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JPRS L/10057 19 October 1981

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 743



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COT REAFFIRMS FRANCE'S 'PRIVILEGED RELATIONS' WITH AFRICA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81, p 2141

[Text] France's interest in Africa has not ceased with the ascendancy of the new president of the Republic. His personal advisors and the ministers in charge of foreign affairs for development and cooperation have stepped up their visits to Africa-Mr Claude Cheysson has gone to Maghreb, while Mr Jean-Pierre Cot has visited South Saharan Africa. Having just returned from a 15-day trip to Cameroon, Senegal and Ghana, he is leaving again for Nigeria. For its part, Paris has received the heads of state from the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Niger, the Congo, the vice president of Kenya, the prime ministers of regal and the Central African Republic, as well as the secretary-general of the Gar [Organization of African Unity]. The new leaders have had just as many opportunities to establish or braoden their contacts with the African leaders, for whom personal relationships have always had a particular importance, to become familiar with their records and, from their contacts with concrete situations, to study the difficult path of reconciling the preservation of principles with the dictates of reality.

Mr Jean-Pierre Cot's statements, and his replies at a press conference of 18 August, as well as those of Mr Claude Cheysson on the respect France has for all the commitments made by her previous governments, and her extremely clear position regarding the Republic of South Africa and the Namibian problem, shed light on the great choices that will inspire France's policy on Africa, and help dispel the anxieties which may have been aroused by certain documents of the Socialist Party.

Above all, the primacy of Africa among France's preoccupations has been reaffirmed. It will have a privileged place in France's relations with the developing countries. This includes all of Africa—the French-speaking, of course, but also the English-speaking and the Portuguese—speaking. Mr Jean—Pierre Cot stated that he was impressed by the aspirations he observed among his interlocutors in Ghana, even more so than among the French—speaking Africans, toward a common destiny, making them so sensitive to everything concerning Namibia's independence and the fate of their black brothers in South Africa, and which led them in Lagos to set the ground—work for an economic community from a self—contained and internal development whose first priority was agriculture. Ghana, the country of Nkrumah, was the first non—French—speaking African state to receive the French minister for cooperation and development—a symbolic and significant choice. It was to affirm this recognition of Africa's aspirations toward unity that Mr Jean—Pierre Cot recalled that for each of his visits to a French—speaking African state, he intended to go to an English—speaking or Portuguese—speaking state, and that France will not only clearly

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respect the decisions of the African governments, but will actively support, by every means possible, the solutions adopted by the organizations which unit them, especially the OAU. In the more limited area of financial aid, France's traditional friends can rest assured. France will continue to concentrate her efforts on them for, as Mr Jean-Pierre Cot stated on a realistic note, before he left Dakar for Paris, "she does not have the means of assuring political and meaningful aid to all of Africa."

Finally, France has traditionally maintained government-to-government relations, no matter what type of political regime either may have. This principle will be upheld, and display a preference for a socialist or capitalist system of social organization will entail neither privilege nor rejection on the part of France. The only ones to find themselves isolated would be those governments that do not assure the basic human rights to their citizems. Their conduct will be judged on the basis of criteria that are presently being thought out.

Facing immediate problems, especially in Chad and the Central African Republic, the new government is defining its position in light of those principles. In Chad, where Mr Campredon was sent to make contact with Chadian leaders, all factions, with the exception of Mr Hissene Habre's, showed a willingness to maintain their country's territorial integrity, to restore the national army, and to regain their sovereignty. A mission of French experts recently travelled to Nadjamena to evaluate methods for re-establishing acceptable living conditions by restoring water, electricity, and communications systems, etc. France's primary objective is to restore Chad's capital, and she is ready to ake part in that by permitting its residents who fled during the battles to come back there and settle again. In line with this, France is pursuing diplomatic actions aimed at facilitating the application of the OAU and Lagos resolutions and reconciling the conditions which would allow the Chadian authorities later on to demand the repatriation of the Libyan troops. On the other hand, if the resumption of French aid may be studied, it still appears untimely today for the French government to consider sending an ambassador to Nadjamena and be completely excluded from participating in one way or another in the restoration and training of a new Chadian army.

In the Central African Republic, the situation remains uncertain. The appeasement tactics taken recently by President Dacko in lifting the ban on certain opposition parties seem reasonable. The French government is continuing to carry out the cooperation agreements, including that of military cooperation, uniting it with the Central African Republic, as it does with all the other African states which have signed similar agreements with France. These, moreover, are nothing other than the legal framework within which French cooperation is expressed, in such a way that, if something must be changed, it will not be the framework but the spirit in which the cooperation was conceived. Despite certain statements made at Bangui by the Central African head of state, after the prime minister's recent official visit to Paris, he did not ask that cooperation agreements with France be revised. Just lately, the minister for cooperation only received a request to modify some of the clauses governing military cooperation, but not concerning the matter of French troop presence in Central Africa.

In Senegal, France showed her traditional solidarity by granting emergency aid which was justified by its difficult economic situation. A group of French experts, under the director for development of the Ministry of Cooperation, is presently

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working with the Senegalese authorities, and in cooperation with a mission of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to define the country's needs and the possible means for aiding the success of the courageous plan of reparation begun by the Dakar government. This would be a type of valuable assistance for France's African partners in preparing their records for submission to international institutions such as the IMF.

Thus, on his first trip to Africa, the new minister for cooperation and development could ascertain the difficulty, as he himself put it, "of passing from rhetoric to politics," and of comprehending the true dimension of Africa's problems: the legitimate desire for true independence and, at the same time, the need for foreign aid in resolving the more immediate problems of everyday life for as long as the complex problems surrounding the establishment of a new economic order, sought by the developing countries, have not been satisfactorily solved. Africa in particular expects France to explain its requests to the industrialized countries. The minister for cooperation and development knows how to respond to the hope of Africa and the Third World and to give France "the ambition, within the framework of Euro-African cooperation, to be the dynamic and animating force for the European side."

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ANGOLA

GENERAL MCBILIZATION AGAINST WASHINGTON, PRETORIA ADVOCATED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 248, 14 Sep 81 pp 8-9

[Editorial by Simon Malley: "Angola: Aggression Should Be Stopped!"]

[Excerpts] South Africa's strategy in opposing the genuine independence of Namibia, in launching its fascist hordes and puppet mercenaries of the UNITA against Angolan national territory, in violating its sovereignty, in causing death and destruction, could not be any clearer. First of all, public opinion should be conditioned to come to believe that it is on the verge of facing a military confrontation with Cuba and the Soviet Union, that the latter has already drawn up the plans aimed at conquering the entire region of Southern Africa--including South Africa itself--and that the only way to save Western civilization, which it claims to represent on the African continent, is to be given a free hand and to be granted carte blanche to strike wherever it wishes, attack whomever it wants, invade wherever it deems it necessary. And even if the quasi-unanimity of the UN members were not taken in and condemned it, as was recently proved by the debates of the Security Council and the General Assembly, is not the support granted South Africa by the Reagan administration sufficient proof? Has not this administration saved it from the danger implicit in the council's resolution vetoed by the United States?

But this is not all. Once these results have been achieved, isn't Pretoria attempting to impose the second part of its strategy? In other words, isn't it attempting to create a kind of Lebanese situation in the southern part of Angola, with Jonas Savimbi playing the role of the Christian militias and South Africa that of Israel? By creating a buffer zone in that area, the racist Pretoria regime could install there the puppet Savimbi, who would then appeal for the recognition and support of the imperialist powers and their allies. Washington and Pretoria would thus repeat with Angola and Savimbi the Moise Tshombe in Katanga, and the Ojukwu in Biafra, experience, two disastrous events, the consequences of which are still—unfortunately—felt by African people, and especially the Zairians and Nigerians. Do the apprentice sorcerers of Pretoria and Washington have such short memories? Have they forgotten so quickly the extent of the repercussions of these tragedies, the indignation and anger pervading African opinion at the time these colonial adventures were launched in the sixties, adventures that were nevertheless defeated, but not without the loss

of thousands of innocent victims? Will the African peoples continue to tolerate that their continent remain a field for imperialist and racist experimentation, for experiments of domination and exploitation?

This challenge by Washington and Pretoria must be picked up. It would be criminal to let it go unanswered. Otherwise, who could prevent Pretoria's racists from being used tomorrow by U.S. policy makers in order to claim that other countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, the Congo—and many others—must be the target of their aggression because their regimes are threatening the security of Southern Africa, of which they consider themselves the principal policeman? Thanks to its nuclear weapons—negotiated, moreover, during the talks in Washington between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Pik Botha—will not Pretoria be assigned the mission of bringing "recalcitrant" African regimes into line, in the name of the United States?

Already, thanks to the Angolan president's appeal, thanks to the Security Council's meetings, to the debates of the General Assembly, to the honest reports of numerous neutral Western diplomats and observers, the psychological war launched by Pretoria did not succeed. Following many days of hesitation and circumspection in regard to Luanda's affirmations, international public opinion sided with the victims of South African aggression.

If the Western press itseuf believes that a break between Washington and Africa is inevitable, if Pretoria's schemes would come to be applied, why and how could African peoples resign themselves to and remain passive vis-a-vis this monstrous conspiracy which is taking shape in Southern Africa? To cross one's arms, to limit oneself to the UN, OAU or other interventions in the international arena while crimes are being perpetrated, while the freedom and independence of African peoples acquired at such great cost are flouted, while new Katangas and Biafras are in the process of developing, would be to insult the conscience of each African, the dignity of each patriot, the honor of each militant. If the Security Council was proved powerless, in the face of the U.S. veto, to take forceful action against South Africa, the UN charter and a number of resolutions voted during the fifties and sixties (notably the one called "United for Peace") confer to the General Assembly the right to step in when the council is blocked by a veto and invoke Chapter VII (referring to sanctions) against any aggressor. And doesn't Africa, the principal reservoir of the mineral resources vital to the West, have the necessary means to halt the aggressor of the whole of Africa, the aggressor and its principal instigator, Washington? And this Arab world, whose sacred cause had mobilized African peoples when they decided to break off relations with Israel, does it not feel a sense of duty vis-a-vis this violated, martyred Africa, the victim--just like itself--of the hegemonic, imperialistic policy of the United States and its privileged ally, Pretoria? Must one cite the names of those Arab countries that are feeding the South African war machine through their oil and their dollars?

For South African invasion to stop forever, for the schemes aimed at balkanizing the countries of Southern Africa to be buried once and for all, collective action by all those who are targets of the danger represented by South African imperialism is imperative, today more than ever before. At the United Nations, at the OAU, at the non-aligned movement and in the socialist camp, a general mobilization must be decreed against Washington's, Pretoria's and their accomplices' economic and strategic interests. The rest is nothing but idle talk....

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ANGOLA

WESTERN SUPPORT SEEN INCREASING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA EVENTS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 81 pp 12-14

[Editorial by Simon Malley: "Pretoria-Washington Isolated"]

[Excerpts] It was in Lagos on 11 September. The Frontline States were meeting for a summit conference under the chairmanship of the Nigerian chief of state, Shehu Shagari, to review the situation created by the occupation of the province of Cunene in the People's Republic of Angola and adopt the measures required to respond to the challenge launched by the Pretoria-Washington axis against all of Africa.

When President Shagari asked, how could the Frontline States' solidarity be translated into concrete decisions, President Samora Machel did not hesitate one moment: "Nothing could better convince the aggressors and their U.S. accomplices than the feeling that they are not only facing the Angolan people, but all of Africa. Our fighters are ready to join their comrades in Angola if the Angolan Government requests it. To be sure, there are other African countries, more powerful and with more sophisticated means, which could play an important role in supporting our Angolan comrades..."

Actually, the participation—be it only symbolic—of the African forces on the side of the FAPLA would no doubt have considerable impact on world public opinion, even though it is obvious that what Angola needs the most is sophisticated weaponry, of which Pretoria has an abundant supply thanks to the assistance of the Western nations, notably the United States. These sophisticated weapons, as well as the cadres able to use them, are available in a number of African countries, be it Libya, Algeria, Nigeria. Ethiopia, etc. Why, then, shouldn't one resort to them?

Have decisions been made on this subject? Will they be applied? Will they produce positive results? If the decisions adopted have, naturally, remained a secret, the hope felt by the Frontline States meeting in Lagos is, nevertheless, great. Isn't it, moreover, the reason why the final resolution addressed a solemn appeal to all the OAU members to provide assistance—especially military assistance—to the People's Republic of Angola in order to grant this country concrete support in resisting and defeating the South African invaders and occupiers? Isn't it also the reason why the OAU secretary general, Noureddin Djoudi, was sent to Luanda to find out what the OAU role could be? However, let us not get ahead of the facts and let us not put our trust in speculations and premature optimism.

Nevertheless, we can note a factor which, in our view, is essential. By <u>first</u> addressing themselves to the OAU members to fulfill their obligations and fully assume their responsibilities, the Frontline States and Nigeria wished to face the two-pronged goal pursued by U.S. imperialism and its allies: first, to internationalize the conflict in Southern Africa and attempt to transform it into an East-West confrontation, and then to try to prove that Luanda's policy is determined by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

Lagos' answer was clear and unambiguous: it is important to africanize the war of resistance against South Africa and its allies, to oppose a common diplomatic front (already established, of course), but also a vaster military front to the hegemonic objectives of Pretoria and to abort the projects aimed at constituting, in the very midst of the independent and sovereign countries of Southern Africa, a number of puppet "buffer states," which would serve as permanent bases for aggression against them. What has just taken place in Laogs should be a lesson for the imperialist, Zionist and racist forces. And if this lesson is not rapidly understood, if, as we are convined, the United States is studying, in conjunction with Zaire, South Africa and Gabon, the formation of a "special military force" targeted against the independence of the progressive and revolutionary countries of Southern Africa—as the socialist Portuguese newspaper PORTUGAL HOJE affirms—the Reagan administration would do well to desist. Threats of intervention, of colonial expeditions, destabilization campaigns...will never defeat this will to resist the schemes of aggressors which is increasingly affirming itself among the peoples and governments of Africa.

Africa, and especially its revolutionary progressive regimes, is not and will not remain alone, isolated, cut off from its friends and allies or subjected to the diktat of Pretoria and Washington. First of all, it has its natural allies in the socialist camp which, no matter what international constraints exist at this time, cannot afford to abandon it to the vultures and the grave-diggers of its dearly acquired independence. Additionally, after the rise of the left in France, the increasingly hard line adopted by U.S. policy, the resort by the Reagan administration to the strong methods that became notorious at the time of the cold war, the political climate in Europe is changing and many foreign ministries are beginning to keep their distance.

Thus it is that Luanda's diplomacy is beginning to bear fruit in Western Europe. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos who started it is determined to break off the isolation in which the Reagan administration has attempted to maintain Angola. He first appealed to the UN secretary general, to the Security Council, the extraordinary general assembly and tens of chiefs of state in the East and in the West. Special presidential emissaries went to many capitals. In Paris, Bonn, London, Rome and New York, the Angolan foreign minister, Paulo Jorge and the Angolan ambassador in Paris, Luis de Almeida, achieved remarkable successes. While French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson was affirming that his talks with Paulo Jorge took place in a particularly warm climate, that the French Government firmly supported Resolution 435 of the Security Council and that he saw no connection between the settlement of the Namibian question and the presence of Cuban troops in the country, West Germany warmly welcomed the Angolan minister. As for Lord Carrington in Britain, did he not affirm to Luis de Almeida that his government would not change its position on Resolution 435 and that despite the

abstention of the British delegation at the Security Council on the South African aggression, London had been the first Western nation to denounce and stigmatize the invasion of Angola by South African troops and demand that they immediately withdraw?

If the climate surrounding the explosive crisis still reigning in Southern Africa seems, for the moment, to be favorable to the Frontline States and Angola, if the international press is continuing to severely criticize Washington's and Pretoria's policy, we are still far, very far from the desired objectives, because nothing, absolutely nothing has changed in the strategy adopted by Washington and in Pretoria's aims. But when French President Francois Mitterrand will officially receive President dos Santos on 15 October, he will no doubt welcome him while taking into account three particularly meaningful realities for France, Angola and the African countries: President dos Santos will be the first chief of state in Southern Africa to visit him, France will be the first Western nation visited by an Angolan chief of state and finally, the reason why France was first chosen by President dos Santos is because of the victory of the French democratic forces at the 10 May elections and the assumption of power by the leader of the Socialist Party, which filled with hope the peoples of the Third World and in particularly those in Africa, who have suffered so much ϵ a result of the arbitrary, personal and corrupt policy of the Giscardian regime.

Should not common sense, mutual interests, the sense of international responsibility inspiring both chiefs of state impose that the success of this meeting be equal to the hopes that socialist France is awakening among the peoples of Southern Africa?

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ANGOLA

U.S. ACCUSED OF WISHING TO REVIVE FNLA

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 81 p 29

[Text] The departure "in exile" of many former leaders of Roberto Holden's FNLA for the United States, recently announced to the press by President Mobutu, is a patently false attempt aimed at deceiving public opinion. In reality, Holden deputy Hendrick Vaal Neto, who is among the puppets of the FNLA enjoying U.S. "political asylum," revealed to his confidentes: "Our American friends informed us that they wanted to reactivate the FNLA so that we can reorganize ourselves and continue our struggle for national liberation."

Thus, the Reagan's administration plot against the People's Republic of Angola is taking shape and affirming itself. Following its decision to support Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, it is now embarked in an operation aimed at training, arming and equipping the second Angolan puppet organization. Since this latter is supposed to operate in the northern part of Angola, the question now is to know to what an extent the assurances and promises repeatedly made by the bloody dictator in Kinshasa to Angolan officials in relation to his desire to cut off any assistance to Angolan counter-revolutionaries can be believed. African diplomats from progressive countries stationed in Kinshasa say that "here, no one believes him. He is an inveterate liar, and his words of honor, his oaths to Presidents Neto and dos Santos are worth nothing..."

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ANGOLA

SOUTH AFRICAN-CAPTURED MATERIEL REPORTEDLY GOES TO UNITA

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 81 p 17

[Text] As could have easily been imagined, the UNITA, which was able to escape in extremis from the province of Cuando Cubango--where it was almost decisively defeated by the FAPLA a little before the South African invasion of the province of Cunene--can be found today in the occupied zone of the border province, in order to "capitalize" on the results of the aggression, as the chief of staff of the racist forces, Gen Geldenhuys, affirmed.

No military role has been attributed to the UNITA, and the South Africans could not leave this province without running the risk of having the FAPLA defeat the puppets without further ado.

In Cahama, the Angolan army was intercepting radio messages from the racist army, whose command post is less than 70 kms from the city of Xangongo. Even though succinct, these messages provided confirmation of the fact that the only task South Africa--fully conscious of UNITA's limitations--can attribute to it is to undertake reprisals and repression against the civilian population.

Consequently, the UNITA is performing "parallel activities" while the army of occupation is, at this time, "recovering" all the civilian and military vehicles, including the agricultural ones, in the occupied province. According to witnesses who were able to escape the area, it is also destroying all the documentation of the Angolan administration, it is locating stores, both state and private, as well as the residences of local authorities or of mere members of the MPLA-Labor Party. As in 1975, herds are also driven beyond the border, into Namibia.

"The racists are not only genuine nazis and assassins," Commandant Farrusco, in charge of Cahama, said with some irony, "but they are also true thieves, who loot everything they can get their hands on. A large portion of this materiel, and especially whatever can serve as transportation means, will then be handed over to the UNITA." Thus the collection of "recovered materiel" that Jonas Savimbi and his follower N'zau Puna will be able to show to the Western press in their bases in Namibia is getting richer. It is even reported that the tractors and bulidozers "recovered" by the invaders are actually sold to white Namibian farmers by the UNITA.

At the beginning of the invasion, it was the South African army itself that took care of the "enemy" and the MPLA militants who had stayed in the city. Jorge

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Mussua Michimichi, hospitalized in Ondjiva until the morning of the 28th, that is, a few hours before the total occupation of the city by the South African troops, escaped the shooting by hiding in the hospital's water tank. From there, he heard the South Africans threaten the women in the hospital to find out where the men were hiding.

Suspecting that all the young people in the hospital were FAPLA members, the South Africans would then shoot the men in their wards. Michimichi took advantage of the confusion and the screams to leave his hiding place and escape through a service corridor.

Officer Alfonso Maria, in charge of the Ondjiva units, told us that there were indeed some Angolan soldiers among the most seriously wounded who were hospitalized in Ondjiva, but that most of the patients were peasants wounded during the course of the severe bombing attacks.

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CAPE VERDE

AGRARIAN REFORM CAMPAIGN MARRED BY INCIDENTS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 248, 14 Sep 81 p 46

[Text] The bill on agrarian reform abolishing the metayage system and making the relations of production more democratic in the rural areas of the Cape Verde Islands—which still presented some feudal aspects—was recently subjected to popular debate throughout the country's 10 islands.

In those islands and regions where the peasant masses have become conscious of the social injustices suffered through the centuries of colonial and class domination, discussions were passionate and constructive. But in Santo Antao groups of individuals, known to have belonged in the past to pro-colonialist and revolutionary organizations attempted to undermine the initiative of the Cape Verdian Government. Taking advantage of the contradictions that feudal relations fixed in the mentality of a number of peasants, and threatening those who wanted to participate in the discussions on a theme that is close to their hearts, these elements succeeded in upsetting the debates.

Mouthing reactionary slogans to Cape Verdian organizations abroad—closely tied to international, and notably Portuguese, fascist groups—they fought local authorities and attempted to disarm a policeman who had arrested some of the agitators.

During the course of these incidents, one of the demonstrators was killed and two others wounded. Authorities arrested all those responsible for the clashes. However, these incidents did not prevent the enlightenment campaign on the fundamental principles of the agrarian reform to be conducted throughout the island.

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

POLITICAL INCIDENTS IN NETHERLANDS—The chauffeur of the Cape Verde consulate in Rotterdam was wounded by gunfire on 9 September following an altercation with opponents of the Cape Verde Government. Simultaneously, in The Hague, police prevented a group of about 20 Cape Verdian citizens from occupying the country's embassy. The demonstrators wanted to protest against the "non-democratic" Cape Verdian regime. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2380]

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FRENCH GOVERNMENT SAID TO BE FACING DIFFICULT POSTCOUP SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1869 4 Sep 81 p 2282

/Article: "Gen Andre Kolingba Becomes Head of State"

/Text/ On 1 September, the Central African army forced the Central African president, David Dacko, to hand over power to it.

The general chief of staff of the Central African army, Army Gen Andre Kolingba, has since then assumed the duties of head of state. The Constitution has been suspended and any activity by political parties has been forbidden.

General Kolingba indicated in a broadcast speech that he had "asked for and obtained" the resignation of President Dacko because of the president's health and "taking into account the political tension that has reigned in our country for the last 6 months."

The leadership of the country is now being taken care of by a Military Committee of National Recovery, composed exclusively of the armed forces and placed under the authority of General Kolingba.

The change in power was effected without any bloodshed and without violence. The international airport at Bangui was not closed at any time and no curfew was set up. Only telephone and telex communications were interrupted. The following day, 2 September, everything was absolutely normal in Bangui and the people seemed rather satisfied. General Kolingba's radio speech seems to have been well received by the people, who seem to be pleased at the arrival of a strong man as the head of state.

The French troops remained confined to their barracks and did not intervene at any point. The minister of defense, Charles Hernu, stated in Le Havre, where he was presiding over the ceremony of the launching of the nuclear submarine "SAPHIR" at the time of the events in Bangui, that the only mission of the French military would have been to assure the protection of the life and property of any French people if they had been threatened.

The forced resignation of President Dacko, although it seems to have caught the French government unawares—the new French ambassador to Bangui had presented his credentials the day before—is not a real surprise. The circumstances of his return to power accompanied by French forces from the Barracuda operation prevented

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him from imposing his authority with regard to political adversaries, thus putting his legitimacy in doubt. His first action was to reestablish the conditions for operating a democracy by authorizing the establishment of political parties. The result of the elections of last March, where he just barely obtained a majority, revealed the fragile nature of his power and his lack of popularity among the intellectuals, teachers, and students, who were irritated by the presence, very conspicuous at that time, of soldiers from the Barracuda force and the number of French experts and advisers, which was deemed too high. The ruined state of public finances and of the economy left by the dethroned emperor had made their presence necessary in the eyes of Paris, which had been asked to contribute financially to the country's recovery. Since the return to Bangui, it has been for all practical purposes France which has assured the payment of government employees and the daily life of the Central African Republic. This French intervention was essential no doubt, but because the few members of the Central African elite have not perhaps been sufficiently associated with it, it has given the impression that France was trying to maintain the same control under President Dacko that it exercised under his predecessor, while the masses, confronted by difficulties of all kinds, became progressively disinterested in the political contests and withdrew their confidence from the head of state.

The worsening of the political situation resulted in bloody disturbances that necessitated the intervention of French troops to safeguard French life and property at the time of the elections, which took place under questionable circumstances and the results were contested by the opposition parties which President Dacko's efforts could not disband. He declared a state of siege on 21 July following the attempt of 14 July in a cinema in Bangui which resulted in four victims, as well as forbidding the political parties of Abel Gouma, Henri Maidou, and Francois Pehoua, and suspending Ange Patasse's party. President Dacko decided upon the arrest of these heads of the opposition. In fact, only Ange Petasse was arrested, the others having taken refuge abroad. Three weeks later, in a desire for appeasement, which, it is said, was suggested by the new French government, President Dacko lifted the measures forbidding and suspending the political parties, and he put an end to martial law on 16 August. Nevertheless, he asked the Central African forces to "remain in a state of alert and continue the necessary missions of surveillance and security."

The development of events in Bangui seems to suggest that the military thought their mission should not end there. President Dacko, in a poor state of health and apparently crippled by the easily discernable reserve shown by Paris with regard to him, seems to have let himself be convinced without difficulty to cede power to General Kalingba. Should we in fact credit him with the intention of having made the first move and having preferred to transmit his responsibilities to the army rather than to one of his political adversaries? Or should we view the operation as a maneuver by the United States, which has intrigued us by its presence in Bangui in the form of military attaches who have been arriving for some time from neighboring African states?

The French government, which cannot be suspected of being mixed up in this change of head of state and which views it as a purely domestic affair of the Central African Republic, nevertheless finds itself faced with a difficult situation. It is obvious that its position in the days to come will be observed attentively both within Africa and elsewhere.

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The penetration by the Libyan armed forces into Chad and the occupation which has followed has led those African nations linked to France by cooperation and defense agreements, along with their neighbors, to question the efficacy of the protection that Paris could assure them and to look for other possible "protectors". President Reagan's doctrine, clearly stated, of opposing the Soviet influence in Africa and elsewhere may encourage some nations to get closer to the United States, especially since Colonel Qadhdhafi's Libya, which has become the warehouse for sophisticated Soviet weapons on the African continent and which has just strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union, may be suspected of trying to expand its influence in the Central African Republic. The French government cannot remain insensitive to such a threat to ruin its positions in Africa and it will have to find a way of reconciling the defense of these positions with still maintaining respect for Central African sovereignty.

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CSO: 4719

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GENERAL KOLINGBA SAID TO BE PRO-AMERICAN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1079, 9 Sep 81 pp 28, 29

[Article by François Soudan: "In Bad Health, Weakened, President Dacko Relinquishes Power To the Army. As In 1965: The Coup d'Etat That Was Expected"]

[Text] Nobody, or almost nobody, knew it, but General Andre Kolingba, chief of staff of the Central African army and simply chief of state since 1 September, is a recidivist. That Tuesday morning when, before dawn, he entered the residence of David Dacko on the banks of the Ubangui, there is no doubt that the president remembered a conversation that he had had, 1 month before, with the one whom he had just appointed general of the army: "The time has come, Mr President," Kolingba had said to him, "to put a stop to political disorder; resign, or else the army will no doubt have to interfere."

In bad health—he suffers from high blood pressure which causes frequent fainting spells—to such an extent that he had decided to come to Paris in mid-September for treatment, looking older than his 52 years, David Dacko had nevertheless held out. In Bangui you do not let go of power just like that, especially when you have experienced a coup d'etat once before (that of 31 December, 1965, which overthrew Dacko and brought Bokassa to the presidency).

And anyhow, it now seems clear, David Dacko had already chosen his heir apparent, ("in 8 or 10 months, after the legislative elections," he confided), and it was not Kolingba, but Msgr Ndayen, the archbishop of Bangui, chief of the powerful Catholic church of Central Africa and brother of the ex-commander of the gendarmery, who had been removed from his position 3 weeks previously at the explicit request of Kolingba.

Following the failure of his first attempt, Andre Kolingba, formerly of the French Military School of Frejus, who was ambassador to Canada and West Germany under Bokassa, therefore returned to the charge. With far less restraint (but without bloodshed), since he brought out of its barracks the small Central African army (2,000 men), of which he is almost undisputedly the chief, and proclaimed, in keeping with a classic process, the dissolution of parties and the repeal of the constitution.

Did France have an "in" in this, did it give its blessing to the putsch? At first glance, this seems possible, even probable, since France maintains 1,160 men in

Central Africa, even right among President Dacko's closest associates. In actual fact, however, this is quite uncertain: the Barracudas had been very strictly confined since last 14 July. It had been necessary to make a telephone call from Paris at 9 o'clock Tuesday morning, i.e. several hours after the "coup," for the ambassador to find out that Dacko had been overthrown. It is obvious that, since the election of the socialist, Francois Mitterrand, information "flows badly," as the saying goes, between certain French information services—especially the military—and the Elysee. Last of all, it is hard to see why Paris would want to burden itself with the dilemma that is taking shape: keeping the Barracuda contingent in a country with a "hard" military regime (which, to say the least, would be contrary to its principles), and thereby risk losing its influence of the nationals in the country.

Support

So then, is it likely that Andre Kolingba acted alone? No, because he will certainly, in the near future, have to pay the civil servants. This general, very close to the former prime minister, Bernard Ayandho (a personal friend of President Bongo and outspokenly pro-American), undoubtedly did not "make a move" without nets. The question is: who put them in place?

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

MILITARY PROMOTIONS--Gen Andre Kolingba, chief of general staff of the Central African armed forces, who took power yesterday in Bangui, had been promoted to army general, the highest rank in the Central African army, on 30 July. President Dacko made this decision when the army was invested with complete authority in the area of law and order following the attempt of 14 July, which resulted in three dead and 32 wounded in a Bangui cinema. Appointed administrator of the state of siege declared on 19 July, General Kolingba had issued a warning to those "who are looting, raising barricades, or harming freedom to work. The army will severely reprimand all agitators," proclaimed General Kolingba. At the same time as General Kolingba, several other officers of the army were promoted to a higher rank. These promotions, observers considered at the time, were justified by the "loyalty" shown by the armed forces during the events that followed the attempt of 14 July. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1869 4 Sep 81 p 2282/ [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cle Paris 1981] 11550

FRENCH MILITARY MATERIEL—Major deliveries of French military materiel to the Central African Republic before the putsch of 1 September: six liaison and reconnaissance vehicles as well as 20 jeeps have just been sent to Bangui. For the month of July alone France's military assistance to the CAR amounts to 150 million CFA francs. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1079, 9 Sep 81 p 49] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9498

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

COVERNMENT REPORTED TO HAVE FAILED TO RESTORE ECONOMY, DEMOCRACY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1079, 9 Sep 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Claude Wauthier: "Two Years After the Fall of the "Tiger" Col. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Has Failed To Reestablish Democracy, and Has Not Restored the Economy: Hope Turn to Disappointment"]

[Text] Nothing is going any better in Equatorial Guinea, or so few things: the great hope that sprang up following the fall in August 1979 of Francisco Macias Nguema, called the "Tiger," has dwindled in fac of the inability of the new regime to get the economy of a bloodless country back on its feet, to say nothing of its refusal to re-establish even so much as the appearance of democratic freedom. Admittedly the time of hasty executions and atrocious tortures is past, but dreary apathy has come to replace the passing gladness which 2 years ago had greeted the assumption of power by the new strongman of the country, Colonel Teodoro Obiang Nguema.

Stage-setting

The strange trial in July of the members of the unsuccessful plot of April 1981, following which nearly 200 people had been arrested, did little but add to the legitimate suspicion surrounding the new regime. Actually the court condemned only the "underlings": one soldier to death, about 10 noncommissioned officers and civil servants to long prison terms. Some 30 officers got off lightly with 6 months of imprisonment, while about 30 other accused people, including two of Macias' former ministers, were released. As for the one who could have been the guiding light of the plot, Moises M'Ba, accused of misappropriation of funds and attempting to destabilize the state, sentenced in his absence to 20 years of prison, he managed to leave the country with entire impunity shortly before the month of April.

The route taken by this politician, and subsequently a wealthy businessman, now taking refuge in Spain, was indeed a curious one. At the time of the Spanish colonization, Moises'M'Ba was one of the leaders of the pro-Franco party, Munge (National Unity Movement of Spanish Guinea) and a representative in the Cortes.

Upon the approach of independence, proclaimed in 1968, he became the head of a dissenting group of the Munge to support the candidacy of Macias in the presidential election. As a result of his "flair" he was awarded the presidency of the Council of State (senate), but in 1972 he deemed it more advisable to go to Geneva and get back into the ranks of the principal opposition party in exile, the ANRD, (National Alliance for Democratic Re-establishment), and he became the president of its central committee. Four years later he was excluded from the

ANRD, and went to set himself up in Spain. Only a few months before the discovery of the plot had he returned to Equatorial Guinea to create there an import-export business firm in which Colonel Obiang is said to have held some of the shares.

In Malabo it is not considered entirely impossible that Moises M'Ba could have been the pawn of a set-up designed to get potential rivals of the chief of state out of the way, one which may have involved some dirty doings relating to big money. As a matter of fact, in Madrid the businessman has just stated that the chief of state likely demanded, for the benefit of his 13-year-old son, Theodorin, a capital increase of 30 percent of the firm, which likely brought on their fall-ing-out and his departure.

In any case, for the time being power seems to remain in the hands of the clan of Mongomo, the village of Macias, who was the uncle of Colonel Teodoro Obiang. The number two man in the regime, Maye Ela, first vice-president and minister of foreign affairs is also a nephew of the fallen dictator. Both of them are members of the supreme military council which was an outgrowth of the coup d'etat of 1979. Mongomo is in the east in the continental part of the country, near the border of Gabon, in the land of the Esanguis, a group constituting the ethnic majority of the Fangs.

Bit-players

The Esanguis represent only about 1.5 percent of the total population of the country, but most of the ministers, the military chiefs and the ambassadors belong to the clan of Mongomo. The Bubis from the island of Bioko (formerly Fernando Po) are represented in the government by the second vice-president, Eulogio Oyo Riqueza, the minister of agriculture, Emiliano Baule, Borico, and the minister of health, Cristino Seriche Bioko: it is believed that they are hardly anything more than bit-players.

However that may be, the political parties have not been able to resume any sort of activity, in spite of the resolution to this effect adopted in March 1981 in Geneva by the UN's Human Rights Committee. But in November 1980 at the time of his official visit to Paris did not Colonel Teodoro Obiang declare that it was possible "both to rebuild the country and restore democracy"?

Lethargy

On the other hand, the chief of state integrated into the army the members of the sadly famous "Youth in Pace with Macias" who had caused a reign of terror during the former regime. Symbolic of the very few changes that have come about during the past 2 years, the Equatorial Guinean "wall of shame," bristling with barbed wire, erected by Macias around the sumptuous presidential palace in Malabo, is still standing.

Colonel Obiang has not restored the economy any more than he has re-established democracy. According to the report of a technician of the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), in January 1981 two-thirds of the population had not eaten any meat for at least a month, malnutrition and underfeeding were widespread. The production of cacao (40,000 tons before independence) today

sits somewhere around 8,000 tons, as during the final years of the Macias regime. The government has returned the confiscated plantations to their former Spanish owners, but the latter hardly dare risk taking them in hand again and investing the major sums required for putting them back into good condition. Furthermore negotiations with Lagos to bring back the 40,000 Nigerian workers who had fled from Equatorial Guinea under Macias have produced no results.

Money is flowing in, however, from Spain as well as from the European Economic Community and from other Western countries. Madrid has sent off to its former colony nearly 400 technical advisors. But neither this windfall nor the Spanish technicians have been able to put back on its feet the economic machinery destroyed by the bloody dictatorship of the "Tiger." A whole pack of businessmen of shady character has pounced upon the country, whose administration is an inexperienced as it is corrupt, according to the testimony of a West German technician recently published in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG. Everything transpires, in fact, as if the country were stricken with a kind of lethargy while waiting for a miracle to happen: the discovery, of course, of a petroleum deposit, which, among other things, would enable Equatorial Guinea, whose monetary unit, the ekuele, is not convertible, to belong to the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), so far noncommittal, and to end its isolation.

All of the neighboring countries, Cameroon, Gabon and Congo, have struck black gold, and two laws have just been passed regulating petroleum prospecting, an undertaking in which Western companies are actively engaged. The West has, in fact, been the principal beneficiary of the fall of the former regime which was aligned with the USSR. The two countries which have gained the most are Spain, which currently supplies 80 percent of the imports, and Morocco, which, after sending a detachment of Moroccan troops following the 1979 coup d'etat, succeeded in obtaining the cancellation of recognition by ex-President Macias of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic.

Exiles

Of all of the movements in exile of opposition to Macias, only ANRD, whose general secretary is a university man, professor Eya Chaama, still remains to demand that changes be made at last in a country which has regained only a semblance of freedom. The 200,000 Equatorial Guineans who had fled from the former regime have, for the most part, felt up to now that it is preferable not to return.

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GABON

DRILLINGS NEAR MAYOUMBA, LOPEZ REVEAL OIL

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Sep 81 pp 2282-2283

[Text] During exploratory and evaluative projects, Elf Gabon has just drilled two promising wells, indicated a statement released by the nationalized company Elf Aquitaine on 26 August.

The first, the Moubenga Marine exploratory well, located 70 kilometers south of Mayoumba, passed through sandstone permeated with hydrocarbons at around 2960 meters in the Dentale formation. A test conducted at the wellhead yeilded an oil flow of $435~{\rm m}^3/{\rm day}$. Additional study will be required to clarify the value of this discovery. The well is located in the Paka Marine license area which is 100 percent held by Elf Gabon.

The second, the Konzi Marine No 3 test well, located 65 kilometers from the Lopez cap, has confirmed that the structure is of interest by passing through about thirty meters of sandstone permeated with oil between 1080 and 1140 meters. Tests will be conducted at the wellhead. This drilling location is in the Pongara Marine license area for which there is an exploration and shared production contract between the Gabonese government on the one hand, and the nationalized company Elf Aquitaine (70 percent) and Elf Gabon (30 percent) on the other.

The last discovery made by Elf Gabon was at the beginning of August (MARCHES TROPI-CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Aug 81 p 2058). Elf Gabon was operating for the Elf Gabon (50 percent) / Mitsubishi Petroleum Development Company (50 percent) partnership.

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GABON

BRIEFS

BONGO'S REPORTED DENIAL--President Bongo made it a point to deny to the French Government that he is attempting to achieve a rapprochement with the United States, according to the information published by AFRIQUE-ASIE. He affirmed to the French Embassy in Libreville that "these are ramblings of a magazine that hates me..." But the Gabonese president forgot to mention to his French colleagues that he had invited two high officials from the CIA to come to Libreville for "consultation." "If I no longer have Col Robert here (the former French ambassador in Libreville, previously a member of the SDECE [Internal Intelligence and Counterespionage Service], accredited by Giscard and recalled by Mitterrand) and if the SAC [Civil Action Service] is abandoning me, I must, of course, look elsewhere," he reportedly confided to his friends. And what would be better, Mr President, than Reagan's secret agents? [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 81 p 28] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie]

CSO: 4719/77

GHANA

BRIEFS

CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH USSR URGED--The Ghana-USSR Friendship Association appealed to the government once again at the end of August to sign a cultural agreement with the Soviet government. The appeal was made by the association's secretary general, K. Opare Ababio, before the departure of 28 students for the Soviet Union. K. Opare Ababio noted that the agreement on the basis of which the students had obtained study grants for the Soviet Union was not an official one. The last agreement at a governmental level dates from Nkrumah times and has been abrogated, without ever having been renewed, after the 1969 military coup d'etat. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2386]

DELEGATION TO DPRK--A 4-member Ghanaian delegation headed by Joseph Wilfrid Boateng, deputy minister of agriculture, left at the end of August for Pyongyang in North Korea to participate from 26 to 31 September in a symposium on food and agricultural production in developing countries. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-RANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2386]

PRC THREATENS WITHDRAWAL—Chinese technicians engaged in the Afife irrigation project threatened at the beginning of September to withdraw from the project if the local traditional chiefs continued to encourage pilfering and depradation on the site of the project. A number of persons have already been arrested and the project itself has been put under police surveillance. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-RANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2386]

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GUINEA

NIGERIAN FISHING, CULTURAL COOPERATION, MINING COOPERATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Sep 81 p 2274

[Text] On 28 August, at the completion of the constitutive session of the Guinea-Nigeria commission, Guinea and Nigeria signed two agreements to cooperate in the areas of culture and of fishing. These agreements were signed by Mr. Ismael Toure, Guinean minister of mines and geology, and by Mrs. Adenike Ebun Oyagbola, Nigerian federal minister of the Plan.

The two delegations also examined the possibilities for cooperation in the areas of mining, animal husbandry and agriculture, as well as the possibility of Nigeria supplying crude oil and petroleum products to Guinea.

Nigeria, which is building a huge steelmaking complex (to be operational in 1983 with a production goal of 3.5 million metric tons of steel) is already associated with Guinea and with other partners in the Guinea Mifergui-Nimba project in which it has a 13.5 percent interest, or the largest share except for the State of Guinea's 50 percent interest. Mr. Ismael Toure has announced that Nigeria's participation in this project will be increased on 16 September.

The Mifergui-Nimba project, which should be launched this year, involves the mining of a high content iron deposit at Mount Nimba (southeast Guinea) whose reserves are estimated at 2 billion metric tons. The first exports of iron ore through the Liberian mineral port at Buchanan are planned for 1984.

The Nigerian government is also involved in the Guinea Uranium project, which should be underway on 1 November, and holds 25 percent of one of the two companies formed for this purpose.

Finally, Nigeria has a 10 percent share of capital in the Ayekoye project. This project involves the mining of a 500 million metric ton bauxite deposit in northwest Guinea and the onsite processing of the bauxite into aluminum at first (1 million metric tons per year to start), and then the production of 150,000 metric tons of aluminum per year. The project also includes construction of two hydroelectric dams on the Konkoure River.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

AUSTRALIAN DIAMOND PARTICIPATION—The Australian company Bridge Oil Limited, which is involved in petroleum and mine prospecting, has just secured a 45 percent share of the \$10.91 million in an alluvial diamond mining project in Guinea. The Australian treasurer indicated on 24 August that the partners in the Australian company, based in Sydney, would be the government of Guinea which will have a 50 percent interest, and two foreign companies, Simonius Vischer of Switzerland and the Industrial Diamond Company Limited with headquarters in London, each with 2.5 percent. According to the Bridge Oil Company, the alluvial deposit contains diamonds (gems) and gold. Production should begin at the end of 1983 and should reach 500,000 carats per year in 1985. Under the terms of the agreement, \$55 million will be invested in machines and equipment. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Sep 81 p 2274] < [COPYRICHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9693

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

FRENCH AGRICULTURAL AID--France has granted Guinea-Bissau the amount of 5 million French francs for agricultural projects in the Bafata and Gabu areas in the eastern part of the country. The agreement was signed in Bissau on 8 September between Mr Robbin, French charge d'affaires and Avito Jose da Silva, minister of rural development of Guinea-Bissau. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2380]

CSO: 4719/32

MOZAMBIQUE

NEEDS, EXPANSION OF BEIRA PORT DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Aug 81 p 2235

[Text] The port of Beira, constructed in a difficult area at the center of Mozambique's coast, quickly proved itself the country's second port, and the first port for the southern region's interior. It serves, in fact, four central Mozambique provinces—Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia—and five other African countries—Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zaire, Botswana and Zambia—which is the reason for its importance to the economy of the country and of the entire region.

The construction of the port of Beira was closely linked to the colonization process in the English-speaking countries of the southern region. For the colonies of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and for Nyasaland (now Malawi), Beira constituted the quickest access to the ocean and, consequently, the most profitable from the point of view of transportation charges for products intended for export. The advantage remains the same today for these countries which are now independent, stresses AFP.

Given the port's privileged location, Mozambique authorities feel its development is essential. The channel entrances must be dredged and excavated to attain sufficient depth for large tonnage ships. The existing channels will not accommodate 25,000 MT ships loaded to full capacity. On the other hand, work is in progress to improve current conditions and to develop the port's capacity. In fact, the future of independent Zimbabwe allows reconsideration of the port of Beira's true international role.

Thus, a dock which will accommodate large tonnage ships and petroleum tankers, which should put into port at Beira for 18-day periods, is nearing completion. Next to this dock, which will have multiple uses, there will be a container storage area and covered storage amounting to almost 3,000 square meters.

Construction of a fishing pier and a repair dock is also in progress and almost completed. Eventually, a cannery, a fish meal plant, a refrigerated warehouse for processing shrimp, as well as a fish oil plant will be built and the infrastructure required for production, equipment, handling and administration will be established.

Plants for processing coal and a pipeline for neighboring Zimbabwe complete the panorama of installations with which the port of Beira is equipped. For 1982, an increase in port traffic of 138 percent over 1972 is expected; the best year the port will have had to date. In 1992, this percentage would increase to 260 percent.

For this purpose, a Dutch consulting company, Nedeco, is currently studying the possibility of dredging and excavating the channels. They feel that at first, over the short term, 40,000 MT ships loaded to full capacity will be able to enter the port of Beira, and that, over the medium term, 75,000 MT ships will be able to put into port there.

According to the port director, Mr. Rui Fonseca, the investments which must be made for port equipment, and particularly for widening the berthing areas, should correspond, over the medium term, to the requirements of international traffic and to modern standards.

From these statements it may be deduced that, like the port of Maputo (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS No 1867 21 Aug 81 0 2179), the port of Beira must actively prepare itself to retain its traditional users and to attract new ones, particularly in the young neighboring republic of Zimbabwe.

Quarters close to the port sector are optimistic and go so far as to consider Beira as the best port in the country, taking into account the level of organization and productivity attained over the past few years.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

MACHEL MAY VISIT PARIS--An important economic agreement between Maputo and Paris is being negotiated and could be signed within the next few days. Moreover, it is possible that President Samora Machel will visit President Mitterrand before the end of the year. It is known that, following President Aristides Pereira, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos will meet with President Mitterrand in Paris on 15 October. The Elysee attributes particular importance to the visit by President dos Santos because of the continued occupation of Angolan territory by South African troops and also because of its concern to find a solution for the impasse reached by the "contact group" on the Namibian issue. As is known, the main reason for this impasse is the support granted by the White House to the racist South African Government. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 81 p 28] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie]

CSO: 4719/77

NIGER

BRIEFS

URANIUM SALES POLICY--By publishing in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 27 August a list of all sales of uranium decided on during the first 6 months of 1981, the authorities confirmed their resolution to make commonplace trade in a highly strategic product. Deliveries to Libya increased six times (1,212 tons as compared with 200 in 1980) and an initial purchase by Iraq (100 tons) was recorded. Whereas these two countries have been blacklisted, in particular by the United States which, invoking nonproliferation, would like to prohibit the third world states from access to nuclear energy, even to the atom bomb. The position of President Seyni Kountche is clear: "We are selling to any customer who, while accepting our prices, satisfies the purchase conditions set by the international commission in Vienna." The loading of blue barrels full of ore is carried out in broad daylight at the airports of Niamey and Agadez or in the port of Cotonou (Benin). Moreover, the quantities which will be sold to each of the customers is known in advance, by decree. Thus for exports which will be delivered this year: France will purchase 2,293 tons (as compared with 1,344 in 1980 or 47 percent of total sales); Libya, 1,212 tons (25 percent); Japan, 816 tons (17 percent); Spain, 300 tons (6 percent); the FRG, 125 tons (3 percent) and Iraq 100 tons (2 percent). In total: 4,846 tons for 1980. In fact, to boycott some purchaser or other according to the whims of western diplomacy would be tantamount for the Nigerien Government to losing control of the receipts of foreign exchange vital for the pursuit of economic development [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1080, 16 Sep 81 p 31] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981]

JAPANESE URANIUM EXPLORATION AGREEMENT -- A Japanese company, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation [PNC], signed on 9 September in Niamey a draft agreement with the Nigerien Office of Mineral Resources [ONAREM] for the exploration and exploitation of a new uranium deposit. The ONAREM-PNC association is to start soon its exploration in Agadez Department (northern Sahara), on the In Adrar site. The draft agreement was signed for the Nigerien side by the minister of mines, Annou Mahamane, the director of ONAREM, Sani Koutoumbi, and by the director of the PNC, Mikio Isetani. It stipulates that the Japanese company will finance the exploration and installations at the rate of 400 million CFA francs for the next 2 years and an additional 600 million CFA francs for the fourth year. Japan is already active in Niger in the exploration and exploitation of uranium in particular through the Overseas Uranium Resources Development [OURD], which holds 25 percent of the capital of the Akouta Mining Company [COMINAK], one of the two large Nigerien uranium exploitation enterprises, with the Air Region Mining Company [SOMAIR]. Japan has purchased in Niger 816.6 tons of uranium since the beginning of the year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2383] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM PRICES--Despite the official denials of widespread information in the West concerning unofficial proposals of a reduction on the order of 3 dollars per barrel made by Nigeria, it appears that this information is correct. It has been announced, indeed, at the maritime exchange of London that shipping orders issued to tankers transporting Nigerian crude increased at the beginning of the week of 10 to 16 August. This increase coincided, the brokers emphasized, with the information according to which Nigeria had reduced its sale price. During the past weeks, the loading of crude from Nigeria had become rare. The American Company Amoco, of whom it was thought that it had stopped buying oil from Nigeria, was among those issuing new shipping orders and proceeded on 11 August to transport 59,000 tons to the United States. On the other hand, during a press conference dedicated to Nigeria's economic situation, professor Emaneul Edozien, president Shagari's economic advisor, declared that "the standardization of crude oil prices will remedy the glut on the world crude oil market." This indirectly approved the proposal for the standardization of prices made by Saudi Arabia. Professor Edozien also implied that Nigeria could be led to accept a decrease in its sale price, adding that officials did not think it possible to return to the level of production that existed before the glut, in other words, about 2 million barrels per day, nor to the prices, and consequently, to the revenues following from them. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2167] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9670

NEW OIL DISCOVERIES--Two oil companies, Mobil (U.S.A.) and AGIP (Italy) recently discovered in the Delta region of the Niger, in the eastern part of Nigeria, two important fields of hydrocarbon, announced Mr Lawrence Amu, new director of the NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Co.?]. Mr Amu, who was addressing the participants at the 5th international symposium of the Society of Petroleum Engineers at Warri, oil town in the State of East Bendel, specified, according to the Nigerian press agency NAN (official) that the Mobil field presumably contains 1 billion recoverable barrels. Mr Amu did not give any details about Agip's field which he qualified as sizable. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2167] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]

UGANDA

BRIEFS

DP ACCUSES GOVERNMENT—The Democratic Party in opposition (DP) accused the government and military officials on 29 August of taking advantage of "isolated" attacks against governmental installations to cause damage to the Ugandan people. "These isolated acts of violence, sometimes carried out even by employees of the government or the armed forces, serve as a pretext for the bad treatment against the Ugandan people," said the MUNNANZI, the opposition's English language newspaper. The government's reprisals against some guerrillas are forcing many Ugandans to "live like nomads" to escape these reprisals, the newspaper adds, and goes on to say that these actions "caused the death of thousands of Ugandan civilians and the destruction of their property. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1869, 4 Sep 81 p 2285] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie 1981] 9670

cso: 4719/405

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

CANADIAN REFUGEE AID—The Canadian government has decided to grant \$500,000 in aid to the refugees settled on the Zairian territory. This aid, drawn from the funds of the Canadian Program for Humanitarian Aid, is part of a total grant of 22.4 million dollars that Canada has pledged to the African relief program. This aid will be allocated mainly to the areas of housing, food distribution and health. According to sources close to the UN High Commission for Refugees (HCR), Zaire has given asylum to nearly 400,000 Ugandan, Angolan, Rwandan, Burundian, and Zambian refugees. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1869, 4 Sep 81 p 2283] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9670

MINE INVESTMENTS—According to Zaire's General Commission of Planning, the total cost of the public investment program in the mine sector for the 1981-1983 period comes to 2,365.7 million zaires, of which 1,869.6 million zaires in foreign currency. The self-financed portion of the program amounts to 518.5 million zaires, of which 76.2 million is in foreign currency. External sources should provide 1,787 million zaires in foreign currency. Some mining companies, like the General Quarry and Ore Company (Gecamines), the Bakwanga Mining Company (Miba), the Kivu Mining Company (Sominki), Kilo-Moto (gold), and the Zairetain Company [pewter] will benefit from new financial contributions provided for by the program. The cost of Gecamine's 3-year program, in this particular framework, comes to 1,956 million zaires, of which 1,566 million zaires is for the "P.420" program and 390 million is for the "P.470." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1869, 4 Sep 81 p 2283] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9670

ZAMBIA

NEXT FEW MONTHS SEEN AS CRITICAL FOR LEADERSHIP

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 247, 31 Aug-13 Sep 81 pp 18, 19

[Text] The government, say the union members, must not place the responsibility for its economic and political problems on the ZCTU [Zambia Congress of Trade Unions].

In Lusaka on this Monday morning in late July at 7 o'clock, the Zambians did not get their news bulletin as usual. In fact, President Kaunda used this prime time to broadcast a 30-minute speech. Though most Zambians were still in bed listening to the morning news that cold morning, they were forced to get up and listen very attentively, for the president was announcing the arrest of some of the most eminent and controversial officials in the country—high-ranking authorities of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The arrested officials are the president, Frederick Chiluba; his general secretary, Newstead Zimba; the assistant general secretary, Chitalu Sampa, and the president-deputy of the Miners' Union of Zambia, Timothy Walamba.

The reason for the arrests, he explained to his shocked and still sleepy-eyed compatriots, was having incited the workers to break social peace and ultimately overthrow the government. This decision is made to insure social peace and harmony in the country. President Kaunda accused the leaders of having urged the workers to carry out wildcat strikes which have practically paralyzed the mining sector in Zambia during these past 6 months.

Torn Flag

Up to now 205,681 working days have been lost in wildcat strikes, and these illegal work standstills have been disastrous for this sector of the already ailing economy. In 1979 there were 44 illegal strikes involving 10,846 workers, and this year the number of strikes has doubled and these have involved 21,921 workers.

These past 6 months have seen the materializing of no less than 84 illegal strikes involving 46,399 workers.

The seeming purpose of all of these strikes was the improvement of work conditions and salary increases. President Kaunda accused the leadership of the workers' movement of trading, for personal purposes, upon the economic problems which Zambia is experiencing. He explained that instead of informing the workers of the

real reasons for the situation and encouraging them to follow the correct procedure for making their demands, the leaders chose to slander the leading party, the UNIP and its leadership. "They consider that the solution to this problem is to change the political leadership and the political and economic ideology. It is for that reason that they are prodding the innocent workers. It is for that reason that they have not condemned the strikes, which have taken place without any real motive," the broadcast message said.

To put a stop to the vandalism which has characterized most of the strikes, the president has ordered the police to intervene quickly and to see to it, whenever necessary, that law and order are respected. He was particularly disappointed by the daring and the lack of patriotism of the striking miners in the city of Kitwe, who recently damaged the official Mercedes Benz of the Minister of Labor, Basil Kabwe, who had rushed off to the Copperbelt to persuade the workers to return to the mine. The miners jeered at the minister and insulted him, and tore up the national flag—a symbol of the nation's unity—which was installed on his car.

President Kaunda questioned whether or not the improvement of work conditions and salary increases were the reasons why the union leaders had asked the workers to strike, saying that in fact their objectives were political and that they were trying to use the workers to attain them.

The four arrested leaders are a part of the group of 17 leaders who were expelled from the UNIP last January for having objected to the new system of local government. None has returned to the party, even though the central committee of the UNIP invited them to do so last March.

The other leaders did not remain inactive following the government's decision. The ZCTU held an emergency meeting of general council shortly after the announcement of the arrests, and decided to require the unconditional release of their colleagues. They launched an appeal for an international committee to investigate the causes of the strikes and the faulty understanding which permanently exists between the workers' movement and the government.

The ZCTU stated that the independent investigating committee should include representatives from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and other agencies of the United Nations.

The worker leaders considered the arrest of their comrades "a betrayal" because they had been thinking that the two sides were at that time coming close to a meeting of the minds. The government, they say, must not take the ZCTU as a scapegoat to explain its economic and political problems, and they warned it that if the four leaders were not released, they could set off a general strike throughout the national territory.

While the two parties were engaged in discussion, the mining companies, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines and Roan Copper Mines, which until they had kept quiet, were making an arbitrary decision which, at the last minute, gave the signal for a final confrontation. The two firms, which had lost about \$35 million during the last strike, which lasted 7 days, announced the dismissal of 590 miners. Before being laid off, 825 miners received one last warning. A spokesman for the

two companies let it be known that the dismissed workers were laid off not only because of their participation in the last strike, but also because they had long since accumulated marks against themselves in terms of disciplinary action.

"Struggle to the End"

This aggravation can only further exasperate the union leaders who were not consulted before the dismissals, and arouse the anger of the workers.

It being clear that the government will not allow a committee to investigate the strikes, the die is cast for a total showdown. The latest reports from Copperbelt indicated that the miners were waiting for their end-of-the-month pay to go on strike again as a sign of their solidarity with the arrested persons.

The dismissal of their comrades gives them an even stronger reason for not working. The next strike action, if and when it gets under way, is likely to be long. It is said that the miners have sent their wives and children back to the villages, and that they are staying to "struggle to the end."

The evolvement of the disturbing government-worker relationships having reached a limit and Zambia's unity is seriously threatened. Other workers, teachers and railroad employees also have already threatened to go on strike immediately to stand behind their demands for housing and other advantages.

On a continent where changes in government are generally not constitutional, especially in the case of single-party systems, the coming months are going to be very hard and crucial for the Zambian leaders. The last-minute cancellation of the trip which President Kaunda was supposed to make to London for the marriage of Prince Charles and Lady Diana shows that the situation is serious.

The four worker leaders were arrested by security officers at dawn on this Monday, 27 July, practically the day planned for the president's departure for London.

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ZAMBIA

ETHANOL PROJECT SEEN AS ENERGY SAVING, ECONOMICALLY HELPFUL

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 247, 31 Aug-13 Sep 81 p 19

[Text] Zambia, which is totally dependent on imported petroleum for meeting its fuel needs, has a choice between different means of reducing its bill for importing hydrocarbon, which at present amounts to nearly \$200 million a year. It can take very strict measures for saving fuel, as neighboring Mozambique has done, look for other sources of cheaper energy, or, better yet, do both things at the same time.

In neighboring countries, in fact, it is forbidden to drive on Sunday, and gasoline is sold there only on certain days at specific times. The amount of fuel sold to consumers is likewise limited.

Where gasoline rationing is concerned, Zambia has known what to expect since the days of the unilateral declaration of independence from neighboring Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and the decision to take punitive action against that country in terms of petroleum.

The Zambian government now envisages the possibility of producing ethanol on the basis of raw materials from the biomass which would be added to gasoline to reduce import costs.

The implementation of the first "alcohol" project has been entrusted to Indeco Ltd., one of the entirely state-owned affiliates of the gigantic Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (Zimco).

During these past few years Indeco has devoted itself to setting up a series of new industries designed to contribute to the national policy of rapid industrialization and import substitution.

The feasibility study on ethanol production which will result in the national project was entrusted to Jager Associates of Zimbabwe. This choice among six international companies which had submitted bids was approved by the Zambian government and the World Bank which is to finance the study. Jager has a broad experience in central Africa, especially in Zimbabwe and Mali, where it has undertaken to carry out ethanol production projects. Zimbabwe is already mixing ethanol with its gasoline.

The production of ethanol from raw materials of the biomass, like molasses, sugar cane and cassava, for energy purposes is already a going thing in a number of countries, especially Brazil.

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Now Zambia has enough agricultural potential to produce alcohol on a large scale, especially from molasses (about 40,000 tons a year), which up to now has been used principally for food reserves and, in part, exported to neighboring countries.

The purpose of the Jager study will be to determine which of these two uses of molasses is the more profitable.

It is thought that it will be more advantageous for the country to devote molasses to the production of ethanol than to use it as at present. The mixture of ethanol with gasoline will cause Zambia to achieve substantial savings on its bill for importing petroleum.

In this country the amount of ethanol mixed with gasoline will probably be between 12 and 20 percent, which will produce savings in the same percentage on the bill for imports.

It is believed that the study will be finished in 2 months, following which financial arrangements and an implementation plan will be worked out. The completion of the project could come about 2 years after the signing of an agreement on equipment and machinery.

The International Finance Corporation and the World Bank have already shown an interest in making a financial contribution to this project.

Besides savings in foreign exchange, the new technology will undoubtedly create new job opportunities, and perhaps will make possible, at a later date, the expansion of the sugar cane fields.

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