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JPRS L/10571

7 June 1982

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 36/82)



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TERRORISM

FRANCE

DIPLOMATIC TIES, INTERRELATIONS, NEW POLICIES EXAMINED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 16 Apr 82 pp 48-51, 72

[Article by Gerard de Villiers: "The Terrorist Plan for 1982"]

[Text] The antiterrorist experts no longer have any doubt. France is threatened in the next few weeks by a wave of attacks which will be both specific and "random." War has been declared; a stealthy and underground war, with unpredictable but planned attacks.

The five killed at the Capitole were certainly not victims of tragic fate but of a premeditated act, planned to cause the maximum number of casualties, and carried out by one or more perfectly trained experts. Excluding the Rue Copernic attack, this was only the second instance in France of an attack aimed at killing, without any specific religious target. The first was the grenade attack on the Saint-Germain Drugstore. The technical investigation has made it possible to trace this back to Carlos, the famous Illitch Ramirez.

There followed the unsuccessful attempt on the Paris Exchange, which could have killed scores of people. It was attributed to Direct Action.

And now, the Capitole.

Who is responsible?

Naturally, it is too early to be able to answer this question. We must be satisfied with what we already know. The explosive used was reportedly penthrite, of Czech origin, used by Arabic and Armenian terrorists.

There is the disturbing coincidence that this murderous attack was the sequel to a chain of events which leads directly to the infamous Carlos. On 16 February, the police arrested two terrorists who were about to place a bomb outside the Paris City Hall. Specifically, a bomb composed basically of

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penthrite. One of the two was Bruno Breguet, a Swiss activist who had already been sentenced in Israel for a bomb attack. His companion, Magdalena Kopp, is the mistress of a friend of Carlos.

Ten days later, the minister of interior, Gaston Defferre, received an ultimatum from Carlos, authenticated by his fingerprints. The French Government must either release the two terrorists within a month, or be prepared for a series of bloody attacks.

This ultimatum, which became known through a leak, expired on 27 March. On 29 March, at 2040 hours, a bomb contained in a black Samsonite suitcase exploded in the luggage rack of a compartment of car 18 of the Capitole.

Then? These are the only facts we know. They are enough to cause great concern to the experts in antiterrorist operations. For example, suppose we accept the most plausible hypothesis, that the originators were Carlos and his men. Who is Carlos?

A Venezuelan from a good family, brought up with Marxism, and sent to Moscow and recruited by the KGB, which introduced him to the Arab terrorist movement. Carlos has never operated on his own account. At one time, he was connected to the Algerian services. He was "handled" by FLN Secretary General Yayaoui. However, this did not last, and at one point the Algerians even wanted to kill Carlos. The latter then moved into the Libyan orbit. This was the time of the OPEC incident in Vienna. According to certain indiscretely revealed information, Carlos was "handled" in Libya by Ahmad Shahati, chief of operations for (Amktab Tasfir Athaoui) [sic], the brain in charge of organizing Libyan terrorist activities.

Then Carlos disappeared. It is known that he lived in Tripoli, Libya, at the Palm Beach Hotel, but he was no longer involved in "outside" operations, limiting himself to instructing. At one time, it was even said that he was dead, but that was a false rumor.

Carlos went back into operation. The proof of this is last month's ultimatum.

The real problem is to find out on whose behalf. The Libyans? The Palestinians of the Rejection Front? Or the French terrorist groups? It has been known since 1979 that the Libyans clandestinely support the Movements for Independence of Reunion and New Caledonia. A number of Basques and Corsicans have taken sabotage training in Libya, including forging of letters, booby-trapped packages, psychological exploitation of attacks, etc. Beginning in 1980, the bomb and automatic weapon attacks against the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) and the ministry of cooperation left the same signature "Direct Action." Since then, the DST and the Foreign Intelligence and

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Counterintelligence Service (SDECE) have obtained proof that the Libyan services have been in close contact with "Direct Action." It was those services, among others, which provided the latter with the leaflets containing the charge: "From Gafsa to Ndjamena, from Djibouti to Bangui, it is the French army which keeps order to protect neocolonialist trade."

The serious aspect today is that the Capitole attack represents a complete change in the strategy of the terrorists operating in France.

Until now, there had indeed been numerous incidents, particularly in Paris, but those actions, though carried out on French territory, had only been aimed at foreigners.

This restraint had been due to the secret agreement reached by the French Government with Yasir 'Arafat in 1975. An Elysee representative had met with the Palestinian leader in Beirut and they had reached an agreement. The French would close their eyes to the travel of Palestinians through France and would not prevent establishment of support networks. In return, the Palestinians would refrain from any action against French interests. The agreement was scrupulously observed. Proof of this was the arrest and rapid release by the French authorities of Abu Daud, the organizer of the Munich massacre.

The negative consequence of this agreement was the transformation of our country into a kind of rear base for terrorists of all kinds, who--still without attacking French interests--began to settle their personal accounts in our capital.

Today, the Capitole bomb incident may mean that the Palestinians and Libyans regard this agreement as broken, and therefore believe they are in their right to target French interests.

Indeed, with the change of administration in France, a new factor did enter the picture with respect to the French intelligence services. Until May 1981, the SDECE and the DST had maintained excellent relations with their Arabic counterparts: Iraqi, Moroccan, Tunisian, Saudi, and Jordanian. This was the result of a policy decision at the highest level to favor the Arab camp at the expense of Israel, even though many members of the former French majority had many friends in Israel. However, some time ago the situation changed. The Arab countries, hardening their intransigence against Israel, did not really accept Francois Mitterrand's visit to Israel, the first visit by a French president to that country. Nor did France's position on reconstruction of the Iraqi "Osiris" reactor fully satisfy the Iraqis.

On the other hand, some members of the "Israeli lobby" within Francois Mitterrand's entourage showed their preference clumsily. This development embarrassed the French intelligence services.

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At the SDECE, which had been put in charge of external security, the new director, Pierre Marion, went to a great deal of effort to maintain the existing ties with his Arab counterparts. He was helped in this by his excellent personal relations with many of the Arab "espionage establishment" and by his tireless activity: visits to the Arab countries, meetings, and contacts at all levels.

In spite of this ant-like industriousness, it seems that some information networks, normally useful for preventing assassination plots, were not as active as they should have been. The Arabs were refusing to talk. Also, there is a difference between knowing and preventing. For several weeks the DGSE [General Directorate of External Security] had been sending notes to the Elysee warning of the danger of attacks. It could do no more. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to say that there is a direct causal relation between the change in policy and the Capitole attack.

However, we must not forget that terrorist attacks are never the product of chance and always have a specific purpose.

Over a number of years we had maintained a precarious equilibrium with the most radical Arab militant movements. That equilibrium has been upset. This fact, combined with the lax approach to terrorism which has prevailed in France for a long time, has created a potentially explosive situation which could produce other attacks which are theoretically "random" but in fact carefully conducted with a specific objective.

According to some intelligence experts, this objective might be to politically "break" the PLO by blaming it for bloody and unpopular attacks.

Already, in December, an attack almost took the life of Yasir 'Arafat. Two of his bodyguards were killed. Toward the end of the year, there was a rumor in Beirut that the Syrians wanted to get rid of him, that he was assuming too much political and military importance.

On the other hand, Pierre Marion's services are now convinced that it was really Carlos behind the Capitole attack. The DST does not exclude the possibility that he was in France.

In this case, as I said, the only question is: For whom is Carlos working?

In whose interest would it be to sabotage the PLO?

The Rejection Front? The Libyans? The Syrians?

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With the PLO destabilized, there would be a danger of the whole Middle East catching fire. Further, who but the Soviet Union, of which Syria is a main "client," is interested in maintaining tension in this part of the world?

The 5 dead and 27 wounded in the Capitole incident were perhaps the victims of an inter-Arab quarrel. If this is so, others will follow.

Before the war, no Frenchman wanted to die for Danzig. Now, some are risking death for the PLO, without anyone asking for their opinion.

What methods do the terrorists use, and what answers can we find? Jacob Barsimantov, who was assassinated on Saturday by a terrorist who was certainly in the pay of the Palestinians, was killed in the same manner as the previous victims. In cold blood, in the presence of his wife and son, by five bullets from a 7.65, two of which were fatal. The killer: a woman, alone.

The murderer will never be found. Just as the killer of the American diplomat in the heart of Paris two-and-a-half months ago has not been found.

It Col Charles Ray did not know that he was going to die when he left his residence on Monday, 18 January. It was 9 a.m. and, as every morning, Charles Ray was going to his job as assistant military attache at the U.S. Embassy. Emile-Augier Boulevard, in the 16th District, was quiet; the diplomat's car was parked in front of no 24. Before he had time to get in, a dark-skinned man, with long hair, of oriental type, approached him and fired a shot point blank into the nape of his neck. He then left on foot and disappeared after carrying out a decision prepared thousands of kilometers from Paris.

This is what is called in special services jargon an "action homo" [personal hit], that is, the final "solution" to an opponent whom you have not been able to neutralize any other way.

In the past 5 years there have been a series of "personal hits" against foreign diplomats in Paris: May 1976: assassination of the Bolivian ambassador; June 1976: assassination of the Chilean ambassador; November 1976: attempted assassination of the social counsellor of the Iranian embassy; December 1979: assassination of the tourism counsellor of the Turkish embassy; September 1980: serious wounding of the press attache of the Turkish embassy; July 1980: killing of Syrian political refugee Salah al-Bitar at his own home; March 1981: assassination of two Turkish diplomats; and, finally, in November 1981: attempted assassination of Christian Chapman, the number-two man at the American Embassy in Paris.

None of the perpetrators have been arrested, and one might be tempted to ask: What have the police been doing? That would be unfair, because, short of some unexpected development, they are powerless. In a "personal hit," everything has been anticipated.



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In the first place, there has been no previous contact between the victim and the attacker. The latter is brought to the attack location by accomplices, who retrieve him afterward and put him on the first plane. Often he does not even speak the language of the country.

Nor does the weapon, even if it is recovered (which is rarely the case) provide any lead. It is usually sent in a diplomatic pouch by a roundabout route. Western intelligence services have long had proof that the embassies of Libya, Southern Yemen, Syria, and Iraq are veritable arsenals of weapons for supply to terrorists. For "personal hits," the latter favor 7.65 Berettas because they are very short, can be easily concealed, and are relatively quiet. Since the murders are committed at very close range, a large caliber is not useful.

When the weapon is not sent by diplomatic pouch, it is bought on site from gun dealers through the support network.

It is also impossible to find out the identity of the killer. The majority come from the Middle East and return there. In Beirut, fake passports are virtually sold in tobacco shops. The intelligence services know, for example, that there is a clandestine printshop in Beirut which prepares Cypriot, Maltese, Kenyan, and Mauritanian passports by the dozen. One of these was used by the Copernic killer.

This is in addition to the blank Cypriot passports stolen regularly in Nicosia; to the complimentary, often diplomatic, passports issued to Palestinians by the Yemenis, Libyans, and Syrians; and the fact that a Bath Party law in Iraq authorizes any Arab to claim Iraqi nationality using any name he wishes.

However, all these murders have one element in common: what I will call the "Lebanese aura." The killers depart from Beirut even if their orders come from elsewhere, and their actions are claimed by more or less phantom organizations operating out of Lebanon. The murder of Lieutenant Colonel Ray was claimed on the same day by the "Lebanese Revolutionary Groups," a totally unknown organization.

It appears that this murder was in reality the final episode in a struggle which had been going on for several months between the Libyan services and the CIA. According to reliable sources, Colonel Qadhdhafi was hit during a shooting attack in Tripoli in December. He disappeared for a week, and when he reappeared on television his left arm was visibly immobilized. The attack was reportedly carried out by Lebanese Shiites who had been "used." Qadhdhafi wasted no time in answering, the experts say. One fact is not generally recognized: Qadhdhafi is very well informed about his American adversaries. His two advisers on terrorism are not Soviet or East German, but American: Two former CIA agents, Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil, who naturally are hunted by

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the Americans. It was they who organized the abduction of General Dozier in Italy, "subcontracting" with the Red Brigade, who are very closely linked with Libya; and the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Ray by a killer recruited in Beirut.

Always Beirut, the Copernic killer came from Beirut and returned there. The killers of the Armenian ASALA are based in Beirut. The Palestinian extremist factions like Abu Nidal, members of the Rejection Front, even though "sponsored" by the Syrians or the Libyans, are also based in Beirut. It provides better concealment. For a long time Beirut has not belonged to anyone, least of all the Lebanese.

In Beirut, anyone can be recruited to do anything. Some of the armed factions which proliferate there need money and advertise themselves as assassins for pay. For example, it is now almost certain that French Ambassador Delamare was assassinated by order of the Syrian services who could not stomach his involvement in efforts to reconcile the Lebanese. However, the Syrians, who are not stupid, hired the services of a "Shiite" death commando. Nevertheless, it all eventually became known in Beirut.

However, the primary factor which makes Beirut the breeding place of terrorism is that it is the largest weapons supermarket in the world. Your hotel porter will offer you a Kalashnikov for \$20, and grenades are used for paperweights. It is the only place in the world where a normal family will buy a combat weapon with a telescopic sight.

In this powderkeg there is a teeming multitude of little organizations who will change their title on request, who help each other, fight each other, infiltrate each other, use each other, and all get their supplies from the same sources.

First, there are all the small Palestinian groups which claim to be part of the Rejection Front and specialize in Anti-Jewish attacks: the PFLP of Doctor Habash, the Abu Nidal group, and others. Although officially disowned by Yasir 'Arafat, they are in their element within the Palestinian domain. It was they at the Copernic attack, and at the murder of Edwin Doweck and his wife in Paris on 26 November 1980. Edwin Doweck was an Israeli who organized tourist travel between Israel and Egypt. These Palestinians have carried out numerous attacks in Europe, always against Jews, in Anvers and Vienna among other places. In France they use extensive support facilities which enable them to carry out their "missions" unimpeded. The man who placed the bomb outside the Rue Copernic synagogue was met by accomplices who gave him the explosive, took him to the place, and subsequently put him on the first plane to Beirut with his false Cypriot passport.

Then there are the Armenians of the ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], a clandestine Armenian organization which emerged in Beirut around 1975 and has since carried out dozens of attacks on Turks to avenge

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the Armenian genocide by Turks early in this century. The head of ASALA goes under the name Agop Agopian, but not much is known about him. However, ASALA is very close ideologically to the Palestinian extremists.

Beirut has the strongest Armenian community in the world, which explains ASALA's location there.

What about the Libyans? Officially, they are very discreet, and their services operate secretly, never getting involved in a direct action. On the other hand, there is proof that they supply money, weapons, and passports to those within their sphere of influence, all in Beirut. Those invited to train in Libyan camps also leave from Beirut. Obviously, that training establishes ties and makes it possible to later ask for services.

The Libyans provide to the Basque ETA logistic support without which the ETA would no longer be in operation. They also give a lot of assistance to the Irish IRA. The Libyans' main opponents are the Americans and the Jews. Several of the attacks carried out by Palestinians have in fact been remote-controlled by the Libyan services.

Beirut also serves as a staging point for Iranian teams when the Ayatollah's government does not want to be directly involved. The commandos who tried to assassinate Shapur Bakhtiar and who did kill on Avenue Foch the nephew of Princess Ashraf, sister of the Shah of Iran, operated out of Beirut. Certainly, there has not been and never will be proof of all these actions. They are verbal commands, references, and there is no written trace. Often, the killers are later themselves executed in one of the countless street battles in Lebanon and the circle is complete. Also, it is extremely difficult to know who has killed and why, especially because everything is so tangled up.

Take the Copernic incident. The explosive used was Czechoslovakian: penthrite. It is a sophisticated product which you cannot simply buy in a drugstore. All right. However, the police discovered that the explosive used by the unidentified terrorists at the Armenian church in Paris was also penthrite. The Swiss police have proved that penthrite was also used in several Armenian attacks on Turks.

Moral: They are getting supplies from the same source. In the Copernic case it is more likely that the killer was supplied by the ASALA networks.

You ask me why the French police were not able to find out? Well, it is not so easy. The present Armenian extremist groups are often descended from members of the pro-Soviet Komintern or Armenians of the Mamouchian group which fought the Nazis. These people have a long tradition of clandestinity and are very difficult to infiltrate.

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Another interesting fact: On 22 July 1980, Salah el Bitar, a Syrian political emigre--the Syrian president had put a price on his head--was killed by a shot in the head on Avenue Hoche. The weapon used was a 7.65. A settling of accounts between Armenians and Turks. Old disputes.

On 26 November 1980, a killer breaks into the travel office of the Doweiks and kills both of them. They were Jews who arranged tourist travel between Israel and Egypt. This time, the weapon was recovered. It was a 7.65 Beretta. The ammunition used in all three murders came from the same Czechoslovak batch.

This is a demonstration of the permeability of the various terrorist networks. One never knows, and they themselves do not know, for whom they work. However, they all have one thing in common: their contacts with the intelligence services of the Eastern countries--of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.

It is an obvious temptation to say: The people are all manipulated by the KGB, which pulls all the strings and sends them out like human puppets to carry out its evil tasks.

I believe the truth is a little more subtle and more complex, because you do not manipulate the militant Leftist Christian as easily as a hothead Leftist ready to put a bullet in your head for a passing smile.

Certainly, the Soviet Union bears a significant responsibility in respect to world terrorism, but its involvement is most often indirect and accompanied by extensive precautions. For example, no recent example is known of a KGB officer himself carrying out a "personal hit." For a number of years now, the major services have refrained from this kind of game: There are too many ways to retaliate.

By contrast, in the obscurity of Beirut, when you scratch the Palestinian, Armenian, or Libyan surface a little, you find evidence of the Eastern presence. In the way of weapons, first of all. The Soviets and the Czechoslovaks have organized a huge arms traffic through the international traffickers based in Northern Europe and even in the United States. The Russians sell their old, outdated weapons and the Czechoslovaks sell new material. It is all at low prices, challenging any competition, and without an option to return if not satisfied. It is still astounding to see that all, or almost all, the weapons used in terrorist attacks come from the East.

In January 1981, the grenade thrown under the car of a Turkish diplomat was Soviet, the Copernic explosive was Czechoslovak, the RPG-7's used against the Phoenix nuclear plant were Soviet, and the ammunition for the weapons used in the three murders was also Czechoslovak. All the Palestinian groups are equipped with Soviet guns, especially Kalashnikovs and RPG-7's, and with Czechoslovak explosives.

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At another level, the collusion is even more obvious. The Soviets operate in the long term. The majority of the commanders of all terrorist actions have taken political or technical training courses at Czechoslovak camps or in the Soviet universities for foreigners. The Soviet leadership concentrates on inviting young people, through various organizations. They love young people. During these visits, they discretely identify those most likely to be influenced and invite them to come for study at Lumumba University in Moscow, for example. Those who really become immersed and who agree to a direct contract with the KGB will be "established," that is, they will be sent back on some pretext in order to "whitewash" them. A perfect example: Illitch Ramirez, better known as "Carlos." Officially, expelled from Lumumba University; in fact, a KGB agent. His career is well known. The Libyan services at one point wanted to get rid of him, for sordid material reasons. The Soviets made clear that this would be regarded as an unfriendly gesture toward them. Carlos would be allowed to continue to serve. He still serves. There will be an operation in which the Soviets will not appear, but which they will have organized.

There are dozens of mini-Carloses in the small Palestinian or Armenian groups. They tend not to be ungrateful to those who have helped, armed, and pampered them. They ask only the opportunity to prove their gratitude.

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TERRORISM

FRANCE

FLNC LEADER ON VIOLENCE, REPRESSION, RATIONALE

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 9 Apr 82 pp 44-47

[Interview with an FLNC leader by Jean-Francois Luciani]

[Text] The FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front] is ready to fight to the finish. Sometimes rejected, but more often accepted by a large part of the population, they number between 500 and 1,000 underground fighters, who are totally convinced that victory--that is to say the island's independence--is now in the muzzles of their guns and the bursting of bombs. One of their leaders explains to Jean-Francois Luciani why the Movement now believes in violence alone.

[Question] You were unanimously condemned by public opinion after your attack on a Foreign Legion recreation camp during the night of 11-12 February, which caused one death. Even the Corsican nationalists withdrew their support. Don't you feel that you made a mistake?

[Answer] We have explained the objectives of the Sorbo-Occagnano operation: to neutralize the Foreign Legion and to destroy the buildings. What happened is one of the risks run if there is armed resistance to our operations. Of course, violence is not commendable, but it has always been our people's means of resistance. In our country, the problem is not deciding whether violence is moral or immoral, but deciding whether or not it is necessary. In Corsica it is felt that violence is justified when you are right. In 5 years of special status, considering the increased colonization following the guarantees extended by the status, our people would be crushed, absorbed, drowned in French assimilation, and permanently lost. Time is working against us and leaves us no other choice. We are aware of this situation. Our problem is not to find out whether our people will accept violence or not, but to explain to them the danger which threatens them. If they realize the danger, then an armed struggle is inevitable. Today this awareness has changed, in part because of the illusion of change which the status promises, and the fulfillment of personal ambitions hinted at by it. Our problem is to prove that special status is not the change our people have been waiting for. The state is currently benefiting from the clamp on our country's political, social, and cultural life which it is maintaining with difficulty while awaiting

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special status. But this is not going to last. The unsolved problems will resurface quickly.

[Question] Why are you making these attacks at this time?

[Answer] The French State and international opinion must be reminded that following the political change in France, the Corsican national problem remains unchanged; that we expect the new power, in the name of its political principles and after its international stands in support of people fighting for their liberation, to apply the same principles to our people; in other words, to recognize our national rights. We wanted to put an end to the campaigns which were saying that the Corsican problem was solved, the nationalists dispersed, and the FLNC in fragments. Furthermore, we struck on a day when Corsica was receiving three ministers. Judge for yourself.

[Question] Rumors corroborate the idea that you were saturated or infiltrated by former unofficial police.

[Answer] If this were so, it would be easy for us to deny or to refuse responsibility for this action. However, we assume complete responsibility with all the political consequences.

[Question] It is claimed that there are two factions within the FLNC--one pro-fascist (Rightwing), the other Marxist--and that it will be the Marxist faction which will take over the other.

[Answer] While we do not claim any Marxist philosophy, we condemn and formally reject any Fascist idea or action. These arguments are only poison which we are obliged to ward off. Yesterday, we were Qadhdhafi's rivals; today, we must be Fascists, that is obvious. But, of course, we expected this.

[Question] Have you managed to build your movement?

[Answer] Our ability to organize is growing daily.

[Question] Have you abandoned the strategy of a split?

[Answer] Despite everything, there is a change in France which we feel is important for the French. Today what we call "French nationalism" is taking on a new aspect. We are obliged to take this into consideration, and, on the other hand, we must avoid serving the interests of the Right. Consequently, we have reviewed our strategy, this is obvious: the truce is proof of this. But, this does not mean that we have abandoned it, since we have responsibilities with regard to our people. The interests of our people cannot be sacrificed to the success of the Left in France.

[Question] Do you still claim, as the National Liberation Front in Algeria did in its time, to exercise power through a single party?

[Answer] We refer you to page 46 of our little white book where it says: "The task of the patriots united within the Front is to lead the political

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and military struggle until colonialism and the clans have been defeated, and to restore to the people, and to them alone, the political, economic, and cultural means to control their destiny."

[Question] Are you being financed or assisted by outsiders?

[Answer] We have just one kind of support--our people's--and one kind of assistance--the commitment and sacrifice of our activists. Of course, we do not refuse the political support of people who are struggling for their rights, just as we give them ours.

[Question] What do you think of Francois Mitterrand's policy on Corsica: general amnesty, special status, the means to control your own affairs, a general assembly elected through universal suffrage; in short, a turnaround which doesn't seem to be very well assessed here?

[Answer] This policy is limited only to increasing the traditional power of those interest groups which are the "clans" in Corsica through a status about which there is nothing special except its name, and to satisfying some personal interests. Of course, there is the freeing of the prisoners! But, at the same time, this is a trap. If we are speaking of generosity, then let them grant us what they give the Palestinians or the Salvadorans: in a word, the recognition of our rights as a nation.

[Question] How do you explain the fact that the government is not using repression?

[Answer] We are not about to teach a Leftist power what the rights of a people are. The new French administration knows very well that special status is only a political maneuver to make the nationalist movement wait a little longer, and that the Corsican problem has not been solved. It knows very well, that it can only be taken care of by a true political solution. According to all evidence, repression does not solve anything. On the other hand, contrary to what they want to make us believe, we do not think that the government is convinced that Corsicans unanimously condemn violence.

[Question] Bomb attacks and violence can strengthen the camp which does not want special status, and give the nationalist candidates an additional handicap.

[Answer] Those who don't want the status are the first to condemn violence. They only see the limited interest of their clan. We are speaking of the rightwing clan as well as the leftwing clan; since, we must admit, part of the Left, the most representative part on the electoral level, does not want the status. And the nationalists will be the political surety for a status which limits itself to making Corsicans Frenchmen who are a little special. We want to be full-fledged Corsicans.

[Question] Some nationalists want "worthwhile" violence. In other words, they would like you not to intervene until they are politically strong enough. What is your opinion?



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[Answer] Those who speak of "worthwhile" violence are dreaming of an FLNC which is simply an armed extension under orders to a specific legal reformist policy. Making the FLNC just a group which sets off bombs is denying armed struggle as a political means, in order to allow complete compromise with and surrender to colonialism. It is denying the political leadership of the FLNC. On the other hand, our position means that the armed struggle for national liberation will be brought to term and that colonialism will be defeated. Obviously, this is not done to reassure the fringe group of businessmen who are hiding behind the movement for legal autonomy.

[Question] Other nationalists even hope that you will be "Zorro, the arbiter of justice."

[Answer] If need be, this wish justifies the popularity of our movement. But, if we are Zorro, then there is no question of leaving the political initiative to just anyone.

[Question] Don't you think that room to maneuver is tight for everyone: the government, the nationalists, the clans, and yourselves?

[Answer] That's true. But, we have one advantage: the firm belief that we are moving in the direction of history. A people marching toward freedom is not stopped. To do this it would be necessary to destroy them. The French State does not have the political power.

[Question] You are hostile to the clan system. But, on the other hand, some nationalists think that the clans represent a part of your culture.

[Answer] It is true that on a cultural level, the clan is the most traditional Corsican form of expression. Corsican culture is a culture of the people, "paisana," kept alive by the most disadvantaged social class, "i paisani," and it is in this class that the clan, with its policy of assistance, is gaining a foothold. But what we condemn in the clan is its political expression which originates in its vocation of controlling the power of the state. The special status will only reinforce this trend. Nothing can be done against these political practices without cutting the colonial ties which bind us to France.

[Question] Doesn't the movement which is being launched--special status, moralizing political customs--condemn you to vanish?

[Answer] This would perhaps be so if there really was a movement; but the colonial situation remains unchanged. The electoral system will remain as falsified as it was, despite the proportional vote. The power will remain with the clans. The monopolizing of the eastern coast by colonists has not been questioned. The freeze and the occupation of the coastline are continuing, real estate speculation is resuming. The economic dependence of our country is becoming accentuated. The University of Corsica remains poorly adapted to the aspirations and requirements of our people. The Foreign Legion is permanently installing itself. Our language and our culture are far from being rehabilitated and finding their place in education, public life and the

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cultural policy of our country. Colonization is increasing and becoming standard. Since 10 May, construction of second homes has increased by 40 percent. And do not forget that Corsicans will soon represent only half of the island's population. See how far off the mark we are. As long as we refuse to bring up the national aspect of the Corsican problem, no political structure whatever will settle anything.

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TERRORISM

FRANCE

POSSIBLE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TIE IN BARSIMANTOV CASE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9-16 Apr 82 p 42

[Article by Elisabeth Schemla: "Death of a Diplomat"]

[Text] A series of questions, all of which have to date gone unanswered, has been raised by the most recent of all the terrorist acts recently committed on French territory: the murder on 3 April of Yacov Barsimantov, the 42-year-old second secretary of the Israeli embassy, who was killed by several pistol shots fired by a woman in the entrance hall of his residence.

In the opinion of Israeli Ambassador Meir Rosenne, the crime bears the mark of the PLO. He told the press so, loud and clear and somewhat hastily (the police investigation had not yet begun) immediately after arriving on the murder scene--a circumstance which did not allow time for reflection. The PLO issued an immediate denial, first in Beirut and later through Ibrahim Souss, its representative in France. Credit for the murder was later claimed first by the Movement of Arab Revolutionary Brigades, an unknown organization, and subsequently by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, whose name had been evoked previously.

This wasn't good enough, however: Ambassador Meir Rosenne persisted in his accusations, which were echoed in Israel by the most important ministers of the Begin administration. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon saw the murder of the diplomat as a "violation of the cease-fire" in southern Lebanon; Minister of Foreign Affairs Itzhak Shamir announced that Israel "will have recourse to force to smash terrorism, its leaders and its bases." The world is awaiting Israeli reprisals--but what form will they take?

Is the PLO really the guilty party, however? In Paris, in response to the virulent statements of the ambassador, certain subtly distilled "intelligence" indicated that Barsimantov had probably been an agent of the Mossad (the Israeli secret services). In Belgium, where he had been stationed before coming to France, had he not been assigned to "telecommunications"?

It was believed that Barsimantov had recently received threats, given the fact that a policeman was on duty day and night at his residence. The surveillance had been removed only a few days before the crime--perhaps because the second secretary believed he no longer had reason to be anxious, but more probably

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because the guards were needed elsewhere to protect more important personages. Lastly, one wonders, is it not strange that embassy officials showed up only a few minutes following the drama, and that they took possession of an attache case, found near the body, and some papers found in the clothing of the deceased?

The attack on Barsimantov, in short, was probably not a manifestation of "blind terrorism" but rather a "settling of scores" between secret services. In such case it was probably the Syrians who were behind the murder.

"What an extraordinary delusion!" Ambassador Meir Rosenne protested. "Barsimantov never received any special protection. No attache case was ever removed from the scene. As for his identity documents, his Diners' Club card, and certain other papers relating to his duties, it is true that we did remove them, by agreement with the French police. What could be more normal," he asked, "in view of the fact that he was a diplomat?" And, of course, what could be more normal than to deny that Barsimantov was a "spy"?

One thing seems probable to the investigators, who are accepting only the theory that it was a political crime: namely, that neither the miniscule French terrorist groups of the far Right nor those of the far Left appears to be implicated, as organizations, in the case. The police had at the very outset undertook to follow these two trails, but apparently returned empty-handed. One must therefore be satisfied with the determination that there are disturbing similarities between this crime and those perpetrated on 12 November 1981 against Christian Chapman, charge d'affaires of the American embassy in Paris, who miraculously survived, and on 18 January 1982 against Charles Ray, assistant military attache of the same embassy:

1. All three attacks took place in front of the victims' residences.
2. All the weapons used were 7.65 caliber pistols, and all the ammunition used bore the Czechoslovak Geco trademark.
3. The crimes were committed by a man or a woman--acting alone and on foot--who subsequently escaped into the crowd.
4. These were the same armed Lebanese revolutionary factions that had claimed responsibility for the two previous crimes. As of last Tuesday it did not appear impossible, moreover, that Ray and Barsimantov were killed by the same weapon.

There remains one more question: Is, or is not, all of this connected in any way with the bloody crime at the Capitoile? Could it possibly prove to be one more episode in that bloody chain of events which Gaston Defferre so much feared following the explosion on the train and the repeated threats made in the name of "Carlos"? The opposition, in any event, is losing no opportunity to point to "the laxity, the weakness, the tacit complicity of the government," shamelessly exploiting this somber series of events while neglecting to mention the unsolved crimes of the preceding 7-year term.

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The government intends to demonstrate its willingness to turn the spotlight on the past cases as well as those of the present. It has accordingly authorized the examining magistrates in charge of the Curiel, Goldman and Copernic cases (just as in the Ben Barka case) to inspect certain files that had heretofore remained secret. In this way--as the Israeli ambassador himself acknowledged--the government has brought all its resources to bear during the past few days.

The mere desire to solve a case is not always enough, however. Today's government leaders are discovering, in their turn, the delights of these investigations of terrorist acts committed by a master hand.

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

KREISKY ON FOREIGN POLICY, RELATIONS WITH ITALY

PM210909 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 19 May 82 p 5

[Undated interview in Vienna with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky by Piero de Garzaroli: "Kreisky Buffeted by the Storms"]

[Excerpt] Vienna--[Question] Herr Chancellor, why is there so little talk about Austria, almost to the extent of a conspiracy of silence against you? Do you not consider this international lack of interest rather too demoralizing?

[Answer] I have already said this on other occasions. I prefer Austria to make the news in the cultural or sporting fields rather than in politics. We are a neutral state, and when one lapses into politics there is always a tendency to provide misinformation about a particular country. This is why we are not in the least interested in being the center of political attention: sport and culture, or culture and sport, suit us fine.

[Question] But your recent invitation to Libyan leader al-Qadhafi prompted considerable uproar abroad, and here in Austria too there was no absence of criticism and polemics. Was it a good or a bad thing to have him come to Vienna? In other words: Did the diplomatic results vindicate the detente gesture?

[Answer] It was an excellent initiative, even looking to the future, inasmuch as it helped a little to break the ice. It will take time to understand its consequences. In my view there is no point in excluding someone such as al-Qadhafi from the group of democratic states. Indeed, it is impossible to do without him when one is willing to accept several billions from Libya but then lacks even the courage, as the Austrians say, to "greet him under the lime trees," in other words, to be seen with him.

I consider such a stance rather ambiguous from the moral viewpoint: one accepts money, but.... Of course al-Qadhafi holds and defends opinions that are certainly not ours. In this regard, we already have some familiarity with communists and we must unfortunately also take into account Latin America's many parafascist regimes. Therefore we cannot always choose our partners.

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In my opinion, one must add to all this the fact that al-Qadhdhafi remains someone with whom one can still talk, as long as one can inspire trust in him. In the last analysis he is intelligent, and obviously a revolutionary who has grown up under conditions different from ours.

[Question] So do you respect him?

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi is a noteworthy person and I am pleased to have received him in Austria. Nevertheless, I do not intend to portray him in unrealistically rosy hues.

[Question] How do you answer Israel's constant charges that you have been too pro-Arab and not at all pro-Zionist, bearing in mind that Austria was one of the first Western nations to recognize the PLO?

[Answer] In my dual capacity as socialist and internationalist I am the friend of all peoples, including those of the Middle East. My idea about Zionism remains the same: There is no single solution to the problem. One solution is of course to go to Israel, and this applies to all Jews unable to exist as Jews in other parts of the world, who are entitled to feel like free men. However, one must not forget the coexistence of several antagonistic currents within Zionism. Begin represents one tendency, Nahum Goldman another.

[Question] You are no admirer of the Israeli prime minister, but what is your opinion of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai? Will it help resolve the Middle East crisis?

[Answer] I have never supported the Camp David accords because I believe that one of the essential aspects of the Middle East problem, the Palestinian problem, was not resolved there. It is moreover a problem at the center of the Arab world of which we are now aware from two aspects: Not only has it remained unresolved, but no path to any alternative solution has been indicated.

On the other hand one must welcome every step taken toward peace. I would add: Every small portion of peace obtained must be protected.

[Question] I read something you said some years ago: "Austria has no foreign policy, only its neutrality." Is this still true?

[Answer] In the past 25 years Austria has developed its policy of active neutrality. What does it mean? It means that we have worked within the United Nations. Especially within the Security Council, that we involved ourselves in the Helsinki negotiations and in the Cancun North-South summit and that we have adopted a stance on the Palestinian question--a stance that has meanwhile spread throughout the world.

[Question] Some people argue that this neutrality is sometimes rather unbalanced, as in the case of your scolding of the United States, the friendship you have shown toward the Third world, your supplies of Steyr light tanks to Argentina....

[Answer] No, it is not true. We have now suspended consignments of tanks to Buenos Aires.

[Question] Austria belongs neither to the EEC nor to any other bloc. What is your opinion of the slow and laborious progress of the united Europe?

[Answer] There is no doubt that we are in the midst of a process of community integration which is advancing despite certain setbacks--a process whose milestones are represented by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The idea of the united Europe has now become the motive force of our continent's political pragmatism.

[Question] What about East-West relations?

[Answer] The detente policy is experiencing a very critical phase, but we are well aware that there is no option for Europe other than the path of detente. This proves the role that belongs to Europe's minor neutral states within the context of relations between the two alignments--a role which has already emerged during the Madrid conference.

[Question] What is the secret of your "minor economic miracle," based on the containment of inflation, low unemployment and the holding power of the schilling?

[Answer] It is very simple: It stems from the coincidence of the interests expressed by the employers and workers in agreeing on a realistic economic and social policy. Despite the rather widespread opinion that such a pact is impossible, we achieved one by learning the correct lesson from our history.

[Question] You are referring to your model of so-called "Sozialpartnerschaft"--a unique model of restrained bargaining that cannot be exported. Is it still working now that "Austria Felix" [happy Austria] is beginning to feel the pinch of the economic crisis?

[Answer] We can in no way spare Austria the effects of the world recession; we can only make them less burdensome. For the time being, by using a so-called reformist policy--or, if you prefer, one based on Keynesian liberalism--we have managed to achieve stability in employment levels, in prices and on the currency market. It is an excellent record, so I do not foresee a gloomy future for Austria.

[Question] Last, let us examine bilateral relations, which have long been tainted by the Alto Adige issue. Have you anything to say in this regard?

[Answer] With Italy? Commercially, things are very good. Politically--and I must say this quite frankly--we have no other neighboring country with which, even at the "top levels," we have so few contacts as Italy. Things are better with Hungary, much better with Germany and Switzerland. The exception is Czechoslovakia, with which relations have become somewhat frozen. I realize the anxiety that my remarks will prompt, but it is the truth.



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[Question] Whose fault is it, bearing in mind that Italy still has to repay the state visit to Rome by President Jonas 11 years ago?

[Answer] I would say at once that it is both countries' fault. Perhaps we have been insufficiently energetic, but it seems to me that not many efforts are made in Italy either.

[Question] One final question: What do you think of President Pertini?

[Answer] I consider him an exceptional person: His vitality and resolve are amazing. I would like to conclude with the following observation: At one time we were the vassals, a satellite, of Germany and Italy, a poor country and the invalid of Europe between the wars. All that belongs to the past. Now we are nobody's satellite.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

CHANGE TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SEEN AS HARMFUL

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9-16 Apr 82 pp 39-40

[Article by Jacques Julliard: "The Siren Song of Proportional Representation"]

[Text] Having observed silence during the cantonal campaign, Francois Mitterrand continued that policy after the votes were counted. This in itself was eloquent comment, however, for it was interpreted as meaning that he intended to have the parliament adopt a change in the system of voting for the coming municipal elections and perhaps (inasmuch as nothing has yet been decided) for the future legislative elections.

A return to proportional representation has long been a part of the platform of the Left. Over and above the considerations of justice which are always invoked in its support, proportional representation has the special feature of rendering the political parties independent of each other. There would be no need to be part of a coalition in order to receive one's due, for with 25 percent of the total vote a party would always receive roughly one-quarter of the seats. Under the majority-vote electoral system, however, a party could very well be defeated in every district in the second-round voting and find itself without a single seat. Or on the other hand, with the aid of a withdrawal in its favor, it could score a clean sweep--and that was the wonderful surprise that awaited the socialists last June.

Guy Mollet's Boomerang

In summary, the majority-vote electoral system is the system of optimistic parties and confident alliances, and proportional representation is the system of cautious parties and precarious alliances. Whereas the majority-vote system is to suffrage what the community property system is to marriage, the proportional representation system can be likened to a legal separation--and its inclusion (in 1972) in the "Common Program" of the socialists and communists spoke volumes concerning the hidden agendas of both sides then and thereafter.

The district voting system has deserved well of the republic, however. Without harking back to the heroic days of 1889, when its reestablishment enabled Minister of the Interior Constans to smash Boulanger's plebiscitary initiative, it is well--before going any farther--to recall that this system played an essential role in our contemporary political life by ensuring the stability of the national institutions and compelling the Left to unite in order to win.

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It is known that upon his return to power in 1958 de Gaulle decided--against the advice of many of his intimates, including Michel Debre--to reestablish the two-round, absolute-majority arrondissement voting system, which the Fourth Republic had repudiated. In so doing, the general was yielding to the entreaties of socialist Guy Mollet, who--following the example of Constans--regarded this type of election system as a veritable trump card ensuring republicans against personal government. Note the irony of history, however! The calculations of the greatest of experts are sometimes foiled by the quiet logic and subtle humor of universal suffrage. After having several times voted for de Gaulle by referendum, the voters gave him the same prize that it would give Mitterrand in 1981--a plurality which the operation of the two-round voting system converted into an absolute majority. Guy Mollet's brain-child had boomeranged against him.

Without this providential intervention (which was largely unexpected), de Gaulle would most certainly have been unable to resist the "Cartel of the 'No's'"--that coalition of his enemies of the Right and the Left which excluded only the communists. The minority vote received by the Gaullist coalition--36.3 percent\*--was transformed into a majority of seats. The way was barred to a return of the Fourth Republic. I cannot bring myself--not even retrospectively--to deplore this development. As much as the adoption of the principle of election of the president of the republic by universal suffrage (on 22 October 1962), it was the majority-vote-style election the following month (on 18 and 25 November) that provided the "second foundation" of the Fifth Republic.

This election put in place what was to become one of the basic pillars of the system: the identification of the parliamentary majority with the presidential majority. It was because he had failed to establish this amalgam on a durable basis that Valery Giscard d'Estaing experienced such difficulty in the closing period of his 7-year term in office. Not that de Gaulle himself adapted easily to the yoke which he found himself wearing, partly against his will; for although the system had the effect of attaching the deputies solidly to the president, it also tended to make the latter dependent on the former. De Gaulle found even the victory of his own party--under the aegis of Pompidou--in the 1968 "election of the great panic" hard to take. It was to reestablish the independence and preeminence of the presidential function that he ran in the suicidal referendum of the following year.

## A Fig Leaf

But even if--all things considered--the majority-vote electoral system has deserved well of the Fifth Republic by giving it the majority, it has no less well served the Left by giving it unity. It was, in fact, to escape the disastrous consequences of the existing electoral system--which he himself had helped to put in place--that Guy Mollet on 12 November 1962 gave the starting signal for the "long march" which did not bear fruit until 10 May 1981 with the election of Francois Mitterrand to the presidency. That day, in effect--to the amazement of public opinion--the secretary general of the SFIO declared that as between a communist and a UNR [Union for the New Republic] Gaullist, one should vote for the communist. Had Guy Mollet ceased to be anticommunist? Not at all. He had merely ceased to be suicidal--and it was indeed to a slow death

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\* Compared with the 38 percent vote for the socialists in June 1981.

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that the majority-vote electoral system doomed a disunited Left. The only course remaining to the Left was to unite--at least as far as elections were concerned.

Inevitably, another 10 years had to pass before this electoral "mutual aid society" was transformed (in 1982) into a genuine political alliance, and only half that long thereafter before the alliance broke up (in 1977). Even after the "era of good feeling" had ended, however, there remained the electoral constraint and the common interest in avoiding disaster: the majority-vote electoral system served as a "fig leaf" for the Union of the Left and prohibited the separated couple from asking for a divorce. As a prize--and under the impetus of the presidential election--that system offered the Left victory in 1981.

It was certainly to respect his commitments that Francois Mitterrand decided to revise the laws regulating municipal and legislative elections in France; but it was unquestionably on the basis of a recent analysis that he decided to do so at this time. First of all, it is advisable to assume that a miracle occurs only once and that the stupidity of the Right--which not long ago presented the Left with an unparalleled victory--will not soon be repeated. In the light of the cantonal elections one must acknowledge that when the communists lose two votes one will undoubtedly go to the PS (out of loyalty to the Left) but the other will revert directly to Chirac (for the sake of Poujadist continuity). Under these circumstances the Left is anything but assured of again receiving a majority in the forthcoming legislative elections, and a majority for the Right in 1986 would guarantee a painful conclusion to the presidential term in office--one even more painful than Giscard's was.

It is understandable that Francois Mitterrand is not very anxious to be the first to test the most serious of the contradictions in the text of the constitution--to discover what would happen if the president found himself with a hostile, newly elected parliament. There would be only one solution: to expand his parliamentary base toward the center, as Pompidou had succeeded in doing by rallying Duhamel to the majority in 1969 and as Giscard had likewise done with Lecanuet in 1974. Today there is no longer any center, no longer any reserve. The logic of the election process forces everyone to choose between the majority and the opposition. Only a proportional-representation election would be able to reconstitute a center--and therefore a new reserve for difficult times.

The establishment of proportional representation would obviously not always have an equal impact, depending on whether it was being implemented in municipal elections or in legislative elections. In the former case it would indicate only that the communists had become less and less acceptable as allies and that the PS had chosen to abandon them to the unhappy fate to which they appeared to be destined, in the hope of saving its own skin. If proportional representation were to be extended to the legislative elections, that would on the other hand be a veritable turning point for the 7-year term and would signify three things:

First, that the Union of the Left is definitively dead, and that under these conditions each component of the union must take its chances individually, unless it finds itself subsequently returned to power.

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Second, that whereas a second victory by the Socialist Party appears to be out of the question the risk of total defeat is not. Under these circumstances one would assume that it is better--through the instrumentality of proportional representation--to ensure to the party the important role that will safeguard its electoral potential by reducing the possibility of a "depreciation" (and likewise of an "appreciation") in strength.

Lastly, that the president has resolved upon (or is resigned to) an increasing dissociation--in proportion as his 7-year term goes forward--between the majority that elected him president and the parliamentary majority. It is perfectly conceivable that a partial setback for the socialists among the voters would be accompanied by a continuation of the support which the president enjoys among the public. It is a possibility that the president cannot disregard.

## Clarity and Efficacy

"All discussion of methods is a discussion of circumstances," Bachelard said. In fact, the belief is widespread in France that individual election systems do "wear out" and that it is therefore advisable to replace them periodically. The majority-vote system--whose principal function is to produce a coherent majority--should accordingly, after a quarter of a century, be replaced by the system of proportional representation: a system which is less capable of distortion and more respectful of the equilibrium of the forces involved and of the diversity of temperaments.

It is obviously possible to be seduced by this complex of political considerations and theoretical arguments. I believe, however, that it would be a disservice to the nation to return to proportional representation. In a country of a pluralist tradition (in contradistinction to a two-party tradition) such as France, the majority-vote electoral system offers the double advantage of clarity and efficacy. By obliging the parties to conclude agreements for the second round of voting, it offers the voters clear-cut alternatives and produces a majority that is equally clear-cut. Proportional representation, on the other hand, defers the problem of a majority until after the election and thereby deprives the voter of his principal prerogative, which is to act as arbiter. It was not so long ago that the opacity of the existing institutions, together with the fragility and instability of the coalitions, combined to threaten the existence of democracy itself. In that context de Gaulle's most important achievement was not ending the war in Algeria but was, first and foremost, avoiding civil war and subsequently endowing France with stable institutions--or, in any case, institutions as stable as the nation could tolerate. The Left--which had at first combated these institutions, subsequently supported them and in time benefited from them--now has the primordial duty of preserving them.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

QUILES ON ELECTION RESULTS, PSF PLANS, MAYORAL RACE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9-16 Apr 82 p 41

[Interview with socialist deputy and 'number three' man in the PS Paul Quiles by Kathleen Evin]

[Excerpt] [Question] Why hold a seminar for the party leadership immediately after convening an executive committee and parliamentary working sessions?

[Answer] The task of the PS executive committee was to derive practical lessons from the cantonal elections. The seminar for the leadership should lead to the formulation of specific proposals that will enable the Socialist Party to play its role to the hilt and, in a sense, get its second wind.

In addition to those of its tasks to which I shall refer as material tasks and which are obvious (the training of the active members, the organization of the federations, and so forth), the party has an important role to play on three levels--a role which it has, in certain areas, somewhat neglected during the past year.

First of all, it has an ideological role. The PS is in the best position to explain the socialist program in all its aspects, and therefore to spell out the ultimate purpose of the governmental action. It is also, however, the only organization able to combat the Right in the political arena and reply--blow by blow--to the latter's systematic campaign of denigration of the policy currently being implemented.

Second, it has a programmatic role. We should strengthen our study committees which were reactivated following Valence, and formulate specific proposals in respect to economic and social matters and matters concerning civil rights and foreign policy--and do so without regard to the positions adopted by the government.

Lastly, it has a role of maintaining liaison between the government and the people and between the people and the government. We should explain, and defend, the government's policy but also transmit to the government the information, criticisms and evaluations offered by the French people and by Socialist Party members.

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We must put a halt to the assimilation which is too often observed to occur between the party and the government. We must, in fact, free ourselves from our inhibitions. This seminar will, I hope, revitalize the socialist dynamic.

[Question] You said--in addressing the executive committee of your party--that these cantonal elections "could not be won." Isn't it rather easy to make this kind of a posteriori "prognostication"?

[Answer] In our program we had established a schedule for the "change": 3 months to make the urgent reforms, 18 months to carry out more far-reaching reforms, and a legislative session to consolidate these reforms. We had, however, underestimated the extent of the various forms of resistance to our policies. Indeed, the first phase will not be achieved until the end of the spring session of parliament. The fact is that during this first period we have become the object of dissatisfaction in various sectors: among our adversaries, who did not believe we would carry out our program; among our political friends, who believe we are not moving forward fast enough; and among the uncommitted electorate who rallied to us between 10 May and 14 June and now find that their own situation has nonetheless not improved.

Certain errors on our part have amplified this predictable voter backlash. First of all, the process of nominating the socialist candidates did not always turn out well: certain sections imagined that the PS label alone was sufficient to win election. Secondly, the campaign of the Right--a systematic, intelligent and well-organized campaign--caused us to react in an uncoordinated fashion: either too violently, which made us appear to be guilty of partisanship, or too mildly, which gave credence to the wildest rumors that were circulated about us. Lastly, the truth is that certain measures and statements of the government appeared to be inopportune, poorly prepared or poorly explained.

[Question] Would you make the same speech today--casting it in the same terms--that you made at the Valence congress?

[Answer] As a politician I have one serious fault: I detest hypocrisy. To do something without saying so is not my conception of political action. For my part, I believe it is better to explain what one intends to do, and to say why one is going to do it, inasmuch as I see nothing wrong in asking for the loyalty of upper-level civil servants. That's the problem I brought up at Valence. It is consistently the underlying cause--and with equal intensity--of our current difficulties. My only regret is that at Valence I spoke the taboo name of Robespierre, which by its mere power of evocation had the effect of distorting my message.

[Question] Are you a candidate for the nomination for the office of mayor of Paris?

[Answer] I have represented Paris in the Chamber of Deputies for the past 4 years and am therefore in a good position to appreciate the misdeeds of the Chirac system in the capital. However, it is the socialist party members of Paris and the executive council of the party that will nominate our candidate. For the moment, no one has taken sides. A number of conditions must first be

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met in order that the nominee will have the maximum chance of defeating Chirac. When all this becomes clear I shall make my decision known. I know this struggle will be difficult, but I do not believe it is doomed to failure. Chirac is considered to be a good mayor. That is true. He's the best mayor Paris has had for a century--because he is the first one.

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