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JPRS L/10085

30 October 1981

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 745



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ACTIVITIES OF WEST AFRICAN CENTRAL BANK REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2379

[Text] West African Development Bank Fiscal Year 1980

The West African Development Bank (BOAD) was established in 1973 by the six member states of the West African Monetary Union (UMOA): Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal and Togo, and their issuing institution, the West African States Central Bank (BCEAO), for the purpose of promoting the balanced development of the member states, and implementing economic integration in West Africa by financing development projects on a priority basis.

A total of 25 billion of an authorized capital of 34 billion CFA was subscribed by the end of September 1980 by the 6 above-named states, the BCEAO, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (with a unit share of 1 billion CFA for the 2 shareholders). The main office of the BOAD is located in Lome, and operations were begun during the 1975-76 fiscal year.

During its 1979-80 fiscal year, the BOAD began /16 studies/ [in boldface] for national and regional projects which involve a total of 236.1 million CFA.

For the same fiscal year, investment decisions involved nine projects amounting to 5.2 billion CFA. Thus, since beginning operations, the volume of BOAD loans and shares has risen to the financing of 34 projects for a total volume of 16.9 billion CFA.

Investments during the last fiscal year involved rural development (27 percent of the total), industry (17 percent), energy (39 percent) and telecommunications (17 percent). The financing is broken down as follows:

Senegal: Back-up of the investment in well-digging groups in the Thies, Diourbel, Kaolack, Tambacounda, Matam, N'Dioum and Ziguinchor regions, for a long-term loan (13 years) of 580 million CFA, which represents 70 percent of the cost of the program.

Electrification of 7 new districts of Kaolack, through a long-term loan (11 years) of 430 million CFA, or 70 percent of the cost of the project.

Togo: Development of village waterpower by constructing drilling rigs and pumping equipment, with a 13-year loan of 634 million CFA, which represents 80 percent of the projected costs.

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Construction of the second production facility of the Benin Brewery Company at Lama-Kara, for which the majority of the capital is held by Togolese nationals, with a 12-year loan of 708 million CFA, or 33.5 percent of the required investment.

Expansion and modernization of the Lome overhead-underground telephone lines system, by a 15-year loan of 900 million CFA, which represents 33 percent of the program.

Benin: A loan to the Farm Loan National Bank of 180 million CFA for a term of 7 years to finance fishermen-craftsmen cooperatives. The BOAD assistance represents 58.4 percent of the projected costs.

Expansion of the diesel generating plant of Parakou through the purchase and installation of 3 new units with an 11-year loan of 585 million CFA, or 80 percent of the project.

Upper Volta: Taking a 200 million CFA share of the capital of the Farm Loan National Bank, or 15.38 percent of the capital of 1.3 billion CFA of that organization.

Expansion of the diesel generating plant at Ouagadougou through the purchase and installation of 2 new units by a 13-year loan of 1 billion CFA, which represents 32.19 percent of the projected cost.

Aside from the capital which has already been subscribed and paid (4.1 billion CFA to 30 September 1980), the BOAD has at its disposal donations from the member states (3.7 billion) on the balance sheet at the end of September 1980, with commitments for long-term loans written for 6 billion CFA.

Mr Pierre-Claver Damiba is chairman of the board of the BOAD, whose board of directors includes representatives from the six member states, from the West African States Central Bank, from the treasury of France and from the Federal Republic of Germany.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PROBLEMS FACING AFRICAN TIMBER PRODUCTION REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1868, 28 Aug 81 p 2236

[Excerpt] In many African countries, one of the priority problems requiring a solution is the obvious exhaustion of their natural forestry resources as a result of their increasingly high rate of population growth and extensive farming. The system of shifting cultivation has proved to be dangerous for forest conservation as well as for the sustained soil fertility even when the land is allowed to lie fallow for long periods of time.

This situation has resulted in efforts to find and to improve the methods of simultaneously growing trees and food crops, methods which have proved to be effective. Now, attempts are being made to perfect systems of agriculture and silviculture which could serve as models for the dual purpose of producing fast-growing species of valuable wood alongside perennial crops such as coffee, cacao and bananas, while care is taken of restoring and maintaining the fertility of the soil.

With this in mind, two kinds of actions are being considered. One is based on a short-term rotation period (between 5 and 15 years) and can be used in areas of very high population growth where the natural forest has disappeared almost entirely and where there is a shortage of timber. It consists in planting fast-growing species, such as eucalyptus, which will be used to make poles and as firewood. The other action, based on a longer rotation period (between 30 and 50 years), makes it possible to grow coffee and cacao crops but gives priority to species such as the limba, framire, samba, obeche or wawa.

Another problem arising also in Africa is the concern created by the very low productivity of the natural forest in that area which has led a number of countries to request a study on the possibility of increasing the yields through effective methods of forest replenishment (either by the method of regrowth under cover, by the method of gradual clearing of the cover or by clear-cutting) and through the genetic improvement of quality species.

To increase the volume of the "timber material," many countries have planted artificial forests with local species and the chief purpose of these experiments is to identify and select the fast-growing species. But the planting programs have revealed an important element: the relationship between the properties of the wood and the requirements of final utilization.

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Particular attention has been given to a species which grows naturally in Sierra Leone and Zaire and is known under different names (samba, obeche or wawa) but has been exploited so heavily that it has disappeared from the natural forests. This species is currently the object of planting programs in the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria. Having found a simple method of producing clones propagated by vegetative means, it is possible to consider transferring stocks to the hinterland beyond the natural forest area.

There is a third problem drawing the attention of African countries and now being studied. Countries with an increasing tendency to process their own timber on the spot, so as to increase the value of their products whenever possible, are very interested in finding adequate processing methods for combinations or groups of species. The need to find ways of seasoning the wood which can be applied to every possible combination of species and the need to perfect methods to protect the timber from perishable species, both pervious and nonpervious species, is something obvious in that context.

A characteristic of the African tropical forest is the great variety of its species, many of which are not known or hardly used. With the traditional common species becoming more scarce, it has become necessary, as we know, to study the possibility of using and marketing species which up to now were little known or little used, and some of which were not exploited because some of their properties made them commercially unsuitable or undesirable. Since, for the time being, it is impossible to solve that problem by suitable methods of silviculture or by improving the quality of the trees, efforts must be directed to solving it as best as possible at the processing stage (experiments in sawing, planning, seasoning, impregnation and so on).

Another characteristic of the African forest is that after the trees are cut down much logging debris is left in the forests or at the sawing location. There is much wastage in the various stages of logging, transportation, secondary processing, manufacture of the finished product and final utilization. Undoubtedly, this large amount of wasted material considerably reduces the productivity of the forestry industry. Technological progress has been achieved in the utilization of the debris to manufacture by-products (chipboard, plywood, wood pulp, charcoal and so on) but one still has to solve the problem of finding economic ways of gathering the logging debris.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

AFRICAN RAILROADS--The Higher Council of OFERMAT (French Cooperation Office for Railroads and Equipment) is scheduled to meet in Paris on 20 and 21 October this year. This meeting, held every 2 years, is a gathering of national representatives of the various railroads from French-speaking African countries which have signed cooperation agreements with that agency. The purpose of this minisummit--which will be chaired by Jean-Pierre Cot, French minister delegate to the minister of external relations for cooperation and development, and by Charles Fiterman, French minister for transportation--is to bring the OFERMAT partners together and take stock of the situation with regard to current activities and future projects. Jean-Pierre Cot has emphasized the fact that this meeting "offers a very good opportunity for an exchange of views between France and the French-speaking African countries on questions of transportation and equipment." The 20 October meeting will take place at the headquarters of the International Railroad Union (UIC) and will be attended, among others, by the general secretary of the African Railroad Union (UAC), Adama Diagne (Senegal). This meeting will make it possible to underline the new guidelines of the French policy regarding France's cooperation with developing countries and more particularly the lines along which the development of land transportation will be directed in Africa. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 247 31 Aug-13 Sep 81 p 53] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie] 8796

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NATION'S RECOVERY SAID TO DEPEND ON UNITY OF SOUND FORCES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 248, 14-27 Sep 81 pp 13-14

[Article by Ginette Cot: "The Military Transition"]

[Text] The burdensome heritage left to Central Africa by the former Giscard regime was dealt a decisive blow by the departure of David Dacko from the political scene in Bangui, on 1 September last, and the substitution of his cabinet by a Military Committee of National Recovery headed by Andre Kolingba, the chief of staff of the Armed Forces who was recently promoted to the rank of general.

Whatever version is accepted--that David Dacko himself resigned for health reasons as he has indicated, or that he was compelled and forced to do so by the military to whom he gave full powers when a state of emergency was proclaimed following the bomb attack of 14 July this year--everybody realizes the significance of the bloodless coup. And it was with a general feeling of relief that the Central African people and the leaders of the opposition parties received the news.

A Powder Keg

This was no surprise at all. David Dacko, who was brought back to power in Bangui riding on the trucks of the paratroops which carried out the "Barracuda" Operation on 21 September 1979, was the ultimate symbol of the process of colonial reconquest initiated by Giscard's former French Government in that country implanted in the heart of Africa and ruined by 20 years of dictatorship during which its national wealth, both in terms of human and material resources, was squandered. Neither the democratic process hastily launched last November, nor the presidential election of March 1981, which was unanimously contested and only gave a narrow majority to the ousted head of state (in spite of the support he received from the administration and from the barracuda troops), succeeded in eliminating the stigma attached to Bokassa's successor right from the very beginning. This situation was compounded by the fact that, as soon as he took office, David Dacko--who reportedly was forced to return to power against his wishes--gave the impression of being not so much a chief of state as a puppet manipulated by his French advisers and proved that he was incapable of bringing even the slightest improvement to the situation in the political, economic or social spheres.

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We know that in October 1979, the former head of state--who had little inclination to establish a dialogue--prevented an opportunity to start building a national consensus when he scuttled the roundtable scheduled to bring together all the country's political movements and leanings. We know that later he tried to challenge at every opportunity (particularly in March and July this year) the multiparty system which, apparently, he had been forced to accept under protest. As for the economic and social situation, it merely deteriorated to such an extent that prospective financial backers avoided the country. The constant strikes, the general absenteeism from work and the farmers' refusal to pay taxes or to plant cash crops--all signs of the population's dissatisfaction with the deterioration of living conditions--contributed to aggravate a situation always characterized by cases of corruption and embezzlement and by an ever-increasing decline of moral standards (gangsterism, robberies, prostitution) which had reached unprecedented proportions.

As the months went by, Central Africa became a powder keg where the worst--as proved by the bombing of 14 July--could be expected.

This is why the opposition parties were calling for David Dacko's departure as an absolutely necessary precondition to any normalization of the situation. It is known that on the day after 10 May this year, the Central African people celebrated with joy the fall of the Giscard regime in France, a fall which, in their view, would inevitably sound as well the knell of the Dacko regime in Bangui.

Although Mitterrand's France--which truly intends to apply the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of African countries regarding its relations with that continent--refused to engage in any operation reminiscent of the "Barracuda" adventure, it nonetheless expressed displeasure for the repressive measures taken by the Dacko regime after the 14 July bomb attack and the regime was, in fact, forced to back-pedal (this is how in mid-August it lifted the measures banning and suspending the movements headed by Dr Abel Goumba and Ange Patasse and promised to hold "soon" the general and municipal elections which had been previously postponed). At the same time, some of the demands made by the opposition were listened to in Paris. For instance, after the departure of Mr Serre, the French adviser to the presidency in Bangui, the former ambassador, who was deeply involved in some of the scandals associated with the "Barracuda" Operation and its consequences, was replaced by a new ambassador, Francois Couturier, the first diplomat appointed by Francois Mitterrand. The network of "overseas voluntary service members" dispatched by the former French regime was being dismantled and the green berets integrated into Dacko's presidential guard to which they were attached were recalled. As for the "barracuda" troops, recently renamed "units of operational assistance in Central Africa," they were restricted to their camps and, as we know, remain there with strict orders to intervene only in the event of external aggression or to protect French citizens. All these developments indicate that the "de-Giscardization" of the situation is underway and this process should make it possible to clear the scene and help the Central African people to take their fate into their own hands.

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Unknown Factors

It is not surprising for the Central African Army, reorganized and reequipped over the last 2 years, to have taken the driver's seat when one knows that the opposition of David Dacko (including the more or less convincing last-minute adherents) was slow to agree on a common program of government. Also when one knows that the Provisional Political Council (CPP, which included the PPO-PT [Ubangui Patriotic Front-Labor Party], the MLPC [Central African People's Liberation Movement], the PRP [People's Revolutionary Party] and the GIRA [Independent Group for Reflection and Political Action] respectively headed by Abel Goumba, Ange Patasse, Henri Maidou and Francois Pehoua), whose initial objective was to fight against violations of the rights granted by the new constitution, did not make a move in that direction until recently, when it was jostled by what was happening.

Of course there are still many unknown elements and, understandably, the former parties of the opposition to David Dacko are adopting wait-and-see attitude until they know more about the intentions of the new leaders whom people hope will rule only temporarily.

In any case, the transfer of power took place on 1 September under conditions which augur well for what is to follow--there was no shooting, no arrests and not even the slightest show of force.

As for the hastily spread rumors that the United States had a hand in the events, rumors chiefly grounded on a simple visit which the American ambassador paid to the new head of state, they seem to be the product of those who want to create alarm rather than to be based on facts. Besides, in the first statements he made, Gen Andre Kolingba, who described those rumors as "utterly false," clearly called for maintaining privileged relations with France which has also been asked to pay the salaries of the Central African civil servants for, at least, 1 year thus allowing him to "have his hands free to reorganize the country and lay down the foundations of its economic recovery."

To put the economic machinery back on the right course and to restore "order in business activity" seem to be the chief concerns of the new head of state, who explained the army's intervention in the following terms: "During the last 6 months, the scene was one of sterile arguments and violence which severely tested our patriotism, with blatant violations of democracy and unacceptable challenges to our reason, our honor and our rights. It is out of respect for the constitution, freely created and adopted by the people, that until now the neutral and apolitical army has maintained a wise silence in the face of the distress calls issued by the Central African people."

But when he announced that the constitution and political parties had been suspended, General Kolingba indicated that the army would rule "until the right time when conditions are met to hand over to civilians the powers of the state." The duration of that transition period will depend, he explained, "on the political parties and their leaders. For the time being, let them keep quiet and stay in their corner. When order is restored, I will see what can be done to hand power over to them."

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To what conditions and what order is he referring? The question remains unanswered.

A Page Has Been Turned

However, in an interview broadcasted by Radio France Internationale, the French minister for cooperation and development said that France "was not reassured but remained attentive." He explained that what had happened on 1 September was "a problem of domestic nature" in which "France must not get involved although it is concerned by all this," and taking note of the wish for cooperation expressed by the new leaders in Bangui, Jean-Pierre Cot pointed out: "A military takeover is always a defeat for democracy. The constitution is suspended. We always regret to see a democratic process interrupted. But, of course, we are not in a position to judge the situation on behalf of the Central African people."

A lot will undoubtedly depend on the ability of all the sound forces of Central Africa to put forward ideas, to get reorganized and to unite behind vital objectives if this new phase, just initiated in Bangui, is really to be the beginning of a revival process in that ravaged country. Let us definitely turn over one of the darkest pages of African history ever written by successive French regimes until 10 May 1981.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

GOODWILL MISSION TO PARIS--A Central African "goodwill" mission headed by the minister of foreign affairs, Lt-Col Jean-Louis Gervil Yambala, arrived on 13 September in Paris where it gave to President Mitterrand a message from the President of the Military Committee of National Recovery (CMRN), Gen Andre Kolingba. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2392] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

JAPANESE RELATIONS--The Japanese Government has decided to recognize the new Central African regime. Japan's Foreign Affairs Minister Sunao Sonoda explained in Tokyo, on 8 September, that he would ask Akio Akada, the Japanese charge d'affaires in Bangui, to convey to the new Central African head of state, Gen Andre Kolingba, Japan's wishes to maintain friendly relations with the Central African Republic. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2392] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

DEMAND FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION--The Association of Central African Workers in France (ACTF), in a communique issued on 8 September, calls for the immediate restoration of the constitution which was suspended on 1 September by the new Central African head of state, Gen Andre Kolingba, and called for the formation of a National Union Government. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2392] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

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CHAD

POLITICAL, MILITARY SITUATION SEEN AS LARGELY POSITIVE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 248, 14-30 Sep 81 p 46

[Text] The normalization process continues in Ndjama where the Chadian branch of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC--Institute of Issue) re-opened its doors on 10 June and air traffic between the Chadian capital--which has been cut off from the world since the last war ended in December 1980--and African and European capitals is due to resume any time now.

This normalization is taking place in all spheres of activity and more particularly in the political sphere. As a matter of fact, there is no further mention of political leanings or factions in Chad. Interrupted by Hissein Habre's "bid for power" which led to a long fratricidal war, the process to reunify within the Chadian National Liberation Front [FROLINAT] all political and military forces which claim to adhere to the ideas of that organization, resumed last January on a sounder basis and has reached an irreversible stage.

After several meetings, a political platform containing eight points of the Front's initial program in an updated and improved version and new statutes were adopted until the time when they convene a congress of the unified FROLINAT.

This, together with the new national army now being formed, an army where the best fighting forces of the former political factions are merging with troops of the Chadian Armed Forces (remnants of the former government's army), is the most important event registered in Chad in recent months and represents the best safeguard for the protection of peace, independence and territorial integrity in the country.

Meanwhile, it is noticed that the first contacts between the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] and the new French Government have been positive ones.

According to some sources, it has been implied that any French move remained linked to the issue of the Libyan troops' presence in Chad.

But these reservations appear to be a minor question. Is it not a fact that the question of the Libyan troops' presence is an artificial problem? Particularly since it is known that in Ndjama and in Tripoli what they want is a final normalization of the situation. The only thing that complicates this problem is the threat hanging over Libya and Chad as a result of the military preparations taking place in Sudan (with Egypt's backing), a country harboring the remnants of Hissein Habre's FAN [Northern Armed Forces].

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CHAD

BRIEFS

U.S. INVOLVED IN DESTABILIZATION--The incursions of Hissene Habre's armed forces near Irika and Guereda in east Chad near the Sudanese borders again confirm what we have written about unceasingly in these columns: because of Egyptian-Sudanese military and financial support--whose main supplier is America--remnants of the FAN [Armed Forces of the North] manage to cross Chad's borders to try and disturb the security of the country's eastern regions. Guided by remote control from Washington, Cairo and Khartoum aim to destabilize the Chadian government in order to overthrow it and replace it with another government under orders from western, especially American, strategy in the area. When all is said and done, the incursions of Habre's mercenaries did not do very much damage. Contrary to Sudanese press statements, the head of the Chadian diplomatic corps, Ahmat Acyl, who was recently in the border areas, was not wounded. Although Irika (1,000 inhabitants) has always been considered a bastion of support for Habre, the FAN soldiers there were driven away last month but they are still trying desperately to regain control. The Chadian national forces, assisted by Libyan troops, have deployed many soldiers and much military equipment to crush, once and for all, FAN operations. According to reliable sources, their soldiers are reportedly now being trained by Egyptian and Sudanese officers who avoid entering Chad for fear of being captured by government forces. Some 20 military advisers from the US were allegedly attached to them in early September 1981. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep-11 Oct 81 p 29] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie] 9479

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COMORO ISLANDS

OPPOSITION SEEN STRENGTHENED BY PARIS'S NEGLECT OF ABDALLAH

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1080 16 Sep 81 p 51

[Article by Sadio Lamine Sow: "Vigil of Arms"]

[Text] After a long wait, the Comorian head of state will finally be received at the Elysee in October. Ahmed Abdallah had multiplied his gestures of goodwill towards the French socialists since the election of Francois Mitterand. He has taken as his own the official position of the PS on the western Sahara, thus diminishing his support of Morocco. At the last OAU summit in Nairobi, he refrained from any allusion to Mayotte. And for the past few months he has been striving to convince Paris of the "painful necessity" represented by the Denard affair.

But the French Government maintains an attitude of watchful waiting regarding the regime which emerged from the 1978 coup d'etat. It thereby leaves a clear field to an opposition trying to take shape as an alternative.

Mouzawoir Abdallah, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of President Soilih (killed in the Bob Denard coup d'etat), secretly left Moroni in June to come to Paris and make contact, according to certain sources, with some exiles. Mouzawoir Abdallah is preparing to return to his country, after a pilgrimage to Mecca. He took care to alert the Moroni authorities by a profession of faith which he particularly addressed to the presiding judge of the supreme court and to the army chief of staff. "A demagogic and useless precaution," according to Ali Mlahaili, Comorian ambassador to Paris, "since Mouzawoir has never been troubled, and could move freely on the island. Besides, he represents no one but himself."

And yet certain French circles, who have kept interests in the Comoros, see in him a possible successor to Ahmed Abdallah. The more so since the URDC [Union for a Democratic Republic in the Comoros], whose president is Soihili Bacari, has just made him its "principal animator." If the ultimate aim of that association is the conquest of power, it also wishes to bar the way to the FNUK-UNIKOM, a movement born of the fusion, on 18 July in Paris, of the United Comorian National Front and the Union of Comorians. Presided by Aboubakar Ahmed Nourdini, that movement does not rule out recourse to

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violence to force in Moroni. The Comorian Government, for its part, maintains that Nourdini is of Kenyan nationality and came to the Comoros but once, in 1960.

There is another opposition movement in the running: the National Committee of Public Safety, founded by Said Ali Kemal, former ambassador to Paris, who resigned his post. He appears to have the support of the Association of Comorian Workers in France. As yet, little is known of his program, which professes to be liberal and contemplates attaining power only by democratic means.

Everything suggests the Comoros are on the eve of change, even though President Abdallah has denied rumors of his intention to leave office before his term expires in 1984. The economic condition of the country could have justified that intention. The state treasury has a chronic deficit of over 1.5 billion CFA Fr. Prices for the four export products (ylang-ylang, vanilla, cloves, and copra), from which are derived 95 percent of the country's foreign exchange, are falling from year to year. France contributes 45 percent of budget subsidies. Development projects exist only thanks to Persian Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Occupying a strategic position in the Indian Ocean, alongside forward-looking Madagascar, the Comoros aspire to change. If Ahmed Abdallah does not impose it, a storm could well follow for his regime.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FAO FINANCING AGREEMENT--The FAO and the Congo signed on 8 September, in Brazzaville, a financing agreement dealing with the study of self-sufficiency in food supplies. The FAO's share in this project is \$45,000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2393] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

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NIGERIA

OIL PRODUCTION DOWN IN AUGUST; FAVORABLE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY 1982

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2384

[Text] According to financial circles in Lagos, Nigeria's oil production reportedly amounted to some 708,000 barrels a day in August and was consequently higher than previous estimates that put it at 640,000 barrels a day (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 11 September, p 2334). Nevertheless, this production of 708,000 barrels a day represents a 66-percent drop compared with the beginning of the year. As for exports, they were put at 500,000 barrels a day for the same month, about one-fourth the monthly exports of a year ago.

The same financial circles indicate that the government's losses in receipts, which were on the order of \$1 billion a month during the last quarter, reached some \$6 billion for the first nine months, according to unofficial sources, or nearly 30 percent of the 1981 budget, put at \$21.4 billion.

Nevertheless, the drop in the price of crude oil; thanks to the granting of a \$4 or 10-percent rebate by the government since 26 August, should favor a resumption of production in the months ahead. Oil circles believe that production could go as high as 1.5 million barrels a day during the first quarter of 1982.

The situation with regard to new prices in effect since 26 August remains confused and it would appear that buyers are awaiting their first bills in order to know the true situation.

Initially, an official bulletin from the Office of the President authorized the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to grant a \$4 per barrel refund to its customers. However, the bulletin stated that the official price per barrel remained \$40 until the OPEC summit conference, to be held in Abu Dhabi in December.

For its part, the NNPC notified companies that the rebate would be 10 percent and that it would imply a price variation ranging from \$34.83 to \$36 a barrel, depending on the quality of the crude, and that it would involve only that portion of production from the NNPC.

This share is partially bought back by the foreign companies. The rest is sold by the NNPC itself.

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At a recent meeting, officials of the national company assured their colleagues in the foreign firms that the refund would finally be granted for all production, to wit, the 70 percent from the NNPC and the 30 percent for the other companies. Concerning the latter, the rebate should result in a reduction in royalties and taxes paid to the Nigerian Government and should be around 10 percent.

In addition, the statement by Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ahmad Zaki Yamani concerning another future drop in Nigerian crude to \$31 or \$32 a barrel has not been commented upon officially. The statement by the Saudi minister has been reported in several daily newspapers in the Nigerian capital, which, as usual, are very discreet about the country's oil situation and publish only authorized statements. In the circles concerned, Yamani's statement was somewhat surprising insofar as for the time being, nothing would seem to point to a drop in the price of Nigerian crude.

Oil: Company Production During First Quarter and in June and July

Oil production of the different operating companies in Nigeria was as follows during the first quarter of this year and in June and July (in thousands of barrels):

	June	July	Average 1st Quarter
Ashland	9.6	5	9.6
ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France]	57.5	56	73.3
Gulf	329	204	318.1
Mobil Ken/Sun	8	8	8.3
Mobil	112.1	93	192.1
AGIP/Phillips [Italian Petroleum Enterprise]	81.1	23	154.6
Pan Ocean	7.6	7	7.9
Phillips	1.02	1	1.2
Shell	698	343	899.3
Texaco	46	31	42.9
Total	1,349.2	771	1,707.3

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NIGERIA

BRITISH LOAN FOR ABUJA FEDERAL CAPITAL PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2385

[Text] Following his visit to Nigeria (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 11 September, p 2335), British Minister of Housing and Construction John Stanley announced on 11 September that the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) of his country -- the equivalent of COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] in France -- was planning to guarantee 300 million pounds in bank credits for construction of the future federal capital in Abuja. The minister added that the guarantee could subsequently be granted for additional credits.

It is emphasized that this is the first time that the ECGD, which has already guaranteed 100 million pounds in credits for about eight other specific projects in Nigeria, has guaranteed such large sums in an African country.

It will also be recalled that the Abuja project was granted the equivalent of some 1.9 billion pounds by the Federal Government itself. Contracts concluded by foreign firms already amount to over 1 billion pounds, but the British share was previously under 10 million pounds. The British firms involved in the project are Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick and Partners, Taylor Woodrow and the Milton Keynes Development Corporation. Representatives of these firms accompanied the minister on his trip, along with representatives of Balfour Beatty, Costain International and the Morgan Grenfell Bank.

The Abuja project is included in the 1981-1985 National Development Plan. The new city will welcome the first official organizations in 1982-1983 and its population should reach 1.6 million inhabitants between now and the year 2000.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

IDA AGRICULTURAL LOAN--Senegal is borrowing \$19.5 million (17 million SDR [Special Drawing Rights]) from the International Development Association (IDA, a subsidiary of the World Bank) to upgrade the practical impact of its agricultural research operations. The long-term goal is to diversify the agriculture and improve the productivity of crop farms. Five regional research stations will be modernized and research teams will be formed. Emphasis will be placed on establishing better links between research and diffusion of knowledge. A communique issued by the bank indicates that the IDA credit will be opened as soon as funds become available. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 230] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

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TANZANIA

ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORTEDLY REMAINS SERIOUS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2396

[Text] On the eve of President Nyerere's visit to Paris, the AFP [French Press Agency] has taken stock of the economic and financial situation in Tanzania which is generally viewed as remaining very serious.

The news agency mentions that since May this year, the Dar es Salaam Government has outlined a "national economic program for survival" on which to base its policy. Gasoline is rationed and there are constant shortages of bread, sugar, electric bulbs and batteries. Maintenance work on roads and buildings is slight or nonexistent.

With a population of 17 million people and a per capita GNP of less than \$250, the country has not recovered from three successive shocks: the oil price increase (55 percent of its foreign currency earnings goes to pay that bill), the war against Idi Amin Dada (which according to the government has cost \$500 million) and the downwards trend in selling prices for agricultural goods (coffee, cotton, sisal).

For the second year running, the industrial activity dropped in 1980. Due to the lack of spare parts and raw materials, which can no longer be purchased because there is no foreign currency available, most factories are operating at 40 percent of their capacity, according to the minister for the plan and economic affairs, Kighoma Ali Malima.

But what is even more serious is the long-term downtrend in the production of agricultural goods for export which represent 80 percent of the foreign currency resources. Observers think that this is probably due to the mistakes made in the implementation of Tanzanian socialism in the rural sphere and most particularly the nationalization of cooperatives.

Over 30 percent of the development budget for 1980-1981 was not used as a result of economic freezes. On the whole, Tanzania imports two and a half times more than it exports and must live on credit.

The external debt amounts to no less than \$1 billion and the outstanding trade debts total \$300 million (one-fourth of the imports), a fact which creates hesitation among those who would like to trade with that country.

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Tanzania receives very large amounts of foreign aid--\$32 per inhabitant and per year--mostly from the Scandinavian countries.

But only the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can restore Tanzania's financial credibility through direct and massive aid to its balance of payments. However, the IMF's conditions for granting new credits are seen as unacceptable by the Dar es Salaam Government. Among other things, the fund calls for a devaluation (the figure of 50 percent is reported to have been put forward) of the Tanzanian shilling which is sold in the black market for one-fifth of its current value (1 Tanzanian shilling = 0.7 French francs). Tanzanian economists believe that a devaluation would increase the government expenses because the cost of imported goods would go up. To offset this increase, there would have to be dismal cutbacks in the social program since the 1980-81 budget for ordinary expenditures already shows a \$150 deficit.

Tanzania does not want to give up its social system which provides, among other things, free primary education. "What is the advantage of development if most of the population is deprived of basic things such as education and medical care?" the minister for the plan told AFP.

So far, the government had managed to keep the price index within reasonable limits (+30 percent) through a price control policy. But inflation is appreciably higher in the growing black market.

Faced with the pressing suggestions made by the IMF, the Dar es Salaam Government is implementing its "national economic program for survival" which allocates foreign currency on a priority basis to the purchase of equipment, raw materials and spare parts to enable the economy to keep going.

Priority has been taken away from big development projects (except for the building of a paper plant and the expansion of Dar es Salaam Airport) and placed on improving the existing structures. But this change of direction will take some time. Two textile factories, in Arusha and in Dar es Salaam, are scheduled to be expanded in the near future although they are currently working at a mere 40 percent of their full capacity. All the financial backers are aware of this need for a change of direction. Making use of unexpended funds from Lome I, the EEC will overhaul 600 vehicles which were put out of service by public companies and will make improvements on the Dar es Salaam-Kigoma central railroad service.

The Tanzanian Government refuses to establish a connection between the country's economic and financial situation and its socialist option. During the United Nations conference recently held at the UNESCO in Paris, the Tanzanian minister for the plan again pointed out that countries following "capitalist" policies find themselves "in the same boat" as Tanzania.

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TANZANIA

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AT TIME OF NYERERE'S VISIT TO FRANCE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep-11 Oct 81 pp 18-20

[Article by Daniel Joussan: "Socialism, Tanzanian Style"]

[Excerpts] The new direction of French policy toward Africa received the approval of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, on an official visit to Paris. After a 2-hour meeting with the French head of state, the Tanzanian leader said he was "very happy" with the exchange of views, mainly on Namibian matters. They also discussed the new international economic order, a topic on which the two heads of state had already expressed very similar ideas. They will meet again next month at the North-South Conference at Cancun.

On 15 September 1981, Tanzanian President Nyerere met the new French president, socialist Francois Mitterrand. This was a significant event. For the past 15 years, Tanzania had tried to wed socialism with African tradition. This effort, on the fringe of the official canon of scientific socialism, has attracted French theorists whose principles the current government espouses. Moreover, the Tanzanian president is, on the international scene, a spokesman for Third World demands--nonalignment, new international economic order, African unity and the struggle against apartheid are the keynotes of Tanzanian foreign policy. It was hoped that this meeting would be the time that the new French government would outline more clearly its policy toward the Third World and Africa in particular.

Another question arises at the time of this visit: "What is the current status of Tanzanian socialism?"

The results of nearly 15 years of this policy are necessarily mixed.*

*The Franco-Tanzanian Friendship Association has just published a pamphlet "Tanzania, Toward Another Kind of Development?" which tries to evaluate these 15 years of Ujamaa socialism; it provides specific types of support in France. (It can be ordered from the Franco-Tanzanian Friendship Association, 20 rue Rochechouart, 75009 Paris, 12 francs plus 3 francs handling charge.)

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The Arusha Statement

First there is "villagization." If the somewhat authoritarian last phase shocked some well-meaning self-management types in the west, the upheavals ultimately were few in number and it is undeniably a success.

Here is 1 example among 9,000--the village of Kigwe located about 50 km from Dodoma, the future capital. It has 4,000 inhabitants. Since villagization, services have increased. There is a school and, as throughout the country since 1977, all primary school-age children are being educated. A total of eight water faucets throughout the village supply inhabitants with running water. In Tanzania, approximately one out of three villages has such taps. Kigwe also has a post office, cooperative store, a veterinary station, dispensary, workshop for making cattle carts, mill, police commissariat and county court. Moreover, village life has provided training in collective life and in decentralized decision making through village committees and various related subordinate committees.

The Ujamaa objective¹ of cooperative production has perhaps been downplayed somewhat because of the obligatory resettlement. Today, collective production is a modest portion of the total agricultural production. However, its social significance should not be underestimated. Thus, in Kigwe, with the proceeds from the Ujamaa field--here, a vineyard--the villagers purchased a truck which serves all villages in the area. However, the possible disadvantages of villagization should not be denied either, disadvantages which Tanzanian authorities sometimes have trouble seeing. Rene Dumont points out that, "in the very large villages, decreased labor productivity has been noted since people lose more time going to the fields, taking fertilizer and harvesting the crops. There is also decreased soil productivity because of the constant cultivation without organic or even (more often) chemical fertilizers." He added that, "these drops in productivity are the primary causes of agriculture and foodstuff deficits which grew larger in 1980."² Agricultural production is inadequate and although in 1978 and 1979, the food self-sufficiency goal seemed to be attained, this is no longer so; in 1980, Tanzania had to import more than 200,000 tons of cereals.

To encourage food crops, the government kept the price of export crops relatively low. Their production, for the most part, decreased, thus aggravating the balance of trade deficit (they represent a total value of

¹Production and service cooperative

²Rene Dumont, Marie-France Mottin "Africa Strangled", Le Seuil, Paris 1980.

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60 percent of exports.) To reverse this tendency, the government was obliged, on 9 July 1981, to increase the price of these crops.

Crisis in Industrial Sector

The situation in industry is more serious. Each crisis shows the catastrophic mismanagement of the nationalized sector. Amir Jamal, the finance minister, recently said that Tanzania had doubled its production capacity since 1974, but that at the same time its production had decreased 20 percent. In other words, factories are currently operating at 40 percent of their capacity. There are several explanations for this. First, the perverse effects of foreign aid. Despite its principles, Tanzania is one of the Third World countries which receives the most foreign aid. It represents more than 15 percent of its GNP. It is used to invest in elaborate technologies which very often exceed the country's capacity to operate or maintain either because of the level of technical knowledge or financial ability. Decreased foreign currency resources and the increased price of oil exacerbated this tendency. Tanzania no longer has the means to buy raw materials or the necessary spare parts for its industry. Here is one example among thousands: most trawlers of the Dar es Salaam port, all provided by foreign nations, no longer have functioning radar or sonar equipment for navigational safety or for detection of fishing beds.

There are other reasons for the current problems. The establishment of a sizable nationalized sector has facilitated the emergence of a large class of bureaucrats. Since the Arusha statement, one objective of the leaders has been to set up a code for civil servants. Most are devoted and effective. Yet administrative delays are often long. Also, traditional family ties overcome national solidarity with all the attendant problems: theft of public equipment, creation of useless jobs, etc. In the past 2 years especially, corruption has been on the increase because of economic difficulties.

Black Market

It must be said that life is very expensive in Tanzania now. For understandable reasons, the government refused, as the IMF wished, to devalue its currency: this would increase its difficulties in obtaining oil unless its exports really increased, since production structures cannot meet this new external demand. Inflation has increased considerably and in June 1981, the government had to double prices. Scarce foreign currency and the relative overvaluing of the Tanzanian shilling created a large black market where the rate of exchange went as high as seven times the official rate.

To deal with these difficulties, the Tanzanian government 2 years ago requested IMF credits. These were conditional on the application of measures of a liberal economic policy, incompatible with the Tanzanian option.* A

*For more details, see "Economic Alternatives" No 5 (July 1981): "Tanzania Grappling with the IMF".

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compromise was reached 1 year ago, respecting in part the Tanzanian objectives. However, since May 1981, the situation has been deadlocked with Nyerere refusing to devalue, as the Fund still wants.

Today, this economic crisis deepens into an ideological one, perhaps more difficult to resolve. The well-off segments of the population are beginning to question openly the socialist option. The well-to-do class is, for the most part, Indian, some of these people are obviously very rich and they regret they must invest their capital elsewhere. Indians, however, are on the fringe of political life. The well-off Africans, especially small businessmen and bureaucrats, are being tempted by the siren call of liberalism and could easily imagine Tanzania following the Kenyan way which they idealize all the more easily because they do not know it well. This tendency is expressed decidedly within the party which brings together most people and civil servants.

During IMF negotiations 2 years ago, the current Finance Minister Edwin Mtei, reputedly pro-American, wanted to accept the Fund's conditions. He was then replaced by Nyerere's old collaborator, Amir Jamal. At present, this liberal faction appears to be very disorganized and does not speak out publicly. Yet discontent is growing among some civil servants and could coalesce. Nyerere's faction which is first nationalist and understands the word socialism as having a strong humanist, government-management content remains in the majority. Today, this uncontested popular leadership group seems shaken by the crisis of its theoretical basis.

Flight Forward?

Nyerere has chosen to make a visible show of strength to the IMF. In recent months, many demonstrations supporting government policy have been held, at which time IMF interference in Tanzanian domestic matters has been criticized. Yet behind this mobilization against a common enemy, was there not a flight forward in some respects? Is there an alternative strategy if the situation gets worse? In addition, since January 1981, President Nyerere has waged a major campaign against corruption: arrest of Indian businessmen, removal of a minister and two regional commissioners, transfer of many civil servants to Zanzibar and dismissal of the entire management of a firm responsible for the cultivation of pyrethrum.

"It is too late, the phenomenon has spread too much. For years, the ministerial department for the struggle against corruption has been preparing files on corrupt individuals. They were never worried." A representative of the radical faction told us this recently. This faction only exists in intellectual and university circles. Moreover, marked by the Marxist-Leninist tradition, it is quite dogmatic. After the Arusha statement, its representatives marched to Ujamaa's tune, attempting to give it a more theoretical content but they never managed to sell their ideas, especially transforming the party with its nationalism of the masses into an enlightened avant-garde. Today, they seem a bit on the offensive, violently criticizing corruption

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and the government for not taking measures sooner. Yet this wait-and-see position is not an alternative.

There is still the army. Its prestige has increased since the war against Amin. It is reinforced by a militia in all villages and places of production, and it is made up of party militants. It tends to be much more visible and several members of the current government are from the military. It is no doubt nationalist, but it is difficult to know more about its political orientation. Would it react if corruption increases or there is a more liberal orientation?

That is not the case for the moment. Despite the difficulties, Nyerere's prestige is considerable. If the situation in the large cities might lead to pessimism, one need only visit the countryside to verify that the mobilization of the peasants continues: a school is built here, a dispensary there and in another place, a village building. Of course, the Tanzanian peasants, perhaps inadequately politicized despite 15 years of socialism, remain somewhat removed from major national problems. Yet those in the central plateau who, because of the drought, have harvested nothing in 1981, know well that the government is distributing free food aid to them. This president focuses on these people.

What will happen afterward? When reelected in September 1981, Nyerere said he was running for the last time. The changing of the guard seems poorly prepared and his departure may cause certain contradictions to arise. The question was raised and discussed, with no answer given, in the July issue of "Nova" (a Tanzanian monthly): "After Nyerere, Who?"

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TANZANIA

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NYERERE'S PARIS VISIT--President Nyerere left Dar es Salaam on 10 September and went to Lagos (see under heading "Namibia"), to Algiers where he paid an official visit on 12 and 13 September (see under "Algeria") and then to Paris where he met with President Mitterrand at the Elysee on 15 September. Since 1969, this is the first stay of the Tanzanian head of state in the French capital. It seems that President Nyerere's wish to make that trip this autumn was connected with the preparations for the Cancun Conference. In fact he wanted to talk with a statesman whose views he considers to be close to his own in many respects and to discuss the need to establish a new international economic order. Tanzania is a country which increasingly relies on cash crops to ensure its survival. But in view of the constantly deteriorating terms of exchange, that country is faced with a very difficult economic situation as we can see in the article below. The luncheon given by President Mitterrand at the Elysee on 15 September gathered, in addition to President Nyerere, the ministers of foreign affairs and cooperation of both countries and the ministers of culture, a fact which is explained by the prestige of the Tanzanian "model" in the eyes of the French socialist leaders. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2396] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

EDUCATIONAL REFORM--A presidential commission, in charge of reforming the Tanzanian system of education, left Dar es Salaam on 12 September to make a 2-week working tour of nine countries of Africa, Europe and Asia. The delegation is going to Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Sweden, East Germany, West Germany, Malaysia and Japan. Prior to making this trip, the members of the delegation were scheduled to tour the main regions of Tanzania to collect suggestions from teachers and principals of private schools, including those of parochial schools. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2397] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

BELGIAN TRANSPORT AID--Belgium has pledged to give Tanzania important financial aid to help improve its transport on Lake Victoria and to help build a training institute in Mwanza, the largest port on the shores of that lake. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2396] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

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UPPER VOLTA

NEW REGIME'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS EXAMINED; IMPRISONMENT OF OFFICIALS QUESTIONED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1081, 23 Sep 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Nuisance Prisoners"]

[Text] After the euphoria and the promises that followed victory, the state of grace which the current regime enjoyed is definitely over. Ten months after he came to power, Col Saye Zerbo is facing a situation that risks becoming more difficult with every passing day.

Hoisting the standard of justice, order and economic recovery, the former commanding officer of the interservice regiment of the Ouagadougou area had no trouble in ousting Gen Sangoule Lamizana on 25 November 1980. Paralyzed by the maneuvers and clan rivalries confronting one another within his regime and violently disputed by an active opposition supported by the most restless unions in the Southern Sahara of Africa, Maurice Yameogo's successor was at the end of his rope. His young subordinates had only to bend over and pick up power.

Wishing to illustrate their desire for change, the new leaders immediately took measures that broke with current practices under the regime of the "old" general. Thus, they required punctuality of workers in government offices as well as at work sites and in the factories, and absenteeism was heavily punished. Cafes, bars and restaurants were closed during working hours and government cars could not be used outside their hours of service. Wages were frozen and the right to strike severely regulated.

Authority

In order to show that the slogan of austerity is not an empty word, Col Saye Zerbo sets the example himself. At the wheel of a Renault 12, he does not hesitate to drive around Ouagadougou to see for himself the application of the policy of rehabilitating the administrative machinery.

This determination to restore government authority both pleases and reassures public opinion, once exasperated by the laxity of civil servants. "In order to obtain a simple document," one cadre told us, "you would have to return to the Ouagadougou City Hall several times," because the head of the department was always absent. He spent more time playing cards and checkers and at the Independence bar than he did in his office. "Now things have changed and it is better," says

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another, mainly thinking about the peasants who, in order to complete administrative formalities, now waste less time in the city.

Ambition

Nor do the foreigners conceal their satisfaction. Initially worried, diplomats, international officials, experts and financial backers did not take long to depart from their expectant attitude. They are happy to finally be able to deal with real interlocutors. Now, one of the expatriates told us, "we can work, for not only is there no fear that one's dossier is going to get lost in a drawer, but one is sure that within a reasonable length of time, they will reply with a 'yes' or a 'no'." In other words, not only has the paralysis of yore come to an end, but the absence of authority and the anonymity of government have given way to a new team that in no way conceals its desire for power, for in its opinion, everything must be subordinate to the higher interests of the government.

But for the Pretorians in power in Ouagadougou, the leitmotiv is above all economic recovery. It was not any accident that the highest organ of government that they created following the 25 November 1980 coup d'etat is called the Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress. They intend to march double time in order to bring the country out of its chronic underdevelopment. This is an ambitious program insofar as Upper Volta is not only one of the five poorest countries in the world, but also a landlocked country which, until proven otherwise, does not have vast natural resources.

This does not prevent Col Saye Zerbo from moving heaven and earth. For him, as for his comrades in arms, it is a question of doing his utmost to succeed where his civilian and military predecessors failed. To that end, he did not hesitate to bring back out all the dossiers being studied or that were buried under the old regime. In February of this year, surrounded by publicity, the cornerstone for the Poura gold mine, southwest of Ouagadougou, was laid. This project was on the brink of entering its active phase because in Luxembourg, the retiring minister of planning, Georges Sanogo, was putting the final touches on negotiations with the foreign partners when he was surprised by the coup d'etat.

The new authorities not only revived the dossier and succeeded in resuming work, but they also hope that the mine will go into operation as early as 1984. They are now trying to find backers for other gold deposits considered to be richer than that in Poura, particularly in the south and north central regions.

Resources

Furthermore, it would appear that the subsoil of Upper Volta contains a number of mining resources: diamonds in the Barsagho region, phosphates in the east, uranium in the west and the Sahel, copper in the southwest. Missions that have gone abroad have received precise instructions in order to interest investors in the operation of these deposits, whose extent remains to be determined.

For the time being, it is above all the Tambao project that is enjoying the government's attention. Located 300 kilometers northwest of the capital, Tambao contains

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a rich manganese deposit which all the governments that have succeeded one another in Ouagadougou put at the head of their program of action, but which none was able to bring off. Will Col Saye Zerbo succeed? What is certain is that he seems to wish to direct his efforts, not so much toward immediate working of the deposit, but rather, to construction of the railroad, because, some in his entourage say, of the rich agricultural possibilities of the regions that the railroad will have to cross.

Questions

The Military Committee has in fact set as its top priority its food self-sufficiency, compromised by the combination of the three chronic phenomena: the drought, encroachment of the desert and rural underequipment. Consequently, it has planned the setting up of 7,000 watering points and the construction of many hydroelectric dams, particularly the Konpienga, on a branch of the White Volta, and the Bagre, downstream on the same river. Electricity must be produced, while irrigating thousands of hectares of land to be used to produce grain and garden crops.

Will such a portfolio of fine projects be enough to dissipate the doubts and uncertainties that hinder the political action of the regime? At any rate, while a large proportion of public opinion was overjoyed about the arrest of the dignitaries of the Third Republic, many are now wondering: Why are those men still being held without trial? If some are guilty of embezzlement and abuses of power, as it has been stated privately, what are they waiting for to prove it?

What is sure is that they have been assigned officers houses inside the military camps of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. The ministers live two to a home, while the former president of the National Assembly, Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, and former Prime Minister Joseph Conombo both occupy a house of their own. The same is true of the former chief of state, Gen Sangoule Lamizana, who occupies the house which he himself once assigned his predecessor at the head of state, Maurice Yameogo, since freed.

We are told that all of these former dignitaries are being treated with the regard due their rank. With respect to food, they have the same menu as the officers mess. In the beginning, those at the new military camp in Ouagadougou enjoyed the daily menu made up at the Hotel de l'Independence restaurant. Military doctors watch over their health. All receive a salary corresponding to their grade in the civil service and regularly correspond with their families. Some manage their affairs from the camp.

Threats

And yet, the many friends which these officials have abroad are beginning to worry, if not about the conditions, then at least about the length of their detention. Old protagonists of the African political scene, such as Joseph Conombo and Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, cannot disappear overnight without people being moved.

As for Gen Sangoule Lamizana, whose moral integrity and political unselfishness is known to everyone, while it is understandable that he was ousted from power, because that goes with the territory, it is difficult to see why he is kept so

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long in a camp. Given his age (65), it would be more reasonable if Lamizana were sentenced to house arrest, if need be, in his native village of Dianra (Tougan region in the west) rather than kept prisoner in Ouagadougou.

Not only are such prisoners a nuisance, but their shadows, which continue to haunt minds, may well tarnish the country's image. Far from facilitating the task of the new leaders, this situation complicates it, particularly with financial backers. Above all, the truce observed by the unions has definitely come to an end. Following the coup d'etat, the secretary general of the powerful CSV (Voltan Trade Union Confederation), Soumane Toure, issued a cautious appeal to his members for vigilance. However, at the beginning of September, he condemned the threat which restrictions on trade union freedoms pose to the independence and autonomy of the unions.

Are these the first signs of the social hurricane which, whether directly or not, has always swept away the different regimes in power in Ouagadougou? Col Saye Zerbo should think about it before it is too late.

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ZAMBIA

BRIEFS

WHEAT PROGRAM'S PROBLEMS--The budget for the wheat growing program in Nampamba, near Ndola, had to be reduced by 1.5 million Zambian kwachas, said L. Turnbull, one of the officials in charge of that program. This cutback was required due to the lack of available funds. The program, started in 1978, is jointly financed by the EEC and the Zambian Government. During the last farming season it produced 11,000 bags of wheat and 13,000 bags of soybean. There were plans to develop 15 farms with an area of 50 hectares each during the current season but only 11 of these projects could be carried out due to financial difficulties. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2398] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

IMF NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE--Zambian Finance Minister K. Musokotwane is scheduled to go to Washington at the end of September to continue negotiations with the IMF (International Monetary Fund). The fund has recently allowed Zambia to draw 800 million Zambian kwachas worth of SDR (special drawing rights) of which about 300 million have already been drawn. The minister has refused to comment on a report carried by the TIMES OF ZAMBIA alluding to possible difficulties in the withdrawal of the rest of the amount granted by the IMF. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2398] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CSO: 4719/26

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