select suitable sites for military training. **

The same type of activity was referred to in a report published in CAMBIO 16 in June, noting that "the neo-Nazi party, Youth Front, consisting of 200 radicalized youths who split from New Force 2 years ago, is attempting to create a secret, illegal military front similar to the armed commando groups of ETA military or ETA politico-military." The report was suddenly issued to the news media on the occasion of the arrest of several activists from this Youth Front. ***

Also in June, the police discovered a new attempt at a coup d'etat, in which a terrorist plan appeared as a basic element.

It all began on 19 June, when a New Force militant, Jose Luis Cuadrado Garrido, was wounded by the explosion of a bomb which he was attempting to set in Dos de Mayo Square in Madrid. Cuadrado stated that he had attended a meeting of the extreme right at which instruction was given on making explosives, and "slogans were issued aimed at fostering subversive activities directed toward destabilizing the Spanish political situation."

* DIARIO 16, 29 April 1981, p 4

** SABADO GRAFICO, "Armed Plan Against Spain," by Juan del Valle

*** CAMBIO 16, No 498, 15 June 1981, "The Extreme Right ETA," pp 33 ff.

After this, the police learned that, for 24 June, the king's birthday, a terrorist-couplist plan was being prepared that would begin by exploding a bomb at the Nou Camp in Barcelona, on the occasion of a nationalist gathering. "The Barcelona bomb, which had been prepared to cause hundreds of deaths and injuries, was really a diversionary operation for a military seizure, an hour later (...) of the Royal Palace (in Madrid), where the king's birthday was going to be celebrated."

Subsequently, the "terrorist-couplists" intended to force the king to abdicate or go into exile, or, if need be, they planned to kill him. A military junta would take over the government of the country.

In the event that this plan should fail, an alternate project would be put into effect, consisting of a campaign of terrorist acts, to be carried out from 24 June to 18 July, the big Francoist celebration, so as to trigger a destabilizing strategy.

According to a police report, "When no one dares to go out on the street, and terror takes possession of the populace on a mass scale; when the trains travel about half empty, and the factories, ports and airports are at the point of coming to a standstill, someone will have to save the nation: the Army."

As is evident, an attempt was being made to arrive at a coup by means of terrorism, which was converted into a necessary previous phase required to create the conditions that would "necessitate" the coup d'etat triggered, in turn, by military intervention.

Shortly thereafter it was learned that the "coup plot" in which a leading role had been assigned to Jose Antonio Giron, a Franco minister of labor and extreme right leader, had at least four armed organizations to start up the destabilizing terrorist campaign preceding the coup d'etat.

The first of these organizations was National Labor Union Action, headed by Jose Antonio Assiego, who was considered Giron's "armed branch." Apparently, this individual would lead the "50 men ready for anything, responsible for setting bombs in the leading Spanish capitals to provoke a crisis situation which could not be controlled by the political authorities, forcing the Army to seize power." The police were convinced that this group had already engaged in the purchase of weapons and the training of its members.

New Force was said to be the second of these organizations within which, and unknown to its leader, Blas Pinar, there would operate an armed organization with cover from the security services of that political party, led by David Martinez Loza, national security chief of New Force, who had already been summoned to make a statement in connection with the assassination of the leftist youth, Yolanda Gonzalez, on 2 February 1980, and who was finally tried at the end of October 1981.

Operating in close relationship with New Force was a business firm called Rio Tajo Iberica, Inc, which police sources and the secret services accused of being the legal front for the collection of funds to be used to finance and to create the Armed Commandos and underground activities of Blas Pinar's party.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Spanish Falange, of the JONS [Junta of National Trade Union Action], was said to be the third of the organizations implicated in the "terrorist-coupist" plot. These commando groups were reportedly led by Col Ricardo Garchitorena, and not only were they accused of having taken part in the attack on the San Bao bar on 6 May 1980, which we have already mentioned, but also, under the command of Garchitorena himself, they were the attackers of the military government of Madrid on the night of 23 February. It is a fact that this notorious incident did not evoke any judicial action.

The fourth of the organizations associated with the destabilization plan was the Youth Front, which "attempted to set up a military front similar to that of ETA," for which purpose some of its members had already engaged in bank holdups in order to collect funds, and in military training in locations on the outskirts of Madrid and Valladolid.

All those involved in this new "terrorist-coupist" attempt were eventually released when it became impossible to prove their guilt convincingly; but Assiego made some significant statements to the press, referring to the fact that there were plans for a "national uprising," although denying the existence of extreme right terrorism. Assiego remarked: "Roson wants to put me in the terrorist camp, and I refuse. Say what you will, terrorism here is still Marxist and Leninist. We have not yet gone so far as to kill anyone." *

Although the matter has not been completely explained as this is being written, the strange attack on the Central Bank of Barcelona on 23 and 24 May 1981 was also linked with the extreme right "terrorism-coupism." Even though, finally, the official account and the explanation from the president of the government himself to the plenum of the Congress of Deputies affirmed the theory that it was a common criminal action, this serious attack, which almost halted the nation's activity, still has some very obscure features.

The link of two of the attackers with government intelligence services and the reference by one of them to a mysterious Luis Antonio, possibly the notorious right wing activist, Luis Antonio Garcia Rodriguez, whom we have already mentioned, gives reason to believe that there are still many aspects of the Central Bank attack still remaining to be explained. **

In July, a report published in DIARIO 16 described another meeting of the Fascist International held in Rome on 7 and 8 June, a continuation of the one which took place at Paris on 2 April. According to this report, the meeting participants had essentially adopted three resolutions: to keep up the strategy of tension in Spain, Portugal and Greece; to supply the destabilizing commando groups in these countries with modern weapons; and to foster the campaign to discredit the government systems so as to promote subversive action among the Armed Forces.

* For this entire matter, see CAMBIO 16, No 500, 29 June 1981, "The Coup Plotters Do Not Rest," p 35; No 501, 6 July 1981, "With the Coup at the Heels," pp 28 ff.; No 503, 20 July 1981, "Giron Trapped," pp 20 ff.; and No 507, 17 August 1981, "The Armed Branch of Giron," pp 21 ff.

** On the subject of the Central Bank holdup, see CAMBIO 16, No 496, 1 June 1981, "The Mysteries of the Central," pp 26 ff.; and No 497, 8 June 1981, "More Mysteries of the Central," pp 36 and 37

At this meeting, an announcement was made of the appearance of a bulletin addressed to the Spanish military and entitled "Victory." The key man on the Spanish side was said to be a mysterious "Colonel Rodrigo" whom the report connected to the attack on the Central Bank of Barcelona. Another Spaniard present was a young man named Jordi Font who had apparently attended the meeting in Paris. *

The ETA Attrition: the Truces

The events of 23 February caused the "historic appeal" which the EIA leaders headed by its secretary general, Mario Onaindia, issued on 22 February upon concluding a special assembly held in Lejona (Vizcaya), to go unnoticed.

In the document a cease-fire was requested of the two branches of ETA. EIA had been studying this proposal since November, when ETA (p-m) assassinated the UCD leader Juan de Dios Doval. That assassination, harshly criticized by EIA, marked the beginning of a period of dissociation between the "abertzale" party and the "poli-milis" which culminated in the request for the cease-fire.

Mario Onaindia, the leading instigator of the proposal, had made a careful analysis which led him to conclude that the "armed struggle" was useless. Despite so much bloodshed, ETA (m) had not attained any of its goals. Insofar as ETA (p-m) was concerned, the continuation of the "armed action" was becoming increasingly senseless, inasmuch as this branch had backed the statute and the resultant autonomous development. We have already demonstrated the inconsistency of the action of the "poli-milis," determined to keep up an armed activism that was increasingly less comprehensible in an autonomous context understood to be a necessary phase.

Onaindia said: "We think that the idea will be late in prevailing, and that the specter of civil war will have to hover over Euskadi somewhat longer before the people realize the risk. Our proposal is one course of action, perhaps the only one."

The rather unfavorable mood of ETA (m) was quite obvious after Ryan's assassination, nor could much be expected of the erratic line being pursued by ETA (p-m) which, after the inactivity maintained since December, had on 21 February kidnapped the honorary consuls of Austria and El Salvador in Bilbao, German del Sel and Antonio Alfaro Fernandez, as well as the one from Uruguay in Pamplona, Javier Biurrun. The operation, carried out almost simultaneously by three different commando groups, apparently preceded the abduction of two other consular agents who had the good fortune to free themselves from the captors..

ETA (p-m) seemed to be jealous of the "benefits" accrued by ETA (m) after the death of Arregui, and dealt a blow which could have had major international repercussions in view of the consular status of the hostages.

*DIARIO 16, 3 July 1981, "The Fascist International Met in Rome," by Claudio Sussoni, p 8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

As terms for the release of the consuls, ETA (p-m) asked several newspapers and magazines, as well as television, to publish the reports of Amnesty International and the Human Rights Commission of the Congress of Deputies on the existence of torture, and also photographs of the body of ETA member Arregui. As the "poli-milis" stated later, it was an attempt "to put the torture and fascism of the State apparatus in question to international public opinion."

When an argument began in the news media concerning the feasibility of consenting to the ETA (p-m) demands or not, the major rash attempt of 23 February occurred, which relegated all the other issues.

Five days later, on 28 February, ETA (p-m) released the three consuls, and announced "an indefinite truce and a cease-fire without conditions," in one of its usual press conferences at which, in the presence of five newsmen, three hooded individuals, after citing their historical career and their ideological line, explained their decision to "allow for progress in the political solutions." They added: "One of those times has come when armed action must be withdrawn and room left for other ways of solving the specific problems." ETA (p-m) issued an appeal to the "progressive Basque forces (...) to make certain that the Statute is a platform without a setback." In the comment on both those who backed the Statute of Autonomy and those who fought it, it was clear that the "poli-milis" were extending their hands to ETA (m).

Moreover, ETA (p-m) overtly admitted that it had been the abortive coup d'etat which had prompted them to make this major decision: "We decided on it within a few hours; at first we were very frightened, as everyone was," the hooded men remarked. And in the communique which was read, reference was made to the historic responsibility "to dismantle all the enclaves of fascism in the State and in the society, because a fascist military coup would represent an enormous setback for the working class, both in political life and in the other areas of life."

Although the document cited several "guide points (...) which must be resolved promptly," such as criteria for the negotiations that they proposed (amnesty, integration of Navarra into Euskadi, the referendum on the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant and the repeal of the antiterrorist law), the "poli-milis" did not establish any deadline nor condition, but stated: "Our halting of the armed struggle is based on the notion that there really exists a dynamics in the political forces to solve the pending problems over the short term."

Finally, they addressed "ETA (m), asking it to cease its action, "Inasmuch as, in the current situation, the use of arms is an element which could objectively preclude the agreements that might be made between the political forces, destroying the political solutions." *

To any observer, a very close relationship was evident between 23-F and the truce, which once again showed the objective connections between terrorism and coupism. In subsequent statements to CAMBIO 16, ETA (p-m) attempted to downgrade that relationship, although without completely clearing up certain

*CAMBIO 16, No 484, 9 March 1981, "Farewell to Arms," pp 53 and 54, and "Cease-fire," pp 54 and 55

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ambiguities. For example, at one juncture they declared: "Without the armed struggle there would have been no Statute, and perhaps there would have been no 23 February (abortive military coup), at least in the way that it took place." Later, however, the "poli-milis" acquit themselves of this responsibility, which they foist indirectly on ETA (p-m). They assert: "We do not think that the ETA (p-m)'s armed struggle caused the coup to take place (...). And, as our use of arms has developed, as part of what the constitutional text for Euskadi indicates, which has subsequently been confirmed, as in the case of the Statute and the powers, we have succeeded in destabilizing or producing a coup situation to the same extent that the political action of PNV and the rest of the Basque democratic forces have succeeded in doing so." As is evident, this is a very peculiar interpretation of "armed struggle," which has been converted into something as respectable as political struggle itself, by the mere fact that it was carried out in connection with the statutory process, "as part of what the constitutional text for Euskadi indicates!" The "poli-milis" have come close to constitutionalizing their "armed struggle."

The gentle criticism of the other "armed struggle," that of ETA (m), is made as follows: "There have unquestionably been other uses of arms in Euskadi, but we do not think that they were the main detonator of the major coup attempt either. The detonator was a class struggle situation, and what Tejero and company claim is merely an ideological excuse for concealing their nostalgia for Francoism." In other words, finally, it is thought that terrorism, any kind of terrorism, has not played a role in triggering coupism. This is hardly believable, because the "poli-milis" admit that it was the abortive coup which prompted them to hasten the decision for the cease-fire that had already been made. All this attests to the ideological rigamarole in which ETA (p-m) is involved, finding no argument to explain 23-F other than a trite recourse to "the class struggle situation."

"The cease-fire was a decision which had been made months before in the organization, backed by the majority of the organization, for which there were no concrete dates. These dates were specified, on the one hand, in view of the request from the Basque political forces for a cessation of the armed struggle, with a public appeal for this from Euskadiko Eskerra, and, on the other hand, by the coup, which actually advanced the decision as the situation produced by 23 February changed radically; in other words, there was an attempt to defend what existed, fascism again began to be the enemy in all its dimensions and this prompted reconsideration of the decision as to when the cease-fire should be started."

Moreover, ETA (p-m) stressed that its decision "to abandon the dynamics of action-repression-action to intervene in the new situation" when the bourgeois democracy and the Statute arrived was not imitated by ETA (m), which thereby became responsible for "a situation opposed to ETA and, more specifically, to ETA (m)." "The dynamics of action-repression-action have been maintained with the fiendish pace of armed intervention by the ETA military, which is backing that intervention exclusively, without offering political solutions." As a result, the "poli-milis" advise their former comrades: "ETA (m) should hold its Seventh Assembly and, just as we have done, it must reconsider the tactic of armed struggle in general, and of course the strategy to be maintained in the future."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Finally, ETA (p-m) reiterates its conviction that the "KAS alternative" must be abandoned under the present circumstances. The "poli-milis" claim: "The problem of Herri Batasuna is that it has been opposing the Statute for the past 4 years, and the solution that it demands, the KAS solution, entails a break with the Constitution. For this purpose, there would have to be a change made in Title VIII of the latter, and this is a dynamic which HB cannot develop; it requires the existence of a left in Euskadi, which is impossible at present. In our opinion, this left must be created with the development of the Statute." ETA (p-m) regards as essential "the defense of the Statute, which has been seriously threatened by the coup of 23-F and the program of Mr Calvo Sotelo, who has already shown his disdain for the autonomous issues upon refusing to reach agreements in the investiture voting with the autonomist forces such as the Andalucian, Catalanian or Basque forces." *

The ETA (p-m) decision (which they never called a "truce" nor an "abandonment of armed struggle," but solely a "cease-fire") was received with relief and hope by virtually all the Basque political groups except Herri Batasuna. Arzallus, president of PNV, expressed the view that, "It is time for a statesman with historic vision, capable of taking advantage of this offer to deal with whatever there is negotiable in the hand outstretched by ETA (p-m) in order to provide a solution to the ETA issue."

Of course, there were some who received the peace offer from the "poli-milis" with caution; for example, Roberto Lerchundi, secretary-general of EPK-PCE, who stated: "If the ETA (p-m) proposal is confirmed, I think that it represents a major change in attitude. However, I view it with caution. The action must confirm it."

This skepticism was more than warranted, because although, in the communique announcing the cease-fire, ETA (p-m) announced that it had ordered all its commando groups "to halt all planned action and to stop that being put into effect," there was one action which was not stopped. We refer to the kidnapping of the Valencian industrialist Luis Suner who, it was learned weeks later, had been kept in captivity at that time by ETA (p-m). Nevertheless, the release of the three consuls gave the impression that everything that had been promised by the Basque organization was being fulfilled. On several occasions, the latter had denied its implication in the Suner case, one of the strangest abductions which had occurred, while it was thought that ETA (p-m) had nothing to do with it.

The "cease-fire" of the "poli-milis" suffered a serious threat when, in a communique sent to the Basque news media and published on 21 March, ETA (p-m) suggested the possibility of resuming its terrorist activities.

The excuses given by the ETA members to justify their threats were aimed chiefly against the Socialists. The "poli-milis" wrote: "In view of the critical current situation, PSOE proposes to revive the defunct Front for Peace (...);

*CAMBIO 16, No 485, 16 March 1981, "The Statute Disarmed ETA," pp 49 ff.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in short, it is inclined toward supporting old cliches the ineffectiveness of which has been more than proven, but this time with the resumption of repression, which might include more severe standby status than what we have undergone... (and) more or less unbloody implementation of the Antiterrorist Law." Consequently, ETA (p-m) advised the Basque political forces "to avoid any temptation to opt for a policy that would strengthen options which have now definitely appeared as those yielding to the greater or lesser evils of the 'Tejero coup.'" The terrorist organization accused PSOE of having backed the right wing orientation and "grand-national" ideas of 23 February, and concluded by stating that the "PSOE proposal, if it should become generalized, will prompt us to reconsider our action."

This solution from ETA (p-m) evoked great surprise, even among the political sectors closest to the politico-military branch. Mario Onaindia, secretary general of EIA, said that he was "doubly surprised" because this cease-fire "had attained the goal of opening up dynamics for negotiation among all the political forces." Onaindia added that, "Of those proposals, the most interesting one is probably that of PSOE which, for the first time in a long while, offered a reasonable solution." *

The ETA (m) Final Escalation. The Government Against Terror. The International Dimension

In any event, the ETA (p-m) cease-fire did not mean the end of terrorism; because the other ETA, the "milis," who had been urged to put down their arms, rejected the offer, immediately showing their intention to continue along the path of violence.

On 1 March, ETA (m) attempted to blow up two National Police Z cars being driven between Sestao and Portugalete; and, upon failing to do so, it shot at them, seriously wounding one policeman, while two others sustained slight injuries. A woman who had been passing by the vicinity was also wounded.

Four days later, the police commissioner, Jose Luis de Raymundo Noya, was assassinated in Deusto (Vizcaya). The ETA (m)'s desires were clear. Chiqui Benegas claimed: "ETA military has sided objectively with the coupists."

But the extreme right was also persisting in its violent plans. Two days earlier, on 3 March, Francisco Javier Ansa Zincunegui was assassinated in Andoain (Guipuzcoa). For the first time, two members of the Spanish-Basque Battalion were arrested, something that was interpreted as a sign of the new style of Calvo Sotelo who, in addition to expressing condolences to the victim's relatives, made a sudden trip to Bilbao, where he attended Commissioner De Raymundo's funeral.

ETA (m) carried out another escalation, the most predominant hallmarks of which, excluding the exploding of devices, were the assassinations of two lieutenant colonels within a period of 48 hours, in both instances when the victims were

*EL PAIS, 22 March 1981, p 12

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

coming out of church: On 19 March, Lt Col Ramon Romeo Rotaeché was assassinated in Bilbao; and on 21 March, Lt Col Jose Luis Prieto Garcia, former chief of the jurisdictional police of Alava, was assassinated in Pamplona. On 27 March, in Alegria de Orio (Guipuzcoa), it was the turn of Juan Costas Otamendi, who had been accused of drug trafficking.

During those final days of March there was a widespread reaction from both the political forces and the people (30,000 persons demonstrated against terrorism in Pamplona on 25 March), as well as from the government.

In fact, the government announced the implementation of five types of measures: 1) the Armed Forces would cooperate to "seal off" the Franco-Spanish border in the Navarra area where the ETA members were in the habit of crossing; 2) a Single Antiterrorist Command was established in the Ministry of Interior, with Manuel Ballesteros assigned as its head; 3) the checking of individuals and goods at certain border points would be intensified; 4) the personnel of the State security corps and forces would be increased in the Basque and Navarra areas; 5) Parliament passed two bills through the emergency procedure: one on crimes of rebellion and terrorism, and another on the state of alarm, standby status and martial law.

The measures showed the intention of Calvo Sotelo (who explained their meaning on TVE) to face up to terrorism and, generally speaking, they were well received, although the use of the Armed Forces aroused some suspicion in Suarez himself, among others. The penal law, which was called the Law for Defense of the Constitution, also aroused criticism of both a technical nature and regarding its essence, which attempted both to prevent propaganda through the terrorist and coupist newspapers (for example, EGIN and EL ALCAZAR) and to punish the activity of the intelligence commando groups and other types of assistance to the terrorists.

During the final days of March there was also a discussion of the constantly updated issue of the terrorists' international connections. It was then that there appeared the book by Claire Sterling entitled "The Terror Network," which we have cited on several occasions. The commentary on the book multiplied, and there even occurred an argument between the United States and the USSR, because while the former accused the KGB of being behind the terrorist groups operating in the West (Haig himself went so far as to make very direct charges), the Soviet Union accused the American CIA.

Even before the argument began, Stanley G. Payne, a well-known American historian specializing in Spanish problems, published an article in which he claimed: "During the past 13 years, while the Soviet Union has promoted terrorism on a worldwide scale either directly or indirectly, great care has been taken to avoid an overt link insofar as possible." He also noted: "In Spain itself, the Soviet activities have reached such an overt level that on at least one occasion a high-ranking Soviet diplomat has been caught recruiting local terrorists in the Canaries." Payne also referred to the "French case," citing "the peculiar policy of the French government of providing protection and, consequently, support, to the foreign terrorist groups. In this way, the irrational,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Kerenski-like role of France has been an essential contribution to the international network." *

On the very same day that this article appeared (24 March), the director of the Soviet-Spanish enterprise Sovhispan, Yuriy Ivanovich Bytchkov, was asked to leave Spain. Many Soviets had already been expelled for espionage activities or for possible connections with terrorist networks. The Spanish secret services were apparently not disregarding that sector.

ETA's international connections were known to the Spanish police, especially insofar as France was concerned. Manuel Ballesteros, chief of the Single Antiterrorist Command, declared: "If the protection that the Basque terrorists have in the south of France, the French 'sanctuary,' were to disappear, or if there were greater cooperation on the part of the French authorities, ETA would not last even 6 months for the Spanish police." And he subsequently stated: "Up until now, ETA has been training in Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Lebanon and, recently, Nicaragua and El Salvador." **

Independent French spokesmen as notable as Raymond Aron or Jean Francois Revel did not hesitate to condemn the French attitude as well. Raymond Aron said: "I believe that the French government should be radically hostile to ETA, and that it should do everything possible against Basque terrorism, because Basque terrorism is an international threat. It is part of a dangerous international movement jeopardizing the democratic community as a whole, and hence there must be no reservations against that terrorist group. The maximum amount should be done. Is the maximum being done? Well, I don't know. The only thing I can say is that it should be done."

Revel, whose valiant position opposing the French attitude we have already cited, continued to be just as categorical and far more direct: "Terrorism is not merely a Spanish issue (he said), but European as well. France should have reacted far earlier, it should have helped Spain against the ETA terrorists (...). The major enemy of all the present forms of terrorism (he added) is democracy; and it is clear that ETA has assassinated far more since democracy has existed in Spain. Insofar as France is concerned, I think that there is a secret agreement not to allow terrorism to develop on our soil. For example, no arrests have been made here of Palestinians or Italians, and very few Germans have been arrested." ***

While Spain did not obtain the needed cooperation from its French neighbor, it failed to attain understanding attitudes from institutions as important as the Church as well. In early April, the Basque bishops, the three titular bishops of Bilbao, San Sebastian and Vitoria, and the auxiliary bishop of Bilbao, Monsignors Larrea, Setien, Larrauri and Uriarte, published a controversial

*DIARIO 16, 24 March 1981, "The Sources of Terrorism," by Stanley G. Payne, p 2

** CAMBIO 16, No 489, 13 April 1981, "Without France, ETA Would Last 6 Months," statements by Manuel Ballesteros of the Single Antiterrorist Command, pp 38 and 39

*** CAMBIO 16, No 490, 20 April 1981, "Raymond Aron Discusses Spain," pp 64 and 65, and "Revel: for Spain and Against ETA," p 67

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

pastoral letter in which the ETA terrorism and the use of the Army by the government in the antiterrorist battle appeared to be put on the same level. Mention was made therein of the "military actions" of ETA and the terrorist assassinations were called "deaths caused in the name of an alleged revolutionary justice or strategy."

The matter of the pastoral letter evoked an immediate reaction from the government, whose president summoned the Apostolic Nuncio of the Holy See to Moncloa. The incident gave reason for certain publications to concern themselves again with the old issue of the connections between the Church and Basque nationalism.*

ETA (p-m) maintained its truce, but still made some armed appearances. On 27 March, two members of that organization attempted to penetrate the women's jail in Barcelona, pretending to be lawyers. The "poli-milis" tried to free their comrades Carmela Barandiaran and Maria Elgoroibe, who were serving a sentence in that prison establishment. They did not attain their goal, and the ETA members ended up by surrendering.

A few days later, on 14 April, the Valencian industrialist, Luis Suner, who, it was learned then, had been kidnapped by ETA (p-m) on 12 January, was released. The abduction lasted 3 months for the person who, judging from the statements of the Finance Ministry, was the richest man in Spain.

On several occasions ETA (p-m) denied being responsible for the kidnapping, and the police themselves confirmed that the Basque organization could not have been involved: a series of details seemed to preclude that possibility. Different data learned (the presence of a woman in the commando group and the weapons) inclined others to continue believing that the "poli-milis" were behind the kidnapping, perhaps, it was said, backing some group of Valencian independence advocates. Specific mention was made of a group called "els maulets," a small party organization of the "armed struggle" which had been known of since 1979 from painted messages which appeared in Valencia and Alicante, summoning the people "to arms." In early January 1981, with members of other parties of the extra-parliamentary left, there was also formed a coalition called Popular Unity of the Valencian Country, which came to be the political front for "els maulets" that would operate as a military front. In short, it was a new implementation of the ETA (m)-Herri Batasuna plan. **

On the same day that Suner was released, the San Sebastian attorney, deputy mayor of the San Sebastian city hall and member of Euskadiko Eskerra, Pedro Ruiz Balerdi, was arrested at the Irun border. He was carrying 5.5 million Belgian francs which he was attempting to bring into Spain and which, he claimed, were his share for having served as a middleman in the Suner kidnapping. Balerdi, who was one of the defenders in the historical trial in Burgos, had also served as a mediator in the Ruperez kidnapping.

* CAMBIO 16, No 489, 13 April 1981 "ETA Te Absolvo", pp 18 ff.; SABADG GRAFICO, No 1,244, 8-14 April 1981, "The Bishop Grapevines," pp 8 and 9, and "The Black Dossier of the Basque Church," pp 10 ff.

** CAMBIO 16, No 478, 26 January 1981, "Who Kidnapped the Mock King?", pp 40 and 41, and No 479, "The Valencian ETA," pp 34 and 35

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A controversy arose in the press concerning the lawyers "who were collecting from ETA." Balerdi was defended by the legal profession's corporative organs, with the understanding that the money was coming from the Suner family to which he was rendering his services, and not from the terrorist organization. On the basis of these assumptions, Balerdi was released a short time later, but a certain amount of uneasiness was noted in public opinion over what was interpreted as leniency toward the "ETA lawyers" who were serving as intermediaries in the kidnapping cases as well as "rendering their services" and even obtaining substantial reductions in the demands on the part of the terrorist organization for the so-called "revolutionary tax." *

The Tragic Week of May 1981. Blow to GRAPO

Despite all these dubious activities, ETA (p-m) was becoming increasingly established in the truce or, as they preferred to call it, the cease-fire. An actual armistice put an end to the "armed action" of the "poli-milis" exactly paralleling the political evolution observed in EIA, which we shall discuss later.

ETA (m), on the other hand, continued its acts of terrorism, which caused five deaths in April, in addition to other attacks of lesser significance. **

The police also learned that, in late March, at San Juan de Luz, ETA (m) had held an important meeting attended by its top-ranking leaders, Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, alias "Txomin," military chief; Eugenio Echeveste Arizaren, political chief; Juan Lorenzo Santiago Lasa Michelena, alias "Txikierdi," chief of the commando groups; and Isidro Maria Garade Bedialauneta, alias "Mamarru," chief of logistics and armament. The ETA (m) staff had decided to heighten the "armed struggle" in opposition to the cease-fire requested by some "milis" jailed in Soria.

According to the reports reaching the Single Antiterrorist Command, the ETA organization was attempting to bring into Spain from the "French sanctuary" six commando groups that were to act in the Basque Country and Madrid. The police services managed to capture five of the six commando groups, also arresting the drivers of the TIR trucks and the locomotive engineer of a train on which the ETA members intended to penetrate "the interior," in their terminology, in other words, Spain.

*Concerning this controversy see DIARIO 16, 17 April 1981, "These Are the First Consequences After the Release of Luis Suner," pp 4 and 5; EL PAIS, 17 April 1981, pp 1 and 9; SABADO GRAFICO, "The Devil's Advocates," pp 10 ff.

** The assassinations during April 1981 by ETA (m) were the following: the national policeman, Vicente Sanchez Vicente, assassinated on 8 April, in Baracaldo, and Francisco Frances Garzon, killed on 9 April in Bilbao; the retired lieutenant, Oswaldo Jose Rodriguez, assassinated in San Sebastian on 14 April; the retired Civil Guard lieutenant colonel, Luis Cadalso, also assassinated on 14 April in Basauri, and the civilian, Jose Maria Latiegui, director of the Moulinex business firm, assassinated the same day in Usurbil (Guipuzcoa).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The only one to succeed in evading the police encirclement was the "Madrid" commando group, whose plans consisted of acting in the capital of Spain.

From that time on, the police set up services in an attempt to detect the ETA (m) infrastructure in Madrid, investigating both persons linked with the Basque country, for example, soldiers or students, and refugees coming from the Latin American countries, among whom there were many former terrorists (Tupamaros, Montoneros, Chilean MIR members, etc.) based on what we have previously termed the "Latin American connection." *

The orientation of the probes was incorrect, because when, after the summer, they managed to disband the ETA (m)'s Madrid infrastructure, it was found that its back-up network consisted of "progressives" linked with intellectual and feminist groups which were definitely from Madrid by origin and background, in most instances.

But, as had already occurred in 1979, it was to be in May that the diabolical repetition of the terrorist attacks with very few days' difference would raise the political temperature and public emotion to a degree of maximum tension. Once again the terrorists struck with such intensity that they seemed capable of destroying the herculean effort for democratic normalization.

This new heated period of terrorism also represented the umpteenth resurrection of GRAPO which, as we know, had kept nearly absolute silence for months. Only the offer of a "cease-fire" made by Sanchez-Casas to the court which was trying him, the day after the one made by ETA (p-m), that is, on 29 February, had afforded an occasion for information on GRAPO. The leader of the terrorist organization had voiced the desire to abandon "armed struggle" if there were certain conditions which, although he did not specify them at this time, could readily be inferred to be "the KAS alternative in a GRAPO version," which we have mentioned before.

This "offer" was reiterated by Sanchez-Casas and other GRAPO members during the sessions of the various trials being held against them for different acts of terrorism. It might have seemed that the "peace" offered was an indication that the dismantling of GRAPO was a fact.

Nevertheless, on 4 May, a GRAPO commando group put an end to the life of Gen Andres Gonzalez de Suso, known for his liberal nature, and that of a national policeman, Ignacio Garcia Garcia. Almost at the very same hour, the GRAPO "Barcelona" commando group assassinated two members of the Civil Guard, Sgt Justiniano Fernandez Perado and Guardsman Francisco Montenegro, at a bar in Ciudad Condal. In the Madrid attack, the police managed to capture one of the terrorists, Avelino Gomez Gomez.

The dual attack occurred at a critical time because, a few days earlier, the leak in the press of some of the summary statements of those implicated in the abortive coup of 23 February, in a story which, it was claimed, although nothing was made clear, favored the coup plotters, had made the issue of coupism timely again.

* CAMBIO 16, No 494, 18 May 1981, "Spain Needs You," pp 28 ff., especially "2. Spain Reacts," pp 32 and 33

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The GRAPO attacks unquestionably benefited the coupist plans, and therefore questions were again brought up concerning the true nature of the strange terrorist group. While some kept insisting that "the GRAPO's final connection is located in the East," others suspected "an infiltration of elements in the terrorist organization which are subject to slogans strategically devised by the ultraright brains."

The repercussions of the GRAPO's twofold attack had not yet subsided when, on 7 May, another attack, this time by ETA (m), heightened the nervousness very seriously. On almost the same site where Gen Gonzalez de Suso had died 3 days earlier, on the same Conde de Penalver Street, two terrorists riding a motorcycle and using the so-called "Algerian technique," set a bomb on the hood of the car which was taking the chief of the king's military squad, Gen Joaquin de Valenzuela, to the Palace of La Zarzuela. The explosion of the device left the general seriously wounded and killed his companions, Lt Col Guillermo Tevar, petty officer Antonio Nogueira and the driver, Carlos Rodriguez Taboada. The fact that the victims were members of the personnel under the king's orders gave reason to think that ETA (m) was now aiming directly at the person of the head of state.

Emotion was evident in the atmosphere, which reached a very high degree of tension. The ultrarightists took to the streets in support of their longed-for military dictatorship, and the most disturbing rumors circulated. It seemed as if an unsurmountable point had been reached. The terrorism had gone too far. The specter of a coup traversed Madrid again.

The next day, at the initiative of the political parties, all of Spain voiced its repudiation of terrorism and its determination to oppose it at all costs, with a symbolic act which had widespread repercussions and served to demonstrate the resolute desire of the citizens to cooperate. At 1200 hours noon, all over Spain, and for 2 minutes, all Spaniards stopped and kept silent. The cars driving on the streets of cities, the machines, the radio broadcasts, all activities stopped; and all that could be heard were the bells and radio tuning. It was like a unanimous cry, like a loud "enough!" to terrorism.

We know that terrorism had been losing ground, backing and initiative in recent months, and that the process of its withdrawal had already begun. But if we had to choose a symbolic moment that would mark the reaction from the citizens and the withdrawal of terrorism, I think we would have to say it was that 8 May. It was obvious that neither ETA nor even GRAPO had been totally defeated, but that was the beginning of the end.

On the same 8 May, the Council of Ministers met, and seriously considered the possibility of declaring a standby status throughout the entire national territory. Possibly only the fact that the pertinent law did not yet exist, because approval of the bill by the Senate was still lacking, precluded this measure.

The resolute desire of the citizens to cooperate was clearly felt immediately. The day after the demonstration of the 2 minutes of silence, 9 May, the police, in a spectacular action carried out in Alcorcon, on the outskirts of Madrid, arrested the GRAPO members who had, on 4 May, committed the attack which cost

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the life of Gen Gonzalez de Suso and that of a national policeman. It was Jose Jimenez Fernandez, alias "El Tigre," and Miguel Angel Bergado Martinez, who confessed their guilt and who were arrested, apparently thanks to telephone tips from citizens. The following day, Guadalupe Nunez Morales, member of the GRAPO Executive Committee and in charge of the organization's liaison, was also arrested. On the other hand, the ETA members of the "Madrid" commando group, perpetrators of the attack on 7 May, mysteriously escaped, despite the fact that the police succeeded in identifying them as Jose Leon Mazusta Artidia and Jose Maria Bereciartua Echarri. In spite of this, other arrests were made, both in Madrid and the Basque Country, which increasingly undermined the structure of ETA (m).

In the following weeks GRAPO received such severe blows that, with all the reservations with which such claims must be made, the police and the minister of interior himself thought that it was left virtually nonexistent.

In mid-May, several GRAPO prisoners had started a hunger strike seeking better living conditions in the prisons. GRAPO announced that it would back the strike with a campaign of attacks.

But, fortunately, the intentions of the terrorist organizations did not materialize. On 17 June, the Civil Guard discovered several members of that terrorist organization in Gerona Province, very near the French border. Four GRAPO members were killed in two different confrontations. Exactly 2 days later, on 19 June, one of the GRAPO members on the hunger strike, Juan Jose Crespo Galande, died.

Shortly thereafter, the trial was held against the six GRAPO members accused of setting the bomb in May 1979 which caused the slaughter at 47 California, including the leader Sanchez-Casas.

In September, GRAPO received another harsh blow when the police discovered the house in Barcelona in which another one of the organization's top-ranking leaders, Enrique Cerdan Calixto, was living. The terrorist attempted to escape, and was felled by the agents. A short time later, in Cadiz, another major GRAPO member was arrested. Of the terrorist organization's supreme leaders, only Martin Luna remained at large.

ETA and Socialist France

Mitterrand's victory in the French presidential elections and, in June, the Socialists' overwhelming victory in the legislative elections, were to require new proposals in the area of relations with France in connection with ETA.

For a time, the Spanish Socialists seemed to think that the arrival of their French counterparts in command posts would entail a radical change in Spanish-French relations concerning the old issue of ETA terrorism and the latter's use of French "sanctuary." During the Giscard presidency, especially during the final period, Spanish-French relations had been so bad, and not just because of the terrorist issue, that it seemed they could hardly become any worse.

At the time (May 1981) there was proposed a request for the extradition of an ETA member, Tomas Linaza, accused of seven assassinations. The dossier sent by the Spanish authorities was so complete and convincing that it seemed difficult

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to refuse the extradition of one who appeared accused of such crimes. According to the French procedure, the pertinent court first judged on whether or not the extradition being sought was in order; however; then, finally, it was up to the government to decide on the request.

The indications that the French Socialists were not in favor of extraditions had already been perceived at the height of the presidential campaign. A high-ranking leader of the French Socialist Party, Claude Estier, had confided to Spanish newsmen his view that one could not expect from the new French government a policy of acceptance for the requests for extradition of ETA members, regardless of how well founded they were.

When Felipe Gonzalez returned from the Mitterrand swearing-in ceremony, he told newsmen that "extraditions are not everything," noting that the important thing was the cooperation of the new French authorities in the battle against terrorism. It was not difficult to imagine that he had perceived in Paris a rather unfavorable position toward extraditions.

These predictions were confirmed on 8 June, when the French prime minister, Pierre Mauroy, in making statements, expressed this intention of refusing the extraditions, resorting to the old idea of France as a paradise of freedom and for political refugees. Mauroy's remarks were like a slap to the Spanish government, particularly since a Paris court had declared Linaza guilty of very serious crimes, considering him a "common criminal."

Not only the government, but other political circles as well, including the Socialists, expressed their surprise. A telephone conversation between Perez-Llorca and his French colleague, Claude Cheysson, and a quick visit to Madrid by the latter, somewhat eased the diplomatic tension, which had become very high.

In the following weeks, other Basque terrorists whose extradition had been requested by the Spanish government went through the pertinent French courts which, in several more instances, agreed to extradition. But it was clear that the French government, which had promised a complete response, would not consent to the Spanish requests. In any event, the Mauroy government was postponing that response.

Opposed to this French position on the issue of extraditions, there was noted a certain amount of cooperation by the French police with the Spanish police, which eased the tension between the two governments. * The Calvo Sotelo visit to Paris in early July attested to this atmosphere of relatively good understanding.

Subsequently, the French minister of interior, Defferre, traveled to Madrid, and the Spanish ministers of interior and justice visited Paris. Following the summer months, the French capital was also visited by a Spanish technical

*L'EXPRESS, 26 June 1981, "Basques: Justice, Asylum and Law," p 53, and CAMBIO 16, No 498, 15 June 1981, "French-Style Stab," pp 22 ff.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

delegation chaired by the general director of State Security, Francisco Laina, which included, along with the general director of the Civil Guard, Gen Aramburu, and that of the police, Fernandez Dopico, the chief of the Single Antiterrorist Command, Manuel Ballesteros. Understandably, terrorism was the essential topic at all these meetings.

The results of these contacts were felt very soon. The French administration required all Basques to regularize their status, as other foreigners were required to do. This fundamental measure afforded the French authorities an accurate knowledge of the composition of the Basque colony in the neighboring country.

At the same time, the members of ETA (m) were notified that the French government firmly proposed to prevent any terrorist action "in or from its territory." It was reiterated to them that there would be no consent for extraditions, but at the same time they were threatened with confinement, no longer on the island of Yeu, but on the Caribbean island of Guadalupe.

In fact, during October it was proposed to confine in certain French localities, such as the island of Ouessant, the ETA members accused by the Spanish authorities. The measure met with difficulties owing to the resistance from the inhabitants of some of those localities against receiving such guests. Finally, two small sites in the department of Lozere were designated as a residence for ETA members.

The so-called "long truce" of ETA (m) which we shall discuss later had one of its causes in this new attitude among the French authorities. The status of the French "sanctuaries" was upset, and this necessitated a logistical redrafting.

At the same time, the French police passed on certain information to the Spanish police. From this source there apparently came the information that the Spanish police had on the move to Spain by the so-called "Madrid" commando group, which was intended to take action in the capital of Spain.

But the relations with France seemed doomed to frequent ups and downs. For example, in early November, the French minister of interior, Defferre, complicated matters again by declaring, not the intention of the French government not to consent to extraditions, something already well known, but the French desire to "accord the right of asylum to the Spanish Basques." The French minister added: "But (the French government) has committed itself to the young Spanish democracy to prevent their return to Spain." It was claimed that the decision meant the imminent release of the incarcerated Basques. The essence of Socialist France's cooperation with its neighbor to the south was rather slight.

The Great ETA (m) Truce

After the assassination of the three members of the military accompanying Gen Valenzuela in Madrid, ETA (m) had continued its attacks. Two more members of the Civil Guard died before the end of May. * In June, another two fatal

*The Civil Guard members Jose Olalla and Manuel Sanchez Borallo were killed in Lemona (Vizcaya) on 14 May.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

attacks took place,* as well as other acts, such as the 50 kilograms of "gum-2" placed in the University of Navarra, which caused four to be injured. In all instances, ETA (m) took credit for the incidents.

In July, ETA (m) assassinated four persons ** and, as it had done on other occasions, it began a summertime truce which, in this instance, had to be extended much longer, giving rise to all kinds of speculation about the meaning of this strange attitude, changed only by occasional attacks on Iberduero facilities.

For this reason, the summer of 1981 was one of reassuring normality in the Basque Country. Tourism resumed and the gaiety of the popular celebrations was not upset by either political implications or deeds of violence.

But no one was overly confident. According to Txiki Benegas, "To the misfortune of everyone, the reality of ETA must be concentrated more on a tactical retreat than on the cessation of a violent activity." Txomin Ziloaga, of HB, for his part, thought that it was "not a tacit truce, but rather a tactical retreat," though he added: "We prefer not to embark on the issue of ETA. If we say that the summer hiatus seems good to us, or if we express the contrary view, they will misinterpret us. For this reason, we remain silent. We do not talk about ETA."

As for Teo Uriarte, of Euskadiko Eskerra, he expressed the following opinion: "We do not think that it is due to a dismantling of its infrastructure. They may stop for awhile and wait for events to occur. A disillusionment on the issue of autonomy would give them a certain strength for another period of violence. This would be a mistake. Madrid and Vitoria must understand one another. The opposite would give advantages to ETA (m) which is so much in need of popular support at present."

From all indications, this latter circumstance, the loss of popular support, was one of the reasons for ETA's inactivity. The Basques had become tired of the violence, the constant mobilizations, the ultrapoliticization of all aspects of daily living. The weariness was evident in the small number of attendees at the demonstrations organized by the "abertzales." Issues which on other occasions had managed to bring thousands of people to the streets were now only capable of mustering a few hundred. Not even the hunger strike of the "milis" confined in the port of Santamaria had succeeded in touching some sectors of the population which had previously been aroused by far less. Only the nuclear issue, and specifically Lemoniz, seemed to still possess a certain amount of mobilization capacity. Furthermore, certain ETA (m) acts, such as the assassination of engineer Ryan, had contributed to prompting many people to turn their backs on it.

*They are those which cost the life of the policeman Maria Jose Garcia Sanchez, killed in a shooting with ETA (m) in Zarauz, on 16 June, and that of the mutilated colonel, Luis de la Parra Orbaneja, assassinated by ETA (m) in Irun on 22 June.

** Involving Army Lt Magin Fernandez, assassinated in Baracaldo on 5 July; that same day, in Oyarzun, the Civil Guard member, Luis Miranda Blanco, was killed; on 10 July, in Basauri, the retired Civil Guard member, Joaquin Gorjon Gonzalez, was assassinated; and on 25 July, in Amurio, the apartment salesman, Felix Galindez Uria, was killed.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Another concurrent cause that might explain the "milis" truce was the breakdown of major portions of the ETA infrastructure, which had obviously been weakened. In recent months the police action had been highly effective, very seriously damaging both the intelligence apparatus and the operational system of the terrorist organization. In early September, for example, the police arrested Ignacio Echevarria Landazabal, a member of the "Donibane" commando group; something which prevented a series of actions which this commando group had planned. Weapons and explosive material were also recovered.

ETA (m) was hurt by this effective disbanding activity, as proven by the document found in the Zarauz apartment which was taken over after the shooting which cost the life of Inspector Maria Jose Sanchez on 16 June. In the document, ETA member Miguel Antonio Goicoechea Elorriaga, alias "Txapela," a major member of the ETA (m) leadership and chief of the "illegal commandos," who managed to escape, complained of the lack of logistical backup and the meager intelligence structure that he had at his disposal.

A third cause explaining the ETA inactivity, from all indications, was the deep-seated internal debate in which the organization was embroiled. During the summer, in the French Basque Country, ETA (m) had held a series of meetings on the issue of the armed struggle, and redrafted its strategy. The example of the "poli-milis" unquestionably carried some weight and, according to certain speculation, there would be an attempt to replace the indiscriminate terrorism with a different selective type that would choose the targets carefully. It was also claimed that these meetings, which, contrary to what some thought, did not turn out to be the Eighth Assembly of the ETA (m), had been concerned with the recurrent theme of negotiations.

A fourth joint cause of what some regarded as a mere "technical truce" was, without doubt, the new French position that we have discussed previously.

Despite everything, caution was the spirit of the police authorities, who feared a new offensive at any moment. "One cannot chant victory," remarked Roson, on a trip to the Basque Country made in September. And he added: "I believe that major steps have been taken, but one cannot preclude further action, because there is a group of commandos in a position to carry it out, and I think that it will happen in the not too distant future." *

A Blow to ETA

As a result of the reports which had reached the police, according to which two ETA (m) commando groups intended to take action in Madrid, the Single Antiterrorist Command mounted a spectacular operation called "Scorpion" in anticipation of attacks which, it was assumed, might be aimed against high-ranking military commanders.

As a result of this operation, on 25 September Juan Antonio Madariaga, head of the ETA (m) intelligence apparatus in Madrid, was arrested. His companion in the intelligence activity, Maria Belen Gonzalez Penalba, alias "Carmen," just managed to escape.

*On the topic of the ETA (m) truce, see DIARIO 16, 14 September 1981, "ETA Will Kill Again," by Pedro Conde Zabala, pp 4 and 5; and CAMBIO 16, No 514, 5 October 1981, "The 100-Day Truce," pp 26 ff.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

While in prison, Madariaga secretly composed a self-critical document to be sent to the ETA (m) leadership in France, but owing to an "informer" a search was made and the document was found. From one sentence contained in the document regarding the insurance on Madariaga's automobile, arrests were made of several individuals who comprised ETA (m)'s logistical and intelligence infrastructure in Madrid, a prominent member thereof being the feminist Jimena Alonso who, according to the police, had been working for ETA since 1977. *

This major action against ETA (m) was completed on 21 October when, at a checkpoint set up by the Civil Guard on the Bilbao-Behovia freeway, near Renteria, the occupants of a car attempted to flee, holding a shoot-out with the Civil Guard members. As a result of the confrontation, two of the car's occupants were killed, and the third was arrested. To everyone's surprise, the ones killed proved to be two important ETA members: Andres Izaguirre Gogorza, alias "Gogor," chief of the "Madrid" commando group, and Jose Juaregui Altube, alias "Josechu." The individual arrested, Carlos Martinez Bastarrica, was also an ETA member.

All these police actions put ETA (m) on the defensive, and represented the hardest blow that the terrorist organization had received since the summer of 1975. For the first time in 6 years, the initiative belonged to the police, who forced the ETA members to withdraw. Hence, it is no exaggeration to speak of retreat.

While the police were continuing to break up the intelligence commando groups in the Basque Country and Navarra, arresting their members, ETA (m) announced "harsh reprisals against those who understood only the language of force and arms," an odd style of speech coming from an organization whose career was a vast stream of bloodshed. This semantic hardness contrasted with the moderate tone of a communique disseminated a month earlier, in which a mobilization was called for 27 September, coinciding with the anniversary of the shooting of the ETA members "Txiki" and Otaegui, together with three GRAPO members. In this communique, use was made of phrases such as "lack of a progressive and liberal desire," or "peaceful dialog," which were unprecedented until that time in the language of ETA (m). Something very serious was happening within the organization that warranted the expectation that the ebbing of terrorism was beginning to be a fact.

The Internal Debate in ETA (p-m) on 'Armed Struggle'

In the fall of 1981, the reports attesting to the existence of a complex internal debate, and even major differences, among the members of the two branches of ETA were becoming increasingly abundant.

*The other individuals under arrest who were eventually placed at the disposal of the courts were Carmen Santos Fontela, Amaya Andreu Sanz, Aida Chalmeta Alonso, daughter of Jimena, Margarita Irastorza Gogoitia, Dolores Illescas Ortiz, Victor Garcia-Hoz Rosales, Jose de la Paz Sanchez Montanes and Antonio Hernandez Rodriguez.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

During October, ETA (p-m) held a series of meetings in Biarritz described by the Political Office as "an urgent, extensive debate on the current problems," in a lengthy document wherein, on 45 pages, the various speeches were reprinted almost literally.

The basic issue discussed was "the future of the armed struggle (...), both the type of armed struggle and the type of organization which needs to be constructed." According to the Political Office, light was shed there "on the problems which the class struggle will pose for us in the future."

Throughout the discussion, two positions were completely apparent: one favoring and the other opposing "armed struggle." The advocates of "armed struggle" were apparently a minority sector headed by Jesus Abrisqueta Costa, chief of the Political Office, and Jose Aulestia Urrutia, in charge of the armed commando groups.* The lengthy debate did not result in either an agreement or a synthesis of the positions. The "poli-milis" cited the need to wait for events and, specifically, the holding in March 1982 of the constituent congress for the new united party, Euskadiko Eskerra-Left for Socialism (EE), formed from the former coalition of the same name, particularly its main component, EIA, and the "Lerchundi sector" of the Communist Party of Euskadi.

This means that, once again, within ETA (p-m) there was repeated the dynamics of division, and if the process were carried out in accordance with the old system that we have mentioned so often, it could be assumed that the "hard-liners," that is, the advocates of "armed struggle," would take control of the apparatus. In this case, it might be anticipated that those favoring the continuation of the "cease-fire" would end up swelling the ranks of EE. According to others, the opposite system might occur, with the control of the apparatus taken over by those opposed to "armed struggle" and the "hard-liners" splitting off. Presumably, the latter would negotiate with ETA (m) and would end up joining that organization, as the "bereziak" [ETA special commandos] did in their time.

This latter possibility was less likely because, in addition to the fact that a convergence between a sector of the "poli-milis" with ETA (m) was difficult, owing to the abyss created between the two organizations, what sense would it make for a pacifist ETA (p-m) to survive? As we shall observe shortly, this was one of the arguments of the "hard-liners" to justify the return to "armed struggle."

*See CAMBIO 16, No 530, 25 January 1982, "Papa Julio Returns Home," by Jose Diaz Herrera and Juan Madrid, pp 18 ff. According to other reports (EL PAIS, 16 February 1982, "The Break in ETA (p-m) Nearly Consummated," pp 1 and 7), the sector favoring struggle was larger than the "pacifist" one. At the same time, according to this information, the "hawks" were headed by Abrisqueta, and it was the "historicals" Aulestia and Goiburua who were in favor of maintaining the truce.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Let us observe, in brief, the arguments of the two positions that we have cited, as they were voiced in the October debate wherein there was also a perspicacious discussion of the problems raised by autonomous development, LOAPA (Organic Law on Autonomous Process Harmonization), the position of PSOE (which "goes along with the Centralists" because "it has little political strength in the autonomies and that is a serious handicap for the time when it comes to power"), the consequences of PNV's hegemonic position in Euskadi ("PNV (...) wants only terrorism to have a place to the left of it") (...), etc.

Those opposed to "armed struggle" think that, "Despite LOAPA, the truce strategy is positive because of the social development that it is affording. At the present time (they claim) there is a political development which, if the truce were to be broken, would be left uncertain, and this would not benefit the left nor its political repair."

This sector also notes that, "With regard to the 'milis' our truce has been positive (because) now there is a proposal for selectivity (in 'armed action'), as had not been proposed before." On the other hand, "That rupture strategy (of the 'milis') has failed (...) because the Basque parliament, the (Basque) government, etc., cannot be erased from the map without further ado (...). At least something has been settled regarding KAS."

The "hard-liners" in turn begin with the dogmatic assertion that, "Armed struggle is needed for advancement in the political process (because), if there is mass political action, armed struggle has a role to play, just as the general strike has, just as the parliament has, or just as civil disobedience has."

In contrast to them, the "doves" respond that, "One cannot analyze whether or not armed struggle has an abstract value, because that is not real. There is no armed struggle apart from the concrete political connotations. When it is time for the truth, one must analyze concrete actions which are incumbent on concrete organizations, and concrete situations." They go on to say: "The act of breaking the truce so as to put (armed struggle) into operation again is something lacking in political maturity on the part of the organization."

They subsequently stress that, "The capacity for negotiation which an armed struggle might produce does not emerge from military force; it emerges from the political entrenchment of the revolutionary dynamics per se. There are but few strictly military matters which have an influence of themselves, one of them being the neutron bomb; but there are but few besides."

These arguments did not convince the ETA "hawks" who retorted that, "The armed struggle that is waged in a particular political context and which nurtures a particular political strategy is proper." And they contrast "the bombs from the Mediterranean...(which) were a major contribution in the winning of the Statute when the negotiations were being held," with "the bombs from Madrid" (a reference to those set in Barajas, Chamartin and Atocha during the summer of 1980), which are regarded as negative and "intolerable" because, they claim, "a different political context" was involved.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

When the opposing sector argued that "the masses" did not understand nor accept "armed struggle," the "hawks" set forth an elitist, revolutionary proposition of the most completely Leninist nature: "If, with respect to an armed action, we must propose for ourselves that it be hailed and approved (...) by the majority of the population of Euskadi, we would have to propose the same proportion to a program of the left; but there is a program, such as that of EE, which is rejected by the majority of the population of Euskadi, and one cannot infer from this that the EE plan is not feasible. Insofar as armed action is concerned, one cannot consider how many approve of it, but rather whether or not it increases the possibilities of a revolutionary political line which will continue to be in the minority for a long time."

On the basis of these statements, it is obvious that it makes no sense to voice a renunciation, a priori, of "armed struggle" which is one tool, among others, to be used if need be. In short, "Political solutions must be provided here, the political parties must negotiate and the armed organization must be prepared to fan the flames at a given time and to stop when there is a need to do so."

The peaceful sector thinks that, "It is contradictory to say that the truce has been positive and to break it"; and, concerned over the process of consolidation of the new party, EE, it states: "The EE Congress would emerge harmed by the breaking of the truce, and the proces of integrating people into the PC would be also." Moreover, with the break, "arms would be given to the 'milis' and to HB, because there has been an end to giving the impression that there is nothing to be accomplished here without shootings and that political solutions are not viable." In a categorical and even incisive manner, they go so far as to say that, "at the present time there is no obvious need for violence," and therefore, "if ETA did not exist at present, there would be no reason for creating it."

As might be imagined, on the basis of this the "hard-liners" reached the conclusion that, on those premises, "armed struggle will not exist in Euskadi for a very long time," and that "this would occur only as a result of a coup d'etat or a terrorist coup." They emphasize, "In view of this, one has to wonder what sense it makes to maintain this organization."

This argument does not make sense to them, because "Today, the organization must be a political organization far more than ever before, it must develop armed struggle in the context of that left and it must have its own practice, distinct from the party; because a large throng of people will join EE, and it would be better if far more joined, but that very fact forces ETA to develop its own armed policy."

As we can observe, ETA is defined as an "armed vanguard" with a clearcut elitist concept, and it is considered even more necessary at a time when EE is in the process of becoming a party of masses. According to the "hawks" ETA comes before EE. The "doves" opposed to armed struggle put EE before ETA.

The interminable discussion entailed not only the division of ETA (p-m) into two virtually unreconcilable sectors but, in fact, a break in the ETA (p-m)-EE bloc.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This bloc had been seriously damaged at the end of 1980 when the "poli-milis" carried out their anti-UCD campaign and since EE, under the skillful leadership of Mario Onaindia, undertook its conversion into a united party with an ambition to occupy all the nationalist political area to the left of PNV. The most important move in this direction was the integration of the former secretary general of the Basque Communists into the new party, at the cost of breaking the structure of EPK-PCE, whose slight remains, again closely linked with Madrid after the "Lerchundi adventure," are once more under the direction of Ormazabal, Lerchundi's predecessor in the leadership of the Basque Communists.

Although the break between "hawks" and "doves" had not been officially consummated, 2 days after the Biarritz meeting, the former held a new session at which they appointed two chiefs of commando groups with the mission to reorganize the infrastructure on the inside. Those named were Jose Maria Iza de Unamuno (aged 21), for Pamplona and San Sebastian, a seasoned terrorist with an extensive record (Mediterranean campaign, attack on the Berga headquarters), and Ignacio Calvo Martin (aged 23) for Bilbao and Vitoria, considered by the police as responsible for several assassinations, who received guerrilla training in Lebanon. The former of the two was arrested in Pamplona soon afterwards. *

The End of the Truce

It was no surprise to those who had kept up with this internal debate in ETA (p-m) when, on 17 January, Dr Iglesias was released after a 20-day captivity, by the GEO of the National Police, and it was reported that the kidnapers were members of ETA (p-m).

The abduction of the father of world-famous Julio Iglesias had occurred on 29 December under strange circumstances. No one thought of ETA as a possible perpetrator of the act, and at the same time the possibility of political implications was precluded. The kidnapping had all the features of a common crime.

On 7 January, DIARIO 16 cited several possible hypotheses: a publicity stunt, a mere vendetta with some settling of accounts, a romantic revenge, etc. In no instance was there any mention of ETA. They went so far as to even doubt the existence of the kidnapping.

Several days later, it was learned that the kidnapers had asked for \$2 million, and that this information was known since 8 January, but that a "pact of silence" between the Ministry of Interior, the Iglesias family and the press had withheld the information to facilitate the police action. ETA still did not appear to be linked with the incident.

On Sunday, 17 January, it was learned that, at dawn on that very day, the Special Operating Group (GEO) of the National Police had freed Dr Iglesias in a spectacular operation. From the arrest of a "courier" who was carrying a letter from the kidnap victim to his family, the police had learned that Dr Iglesias was being held by ETA (p-m) in a house that the organization had in the Zaragoza town of Trasmoz, very near Navarra.

The fortunate outcome of this kidnapping, the first one resolved without paying ransom and saving the life of the hostage, was a major gain scored by both

* Ibid.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Minister Roson and Ballesteros, chief of the Single Antiterrorist Command, as well as Commissioner Joaquin Domingo Martorell, who directed the operations. The GEO (under orders from Comdr Holgado) added new laurels to its service record and lent more brilliance to the reputation that it had acquired by the assault on the Central Bank of Barcelona, being held by armed men, in May 1981.

As a result of this action, not only were the ETA members guarding the kidnap victim arrested, but also seven more presumed members of ETA (p-m) and six "milis."

This abduction had some rather unclear aspects, and there was never a rejection of the hypothesis that the action had been carried out by common criminals who, in view of the difficulties, turned over the hostage to the Basque terrorist organization. The attorney for the Iglesias family, Fernando Bernaldez, who served as negotiator, confirmed this rumor.

There was also speculation that the success of the police had been made possible by the citizens' cooperation. It was even claimed that both PNV and EE itself had not begrudged their assistance.

In any event, it seemed clear that the police had recovered the initiative and that the battle against terrorism was showing a very different and clearly positive aspect, quite in contrast to what had been customary in previous years.

In a communique made public the next day, 18 January, ETA (p-m) assumed responsibility for the "arrest" of Dr Iglesias. It stated: "The arrest of a militant from our organization last Thursday in Bilbao made the thwarting of the operation possible."

In the same communique, the "poli-milis" attempted to answer those who had been surprised by the break in the truce without prior notification, and they did so in this way: "Nevertheless, this does not by any means represent the breaking of the truce that we have been maintaining since 27 February of last year. The provision of financial resources is a constant need of the organization; it does not imply any change in our decision for a cease-fire."

This communique had a very bad effect on the sectors close to EE. Whereas, according to Javier Markiegui, spokesman for EE in the Basque parliament, "The ETA (p-m) return to armed struggle has absolutely no effect on us; since 15 February of last year EE has expressed radical opposition to it," another leader of the same group made this statement: "It is a total, definitive disqualification of armed struggle and of ETA (p-m). People who have to draw from the trigger in order to eat, and who cannot live like normal persons, cannot be called "gudaris" [Basque soldiers] or anything of the kind. They are common 'fools.'"*

Much more gently, Juan Maria Bandres, also an EE deputy in the Madrid Congress, remarked that, "The perpetrators of the kidnapping could be ETA (p-m) dissidents

* Ibid.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

who were not in agreement with the organization's line." * As we can observe, Bandres still refused to remove the myth from ETA, in contrast to the far more realistic position of the majority sector among the very members of the terrorist organization. As DEIA noted on 20 January, the two opposing sectors of ETA (p-m) had been in agreement on the kidnapping to collect funds.

Mario Onaindia quite categorically condemned the kidnapping without any hedging, considering the break in the truce "an event that will have more of an effect than one could imagine at first glance on the political situation in Euskadi and that of Spain as a whole." According to Mario Onaindia, "For ETA (p-m) to break the truce on the eve of the trial of the military coup plotters is to offer new excuses for coupism, to do little favor to those who have shown that they uphold the Statute and to serve to ETA military on a silver platter what would be its only political success since the split: the transformation of ETA (p-m) into a merely militaristic organization." **

Just a few days after Dr Iglesias' release and the resultant news that ETA (p-m) was returning to action, although to the "poli-milis" this "did not represent a break in the truce at all," a new blow was to fall on the Basque terrorist organization.

On 20 January the police announced the discovery of the ETA (p-m)'s largest arsenal. The arsenal, which was found in a settlement in the vicinity of Bilbao, had a total of 5 tons of weapons, most of them shotguns, the product of thefts of arsenals. The find was received with triumphalism, and hastily categorized by some as the beginning of the end for ETA (p-m).

As a result of all these incidents, and particularly the kidnapping of Dr Iglesias, the government halted the transfer of the "poli-milis" in custody from the prison in Soria to that in Nanclares de Oca, near Vitoria. Since the truce began, a total of 18 members of ETA (p-m) had been transferred to that prison. Nevertheless, Bandres, emerging from a meeting that he had held with Roson, along with Onaindia, claimed that the transfer of prisoners to Nanclares would continue, and that the stoppage was only a temporary measure. *** It was thought that the continuation of this transfer would support the advocates of the truce within ETA (p-m) and even a possible future dissolution of the terrorist organization was predicted.

ETA (m): The Return to the Attack

As we have already remarked, the almost habitual summertime truce of ETA (m) lasted during the fall of 1981. Only the campaign against Iberduero had kept the "milis" active. Several attacks on Iberduero facilities and premises had been a reminder of the dangerous affair involving the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant.

* DIARIO 16, 19 January 1982, p 5

** CAMBIO 16, No 531, 1 February 1982, "Truce at All Cost," by Mario Onaindia, p 21

*** Ibid., "The Rebellion of the Victims," pp 18 ff.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But on the very first day of 1982, there occurred an outbreak of violence in the troubled town of Renteria which marked the end of the period of relative peace and announced that ETA (m) was returning to the attack.

The occasion was an unauthorized demonstration called by the Negotiators for Amnesty, on behalf of the ETA (m) prisoners on a hunger strike. Barricades, shouting, rock throwing, intervention by the State Security Forces and two persons slightly injured by police bullets were the elements of the incident. The next day, the town hall approved the resolution submitted by the HB mayor condemning the action of the Civil Guard. But that was only a warning.

The return of the "milis" to "armed action" occurred 4 days later, on 5 January, with the kidnapping of the Basque businessman of German origin, Jose Lipperheide, aged 76, who had refused to pay the so-called "revolutionary tax."

The kidnapping was a show of force by ETA (m) in response to the attitude of resistance toward the extortion which the entire Basque society was showing.

In fact, during the final weeks of 1981 thousands of Basques from different occupations and economic levels received letters from ETA (m) demanding of them, in the form of a "revolutionary tax," amounts of between 2 and 10 million pesetas, with an average of about 5 million. So many letters were received that it was even thought that the ETA members had used the telephone directory as a guide.

Among the recipients there were many PNV militants who pressured the party, requesting an organized reaction. The PNV leaders asked the members not to pay and did not hesitate to use a threatening and defiant tone. Xabier Arzallus, president of PNV, stated: "Do they want to frighten us? Well, everyone will be frightened." And the "lendakari" Garaicoechea asked them "not to let yourselves be intimidated nor give in to the blackmail."

At the PNV headquarters, the "batzokis," the tactic of reprisals was even bandied about, more or less indirectly: "Beware, if something happens to one of our friends, three of yours, with a stone at their necks, will go to the bottom of some estuary!" And also: "We know who you are, name by name and domicile by domicile; it is no trouble for us to make lists." It was clear that the targets of these threats were the members of Herri Batasuna.

Among the recipients of the extortion letter were the PNV mayors of Guecho and Santurce, who courageously proclaimed their intention not to pay.

This resolute position managed to overcome the pessimism that the Lipperheide abduction had caused and, to some extent, represented the attainment of the goal of Txiki Benegas, secretary general of the Basque Socialists, who wrote: "The battle against the 'revolutionary tax' must cease to be an act of solitariness and abandonment by those subjected to extortion (...). The resistance of those threatened must be organized, and they must be protected by a solidary act by the whole society." *

* CAMBIO 16, No 529, 18 January 1982, "Paying to Live," by Txiki Benegas, p 21. On the topic of resistance to ETA (m) and the "revolutionary tax," see in that same issue "Hand to Hand against ETA," by Xavier Domingo and Ander Landaburu, pp 18 ff., and No 531, 1 February 1981, "The Rebellion of the Victims," pp 18 ff.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Meanwhile, the kidnapping of the elderly businessman, Lipperheide, which was to a large extent the detonator of this collective reaction, continued, without the disclosure of news about possible negotiations with the kidnappers nor the condition of the hostage.

As confirmation of the fact that violence was returning with the new year, on 27 January a municipal policeman, Benigno Garcia Diaz, whom they had accused of being a police informer, was assassinated in Ondarroa (Vizcaya).

At the end of January, signs began to appear that the Lipperheide kidnapping might be resolved without bloodshed. In fact, on 5 February, after a month of abduction, the businessman was released, and it was learned that the family had paid a sum of about 120 million pesetas. ETA (m) was winning, at least partially, and Minister Roson stated that the police case could not be considered closed.

Despite this resumed activity, it was thought among certain sectors that ETA (m) would be willing for some type of negotiation. And it was claimed that the "milis" were no longer backing the coup d'etat, as had appeared obvious at other times. According to these reports, certain leaders would be willing to revise and mollify some points in the "KAS alternative." *

Nevertheless, after the Lipperheide kidnapping, in Basque political circles there was a dissemination of the notion that, in the potential internal conflict which was also occurring in ETA (m), this negotiating position which was chiefly that of the "historicals" headed by Domingo Iturbe Abarolo, alias "Txomin," did not predominate, but rather the "hard" line of the younger members. According to these reports, Eugenio Echeverte Aranguren, alias "Antxon," chief of the ETA (m) Political Office, was the best known leader of this tendency. "Antxon," a Guipuzcoan from Pasajes de San Juan, slightly over 30 years of age, came from the "poli-milis" and was one of the "bereziak" who had transferred to ETA (m) seeking direct action without halfway measures that the militarists were offering him. As opposed to the compromisers who were resting in the truce, "Antxon" was calling for a return to the times of merciless violence.

The predominance of the "hard-liners" in ETA (m) was proven. While the Lipperheide kidnapping with a relatively happy ending had prompted some to think that there was a certain amount of "humanity" among the "milis" after an assassination had been feared, within a short time ETA (m) showed its true countenance. On 16 February, undoubtedly based on a coldly devised plan, two almost simultaneous assassinations put an end to the last hope that the truce might be extended. In the old district of San Sebastian a retired member of the Civil Guard aged 60, Benjamin Fernandez Fernandez, was assassinated from behind. Shortly thereafter, in Oyarzun-Renteria, another Civil Guard member who was returning home after service, Jose Frago Martin, was assassinated in his own car. Every indication pointed to ETA (m).

According to DIARIO 16 (of 17 February 1982), the two fatal attacks were the beginning of the ETA offensive associated with the court-martial against the participants

* See the serial article by Jose Luis Gutierrez in DIARIO 16 (1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 February), "Euskadi, Between Fear, Surfeit and Hope."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in the abortive coup d'etat of 23 February of the previous year. On the same day, EL PAIS, in an editorial entitled "The Strategy of Death," also claimed that the attacks "prove quite clearly that the terrorists are not willing to miss the opportunity that the trial against those accused of military rebellion affords them." According to this newspaper, the goal of the terrorists was "on the one hand, to upset the basic conditions of calmness under which the court must pass judgment and, on the other, to contribute to the agitation that the pro-coupist sectors are attempting to implement at this time." Once again, there appeared the coincidence of interests and objectives between coupism and terrorism. Both were seeking to put an end to democracy.

The curse of violence, the shadow of Cain, seemed to be spreading over Spain again and over the Basque Country specifically. But the perpetual return of criminally shed blood was no longer capable of paralyzing the desire of so many Spaniards, both Basques and non-Basques, determined to reach an understanding over and above the differences and disputes, vehemently disposed to escape from the diabolical merry-go-round of violence which reproduces itself.

This account concludes with the conviction that the worst has already passed, and that neither ideas nor weapons can destroy the peaceful coexistence of all the people of Spain who have shared a land and history for over a thousand years.

COPYRIGHT: Alejandro Munoz Alonso, 1982

2909

CSO: 6000/0002

END