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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 770



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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BURUNDI

BRIEFS

FRENCH AID FOR AIRPORT--On 23 February, Jean-Pierre Cot, French minister-delegate in charge of cooperation and development, who was heading the French delegation to the annual meeting of the High-Level Franco-Burundian Cooperation Commission, a meeting organized each year in Bujumbura--and Remy Nkengurutse, Burundian minister of transport, posts, and telecommunications, signed a 7.6 million French franc agreement relating to phase II of the modernization of Bujumbura's airport. Since 1967, France has been giving assistance to Burundi in the area of air service. France has been involved in part via the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE), in the amount of 60 million French francs, and in part through an Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) subsidy, initially set at a sum of 10 million French francs and subsequently to be raised to 11.6 million French francs. An initial agreement signed in April 1981 related to the financing by France of a first segment of 4 million French francs, which made it possible to start up infrastructure work and equipment supply. The work financed by France, and in particular the lengthening of the runway to 3,600 meters, has nearly been finished already, and the first large transport aircraft are due to land at Bujumbura in a few weeks, as soon as the handling equipment for disembarking and embarking passengers and cargo, equipment specific to those aircraft, has arrived. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 694] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

NEW OIL DEPOSIT--At the end of February an oil deposit was discovered by ELF-SEREPKA on its licensed territory PH44 (Douala 2) in Cameroon. The drilling, made on land halfway between Edea and Kribi, reached a total depth of 1,900 meters. ELF-SEREPKA has a 100-percent interest in that license. If the evaluation drillings, to be undertaken over the short term, show that the deposit made up of ELF-SEREPKA and National Hydrocarbon Company of Cameroon (SNH). According to a communique from ELF-Aquitaine National Company (SNEA), SNH and ELF-SEREPKA believe that this new discovery may, after the Rio del Rey [deposit], open up a new area for oil exploitation in Cameroon. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82, p 741] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8568

COMPANY FOR URANIUM, MINERALS--The BRGM's newsletter for January 1982 mentions that the French Mokta Company and the BRGM (Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration) have just created a joint enterprise under the name Cameroon Uranium Union, an enterprise for the exploration and surveying of deposits of uranium, thorium, beryllium, and their compounds in as detailed a fashion as possible, and for the furthering of their extraction. The union's mining domain consists of an operations zone located in the northern part of Cameroon and a permit for mining exploration within that zone. The creation of this union is thus in response to the wish expressed in 1979 by the Cameroonian Government to see the BRGM play the role of developer for uranium prospecting in Cameroonian territory. In the petroleum area, SEGAZCAM, the nontrading research company for Cameroonian natural gas development, is starting construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant which will be supplied by the Victoria deposit and, very probably, by the sizable reserves currently being prospected off Kribi. SEGAZCAM has selected the French Oil Company [CFP] to supply it with the required technical assistance. CFP will turn to BRGM for the work of surveying the plant's base soil, for the search for 1.5 million tons of materials for concrete aggregate and stone blocks to construct a barrier, and for a hydrogeological study for supplying the future plant and its associated buildings with water. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 687] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

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CHAD

OAU ROLE AT NAIROBI SAID TO BE PLOT THREATENING NATION

Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French No 1013, 1-14 Mar 82 pp 10-12, 12

[Article by Ginette Cot: "Who Is Using Hissein Habre?"]

[Excerpts] ...Many individuals and many interests. But as President Goukouni Oueddei said on his return to Ndjamena, "Chad is not a protectorate under OAU tutelage"...or one of its performers.

What role are some people trying to give to the OAU, and who is manipulating that organization on the Chadian issue? Already the tendentious debate on the nature of the mission of the pancontinental force in Chad following the Libyan troop withdrawal has led to a paralysis of the African "blue helmets" and has enabled Hissein Habre to go on the offensive with impunity and to capture a number of strongpoints.

For a time, there had appeared to be signs of rallying on the part of some of the officials in charge of the operation of the pancontinental force. OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo, on an information mission to Chad, himself had affirmed on the eve of the Nairobi meeting that the misunderstanding between the pan-African organization and the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] over the role of the "neutral" force had been eliminated at the level of Goukouni Oueddei.

Was this only to help throw off their guard those against whom he was about to deliver a strong blow? There is every reason to believe so. The limited summit of presidents and ministers of 11 African states which met in Nairobi 10-11 February issued at its conclusion a number of shocking decisions. Today we can only conclude that if one wanted to pave the way for the chief of the FAN (Northern Armed Forces) to come to power and at the same time throw Chad into a new bloodbath and encourage secession by the south, this would be the way to do it. Thus, we can no longer evade the question as to what intrigues are being prepared, under cover of the OAU, against the future of Chad.

The "timetable" for a Chad settlement as concocted in the Kenyan capital is known. It amounts to a virtual edict to the GUNT. The "concerned parties"

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are "invited" to carry out the following scenario: "Implement an immediate cease-fire; i.e., midnight 28 February. Begin, effective 15 March, negotiations toward a national reconciliation under the aegis of the OAU permanent committee in an African country to be selected. Draw up, between 1 and 30 April, a provisional constitution and approve it. Organize, between 1 May and 30 June 1982, legislative and presidential elections and proceed to establish new institutions under the OAU's auspices," Finally, while the African "blue helmets" have not even started to really perform their mission, the date for completion of their mandate and withdrawal of the OAU force is set for 30 June....

The Edict Resolution

Indeed, the Chad issue was raised right at the start from an unexpected angle, by both the acting chairman and the OAU secretary general--who seems to have been the stage director of the Nairobi performance. Daniel arap Moi, Kenyan head of state and OAU chairman, said in his opening speech: "The Chad problem is basically political, and we must find a political solution which will be supported by all the Chadfan parties." And we saw an "OAU permanent committee on Chad," whose birth was dubious and whose legitimacy was questioned by the GUNT in November, set itself up as the supreme organ speaking and acting in the name of the OAU as a whole--that is, for all the independent states in Africa.

Even more serious, it claimed the right to judge and make decisions instead of, and on behalf of, the Chad people and their government.

We also know that the GUNT delegation led by Goukouni Oueddei requested, to no avail, an adjournment of the session in order to review the meeting's agenda. Thus it was in the absence of the Chad Government's representatives that the proceedings ended with the known conclusion. Who were the signatories to the plan of the so-called "permanent committee" announced by Edem Kodjo in Nairobi on 11 February? The question remains. Because although the OAU secretary general implies that this edict was approved unanimously, it is obvious that reservations and firm opposition views were expressed. For example, Mohamed Benyahia, the head of the Algerian delegation--who attended the meeting as an observer--pointed out during the debate, among other things, that the "permanent committee's" proposals could have the effect of encouraging the FAN to step up the war... But all this was certainly glossed over at the level of the OAU Secretariat, which does not seem to hesitate, when the need arises, to resort to acts of political and intellectual piracy.

An additional and troubling fact may provide proof of this. Several hours after the closing of the "mini-summit," an OAU press release was issued linking the mission of the neutral pan-African force in Chad to acceptance by the GUNT of elections under the control of the OAU. This statement, which was justified--who knows by what juridical acrobatics--on the basis of the Lagos agreements of August 1979, declared that the OAU Permanent Committee on Chad calls for the organization of national elections under OAU

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supervision within 4 months. "The continued presence of the peace force will be linked to the GUNT's acceptance of these conditions," the English version of the communique read, while the French version stated that "the continued presence of the force will compel the GUNT to accept these conditions."

Glaring Contradiction

Indeed, the decisions of the Nairobi meeting appear clearly to be the culmination of a virtual collusion--as, moreover, has already been suggested in several African capitals, including the Congo, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe--and a defiance of the whole group of African heads of state, whose previous decisions respecting the Chad problem have been canceled with the stroke of a pen. The "proposals" of the "permanent committee" in fact sharply conflict with the resolution on Chad approved by the last OAU summit in the Kenyan capital in June 1981, in which all African states participated. At that time, these states recognized the "legitimacy" of the GUNT and pledged to give all possible support to the government team led by Goukouni Oueddei.

As for the planned pan-African military force--designed for the implicit purpose of making the Libyan withdrawal possible--it was intended not only to help the GUNT establish its own national, integrated army but also, and above all, to protect and defend the peace, sovereignty, and security of Chad. It would no doubt have been advisable, in order to prevent any stalling tactics, to have stated clearly the most imminent danger that could threaten this peace which had recently been reestablished with so much difficulty. However, the support for the GUNT had seemingly been sufficiently explicit to remove all ambiguity. Finally, it was understood that nothing would be done without the prior approval of the Chad Government.

Today, if we are limited to the "permanent committee's" objectives, the GUNT will no longer have any legitimacy. The factions have been revived. We are back to the situation which prevailed on the eve of the August 1979 Lagos agreements.... The victim and the aggressor are given the same status. Or rather, everything is managed to favor the aggressor party, which--because it has conquered a few strongpoints, again violating its commitments--is being invited to the negotiating table. The GUNT, on the other hand, summoned at its inconvenience, is somehow put in the position of being an accused and is called on to participate in a cease-fire process which can only benefit Hisssein Habre, and we know from experience how little importance he will attach to it. Who but the FAN chief broke the last cease-fire agreement, which he had hurried to sign at Lome in December 1980 to secure his future after the debacle of his forces, while Goukouni Oueddei had already signed the agreement several weeks before?

Indeed, this is a matter of helping Hisssein Habre to seize power.

It would take too long to list the extortions that have ornamented the itinerary of Hisssein Habre, who is known for his fanatical tribalism and the massacres he has committed.

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Hissein Habre certainly incarnates fascist dictatorship to the members and leaders of FROLINAT. And the Chadian people fully comprehend that description. There is hardly a family in the country that has not suffered from the FAN chief's extortion.

As for the legend concocted by Hissein Habre's propaganda agents that he is a fervent nationalist, this has been shattered in a dramatic way.

In recent months, particularly in 1980 and 1981, the FAN chief has used as his rallying cry the struggle against the alleged danger of Libya's establishing itself in Chad. However, this threat has totally evaporated. Hardly had the last Libyan soldier left Chad, however, before Hissein Habre again plunged headlong into aggression and war....

A final victory for Hissein Habre would mean cancellation of all the progressive and revolutionary gains achieved in more than 6 years of struggle at the cost of heavy sacrifices, including the killing of the best sons of a whole generation.

Fallacious Arguments

As for the argument made by his supporters that only a "man of authority" like him can rescue Chad from paralysis and achieve national reconciliation, it ignores two things. How could a people who took up arms with the very purpose of combatting dictatorship and regaining their dignity and full sovereignty agree to accept an even more terrifying dictatorship than the previous one, and also one imposed from abroad? Moreover, who is more committed to national reconciliation than Goukouni Oueddei, who in July announced a general amnesty for FAN fighters?

However, this reconciliation cannot come about until Hissein Habre, a factor of division and unending war, is removed from the Chadian political and military scene.

The instigators of the plot against the GUNT, who were exposed in broad daylight at the latest meeting in Nairobi, no doubt counted for their project's success on the passivity of a people yearning for peace and tranquility after their sufferings, and on the discouragement that a knife in the back of the Chad Government might cause.

Challenge Rebuffed

However, the challenge to Chad's sovereignty and dignity by the Nairobi resolution was promptly and courageously rebuffed in Ndjamena. Greeted by thousands on his return from the Kenyan capital on 12 February, President Goukouni Oueddei affirmed: "Certain countries, encouraged by imperialism, have gravely insulted our country, people, and army. However, helped by reliable friendly countries, Chadians will succeed in solving their problems themselves."

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Repeating a slogan on a sign being waved by the demonstrators, he shouted: "Chad is not a protectorate; Chad is not under OAU trusteeship."

On 13 February, the GUNT issued a communique rejecting as null and void the resolutions of the OAU "permanent committee" "summit" and describing the proceedings of this meeting as "absurd theatrics." This permanent committee, the communique continued, "has no reason for being, and still less has the right to act in place of and on behalf of the people and their legitimate government."

Expressing indignation that the Chad issue has been dragged backward to become a factional problem again, and that the GUNT is being denied its existence as a government, the communique stressed: "Implementation of the Nairobi resolutions would surely mean a return to the vicious circle of war and destruction."

If, as the first reactions seem to indicate, numerous African capitals agree with this analysis, the GUNT--now caught in a pincer situation between Hisssein Habre's aggressive forces, which have received explicit encouragement from the Nairobi resolution, and the pan-African force--will not remain alone in its resistance to a plot which not only directly threatens Chad's survival but is a dangerous precedent for the peoples of the continent.

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CHAD

ASSEMBLY OF ALL FORCES NECESSARY FOR RECONSTRUCTION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1104, 3 Mar 82 p 22

[Article by Jean-Pierre N'Diaye: "Chad: Nothing Should Divide Them"]

[Excerpts] In 17 years of civil war, many chances for peace have come and gone. The conferences organized at the revolutionaries' request in Kano, Nigeria, led to the final withdrawal, in the name of the national interest, of Felix Malloum.

Upon returning from Ndjamena, the leaders of Chad's revolution--Hissein Habre, Goukouni Oueddei, and Acyl Ahmat, who were comrades in arms--met in Douguia (10 November 1979), together with Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, the strongman of the south, to set up the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT).

Everyone heaved a sigh. Chad's troubles were over! The end of the tunnel was in sight. Then one of the key figures in the picture upset the applecart. Hissein Habre, minister of defense, seemed to contest the way the GUNT was set up, and in particular the fact that Goukouni Oueddei was to be the country's chief magistrate. Habre withdrew with his FAN [Northern Armed Forces] to the environs of Ndjamena.

What is the nature of these disputes? Some say these people are military chiefs who are incapable of yielding. Others stress the different backgrounds of the two men--Habre and Goukouni--who, however, are both from the north. One is a revolutionary, more modern, more of an ideologue, an intransigent nationalist. The other is more traditional and has closer ties with Chad's northern neighbor, Libya. At any rate, both are patriots, and both epitomize Chad. There should be nothing fundamentally serious to divide them and prevent them from working together to reconstruct a cruelly torn Chad. For Goukouni the trouble is the presence of the Libyans and Habre's withdrawal from Ndjamena to rebuild his stronghold in the east, on the Sudanese border, and again begin his long march.

The presence of 10,000 Libyan soldiers--considered an army of occupation by African public opinion--forced Goukouni to call for the withdrawal of these troops. The inter-African contingent arrived. The OAU's difficulties in trying to make peace are due to internal contradictions and rivalries which can't be resolved. The difficulty of the OAU's mission can be readily understood when one hears the two Chadians say that their dispute can be resolved only by military means, by outright warfare. But the OAU's presence has had a calming effect on the situation, attenuating the confrontation and bringing relief to African peoples.

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staggering under the weight of poverty, bombs, and exile. And this is far from negligible.

In this context, made less tense by the efforts of the OAU, another meeting or even a roundtable may be possible. It is almost like a film being played over again. Will there be another conference, this time without the sequel of brothers at loggerheads? While the situation inside Chad seems to be fixed in the same pattern as before, the international situation has changed. There has been a savage revival of the cold war.

If a country like Chad can't solve its domestic problems in a dynamic and positive way, and the national participants in the drama are relegated to the sidelines, there is an unavoidable risk of uncontrollable foreign intervention in the medium term.

For the past 10 years, Hissein Habre has been Chad's strongman; he has turned every situation to his advantage, defeated his adversaries, and made the great powers yield, and he has done it exclusively with Chadian forces. But let us not forget all the Chadians who have taken part in the combat; Dr Abba Siddick was a precursor of this struggle, and he is not finished yet.

All active forces should be assembled for the work of reconstruction. Can Habre bring about national reconciliation at a time when a country like Sudan is again threatened by the specter of civil war, and when the international situation is so dangerous? In this connection, socialist France, the OAU, and Chadian immigrants should make bolder suggestions.

The main point--and this is cause for optimism--is that no Chadian faction has proclaimed the secession of the territory it controls.

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CHAD

GOUKOUNI MAY BECOME MERE FACTION CHIEF

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1103, 24 Feb 82 pp 20, 21

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Call of Rocky Terrain"]

[Text] The Libyans should not have left so fast. Paradoxically, there are two men in Chad who could agree with this statement today: Goukouni Oueddei and Hissein Habre. That is undoubtedly what they have in common, although their reasons are diametrically opposed. Oueddei has concluded--too late--that the withdrawal of Libyan troops left him with no protection other than the overly relaxed boys in his Presidential Guard. Habre thinks the country would have united around him if Qadhafi's legionnaires had stayed a few months longer. Their similarities stop there; after 3 months of fulminating blitzkrieg, the rebel Habre now controls almost three-quarters of Chad, whereas Goukouni, the President, seems to have reverted to the role of a head of state whose authority is contested by his own faction.

Is it simply a case of the pendulum's swinging back, or is it a historical necessity? When one wins, the other loses, but always haughtily. How else can one explain the truly suicidal policy adopted by Goukouni Oueddei in Nairobi at the last meeting of the OAU's permanent committee on Chad (Nairobi, 10 and 11 February)? By rejecting all of the OAU's decisions--cease-fire, negotiations, elections--the man who is still President (for how long?) in Ndjamena has lost much of his legitimacy in the eyes of the OAU. Furthermore, he is leaving the military and diplomatic initiative up to Hissein Habre--while he is already in a weak position on both counts--and his intransigence may well lead to an early departure of the OAU's white helmets.

This self-destructive tendency is certainly typical of this aristocratic Tubu, the third son of the Derdei Kefedermi. Although used to compromises and hours of informal negotiations in the shade of a tree, Oueddei is nevertheless more motivated by a sense of honor than by an awareness of reasons of state. And when his quavering voice loudly interrupted Nigerian President Shehu Shagari in Nairobi on Wednesday 10 February, while the latter was talking about "national reconciliation" in Chad, to say that he had not come for that, his listeners were reminded of the fact that Goukouni Oueddei is a man of sometimes uncontrollable anger. But above and beyond the real feeling he has of having been betrayed by everyone, and beyond his personal feud with Habre, for whom he has demanded and obtained a death sentence by default, Goukouni is perpetually tempted by "the call of the rocky terrain."

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He has never really thought of himself as a chief of state. Every time he has spoken freely about himself, and apparently especially since the OAU appointed him to head the GUNT in August 1979, he has conveyed the feeling that his happiest days were behind him, when he roamed over the rocky terrain of Tibesti with the French Army at his heels. Oddly enough, it is Habre, the eternal rebel, who has always felt that it was his destiny to lead the nation, so much so that he lives only for that.

But even if Goukouni has never really thought he had what it takes to be a head of state, he has accomplished the feat of persuading other people that he has: first the French, from Martin Kirsch to Guy Penne; then the OAU. Everyone believed him when he said that Habre was finished, that almost the entire country was united behind him [Goukouni], and that the National Integrated Army (ANI) was more than a mirage. But Chad, from the GUNT on down, has never recognized Goukouni Oueddei as its representative. There have been constant rivalries and sometimes violent quarrels for the past 2 years between him and Acyl Ahmat's pro-Libyans, the Kamougue's southerners, and Mahamat Abba Said's 1st Army. Ten thousand soldiers stationed in Chad for 20 months by Qadhafi were unable to stop this perpetual clan warfare. As a result, barely 3,000 men could be found to resist the FAN's offensive in November and December of 1981, and desertions followed the first defeats. Thus Moussa Sougui, one of Goukouni's most effective military aids, and a hero of the battle of Kotoro Fallata fought at the beginning of December (GUNT's only victory), joined the FAN 2 months later on Faya's side with 200 men. Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, vice president of the GUNT, after a short visit to the front, refused to send his troops to participate in this combat between northerners.... The list of "betrayals" of which Goukouni can say he is the victim is long, but he never had the strength or the will to avoid them. Even his crates of weapons and munitions sent from Paris found their way, through various intrigues, into the hands of the FAN....

What can Goukouni do now? Call the Libyans back? But Colonel Qadhafi is likely to be very cautious, prompted by American pressures, (discreet) Soviet pressures, the coming OAU summit meeting in Tripoli, and the ghosts of hundreds of soldiers who died in eastern Chad. France? Goukouni has thought about it. It is said that he even requested--through Francois Soubestre, the new French ambassador to Ndjamen--the intervention of the 11th Parachute Division.

But France is not going to do anything, because its support for Goukouni was conceivable only as long as the OAU lent him an air of legitimacy. Now the Chadian President has slammed the door on Nairobi.

What about Algeria or Ethiopia (already approached by Goukouni at the beginning of December)? For many reasons, neither would think of getting bogged down in Chad. Will there be nothing left for him but to become once more what he has perhaps been all along: a faction chief alternating between rebellion and power? History undoubtedly stammers in Chad, moreso than anywhere else.

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CHAD

OAU ROLE IN CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS BACKED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1103, 24 Feb 82 p 20

[Excerpts] Has the OAU reversed its stance, as Goukouni Oueddei thinks, by calling on the President of the GUNT to negotiate with Hissein Habre? Only apparently.

It is true that so far it recognizes Goukouni as the only legitimate authority in Chad, but only in a specific context: that in which Goukouni heads a transitional union government for the purpose of holding elections.

In Nairobi the OAU simply took note of a de facto situation. But the situation has changed in Chad, and the GUNT President doesn't have the support of the government or the people. Elections are out of the question now. The transition must be accomplished some other way, now that yesterday's rebel, Habre, controls so much territory.

The OAU is now proposing new paths to reach the same objective--namely, the normalization of the situation in Chad. The people of Chad may again refuse to follow this path. But the pan-African organization has stuck to its mission: to propose nonpartisan solutions and enunciate the law--but without any way to enforce it.

It cannot be expected to do more. After all, does one expect more of the United Nations?

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FOREIGN MINISTER ACYL AHMAT INTERVIEWED

PM051459 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 29 Mar-11 Apr 82 pp 18-19

[Unattributed report on Chadian Foreign Minister Acyl Ahmat press conference in Paris: "Nobody Apart From Chadians Can Find a Solution"; date of interview uncertain]

[Text] While internally an effort is being made in N'Djamena to rally and reorganize the military forces to quell Hissene Habre's rebellion, the National Unity Transitional Government [GUNT], which in the past allowed the Armed Forces of the North [FAN] propagandists a free hand for too long, is carrying out large-scale activity to make its position known abroad.

It is within this framework that numerous GUNT leaders presented themselves to the Parisian press. Among them, on 2 March, during a visit to brief the French authorities, was Chadian Foreign and Cooperation Minister Acyl Ahmat. He reasserted the correctness of his government's rejection of the resolutions adopted in Nairobi in November by a group of African states which formed a "standing committee" on Chad--resolutions which conflict with the decisions taken at the latest summit meeting of the 50 African states.

In reply to the question whether N'Djamena envisages requesting Libyan troops or other countries' forces to help the GUNT crush the FAN aggression, the foreign minister confirmed that for the time being his government intends to give the OAU every chance. "We are giving the OAU time to take a grip on itself and to reach, in agreement with the GUNT, a solution to the Chadian problem," Acyl Ahmat said, explaining that he viewed the OAU as the ensemble of members states, not a club of reactionary heads of state with little respect for their peers' undertakings and motivated by a desire to restore Habre to the Chadian political scene.

Asked whether he considers the decision to ask Libyan troops to withdraw from Chad a "mistake," the GUNT's foreign minister took the opportunity to very wittily "relativize" the distorted image of him provided recently by Radio France International and other Western media. "I have frequently been called a Libyan agent by Radio France International, which has too much to say about me and which does the Chadian people much harm. I have, in a sense, been denaturalized. I have been depicted as a Libyan, rather than a Chadian.... Acquainted as I am with my country and its internal contradictions,

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I am opposed to Chad's occupation by any other power. But I am very realistic. Libya is a fraternal country that helped us at the most difficult moment and that extinguished the blaze that had been burning for 17 years.... And I expressed the opinion at the time that it was inadvisable to request a Libyan withdrawal, since we were not confident about the undertakings made by the others and we were not ready to guarantee our own security...."

Asked about France's stance toward the GUNT and the Chadian problem in general, Acyl Ahmat, who at the beginning of March met in Paris with Jean-Pierre Cot, French minister of cooperation and development, and Guy Penne, presidential adviser on African affairs, was keen to put an end to the questioning of motives to which Francois Mitterrand's government has been subjected in this regard.

"I must first clarify a misunderstanding," Acyl Ahmat stressed. "I was with President Francois Mitterrand and French External Relations Minister Claude Cheysson. Of course one can never know exactly what happens behind the scenes. But in my opinion matters were made clear. Francois Mitterrand told the GUNT president in essence: 'There is no question of France's asking you to make the Libyans leave until you are sure about your security.' That is what I heard Francois Mitterrand say. So people must not say to us that France exerted pressure on Chadian leaders via its most authoritative representative."

With regard to his meeting at the beginning of March with the French minister of cooperation and development, Acyl Ahmat said: "Our position is clear. As for France, it promised, after the advent of the socialist government, to help Chad's legitimate government. According to some radio stations and press agencies, however, France has allegedly asked us to move toward a reconciliation with Hissene Habre. I told Jean-Pierre Cot yesterday (4 March) [date as published]: 'There is no question of France's urging us to sit down at the negotiating table with Hissene Habre. We are struggling to eliminate the phenomenon of the currents that have killed the country. This is not so that others can force us to revive or multiply them in the future.' So the GUNT's position is clear and I believe that Jean-Pierre Cot's reply was constructive. In my opinion, France has not changed its position."

With regard to the kind of assistance promised by Paris, the Chadian foreign minister simply said: "What I can tell you is that France asserted, via its cooperation minister, that it will continue to help Chad."

Last, asked about the impact of foreign interference in Chad, Acyl Ahmat pointed out that "Chad's problem is above all a national problem. The inconsistency of which the GUNT has been accused is doubtless not entirely unconnected with the situation being experienced now. But I believe that Chadian people have learned their lessons from all this, that they have realized that the problems could not be resolved except by their own will. Neither France, nor the United States nor any other country--not even the OAU itself--nobody but the Chadian people can find a solution. The problem is above all a national one. And everyone has concluded that everything must be done to finally extricate Chad from deadlock and war."

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CHAD

GOUKOUNI SAYS KAMOUGUE TRYING TO TALK WITH HABRE

AB091430 London REUTER in English 1418 GMT 9 Apr 82

[By Abakar Assidick]

[Text] Ndjamena, 9 Apr (REUTER)--Chad President Goukouni Oueddei has accused the country's vice-president of sabotaging his authority and attempting to negotiate with the rebels in the country's civil war, Ndjamena Radio reported today.

The Chad leader faces increasing political opposition within the 10-faction provisional government after serious military setbacks against the rebels last month in eastern Chad, political sources said.

His accusation, in a statement released last night by President Goukouni's own armed FROLINAT faction, came almost five weeks after Vice-President Abdel Kader Waldal Kamougue publicly suggested a ceasefire with rebel leader Hissene Habre.

Colonel Kamougue, a veteran leader from the predominantly Christian south, suggested the ceasefire as part of a political settlement of the civil war leading to the setting up of a new all-party government, seen by the sources as a return to the original 1979 11-faction government including Mr Habre.

The Goukouni-led FROLINAT rejected the suggest and accused Colonel Kamougue of trying to achieve a ceasefire with Mr Habre's guerrillas, a proposal also strongly advocated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

In what was seen as an effort to boost his credibility as leader of all the factions in the war, President Goukouni last month tried--and failed--to regain ground taken over by the rebels in the past five months.

Military sources said successive attempts by the Chad army to regain control of the key town of Oum-Hadjer straddling the strategic road from the capital to the Sudanese border ended in failure, with heavy casualties for government forces.

Since a Libyan military pullout in November last year, Mr Hagre's guerrillas, estimated at around 4,000 men, have now control of more than half of the huge Central African country, military sources said.

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They said only the presence of an estimated 3,800 troops of an inter-African force from Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal setting up a buffer around Ndjamena was preventing the guerrillas from moving towards the capital.

The force might have to be withdrawn by the end of June for lack of funds, unless an agreement can be reached for the United Nations to finance it, the sources said.

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GHANA

RESISTANCE TO RAWLINGS REPORTEDLY EXISTS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1100, 3 Feb 82 p 1

[Article by Siradiuo Diallo: "Jerry Rawlings and the Intellectuals"]

[Text] Jerry Rawlings certainly had no trouble seizing power for a second time in Accra (31 December 1981). But he is obviously having more trouble governing this time than after his coup of June 1979. Oddly enough, the bloody repression that the idol of Ghana's youth indulged in (a dozen high-ranking officers, including three former heads of state, were shot) at that time did not affect the will of the people of Ghana to resist. On the contrary.

The stubborn opposition confronting Jerry Rawlings today is evident at all social levels, starting, naturally, with the merchant bourgeoisie, who are adversely affected by the "holy war" against corruption proclaimed by the country's new strongman. The freezing of bank accounts, limits imposed on withdrawals of deposits, and a multitude of controls introduced both inside the country and at its borders are not likely to reassure Accra's rich gentry.

But the gentry are not the only ones to complain. Shopkeepers, merchants, and salesgirls--the famous "mamies" of Nakola (the capital's main market), Takoradi, and elsewhere--immediately hoisted the flag of rebellion. They refuse to lower their prices, despite the orders of the Provisional National Defense Council, the highest authority in the country. In vain the army plunders and even dynamites their stalls: the merchants show no signs of yielding. They hide their wares, thus further complicating the problem of supplying large urban centers.

Trained personnel and intellectuals do not stop at passive resistance, either. The professional association grouping doctors, jurists, engineers, and technicians is demanding the speediest possible return to constitutional government. "Either by means of a restoration of the third constitution, appropriately amended, or by any other legal means decided on by the people," states the association's communique. There is nothing surprising about this stance, as Ghana has the largest and most active intelligentsia of any country in black Africa.

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This social stratum, which is keenly aware of its role in the nation, has never made any secret of its contempt for politicians and the military. None of the regimes which have emerged from Ghana's five coups d'etat has succeeded in winning over the intellectuals. This is why it took Jerry Rawlings 3 weeks to form his cabinet. Even now he has managed to collect only a team of "secretaries"--no ministers.

Many well-known and respected intellectuals are said to have been sounded out and to have refused to join the government. Thus, after forming his Provisional National Defense Council with eminent unknowns--except for Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, chief of staff of the army--the master of Accra was obliged to recruit his ministerial secretaries from among politicians whom he was vilifying only yesterday. This did not help his public image. The national student union, which initially applauded the downfall of President Hilla Limann and asked its activists to go to the plantations and help the peasants harvest cocoa (the country's main export), is turning against [Rawlings]. The students feel that by [picking] a band of "reactionaries" and "professional politicians" to form his government, Jerry Rawlings has made himself look like the architect of a mere "palace revolution."

Thus hard-pressed on both the right and the left, the ebullient captain's margin for maneuver is receding daily. In these circumstances, the only place for him to go is probably straight ahead. Unless he resigns once again--but that is unlikely.

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GHANA

COMMENTS ON FRAGILITY OF LIBYAN CONNECTION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1104, 3 Mar 83 p 16

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Jerry Rawlings Saved by Qadhafi?"]

[Excerpt] Two months after coming to power in Accra, Air Force Captain Jerry Rawlings is marking time. He had no trouble arresting his predecessor, Hilla Limann, and interning him in Akossombo, or in dissolving Parliament. But so far he has not been able to form a homogeneous, representative government, restore unity and discipline to the army, or rally the active elements of the nation.

It is as though J.J. (Rawlings likes being called by his initials, which stand for Jerry John) didn't know what to do with the power he has achieved. He just harangues the crowds now and then from the top of an armored car flanked by armed soldiers, or he thunders at the women selling goods in the market (he has forbidden them to sell imported products). Otherwise, Ghana's new strongman lies low at Camp Burma, where he has set up his office and, next to it--ostentatiously--an austere camp bed.

All this is in a small tent guarded by soldiers in combat attire, standing or lying behind heaps of sandbags. Holed up in this manner at Accra's main military camp, two steps from the airport, J.J. has closed himself off in obstinate silence. There is not the slightest indication of a domestic policy program or of foreign policy options. Is he overwhelmed by the enormity of the task of national recovery before he has even begun to face it?

At any rate, the legacy left by his predecessors is in such a state that it would be hard to make it produce anything positive.

So it is not surprising that in the middle of February, Captain Rawlings sent a high-level delegation to Tripoli to ask Libya for immediate aid: not just oil, but ordinary consumer goods, and of course financial support. Colonel Qadhafi, who made an important contribution to J.J.'s return to power, has already supplied him with quantities of weapons, ammunition, and medicine. His representatives, who lost no time reopening the Libyan Embassy in Accra, have been feverishly active there ever since. They go from minister to minister to find out what the country needs, and promise the earth. But the country's needs are immense....

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There is very little chance of the Libyan graft taking hold in a lasting way in Accra. Given the way of life, mentality, and culture of the 14-odd million Ghanaians, it would be very hard for Qadhafi to convert them to the precepts of Islamic integrationism as taught by the little green book-- quite apart from the fact that the drop in oil prices and his scraps with the Western powers have given the Libyan chief of state a lot of problems.

It's like saying Rawlings hasn't come out of the hotel.

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GHANA

FORMER NO 2 MAN EXPRESSES DISAPPROVAL OF RAWLINGS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1104, 3 Mar 82 p 50

[Text] Many young, low-ranking officials who were members of Rawlings' first team, and who decided to leave the country when Hilla Limann's civilian government regained power, did not participate in J.J.'s second coup d'etat on 31 December. They were not recalled, either. Among them is Major Boakye Djan, the former "No 2" of the Revolutionary Council and Rawlings' former right arm; at the time, he was presented as the Council's ideologue.

He and his friends, whom we were able to meet with in London, take a very dim view of J.J.'s latest activities. "Rawlings thinks it's enough to change men to change society," they told us. "If he stays in power now, Ghana will enter a long period of trouble and chaos." The disillusionment expressed by Major Boakye Djan and his associates about Jerry Rawlings was not born yesterday. "When we took power in 1979, we did so to carry out a genuine social revolution," they told us. "Unfortunately, Rawlings and his friends wouldn't hear of it. It was because our team was rudderless and had no coherent strategy that we decided to hand the reins back to the civilian authorities in October. We were heading for a catastrophe."

Referring to the latest coup d'etat, Major Boakye Djan told us that "Rawlings' armed bands liquidated hundreds of the new regime's opponents." At least three of the 16 "martyrs" who were buried with military honors at the end of January were murdered in cold blood by Rawlings' men; Rawlings recorded them as "killed in combat."

The major and his friends also confirm the existence of the "Libyan connection." "Because of it," they say, "Rawlings is alienating all of the countries which had been Ghana's friends. The airplane that was supposed to carry food and medicine from Tripoli the day after the coup d'etat was really carrying weapons." Rawlings' future? Anything but brilliant, if they are right: "The civilian population has had enough. Sooner or later, it will realize that it takes more than guns and promises to be able to survive."

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GUINEA

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE SEEM UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1100, 3 Feb 82 pp 30, 31

[Article by S.D.: "Lost Illusions"]

[Text] The members of the Association of Families of Political Prisoners in Guinea are preoccupied by the fate in store for their families. Comprising several women citizens of France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands married to Guineans who have been held in the prisons of Sekou Toure, these women have for years been making approaches to secure, if not the freedom, then at least some clarification concerning their husbands' situation.

The association has brought its case to the attention of the Pope, international political and humanitarian organizations, and the governments of many countries. During his official visit to Guinea (December 1978), the then president of the French Republic, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, raised the problem with President Ahmed Sekou Toure. And he obtained a commitment that those under arrest would be freed without delay.

Confident in this promise, Rene Journiac, adviser for African affairs in the Office of the President of the French Republic, hastened to place balm on the wounds of his fellow citizens.

And time passed. Receiving no tangible sign from Conakry, despite several discreet approaches by the French authorities, the association resumed activity. On 18 April 1980, the European Parliament passed a motion calling for the liberation of political prisoners in Guinea. During the campaign for the last presidential election in France, the association obtained from the principal candidates the commitment to do everything possible to this end in the event that they were elected on 10 May (1981).

President Francois Mitterrand seems to have kept his word. In any case, incircles close to the Socialist Party it is stated that the discreet visit to Conakry in October 1981 by Attorney Rolland Dumas, Socialist deputy from Perigueux and a friend of the French chief of state, had no other purpose than this matter. But Mitterrand's special envoy obtained nothing definite. On the contrary, Mme Marie Jeanne Pruvot, a Giscardian deputy to the Strasbourg parliament, and author of the April 1980 motion, knows how things stand.

After having visited Conakry last November at the invitation of President Sekou Toure, Mme Pruvot has just received from the Guinean ambassador in Brussels,

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Kourouma Daouda, called Windo, an official letter dated 12 January 1982. The letter was signed by Guinean Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdoulaye Toure, who stated, for the purpose of finally settling this matter, that with regard to the eight husbands of the Frenchwomen who were members of the association, seven had been executed since 24 January 1971. The eighth, Barry Abdoulaye, former office director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had escaped prior to the execution of the sentence.

Abdoulaye Toure's letter is troubling, to say the least. First of all, this is because it proves that, while he was promising in December 1978 to free prisoners who he knew had been executed during or after January 1971, Sekou Toure was clearly making fun of President Giscard d'Estaing. Even more serious, if it is true that four of these men were shot on 24 January 1971 at the same time as dozens of other Guinean officials, the statement of the minister of foreign affairs must, with regard to the four others, be taken with caution.

Actually, Gen Keita Noumandian, former head of the General Staff of the Guinean Army, and Keita Kemoko and Sylla Fode Saliou, both magistrates, could not have been executed on the date indicated. And for a good reason, since they were arrested in May and on 7 and 8 July, respectively, in Conakry. As for Barry Abdoulaye, who, the head of Guinean diplomatic service writes, escaped before the imposition of the penalty, his case is rather unusual, for he was arrested on 29 August 1972 at Sinko, a little village on the Ivory Coast frontier, during his escape [attempt]. Brought back to Conakry, he was probably also executed.

These revelations, which say a great deal about the manner in which Guinean authorities behave with regard to the rights of man, are not likely to encourage President Mitterrand to fulfill a wish very dear to Sekou Toure: to be officially invited to France.

Some African chiefs of state, and not minor ones, have intervened in this regard; French companies interested in exploiting the rich Guinean subsoil are doing everything to improve French-Guinean relations. This does not alter the fact that since the election of Francois Mitterrand, these relations seem dead. Are the open wounds caused by Sekou Toure's violent attacks in 1976 against the Socialist Party--likening it to "filth," and describing its leader as a "Nazi" and a "bandit"--likely to heal badly?

The members of the France-Guinea Friendship Association, in any case, plan to make approaches soon to Minister of Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy in order to find out what Paris intends to do. As for Sekou Toure, he seems no longer to be under any illusions as to his chances of coming to an understanding with Francois Mitterrand.

[Toure] seems to be so disabused that he did not hesitate, during his recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany (30 November-3 December), to make a long telephone call from Bonn to Valery Giscard d'Estaing to say that he not only did not regret having supported him during the presidential election campaign, but that he was solemnly inviting him to return to Guinea whenever [Giscard] might wish--and to assure him in advance that the former French chief of state will be better received than in December 1978.

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IVORY COAST

REORIENTATION OF FRENCH AID EFFORT REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Mar 82 p 790

[Article: "Toward Reorientation of Cooperation with France"]

[Text] The French minister delegate to the minister of external relations for cooperation, Jean-Pierre Cot, left Abidjan on 10 March at the conclusion of a 2-day official visit to the Ivory Coast.

Before leaving the Ivorian capital, Mr Cot stressed the fact that the adjustment of the cooperation between the Ivory Coast and France--an adjustment desired by the two countries--was not at all a disengagement on the part of France. On the contrary, he declared, it is a matter of "anchoring (this cooperation) better and developing it better."

"France," he continued, "intends to increase its aid to the Third World....and I want to assure Ivorian public opinion that there is no question of reducing the scope of our cooperation, but rather of developing it.... We desire the opening-up of new areas of cooperation--in the matter of rural development, for example.... The fact remains that we have to examine the possibilities of handing over certain positions occupied by technical assistants, in those cases where Ivorianization is possible."

Mr Cot referred to the fact that France favors self-directed development for the countries of the Third World and encouragement of each country's capacity to carry out its own development itself. He recalled that France intended to double its public development aid to the Third World in the course of President Mitterrand's current 7-year term, to reach 0.7 percent of France's Gross National Product, instead of the present 0.35 percent.

For his part, the chief of Ivorian diplomacy, Mr Simeon Ake, considered that the fundamental principle of cooperation between the Ivory Coast and France should henceforth be that of ongoing concertation. Furthermore, he continued, "we unreservedly approve the French idea that the necessary updating or readjustment of development policies should be carried out with respect for the sovereignty of each country, in function of its needs, its interests and its political and economic choices."

In the view of the Ivorian minister, the development efforts should be applied to three "sparkplug" sectors: agriculture, industry and energy.

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Diversified Cooperation

Franco-Ivorian cooperation covers several areas, both on the level of technical or scientific assistance and on that of development.

Of the roughly 12,000 technical assistants working for the French Ministry of Cooperation, nearly one-third--3,758--work in the Ivory Coast. Teachers represent 80 percent of this direct assistance, and the cost of them to France was CFA 6.9 billion in 1981.

On the other hand, France furnishes its aid to the development of the Ivory Coast through the intermediary of several organisms: the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC)--CFA 911 million in 1981; the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE)--CFA 12.7 million in loans and participations; and the Studies and Research Group for Development of Tropical Agronomy (GERDAT), which groups eight research institutes and whose financing is provided jointly by the two parties --CFA 1.576 billion in 1981.

Finally, through the intermediary of the Office of Overseas Scientific and Technical Research (ORSTOM), which has three centers in the Ivory Coast, with 20 scientific disciplines represented, France is subsidizing research projects in the amount of CFA 3.786 billion.

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IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

GEODETIC SURVEY--From 20 January to 3 March, a group of 10 experts in geodesy from several FRG universities developed a pilot project for geodesy using satellites, in collaboration with the Geographic Institute of the Ivory Coast. This project, carried out within the framework of Ivorian-FRG cooperation, has the purpose of providing the Ivory Coast with 17 geodesic points of very high precision that will serve as a base for establishment of geographic and road maps. The project will also be of very great utility for construction of roads and rail lines, as well as for carrying out irrigation projects and for exploitation of mining resources. At a ceremony on 3 March marking the end of this work, Mr Ernst-August Racky, the FRG's ambassador to Abidjan, handed over a set of geodesic observation equipment to the Geographic Institute of the Ivory Coast. This equipment, with a value of CFA 40 million, includes, in particular, two instruments for observation of artificial satellites and three vehicles. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Mar 82 p 725] COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 11267

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

MALAGASY FRANC EXCHANGE RATE--Antananarivo, 10 Apr (REUTER)--The Malagasy franc (FMG) no longer has fixed parity with the French franc, according to official exchange rates published by the central bank. The FMG, which has been worth one fifth the value of the French franc since leaving the franc zone in 1973, is now floating against other currencies. On Thursday, the exchange rate for the French franc was 49.94 FMG. Malagasy authorities have not given any explanation for this change, but informed sources say that negotiations between the Malagasy Republic and the IMF for the redress of the Malagasy economy "have resumed." These talks came to a standstill several months ago because of the drastic IMF demands which were apparently difficult for the country to implement. The country is currently facing an economic crisis and shortages of foodstuff and essential goods. [Text] [AB110726 London REUTER in French 1334 GMT 10 Apr 82]

COUP PLOTTERS IN CUSTODY--Antananarivo, 10 Apr (REUTER)--The suspected plotters of a coup aimed at overthrowing the regime of President Didier Ratsiraka have been remanded into custody after an inquiry by the Office of Investigation and Documentation (Political Police). This was announced on Saturday by the daily MADAGASCAR MATIN. The newspaper did not give the names of the suspected coup plotters. According to Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka, officers, civilians and clergymen were involved in the plot. The Malagasy head of state said last January that "the priest who engineered the plot intended to call on witches to make lightning strike at the houses of present Malagasy leaders." In case this method failed, I was to be killed by seven sticks of dynamite at Ambohitsirohitra Palace (presidential palace)," he added. [Text] [AB110645 London REUTER in French 1337 GMT 10 Apr 82]

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MALAWI

BRIEFS

POLYPROPYLENE BAG PRODUCTION--In keeping with a plan to develop activities to replace imports in Malawi, Blantyre Netting Company, a subsidiary of the David Whitehead group, will set up a factory to make polypropylene bags for packaging agricultural products (grain, fertilizer, etc.). Its annual production capacity is to be about 4 million bags. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 747] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8568

SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE AID--During his recent visit to Malawi, South African Agriculture Minister P. T. Du Plessis announced that his country would grant a loan of 1.5 million Malawian kwachas (over a period of 15 years at 2 percent) to the National Seed Company of Malawi in order to enable it to enlarge its warehouses and increase its feed stocks. He also said that his country would make a gift of 420,000 kwachas to finance the transportation of wheat which Malawi (whose needs increase at an annual rate of 24,000 tons) normally imports from South Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 747] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8568

CONTAINER TERMINAL--Lilongwe has just installed a container terminal (as an addition to the two terminals already set up in Blantyre) with an initial capacity of 120 units (6 meters per side); this will soon be expanded to 370 units. The overall cost of the operation is to come to almost 1.5 million kwachas. It should be noted that 60 percent of Malawi's exports and 50 percent of its imports travel in containers, principally via Nacala, second largest port in Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 747] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8568

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NIGERIA

MAJOR RAILROAD PROJECT, DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED

Details of Railroad Contracts

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82, p 739

[Text] Three railroad contracts of \$400 million each, recently concluded in Nigeria by a French company, a Yugoslav company, and a Chinese-Swiss consortium, actually involve a single international-gauge railway project of some 400 km aimed at linking Port Harcourt with the future Ajaokuta steel complex.

The French company (Dumez) has been assigned the Umuahia-Enugu section, the Yugoslav company (Partizanski), the Utonkon-Makurdi section, and the Chinese-Swiss consortium (CCECC-Electrowatt-Noga) the Oturkpo-Ayangba section (from a place halfway between Utonkon and Makurdi to another place halfway between Oturkpo and Ajaokuta).

Of the three remaining contracts to be concluded to complete the railway, a Brazilian company (Parana-Panama), presently under consideration, is to be assigned the southern Port Harcourt-Umuahia section. It is thought that another French company, Dragages et Travaux Publics, might be assigned the Enugu-Uranko section. On the other hand, it is not yet known which company will be selected to complete the last section, linking Ayangba with the steel complex.

The railroad project as a whole has been established at \$2.5 billion (more than half of this amount remains to be invested), and the project is expected to be finished before the completion of the steel complex itself, foreseen for 1985. We may recall that this complex is being built by the Soviets, headed by a firm called Tyazhpromexport.

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Development of Railroad Activity

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82, p 739

[Text] The Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) is counting on average monthly receipts of 7.7 million naira this year, or 92.4 million for the 12 months.

In 1980 its average monthly receipts came to only 5.07 million naira because of strikes. Off to a good start during the first quarter, with a

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monthly average of 7.4 million naira, receipts dropped in May and June due to protest movements.

It is to be noted that in 1979, monthly receipts came to only 3.82 million naira, and in 1978 to only 2.78 million.

The increase in receipts expected in 1982 is based on the normal development of traffic and, according to the railway organization, could be still higher if there is a revision in rates.

In fact, the increase in receipts each year has not kept pace with the cost of operations, which increases much more rapidly and leaves the organization with a deficit.

In 1978, with receipts of 33.45 million naira, operational costs increased to 74.77 million, giving a negative balance of 41.32 million naira.

In 1979, operational costs exceeded 100 million naira compared with receipts of 45.84 million, resulting in a huge deficit.

In 1982, because of increases in wages and other development costs, and despite receipts of 92.4 million naira, the deficit is expected to reach 80 million naira at the present rate schedule.

In another matter, the NRC has been pleased with the technical accord reached with Rail India Technical and Economic Services Ltd (RITES) early in 1979 for a period of three years, which expired at the end of 1981. In fact, this accord permitted the NRC to get back on its feet and develop its services.

Thus, with 10.5 million passengers per year, passenger traffic even exceeded the goal of 10 million established for the end of the period. Freight traffic, which a short time ago was still 230 railroad cars a day, has increased to 300 cars.

Lastly, in a year and a half, the number of railroad employees has increased from 30,000 to 35,000.

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

ARMS PURCHASE FROM SWITZERLAND--Switzerland: Nigeria is top customer for arms sales: According to the Swiss minister of defense, the country's arms sales totaled 511.5 million Swiss francs last year. The portion of that amount bought by Nigeria added up to 149.9 million francs. Thus, in this area Nigeria came into the lead among Switzerland's customers, ahead of West Germany (143.7 million francs) and Austria (76.1 million francs). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 396] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

MISSILE SHIPS FROM FRANCE--A ceremonial Nigerian flag-raising in Cherbourg on 6 February marked the delivery of three missile-launching patrol boats to Nigeria built by Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie. These patrol boats--"Siri," "Ayam," and "Ekun"--represent a 450-million-franc contract. They are due to leave the above-mentioned French port in a few weeks to get to Lagos at the end of a journey lasting 3 weeks, with stops in Spain, the Canaries, and Africa. In the event Nigerian military officials do not carry out training exercises with the collaboration of the French Navy, the three patrol craft might leave Cherbourg toward the end of March or in April. Otherwise, the three ships should be leaving France later on. The crew size is 50 for each of these patrol boats. They are 56 meters in length and 8 meters wide, and their means of propulsion is provided by four 4,500-horsepower engines which allow them to attain 37 knots. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 396] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

POLICE AUTHORIZED TO SHOOT--In January the Lagos police commissioner, Alhaji Mohammed Gambo, announced that from now on the police are authorized to shoot persons disturbing the peace by engaging in theft and murder. Directives have been given to the police concerning this. The commissioner stated that the measure has become necessary following an increase in the number of attacks, the victims of which are residents of the city. These attacks are most frequently made against motorists and when there are traffic accidents. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 396] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

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COOPERATION WITH EGYPT--On 27 January, Egypt and Nigeria signed an economic, scientific, and technological cooperation agreement in Lagos. On that occasion the Nigerian federal minister of planning, Mrs Adenike Egun Oyagbola, who signed the agreement along with Egypt's ambassador, Muhammad al-Atif Nawani, expressed regret regarding the imbalance in trade between the two countries, an imbalance very much in Egypt's favor. While Nigerian sales to Egypt have greatly declined, going from 143,000 to 17,000 naira just from 1975 to 1979, Egypt's sales to its Nigerian partner went from 965,000 to 1.1 million naira during the same period. In the area of technological cooperation, Mrs Oyagbola made the additional observation that there are currently some 2,000 Egyptian experts in Nigeria, mostly teachers, engineers, agricultural experts, and building experts. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 686] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

NEW SALT PRODUCTION COMPANY--New Nigeria Salt Company, Ltd, a salt-producing firm with an annual capacity of 120,000 tons, installed on Ogha Reki, in Bendel State, has recently entered into operation. This company, established with the technical participation of a Spanish company, Union Saltenera, cost about 17 million naira. The Spanish company is to provide management and administration for a temporary period of three years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 739] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8568

HOG, POULTRY PRODUCTION--Decline in hog production but increase in chicken production: Pork production is currently down in Nigeria, while chicken production is experiencing an increase. That is what the Federal Livestock Department states in a report recently made public. In fact, farmers raising animals seem to be more interested in poultry than in hogs, even though the latter are in great demand. That demand was estimated at about 50,000 tons of meat per year (which is 1.3 million animals), compared to local production, which is no more than 38,000 tons. By 1985, demand is estimated to be around 57,000 tons, with production to be fairly close to 52,000 tons. According to the Federal Livestock Department's report, hog raisers have not tried to expand their production--58 percent of them limiting themselves to fattening up only about 50 animals maximum, and only 15 percent fattening up 200 or more. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 686] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

DELEGATION FROM HONG KONG--A mission of some 15 members from the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce paid a visit to Nigeria in January. The members of this mission were representing the following sectors: construction materials; the plastics, electric, and electronics industries; watches; toys; and various leather and metal goods. It was emphasized that Nigeria is Hong Kong's top African customer. Its purchases totaled more than 1 billion Hong Kong dollars in 1980, showing a rise of 180 percent that year compared to the previous year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 685] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

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SENEGAMBIA

POSSIBLE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ANTICORRUPTION DRIVE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1101, 10 Feb 82 pp 22, 23

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "Diouf Against the Corrupt"]

[Excerpts] The arrest on the evening of 26 January of two Dakar physical therapists for forgery, use of forgery, and swindling, and the placing of two physicians under surveillance have aroused excitement in Senegalese medical and paramedical circles. There is the same excitement everywhere, for the fraud uncovered by the state inspectorate seems to implicate not only a few doctors and masseurs but also a good number of officials who are profiting from a particular social security system.

The "affair of the budget charges," as they call it in Senegal, seems actually to be quite broad. According to the national daily LE SOLEIL, the state has thereby lost 1 billion CFA francs (20 million French francs). How? The combine was quite ingenious. An official falls ill: thanks to a letter of guarantee, a "budgetary charge," he pays only one-fifth of the medical costs, with the state assuming the rest of the cost. Let us suppose that the official in question wishes to make a little money. He pays his share and goes to consult an unscrupulous doctor or physical therapist. The latter reimburses him his costs, adds a small supplement, and is paid by the state the remaining four-fifths for medical treatment he never gave. Since little brooks come together to form big rivers, certain doctors and physical therapists are said to have acquired more than comfortable fortunes this way. One of the arrested physical therapists, Siby Faye, owns a housing development near the airport consisting of 20 villas. Many Dakarians went there to spend the last weekend of January.

Dr Albert Bachir, a veteran of the RDA (African Democratic Rally), of Lebanese origin, placed under surveillance on the 27th, and head doctor of a clinic of the inner city, was known for similar activities. The physicians' Council of Order launched an investigation of him 3 months ago because he was suspected of engaging in the "charges" business. It was therefore no surprise to the Council. The surveillance of Dr Abdou Niang, on the other hand, seems more difficult for it to accept. Dr Niang, 72 years of age, is one of the first African physicians. He is a leading citizen, and a sheikh in addition, and grand master of the Masonic Lodge of the Grand Orient of France in Senegal. In his case the doctors speak of "negligence." After the affair became known, the Council of the Order of Physicians met to decide on what measures to take. But the idea of a communique was rejected, and a commission charged with establishing responsibilities was set up. "We

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are carrying out an investigation for our part in order to find out if these or other doctors have participated in this fraud," explained a member of the council. The physical therapists immediately announced that one of the accused, Becaye Diarra, did not have the degrees required by the profession, and that they therefore had nothing to do with him.

So much for the incident itself. But what is behind and around it is much more interesting. The affair has assumed such proportions that some Senegalese affirm...that it has been concocted out of whole cloth in order to distract attention from the increase in the price of rice which took effect on 30 January, going up from 80 to 105 CFA francs per kilogram. Others take it seriously, however. Unverifiable rumors of panic speak of quick sales of shares or of real estate in order to escape the roundup which seems to be in preparation. Because the desire to lance the abscess comes from very high.

As early as 21 September, President Abdou Diouf had demanded the opening of an inquiry into the "budgetary charges." A routine check, it was said. Actually, the President decided to act after receiving an anonymous letter informing him of the fraud. A final report at the end of January confirmed its allegations. The chief of state then decided to make the affair public.

Having done this, Abdou Diouf took another step. The creation in June 1981 of a Court for the Suppression of Illicit Enrichment, and then the removal of certain high personalities of the regime known for their "business sense," gained for him the trust of the little people. Nevertheless, some people still wanted to be convinced of the willingness of the chief of state to hand out punishment. Just how far will they go this time? This is the question which everyone is asking. "We will go right to the end," said Prime Minister Habib Thiam, "in conformity with the instructions of the chief of state." On 26 January, during a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Abdou Diouf in fact declared that the Senegalese Government was willing "to struggle against fraud of all kinds by imposing appropriate punishment, whoever the perpetrators may be." No one seems to be protected.

Siby Faye is actually the official physical therapist of the wife of the President and is a friend of the family. He is, moreover, the right-hand man and spokesman of the caliph of a Tidjania subbrotherhood. When one knows the strength and importance of Senegalese Muslim Brotherhoods, one better understands this thought: "It had to be done! Abdou does not lack courage."

Some newly rich men must not feel very well at the beginning of this year. It is not that corruption is more widespread in Senegal than elsewhere; it is rather less so, as a matter of fact. The difference is that today the government is making it a fundamental problem against which it is determined to struggle, and do it quietly and legally. Where are they headed? In Africa one usually witnesses this type of operation after each coup d'etat. The newcomers accuse their predecessors of having filled their pockets, empty their bank accounts, and shoot or imprison them. One has seen it in Ghana, Liberia, and in Nigeria after the Biafra war. In Zaire, embezzlement of funds was for a time subject to the death penalty.

It is also true of countries where discretion is the norm. It is arranged within the family. In Senegal, too, they gladly kept their eyes closed. The perpetrators

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of the embezzlements in the National Office of Trade in Agricultural Products, ONCTAD, that were "uncovered" in 1979 have not been severely punished, and no embezzler has ever felt threatened.

There is no coup d'etat in sight, and therefore no bloody purge on the horizon and no really repressive law. The Senegalese embezzler had been a happy man. The arrival of Abdou Diouf spoiled the game. In 1 year the government, under his stimulus, has set up the structures necessary to suppress illicit enrichment and embezzlement. But some people reproach him for not moving fast or firmly enough, and for not using the instruments which he has created. The reproach is only half justified. One of the main keys to the personality of Abdou Diouf, like that of his prime minister, is incontestably his discretion. Discretion, but firmness. The year 1982 may well contain some surprises, for once the first stage has been broached, President Diouf will have to confirm his action or risk appearing to have engaged in deception.

This is not easy, for precisely in the field of the struggle against corruption he will have to--he has to now--attack men who gravitate around power and who are even its barons. This economic and moral battle is actually accompanied by a parallel political battle. By striking hard, Abdou Diouf risks causing damage within his party which could hurt him in a presidential election year.

On the other hand, it is difficult for him not to act: corruption is a scourge which undermines institutions and enfeebles an already sick economy. As a chief of state determined to restore the situation in his country, Abdou Diouf can only make it his own problem. The struggle against corruption is his fight, a long and difficult fight which no African chief of state has attempted in similar conditions. Abdou Diouf is walking a tightrope, and this without doubt is the reason why he is advancing slowly. But surely.

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SENEGAMBIA

GAMBIAN, SENEGALESE CONFEDERATION SEEN FOR SENEGAMBIA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1102 17 Feb 82 pp 28, 29

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "The Free Union"]

[Excerpts] It was expected for 1 January, but it was finally on 1 February 1982 that the Senegambian Confederation was born.

The Senegalese have never valued it. Gambia, they say, is Senegal, and the creation of the confederation seems to them to be a matter of course. The first to rejoice about it are without doubt the Casamancians, cut off from the rest of the country by Gambia and forced to undergo vexations and insults inflicted upon them by customs officials, police, or ordinary citizens every time they made the ferry crossing--the Gambians have always refused to build a bridge over the Gambia River. "They're going to have to respect us now," they say.

On the other hand, some businessmen and all the smugglers are sad, for the Senegalese Government has not concealed the fact that the first problem which the confederation should attack is contraband (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1081). But the contraband sale in Senegal of products imported in excess of Gambia provides a living for many small and large businessmen. Worse yet, the Gambian state derives two-thirds of its revenues from the import duties it levies on merchandise with which it floods Senegal. On the other hand, some Senegalese peasants, businessmen, and religious leaders find it more advantageous to go sell their crops in Gambia, while subsidies, fertilizer, and so forth have been provided to them by the Senegalese state. The latter must, with the help of its Gambian "half," find a means of putting an end to this vast mess. But in defending itself, Senegal risks weakening its partner and could in this case feel obliged, while waiting for the recovery of the economic situation in Gambia, to make good the difference. Can it permit itself to do this? What is certain is that patience is the main requisite for success.

The difficulties do not derive from the economy alone. While an immense majority of Senegalese favor the confederation, it is otherwise with the Gambians. Its opponents fall into two categories: those who are against the principle itself in the name of nationalism, and those who criticize the procedure.

Like all the nongovernmental Senegalese parties, the Gambian opposition represented in the Assembly wanted, without jeopardizing the principle, for the plan to be submitted to a referendum beforehand. It is difficult to guess the result. This

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is doubtless why parliament opted for a vote. As a diplomat explained it: "Historically, economically, culturally, and socially, the union is indispensable. Was it necessary to try to bring it about immediately, or to wait while knowing all the while that there were risks of instability?"

As evidence of its desire not to plunder its neighboring country, Senegal accepted that the Parliament of the Confederation would consist one-third of Gambian deputies and two-thirds of Senegalese. This in no way reflects the numerical disproportion which exists between the two populations: 10 to 1. What will confederation bring to the Gambians? Political stability and security. Also, perhaps a greater democracy, which should benefit the 13 men condemned to death for the unsuccessful coup in July: their sentences could be commuted to life imprisonment. The harnessing of the Gambia River, the development of agricultural research, and tourism, thanks to Senegalese aid, are also positive points.

It remains to be seen what the future of the confederation will be. There is no lack of examples of failures. But successes also exist. Tanganyika and Zanzibar became the Republic of Tanzania in 1964. While relations between Dar-es-Salaam and Zanzibar have sometimes been tense, the union has nevertheless never been jeopardized. Nor [has] that of the United Arab Emirates, which have been living together since 1971. The Cameroon experience is also interesting. The federation of an English-speaking part of Cameroon with its French-speaking neighbor in 1961 gave birth, after a referendum in 1972, to the United Republic of Cameroon. As is the case with Senegambia, the two sides officially have different languages, French and English, but the people actually speak the same languages: Wolof and Manding, in the case of Senegambia. The Cameroonian federation has evolved toward a unitary state; the Tanzanian union does not exclude internal autonomy for each party. Although the future of Senegambia also appears to be under happy auspices, one should note the caution shown by the two partners. Gambia, with its own national anthem and flag, still exists in the UN and the OAU, as does a sovereign Senegal. Provided that realism remains in force, the confederation will probably become a federation. This at least is what they intend in Dakar. Furthermore, they do not hide the fact that a union "in which the particular characteristics of each shall be respected" remains the final goal. This will be the first time in continental Africa that two sovereign states--English-speaking Cameroon had a choice only between federation with Cameroon or with Nigeria--will have reached a common agreement to erase the absurd frontiers inherited from the colonial period.

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SENEGAMBIA

BRIEFS

PPP CANDIDATES--Banjul, 13 Apr (REUTER)--Gambia's ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP) is fielding candidates in all of the West African country's 35 constituencies in forthcoming general elections, officials said today. As candidate lists closed last night for the May 4 and 5 elections, the PPP had put up 35 candidates, three of them unopposed, the National Convention Party (NCP) 19 and the United Party three. There are also 14 independent candidates. The PPP currently has 30 of the 35 parliamentary seats with the NCP holding the rest. Presidential elections are due to be held at the same time, pitting President Dawda Jawara against NCP leader Sherif Diba, currently on trial for his alleged role in a failed coup last July which was crushed by troops from neighbouring Senegal. [Text] [AB131321 London REUTER in English 1048 GMT 13 Apr 82]

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SIERRA LEONE

BRIEFS

ELECTIONS DEATHS, INJURIES--Freetown, 12 Apr (REUTER)--Several people were injured and some may have died in clashes in Sierra Leone during recent voting for candidates for forthcoming one-party elections, according to political sources. They said 19 people were hurt last Friday when supporters of rival candidates clashed in the remote northern constituency of Koinadugu East, adding that unconfirmed reports of deaths and further violence in the north had reached Freetown. Supporters of Koinadugu's current representative, Mohamed Mara, said those of challenger Shehu Sesay attacked them with machetes, iron bars and sticks. An unspecified number of people were injured by knives, sticks and stones in Freetown West One constituency where the son of President Siaka Stevens, Alex, is challenging incumbent Sylvanus Kamara, the sources said. Results of primary elections held between April 6 and 11, are due tomorrow, and general elections are due on April 29 and 30, the first since Sierra Leone became a one-party state under the All People's Congress in 1978. [Text] [AB121032 London REUTER in English 1015 GMT 12 Apr 82]

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SOUTH AFRICA

NEW GOLD BAR TO BE INTRODUCED

PM151453 London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 15 Apr 82 p 6

[David Marsh report: "South Africa To Sell New Gold Bar"]

[Text] South Africa, the world's principal gold producer, is about to follow the example of the Soviet Union, its main bullion trading rival, by introducing a super-high quality gold bar into its marketing range.

The new bar--of 99.99 per cent purity compared with the standard South African ingot of 99.5 per cent--will be introduced mainly to meet heavy demand for high-quality gold from Far East markets.

The Soviet Union manufactures 99.99 per cent bars as part of its normal refining process. The Russian product is prized particularly by the jewellery and electronics industry in Japan, which has emerged as the single biggest buyer of gold on the international market over the past year.

The South African innovation was announced in parliament by Mr Owen Horwood, the finance minister. He said the South African Chamber of Mines would sell overseas this summer standard 400 ounce bars with 99.99 per cent purity.

The chamber will also market smaller one-kilo gold bars with the higher purity.

The new bars will be produced at the Rand refinery in Johannesburg, with marketing probably starting in July.

One-kilo bars are proving especially popular at the moment in Far Eastern centres like Indonesia and Japan, where banks have just started to sell bullion over the counter. Bullion dealers in London report a lengthy waiting list for orders to consign small bars to the Far East. It is this gap in supplies which South Africa will be trying to plug.

The Soviet Union, too, for some time has been considering producing one-kilo bars for sale in the Far and Middle East.

The world's two main producers claim never to have contact in bullion marketing. But they are following broadly similar policies in trying to diversify sales.

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South Africa has already been successful in spreading sales away from standard gold bars. The Chamber of Mines has just announced improved demand for Krugerrand coins, which March sales of 664,335 ounces, the highest monthly figure for two years. [As published]

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ZAIRE

REPRESSIVE MEASURES REPORTEDLY USED TO QUELL STRIKERS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 259, 15-28 Feb 82 p 45

[Article: "Zaire : Repression Constantly Starting Up Again"]

[Text] The University of Kinshasa and the National Teacher-training Institute (INP) have been closed until further notice, the "ringleaders" have been drafted into the army for "reeducation," and most of the other students have been sent back to their homes. These are the retaliatory measures, now become standard practice in Mobutu's kingdom, with which the Zairian Government has responded to the student protest which flared up once more in January.

According to State Commissioner (Minister) for Information Kande Dzambulate, these Draconian measures are justified by "the character of the movement, which is definitely confirmed to be subversive, and the necessity of maintaining order and discipline." However, the goal of the strike started by the students—a strike which lasted 2 weeks before the Draconian sanctions fell the night of 31 January-1 February—was to support demands for basic material needs, and, in particular, to protest against the amount for student grants, considered ridiculously low.

In the face of silence on the part of the authorities, the movement was accompanied by street demonstrations and by outbursts of anger—anger turned against an increasingly detested regime. It was going too far. But when you are acquainted with the expeditious methods of Mobutu "justice," you might well fear the worst for the victims of the measures of arrest and of "conscription" into the army.

However, one conclusion is already emerging. It is pointless to use the most extreme methods of repression to try to stifle the voice of a population. Dramatic blows can be struck, but after a few weeks or months of "cemetery" calm, protest once again reappears right where the protest movement had been most savagely decapitated and wiped out. Thus, one remembers the mighty movements of struggle in 1980-1981 which had shaken Zairian universities and higher institutes. Following those outbreaks, the higher education establishments had been closed for several months, the entire leadership of the only student union had been removed, a great number of professors and students had been arrested, and others had already been drafted into the army. Tens of young people had "chosen" the path of exile to flee the repression.

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A few months later, however, everything is starting up again, as has just been seen, even though nothing in the government's intentions or methods has changed. On the contrary, the student strike has taken place in a social and political context marked by the continuation if not intensification of what is circumspectly called violation of human rights. And the most dreadful news continues to cross the borders, evading the tight vigilance of the Zairian police. More and more, these days, the Zairian police are heavily seconded by Israeli agents, whose experience in the area of repressive "tracking down" is well known. Thus, the bodies of six young people arrested at Uvira in Kivu on 17 March 1981, including Sakiki and Shindano, were found a short time later in Lake Tanganyika. They had been shot in the head and killed by the regime's policemen. In May, Faustin Kinuku and Mincent Waziwazi, members of the underground MNC-L (Congolese National Movement-Lumumba wing), suffered a similar fate. But before they were killed, their teeth had been broken, they had been whipped with a cable, and they had been tortured with electric shocks.

More recently, five students at the Higher Institute for Applied Technology —Bongo, Ingindu, Lubaki, Mboyo, and Nkiere—were shot down in the buildings of the National Police (CNRI) [expansion unknown]. Last 27 October those same CNRI services proceeded to carry off Mosobda ShadTrack, the traditional grand chieftain of the Katango, in Makambo. There has been no news of him since. Finally, in January the arrest of a militant Lumumba follower was announced, Ekongo Paul, "picked up" at his home by Mobutu police. Nobody knows where he was taken.

These are only a few examples, but they are sufficient for those promoting the African Charter of the Rights of Man and of Nations, adopted unanimously last June in Nairobi, to start getting upset in concrete terms about what is happening in Mobutu's kingdom.

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ZAIRE

SUGAR FIRM SEEKS VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT FOR MODERNIZATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 405

[Article: "Sugar Industry: Supply of Vehicles and Equipment for Kwilu-Ngongo"]

[Text] In the context of the SDR [Special Drawing Rights] 20.2 million (approximately \$24 million) granted to Zaire by the International Development Association (IDA, a World Bank affiliate) to finance the renovation of the Kwilu-Ngongo Sugar Company and increase its capacity, that company proposes to acquire the following equipment (24 consignments): 1) 10 small all-surface trucks, 5 self-propelled firefighting vehicles (sugarcane fields), 1 self-propelled firefighting vehicle (industrial buildings); 2) 3 four-axle diesel locomotives, .60-meter gage, approximately 250 horsepower; 3) 1 forklift truck; 4) 5 dump trucks; 5) 7 12.5-kilovolt-ampere generator units and 1 40-kilovolt ampere generator unit; 6) 5 welding sets; 7) 2 high-pressure cleaning apparatuses for cleaning machines and engines; 8) 1 chain press; 9) 1 cylinder boring machine and 1 cylinder glazing machine; 10) 1 test bed for injection pumps; 11) 1 universal grinding machines; 12) 1 valve cutter and equipment for grinding valve seatings; 13) 2 lubrication stations for garage purposes; 14) machine tools for steel work: 1 slide lathe 1.5 meters between centers, 1 slide lathe 1.5 meters between centers able to make successive cuts, 1 (variable) capstan lathe, and 1 vertical turning mill; 15) hydraulic press equipment; 16) 1 lathe for grinding sugar refinery cylinders; 17) 1 universal milling machine; 18) 1 computer; 19) equipment for office complex air-conditioning; 20) water supply equipment; 21) equipment for renovation of evaporation operation (steel, tubing, steam and vacuum valves); 22) equipment for renovation of boilers (various pipes and coils of tubing, fireproof bricks); 23) equipment for carbon dioxide plant: 1 freon unit, 1 unit for storing and weighing liquid carbon dioxide, 1 pump for carbon dioxide scrubbing; and 24) various garage equipment: a pressing machine for vulcanization, a tire removal apparatus, a wheel balancer. The equipment must originate in an IDA member country or Switzerland.

Bidders interested in this invitation to tender can obtain special schedule 003-81-C.S. in return for payment of 150 zaires or 1,000 Belgian francs to the following addresses: 1) Compagnie sucriere de Kwilu-Ngongo [Kwilu-Ngongo Sugar Company], 1963, avenue de l'Industrie, BP 8816, Kinshasa (Zaire); 2) Compagnie sucriere de Kwilu-Ngongo, c/o Sogesucre [General Sugar Company], 13, rue de Brederode, 1000 Bruxelles [Brussels] (Belgium). Deadline for delivery of bids: 12 March 1982.

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

BADEA AID—In our 4 December 1981 issue (page 3252) we pointed out that the Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA) had granted a loan of \$10 million to Zaire for financing of a project to develop and modernize river and rail transportation networks. This loan is redeemable in 10 years, including a 3-year grace period, and it carries an annual interest rate of 8 percent. BADEA recently put out a release stating that the project, financed as described above, came within the framework of the five-year plan for investments in the transportation and communications sector. The project's goal is to improve the railroad infrastructure and its linkage to river ports, which should provide for a better flow of exports and particularly for getting copper out. It should be pointed out that with this agreement, the total BADEA commitment in Zaire goes up to \$36.8 million. Zaire has already benefited from two of the bank's assistance efforts: \$10 million for a water supply project, and \$4.4 million for an oil palm cultivation project. From 1973 up to the end of the first half of 1981, Arab assistance contributed to Zaire has reached \$444.4 million. Eighty percent of that money was given on liberal terms. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 405] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

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