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# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 18/82)

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KLIBI COMMENTS ON DIVISIONS IN ARAB WORLD

PM191503 Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 13-19 Mar 82 p 38

[Interview with Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi by Guy Sitbon: "The Arab World's Divisions? They Disappear When It Comes to Israel..." date and place not given]

[Text] LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Is it true that a major war operation is being planned in Lebanon? This time the Israeli Army is apparently aiming to finally destroy the Palestinian military apparatus by occupying its west Beirut bases on behalf of the Christian Phalangists.

Chedli Klibi: We have received information on that eventuality from several sources. It would be a large-scale action which would enable the Israelis to permanently occupy southern Lebanon. In the short term they would gain control over the source of the Litani River and they intend to exert more direct pressure on Lebanon. Will the United States allow them to do that? Will the great states watch this new violation of international law without reacting?

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: How could you resist? The Middle East countries have never been so divided?

Chedli Klibi: It is necessary to look beyond that appearance. The Arab world may be divided on the path to follow but it is united on the objectives. There is no doubt about that. Moreover, every time we have faced a serious test, we have regained our unity and our cohesion. The ferment you mention is, of course, worrisome. All the Arab leaders are anxiously wondering what must be done to unite our states in the face of Israel. But it should not be concluded that the Arab world is incapable of reacting. That would be an erroneous judgment and hence would be dangerous for peace. I think we are moving toward a period of serious tension in the region. Unless the countries concerned are sufficiently vigilant and take the necessary measures, we are heading for war.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Morocco is using vast resources against the POLISARIO, an Arab movement. Algeria and Libya are sinking fortunes into helping the POLISARIO. Libya is channeling all its energies into fighting other Arabs,

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as in Gafsa. Egypt and Libya have waged war on each other and each is on guard against the other. In Syria a whole army is fighting the Muslim Brotherhood. Iraq and Iran are continuing hostilities and are wasting their strength in them. Those are the facts. The words, however, remain the same: Israel is the enemy. Will you not eventually have to admit that is a demagogic slogan?

Chedli Klibi: Allow me to think that it is rather an exaggeration to say the Arab countries are waging war on each other. Algeria and Morocco are not at war. In fighting the POLISARIO, Morocco does not feel it is facing a state. Tunisia and Libya are not at war. The Gafsa operation did not bring a direct clash between Tunisia and Libya. These are incidents, dramatic episodes, of course, but their equivalent can be found almost anywhere in the world. Care must be taken not to make generalizations. On the contrary, I think these troubles are now being allayed in some instances. The awareness of a higher stake is prevailing over state egoism.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Nonetheless does not that higher stake, Palestine's fate, strike you as secondary to the very different challenge of the Arab world's accession to modernity? The Arabs have been using their energies in a fruitless enterprise for almost 40 years. Will it be necessary to fight for decades more; will our great-grandchildren see the end of it?

Chedli Klibi: The Arab world, too, is being constantly modernized. The Palestinian cause is our central concern. It cannot drag on much longer.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: More than 4 years have elapsed since the visit to Jerusalem and al-Sadat has been killed. Are you revising your verdict? Does Arab opinion not realize that Egypt has indeed recovered the Sinai by diplomacy where no war had restored it?

Chedli Klibi: If we were to generalize that argument, Syria would have to follow Egypt's example and do the same to win back the Golan Heights....

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Of course, why not, since it works?

Chedli Klibi: If they did that, what would remain of the Palestinian cause? If everybody takes back his stake, how can the battle be continued? That is the significance of the Arab front against Zionist aggression and expansion. The Palestinian problem was the cause of the occupation of the Sinai and the Golan Heights. So I do not think President al-Sadat's approach was correct. What he should have done was tackle the central problem. And if you want to avoid serious disturbances, you in the West should also have a clear view and intervene in the right direction. Real solutions exist.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Is Francois Mitterrand's approach the right one?

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Chedli Klibi: His speech to the Knesset struck me as ambiguous. It is remarkable that your president has recognized that peace and justice cannot be handled by proxy. Camp David was a violation of that rule. But I am disappointed that there was no full and complete recognition of the PLO and that Mitterrand kept silent on the problems of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and so forth.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Are the Palestinians now prepared to resign themselves to partition?

Chedli Klibi: I think they have decided to accept it. For them the most important thing is a homeland, a state, a flag. They have had enough of humiliations, they would really like a home.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: So what guarantees will there be for Israel?

Chedli Klibi: That is the wrong way of posing the question. There is no question of begging the Palestinian state from Israel. We have a UN decision which recognizes that they have that right. It just has to be implemented. On what territories? On the West Bank, in the Gaza Strip and in the Arab part of Jerusalem, Palestine's capital. Contacts between the two peoples will begin in Jerusalem and then there will be cooperation. The Palestinians will then have no desire to wage war on Israel. They will be totally absorbed in their development. They will work miracles with their cadres and Arab capital, as the Israelis have done in the Negev. What about security? All the necessary provisions can be made. Initially an international force would guarantee the two states, pending a better solution.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Is Egypt's return to the Arab League close?

Chedli Klibi: Close is perhaps not the right word. It is possible. President Mubarak is taking a different tone. He has had the wisdom to refrain from any attack on the other Arab countries.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Is Saudi Arabia pressing more for Egypt's return?

Chedli Klibi: Everybody is in favor of it. I do not know a single country which does not want it. The whole problem is how to bring it about.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB LEAGUE'S KLIBI ON FAHD PLAN, SINAI PULLOUT

PM140851 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 23 Mar 82 p 5

[Interview with Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi by Igor Man in Tunis: "On Behalf of 130 Million Arabs"; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] I believe that the first point on the agenda for the next Arab League Council meeting is the "conflict" between the United States and Libya....

[Answer] I believe that the present line pursued by Washington is not exactly the best, since it is based on erroneous options, the United States is mistaken if it believes that it can have no friend in the region other than Israel. All the Arab peoples, all of them, would ask for nothing better than to cooperate with the United States, within full trust and dignity, as long as the United States remains consistent with its principles of freedom and justice. Washington condemns the invasion of Afghanistan. Very good. But what is happening on the West Bank and in Arab Jerusalem? And what about the suffering of the Arabs living under Israel?

[Question] But there is a problem, Mr Secretary: Israel feels threatened with destruction....

[Answer] Nobody wants to destroy Israel. It is a ruse for influencing world public opinion, particularly in Europe. Israel does not intend to accept a Palestinian state--not because it fears its own disappearance but purely and simply because it wants to [as printed] West Bank and Gaza and more than that, so as to realize Begin's biblical dream of a greater Israel. You cannot trample a people because Mr Begin wants to realize a biblical dream that is vaguer than anything. Politics does not consist of dreams. Peace is built under the banner of realism and historical honesty.

[Question] What are the prospects for the Arab peace plan, known as the "Fahd plan," following the failure at Fes?

[Answer] The adjournment of that meeting was a wise decision taken by the king of Morocco. Since that day the dialogue among the various Arab countries has continued and gradual progress is being made toward an agreement. This is my belief, rather than a definite fact, but if the inter-Arab dialogue continues on the recent wavelength I believe that we could see a resumption of the Fes summit before the summer.

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[Question] Nevertheless there are countries that cannot swallow point seven of the Fahd plan, which implies the recognition of Israel.

[Answer] Neither Syria nor the PLO nor Iraq rejects point seven, which ratifies the right of all peoples of the region to live in peace and security. In any case this is consistent with UN Resolution 242, which is accepted by all the Arab countries. Some problems do arise with regard to implementing this principle in a fairly flexible plan. This is why Syria, for instance, says that it is not enough to suggest. But that it is necessary to negotiate.

[Question] One final question: 25 April is approaching. It is a date to mark, a historic turning point....

[Answer] For us Arabs it will not be a fateful day. For Egypt, if all goes well--and we would like to be optimistic--25 April will lead to the liberation of the final portion of its national territory. This is undoubtedly an important factor. But for all other Arabs it is different: Egypt's recovery of territory that belongs to it will take place at the cost of a policy that has weighed heavily, and weighs heavily, on the future of the Arab nation. Al-Sadat, who is now in a better world, paid with expulsion from the Arab family for having agreed to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians--who did not authorize him to do so--the so-called autonomy, which is an outrage, a swindle, a tragic fraud. It is not for that that the Palestinians have been fighting and suffering for years.

The date 25 April reminds us of disappointments and very profound suffering. Al-Sadat's big mistake was to pay with his dignity. Now that he is at rest, above, we are suffering the consequences of his policy. Egypt and President Mubarak are bearing the brunt of that policy. A trip of Arab land is returning to its rightful owners, but what about the Golan, Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza? And what about the rights of the Palestinian people, deprived of their land? There is a difficult path ahead of us, along which we must be able to depend on Europe's help. We trust in France's return to consistency and trust in Italy's role: I was encouraged by my latest meeting with [Italian Foreign] Minister Colombo, a man who tackles problems with an open mind, unselfishly.

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ALGERIA

AFTERMATH OF LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS ANALYZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 265, 12-18 Mar 82 pp 22-23

[Article: "Legislative Elections in Algeria: What Continuity? What Renovation? The New National Assembly Dedicates a Stage of Doing Business with the Private Sector That Is More Flexible and More Liberal"]

[Text] Legislative elections were held in Algeria under the slogan of "continuity and renovation." The new National Assembly will usher in a new stage in the course of democratic practice, especially since a large ratio of young people and university [graduates] are entering the council for the first time. One of the most prominent features of [this] stage is to be the flexible and liberal way of doing business with the private sector.

Hundreds of thousands of voters went to the polls last week to elect 281 deputies from among 843 candidates. These elections had several characteristics among which were [the following]:

1. Preparations for the elections took place under the supervision of the Algerian Liberation Front party.
2. Candidates were nominated within the party and amidst the ranks of party fighters. Party structures from Kasma to the Political Bureau took part in this process.
3. The process of evaluating the candidates did not turn out to be in favor of those who are considered political supporters of Col Mohamed Saleh Yahyawi, former executive coordinator of the ruling Liberation Front party.
4. The Berber Tizi-Ouzou region responded coolly to the elections to show its dissatisfaction with the candidates.

The slogan under which Algeria's fourth legislative elections since independence were held was "continuity and renovation." Independent Algeria had its first parliament in 1963 during the days of the provisional government. The parliament too was a provisional body that was swept by political struggles. With the withdrawal of the provisional government, parliament disappeared from the political scene. During the administration of President Ahmed Ben Bella parliament was given a prominent position in political life. At that time Mr al-Haj Ben Ila was

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the speaker of the National Assembly and the second official in the Liberation Front party. However, this assembly was not to last longer than its predecessor. One year after it was established, it clashed with the men of 19 June, and the experiment ended just as the men who had carried it out did: in jail and under house arrest.

From 19 June 1965 to 5 March 1977 the Revolutionary Council which was headed by Houari Boumedienne was the highest power [in the land]: it provided guidance; it enacted legislation; and it controlled [everything]. After 12 years the late president realized that the role of a legislative institution was more than necessary to ensure the stability of the regime's institutions and to safeguard the future. Algerians then asked Mr Edgar Four, who had been speaker of the French parliament for many years, for much advice regarding the restoration of life to parliament.

On 5 March 1977 a new experiment began, and the National People's Assembly was restored to political life. That body represents the highest of people's assemblies that are elected. In an address to the nation delivered by then President Houari Boumedienne from the podium of the National People's Assembly, the president said, "The installation of the National People's Assembly is a political event in a country that abounds with political events. It is one day in the life of a nation which each one of us feels is a significant moment not because it was not expected--for it was included in the preamble to the 19 June Declaration--but because it represents within the same course the culmination of the national effort. At the same time it marks the beginning of a new revolutionary spirit."

The first action undertaken by the National People's Assembly in its first preliminary session was to organize the assembly and to enact a law that would govern the operations of its agencies. The second session dealt with the state's monopoly of foreign trade. The 1978 spring session was truly considered the session of the general basic law for workers' rights, while the fall session of the same year was confined to [consideration of] the financial law and the budget, which is considered the subject of every fall session.

The 1977 fall session was the first actual session in which the National People's Assembly began to pursue its legislative function after having established its foundations and devised the legislative framework for its actions in the first session.

The Finance Law was considered the first bill presented to the Assembly. It sought to achieve these objectives:

1. To fight all speculations that affect prices.
2. To double the mobilization of available resources and especially to increase savings.
3. To exercise stern control over operations in the nation's various means and capabilities.

During the same session the Assembly also considered the state's foreign trade

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monopoly law. The Assembly ratified the law, thereby establishing two principles:

1. The state's monopoly of foreign trade; and
2. The elimination of middlemen in foreign trade operations.

Where Are the SONATRACH Dollars?

Briefly the National People's Assembly held nine regular meetings during its first legislative session. These meetings were preceded by a preliminary one. An emergency meeting was also held at the request of two thirds of the members of the Assembly. It was devoted to the subject of Algerian emigration to France. When President Houari Boumedienne was dying the assembly met in an emergency session to establish the fact that the president's position was vacant and to appoint Mr Rabah Bitat, speaker of the National People's Assembly President for 40 days as stipulated by the constitution.

During that legislative period--from 5 March 1977 to 5 March 1982--178 motions were made in the Assembly by the secretaries of permanent committees; 7,263 motions were made by assembly members; and there were 1,766 roll calls about various points that the assembly had dealt with. Also 1,798 amendments were approved: 105 of them were made by the government; 654 were introduced by Assembly members; and 939 were introduced by the committees that are responsible for such matters. This is in addition to the amendments and the motions that were made at the last session.

During the previous legislative term members of parliament asked members of the government 128 questions: 103 of these questions were directed to 22 members of government. Government responded to 95 of those questions before the deadline set by the constitution in most cases, and 8 questions remained unanswered.

During the legislative term the assembly formed a committee to investigate the SONATRACH Agreement with the U.S. El Paso Company. Serious charges had been made against Mr Siad Ahmed Ghazali, former minister of energy who washed his hands of the charges against him and of responsibility for the agreement in a bulletin he distributed to members of the Central Committee. This action provoked President Chadli Benjedid, so he relieved him of his duties as minister and then suspended him from the Central Committee. He also suspended his "god-father," Abdessalam Belaid from the Central Committee. The Central Committee asked both of them "to return all party and state property and documents" which they had in their possession.

During the court investigation astounding information about the agreement, which was neither equitable nor fair, was revealed. It turned out that scores of millions of dollars had been turned over to numerous Algerian officials so they can approve the agreement in 1969.

It is known that Mr Abdessalam Belaid was the one in charge of Algeria's oil policy during that period. He had special ties with the United States of America with whom Algeria signed the large gas deal for a period of 25 years.

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Despite the earnestness of the investigative committee, which was formed by the National People's Assembly to investigate the gas deal, those who were implicated in the deal on the highest levels were not unequivocally condemned. At one of the Assembly's closed meetings which were held to discuss the deal, Mr (Boualam Ben Hamouda), who was then minister of the interior, took out a recording device from his pocket and told members of the Assembly, "Everything is here on tape."

No one yet knows what is on the tape because none of those present asked to listen to it, and this concluded the file.

From Where Did You Get This?

After this committee the National People's Assembly brought up the question of oversight for discussion, and it presented for consideration the question, "From where did you get this?"

During the 1979 fall session the Assembly submitted three texts for discussion. The first had to do with the oversight practiced by the National People's Assembly.

The second had to do with the oversight practiced by the Accounting Council; and the third had to do with the oversight practiced by the Financial Inspection Office. However, the latter text was withdrawn at the last minute.

When it was approved the National People's Assembly Oversight Law included 42 articles according to which the purpose of the oversight that was to be practiced by the Assembly was to ascertain--just like other national institutions--that responsibilities were being met; that decisions were being implemented; that the national economy was being operated soundly; that efforts were being made to avoid shortages and appearances of neglect; and that manipulation or embezzlement of the state's funds or infringement upon the economic wealth of the nation did not take place.

Therefore, extreme importance was given in 1980 to the Accounting Council, and its areas of operations in overseeing the finances of the state, of the party, of local and regional groups and of all kinds of socialist organizations were determined.

The most important question that came up during the discussion of the issue of oversight and embezzlement of the state's funds was that of applying the statement, "From where did you get this?" Application of that statement meant retroactive oversight. Members of parliament suggested three formulas for [auditing people's records]:

1. Officials were to be audited from the beginning of independence until 1970.
2. People were to be audited as of 1954.
3. Everyone who has an illegitimate fortune or a fortune whose source was suspect, beginning with the last 7 years, was to be audited.

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The government's representative and chairman of the Accounting Council then was Mr Ahmed Talib Ibrahimi who rejected the three proposals. Addressing the members of parliament he said, "The auditing must begin from the reality of Algeria in 1980 and not before." Actually, people were not asked to account for the fantastic fortunes they had "earned." President Chadli Benjedid once said, "If those people had worked day and night, and if they had been assisted by mortals and demons, they would not have been able to amass those fortunes which they did amass."

The National People's Assembly records the significant role of the general basic workers' law, the customs law, the foreign subjects employment law, the professional organizations law, the law for relinquishing the state's property and the media law.

The Language Problem

About some of the problems that the Assembly is facing one of the members of parliament says, "A basic article determines that the language spoken in the Assembly is the Arabic language, but only two thirds of the members of parliament speak Arabic fluently. In some cases the government sends us bills in French, and we have to spend a certain amount of time to have them translated. Speaking of the time factor, most of the bills that come up in front of the National People's Assembly are not brought up at the proper time. This is reflected in the content of the laws; so don't be surprised if you find some weakness in numerous articles of the law."

Regarding the written queries that were addressed to the government, there are some questions that are still unanswered. The laws did not determine the measures that must be taken in case answers are delayed or if answers to the Assembly's questions do not come at all.

At any rate the Assembly's national and international experience has been positive. Undoubtedly, the new assembly will benefit from the pros and cons of the previous stage.

The legislative elections which took place this March 5 took place under the slogan of "continuity and renovation." Algerians comment on this by saying that legitimate continuity manifests itself in the fact that freedom fighters are taking part in the Assembly. It is because of their lengthy experience of struggle and their sacrifices for the homeland that they realize full well the meaning of independence, sovereignty and siding with the masses (41 percent of the members of the assembly [are freedom fighters]).

The renovation lies in the youthful element--under 40 years. The ratio of this group amounts to 55 percent of the total members of parliament; 53 percent of them are university graduates.

Voters had to choose from three candidates. This means that there were three candidates for each parliamentary seat. The observation that one cannot keep out of one's mind is that the new assembly has more than 150 new members most of whom are young people. Therefore, the assembly may produce a new experience that is more flexible and more likely to deal with the exigencies of the new stage.

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One of the first bills pending in front of the new National People's Assembly is the Private Sector Bill which may be one of the decisive bills of the new stage. One of its functions is to reconsider the economic structure of Algeria in many of the vital sectors. Changing the economic structure would necessarily change the political skeletons, agencies and structures. This would begin with the introduction of new professional organizations, such as the association of manufacturers, the association of merchants and others, into all the structures of the Algerian Liberation Front party.

The question remains: to what extent will these associations fit the agency of the party, and how influential will they be in the making of political decisions? Who will guarantee that they will not turn into political platforms? In the charter of the Central committee on whose basis the Private Sector Law will be based the Central Committee states that:

"It appreciates the real and numerous contributions made by the private sector in building the homeland, and it affirms the need to correct the negative aspects that tarnish its development and present condition. Based on its insights and responsibility the Central Committee calls for the creation of all favorable circumstances so that the real capabilities and significant resources it owns can be harnessed to serve national development."

In another paragraph [the Central Committee] "calls upon the agencies of the state to prepare and put into application a complete cohesive framework that would prod, direct and oversee the development of the private sector under cover of taking into account the directions of the National Charter, the Constitution, the provisions of party congresses and the resolutions of the Central Committee. It would do that and honor the objectives of national development plans as well.

"The Central Committee accordingly requests that a concrete text of a genuine model be formulated for the conduct of the private sector. This would be guarded on the basis of rights and duties and, at the same time, would allow a purge of the present situation. It would allow the creation of an atmosphere that would encourage initiatives that are socially and economically beneficial."

It is certain that the new National People's Assembly will begin the stage by being more liberal in dealing with the private sector. If the early days of the assembly under the administration of the late president Houari Boumediene paid attention to the state's monopoly of foreign trade and to the enactment of the general basic workers' law, attention during the administration of President Chadli Benjedid will focus on refurbishing the structure [of the country] from the inside by issuing the Family Law and the Private Sector Law so as to establish the foundations of the new stage followed by that of the emergency congress next summer.

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ALGERIA

RABAH BITAT HEADS APN AGAIN

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 29 Mar-11 Apr 82 p 16

[Text] Officially opening its second session, the Algerian people's national assembly, elected on 5 March 1982, again chose Rabah Bitat as its speaker. Bitat, who won reelection in his home district of Bouira, 100 kilometers from Algiers, now 50, is one of the historic leaders of the FLN who, on 1 November 1954, took part in the opening of the armed liberation struggle of the Algerian nation. As Minister of State for Transport from 1965 to 1977, he was elected president of the first people's national assembly in 1977 and, in 1979, made a member of the FLN's political bureau by the party's congress.

The Algerian Assembly got right down to work. The five standing committees of the legislature have been installed, and their respective staffs chosen.

In the course of a visit to the new deputies the day after their official installation, President Chadli Ben-Djedid spoke at length of the various aspects of the phase his country is now going through. The APN consists of 281 deputies, all elected on 5 March 1982, in elections that evoked a relatively large voter turnout: 71.74 percent by official count, as opposed to 72.65 percent who voted in the 1977 elections. This is indicative of Algerians' deep commitment to parliamentary government, hardly surprising in light of the keen interest they took, particularly in the final months of the last Parliament, in the democratic debates over issues crucial to the nation's future.

Another remarkable feature of these elections is that they markedly altered the makeup of the legislature: only 68 percent of deputies of the 136 running for reelection were returned.

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IRAN

POPULARITY, FRAGILITY OF REVOLUTION CONTRASTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1101, 10 Feb 82 pp 35-38

[Article by Amal Naccache: "The Immobile Revolution"]

[Excerpts] Politically isolated, attacked on its southern borders, opposed even within its own territory, the foundations of the young Islamic Republic of Iran are tottering. Some people reproach it for not having achieved anything substantial; others feel that, all things considered, this revolution is no more bloodthirsty than any other. Whatever the case, Khomeyni's Iran is celebrating its fourth anniversary and still depends on a single man: perhaps never has a government been both so popular and so fragile.

Three years ago on 1 February 1979, the people of Tehran hysterically welcomed a 79-year-old man who had returned from exile to take control of their destiny in the name of God, the Koran and justice.

On 1 February 1982, revolutionary Iran is running out of steam on the eve of its fourth year. Some people even have no qualms about saying that it has already run out of steam. Blood is flowing not only on the front of the war which the country has been fighting with Iraq for 16 months, but also in the prisons, from the victims of firing squads, from prisoners being struck down by an Islamic law which countless Moslems reject, and in the streets, from the victims of assassinations, from government officials being killed by the bullets of young militants who have gone back into hiding and who refuse to allow them a monopoly of power which they consider to be seriously corrupt.

Isolated from the settling of scores at high levels, the average Iranian is growing colder and colder, more and more hungry. Isolated from the life of nations, Iran is confined to an isolation which was meant to be magnificent but which is only strangling the country. And the sinister Savak has itself been replaced by God's secret police, Savama, about which no one dares to admit that it has probably surpassed the horrible crimes of the shah's executioners.

The country is believed to be on the brink of civil war, but this does not take into account two essential factors: the popularity of Khomeyni and the government which he symbolizes among the common people of Iran, and the effective repression of mounafikin (hypocrites) by the judicial apparatus, the police and the Guardians

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of the Revolution. For the following of the leaders endorsed by the imam is still undeniably there. Many Iranians, who initially supported Khomeyni, have since deserted this denatured revolution. But this is not true of the working classes and moustafizin (underprivileged), among whom feelings of patriotism and revolutionary legitimacy are one and the same, as was apparent when hundreds of thousands of people swept into the streets following Rajai's assassination and especially on the war front, where the popular outburst occurred with unusual energy and where hundreds of civilian auxiliaries went to aid the soldiers.

The economic collapse itself, despite the hardships which it is causing, has not had the expected political consequences: It is too often overlooked that during the shah's time the distribution of wealth was such that its beneficial effects barely touched the masses.

Undeniably popular, the revolution is nevertheless extremely fragile. At 82 years old, Khomeyni remains its sole personification, the keystone and supporting legend. No strong institution has emerged despite the existence of the PRI [Islamic Republican Party], which has more or less survived Beheshti's death but which would not withstand the supreme leader's disappearance. This disappearance is the major concern of all Iranians, just as it is the major question concerning Iran.

How could it be otherwise, when a quick survey of the situation shows, even within the government, so many divisions and, among the opposition, whether clandestine or in exile, a mixture of confusion and helplessness? There is division among the mullahs, who are in daily confrontation, clan against clan, in a furtive contest for succession. There is division among the Toudeh (Communist Party) and part of the religious hierarchy, silent antagonism between the Guardians of the Revolution, the famous pasdaran who were the secular arm of the Revolutionary Council, and the present government, which is now beginning to fear their power. In the case of the opposition, the savage repression which has rained down since June on the mojahedin--4,000 have reportedly been executed and 6,000 imprisoned--even in their places of refuge in rebel provinces, has put an end to the remarkable organization of those militants for a long time and has considerably weakened their leader, Mass'ud Rajavi, who has joined Bani Sadr and his "provisional government" in exile. The guerrilla attack which claimed 55 lives in the city of Amol on 26 January was apparently not their doing.

Anachronistic monarchists and republican laity constitute the remnants of a fragmented opposition that will not be able to mobilize many people. Then from where will sufficient authority come to fill the void left by the imam's disappearance, to establish a new government, to hold in check the centrifugal forces of political life and the rebellion of ethnic minorities, which will not fail to take advantage of a weakening of the government?

In the opinion of some experts, the future belongs to Bonapartism: The savior will likely come from the army or the pasdaran apparatus. Others see nothing after Khomeyni except chaos and the specter of a hideous civil war. For the time being, and without speculating about a future that is still not apparent, several observations may be made. Except for the overthrow of the shah, the Iranian revolution has achieved nothing that would enable it to grow stronger, to establish itself, in the strict sense of the term. Left with economic structures inherited

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from the former regime, it has become frozen in total immobility, as evidenced also by the absence of any plan for political reform worthy of the name. This astounding immobility has been more or less offset for 3 years by every demagogic stratagem, including the affairs of the hostages and naming the "Great Satan" as well as the insane repression in which the government has indulged almost since its inception and which has had a dual effect of seduction and dissuasion on the people.

It is true that there are only few barriers between this situation and actual chaos. Yet it is in such a balance, which is unstable by definition, that the Iranian revolution is celebrating its fourth anniversary, in a country in which everything still remains to be changed.

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IRAN

REGIME'S FAULTS EXPLAINED, UNDERSTANDING ASKED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1101, 10 Feb 82 pp 36-37

[Article by Hamza Kaidi: "The Case for Khomeyni"]

[Text] In September 1978, demonstrations in every Iranian city took on the scale of a popular uprising. The formal diagnosis of experts in the United States: The shah will weather the storm. He has been through others! Khomeyni? Come now! How could that faraway octagenarian threaten a government which relied on an army of 450,000 well-equipped men who were superbly trained and advised by nearly 45,000 Americans? Four months later, a special White House envoy urged the shah to leave Iran for a "long vacation." And the unbelievable occurred: Khomeyni made his triumphant entry into Tehran on 1 February 1979.

In that struggle of clay against iron, an essential factor had been overlooked: an entire people's faith in a religion which orders its followers to accept no yoke and to believe that dying for the triumph of truth and justice means going to a better world.

For Moslems the world over, for most of the "accursed of the earth," the February 1979 victory in Iran immediately took on symbolic value. Thanks to that victory, hope was reborn. Peoples became aware of their power. Above all, it heralded a real rebirth of Islam after the failure of imported or imposed Western and communist doctrines. Three years later, in February 1982, there is talk of disaster. Experience shows that few revolutions have not been slandered or dragged through the mud, at least for a while, and the Iranian revolution is no exception to the rule. It is even one of those which have met with the greatest hostility--although hailed, at the time of its victory, by the very ones who had helped to strengthen the imperial regime in one way or another. They thought that everything would fall back into place and that they could adapt to the situation.

But in Tehran, they had decided otherwise. This was not just a bid for power in which they would be satisfied with changing governments, without touching the structures, the causes of all of society's ills. This revolution would not be based on a Marxist or Western doctrine, but on the principles of authentic Islam, as defined by the Koran and tradition. Heresy! How is it possible to govern in the late 20th century according to laws dating back 1,400 years?

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We forget that Islam "is, above all, a religion of life, that the Koran contains 100 times as many verses on social problems as on subjects of devotion; that of a series of 50 volumes on Moslem tradition, only 2 or 3 deal with prayer and man's duty to God. Some are concerned with morals, while all the rest deal with society, economics, law, politics. Islamic laws and principles are concerned with every jurisdictional aspect of justice, transactions, sanctions, even wartime and peacetime procedures and problems of international law, etc."\*

This return to Islamic sources bothers some Iranians and irritates a good number of foreign powers, both large and small, especially Arab governments, which fear the spread of the Iranian example--didn't Khomeyni say that all tyrannies must be combated and that Islam does not recognize royalty? The Soviets also fear the spread of such an example, because their republics in central Asia contain more than 40 million Moslems who have 1,001 reasons for feeling bullied by a Marxism which restricts or prohibits membership in the party and bars all religious followers from any promotion.

As for the Americans, they can only resent the Islamic Republic's leaders. Didn't they humiliate the United States in the worst way and give it the worst insult in its history when they took its diplomats hostage, when they made the United States publicly acknowledge its responsibility for the hardships of Iranians under the shah, and when, above all, they jeopardized U.S. interests? Other Western countries resent Khomeyni for his "ingratitude": Didn't the ayatollah find asylum in their countries at the end of his exile? Shouldn't he have rewarded them by giving them at least part of the place formerly occupied by the Americans? Everyone has banded together to isolate the Islamic revolution and to tarnish its reputation. Some have fomented unrest by supporting autonomist movements. The Arabs have outdone themselves in this regard. Forgetting the solidarity which the young republic expressed for the Palestinian cause, they have joined hands to bring down the Khomeyni regime. Encouraged and supported by its peers, Iraq took action by launching, in September 1980, a war which, according to its predictions, would reduce Iran within a few days.

Alas! Such estimates have proven false. The Iranian Arabs whom they were trying to liberate from the "Persian yoke" welcomed the invader with gunshots. A good percentage of autonomists turned their backs on the Iraqi sirens to support the Islamic Republic--to such an extent that the Iraqis could make no progress and had to retreat. Iran's situation is definitely not bright, but it is far from being as dark as described by the Western media, whose sources dried up with the outbreak of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict and which have had to rely mainly on the regime's opponents for their information.

Blood has certainly been spilled in futile quarrels, which is deplorable. All opponents are not mounafikin (hypocrites) who think only of destroying the Islamic Republic. But how is it possible not to condemn those who have stepped up their assassinations and sabotage without considering the bloody war against their country or the occupation of Iranian territory.

\*Khomeyni: "Pour un gouvernement islamique" [For an Islamic Government] (Course taught at Najaf, Iraq, in 1969). French edition: Fayolle publishing company, Paris.

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Let's not accuse the Iranian officials of vampirism! What country at war has spared spies, saboteurs and agitators? What penalties have been inflicted on the perpetrators of such crimes in so-called civilized countries? In France, communist workers who wanted to express their disapproval prior to the USSR entering the last world war (1939-45), and who sabotaged military materiel, were shot. In Tunisia, the allied armies executed natives who had been accused of collaborating with the enemy because they had sold bread to German soldiers.

In any case, what foreigner can claim the right to judge the Iranian leaders or to give them lessons in morality? Less than anyone, the Americans, who exterminated the redskins, are responsible for numerous genocides in Vietnam and many crimes committed, with their support, by tyrants in Latin America and elsewhere.

Have the ayatollahs plunged Iran into a bloodbath? According to the most credible source (Amnesty International), the number of executions which have taken place since the shah was overthrown is probably about 3,700, which is slightly less than the number of "disappearances" caused by General Massu's paratroopers during the battle of Algiers alone. And not even one-twentieth the number of persons executed, with or without due process of law, when France was liberated in 1944. But let us be done with this macabre accounting.

Let us simply ask ourselves why there is so much uproar over the disappearance of a few baha'i leaders and so much indifference, if not satisfaction, concerning the death of 72 Iranian leaders in the attack on Islamic Republican Party headquarters (June 1981) or the death of President Rajai and his prime minister (August 1981). Isn't the blood of some people the same color as the blood of others?

But then there is the economy, some people will say. In this regard, Iran's situation is hardly bright, that's for sure. But was France's situation bright following the revolution of 1789 or was that of the USSR in the early 1920's? Shouldn't it also be admitted that it takes long years to recover from a war? So then, how is it possible to judge a country in the midst of a war?

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ISRAEL

ANONYMOUS PALESTINIAN OFFERS PEACE PROPOSAL

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English No 2, Mar 82 pp 39, 49

[Text]

In an attempt to establish peace between Arabs and Israelis, the following proposal was formulated early in 1974, i.e., before Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem.

The proposal in itself may seem imaginary. But at the time Sadat's visit was also thought of as an imaginary step. Yet it did happen and it did release many suppressed ambitions for peace and pushed them up to the surface, demonstrating that there are many people on both sides who really want to live together in peace.

This proposal, in my opinion, presents a fair solution to the main points of difference: namely, 1. Existence, security and recognition of Israel; 2. Establishment and recognition of the Palestinian entity; 3. The status of Jerusalem.

As for the Jews, they will have the state they have dreamed of; it will be theirs to do with as they wish, however they wish.

This state will be recognized by all Arabs and, as a part of the Arab League, it will enjoy all facilities in the Arab World without any threat of destruction or hatred. The combination of Jewish technical skills and Arab national and human resources will be more productive than we can now imagine.

The Palestinians will also have their own state to form in the way they want. This new state will get all possible support from the rich Arab countries, from other states such as the USA or the U.K., etc., and also from various U.N. organizations.

Similarly, Jordan will have its dream fulfilled, i.e., access to the Mediterranean.

There is little doubt that the proper exit for Israel and Palestine to the Arab World is through Jordan, without which neither can live satisfactorily. This will be of great benefit to every member of the confederation of which I speak.

Finally, the holy city of Jerusalem, being the capital for Israel, the capital for Palestine and the capital for the confederated states, will be also opened to the world for free worship.

If you find any value in this proposal, I suggest that your magazine adopt it and press for a national referendum for both Arabs and Jews to vote on. If the nation decides, then governments or organizations have to accept.

How nice the dream is! Is there any chance that it may become a reality? Let us hope for that.

1. Withdrawal of Israel to its 1967 borders.
2. The establishment of the Palestinian State in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Its capital to be the Arab section of Jerusalem (Arab Palestine).
3. The capital of Israel to be the Jewish section of Jerusalem.
4. As now, the capital of Jordan to be Amman.
5. Establishment between the three states of a Confederation (The Arab Israeli Confederation) with its capital in a united Jerusalem.
6. Proper legislation to be drawn up to ensure free movement, residence, trading and proper arrangements for representation, and to arrange diplomatic, military, cultural and economic aspects of all these

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- matters to establish full equality for all citizens of the confederation.
7. The Arab Israeli Confederation to be accepted as a member of the Arab League, and to be recognized and dealt with by all Arab states at the same level as other member states.
  8. All Palestinian Arab emigrants and Jewish emigrants to be allowed to return and live, if any of them wish to do so, as a citizen of the new Palestinian state or of the other Arab countries.
  9. Arab Palestinian emigrants and Jewish emigrants to be compensated for all their losses.
  10. The United Nations to be responsible, by suitable means and for the proper period of time, for the implementation of this agreement. With the backing of its members, the U.N. will give necessary financial, economic and cultural support to the Arab-Israeli Confederation, particularly the State of Arab Palestine, in order that the new entities may be self-supporting.

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MOROCCO

MARATHON CHESS GAME PITS KING AGAINST USFP

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 262, 29 Mar 82 pp 15-16

[Part 2 of political analysis by an unnamed political prisoner in Morocco]

[Text] The Saharan war strongly influences the economic and political situation in Morocco. The Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) has been engaged for years in a chess game, and it is losing: King Hassan II has always maintained that any opposition to his policies must be contained within limits drawn by him, and by him alone. This second part of an analysis by a Moroccan political prisoner takes the machinery of the Palace-Opposition game apart to show how it works.

The USFP will continue to play its role as parliamentary opposition until it emerges as the only possible solution for change. It had reorganized itself as a function of this parliamentarist strategy after its representatives in Parliament voted for it in 1975 and again in 1977.

The USFP's ranks swelled very considerably in approval of this strategy, which did not displease the government at all, since M Bouabid's party thereby withdrew from the strategy of violent change which had pervaded the left since 1962. It organized the labor unions it controlled into a democratic labor confederation (CDT).

This meant that opposition to the government was no longer confined to statements by USFP parliamentarians or to articles in the party press. It expanded to embrace the CDT which, once it was formed, organized a strike that effectively put an end to the "social peace." What happened was that the USFP board of directors, meeting at the end of 1972, had drawn a distinction between the struggle for territory and the workers' struggle to improve their living conditions. The CDT gave the coup de grace to the sacred cow of "social peace" that had prevailed ever since the beginning of the war in the Sahara. The strike it mounted was considered a threat to national unity. In the wake of an ultimatum from the prime minister to the CDT, all the

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strikers, most of them government officials, were either suspended or fired outright. Several dozen of them were jailed. It was a severe blow to the infant labor union. The USFP thereupon returned to the opposition ranks in Parliament. In May 1980 the two-issue referendum called to lower the age of majority of the crown prince to 18, and to extend the terms of members of Parliament by 2 years was a new bone of contention between the palace and the USFP opposition.

The balloting on the referendum issues went in favor of the government. Hassan II, who wanted to strengthen his ties with the USPF -- whose support he needed for his new approach to Saharan policy -- made the conciliatory gesture of freeing its jailed members and rehiring the civil servants who had been fired or suspended.

The USPF lent him its support with a will by playing a very active role in "controlling" the members of the Moroccan Student Union (UNEM). However, the government's desire to implement the constitutional amendments stemming from the referendum immediately again touched off hostilities with the UNPF, which spread the word in the corridors of Parliament that its members would leave at the expiration of their terms, in October 1981. Meanwhile, the debate over the 1981 budget was a chance for the USFP to launch a full-scale criticism of the government. That campaign culminated with the demand from the Ittihadia (USFP's members of Parliament) benches for the resignation of Maati Bouabid's government when the first signs of the dry season should appear.

The CDT, which had barely recovered from the blow it had sustained in 1979, fell into step with the USFP and shortly thereafter the other major labor organization, the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) joined the party.

The campaign against the government was at its height when the government announced its decision to increase all staple food prices by 45 percent. The CDT and UMT delivered an ultimatum to the government demanding that it rescind its decision, which it did, but only by half. The UMT then called a one-day warning strike in Casablanca for 18 June. The CDT raised the stakes when it called for a nationwide general strike on 20 June.

The government responded by arresting all the CDT's leaders and by shutting down all its offices. It then arrested several USPF cadres, following that up on the eve of the riots that broke out on 20, 21, and 22 June by shutting down all its offices as well as its newspaper. Bloody but unbowed, the USFP apparatus stayed in operation through its executive committee. The political bureau, playing from strength derived from the great popularity it had regained during the events in Casablanca, to which it was perceived as principal midwife not only by the government, but by the masses of the people, and knowing too that it had the backing of the French Socialist Party, stood up to Hassan II in his decision to allow a referendum for the Saharan peoples' self-determination. The political bureau felt that it was

the height of political naivete to think that the outcome of a referendum carried out along the lines and under the conditions called for in OAU decisions would automatically be in Morocco's favor. As a consequence, the USFP called for a referendum asking Moroccans their opinion of the OAU decisions. That was encroaching on the prerogatives the constitution vests in the king. The USFP was summarily beheaded, and the members of its political bureau were arrested and sentenced to prison.

The USFP's people in Parliament had no choice but to obey the orders of their board of directors and leave Parliament when their terms expired. At one blow, that was the end of any real opposition in Parliament and, basically, the end of the "democratic process." Hassan II had warned that he would deal severely with the USFP members should they withdraw from Parliament. When they did, he declared them outlaws under Islamic law, which put their lives in imminent danger.

The battle of Guelta Zemmour providentially came just in time for them to stand for and win back their seats in Parliament, without forming a party caucus and without losing face in the eyes of their constituents.

At the conclusion of this chess game with the Moroccan government, the USFP was gravely weakened. Hassan II had carte blanche from then on to pursue his Saharan policy without risk of encountering any serious opposition. ([...]) His sole concern was to win total support at home: the press campaigns he mounted came on the heels of what seem to be the most important battles between the army and the Polisario, and they were fought in a very special Arab and international context.

"We have lost more men than anyone expected," said Hassan II in his speech on the anniversary of the "green march" on 6 November 1981, referring to the battle of Guelta Zemmour. If the Moroccan authorities admit to heavy losses in men and materiel, but without giving any figures, it means that the battle was nothing short of total catastrophe for Morocco

Against that background, Hassan II's reaction is understandable. The fact that Morocco made such an issue of the Polisario's use of sophisticated weaponry is no chance coincidence.

U.S. Intervention to Topple the Balance of Forces in the Sahara...

The fact of the matter is that Morocco's officers have always complained about their obsolete equipment. We know how much of the Moroccan budget has been earmarked for national defense since 1975. The Moroccan army has replaced and diversified its equipment, but orders for certain sophisticated weaponry from the United States, including M-60 tanks and V-10 reconnaissance planes, were a long time being delivered: Carter did not give the green light until 1980. Even so, the Moroccan general staff plans to buy more arms,

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including electronic detection systems. When the United States was considering sending two fully equipped AWACS planes to Egypt, to be used for monitoring Libyan troop movements along the Libyan-Egyptian-Sudanese borders, Moroccan officers were dreaming of persuading the United States to let the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) take advantage of them.

Since Reagan moved into the White House, the United States has been moving fast to reinforce its military presence in the Mediterranean, in the Indian Ocean, and on the African continent. In the context of this new policy of redeployment of American forces, the Reagan administration is gradually increasing military aid to its principal African allies. In order to get a piece of that action, Moroccan leaders had to convince the Pentagon that North Africa, too, was "a probable area of penetration for the Soviet Union." For the first time, the Moroccan sovereign explicitly implicated the USSR in the Saharan conflict. From now on, "Soviet penetration" is the thing to fight. The "communist threat" hangs over Morocco, not to mention the rest of North Africa: that is the tolling bell Rabat wanted to make Washington hear to persuade Ronald Reagan to step up deliveries of arms on order and to increase military aid to his ally.

## New Opposition to His Majesty

With the investiture of the new Maati Bouabid government, the National Rally of Independents (RNI) shifted into the opposition. Hassan II has created the unique opposition of which he spoke on the day after the abortive putsch of 10 July 1971.

"Had there been no opposition in Morocco then," he said, "I should have created one. Now it is a fait accompli. Officially, the RNI is going to play the part of "loyal opposition to His Majesty's government." That is the role Hassan II assigned it when he welcomed the RNI's parliamentary delegation early in November 1980.

The USFP would seem to be barred from the legal political scene, at least for the 2 years remaining of the extended terms of members of Parliament. With some 63 members, the RNI holds the largest number of seats in the present Parliament. It commands a relative majority, but the Independent Democrats, Istiqlal, and the People's Movement, which are allies in the present government, command the absolute majority. ([...])

Well aware that the present members of the cabinet have a lot of reservations about going along with Hassan II in his Saharan policy, the RNI could play a major role by asking the government to hasten the peacemaking process in the Sahara once the king decides that the balance of forces on the ground allows him to open negotiations with the Polisario. For Hassan II, though, the top priority is to strengthen the positions of his royal army in the Sahara.

The arms buildup, and particularly the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, hence constitutes -- and it becomes more understandable so -- one of the goals of the diplomatic push launched immediately after the battle of Guelta Zemmour: [the king] had to get outside support, not only at the diplomatic level, but also and above all at the military level. Yet even though Hassan II would stand to profit by the aid he was seeking, it would not stop the domestic situation in Morocco's deteriorating at every level. The government would prepare to increase prices of staple foods very gradually, even while unemployment was steadily climbing.

On top of the other stricter disciplinary measures imposed on the people of Casablanca, specially uniformed police were sent onto all university campuses to snuff out any spark of resurgent mass movement. ([...])

On the morrow of Sadat's execution, hundreds of graffiti appeared on Casablanca's walls. Wherever one looked, they said over and over again: "Your turn is coming soon, Moroccan tyrant!" The allusion could not be clearer. The Moroccan government has in fact left its young subjects, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the people, only one possible way to achieve their legitimate aspirations to jobs, a decent standard of living, and freedom: rebellion in all its forms, including violence. It would surprise almost nobody if Casablanca's young people were to find a way of their own to celebrate the first anniversary of the events of June 1981. And it is altogether possible that next June's festivities will not be confined to the nation's economic capital alone.

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MOROCCO

ARTICLE OUTLINES 1982 GENERAL BUDGET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 pp 674-675

[Article: "1982 Moroccan Budget"]

[Text] The Moroccan general budget for fiscal year 1982 has been set at 33.1 billion dirhams of resources and 39.4 billion of expenditures, the estimated deficit amounting to 6.3 billion dirhams.

The breakdown of resources is as follows, in millions of dirhams:

Direct taxes	5,475
Customs duties	5,142
Indirect taxes	7,806
Stamp duties	1,724
Government revenues	50
Department revenues	1,718
Different products	474
Direct budget transfers	156
Loan resources	10,460
Revenues derived from orders	50
Total	33,045

The professional profits tax will provide 3,118 million dirhams in direct taxation; the tax on public and private salaries will account for 1,350 million. Revenue of 350 million is expected from the national solidarity contribution, and the agricultural tax will bring in 60 million.

Import duties and taxes will produce 4,883 million dirhams in customs duties; export duties are calculated at 259 million, including 230 million on minerals.

With respect to indirect taxes, the turnover tax and the tax on services are listed at 5,594 million dirhams; the tobacco tax will provide 1,055 million, and the petroleum products tax will amount to 569 million.

In terms of department revenues, 800 dirhams are expected in the form of the Moroccan Phosphates Office (OCP) dividend; 400 million are expected from the Bank of Morocco profits assigned to the state, and 100 million are listed as

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coming from the Exchange Office. Seventy-five million are expected from Depot and Management Office profits; 50 million will be furnished by the National Transport Office; another 50 million from the National Tea and Sugar Office, and 10 million represent part of the profits of the Tobacco Administration.

The 1982 general budget is 31.70 percent sustained by loan funds, including 9 billion dirhams of exchange value for foreign loans and 1.3 billion for long-term domestic loans, the balance (150 million) being provided by the proceeds from equipment bonds.

Thus the distribution of the expenditures in the 1982 general budget is as follows, in millions of dirhams:

Operational expenditures	18,105
Investment expenditures	16,806
Debt service	4,450
Total	39,361

The principal operational appropriations benefit the ministerial departments listed below, in billions of dirhams: national education (4.7 billion), national defense (3.8), finance (3.4), interior (2.1), agriculture and agrarian reform (0.8), public health (0.8), etc.

In investment expenditures, the largest credits are allocated to finance (4.1 billion), equipment (3.5 billion), agriculture and agrarian reform (1.9 billion), national defense (1.9 billion), national education (1.3 billion), energy and mines (0.9 billion), housing and national land management (0.5 billion), health (0.3 billion), etc.

The 1982 appropriations bill includes different fiscal provisions concerning the professional profits tax (amortization rates for property, equipment and vehicles and the tax rates for taxable profits of private individuals (20 to 48 percent depending on the bracket) and companies (48 percent above 250,000 dirhams)), customs duties (codification of rulings made during 1981), domestic consumption taxes (mineral water, beer), the transaction tax (normal rate of 17 percent on imports and domestic sales), the tax on services (normal rate: 12 percent), the vehicle tax, etc.

The appropriations bill further authorizes borrowing from foreign pools and foreign or international organizations within the limit of the 9 billion dirham exchange value listed in the chapter of the general budget on loan resources.

The five attached budgets are balanced in revenues and expenditures, in millions of dirhams:

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<u>Investment</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operation</u>	
Port of Casablanca	95.5	37.5	58
Ports	256.4	104.4	152
Posts and Telecommunications	1,095.9	781.8	314.1
Radio and Television	167.8	103.9	63.9
Official Printing House	5.6	4.7	0.9
Total	1,621.2	1,032.3	588.9

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SUDAN

SCHOOLS REOPEN BUT SOCIAL SITUATION REMAINS TENSE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82 p 555

[Text] The University of Khartoum, which was closed at the beginning of January as a result of violent student demonstrations, will be partly reopened as of 20 February. On that date, classes will be resumed for students at the end of their courses of study; resumption of classes for other categories will be announced later. In addition, the senior classes in all schools in the province of Khartoum have just been reopened.

Though the reopening of the university may be considered as the sign of some detente, though the tension created at the beginning of the year by the removal of subsidies on certain staples has decreased to some extent in Khartoum, the negative mood and scepticism of the Sudanese are perceptible everywhere, notes the AFP correspondent. The public, which did not actively participate in the student demonstrations against the rise in price of sugar and petroleum, has in fact not stopped protesting on an individual basis.

Despite the government's announcement at the end of January of increased supplies to service stations in the capital, gasoline reserves are insufficient to meet demand for the 52,000 private cars, 10,000 taxis, and 5,000 "boxis" (tarpaulin-covered pick-up trucks turned into taxis for the masses), to say nothing of the trucks and buses, etcetera. The rise in gasoline prices, which started by causing a rise in freight carrier prices, is gradually having repercussions on all goods, which often come from far away.

The austerity measures are also affecting a large number of government and public sector employees, who are afraid of losing their jobs as a result of the reduction of state expenditures called for by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since the state is by far the main provider of jobs, thousands of rank-and file employees are apprehensively awaiting the government's directives.

The Sudanese are becoming more and more resigned to emigrating to Arab countries in the Gulf, Libya, and Egypt, and the rate of the skilled worker drain, which has already been considerable during the last few years, is constantly increasing.

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SUDAN

## DECLINE IN OILSEED EXPORTS ASCRIBED TO QUALITY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82 p 555

[Text] The Sudan, a traditional exporter of oilseed, has experienced a deterioration of the situation in this field the last few years. The Oil Seeds Company, a state company, which enjoyed a monopoly of oilseed exports until last May, saw its profits drop by 40 percent on 1980-1981. This development is certainly due in part to the fall of world market prices for these products, but in particular to the deterioration in quality of the seeds; the loss of quality is believed to be the consequence of a chronic lack of experimentation and improvement of species since independence.

The share of oilseed in Sudanese exports clearly declined in 1979, as the following table shows:

## Percentage of Oilseed in Sudanese Exports

<u>Type of Seed</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
Ground nut	21.1	12.1	12.7	21.9	6.7
Sesame	8.3	9.5	9.8	14.5	4.4
Castor	8	6	0.1	0.2	2
Total	32.2	31.2	22.6	36.7	11.3

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SUDAN

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IMPROVED CEMENT PRODUCTION--For the first time since 1970, the Nile Cement Company in Rabak has been working at full capacity for the past few months, which means an annual output of 100,000 tons. The improvement is due to the raising of cement prices by the government, and especially to the renovation program conducted by the Krupp Company of Germany since 1977. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 555] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 12149

PORT SUDAN GENERATORS--Installation of the three new generators needed to run the Port Sudan Spinning Factory has just been undertaken, and will continue until May. The factory will consume only 9,000 of the 15,000 kilowatts produced, and the rest will be used to reduce electricity shortages in the city. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 555] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 12149

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