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West Europe Report

(FOUO 27/82)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

ARMY CHIEF LACAZE DISCUSSES STRATEGIC WEAPONS, NEUTRON BOMB

PM151351 Paris L'EXPRESS in French 2 Apr 82 pp 37-42

[Interview with French Armed Forces Chief of Staff Jeannou Lacaze by Guillemette de Sairigne: "The Army Talks"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] L'EXPRESS: In 1978, in reply to a question put to you by L'EXPRESS following the parliamentary elections ("What if the left had come to power?") you replied: "The armed forces would not have moved but I know many officers who would have gone home." In May 1981 the left won and they did not....

General Lacaze: First, the military hierarchy did not move. Second, we were not forced into a fundamentally different line from the one previously followed. A politicization of the armed forces by a kind of American-style "spoils system" might also have been feared: that did not happen. That is extremely encouraging and entirely to the armed forces' credit since they have been able to demonstrate their apolitical nature. Finally, aside from a few exceptions, the postings and appointments which have been made so far are ones which we had been planning for months. If there had been an abrupt change, some officers would possibly have left, and I would probably have been the first. That was not the case.

The image of the armed forces is that of a rather conservative community because by nature they need to hold on to basic values and feel the ground firm under their feet. But to a very large extent the armed forces are the reflection of the nation. Over the past few years they have shown they could adapt to society's development and were not hostile to change.

L'EXPRESS: Some people claim that the armed forces are the only big state body which would allow itself to be radically reformed without saying anything....

General Lacaze: First, is it particularly desirable? And to what extent would we accept it? I do not know. Then what do you mean by "doing something?" That military would have the task of leading the different armed forces. I think it would be impossible to reproach them if they carried their ideas through and said to the government: "A different tool

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must have new missions." For instance that would mean abandoning the large volume of external technical aid, reducing the number of conventional units in the army, producing additional helicopter regiments, having a few extremely heavily equipped armored and mechanized divisions and professional or volunteer armed forces. If that were the case it would be possible to create a new concept. A concept still based on the nuclear deterrent but with a conventional system having much less manpower, which would probably be more costly on the whole and would reflect a national will for a different kind of defense.

L'EXPRESS: What would you find unacceptable?

General Lacaze: Any upheaval which would call into question the very foundations of discipline and anything which could reduce the armed forces' capability to fulfill its missions. For instance, if our budget remained below 4 percent of the gross domestic commercial product for long, the missions set and the means provided would be incompatible!

L'EXPRESS: Are you now the great coordinator of the French Armed Forces?

General Lacaze: The job of armed forces chief of staff was created around 20 years ago with the aim of unifying the armed forces following the Algerian war. While each branch of the armed forces has a chief of staff responsible for its administration and training, I am responsible for the use of the forces. It is my job to ensure coordination between the branches of the armed forces in planning short and medium-term spending. It is also my job to help define the requirements for the men and equipment of which I will have operational use in case of serious crisis.

L'EXPRESS: What happens in time of crisis?

General Lacaze: The armed forces chief of staff can become armed forces chief of general staff by government decree--the former job of "commander-in-chief" if you prefer. That is an initial spectacular gesture toward a possible aggressor: it means that the government regards the situation as serious and that large-scale operations may be started. In case of a limited crisis in peacetime, like the one in Kolwezi or Chad for instance, it is also the armed forces chief of staff who is responsible for the use of forces and who directs the units put into action.

L'EXPRESS: What about the use of strategic nuclear weapons?

General Lacaze: The head of state alone is responsible for using them. Those weapons--and this is the very principle of deterrence--make us capable, even after a strike which would have destroyed a large part of the country's vital forces, of responding strongly enough to cause the aggressor damage which in total represents the demographic and economic stake which we ourselves represent. Thus they strip its actions of any logic.

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But, before reaching that point, there can be several stages. For instance a conventional response which, if it proved powerless to halt the enemy offensive alone, could be combined with nuclear means. That would be the final warning, showing our determination to go on to the end if necessary. But the use of those nuclear weapons, even tactical nuclear weapons, is subject to the president's agreement. It is I who endorses the check but it is he who signs it.... Moreover the strategic nuclear "button" is only the last resort. In that connection I would like to recall that our objective is not to have an arsenal capable of destroying the world several times over as the two superpowers have. It is necessary and sufficient for us to be able to inflict on an adversary, in the very heart of his territory, loss of life and material damage disproportionate to the benefit he could derive from his offensive action against us. Thus we are not seeking parity but only the level of sufficiency which we regard as necessary.

L'EXPRESS: Would the enhanced radiation bomb, known as the neutron bomb, upset that plan?

General Lacaze: No, it too is merely a defensive weapon. It simply gives the victim the opportunity, not of showing additional determination, but of envisaging the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conditions less unfavorable to the inhabitants who are likely to find themselves on the battlefield. This is because it is very accurate and makes it possible to limit the threat more to troops by considerably reducing the blast and heat effects.

L'EXPRESS: So tactical nuclear weapons delay the use of strategic arms....

General Lacaze: No, because they still remain closely linked with strategic armaments. It is important to understand clearly that, in the French concept, tactical and strategic nuclear weapons differ only in their objectives: tactical weapons are aimed at forces and strategic weapons are aimed at cities. But both are based on the same deterrent principle; both imply the same extraordinary change of level from conventional weapons.

L'EXPRESS: Is France capable of manufacturing the neutron bomb?

General Lacaze: From the technological viewpoint we are fully capable of manufacturing that weapon. It can even be done in the eighties if the decision is taken.

L'EXPRESS: Is a soldier bound to favor such a weapon which limits civilian losses?

General Lacaze: Yes, in a country like ours which is not showing any aggressive intention. But the choice is not only military--it is primarily political.

L'EXPRESS: In case of a limited crisis, what is the overseas intervention forces' mission?

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General Lacaze: Those forces, which have been renamed "rapid assistance elements," can intervene in several cases. 1. to protect the overseas departments and territories and French people living abroad whose property or persons are threatened; 2. to honor a particular agreement which binds us to a number of countries, particularly on the African continent; 3. to protect our channels of communication, which are vital for transporting the goods essential to our economy, I am thinking, for instance of oil; 4. finally, some countries, which are not bound to us by explicit agreements but with which France traditionally has friendly relations, may turn to us for assistance and advice.

L'EXPRESS: Does France have adequate means of carrying out such operations?

General Lacaze: Yes, as regards personnel. Possibly not fully adequate as regards equipment, and that forces us to limit our ambitions. Last November, during the bright star maneuvers in Egypt and Sudan, the Americans demonstrated that they could drop a battalion of paratroopers 7,000 or 8,000 km from their bases with all its "support." We cannot do that. But that is a question of economic choices. In France, for the time being, there are no large military transport aircraft. Even in the United States the C-141 is already an old-fashioned airplane. But perhaps a new plane will be available on the Western market between now and 1985.

In any case three questions must be answered: exactly what type of machine do we want? Where can we find it? Supposing the Europeans or Americans design such a machine, will we be able to buy it? Meanwhile we are making do by increasing the range and number of our transatlantic aircraft.

L'EXPRESS: When President Reagan envisages the battlefield in Europe, how do you react?

General Lacaze: I am not particularly surprised. That is one of the hypotheses which we must take into account. The Soviets and Americans will do all they can to preserve their territory from strategic weapons. That is only human. There is no doubt that this possible battle in the plains and mountains of northeast Europe would be the most dangerous hypothesis for us. Politicians and the military are perfectly aware of that situation, particularly in France, and, in that respect, I note that the Maurras-style tone [reference to Charles Maurras, a staunch supporter of the Vichy government who was sentenced to life imprisonment for treason after World War II] adopted by some commentators on the subject of our country possibly capitulating without fighting shows either their extreme insincerity or their profound misunderstanding both of the French concept and of the determination of those responsible for implementing it.

That leaves another possibility: that the conflict might break out not abruptly and directly between the two superpowers but outside Europe, using a proxy. For instance in the Middle East, in Africa (and in that case we would probably be directly involved) or in Southeast Asia. I think that that is the most probable hypothesis. That is why I think it essential for

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all our rapid assistance forces to be constantly kept at optimum level, which, of course, is not the maximum level. Indeed, if we could not help to stop that foreign conflict--localized one to begin with--there could be a process of escalation which it would be difficult to control.

[Lacaze continues] What I say there refers to the eighties. But if there were to be nuclear proliferation later and if other, less important, countries succeed in manufacturing 3, 4 or 10 bombs, then a new danger would emerge. Indeed those countries, which would not necessarily follow our reasoning, could contemplate using those weapons without the enormous precautions with which we surround them. And that would be very serious because either the escalation would become uncontrollable and would lead to the threshold of generalized nuclear exchange or the authority of the superpowers would succeed in controlling the escalation and nuclear weapons would have lost some of their deterrent value. That is one of the major risks in the next 10 or 15 years: that possible "banalization" of nuclear weapons.

L'EXPRESS: Do you think that the Polish crisis increases the present risk of conflict?

General Lacaze: I do not think so. It merely confirmed that the Soviet bloc was still as we conceive it: the seat of a power based on a very strong state system, a monolithic religion, and anxious to fight to the end against any schism which would be likely to undermine its dogma.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

COALITION WITH FRAGA NOT IMPOSSIBLE, CABANILLAS SAYS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Feb 82 pp 18-21

[Interview with Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Pio Cabanillas by Antxon Sarasqueta, date and place not given]

[Text] Pio Cabanillas, in addition to being minister of justice, is the concealed hand behind almost all that is inexplicable in national political life. Pacts, maneuvers, operations. This is the enduring legend in political circles and among observers. These are "intimate" issues which he himself defines as "household matters."

CAMBIO 16: It is said that you, who have been everywhere, control the Foundation for Progress and Democracy.

Pio Cabanillas: No, no. It is a fact that when one has been in politics for a long time, it seems that one has many men in place, although basically the fact is that one knows many men.

Cabanillas says that he does not aspire to head the cabinet, because "I sincerely do not believe I have the qualifications to be prime minister. In this matter I want no mistakes made," he concluded. Perhaps because he is so close to the palace post now held by Calvo Sotelo. "Well, I am a good friend of the prime minister, but this friendship exerts no decisive influence on the ability to organize problems."

He denies almost everything and enjoys genial digs. For example, when asked if the UCD [Democratic Center Union] group is more or less valuable now than when he founded it, he responded with a Galician anecdote. "A pair of lovers are sitting on a bench and a very well-dressed young woman passes by. They both watch her closely. Then the girl asks her sweetheart: 'Would you love me more if I were rich?' And he answers: 'There would be no reason to love you less.'"

But the political personality of Cabanillas, who has a passion for the political right wing and, by his own admission, an obsession to get close to things, subjects and persons, has another dimension, which in the course of an interview of more than 2 hours, leads a journalist along the paths of current political development and the historical importance of events and personalities. For example, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.

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CAMBIO 16: Do you believe that Calvo Sotelo is going to be prime minister in the cabinet and the UCD for a long time?

Pio Cabanillas: I will tell you something which seems contradictory. Do not forget the type of person who is prepared to depart, because ordinarily it is these people who remain. I believe that there is in the personality of Calvo Sotelo a tranquility of being and a certain background of seriousness as to how one should be. I also think that the morning after the day it is concluded that he will stay, he will depart, but I am also certain that he will not do so in an arrogant way. There is a very valuable framework of human and personal balance in his political personality.

CAMBIO 16: And do you believe that this image will serve the UCD well when it comes to the elections, being in the final analysis drastically different from the image which prevailed in past elections?

Pio Cabanillas: What has changed is the mechanisms for getting close to the voters, where the leader we had in Adolfo Suarez and the personality of Calvo Sotelo are concerned. The political "attractive force," in terms of a sincere and cordial humanity, was something which Adolfo Suarez very obviously had. Like many other individuals, I have been a witness to what I called his capacity to enchant. One emerged from an interview with Adolfo Suarez convinced of two major qualities--when I see him in the morning, I remember this, and I sincerely believe it is still true.

CAMBIO 16: Can you name these qualities?

Pio Cabanillas: They are a desire to please and an attractively normal way of presenting himself. Adolfo could maneuver very skillfully in politics because he bore within him a total rejection of any other type of attitude, interest or curiosity other than political. He won votes and did so in brief specific actions--speeches on television, trips, etc.

CAMBIO 16: What about Calvo Sotelo?

Pio Cabanillas: The breakdown of Calvo Sotelo's political personality is rather different. First of all, there is a jarring note. In Calvo Sotelo the predominant note is correctness, but not the intention to charm. He gives his equals a hearing and explains his beliefs to them, but not solely to persuade them. Naturally, he also attempts persuasion like any other politician, but this is not his a priori intention as was the case with Suarez. Secondly, his approach to subjects is less balanced by intuition or instinct. Calvo Sotelo usually has methodical research on the subject behind him. For example (here Cabanillas laughed ironically), there is no weightier problem when it comes to the prime minister than drafting notes, because he is a man much given to grammatical requirements, and therefore he is a great corrector of documents.

CAMBIO 16: What about Calvo Sotelo's image?

Pio Cabanillas: I think we must overcome a certain primitive compulsion to attribute a certain kind of qualities to the political leader administering the

life of a country at a historic moment. There is the assurance resulting from high-level leadership, the great charisma, the exceptional character. There is no longer any need for men of genius who can save the country every morning with mysterious or primitive formulae. Democratic and liberal life approaches rather close to the ordinary political knowledge of the average man. I think that mature men, thoroughly familiar with Spanish life and properly oriented, quite suffice and always do well.

CAMBIO 16: During recent months it has been said that Suarez might leave the UCD. Have you assessed the harm this might do the party?

Pio Cabanillas: Naturally, it would be a serious loss. Adolfo Suarez has rendered great service to the UCD. I am a witness and I can assure you that Suarez achieved the central post after a rather well thought out and responsible analysis. Initially there was doubt, but after than no one had either similar or comparable personal achievements when it came to establishing the framework, achieving ideological goals and sacrifice for the survival of the party. A general analysis of the content of his political activity is a different problem.

During the interview and throughout the discussion, the elections seemed an inevitable point of reference. "The political reality," Cabanillas said, "made it very difficult for last year to be other than a year colored by the election. This is not an abnormal phenomenon, but rather I would say that I see normalcy therein."

In his ministerial office in old Madrid, near the noisy Gran Via, there was silence for long moments. Cabanillas meditated, eyes downcast as if in a trance, sketching squares and symmetrical lines on the back of a letter with his pen. "The fact is I assign great importance to 1982. It is one of those years marked by history, in which something new begins. The elections in 1983 will be highly indicative. For the first time, you cannot claim to be experimenting. And obviously, one thing is indeed very important in Spain. If there are justifications it will no longer be defensive assertions, but a confession of ineptness."

CAMBIO 16: And how do you think our government should be affected until then? Do you support a parliamentary or electoral alliance or coalition with other parties, with Fraga?

Pio Cabanillas: There is a whole series of laws to be completed which are of total interest--they are laws for all. I am speaking of the laws on which ideological content exerts an influence to justify their existence as laws, not because I believe that ideological content should prevail in each one of them. It is state laws--like the LOAPA, the most important since it winds up a major operation regulating the autonomous bodies--which should be the focus of the greatest volume of this legislature's work.

CAMBIO 16: Do you then exclude an alliance with Fraga?

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Pio Cabanillas: When we know what the electoral results are, we will see. I believe that in each electoral confrontation there is a renewal in the political sense, either because of a change of goals, of focus or of circumstances. If the electoral results tomorrow lead to the formation of coalitions or whatever it may be (he emphasized these words), naturally one must deal with the new reality. But it should not be forgotten that this is a logical need justified by the electoral results.

CAMBIO 16: But you do exclude such a coalition a priori, do you not?

Pio Cabanillas: No, no, a priori, no. As it says in the romantic poem "Not all is thought of thee til then."

CAMBIO 16: I am speaking in terms of strategy.

Pio Cabanillas: Strategy has only one principle, to the effect that if you think you can reach understanding, you begin cautiously to reduce emphasis on the differences.

CAMBIO 16: But how can it be, for example, that the CEOE employers' group can decide to support Fraga against a party which is in power and which represents interests close to yours?

Pio Cabanillas: The CEOE is a new institution. In political activity, it is a consistent phenomenon for business associations to have to try to defend their interests in the normal struggle in any political process, and in this connection, to support the political groups consistent with the content of these interests. What they must analyze is whether in order to do so, they need political leaders produced from among themselves, or whether it suffices to support individuals already to be found in politics. One of the great problems will have to do with whether political leaders emerge from within the CEOE, something which for the time being we will have to wait to see. It may be more or less advisable for the CEOE to support the political content characteristic of a party of the right wing and another of the center, but this does not seem to me abnormal. What would be inconsistent is to support choices which if jointly supported would produce a negative effect. And this is a subject for the CEOE and for concrete analysis with each electoral event.

CAMBIO 16: Probably this is one reason the socialists want to govern in coalition with the UCD after the elections, is it not?

Pio Cabanillas: Naturally I believe that it would be a very good thing for the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] to arrange a government alliance with the UCD. My concern is as to whether this would be good for the UCD.

CAMBIO 16: You were one of the main sponsors at the time of the establishment of the UCD. In what way has the situation of your party changed since then?

Pio Cabanillas: As a party governing during one of the most uncertain stages, characterized by the need to build up the institution simultaneously, the UCD

has been affected by the inevitable wear and tear of governing, above all if one undertakes the basic analysis of the difference between what it would be desirable to achieve, what has been achieved, and the time frame within which both considerations operate. As the sum total of the interests of the UCD members who particularly want to continue in political life, our party has been subject to the loss of those who do not see as possible or deem likely their political survival within the confines of the UCD.

CAMBIO 16: In your view, which then has been more important, the departure of three deputies to join the right wing or the resignation of Fernandez Ordonez and his deputies to join the left?

Pio Cabanillas: Fernandez Ordonez and the deputies who went with him had always had what we might call "plans to depart." I think that they always achieved what they wanted by making their possible stay conditional. Sometimes this was a pleasant horse trade, and in other cases, it appeared to be or was justified on the basis of ideological dogmatism. The departure of other deputies to join the right wing was an act by men who had always indicated this type of inclination, such that it was consistent.

CAMBIO 16: And what will the government and your party do in the coming months to rebuild all that has been lost as well as the credibility and confidence which may have declined following all of these vicissitude intentions?

Pio Cabanillas: I believe that we are doing this in the course of governing. We are facing up to three or four themes which are truly hard and difficult. The level of demand is strictly speaking the political thermometer. Those who demand everything and are doing so here and now are obviously revealing their own lack of maturity.

CAMBIO 16: They are continuing to do so now?

Pio Cabanillas: Yes, due to the natural tendency of certain groups to dissent by way of proof that they exist. It is only when they do not agree that it is clearly obvious that they have a position. Basically what is forgotten is that one of the great current needs is to "settle" sufficiently on the main guidelines in a period which will require another legislative terms, for the good of Spanish democracy.

CAMBIO 16: How do you explain and assess the fact, for example, that a government which seems to have won one round (Gibraltar, the antiterrorist struggle) could within 24 hours come to the point of dissolving the chambers because three deputies in its group have gone over to another?

Pio Cabanillas: This is the most important problem at the present time: assessment of political events. There are three negative constants in such an assessment. First, a high dose of skepticism. The second has to do with the fact that the parties have not as yet found the mechanism for justifying their own actions, and all of the political speeches are aggressive toward their opponents. We have just had an obvious demonstration of this in the speech by a veteran politician (Santiago Carrillo) who, while having a problem in his own party, spent all his time attacking the others.

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CAMBIO 16: What is the third constant to which you referred?

Pio Cabanillas: Political error. Clarifying formulae are needed but we continually have evidences that what we view as problems are not that. For example, the analysis in political law on the pros and cons of nationalization, and whether a policy of self-management will soon be achieved. Two terms which are absolutely clear and are keys to the content of political doctrine are deliberately camouflaged, and there is even more contradiction in deed and gesture than in content in order to relieve tension, while on the other hand tremendous importance is given to the slightest political event, above all if it has to do with personal issues.

CAMBIO 16: Returning to the UCD, how will your party accomodate this liberal resurgence it seems to be experiencing?

Pio Cabanillas: The most important thing about the liberalism within the UCD is its identification with the concept of democracy. Support of pluralism as a field of political action--this is the liberalism of the UCD! Now if the intention is to get into the UCD with a liberal label, there is no problem, but understand us clearly, this does not mean liberalizing the UCD other than in the sense of being free. In other words, it is not that you make of it a liberal party fundamentally.

CAMBIO 16: Probably this is indeed the intention of some liberals.

Pio Cabanillas: But I do not believe that this means that the liberals alone will rule in the UCD. And that is the issue.

CAMBIO 16: What is the importance of the Christian Democrats as a party?

Pio Cabanillas: No one can place a claim on the gospel or utilize it exclusively in his own favor. Politics is a particularly secular phenomenon. Therefore, one cannot take the religious concept and embed it in the ideological content of a party: this is ipso facto fraudulent. Now then, no one can deny the weight of religious faith in Spanish society: to know its value is the intelligent responsibility of a politician.

CAMBIO 16: How might the Pope's October visit influence the elections?

Pio Cabanillas: The people are sensitive to this event and they relate results with attitudes. The visit of the Pope in October will be a very important event in Spain. For we will see very clearly how firmly anchored the essence of Catholicism is in Spanish life.

From the anecdote to the political situation, Galicia came to the fore repeatedly in the interview with Cabanillas, and he went so far as to say that this subject "merits a separate interview." But the fact is that certain sectors have placed the blame for the shrinkage of the UCD in Galicia on the politician from Orense.

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"I have always thought and done everything possible" he responded, "to find a great representative of the UCD in Galicia. Things did not work out that way. Now the two most important groups in the Galician parliament (the UCD and the AP [Popular Alliance]) have a duty to reach agreement so that Galician interests will benefit."

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

CARRILLO'S DEMISE EXPECTED TO AGGRAVATE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Feb 82 pp 28-32

[Article by Jose Manuel Arija, based on interviews conducted by Rafael Cid (Madrid), Ander Landaburu (Basque Region), Santiago S. Traver (Seville), Mario G. Bango (Asturias), Albert Arbos (Catalonia) and Juan de Dios Mellado (Malaga)]

[Text] The Spanish Communist Party is currently going through one of the most difficult periods in its history, as described by PCE members themselves. They avoid using the word "crisis," but it is certain that they are deeply caught up in one.

Unlike other occasions, the crisis is not taking place within party walls. Something different happened when the debate went public, with loud voices raised and with all the ensuing consequences. This time the crisis is so serious that the PCE's very future is at stake, its isolation or participation in society. But above all, this is a crisis of identity: How must the PCE function in a democracy? What is its role in the left, with a dominant socialist party?

A drop in membership, the loss of intellectuals, the closing of offices which have been empty for some time, disillusioned militants, confusion among cadres, a trade union breakdown, the decline of voter support, expulsions and the danger of a schism characterize the serious overall situation of the communists. And what is more alarming: For the time being, there is no note of optimism concerning their immediate future; on the contrary, it looks even darker.

The ship of Santiago Carrillo, the PCE general secretary, is being pulled to starboard by pro-Soviets and to port by the Euroreformers while the communist leadership tries to set a course that will lead them out of the storm.

The joy over the legalization of the Communist Party in 1977 was short-lived. Opposition leaders were released from jail, exiles returned from abroad and member intellectuals and professionals publicly revealed their affiliation. But the warm reunion also contained the seed of their differences. As Jaime Sartorius, a 46-year-old lawyer who was expelled from the Central Committee, said: "We reformers are communists who have been shaped by fighting for democracy." And these young professionals, who combined democracy and communism in their anti-Franco struggle and enjoyed great independence in making decisions, were soon directly controlled by former legendary exiles, who dominate the party apparatus and make decisions, which is something they know how to do very well, since the "French leadership" is, above all, made up of trained and experienced apparatchiks.

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The PCE leadership is starting to make party policy from on high and to pass out orders below. The legendary leaders are starting to fall from their pedestal, not so much because of implementing incorrect political decisions as for not bothering to give party members themselves any explanation; not because of their externally oriented democracy and Eurocommunist policy, but for internally maintaining an old-style party concept.

At least this is what the reformers think. According to the pro-Soviets, there have been both external and internal mistakes, in the case of both domestic and foreign policy. The policy of alliances, put into practice by Santiago Carrillo from the final years of Francoism up to the present time, is criticized as "middle-class" and "turncoat" by some and by others as "inadequate" because of its lack of internal democracy.

The results of the June 1977 general elections meant something more than just a cold shower for the communists. Many members and especially cadres felt betrayed by the voters: How can it be--they thought and said--that we, who struggled as the opposition, were jailed and have always fought, received only one-third as many votes as the socialists, who are all a bunch of upstarts?

The blow at the polls was hard to take. One explanation was that the low percentage of votes was due to the fear of communism generated by Francoism. To overcome that fear--they said--the policy of alliances must be intensified and citizens must become accustomed to seeing communists together with parties to their right. But the 1979 elections produced the same results. The communists received a maximum of 10 percent of the votes. The reformers concluded that only a more internally open party could break through that percentage barrier. The pro-Soviets think the opposite: only a pure, hardline party will win over the masses.

The most recent congress of Catalonian communist members of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia] and the 10th PCE Congress in June further increased the distance between Carrillists, reformers and pro-Soviets. The leadership is proving to be unable to unify the party. The decision of the Madrid communist council members, who refused to resign from their posts as a penalty for having supported the Basque Lerchundi in his process of unity with the Basque working-class left, has given an added dimension to the PCE crisis.

Extension of Crisis

The proportions of the new disagreement have given the conflict its own special dynamics, due to the intransigence of the opposing sides. The reformer faction, which includes the chastised council members, and the Carrillists are playing for keeps and in the end they will both lose. Expulsions and an extension of the problem are the immediate result.

The more intense the crisis grows, the more radical positions become. Differences of political views are being replaced by motives of "individual dignity" and "personal insults." Accusations, insults and contempt characterize the present level of the debates.

The latest opinion polls on voter intentions also reveal that the PCE's internal crisis has spread from members to the voters. In Andalucia, on the eve of the

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elections for the Autonomous Parliament, the communist loss could be very great, according to the latest surveys. In Catalonia, another poll shows that the PSUC would lose 7 percentage points in Barcelona and the province (from 21 to 14 percent) and it is not hard to predict that communist vote prospects will decline in Madrid following the scandal over the expelled council members, both in the capital and in its outlying suburbs of the industrial belt.

A quick look over the map of communism shows that no area with a significant establishment has escaped the crisis.

On a cold afternoon in March 1978, dozens of Asturian members deserted the PCE on the first day of the Third Regional Conference, having criticized the party's organizational methods and operation some days before. Since then they have been subject to persecution which they describe as Stalinistic, "until we were forced to leave."

The Asturian communists were the pioneers of the present crisis. "The proceedings ended, however, showing that we were right, because our problem," one of the dissidents said, "was a problem of all communist organizations in the country and sooner or later they will all end up the way things are now, in total disarray. We simply preceded some events that were easy to foresee."

The year of 1981 was an ill-fated period for the communists. From the beginning--with the Fifth PSUC Congress in January, which chucked Eurocommunism out the window--to the end, with the expulsions of the council members, it was a series of departures and expulsions, reaching to the Central Committee itself.

In Catalonia, the pro-Soviet faction, with a strong influence on Workers Commissions, has turned official party policy upside down. Referring to the pro-Soviets, Francesc Frutos, the general secretary, said: "This is an initiative based on lies, slander and demagoguery."

The Catalanian communists will hold their Sixth Congress in March and the schism could arise there. Frutos thinks that the pro-Soviets' strategy consists of organizing to convince the Sixth Congress to adopt its positions and, if it does not do so, to mount another similar initiative. "We discovered the conspiracy in time," Frutos concluded.

In Catalonia, the result thus far is the expulsion of 12 leaders, including Pere Ardiaca, who until recently was party chairman, and 17 others penalized, not to mention an ongoing serious internal split within the PSUC over political fragmentation and incompetence.

Leopoldo Espuny, a 41-year-old lawyer who is one of the principal theorists of the Catalanian pro-Soviet faction, said: "We are going to try to establish a democratic congress in practice, but if our requests are ignored, we will hold our own assembly, which will take place right after the official congress."

The split within Catalanian communism has become more and more pronounced within the last 2 months. "It is up to the members to decide whether to establish a new party and the time will be that possible constituent congress," Espuny affirmed.

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The pro-Soviets have little influence in the rest of the country, but carry considerable weight in Catalonia. What is the reason for this presence of hardline communism in the most developed region with the most moderate electorate? Several reasons are given in the corridors of the Central Committee's headquarters in Madrid. They first cite the "democratitis" of the PSUC's previous leadership, which, for lack of authority, permitted the expansion and maneuvering of the "orthodoxy." The second reason given is the Soviet Union's clandestine activities and third, as a result of the irritation over unemployment, the status of immigrants and election results.

The fact that a man such as 71-year-old Pere Ardiaca, the founder of the PSUC and who has great prestige among communists, is leading the rebellion against Carrillo has helped to give the Catalonian pro-Soviets an image of cohesion.

These rebels have now formed a--"parallel," the leadership criticizes--coordinating committee, are publishing a weekly bulletin in which they explain their political positions and have launched a campaign to collect signatures and attract members. They are also backed by about 1,000 Workers Commissions cadres.

According to Pere Ardiaca, "Our identity as communists is at stake. From a general standpoint, because agreeing to the leadership's demands means a return to social democracy; from an internationalist standpoint, because it means isolating ourselves from all communist parties and finally, from the standpoint of Spanish and Catalonian politics, because it means actually giving in to the right. We have to become communists again; only in that way will we be able to recover lost ground."

New Communist Parties

Another expelled pro-Soviet, Francisco Garcia Salve, Father Paco, is also currently very active in trying to establish a "true" Marxist-Leninist communist party. He has just published a book, "Por que somos comunistas" [Why We Are Communists], in which he not only calls for the creation of a new party but also provides advice on how to start building such a party.

"Let us build a new communist party," Garcia Salve writes. "We must get on with it." And with the most fiery fervor and euphoria, he repeats: "Filled with that new inspiration, with that strength which propels us along the path awaiting us: the unity of all communists in creating the new Spanish Communist Party." And the book concludes: "This green tree, tender and looking toward the sea, is planted here."

But from this side, even looking toward the sea, unity does not appear easy. An old leader, Enrique Lister, the founder of the Fifth Regiment in the civil war, a general in the Soviet Army and in other Eastern countries and the general secretary of another pro-Soviet group, scowls and stresses loudly that there should be no other communist parties.

Breaking with the PCE general secretary is not a sufficient guarantee. The first thought of all those who break with the party is to create their own party." And Lister goes on to say that the practical thing for his organization to do is to "maintain relations for specific actions with all those who share our views," because "among the anti-Carrillists there are all kinds, even people like the Euro-communists, who have little liking for Santiago Carrillo's anticommunist and anti-socialism."

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If the pro-Soviets seem determined to establish a new party, with the aim of creating a situation such as that in Greece--where there are two parties, an orthodox majority party and another small, Eurocommunist party--the reformers are taking another approach.

The plan which the Euroreformers have prepared also seems confused. Personal pride, political differences and views on organization have managed to permeate the ranks of Eurocommunist supporters, dashing any possibility of homogeneity or understanding.

Carrillists and reformers acknowledge that they have made monumental mistakes and that they were wrong not to estimate the consequences of their actions. Now the situation is irreversible and each side is devoting its time and energy to justifying its own positions and belittling opposite views as loudly as possible.

From the time the problem developed up to the present time, it is not clear why the reformers, who agree with Carrillo's foreign policy and with the main features of domestic policy strategy, have broken almost completely with the party over issues of internal operation.

"We reformers," Jaime Sartorius admits, "have also made gross errors which have led to a weakening of the party on both sides, to a loss of its credibility and possibly to an election defeat as well. And more seriously, to its social isolation. But still most at fault is the leadership, which has the means and the power to try to resolve this situation."

Another group of reformers is much more critical. Amparo Rubiales, vice chairman of the Seville delegation, states: "I believe that there is no way out and that there will only be a long-term solution." Julio Anguita, the mayor of Cordoba, confirms: "A solution will be more and more difficult."

This is the opinion of most municipal representatives, among whom the reformers have their greatest strength. But they do not want to leave the PCE. They hope to be expelled, which they consider to be more and more inevitable. Their intention is not to form another party, but rather "collectives," "platforms" or "theoretical revisions."

There are very few reformers who would be bold enough to sever the umbilical cord on their own or to join another political party, as Luis Larroque, vice chairman of the Madrid delegation, has done, having requested entry into the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. "I know that my position is contrary to that of other comrade reformers, who are thinking," Larroque answers, "about the possibility of a middle path between socialism and communism. I do not believe that; there is no such electoral space." Most reformers have adopted a wait-and-see stance until one of two miracles happens: until Carrillo modifies his position or until the PSOE changes.

But the PCE leadership, led by its general secretary, Santiago Carrillo, seems more willing to do without 1,000 or 2,000 members than to allow a faction which is bothersome, because of its criticism, to remain in the party, even though it is a group of the best prepared people.

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The vice general secretary of the communists, Nicolas Sartorius, will be in charge of stopping the spread of the pro-Soviet and reformer hemorrhage that is draining the PCE. "A debate must be opened with the critical factions in order to integrate them," Sartorius says, proposing the channels of party by-laws as a framework for discussion.

The start of reconciliation will prove difficult, because expulsions are continuing at the same rate as the signs of intransigence. In Andalucia, for example, reformers complain of being ignored when the tickets for the Andalucian Parliament were prepared, when they are precisely the ones who enjoy the best public reputation.

An election defeat of the communists in Andalucia, within just a few months of the general elections, could result in profound changes in the PCE, changes which would undoubtedly affect Santiago Carrillo himself. Many fear this and are starting to plan for the post-Carrillo period, especially since the general secretary has become the main target of both pro-Soviets and Euroreformers, although for different reasons and opposite aims.

A Difficult Future

Despite his harsh criticism of the Soviet Union, Carrillo continues to be the bridge between Soviet sympathizers and those critical of "Soviet imperialism." And not only among rank-and-file members, but even among the Central and Executive Committees.

Leaders such as Romero Marin and Ignacio Gallego, whom reformers describe as pro-Soviets and even Stalinists, would be hard pressed to work together with Eurocommunists in defining their party's political policy in the absence of a Santiago Carrillo.

The question of what happens after Carrillo today represents a disturbing unknown for the communists, especially since the PCE is running the risk, because of its internal problems, of withdrawing into a shell and acting according to a defensive policy of fear concerning national issues.

This latter question has now caught the attention of the leadership. During the Catalanian communists' Treball period, Nicolas Sartorius said: "The situation requires that the leadership take the initiative, by putting the party in contact with the masses, putting the leadership itself in close contact with party members, in order to avoid the defensive temptations to which the party might yield and as the only way of increasing our moral and political authority."

The Communist Party knows that it is risking the party's future with the present crisis and its future views are thus aimed at overcoming "traditional communism." This requires two things: urging and convincing the electorate that the PSOE is a social-democratic party and devoting itself to what party members call "occupying spaces in society."

With only slight differences between socialist and communist programs, the PCE will only be able to justify its existence by trying to displace the PSOE toward the right, in order to thus occupy the place of socialism. Its second strategy, infiltrating society, would provide it with a new image, which would at least render credible its intention to govern, an image which even a party with few voters, such as Popular Alliance, has today.

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Santiago Carrillo's challenge is to overcome the problems of advancing this dual strategy and preventing a loss of votes in the upcoming elections. His internal obstacle lies in the difficulty of doing so with a party in crisis and being the general secretary who has raised the most opposition among the members. Neither Jose Ballejos nor Jose Diaz nor Dolores Ibarruri, his predecessors as head of the PCE, created so much hatred or opposition among party members.

It may be that such ill will is a tribute to Carrillo for his attempts to modernize the party, to accept democracy, to remove his organization from the Soviet orbit and to put coexistence above the class struggle. The result has been that the strongest contradictions did not occur between the PCE and society, but within the communist family itself.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

GROUND-AIR MISSILES, WEATHER CONDITIONS CHALLENGE LIGHT ARMY PLANE

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 32-35

[Article by Col Bertrand de Lacroix de Vaubois (a graduate of Saint-Cyr [class of 1953], Col Bertrand de Lacroix de Vaubois served in the armored branch and the cavalry. Having earned the BEMS [Certificate of Higher Military Studies], he was assigned to the general staff of the First Army, and subsequently created the 6th RHC [Helicopter Combat Regiment] at Compiègne. Assigned to the ALAT [Light Army Plane] command in 1978, he is presently the assistant senior officer to the ALAT commanding general. He has more than 3,000 hours of flying time.): "The Enemies of the ALAT"]

[Text] Combat helicopters are faced with a multitude of threats. The permanent ones, connected with weather and urban development, can be attenuated by appropriate training. The others arise in combat, and these are more difficult to parry.

The particular qualities of helicopters--mobility, maneuverability, transport and reach capacity--give the Army's light-aviation formations tactical possibilities that are of great advantage vis-a-vis the requirements of ground combat. However, these possibilities are attenuated by passive or active threats that limit their regular availability on the battlefield and sometimes make them vulnerable.






The first threats have to do with certain meteorological phenomena or the overflying of built-up areas; unfortunately, these threats are ongoing and exist in peacetime too. The second are the doing of the enemy, with his antiaircraft weapons or his own helicopters equipped with intensive-fire weaponry based on the most advanced technology.

Let us attempt to identify them and to describe the parries that can decrease our helicopters' vulnerability.

The Passive Threats

There is a very widespread notion that the ALAT flies only in good weather. This is not at all true--first of all, because the borderline between good and bad weather is often difficult to define in the European theater, and secondly because the safety of the personnel makes it necessary to impose in peacetime measures that are far more severe than in combat.

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| (1) Niveaux de nuit | (2) Définition de la nuit | (3) % par an | (4) ECLAIREMENT | | Types de vols possibles (7) |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|--|--|
| | | | Mesuré en (5) millilux | Lune + (6) nuages | |
| 1 | Très claire (8) | 14 | |  | Vols TBA sans aide (1) dans (14) région à relief peu accidenté. Vols TBA ou tactiques avec (15) Mican (2) dans région reconnue. |
| 2 | Claire (9) | 24 | 40 |  | (16) Vols TBA ou tactiques avec Mican dans région reconnue. |
| 3 | Intermédiaire (10) | 7 | 10 |  | Vols TBA ou tactiques avec Mican dans région reconnue. (16) |
| 4 | Sombre (11) | 27,5 | 2 |  | Vols à altitude de sécurité. (17) |
| 5 | Très sombre (12) | 27,5 | 0,7 |  | Vols à altitude de sécurité. (17) |

(1) This type of Very-Low-Altitude flight is presently done only by the crews of the ALAT Night Experimentation Center and by experimental flights.

(2) MICAN: microtube binoculars.

Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1. Night levels | 12. Very dark |
| 2. Definition of night | 13. or |
| 3. % per year | 14. VLA [Very Low Altitude] flight unaided |
| 4. Amount of light | (1) in regions whose relief has little |
| 5. Measured in millilux | irregularity |
| 6. Moon + clouds | 15. VLA or tactical flights with MICAN (2) |
| 7. Types of flight possible | in known region |
| 8. Very bright | 16. VLA or tactical flights with MICAN in |
| 9. Bright | known region |
| 10. Intermediate | 17. Flights at safety altitude |
| 11. Dark | |

Reduction of visibility (night, clouds or fog), snow and frost conditions, electric-power lines--these are the dangers with which the ALAT crews are continually confronted.

Even though reduced-visibility conditions sometimes offer the advantage of masking movements and therefore of achieving surprise more surely, helicopters,

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not equipped with special instruments, need a minimum of space for moving about. Study of the meteorological statistics enables one to form a more exact idea of the constraints in this domain: they show that in Europe, visibility is greater than 1.8 km and the ceiling is higher than 100 m an average of 95 days out of 100.

If the standards for movement of ALAT helicopters are considered--500 to 800 meters of horizontal visibility, depending on whether a single machine or a formation is involved, and flight at altitude of more than 100 m--one notes that these constraints are not very limiting. But if one wants to be able to use one's weaponry effectively, one has to be able to see the target correctly, especially if the practical range of the munition is capable of reaching 4,000 m, as with the Hot. Night complicates the use of the machines, inasmuch as they generally fly "by sight."

In recent years, the ALAT has made a spectacular leap forward in the use of its nighttime resources: in 1974, 3,500 hours were flown, on bright nights and at above-ground altitudes on the order of 300 meters, and in 1981, 12,000 hours were flown in dark nights and at variable altitudes, sometimes no more than 50 meters.

This type of flying, now well-mastered, considerably increases the effectiveness of the ALAT, since it permits RHC movements of 150 to 200 kilometers, dawn actions after nighttime positioning, helicopter transport to known zones beaconsed by personnel of the recipient units, or participation in night crossings, etc (see table).

In addition to these possibilities in flying by sight or with use of MICAN binoculars, there are those offered by the practice of instrument flight, which permits movement in clouds or in fog, with the sole restriction of avoiding storm clouds (cumulonimbus), whose turbulence risks damaging the instruments.

There is one particularly dangerous enemy that it has not been possible to eliminate: icing--that is, the appearance of ice over the whole of an aircraft flying in a humid atmosphere at negative temperature. Contrary to airplanes, no helicopter to date seems to have a complete deicing device. At present, the only really effective counter consists in not flying under icing conditions.

In our regions, the development of urban zones entails multiplication of overhead wires, electrical or other. They are the helicopter pilot's nightmare: over the last 8 years, there have been 14 ALAT helicopter collisions with lines, causing the destruction of 5 machines and wounding or killing a certain number of personnel.¹

Detection of wires is in its exploratory phase with development of LLDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), which acts like radar but with greater precision, while having shorter range.

1. To our knowledge, the U.S. Army Aviation has experienced a percentage of collisions with lines in relation to flying hours that is roughly equal to ours.

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A last resource has been designed and tested by the Canadians: it involves a big shears, mounted on the cabin, that cuts the wire when it is contacted. It seems that this device is effective for any wire that hits the cabin, but it does nothing about collisions with the main rotor.

Night, fog, icing conditions, electric lines--these are some of the threats that the ALAT has to contend with and that it is seeking to counter. The most effective way to counter them lies in the skill of the crews, with rigorous and ongoing training, and especially, the application of strict flying procedures.

In addition to these "enemies," whose effects can be attenuated by appropriate measures in peacetime, there are, in the event of conflict, other threats that are far more dangerous. Put into effect by the enemy of the moment and aimed at destroying the helicopter, they are either ground-based or aerial.

The Ground-Based Threats

They take the form of actions on the ground or from antiaircraft weaponry. Artillery fire presents a threat to helicopters, which are vulnerable to projectile bursts. Against such a danger there is no perfect parry, the only palliative being to avoid being seen during positioning and to stay in one position for the shortest time possible.

Ground-to-air weaponry as such is far more formidable. We cite some of it:

--the portable ground-to-air missile of the Redeye or SA7 type. The latter, with its Mach 1.5 speed and its 4,000-m range, is an excellent individual weapon against helicopters flying at low altitude--all the more so because it is almost impossible to detect it ahead of time, since it is not tied to a vehicle. It is formidable because of its infrared self-guidance system;

--the very-short-range ground-to-air missile such as the Soviet SA9, also with infrared self-guidance system, is capable of hitting a target at more than 7,000 m. Being transported by a launching vehicle, it is easier to detect, though;

--the multitube cannon of the ZSU-23/4 type--a formidable weapon because of its effectiveness at very low altitudes, its speed of readiness for action, and its great mobility on the battlefield.

ZSU-23/4 cannons and SA9 missiles are quite often grouped in the same mixed battery, and the crews for the latter weapon have available to them the data from the cannon's radar for detection and preorientation.

Depending on their capacities, these weapons constitute the priority target of armed helicopters. An example of the importance attached to this task is furnished us by the Americans, who have for this purpose developed a particularly effective high-performance charge for the 2.75-inch rockets that can be fired by their Cobra helicopters.

If one does not have such offensive weaponry, the only counter, apart from the mounting of special equipment designed to diminish the thermal signature of the turbines, lies in continual practice of tactical flying, as close to the ground

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as possible, and respect for the reach offered by the modern antitank missiles [as published].

The Aerial Threats

Until the relatively recent past, these threats were represented only by high-performance tactical-support aircraft. It was considered that while such a threat represented a certain danger to helicopters surprised on the ground, it was minimal for the same machines in flight, because of the difficulty of spotting them and their great maneuverability.

The recent reappearance of armored airplanes on the battlefield--the American A-10, for example--presents the risk of imminent introduction of a new kind of threat, so far not very well identified.

Such is not the case with the heavily armed helicopters such as the Soviet MI-24 Hind or MI-8, or the American AH-1 S Cobra. As Colonel Belov, a Soviet author, stresses in "Soviet Military Review"; "Just as the best antitank weapon has always been the tank in the conflicts of the past, the helicopter should prove to be the most effective antihelicopter weapon in future operations."

Indeed, the existence of a hostile cannon-helicopter in the battlefield represents a more acute danger than the high-performance fighter planes, for its use environment is the same as that of friendly helicopters. Flying at the same altitude and having the same turning radii, the enemy combat helicopter detects and attacks other helicopters, without its being possible to employ effective parries against it in the face of this threat.

By way of information, the carrying capacity of an MI-24 Hind is as follows: a 12.7-mm quadruple machine gun of Gatling type mounted in a turret under the nose, capable of use both for air-to-air combat and for air-to-ground firing; 4 antitank missiles; and 4 carriers with 32 57-mm rockets (or 4 bombs of 50 to 250 kg).

In the face of such a danger and until their powerful AH-64 is placed in service, the Americans have decided to improve the offensive capacities of their Cobras by replacing the present 7.62-mm Minigun turret with a far more high-performance turret capable of receiving either a 20-mm or a 30-mm three-tube Gatling cannon.

The French Army is going toward the placing in service of an SATCP² capable of air-to-air firing and construction of a specialized protection-support helicopter.

Meanwhile, the problem of self-defense remains.

In the face of such a range of dangers, one cannot but wonder about the justification of the military helicopter; yet more and more countries are equipping

2. Very-Short-Range Weapon System

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themselves with such materiel, and the number of military helicopters built is constantly growing. Two examples show why this current trend is well-founded:

--despite the extension of night flying, the development of instrument flying and the collisions with lines,³ the accident rate of the French ALAT has dropped steadily in recent years. Statistics for the year 1979 show that it was seven times lower than for civilian helicopters;

--during the Chad operations, 36 impacts against our helicopters were noted, yet despite this, none interrupted its mission. Likewise, helicopters belonging to foreign countries have continued flying despite considerable material damage caused by ASA.⁴

Let us therefore be optimistic, while at the same time instilling in our crews a concern for painstaking preparation of missions. In the absence of invulnerability, that alone will enable them, in time of conflict, first of all to move undetected, and subsequently, to remain untakable.

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3. None of these collisions occurred in the course of tactical exercises.
 4. Ground-to-air artillery

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MILITARY

FRANCE

INCREASED EFFICIENCY, REDUCED VULNERABILITY SOUGHT FOR HELICOPTER

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 36-38

[Article by Lt Col Andre Martini (a graduate of Saint-Cyr [class of 1954], Lt Col Andre Martini is a qualified test pilot and has 4,700 hours of flying time. He has commanded the 1st Helicopter Combat Regiment. He is presently chief of the ALAT [Light Army Plane] group of the Army Technical Section at Valence.): "Combat of the Future--the Evolution of the Materiel"]

[Excerpts] To increase the combat capacities of the helicopter, three actions are currently being carried out: overcoming poor visibility conditions, fighting enemy helicopters and reducing vulnerability to antiaircraft weapons.

When the subject of use of the ALAT is raised, two limitations are necessarily cited:

- it is not possible to construct a maneuver that includes the ALAT because its availability is too often subject to meteorological conditions;
- helicopters are too fragile and too vulnerable to be engaged in combat zones.

These reservations are largely well-founded. It is true that helicopters cannot fight when fog hits. But who can? It is true that a well-placed projectile can do in a Gazelle or a Puma. But it has to be hit.

The available techniques and appropriate modes of use already make it possible to reduce these constraints. For tomorrow, the studies in progress permit one to foresee, for the helicopter, less dependence on meteorological conditions as well as better ability to keep its freedom of action and to fight on a modern battlefield.

Night Vision

Increasing the regular availability of helicopters means giving them the capacity to overcome reduced visibility conditions at night or under low clouds. Since the security of the movement of the craft under these conditions has practically been ensured, it remains to give the crews the means for combat--that is, for piloting, observing, identifying and firing.

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Combat in fog is still in the realm of the future and will not be examined here. It would, in effect, require extremely elaborate aids, the technology of which is far from mastered and the cost of which is prohibitive.

Night combat, though, offers more promising outlooks for an attractive cost-effectiveness balance-sheet. Two techniques are presently envisioned for providing the crew with the necessary information:

- intensification of light;
- thermal imagery.

The ALAT Night Experimentation Center and the Technical Section of the Army have carried out evaluations that have led the EMAT [Army General Staff] to order an initial series of binoculars termed "third generation." The microtubes with which they are fitted are more sensitive than those of the preceding generations and offer better definition. They therefore have greater range (up to 20 percent more). This equipment makes it possible to read the on-board instruments and to obtain a good image of the outside in dark night. Piloting is thus made possible in 75 percent of cases, at an altitude on the order of 50 m above the ground--in any case, above the power lines, which are not detectable in all cases. Firing, though, is not possible by virtue of the ranges obtained. Thermal imagery has to be used.

The Technical Section of the Army and the Night Experimentation Center have evaluated thermal cameras mounted on helicopters. The tests show that the observation and firing functions can be achieved under good conditions, but that piloting remains very tricky and calls for greater system sophistication, especially to furnish to the pilot the image corresponding continually to the direction observed.

It therefore seems realistic to go first toward a mixed system combining microtube binoculars for piloting and thermal camera for observation and firing, until the integral system, such as the one on the American AAH [expansion unknown], can be installed on French machines.

The Antihelicopter Helicopter

Increasing the regular availability of the ALAT in the field also means giving it the means for preserving if freedom of action in the face of enemy helicopters. The helicopter has to be given the means for downing a machine of the same type that is moving, as it is, in tactical flight and that it detects at 200 km per hour as it comes around the edge of a wood.

It is more or less obvious that the man in the best position to react effectively in such a situation is the one flying the craft--that is, the pilot. He has to have a weapon that he can aim immediately and of sufficient effect to have a good probability of neutralizing the adversary. Initially, this weapon could be a medium-caliber cannon with a practical range of more than 1,000 meters and a rate of fire giving high fire density, so as to make up for the weapon system's scattering, no matter how sophisticated the system might be. In the second phase, an air-to-air missile should be adopted, precisely because of the ease of use that it provides. It is indeed considered the most effective antihelicopter weapon.

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The helicopter is a platform whose instability is well-known, and high-performance conduct-of-fire is therefore necessary in order to achieve real effectiveness of the weapons system. It should therefore make it possible, in particular, to do telemetering, automatic tracking of target, to take the movements of the carrier helicopter and the target into account, and finally to aim the weapon on the basis of the firing corrections calculated. Immediate use of such conduct-of-fire will require the use of a helmet sight, which implicitly requires that the weapon be mounted on a turret whose clearances are sufficient to permit aiming of the weapon in the forward sector. In other circumstances, use of an electronic sight will be necessary to permit use of the weapon system under good conditions.

The weapon, conduct-of-fire and helicopter now constitute a whole; thus the armed helicopter should be specific to the military need and be defined around its weapon system. In addition, it will be necessary, despite the use of sophisticated materiel, to seek simplicity of employment.

A good many of the technologies cited above have not been totally mastered yet. Thus, in order to take on at this time, with minimal effectiveness, enemy helicopters that threaten the freedom of action of our own machines, it is desirable to equip them with existing weapons assemblies.

Reducing Vulnerability

Finally, increasing the ALAT's regular availability on the battlefield means reducing the machines' vulnerability.

Tactical flying already makes it very difficult for a projectile to hit a helicopter, but with the performance characteristics of the specialized weapons improving, it is necessary to use supplementary protection, diminishing the machines' signatures, improving their resistance to impacts and limiting the consequences of forced landings.

This is the object of the studies in progress, which will be applied to the existing fleet insofar as possible, and then integrated into all future craft.

The French choice of small, heavily engined machines that fit easily into the relief is in itself a factor that reduces vulnerability, by diminution of the visual signature.

The use of composite materials, for fabrication of the blades in particular, makes electromagnetic detection difficult, while backswept cuffs and fenestrans considerably reduce the sound levels.

The infrared signature remains the most preoccupying one. While thinning and diversion of the jet flows from the turbine are sufficient to reduce the effectiveness of self-guidance systems that use the frequency band close to the visible, the situation may change with the appearance of missiles whose self-guidance systems work on higher frequencies.

To improve resistance to impacts, not only the present weapons but also the future ones have to be taken into consideration--in particular, the electrostatic

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proximity-fuse missiles, the antihelicopter munitions of tanks, and the neutralization weapons (lasers, smoke bombs). The solutions envisioned combine various techniques:

- general architecture providing judicious arrangement of the elements in relation to one another so as to create natural masks;
- choice of materials, especially composites, insensitive to gash effect;
- redundancies, self-shutoff of tanks;
- armoring (opaque or transparent)--a solution to be adopted only as a last resort, since it penalizes in terms of mass (50 kg/m²) and is in principle reserved for crew protection.

Finally, if the machine has to make a forced landing, the consequences for the materiel and the personnel must be limited. The characteristics of a helicopter's crash protection depend essentially on its basic design. The present machines, which were not designed in this spirit, offer a probability of survival for vertical speeds less than 5 to 7 m per second. On the other hand, when this concern is introduced in the design stage, it is possible to achieve a far higher level of protection, up to 10 or even 12 m per second, as with the American AAH. The rule of the art is to use the existing elements, both for their own function and as elements of protection. The techniques employed range from anticrash seats capable of reducing vertical acceleration from 60 g to 20 g to beams capable of absorbing energy by collapsing, and also special tanks and flexible fuel lines.

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