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West Europe Report

(FOUO 2/82)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

KREISKY ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS

DW230957 Hamburg STERN in German 23 Dec 81 pp 48-52

[Interview with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky by editors Bernd Doerler, Georg Karb and Henri Nanner in Vienna, date of interview not given]

[Text] STERN: Mr Chancellor, you have just returned from a tour of the Persian Gulf states. Austria is not a world power, but the head of the Austrian Government obviously deems himself a world politician. How does that jibe?

Kreisky: The Austrian head of government does not operate as a world politician but is an old man who, of the 70 years of his life, spent at least 55 awarely as a politically thinking person. And during these 55 years he did see quite a lot of people, political configurations, crisis and wars. And this Austrian chancellor does advocate the presumptuous view that whenever he sees a solution in a difficult world configuration of which he believes that it is practicable, he should say so, too. After all, it has turned out that people occasionally wish to know this.

STERN: People have often said that your stand for the Arabs and against the state of Israel is quite remarkable, for a Jew. Do you propose to overcompensate something there?

Kreisky: Well, you know, this is old hat as far as I am concerned; I am familiar with it, and you can forget it. As far as I am concerned the Middle East has been the politically most important part of the world since World War II. And I will tell you why. A new state has emerged here due to the Europeans' fault. Without Hitler Israel never would have gained this virulence. But it was not Hitler alone. Other European politicians did not behave particularly magnanimously in the face of the Jewish persecution in Germany. Then they created this state by UN decision and stuck to the principle: "Right or wrong--we are greatly culpable, we are unable to prevent the misfortune which swooped down on the European Jews, and therefore we must protect them no matter what the cost might be." But you cannot make amends for one injustice by means of another. So, this new state existed in hostility with its neighbors, the expelled Palestinians, and it has always been clear to me that a catastrophe will occur unless a melting process takes place.

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STERN: Did the UN declaration of March 1948 not envisage two states in Palestine, an Arab state and a Jewish state?

Kreisky: Yes, of course, all this is exactly written down on paper, but history has ignored it. Just the same, I am convinced that Israel in the long run will be able to live only if it comes to terms with its neighbors. It is possible to negotiate on anything, and one must try to do that, anyway. I realized quite early that the Palestinian problem is the crucial problem of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Hence, Israel must negotiate with the Palestinians. You just cannot pick the one whom the other side selects as its representative. Hence, if it is 'Arafat, then they must negotiate with 'Arafat.

STERN: Prime Minister Begin says, as did Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir in STERN just recently, that they would not sit down at the same table with a terrorist who has made Israel's destruction his maxim.

Kreisky: Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir, after all, was one of those who at the time participated in the assassination of Graf Folke Bernadotte. And probably there was nobody who was as meritorious for the Jews as was this Swedish count. Near the end of the war Graf Folke Bernadotte achieved through negotiations the option of liberating the Scandinavians but also tens of thousands of Jews. Because of these extraordinary merits he was sent to Israel as UN commissioner to implement there the UN resolution on the two states.

STERN: But Israel's Prime Minister Begin also refused to negotiate with 'Arafat whose people committed bomb attempts on school buses.

Kreisky: You know, terrorism is a strange matter. There is a terrorism as a means to its own end--that involves the crazy people who really do not have any particular objective, such as the Red Army faction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. They simply want to destroy the democratic order. Then there is the other terrorism which I will neither condone nor approve, yet this terrorism often marks the beginning of revolutions and political movements. De Valera, the Irish president of long years, first was a terrorist--and later a recognized, respected statesman. And there was hardly any more terrible and brutal terror movement in Africa than the Mau-Mau revolt led by Yomo Kenyatta. But later Kenyatta became a statesman and a hope for stability in Africa.

And let us not forget that Begin at the time blew up the "King David Hotel" in Jerusalem with his people. The victims at the time were British soldiers--but I do not differentiate. To me women and children as victims are just as pitiable as is the humble English soldier or Graf Bernadotte. I do not accept this double morale. I do not approve of the terrorism of the Palestinians, but neither do I share the hypocritical outrage displayed if and when this happens to oneself. There has always been that kind of terrorism which ceases immediately once the goals can be attained with different means.

STERN: Can the Israelis sit down with the Arabs at one table as long as the Arab states do not accept the existence of Israel?

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Kreisky: Why should the recognition stand at the beginning? One starts negotiations always with maximum demands. They should try it first. If nothing came of it, one would at least have done everything. But as things are today, the Israelis do not want to negotiate at all. They want to dominate the region, and whether they want to do it out of a need for security or because they consider themselves the masters of the Middle East does not matter in the end. You see, when I made my first trips to the Arab countries, I was not received in a friendly way at all. They have naturally told the socialist Kreisky: You come as a representative of the socialist international, the political grouping which failed in the case of France in Algeria, which marched to the Suez Canal with the socialist Premier Guy Mollet, the British and the Israelis. Well, I was suspicious to them as a socialist. Not only as a Jew; that did not interest the people. You forget that the Arabs are not anti-Semites.

It was not much different with regard to the West. When I first met al-Nasir in 1965 and 'Arafat in 1974, the European politicians asked what Kreisky want to achieve there, adding that he should not bore us over and over again with these things. They considered the Palestinian problem only as a refugee problem, and they believed Golda Meir who had said: "There is no Palestinian people, all that is nonsense." When the oil crisis came, one has suddenly thought differently, saying that Kreisky obviously has the best relations with the Arabs and that Kreisky should handle the matter.

STERN: The idealist Kreisky suddenly became a useful man for the pragmaticists?

Kreisky: You see, I have not spoken of idealism. I said that I may have realized somewhat earlier than others that the Middle East will become a hotbed of crisis if the Palestinian problem will not be solved, and that a new war is more likely to come from there than from the big powers who know what will happen to them if they start a war. But the big powers can become involved in it.

And as regards oil, I have my own experience, too. I have been dealing with energy problems much earlier than others. Austria would still be a Russian oil colony if we had not excluded this in long negotiations with the Russians from the 1955 state treaty. Austria has a few oil fields, and according to the state treaty pact of the victorious powers, the Russians were to have the right of sitting up to 30 years on the oil fields opened up by them. So they would still be sitting there today. After fierce disputes we have eliminated this from the state treaty through negotiations.

I realized it pretty soon that the energy basis of Western Europe does not lie in Europe and that it will lie for a long time far away, namely in the Middle East. The Americans have their own energy resources, the Russians have theirs, the Poles have their coal, only Western Europe was living at that time from the oil of the Arabs. Naturally we have found some oil in the meantime, but of the 600 million tons of oil consumed annually by Western Europe, some 400 million come from the Arab states. In such a situation Europe cannot afford not to cooperate with Arab countries, even more so since it turned out that alternative energies are not available--for political reasons. The only ones who managed to use nuclear energy on a large scale are the French. Otherwise nuclear energy supply of Europe has practically failed. So Arab oil remains for us the most important energy basis.

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The Western statesmen suddenly realized that the socialist dreamer is a quite pragmatic man, and from there on one had much understanding for my policy. It is obvious now for the European community that we must do everything to live under acceptable conditions with the Arabs.

STERN: But the Arabs said they would drive the Israelis into the sea. Are negotiations between Israelis and Arabs at all possible under these circumstances?

Kreisky: That is an old hat. I think it is extraordinary that the Arabs, responsible Arabs, say today: "We realize that the state of Israel exists, that is a reality. Help us now to found a Palestinian state so that these two states can exist side by side as envisaged by the UN resolution." And in this situation Israel says "no."

STERN: Jordan is a state mostly populated by Palestinians.

Kreisky: At the time being some 1.2 million Palestinians still live on the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip. And that is occupied country like Czechoslovakia when it was occupied by Hitler and treated as a protectorate. We cannot ignore that. No moral right exists to withhold a state from the Palestinians. Moreover, Israel would never be able to handle such a large Arab populace. That would be a built-in explosive with which an Israeli state could not exist in the long run. The plan presented by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd is clearly based on the existence of the Israeli state. Point 7 says: "Conformation of the states of the region to exist in peace." Israel belongs to this. And what do they do? They annex the Golan Heights, and Israeli Prime Minister Begin has the cynicism to state in the Israeli Parliament that the timing was caused by the Polish crisis. The attention of the world is focused on Warsaw so that Israel does not make the headlines. The annexation of the Golan Heights is an obvious violation of international law. I can only support the statement of the German-Israeli working circle for peace in the Middle East, when this really not anti-Israeli circle stated through its chairman, evangelical Professor of theology Rendtorff: "Israel's radical territorialism plays openly into the hands of radical Arab forces." No wonder that there are people among the Arabs who consider even 'Arafat a traitor if he is prepared to negotiate with Israel.

STERN: The conference of Fez has shown that the Arabs do hold different views about the Fahd plan. And perhaps Israel thinks this Fahd plan is just some bluff.

Kreisky: This can be found out only if a test is made. What I told Israeli Interior Minister Burg just recently was this: "Why don't you sit down and find out whether it is bluffing." It is, after all, a big chance if as important a country as Saudi Arabia has the courage to advance such a proposal. After all, such a proposal does not mean "root, hog, or die." Nobody says that Israel must adopt the plan as it is. Yet, it is necessary to sit down and negotiate--provided one really wants peace.

STERN: Do you believe that the PLO would be satisfied with the West Bank and the Gaza Strips? Is Israel's apprehension so wholly unjustified in that continuously new attacks might be launched against Israel from this Palestinian state?

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Kreisky: Israel would not be any weaker if a Palestinian state would exist on this territory whose form and armament might be subject to negotiations. After all, nobody asks the Israelis to disarm. It is quite definite that they will continue to be the strongest military power of the region. The present situation is what constitutes for Israel the real source of all tensions and security problems. Just as the Balkan dodged our control at the time the Middle East, too, will be beyond any control unless pacification is achieved there.

STERN: How can the Middle East calm down if the United States concludes a military pact with Israel and the Soviet Union an assistance treaty with the Syrians?

Kreisky: The Americans do not even understand the whole problem. In the United States the presidents obviously begin to think about the Palestinian problem only when their term is over. Besides, the two superpowers in reality are trembling with fear of being dragged into war by the Syrians or by the Israelis. And the vast majority of the Arabs, too, does not want the Russians. They want to be left alone by both great powers as much as possible. After all, it is the fault of the policy of the Israelis that the Soviet Union is now sitting in this region.

STERN: Do you consider it possible that you would fly to Israel to point out your standpoint to Begin?

Kreisky: That is senseless. The aversions between us are too great. A mediator can be only somebody who is trusted by both sides. I have done what I could to outline the problem.

STERN: And you believe that the Israelis have no reason to mistrust you?

Kreisky: No, they have no reason, by God. If they need something from me, they come to me. For instance when it comes to letting 250,000 Russian Jews emigrate through Austria to Israel. No other country in the world wanted to handle this task. We are doing it for 15 years.

STERN: But if reconciliation between Jews and Arabs is the work of your life, so to speak, should not you overcome yourself to make a step toward Begin?

Kreisky: To make that clear: The work of my life lies in Austria. This is where I have to fulfill my political mission. My relations with the Middle East were a task I have set myself next to other things, but it gained more and more significance. Today all West European governments realize, be it in Bonn, London, Brussels or Oslo, that the solution of the Palestinian problem is the key to solving the Middle East problem. A simple person cannot achieve more.

STERN: But the problem will still occupy you.

Kreisky: I will tell you an anecdote: Around 1912 or 1913 the whole glorious Austrian Army was parading on Vienna's Ringstrasse. The lancers in their neat uniforms and the dragoons in their attire. A spectator says to another: "Say, are they not too nice for waging war?" I think of that anecdote which is not pathetic when I see the young Israelis working somewhere in a kubbuz, or when I see the young Arabs. Then I say to myself that they are really too good for

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waging war. But it seems that the Israeli politicians are far from this insight. Read the bible. There are unbelievably many examples showing that Israel has always fought at the wrong time, at the wrong place against the wrong people and that it has always lost. Heroism alone does not help any, politics is a matter of reason. But I fear that Mr Begin and Mr Shamir are about to prepare a new biblical fate for the Israeli people.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

AMBASSADOR MARTINET ON NATO, FOREIGN POLICY, PACIFISM

Rome MONDOPERAIO in Italian Nov 81 pp 18-20

[Interview with Giles Martinet, French Ambassador to Italy, by Mario Baccianini, correspondent for MONDOPERAIO; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Last July 50,000 peace marchers descended on Paris from northern Europe. They were received with indifference. A march organized by the PCF at the end of October was equally disappointing. The non-Communist French Left seems willing to exert itself mainly for causes like Afghanistan and Poland, but it is luke-warm about incipient neutralism in West Germany, Holland (where this peace movement originated) and England. Is this just because the Reagan administration's military choices are of no concern to France now that France is out of NATO? Or are there more complex reasons?

[Answer] There are more complex reasons. We want Europe to be independent both politically--especially where the Third World is concerned--and economically, especially as regards American and Japanese competition. We would like Europe to be independent militarily as well, but we know that that isn't possible. Europe as a whole has not been willing to make the effort that would have enabled it to have military power comparable to those of the USSR and the USA. Our population is larger than that of the Soviet Union and our industry is stronger, but we allocate only about 3.5 percent of our national revenue to military expenditures compared to the 12-14 percent spent by the USSR. From the moment when, for very praiseworthy reasons--you can call them development or social progress--we bet on peaceful coexistence, we have relied on our alliance with the United States for our defense. You can't get away from that. We don't have the right to say we want to be defended from a potential Soviet threat and at the same time reject the consequences of our alliance with the United States.

[Question] But that alliance can also have undesirable political costs.

[Answer] Our position on this point is common knowledge, as reflected in the press all over the world after the Mitterrand-Reagan meeting. We don't want our military alliance to affect our foreign policy or our economic policies. But in the realm of the military, since we don't intend to make the effort to maintain the balance of power in the world by ourselves our dependence on the United States is inevitable. We don't understand why some people who accept the Atlantic Alliance--as the French and Italian Communists do--want to deprive the United States of the means to ensure this defense.

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[Question] Isn't it slightly paradoxical that the Italian and even the French Communists--albeit with mental reservations--recognize the need for the Atlantic Alliance, whereas traditionally pro-NATO groups like the British Labor Party, certain sectors of the SPD (German Socialist Party), and even some members of the British and German liberal parties are questioning this need?

[Answer] I should say that French public opinion, including the Socialists, is very independent. But independent thinking takes two forms in Europe, one pacifist and the other "military." In France we don't have the problem of the installation of American missiles on our territory, it's true, since De Gaulle rid our soil of the American presence completely. Instead we have our nuclear force de frappe [strike force], and it is this force on which some of France's independents base their position. A lot of people say: If there were to be a war in Europe--and we don't think there will be, despite everything--then it will be a war of coalitions, and that is what we are used to. But if the Americans or the Soviets were to start such a war under circumstances which we found unacceptable, we have the means to protect our neutrality: the force de frappe. You can disagree with this reasoning. But you have to bear in mind the fact that because it has nuclear weapons France is not in the same position as the other European countries.

[Question] You mean it has a sort of potential armed "neutrality?"

[Answer] Yes, but with this difference: if we were faced with a war unleashed by Soviet aggression we would undoubtedly go to war. If, however, events were to take place somewhere in the world that induced the Americans to intervene and force their European allies to join them in their venture, we would be able to make our own choice.

[Question] On Saturday 17 October LE MONDE reported Mitterrand's trip to America: "Washington considers the French president able but hard to understand." What is it about Mitterrand that the American administration finds enigmatic?

[Answer] The Americans were surprised by our firmness about East-West relations. They expected strong disagreement with their policies, partly because we have Communist ministers in our government. The fact that of all the countries of Europe we were the firmest vis-a-vis the USSR was a big surprise to them. But then we criticized the Americans for their attitude toward Latin America, especially Central America. We made a joint statement with the Mexican government about civil rights in El Salvador. The Third World's problem is to free itself from poverty. The Americans find this reasoning hard to understand. For them everything is black or white. There is the problem of relations with the USSR, they say. Our attitude is firm on the problems of Afghanistan, Cambodia and Poland? Then we must also support everyone who is fighting Communism in the world, including Latin American dictators. We don't accept this concept, and the Americans, just as they consider us realists where East-West relations are concerned, consider us starry-eyed idealists where North-South relations are concerned.

[Question] Henu does not exclude the possibility of producing the N bomb. It seems to me that the French position resembles Carter's: continue research, perhaps be able to produce it, but then make a political decision as to whether to actually produce it. These statements don't bother the French. Is that because there is a widespread conviction in France that the Russians took advantage of the detente years to alter the balance of military power--conventional or nuclear--in their favor?

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[Answer] There are various opinions in the French socialist movement. One group is hostile to the neutron bomb and even had trouble accepting the idea of our maintaining a strike force. Another group is basically pacifist, but is in the minority.

[Question] In public opinion as a whole, too?

[Answer] Yes. But surveys have shown that the majority of the population accepts the strike force. There are two schools of thought among those who accept the strike force, however. The first adheres to the doctrine of deterrence. It is really a sort of neutralism: we say that deterrence can only be a national issue, not European. In the present circumstances this means simply letting it be known that the French sanctuary is inviolable. This theory has been expounded by various circles, including some generals. It was General De Gaulle's official theory.

[Question] But it's hard to reconcile it with membership in the Atlantic Alliance and with policies based on a European Community...

[Answer] That's true, because it is based on the following reasoning: if someone attacks French territory we will use our atomic bombs. This is the principle of deterrence. But if we look at the map we see that we don't have any borders in common with the USSR and if we were ever in a position where we were not threatened by a war that started in West Germany, for example, either we would go to war because we thought there had been aggression, and then we would have to join our allies, or we would withdraw from the alliance and take refuge in our sanctuary. Those who hold this latter opinion are against the neutron bomb, not because it is more terrible than other bombs--it is less terrible than the atomic bomb we have--but because if we produce the neutron bomb we are accepting the idea of fighting in Germany and rejecting the idea of a French sanctuary. But if we are already involved in a war in Germany fought with tactical weapons it will be hard for us to brandish this threat. The theory of deterrence is one of all or nothing: either the Apocalypse or leave us alone.

[Question] But this makes sense only in a context of political neutrality.

[Answer] In fact, some people think that we should retain the possibility of France's deciding to avoid the conflict, and that we should therefore keep this apocalyptic threat. Others think that if there is a war in Europe it will be a war between coalitions and we will be drawn into it because we can't accept a Soviet presence on the Rhine, for example. So then we ask ourselves why we shouldn't have the same weapons our allies have in a war between coalitions.

[Question] So we have three trends in France: one pacifist, one neutralist (the "French sanctuary"), and one based on a solid alliance among Western countries, especially European ones.

[Answer] This third trend is represented now by the present government and by the President of the Republic, feeling that France's policy should not be purely selfish and that the force de frappe is an important political factor for Europe. Our having it changes the given part of the problem of relations with the United States.

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Take for example Reagan's last speech, alluding to the possibility of a nuclear war limited to Europe. The reaction to this was indignant. In fact, the Americans have always contemplated this possibility. The concept of flexible defense implies escalation up to the Apocalypse or a limited nuclear war. This last hypothesis implies the use of American tactical atomic weapons against East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but they would not reach Soviet territory because if they did American territory would be bombed in retaliation. But if there is someone in Europe who can say: "If our territory is bombed we can bomb the USSR," than the Americans are obliged to discuss matters with us.

[Question] But there is obviously a psychological and moral crisis in northern Europe because of the end of detente, and not surprisingly it is above all West Germany which reacts the most sensitively to pacifist movements. Don't you think the Reagan administration has committed some errors in proposing its present policy, at least for the initial phase? Above and beyond the merits of the issue, est modus in rebus.

[Answer] Here we must distinguish between Germany and other countries. Pacifist feelings have always run strong in countries like Denmark and Holland. In my opinion the change in Germany is due to two fundamental reasons. Thanks to the Pershing affair the people discovered that they were living not on a keg of gun powder but on a formidable array of atomic missiles. The quantity of these weapons somehow transformed their quality. The feeling of fear came when it was proposed that something be added to what already existed and had been accepted and which people didn't want to think about. The Pershings had a shattering psychological effect. We already have thousands of warheads on our territory--the Germans said to themselves--and now they tell us the battle will start in our country. The German people suddenly woke up to their problem. They have rediscovered it not because of any change in the nature of the American presence but because this quantitative change suddenly revealed a reality they wanted to ignore.

The second reason is the economic crisis, which plays an extremely important part in this issue. Germany does need to maintain and develop its economic relations with the East, above all with East Germany. We know perfectly well that a lot of products exported by West Germany are partly made in East Germany, which fulfills the same function for West Germany as Taiwan or Korea for Japan. Then we have the problem of gas and the problem of German exports to the East. All this gives rise to resentment toward the Americans when the United States--which is supplying the Soviet Union with grain--says: You mustn't supply the East with sophisticated technology, or buy gas, etc.... A reaction is understandable.

[Question] The big peace demonstrations--I'm thinking of the German far Left--seem to be a repetition of the big youth demonstrations of the 60s against Vietnam. Terrorism has even re-emerged as anti-American. There is none of this in France. All the former protestors, from Pierre Victor to the new philosophers to newspapers like LIBERATION and ACTUEL, have been deeply critical of socialist realism, and also of terrorism. France has been almost untouched by terrorism of the Left. Why?

[Answer] There has been a very interesting phenomenon in France. May 1968 could have given birth to terrorist movements, with the enormous disillusionment there was among young people. But this didn't happen, for various reasons. The main one is that most of the intelligentsia that belonged to the far Left or supported it was struck above all by totalitarianism. The discovery of the Gulag made the intelligentsia--exaggerating

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at times--set their sights on totalitarianism (in eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa). There was a sort of fascination, even an obsession, with totalitarianism, that is in contrast with what the Red Brigades or the German terrorists were saying. What they said didn't get through to France. Young people can be against our present society, they may criticize reformist socialism as they have experienced it, but the idea of resorting to violence and not respecting democracy is inadmissible for them. So the reaction in France was a little different from in West Germany. But it is also true that in France we have never had the kind of primitive anticommunism that was bound to arise in Germany.

[Question] The basic difference, therefore, is still that the French far Left is unwilling to give the USSR and socialist realism any credit, whereas the German and Italian far Left is. For example in the case of the peace movements this willingness to see good in the USSR takes the form of a certain reluctance to recognize the reality of Soviet expansionism and of the aggressive intentions of the USSR.

In France we have a problem with the attitude of the Communist Party. The PCF denounces the Pershings without contemplating the problem posed by the SS-20 at the same time. We are not in favor of the installation of the Pershings. We would like an agreement to be reached with the Soviets for the withdrawal of the SS-20. But the PCF is waging a unilateral campaign against the Pershings. This is a pro-Soviet position. But when they demonstrate they find themselves alone. In France pacifists dislike being mistaken for pro-Soviets.

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MILITARY

ITALY

COMMENTARY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, NATO, TNF, EEC

Rome MONDOPERAIO in Italian Sep-Oct 81 pp 8-17

[Article by Stefano Silvestri: "Political Ties"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] If one would like--as is only proper--relations among the members of the Atlantic Alliance to be on a more equal footing, the problem to be resolved is to be found not so much in America as in Europe. The American policy may or may not be to one's liking, but it cannot be replaced or seriously altered unless Europe itself is in a position to resume effectively at least some of the roles that are today played by the USA. Desiring to gain more autonomy at small cost would be too risky a proposition for everyone concerned.

In the case of Italy we have, to be sure, an opportunity to leave the "small time" and set sail in the more difficult waters of international policy; but this also requires that our country assume a greater measure of responsibility in respect to security. Moreover, it requires a more active Italian presence in the EEC in order to develop a common policy for the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East.

Let us begin by establishing the fact that the world is changing, and rapidly. The old alliances no longer safeguard us at all. The new dangers are called energy, inflation, tempo of development. The old dangers (war, subversion, ungovernability, totalitarianism) have not disappeared; on the contrary, they have in some cases intensified. The world as a whole--seen from Europe--is at one and the same time very secure and very terrifying. No one really thinks that it would be advantageous to unleash a war in Europe or in behalf of Europe. Europe does not know, however, how it can survive the change in equilibriums and the threats against its prosperity, its stability, its security and its freedom. Things are not so bad at present, but the outlook is gloomy.

It is therefore not easy to design a foreign policy for Italy (and for Italy as part of Europe): it is a question of not losing the security enjoyed today, and of improving the prospects for the future. The difficulty is that many formulas for improving the future have until now been limited to taking action that would worsen the present, and are therefore unacceptable. "Better an egg today than the chicken tomorrow"--especially if the chicken can be realizable only in the very distant future and serious doubts exist as to the freshness and fertility of the egg. This will be our point of departure, however: namely, changes in respect to security. Not a very exciting topic, you say? Yes, wars are what is exciting--at first, anyway.

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New Challenges

Michael Nacht recently summarized the "factors for change" (in DAEDALUS, January-March 1981). The first factor is the relative reduction of U.S. power vis-a-vis the USSR. The latter has developed at least as many--if not more--intercontinental nuclear weapons, an ocean-going fleet, a capability for global intervention, and has intensified its conventional and nuclear threat to Europe, China and Japan. It has therefore become difficult to replicate experiences such as the Korean War, the crisis of the Chinese islands, the Cuban crisis of the 1960's, the siege of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam war, the blockade of Soviet intervention during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and so forth. In each of these cases (and in others as well, as for example the various Berlin crises) the USA threatened the USSR with its nuclear arsenal and the USSR avoided direct intervention. Today such a threat is more risky and less credible; in short, much more difficult.

Moreover, the American government today has less freedom of action than previously vis-a-vis the Congress and public opinion. However much Reagan can count on his great popularity and his majority, it is clear that everything would change in the event of defeat or humiliation. Prudence therefore reigns supreme.

Even the American economy is less strong than it was. In the 1950's the USA produced more than 50 percent of the world's manufactures; today it produces less than 25 percent. In terms of per capita GNP it is today surpassed by Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Kuwait and is more or less on a par with Canada, Federal Germany and Denmark.

Besides the USSR, the other center of power that has developed enormously in today's world is OPEC: that is to say, the petroleum exporting countries taken as a whole. Although OPEC is not a unitary center of power, it is a source of economic threats and threats with respect to energy, as well as the motivating factor for an immense concentration of conventional military power (and of dangerous developments with respect to nuclear proliferation) in parts of the world that are anything but peaceful.

In addition to these traditional conflicts, the end of colonialism has also bequeathed to the world the so-called North-South conflict, that is to say the diversity of interests, perceptions and strategies as between the developed world and the developing world. These diversities are in general the underlying cause of much strife and absorb a great part of the attention of our diplomats and our military.

Lastly, what we have is the reality of a world that is increasingly interconnected (communications, culture and so forth) and increasingly interdependent--a world in which negative phenomena are being manifested which are both universal and transnational in character, such as terrorism; the growth of separatist, nationalist and religious irrationalism; and, in general, the conflicts between traditional values and modernization. The nation-states have survived but are becoming more interdependent (and therefore less independent) and are undergoing a process of political and military fragmentation that militates against their survival.

These changes are threatening the traditional arrangement with respect to European security and are changing the relationship between Europe and America.

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In essence, it is a question of coping with four principal problems to which all the other problems are subordinate: a) What kind of relations should be maintained with the USSR? b) What kind of relations should be maintained with OPEC? c) How should the problem of economic development be dealt with? d) How can a credible framework of European military security be maintained (or, in other words, what kind of relations should be maintained with the United States)?

Europe and the United States

The /optimal/ response to these four questions implies a qualitative change in the European political picture. Any change involves, in its own way, a reexamination of the relationship between Europe and the USA--a relationship /which has until now ensured that there will be acceptable responses/ to all four of these questions. In fact, these questions are raised precisely because an examination of the current trends in the development of the international system has raised doubts as to the ability of the USA to ensure that these same responses will continue in the future. Naturally, however, any new response cannot exclude the United States. Even if the United States is not (and can never again be, in the future) the same super-superpower it has been in the past, it nevertheless is still a superpower. Not only, therefore, can the USA not be disregarded (just as the USSR cannot be disregarded) but it is /entirely advantageous/ to Europe that the United States remain its ally, because the American interests are assuredly closer to Europe's interests than are the Soviet interests, and because only the American superpower is in a position to oppose the Soviet superpower.

If indeed this is the way things are, then the dilemma of the relationship between Europe and America can be stated simply: Is it a more "equal" relationship that is desired, or more rapid and efficacious decisions? The two propositions are not at all compatible, at least for the short term. Rapid and efficacious decisions imply a kind of division of labor that is centered on the partner who is more powerful and flexible, namely the USA. Better consultation can mitigate the inevitable discord, but it cannot change the substance of an American "bossism" in the international context. Because we are in the pluralistic and democratic West instead of in the monolithic and autocratic East, this "bossism" (which some erroneously define as "imperialism" because they love cheap sensationalism) obviously leaves some room for dissent. Mitterand may continue to criticize the USA over El Salvador or Namibia; Schmidt may be angry with Reagan's economic policies; Brandt may praise detente, inventing--for the use and consumption of young German social democrats--a "golden age" that never existed; and even Berlinguer may conjure up a NATO that has nothing to do with the military equilibrium vis-a-vis the USSR. At the appropriate moment, however, the Europeans must "go along with" the American decisions and content themselves with a few corrective changes in respect to form.

A relationship based on greater equality, however, entails greater European responsibilities. The justification for demanding this greater equality is to be found both in the fact that European interests do not always coincide with American interests, and in the fact that Europe is far richer and potentially much more powerful today than it was 20 or 30 years ago. If these two premises are accepted the Europeans can certainly be more autonomous, on condition--of course--that they acquire the means to guarantee for themselves a greater measure of independence coupled with at least an equal measure of security, and if they assume the risks and responsibilities inherent in such a choice.

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To want to be more autonomous at small cost (a scenario which the Americans have defined as "Finlandization" and others define as a pacifist--or scantily armed--neutralism) would not only be dangerous but would have profoundly divisive effects both as among the various European countries and inside those countries. It is indeed obvious that those countries which feel themselves most threatened--and those political forces which place the least confidence in the goodwill of the USSR--would have no other choice than to appeal to the Americans and to their "bossism," as the lesser of two evils. In other words, it would amount to a return to the 1949 split between pro-Russians and pro-Americans, with a resultant crisis in respect to the outlook for Europe.

If we therefore concede that the Europeans--in an outburst of seriousness and faith in their future--will insist on a greater measure of autonomy from the USA, European-American relations would then undergo a "crisis of effectiveness" if for no other reason than because Washington would have to be reeducated in order to accept that greater measure of equality. It could be worth the while, however. The "bossist" hypothesis could in fact--over the long term--prove to be weak and counterproductive, eliciting domestic neutralist opposition as well as "Third Force" (or nationalist) opposition within various European countries. If the "bossist" hypothesis should then also prove to be incapable of dealing with a serious crisis with optimal results, we could abruptly find ourselves facing a sudden public rejection of the alliance with the USA without having prepared any alternative. Imagine, for example, a serious crisis in the Persian Gulf and an American inability to guarantee Europe's energy supply: would NATO survive?

Let us not deceive ourselves, however. The problem to be solved is not so much in America as in Europe. The American policy may or may not please, may satisfy or may leave one perplexed, but in no case can it be replaced--or significantly amended--if Europe itself is not in a position to resume at least some of the roles that are today being played by the Americans.

In the absence of such a development, the only course remaining will be to opt for "bossism" and try to handle it as well as possible while hoping for the best.

There are many possible instruments to effect an awakening--or qualitative leap forward--in respect to European policy. We shall discuss several hypotheses at the conclusion of this article. These hypotheses must, however, be prefaced by some general political considerations, for the quality and quantity of the instruments in question depend in great part on what one wishes to do. We shall therefore return to our four original questions. What would be the best course to take?

What Does the USSR Want?

Any policy regarding the USSR involves an evaluation of what the USSR wants from us. Such an evaluation is not easy to make, because there are so many different interpretations: at least as many as there are Sovietologists. If a Sovietologist wishes to be a realist, however, a measure of simplicity is called for. Basically, it is not so much a question of knowing whether Brezhnev is being more honest when he invades Afghanistan or when he proposes a new era of peace in Europe as it is a question of accepting the fact that the USSR--just as every great power (and as a superpower, in an even more definite sense)--has a multiplicity of interests and policies that are adapted to, and change with, changes in circumstances and in interlocutors. These considerations should disabuse anyone of either optimism or pessimism. Pierre Hassner (at the most recent annual conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London) brilliantly summed up the

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weaknesses of both camps, urging the reader to "avoid both the illusions of the progressives--who tend to minimize the Soviet threat and the role of military force and to exaggerate the hopes engendered by detente--and the illusions of the conservatives, who tend to exaggerate the former and minimize the latter." We should accordingly avoid the mistake made by those "who tend to minimize the importance of new weapons systems, and military interventions, when they are the work of the USSR but find them highly destabilizing and dangerous when they are the work of the USA." These individuals tend to mistake fiction for fact. We should also, however, avoid the conservative conviction that there exists a "conception of spheres of influence of the 'cujus regio ejus religio' type, and a dogmatic belief in the impossibility either of evolution, or of revolution, within the communist regimes."

Hassner goes on to observe (also quite correctly) that the strangest thing of all is the fact that those who ask the USA to imitate the USSR by assigning absolute priority to a policy of strength are the same people who affirm most strongly that the relationship between the Western system and the communist system is characterized by diversity and indeed by incompatibility; in short, precisely those conservatives who in the last analysis are advising Reagan to imitate Brezhnev. In so doing they are "assuming that an open and pluralistic democratic society or alliance can adopt the same strategy as a totalitarian society without itself being transformed in turn into such a society." To tell the truth, it is not a very convincing assumption.

Equally strange and unconvincing, moreover, are those anti-Soviet observers who--less strongly anti-Soviet--put their faith in a depoliticized vision of economic relations and of disarmament, thereby eliminating from these relations any pressure on Soviet behavior and hoping to "teach the USSR by example" to do likewise. These observers are committing the error (exactly the opposite of that committed by the conservatives) of tending to "underestimate the differences existing between the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the other hand to emphasize the common interest in disarmament and economic interdependence, but then advising the United States (and the other Western countries) to behave differently than the USSR is behaving."

Both positions, in short, seem neither very logical nor very farsighted. The fact is probably that both positions are partly correct and that the relationship between the West and the USSR cannot be interpreted in as simplistic a fashion as one faction or the other would like. A European policy vis-a-vis the USSR must inevitably include a little of both positions.

After all, Moscow's policy toward Europe is itself full of ambiguity. At the military level there is no doubt of this: the same period during which Washington and Moscow were talking about detente is the very same period during which the great arms buildup and Moscow's offensives in the Third World took place. The emphasis changed with the changes in circumstances. At times the effort was directed toward obtaining gradual political control of Central Europe, and Germany in particular, both by direct and by indirect methods; at times Moscow has concentrated on revolutions in the Third World; at times it has favored detente (as in 1981); and at times it has exalted the growing might of the Red Army and the Soviet capacity for being the principal axis of international policy (as in 1976). Underlying this diversity of tactics are differing evaluations of the forces in the field, political opportunities and internal problems of the communist camp; but overall we can single out

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elements of convergence--as well as elements of competition--with the West. The problem is: how to enhance the convergence without in fact diminishing the chances of defeating the competition?

A Nonsuicidal Response

The response is to be found in the elaboration of an overall strategy that will combine both of these elements. But beware: a certain pacifist rhetoric existing in Europe is tending to divide the problem geographically. To put it in simple terms, many Europeans appear convinced that the USA should concern itself with the "competition" and Europe the "convergence." Such a formula is suicidal, for several reasons:

- a. Because the Americans by themselves (as we have already said) could find themselves in trouble and abandon the competition in regions or areas that are of vital concern to us Europeans.
- b. Because this division impels the USSR to strive for a deepening of the gulf between Europe and America, rather than for a modification of the policies of both.
- c. Because this method has already been attempted, first by De Gaulle and then by Schmidt and Giscard, and has already failed on several occasions. The USSR has not accepted the European nations as interlocutors on a basis of equality (it has contented itself with attempting to play them off against the Americans), while on the other hand the hopes (especially on the part of the Germans) for the creation of a "community of interests" (a kind of "lingua franca" of detente) between Western Europeans and Eastern Europeans, simultaneously imposing conditions both on the USA and on the USSR, have been dashed against the fragility--and the subordination to Moscow--of the governments of Eastern Europe (the fall of Gierek, the Polish "friend" of Schmidt and Giscard; the anti-Bonn betrayal of Honecker; and so forth).
- d. Because such a course will encourage the already strong European inclination toward irresponsibility and noninvolvement, and induces the European governments to underestimate the elements of competition and long-term strategy that are present in Moscow.
- e. Because such a policy contradicts the basic European need (as we have noted) for maintenance of a close alliance with the USA.

The operative conclusions flow rather easily from these premises. On the military plane (we shall speak of it in greater detail later) it is a question of maintaining and strengthening the existing equilibrium in Europe and in those regions of strategic interest. Negotiations are a viable course to follow only within the perspective of this greater security, as a complementary and confirmatory factor. It is not a question of attempting to roll the USSR back to a regional role, or to regain total military supremacy over the USSR (an objective which, among other things, is in practice unrealistic), but rather of convincing--once and for all--both the USSR and the Third World of the impossibility of successfully employing force, or the threat of force, to oppose our fundamental interests.

On the economic plane, it is a question of taking account of the political vision that the USSR has of economic relations (a vision that is shared also with our

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partners of the Third world, with OPEC in the vanguard). It is not possible to hope (as some spokesmen of the Reagan administration seem simplistically on occasion to be saying) that the cost of the military competition will force the USSR into a domestic economic crisis of such seriousness as to compel it to come to terms or to change its policies. This was already the hope of George Kennan when he developed the first American theory of "containment" and was the basic idea behind Foster Dulles' hope for a "rollback" (i.e., forced withdrawal) of the USSR from Europe. Such theories have shown themselves incapable of foreseeing the Soviet capacity for resistance and the long-range character of Moscow's policy.

Economic cooperation can therefore become a permanent factor in East-West relations, on condition however that it not be burdened with excessive hopes that are at least as unjustified as the hope that was placed in the development of reformist forces in the USSR (in the eyes of many Europeans--Heaven only knows why--Kosygin had remained a "reformist" long after even the abandonment of every reformist policy).

It is not easy to find a middle way between economic cooperation without preconditions and the short-term political use of the economic weapon. Because both of these options have already proved disappointing to us, however, it is at least advisable that we cease to repropose them uncritically and turn instead to a more realistic and analytical vision of the overall situation.

One course of action, however, has not yet been undertaken decisively, and an effort in this direction could be worthwhile: we have always spoken in terms of economic relations with the USSR, but /why not make a distinction between the USSR and the Eastern European countries?/ For even though Eastern Europe has shown itself to be politically weak and economically in a situation of crisis, it is certainly more interested--from a structural standpoint--in its relations with the West than in its relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union itself--in Poland, and in a different form in Hungary and Rumania has appreciated the importance of relations with the West, provided that these relations do not seriously jeopardize the solidity of its bloc. The greater the political and economic tensions within the CEMA, the more opportunity there is for a Western economic initiative that would be politically relevant and that in any event could influence Moscow's behavior toward its satellites. The same thing could happen in countries of the Third World that are linked to Moscow militarily but that are very desirous of increased economic relations with the West. In short, it is a question of rendering the Soviet empire maximally permeable to the West. A strategy of this type can be attempted, although there is one difficulty: in some cases it can prove to be a costly strategy. However, unless we believe that the communist bloc is monolithic--and provided we believe that after all, even this bloc is capable of evolving--it is an option full of promise.

Petroleum, Development and World Equilibrium

It is now time to discuss international economic policy. Not being a specialist (or, in any event, an observer with expertise) in this field, I gladly leave to others (in this same issue of MONDOPERAIO) the task of examining the intricacies of this subject. In the present article I should like to emphasize certain political aspects of relations with OPEC, on the one hand, and with the Third World in general.

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These countries have become important actors on the international scene thanks to the economic leverage they possess (in the case of OPEC) and thanks to their ability to give expression to a broad common front (in the case of the developing countries that identify themselves as members of the group of the "77" in the United Nations). Even Western Europe, moreover, owes its current international role to its economic dimension and to the power of attraction demonstrated by the European Economic Community. The necessity for taking political action based on the economic dimension is therefore obvious, in order to respond to the demands and pressures of some and to do justice to the cards we hold.

In this case, too, the primary requirement is security--the stability of our basic position. We cannot be credible partners if we remain vulnerable to every change in the wind. The very fact that our interlocutors are especially able to take action in the economic sphere should put us on our guard, for vulnerability or excessive dependency (in the absence of reciprocity) on our part would inevitably motivate them to attempt to force our hand, that is to say, to employ the means at their command in a competitive rather than a cooperative manner. Suffice it to remember the experience gained in relations with the Arab nations of OPEC, for the period of maximum European dependence and vulnerability in the energy field was also the period of the largest increase in energy prices and of the gravest threats to employ this weapon politically in order to influence Western behavior in the Middle East. A marginal change in the situation of Western dependence was sufficient to create a growing opportunity for the moderate forces within the Arab world to achieve relatively stable petroleum prices.

This experience should not be forgotten. The less our partners are convinced of our vulnerability, the longer will cooperation and interdependence be able to survive. This obviously has important consequences for the domestic economy, including rapid development of all alternative sources of energy.

If, however, we accept the hypothesis that Europe and its partners in the industrialized world will succeed in maintaining a sufficient margin of flexibility in respect to energy and economic autonomy, we are then faced with the problem of how to play a positive role in the Third World.

We are already aware of many of the theoretical responses. They have been developed at international conferences and in the attempts (excessively modest so far) to effect a triangular recycling similar to that proposed, in his day, by Guido Carli. These responses, however, come into conflict with a difficult political reality.

The fact is that in the Third World a competition for the reins of power is taking place--competition centered around two problems that are often confused with each other but that should instead remain well differentiated, at least as far as analyses are concerned. The first problem is that of the /growth, in world political stature, of the individual developing countries./ This growth results in contradictory tensions as between cooperation and conflict with the wealthier (or more developed) countries, encourages domestic instability, and underlies various regional conflicts among Third World countries. Although economic development requires a framework of cooperation and interdependence, the political premises for it give rise to conflicts that are endogenous to the Third World itself.

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East-West Competition in the Third World

The second problem is that of the /competition between East and West in the Third World/, competition which has as its reward and objective the conquest of bases and allies and the control of the strategic resources and means of communication upon which the West depends. This kind of competition exploits the endogenous conflicts and at times exacerbates them or accelerates them, but only very rarely provokes them.

Even in this case the problem is one of finding a happy medium between two equally inadequate formulas. The formula of the new American administration--an administration which ends to expand the concept of "terrorism" to make of it a label applicable to every offensive initiated in the Third World and which tends to see the "long arm" of the USSR behind every domestic or international conflict--is not convincing. The drawback of this formula is that it gratuitously hands over to the USSR a profitable position which the latter can exploit at its pleasure, and the formula has a subsequent disadvantage in that the West is thereby motivated to support uncritically every reactionary force, eliminating all flexibility and squandering political opportunities. This kind of decision is divisive within the Western world itself and therefore threatens to weaken our internal consensus. In short, such a decision does not allow us to exploit in depth the potential of our greater economic capacity and impels us to disregard the requests that flow independently from the Third World countries, needlessly making them our enemies.

On the other hand, the theory of those who believe that the West should not concern itself with the East-West dimension of the problems of the Third World is not convincing either. This theory has had various applications, as for example during the initial years of the Carter administration (in the conviction, later revealed to be mistaken, that the USSR would be unable to "rule" for very long in the countries where it had established itself)--applications in the form of certain multilateral initiatives by the United Nations and the EEC. To disregard the struggle for power under way in the Third World is to cut oneself off from the dimension which is of the greatest interest and concern to the very same developing countries which are our partners. One cannot understand how it is possible at one and the same time to hope for greater interdependence and cooperation and then attempt to disregard the very bases of any policy of interdependence and cooperation: that is to say, the continuity of the interlocutors; their capacity for respecting the agreements signed; their security; and their national ambitions.

A "middle way" should therefore avoid all dangerous theoretical or ideological generalizations. Specifically, it is also a question of sorting out an overall policy composed of various correlated initiatives. It is essential to establish a code of action that will make possible a joint effort to put the theory of interdependence into practice. This code should be based simultaneously on initiatives to promote military security and economic cooperation (that is to say, on both dimensions of the political reality of the Third World).

There is accordingly no need to be afraid to speak of the need for reestablishing--or maintaining--certain regional military equilibriums, both in relation to the USSR and in relation to the countries of the area in question. Interdependence is directly connected with the overall stability and security of the developing regions. Areas such as the Mediterranean; sub-Saharan Africa; the Middle East (or

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"Southwest Asia," as it is currently fashionable to say, so as to emphasize the Persian Gulf and Pakistan); Southeast Asia; and the region between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean require for themselves a strategic equilibrium in which the West should play a fundamental role. Europe can participate in a decisive way in some of these equilibriums, and Japan in others. The United States is basically present in each area. Maintenance of an equilibrium also involves the possibility of the use--or threat of the use--of force in a credible manner. Force should be employed primarily to keep the USSR under control, but it is also a necessary element for ensuring the overall credibility of the West vis-a-vis its allies. It is true that many states of the Third World actually contend that the military presence of the superpowers is "destabilizing," but there are no other alternatives. If anything, it is a question of apportioning the forces in a political manner so as to avoid having them ultimately prove to be counterproductive.

Such a policy should obviously also have an economic dimension, either as a deterrent or as an incentive for regional stability and development. This economic dimension must at times go as far as "linkage": in other words, it is possible to try to increase the price that the USSR must pay for every intervention it makes in the Third World, thereby forcing the Soviets to take into account the probability that there will be reprisals--in different areas and in different modes--in those regions where its operations are taking place. Above all, however, it is essential to develop a policy of incentives that will speak directly to the developing countries.

It is also necessary to remember our premise, namely that there are, in the world, revolutionary situations and situations of conflict that are not a function of Soviet intervention. In coping with a situation of this nature, the use of force or of the economic weapon should be apportioned in various ways: the West should show itself to be at least as amenable to change as the Soviet Union. The two aspects are not mutually contradictory, however. It is very difficult to accept change if one is in a situation of strategic inferiority, and if one is afraid of losing the last positions of strength that one possesses. In this way, for example, it was very difficult for the Americans to accept the hypothesis of a change of regime in Iran, because in that period the USA appeared to be short of allies and was in a situation of strategic inferiority in the Middle East, and because Europe was in a period of great vulnerability with respect to energy. On the other hand, it was possible to achieve a positive compromise and a change of regime in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) because the French-American-Moroccan intervention in Zaire had preserved the stability of that country and because the strength of South Africa was a sufficient guarantee of the maintenance of a military equilibrium in the region. This lesson, too, should not be forgotten or undervalued.

The Military Problem and NATO

We now come to our final problem in the area of foreign policy: the maintenance of a credible framework of military security. I do not propose to dwell on the strategic problems of the East-West conflict. On the other hand, it is interesting to emphasize some problems relative to the relationship between the Western Europeans and the Americans.

President Reagan has decided on a strong program of rearmament--both conventional and nuclear--justified on the basis of the slow but continuing numerical decline in

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the American armed forces during the past decade. This process of rearmament (which is quantitatively inferior to the rearmament that took place in the USA on other occasions such as the Korean War, the "missile gap" of the Kennedy era, and the Vietnam war) should make it possible for the USA to face several crises simultaneously in several parts of the world. This theory is not completely in accord with reality, however.

In terms of conventional forces, the equilibrium of the forces in Central Europe is not one of the best. After a couple of weeks of mobilization the Warsaw Pact could, in this category, achieve a ratio of superiority to NATO of 2 to 1 in personnel, 2.5 to 1 in tanks, 2.4 to 1 in artillery and tactical missiles and 2.4 to 1 in armored equipment, whereas NATO has a 2 to 1 advantage in antitank missiles and 1.8 to 1 in helicopters. The fact is that the Americans probably have neither sufficient tactical aircraft nor sufficient personnel, for example, to confront the USSR in Europe and in the Persian Gulf simultaneously.

According to calculations made for the IISS by Tom Wheelock, the Soviets can put approximately 600 tactical aircraft over Iran, plus an unspecified number of medium-range bombers; two airborne divisions ready for action plus another six available on short notice; 21 mechanized divisions (ready after a brief period of mobilization) and one armored division, in addition to a flotilla of eight warships. Almost all of these forces are stationed in the southern districts of the USSR and therefore do not diminish the Soviet presence either in Europe or on the Chinese border.

On the other side, the Americans have a group of two aircraft carriers, 16 warships and 110 fighter-bombers; the AWACS stationed in Saudi Arabia; a tactical air group of 70 aircraft normally stationed in Europe; the use of the B-52's normally stationed in Spain or Guam (in the Pacific); four tactical air groups stationed in the USA (and normally regarded as part of the NATO strategic reserve; two battalions of marines available within 24 hours (one airborne battalion from Italy and the other an amphibious battalion now in the Indian Ocean); one brigade of marines available within 7 days from the USA and from Diego Garcia; one airborne brigade available within 7 days, and the entire division within 14 days (forces destined for NATO and based in the USA); one brigade of marines from the Pacific, available within 21 days; one division transported by air within 4 weeks; and one mechanized division transported by sea within 6 weeks (these two divisions are also part of the NATO strategic reserve).

In terms of naval equilibrium, the dispatch of two aircraft carriers to the south of the Gulf reduces the permanent American presence in the Mediterranean to one aircraft carrier, and forces the Atlantic command to concentrate all its other forces in the North Atlantic (among other things, with problems relating to lines of communication and to the defense of the South Atlantic). It also reduces to one aircraft carrier the permanent presence in the Pacific, thereby intensifying Japan's defensive problems.

However much Reagan may increase the number of aircraft carriers (but this will take more than 10 years) and the number of divisions (but here there are personnel problems) as well as the "prestocking" in Europe, designed to speed up the tempo of reinforcement of the European front, the fact remains that the USA does not have--and probably will not have--sufficient forces ready for action in order to cope with more than one crisis at a time. It would need at least 2 months to mobilize all the forces necessary.

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Nuclear Forces and Conventional Forces

Other developments--in the sphere of nuclear forces--have been announced that may complicate the situation. The strategy of "compensation" provides for the limited use of nuclear forces in response to a victorious conventional attack by the Soviets. This is also the standard doctrine of NATO. It is a doctrine, however, that requires a greater degree of invulnerability on the part of the American strategic forces (some people are in fact talking about "dusting off" the anti-missile missiles that were restricted by the SALT-1 treaty), for a greater invulnerability of this sort would render the use of tactical nuclear weapons more credible but clearly run the risk of increasing the /distance/ between the tactical theaters (Asia, Europe) and the American national theater. This may create tension between the USA and its allies, who may feel themselves threatened by the hypothesis of a nuclear war limited to their own territory.

Moreover (as Jan Lodal emphasizes, also for the IISS), the tactical and "Eurostrategic" use of nuclear weapons gives rise to /operative/ doubts, inasmuch as the problems of command, control and communications appear not to have been solved, as well as the problems relating to recognition and acquisition of tactical objectives (especially if they are moving objectives) by these forces. These weapons can, to be sure, destroy preselected fixed objectives, but it is unlikely that they could keep up with a strategic situation which is in motion. According to certain journalistic indiscretions, the nuclear /reaction times/ themselves could prove to be too great to cope with close-in strategic situations. Lastly (to quote Jan Lodal), "the growing possibility of rendering credible antipersonnel capabilities operative, combined with the current NATO strategy of threatening to be the first to use nuclear weapons to strengthen a conventional defense that is failing, adds a strong argument in favor of the development of antipersonnel nuclear capability in the USA (such as the "N" bomb or other tactical categories--editor's note). The technical impossibility, however, of carrying out an antipersonnel attack that would be /completely/ crowned with success removes much of the validity of the decision to continue the development of antipersonnel weapons." In short, we have in this case as well two contrasting truths both in respect to nuclear forces and in respect to conventional forces.

In the conventional sphere, it is by now increasingly obvious that the USA must increase the mobility and strategic flexibility of its forces, but this will reduce the concrete possibilities for reinforcement and in some scenarios its very presence in Europe.

In the nuclear sphere, the existing disequilibrium constitutes an incentive for development of tactical nuclear forces, but these forces will subsequently resolve neither the economic problem (a "C³I" system--command, control and communication plus "intelligence"--that is truly effective costs as much as, and more than, new conventional armed forces), nor the human problem (for in reality the requirements for troops appear to increase rather than decrease), nor the military problem (because of the aforementioned technical problems and because the advantage to be gained by being the first to use these forces would very likely prove to be fleeting, except in certain cases involving the "closing off" of lines of communication or a surprise attack, either of which would, however, be difficult in view of the NATO systems of C³I).

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The development of "Eurostrategic" forces could actually enhance the credibility of the use of tactical nuclear forces in Europe. Such forces could in fact--by posing a strong direct threat to the Soviet national territory--dissuade the USSR from any massive use of tactical nuclear weapons against Western Europe in response to any tactical military use of NATO nuclear weapons against Soviet conventional forces. Whereas the NATO tactical nuclear weapons would indeed strike Soviet forces but not the territory of the USSR, the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons employed by attacking forces and advance forces would inevitably strike Western European territory. In densely populated areas (such as those of Central Europe) the destruction of numerous Western military objectives with nuclear weapons would also involve the massive destruction of civilian objectives and would be little--if at all--different in its effects from a massive nuclear attack against the European populations. To this, NATO could therefore--with good reason--respond by carrying out the massive destruction of civilian and military objectives in the USSR. This could induce the USSR to engage in a much more limited use of its theater nuclear forces in Europe, and could therefore enhance the credibility of the military use of tactical nuclear forces by NATO.

Europe's Military Commitment

This development, too (just as every other aspect of nuclear strategy at every level), has its own ambiguities: above all, because it is anything but certain that this kind of reasoning will "hold up." The USSR, for example, might fear that almost any nuclear attack in Europe could unleash a "Eurostrategic" response, and could therefore attempt a preventive strike against the Eurostrategic forces, thereby "escalating" the conflict by many degrees and accelerating the destruction of Europe; and secondly, because wherever this line of reasoning does "hold up" it would in any event make the limited use of nuclear arms in Europe more feasible, with consequences that would certainly not be at all positive and would be politically divisive.

A European political-military response to these problems is therefore essential. This response should be made in at least two directions: nuclear weapons and conventional weapons.

If we proceed on the latter basis, the conclusions to be drawn are very obvious (at least the extent to which they will be difficult to put into practice): it is a question of relying less and less on the American conventional forces, and in some cases (as in the case of the air and naval forces) of integrating them better. If the USA must defend European interests in Asia, Europe must make a more substantial contribution toward equilibrium on its continent.

This of course does not mean a geographical division of jurisdictions, for that would be counterproductive. The USA must remain closely linked to the defense of Europe and the Europeans must be able to intervene in the Third World, if only for reasons of political-military flexibility and in some cases because of different interests--and different degrees of vulnerability--as between the USA and Europe. It is inevitable, however, that the relative relationship between the two components will change and that the European role will grow in importance. This is true--unless one wishes to stake everything on nuclear weapons.

Defense, unfortunately, is expensive. Germany has reduced its proposed expenditures. To finance its presence in Germany and its strategic nuclear forces, Great Britain

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has reduced its naval presence in the western and southern Atlantic, leaving the Americans virtually alone there. France has announced a reinforcement of all areas, but it is likely that the development of new nuclear forces will consume a disproportionate share of the budget to the detriment of the conventional forces. Italy is gradually increasing its budget, but not sufficiently to enable it to carry out a "two-front" strategy, that is to say, to enable it to operate with full efficiency both in the northeast and in the Mediterranean (and it is therefore sacrificing both sectors somewhat, but especially the latter).

To compensate for the American changes therefore requires a financial effort, but above all requires (and this is the most difficult part) the coordination and integration of the various national efforts. A greater /specialization of the roles/ of the European forces is inevitable, as are also a greater mobility /among the various fronts/ and the effective /standardization/ of the armament. Unless these three developments take place, Europe's defense will experience a multiplication of instances of duplication and waste of resources, accompanied by the impossibility of integrating the forces in the field effectively; as a result, the use of nuclear forces would become more necessary and more urgent. Such a failure would in fact have the effect of deterring the very defense of Europe and thereby discourage all resistance.

In the nuclear sphere the problem is not so much one of freeing oneself from nuclear weapons (which are henceforth an integral part of the European equilibrium) as it is one of keeping them under control both from the military standpoint and from the political standpoint as it relates to negotiations.

There are those who--as an alternative to the present situation--are inclined toward the development of an autonomous nuclear deterrent (either a national one or, less likely, a European one). The development of such a deterrent would in reality not solve our problems, which are as follows:

- a. The problem of credibility--because national deterrents do not add to the overall deterrent effect vis-a-vis the USSR. On the contrary (at least in the case of Germany) they are probably less credible than the American tactical deterrents and Eurostrategic deterrents of NATO.
- b. The problem of cost--and therefore of the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrents. On the contrary: the British and French experience (and on a larger scale, the American experience) demonstrates that the development of the nuclear deterrent impacts the availability of funds for the conventional deterrent, thereby intensifying the overall defense problems.
- c. The problem of C³I--with the aggravating factor that in the event a national nuclear deterrent is developed it would probably be necessary to renegotiate the use of the C³ systems and--above all--the "intelligence" systems of the Americans. This would therefore create new, additional costs of no small consequence.
- d. The problem of negotiations--because the USSR would inevitably tend to view such forces as additional forces and therefore as justification for increased rearmament on its own part.
- e. Political problems--whether domestic in nature or (especially) those involving relations with the USA.

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f. Problems of regional equilibrium--for example, in the Mediterranean. Nuclear rearmament of Italy would accelerate the nuclear rearmament of other states such as Libya, Egypt and so forth.

Consequently, a more appropriate hypothesis would appear (at least for the medium term) to be the exercise of better European control over this problem without making any basic change in the current arrangement. To this end there already exist numerous NATO committees (such as the Nuclear Planning Group, the High-Level Group and the Special Group), although France has excluded itself from them. These committees, moreover, operate strictly from the "NATO perspective," which on the one hand is perhaps based too much on a military--and Central European--logic and on the other hand excludes problems such as those relating to the extension of force to areas outside Europe and to regional equilibriums other than the principal equilibrium with the USSR.

Instead, it would be advisable for the Europeans to begin to think autonomously concerning the problems with respect to negotiations, strategic logic, and "contingency planning," without reference to the fact that the nuclear forces belong to the USA. This latter reality has impelled the Europeans to adopt a "passive" stance characteristic of recipients who find themselves being urged with the greatest insistence to express their criticism and propose modifications to the strategy chosen by the Americans. What is lacking is the autonomous elaboration of /European doctrines/, even though the ability to do so is not lacking. Furthermore, in the absence of any elaboration of such doctrines, even the control exercised over the nuclear weapons of NATO and over the progress of negotiations cannot help but be limited. The European interests are singled out and defended in a fragmentary manner, while the overall picture passes unnoticed.

Instead of promoting the development of other national nuclear deterrents (which among other things would intensify the fragmentation of the European response), this kind of situation calls for the creation of a sort of "European Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" on the model of the American counterpart, including however a /function of "contingency planning" and analysis/ of the overall, and regional, strategic situation (of the type which in America is carried out by the Department of Defense). Such an "agency" (which should inevitably maintain a dual headquarters, in Europe and in Washington, in order to have the necessary quick reaction time and completeness of information) has already been singled out as a "necessity" by many analysts (including, among others, Alistair Buchan as early as 1966) but was never created because to do so was politically difficult.

The European Problem and Italy

Now we come precisely to the real European political problem, the problem which underlies all the proposals put forward in the present article: namely, the lack of a genuine process of European political integration. Without a European "intellect" (one obliged to think, and act, in continental and integrated terms), these policies either cannot be implemented or can be implemented only in a very partial and inadequate manner.

The European governments have proposed many palliatives (ranging from development of cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy among the 10 EEC countries to a more extensive use of summitry and to the creation of special groups of countries--in

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the nature of "managers"--that would be assigned to serve as "task forces" to deal with individual problems, specific strategic areas, and so forth. I shall not digress into a detailed discussion of these proposals (I discuss them in detail in my article entitled "A Policy for Europe: Foreign Policy and Security Problems," published this year in SPETTATORE INTERNAZIONALE, to which I refer anyone who is interested). I should like only to quote the conclusion I drew: "The central problem is that this kind of /communications network/ is devoid of any incentive or institutional stimulus to arrive at effective and operative decisions. Every ministry of foreign affairs or national defense is, quite logically, structured with a view to making decisions at the national level. Once this objective is achieved, the mandate of these ministries has been fully satisfied. The network of European contacts is therefore viewed basically as a means for improving communications, speeding up the flow of information, avoiding mistakes and misunderstandings, and--if possible--developing a common position. It is not a decision-making process in the strict sense of the term, for it lacks any internal institutional logic that would impel it to make decisions, or any necessity to face up to the major European problems in a timely and efficacious fashion."

The principal political conclusion to be drawn from this entire analysis may therefore appear to be self-evident and commonplace, but it is nonetheless necessary: Italy must strive to develop European institutional systems that possess this internal necessity--and impulse--to make decisions.

This conclusion is likewise incomplete, however, if one does not add that in order to accomplish this goal Italy /must in the meantime change its ways/, change tempo and quality of its foreign policy and policy on security. In this way the medium- and long-term problem becomes in actuality also a short-term problem.

Such a change will require first and foremost a new awareness of Italy's potential and opportunities--of the real possibilities that exist to emerge from the current "small-time" phase and set out into the more difficult waters of international policy.

Such a choice will require a /greater degree of responsibility/ on Italy's part, even with respect to security. The course undertaken with the conclusion of the agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of Malta and the installation of the Euro-missiles must be perfected and substantiated. In this way, for example, it is no longer possible to adopt the hypothesis of a greater initiative in the Middle East if this is not accompanied by the assumption of a greater measure of direct responsibilities, such as participation in the international force that is to guarantee the Camp David accords in the Sinai and a series of political-military and technical assistance agreements with Middle East countries--agreements that are congruent with the policies that one wishes to carry out (above all, therefore, with Egypt, Tunisia and perhaps Algeria). This kind of Mediterranean projection is already included in Italy's diplomatic plans (continuing attention to the Greek-Turkish dispute, a growing interest in the Cyprus problem, a treaty with Yugoslavia, and so forth). However, it also involves an analysis and an orientation of our defense policy designed to make our presence in the Mediterranean credible, and a study of the economic compatibilities and prospects that underlie a better common European policy toward the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East. In this connection, the two aspects of defense and international economic policy (including energy security) are closely linked.

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This also will mean seeking a different, and more active, Italian presence in the EEC, which must however undergo a change in quality and in strategy. Our European action is in general centered on the search for /political axes/, or indeed privileged alliances with one nation or another. We may call attention, for example, to the Rome-London axis, and more recently the Rome-Bonn axis. This type of /policy by alignments/ has not proved to be very productive. Not only has the Italian position appeared generally speaking to be "in tow," adapted in reality to the interests and plans of the other partner, but these very same axes have proved to be rather unproductive because they have been partial and incomplete. Thus, for example, there is today a clear-cut Italian-German and Italian-British convergence on certain problems of foreign policy (with the Germans as regards detente, with the British as regards certain decisions concerning the Middle East), but in neither of the two cases has there been a convergence on the problem of reforming the EEC institutions and budget.

It is therefore advisable to abandon for the time being this typically Italian obsession (which can also be found in our domestic policy) concerning alignments and alliances, in the illusion that these alignments and alliances can in and of themselves define a policy, and to pass on decisively to a planning phase, a phase of proposals, and therefore a phase of a search for alliances, for collaboration and commitments based on effective operative plans developed with a full measure of analysis (instrumental analyses, cost analyses and analyses of results). In short, in respect to our foreign policy as well, it is time to /establish our priorities/.

Naturally, a change of this sort cannot take place in an institutional vacuum. Giulio Amato (in this same issue of MONDOPERAIO) analyzes the negative political and operative implications of the current institutional chaos in which our foreign policy functions. Greater effectiveness in our foreign policy entails greater consistency in governmental action, an emphasis on planning, and a closer linkage with domestic policy.

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MILITARY

SPAIN

SECRET COUPIST ORGANIZATION WITHIN MILITARY DESCRIBED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 7 Dec 81 pp 56-61

[Text] An underground, coupist and antimonarchical military organization, detected but not infiltrated by the state secret services, is attempting increasingly to make its presence felt. It is a question of the Spanish Military Union (UME).

In 1975, after the arrest of a senior officer and eight junior officers belonging to the then unknown Democratic Military Union (UMD), when the minister of the Army, Francisco Coloma Gallegos, received a lieutenant colonel, already retired, a former comrade-in-arms, the latter tried to intercede in behalf of the arrested officers. "What they want," he stated, "will be the country's future before 5 years have passed."

The minister said that perhaps this might be true, but that he could not pardon them for having established an underground organization within the Armed Forces.

Then the lieutenant colonel could not avoid a gesture of skepticism and, addressing his superior and friend, he reminded him that 40 years earlier they had organized the Spanish Military Union, the UME. The reply by Lieutenant General Coloma Gallegos was categorical: "That is different!"

At that same time, the military governor of La Coruna visited three UMD prisoners held in the El Ferrol military prison. During the interview with the UMD members, reference was made to how dangerous the establishment of underground organizations within the Army was to it.

When the topic of the Spanish Military Union was discussed, the military governor of La Coruna changed his mind: the UME that they had established before the Civil War was made up of decent, rightist persons.

These two anecdotes, unpublished up to now, reflect a constant in the Spanish Army in recent years: an excessively benevolent treatment of military persons connected with the extreme right and strictness, harshness and persecution for military persons defending liberal or democratic political positions.

This constant enabled the coupist sectors in Army to have a free hand, once the political reform had been carried out, to conspire against democracy. The facts are evident: in Holy Week 1977, while the UMD was persecuted harshly, a group of

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generals connected with the reactionary right met in Javea and promoted an attempt to have the legalization of the Communist Party of Spain reversed.

One year later, shortly before Christmas 1978, another military officer advocating reversal of that legalization--LtCol Antonio Tejero Molina, of the Civil Guard--was the protagonist in a second attempted coup d'etat.

UME Comes Into Being

Up to that time, coupist military plots had shown signs of not being organized. Several groups of military officers with far right leanings had established organizations like the Military Patriotic Union (IPM [sic; should read UPM]), the Military Patriotic Movement (MPM), the Patriotic Associations or the Spanish Union for the Defense of Spain (UEDE), which did not go beyond being mere attempts to form an association of military persons thinking along conservative, coupist lines.

They died a few days after their establishment. Like autumn flowers. And the only evidence that there is of the existence of those secret organizations in the barracks are photographs in the files of military secret services of some isolated item signed with the acronyms UPM or MPM.

The situation was to change as a result of the reduced sentence imposed on Antonio Tejero Molina, a Civil Guard lieutenant colonel, and on Ricardo Saenz, a major in the National Police, for the attempted military coup known as "Operation Galaxy."

Starting at that time, military officers of the extreme right who went under the acronyms of Military Patriotic Union, Patriotic Associations and Military Patriotic Movement entered into contact with each other and established the Spanish Military Union, resuscitating the old underground organization that enabled Gen Francisco Franco to set off the coup d'etat on 18 July 1936.

Nevertheless, the new UME was not a strictly military organization, as it was in 1936, but also behind the extreme right military persons there is a complex conspiracy of civilian coupists connected with the New Force Party and the intelligence services of the single party of Franco's Movement and of the vertical labor unions, including the only civilian arrested during the 23 F /23 February/ coup: Juan Garcia Garres.

The civilian conspirators were precisely the ones who gave the UME cohesion and structure and the ones who designed the new strategy to be followed, in order to demolish the structures of the democratic state.

A member of the state's intelligence services who agrees with CAMBIO 16's analysis stated to this periodical that, starting in 1979, a very subtle operation of infiltration in the areas of military intelligence and in the immediate intervention units was detected in extreme rightist circles of the Army.

"The extreme right military persons," he stated to CAMBIO 16, "who up to that time seemed to be little interested in the art of warfare, suddenly began to aim at General Staff courses and to request assignments in the best equipped military units regarded by the high command to be for 'immediate intervention'."

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The same source remarked that "it was clear that their intention was to take hold of the three basic means for the operation of any army: intelligence, staffs of the units in which action plans are prepared and guns."

Bound by Oath

In the first months of 1979, the UME--according to data from this periodical--was only a group of military persons with extreme right thinking, very closely knit and bound to each other by oath, in order to prevent infiltration and in order to act in the most absolute secrecy against the democratic institutions and against the Crown.

That structure is the one that they still maintain at the present time, although among its plans is a plan to come to the surface some day, in order to be able to increase its number and to create a reliable structure that will enable them to carry out military action against the king and the will of the people. What concerns them most is not the number of members that the UME can have, but rather the contacts and the number of persons with whom they associate every day.

One of the UME's instructions to its members is to associate constantly with other military personnel of their same class, to study what their political thinking is and to try to ascertain how many persons in each Army unit would be inclined to participate in a seditious coup, under the assumption that a favorable situation would occur in Spain that would enable them to destroy the regime of freedoms.

Intact

These instructions, which are not written in any manual, but which are transmitted verbally, have enabled the UME to have a rather complete file in which the number of military persons who would be in agreement with a military solution and the number who would remain passive and would not obstruct tanks from going out into the street is recorded.

The UME, which, according to all the information that CAMBIO 16 has, took part in the preparations for the 23 February military coup, disassociated itself from it as an organization when, months before Lieutenant Colonel Tejero Molina seized the Congress of Deputies, Gen Alfonso Armada, with the support of foreign secret services, entered into the coupist plot, in order to try to soften the rebellion and to attempt to prevent bloodshed as much as possible.

On the other hand, it does seem that there were members of the Spanish Military Union who joined the 23 February coupist conspiracy in an individual capacity. The Almendros collective, which, according to the French newspaper LE MONDE, consisted of Colonel San Martin and Colonel Marchante, Lieutenant Colonel Villalba and Lieutenant Colonel Fuentes Gomez de Salazar and Major Pardo Zancada, was an idea of the UME to warm up the atmosphere and prepare the way for the coup from the pages of the daily newspaper EL ALCAZAR.

Of the five persons mentioned by the French newspaper, two of them--Pardo and San Martin--are under arrest for military rebellion and Lieutenant Colonel Fuentes y Gomez de Salazar, who was the one who convinced Tejero to surrender, has been under strict watch by the anticoup brigade, which has been unable to find the slightest shadow of suspicion in his behavior.

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Therefore, the internal structure of the UME is intact and running smoothly. The proof of this is that many of its members have been the main promoters of the strategy of disinformation and negotiation concerning the ones tried for the 23 February coup, while another sector of the organization has worked on organizing collections for the coupists. "And it must not be forgotten," according to a member of the secret service, "that Franco's UME came into existence, in 1934, to organize "Blue Aid" for the military personnel against whom reprisals were taken because of the [miscarried] Sanjurjo [coup]."

They made only one mistake in this work, although it occurred quite a bit before the 23-F coup. A lieutenant colonel in Seville, associated with sectors close to the Spanish Military Union, was dismissed in the middle of 1980, after someone in his office stole some code tapes with which the military coupist conspirators were attempting to control the military intelligence communication networks and to decipher their messages.

The incident was only an obstacle on the way, but it did not make the UME change its course or its objectives. And thus, on 31 [sic] April 1981, over a month after the miscarried coup d'etat, the UME brought out a 70-page report in which it analyzed the mistakes made in the coupist attempt and stated that "the first obstacle to saving Spain is the king" and that, when they go into action, they are not going to ask anyone for permission.

Not even their seniors. Because, according to CAMBIO 16 data, the present UME is made up basically of junior and senior officers of the Armed Forces--the men who command the regiments, battalions and companies--and they have an olympic scorn for the generals whom they regard as a disturbance to their plans, because they regard them as a class very much tied to the political command.

"The men who won the war of liberation," they say in one of their reports, "were not the generals. The generals, the majority of whom remained loyal to the Republic, lost it. Only the captains, majors and colonels in command of the units and who are in direct contact with the troops are, therefore, the ones who can again "enable us to rise up victoriously."

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