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Latin America Report

(FOUO 24/81)



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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

SOVIET UNION'S INFLUENCE IN COUNTRY DESCRIBED

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 1 Jun 81 p 3

[Article by Pietro Sormani: "Cuba: Needful and Fearful of Russia"]

[Text] "Soviet Influence Emerges with Arrogance in Fidel Castro's Republic."
"What little industry the island has today has been achieved with Soviet capital and assistance." "What is not produced there is imported." "Sugar--the only local resource--is not enough to pay for the price of low-interest credits and energy supplies." "Cuban soldiers are in Africa and in Latin America to support Moscow's policy among the nonaligned countries."

From our special correspondent.

Havana--"Cuba," said a young intellectual to me, "has become the sixteenth republic of the USSR." He said this in a low voice, glancing around him because one of the characteristics of "real socialism" is a very efficient secret police. Who can guarantee that there are no powerful electronic ears here in this typical dark bar in the Rampa section.

This statement, at first glance, seems absurd. What can be more different from Soviet dreariness than this sunny and extroverted country? What can two people like Fidel Castro and Leonid Brezhnev have in common? The cultural difference is more important than any ideological brotherhood. Even "The International" in the first few years after the Revolution took on the beat of the conga.

But looking more deeply into things, the Russian influence is emerging with arrogance. The massive Sovietization of the Seventies has left its trace on the government apparatus and the party, on the economic planning system, on the police and on the army. What can be called the "organization of life" from education to work, from sports to tourism and from hotels to business, is copied word for word from the Soviet Union. For the foreigner, that identification is absolute. At times, even the National hotel seems to be right out of Moscow's Ukraine: the same inefficient service, the same bathrooms that do not work, right down to the same "tarakani" (even though here they call them "cucarachas").

Officially, it is spoken about as little as possible. In every public speech, the reference to the "beloved" Soviet Union is obligatory--a testimonial in recognition of its friendship and its aid. But the propaganda is discreet. There are no photographs or sayings of Soviet leaders. Russian, although taught in the

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schools, is never used. People pretend to believe that Cuba is a sovereign state and that its relationship with the USSR is of the same type as, for example, France.

Reality is quite different. If the Soviet influence is underground, its presence cannot be concealed. In some cases it is flaunted, as when, in the past few weeks, four units of the Black Sea squadron, amongst which was a missile-carrying ship, dropped anchor in the port of Havana. But generally, the three or four thousand military stationed on the island are not seen in uniform and have practically no contact with the local population.

Even the 15,000 technicians who work in the nickel mines or in other industrial plants try to keep a low profile. They travel in groups and frequent businesses and local establishments set aside for them. But it is impossible to avoid them, especially on Sunday when they join their hefty comrades, exhibiting their milky white skin on the edge of the pools.

Above all, the Soviet influence is evident in the economy. What little industry Cuba has today is built with Soviet capital and with assistance from Soviet or East European technicians. I visited the only steel mill on the island, which produces 350 thousand tons of ingot per year. The machines are Russian, the technicians have studied in Russia and the entire work organization is Russian. What Cuba does not produce is imported directly from the Soviet Union--refrigerators, radios, televisions and photographic equipment. Even the automobiles are by now almost all Soviet (or rather more appropriately stated, Italian-Soviet), the "Lada" (the old FIAT 125) having supplanted the lovingly cared-for Fords, Buicks and Cadillacs that for so many years had provided the only means of private transportation for the Cubans.

"The USSR has saved us from economic disaster," Jose Ramirez, assistant professor of the University of Havana, told me. "When the U.S. imposed the embargo and pulled out all of its investments, we were confronted with a scary crisis. Who else could we have turned to if not Moscow?" This is the drama of all of the emerging or ex-colonial countries who need foreign aid, and who, abandoned by the West, rely on the interested generosity of the communist East. What happened in Cuba has occurred in other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and is happening in Nicaragua.

The America of Eisenhower deceived itself in thinking that it would be able to sway Fidel Castro by suspending guaranteed-price sugar purchases. But Castro struck up an agreement with the Soviet Union. In exchange for sugar, the USSR supplied Cuba with petroleum, raw materials and industrial plants. Shortly after the revolution, the Cuban leaders tried to diversify the economy and Castro went as far as actually asking the peasants to destroy the sugar cane plantations. Production which under the Batista government had reached 6 and even 7 million tons per year, collapsed, causing the country great damage.

Castro changed his tactics, had them replant the cane and again concentrated on sugar to insure the development of the island. Production again rose, but never achieved Castro's goal of 10 million tons. Today, the "zafra" is about 7-8 million tons and even though its importance has diminished in the Cuban economic complex, sugar still represents 80% of exports.

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Sugar is the wealth and curse of Cuba--wealth because it means work (even though hard work) and profit, a curse because it means soil depletion, dependency and colonialism. All of Cuban history can be viewed in terms of sugar. Sugar needs a large market: first Spain, which, in order to cultivate it, imported slaves from Africa, then the U.S. (careful not to upset the interests of the great monopoly) and finally the Soviet Union which has replaced private with state interests. Cuba is caught in a vicious circle from which it is not able to escape. It needs sugar, but at the same time it must free itself from it if it wants to become independent.

Carlos Franqui, Castro's former compatriot in the revolution and now exiled in Italy, states in his latest book (recently released): "There is, in the history of Cuba, an unchanging characteristic--cursed, (but) objective and real--that keeps returning, recurring and rising again: the small island at the door of the U.S. cannot be free and independent." But as a result of conservative thinking, he refuses to recognize that this constant factor has an absolute value. He observes: "It was impossible to gain freedom from Spain during the colonial period, and we freed ourselves from it. It was impossible to gain freedom from the U.S. during the Republic, yet we freed ourselves from it. It is impossible to gain freedom from Russo-Castroism, but we will free ourselves from it."

Will it be so? Or is Franqui forgetting the profound differences between the present situation and the past and deluding himself? Cuba freed itself from Spain with the help of the U.S., and freed itself from the U.S. with the help of the Soviet Union, but who can help it to free itself from the Soviet Union? What other country is today in a position to defy the two superpowers? Perhaps, one day, China, but this is an uncertain and far-off prospect. At any rate, before it can happen, Cuba runs the risk of being completely Sovietized. The mechanisms of mass control that are at the disposal of totalitarian regimes professing "true socialism" are much more efficient than those of a Spain in full decline or an America fraught with consumerism.

Not even Cuba is able to give up easily the economic advantages derived from Soviet friendship: the security of energy supplies, the aid and the low-interest credits. Sugar is not enough to pay the costs of it. Castro is constrained to accept a Soviet military presence on the island, to support Moscow's policy among the non-aligned and Third World countries, to help the insurrectionist movements in Latin America and to send its "mulatto legions" to Africa. There are 60,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Underpaid and disliked by the locals, they meet in battle thousands of miles from their homeland for the sake of Castro's cynical self-interest. For a handful of rubles he has lent himself to the Kremlin's imperial dream.

There are those who attribute to Fidel Castro a more subtle and more noble design: After having used the Soviet Union to free himself from American control, he plans to be able someday to use his rising personal prestige, which he still enjoys in the underdeveloped countries, to free himself from Soviet control. The African legions, if they serve Moscow's interests also serve Cuban interests, imposing them on the international scene. Sugar, an instrument of Soviet dependence, is also the condition for development and, therefore, for economic independence. The working class mobilization campaign launched in the past few months is not

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only a maneuver to cover up secret dialogue initiatives with America, but an attempt to renew the more genuine revolutionary traditions and to regain a legitimacy that has been lost over the years.

It may be that all this is true. Castro is an ambiguous and contradictory person, but one who has his own dignity. His love for his homeland is indisputable. The same cannot be said for the other leaders such as his brother Raul or Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, that long-time communist who had no scruples about participating in the previous Batista government. And there is the weight of a situation the terms of which not even Castro can change.

The Soviet Union will never give up Cuba--the outpost of its empire a few tens of kilometers from the U.S. and center for control and subversion of all of Latin America--and, if it should ever do so, it would be within the framework of a worldwide agreement that would leave little or nothing in terms of independence for the island. The fatalism against which Franqui hurled himself, is still well-rooted in Cuba, and everything in the present or in the immediate future tends to confirm this.

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

ATTACKS ON CUBA IN YUGOSLAV PRESS SCORED

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 17 Jul 81 pp 62-63

[Article by Carlos Mora]

[Text] Any observer of international politics is in a position to know that recently friendly relations and cooperation between Cuba and Yugoslavia have grown. This is a healthy sign in the panorama of tensions troubling today's world, threatened by the imperialists' most bellicose, reactionary sectors with another war, whose consequences would be catastrophic for humanity.

The visits to Cuba by, first, Petar Flekovic, president of the Executive Council of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and, later, by Dragoslav Markovic, president of the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are events of great significance in the history of relations between the two countries.

As a result, it is genuinely surprising that there is in Yugoslavia a certain current harmful to those relations that seems to run outside the policy laid down in that country by the League of Communists.

Periodically, articles hostile to Cuba appear in different Yugoslav publications, employing all the known falsehoods, defamatory statements and distortions concerning our history and our social reality for purposes that we really cannot understand.

One day, the article appeared in the magazine NIN. Another time, the pages of the INTERNATIONAL REVIEW [translation of the Spanish title] were used; and suddenly, as if to confuse the inexperienced observer, there was an article signed by a gentleman called Janez Stanic in a very "modern" magazine published in Yugoslavia that is called START. Some people call it the "Yugoslav PLAYBOY." In the journal, the most subtle political arguments are used, and the point of view of some "socialists" in that country is defended, in alternation with naked women and the "cleanest" pornography.

It is there, in that magazine, where this Stanic, in a curious demonstration that in his country there is the so-called "freedom of the press" that the bourgeois defend so ardently, attacks the Cuban Revolution, using vile, hypocritical language typical of the most rabid enemies of socialism. It is a sick language of cheap, clumsy anti-Sovietism that shamelessly employs all the "slogans" that the Yankee imperialists and their puppets once used against Cuba and that is currently used by the traitors making up the Peking gang which has placed itself at the service of humanity's worst enemies.

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Apparently, Stanic is writing outside the policy that his country, his government, and his party (if he is a member of the league), are carrying out.

For it is not a matter of dealing in nuances in the interpretation of any of the problems faced by today's world. It is not a matter of speaking out in favor of this or that road to socialism within observance of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism.

No; what Stanic is doing is repeating, with alleged semantic skill, all the defamatory statements and lies that the American imperialists have used against Cuba throughout the last 22 years.

The Yugoslav hack speaks of Cuba's "dependence" on the USSR and says that the Cubans do not view that dependence as an obstacle to their sovereignty.

Immediately thereafter, Stanic says--with admirable cynicism--that for Cuba the principal enemy continues to be the United States, not the Soviet Union.

The foregoing is not worth a response. What would be interesting is to find out how Stanic developed that blind hatred, similar to that of the most stubborn reactionaries and bourgeois, toward Lenin's homeland, the cradle of world socialism.

By utilizing lies and distortions as an argument, the writer echoes the reactionary myth that Cuba became socialist because of the American imperialists' pressure and stupid aggressive policy.

The maligner completely ignores the Cuban people's anti-imperialist roots. He has not read Marti, and, of course, he is not familiar with Fidel Castro's "History Will Absolve Me."

The struggle against Fulgencio Batista's bloody dictatorship, which cost the lives of so many revolutionary fighters, is, for Stanic, a series of terrorist acts, and the assault on the Moncada Barracks by a group of brave patriots, a mere "adventurist action."

The entire struggle of the Cuban people for true independence, for what it formally obtained after the 1895 struggle was despoiled by Yankee appetites, constitutes no more than an expression of "romanticism" to this START writer.

We said at the beginning of this article that we cannot understand how such things as this monstrosity by Mr. Janez Stanic or the articles that have appeared previously in NIN and other publications can be published in Yugoslavia, a friendly country.

This expression of liberalism is disconcerting to us, although there is an effort to present it to us as a manifestation of "freedom of the press"; for it is not easy for anyone with common sense to swallow that alleged "freedom of the press," managed with the same viewpoint as that of the bourgeoisie and the newspaper owners joined together in the IAPA.

In Yugoslavia, no one may publicly attack the League of Communists or oppose its domestic and foreign policy. No one in Yugoslavia may publicly attack, in an article such as the one Mr Stanic devoted to Cuba, the self-government that constitutes the basis of the social system in that country.

As a result, it is disconcerting, inexplicable and surprising that in a Yugoslav publication it is possible to run an article full of defamatory statements, venom, distortions and ill will toward Cuba, its revolution and its people.

That obviously runs counter to the present level of relations between the two countries.

Stanic does not confine himself to the general remarks we have cited concerning the origin of the Cuban Revolution, in the struggle against Batista and the assault on Moncada.

He centers his criticism on what he calls the consonance of Cuban and Soviet interests in Africa, attacking the example of proletarian internationalism that the Cuban people have consistently, selflessly and bravely provided in the African continent.

It is here where the author of the START article reveals himself to be a master of maliciousness and defamation.

Stanic compares Cuba's aid to the Angolan people to South African intervention in that country.

He says that the Cubans saved Agostinho Neto, whom he terms a representative of a competing force in a battling Angola, along with two forces represented by Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto.

There can be nothing lower, more rotten, more vile than that thesis advanced by the Yugoslav hack.

This unhealthy anticommunist does not say that Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto are two vulgar agents of the CIA, serving the worst African cause, which is that of the enemies of the people, in collusion with the Chinese hegemonists and other forces of reaction allied with the American imperialists.

When Ethiopia is mentioned, he also uses the same lies employed by the imperialists, waving the flag of Eritrean separatism and hiding the fact that the charlatan Siad Barre joined the game of the enemies of the Ethiopian Revolution in order to try to carry out his clumsy ambitions to expand and dominate the Horn of Africa.

At the height of his feverish anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet rage, Stanic goes so far as to use the same map circulated by the Yankee Pentagon to indicate alleged Cuban military bases in Africa, a ploy that could not fool anyone and which was even criticized in the U.S. press itself.

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According to the author of the START attack, Cuban intervention in Africa is causing unification of the reactionaries and irritating the United States.

As one can see, it concerns Stanic a great deal that the United States is irritated.

The article does not mention Washington's policy in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin America. Nor does he attack South Africa, nor is he concerned about apartheid and South African racism.

The objective underlying this vile START attack is to undermine Cuba's prestige in the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.

An old lie, that Cuba has brought the entire nonaligned movement to a position of confrontation, is used by Stanic.

In his lengthy article, even the untruths that Peking continually wields against Cuba are echoed.

He says that "Peking is sensitive to the strengthening of the Soviet presence in Africa" because that continent belongs to the third world and cannot be left at the mercy of Soviet hegemonism.

There is no room in the narrow, chauvinistic, hate-filled mind of the hack in question for the idea that Cuba, the Cubans, practice proletarian internationalism as a matter of principle, fairly, honorably, without asking anything in return or demanding anything in return.

To Stanic, there are two types of internationalism:

- a) That carried out by Cuba and the USSR by means of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries;
- b) That carried out by Yugoslavia, which gives precedence to sovereignty, autonomy, independence and responsibility for the people themselves and for the working class.

To the Cubans, there are actually two conceptions of internationalism, in response to the thesis stated above on the basis of Stanic's point of view:

One conception, the one put into practice by Cuba, is that of solidarity with the people fighting for independence, that of socialist unity, that of the unrelenting struggle against American imperialism, the leading enemy of the people, and the struggle for national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The other conception, the one embraced by Stanic and those who stand behind him, is that of infidelity to principles, of opportunism, of intrigue and maliciousness, of divisiveness and constant plotting against the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.

All the rest is providing ammunition for the imperialist campaign against Cuba, against the Soviet Union, against socialism.

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Each country has the right to build socialism in accordance with its own characteristics and its specific conditions.

This has always been recognized by the Cuban revolutionaries. There are no magic formulas that are valid for the entire world.

Cuba respects the road to socialism that the Yugoslavs have chosen, and by the same token it does not accept any Stanic's telling us that we are copying the Soviet model, for in the hypothetical case that we were, we have the same right that the Yugoslavs have to travel the road of self-government.

To assert that what we are doing is incorrect and that what Mr Stanic defends is correct is to practice the most clumsy dogmatism and, what is worse, to come dangerously close to the ideas advanced by the enemies of socialism, to the ideas of the American imperialists, of their interventionist arm (the CIA) and to the Chinese gang's policy of betrayal of socialism in collusion with the world's most reactionary groups.

Stanic's defamatory statements in the magazine START, his foolish string of lies and his cowardly attack on the Cuban Revolution and its heroic people cannot be disguised by being hidden amid all that pornographic filth used by corrupt capitalist societies in magazines such as START, with which those advocating certain viewpoints in Yugoslavia want to emulate western consumer society.

Or could it be that this is the socialism that Stanic and his political advisers want?

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

PORT WORK, TRANSPORT PROBLEMS IN CIENFUEGOS

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 17 Jul 81 pp 28-31

[Round-table discussion among port and transport officials, organized by BOHEMIA; report by Gregorio Hernandez]

[Text] One of the meeting rooms of the Executive Committee of the Cienfuegos People's Government was the setting for this round table.

This province, which until recently was one of the national leaders in the effort to avoid delays in the loading and unloading of goods in the port-transport-domestic economy chain, and thus in the payment of demurrage, suddenly fell to sixth place, with the resultant harm to the economy, among other things, that such a situation entails.

To find out the reasons and the measures adopted to recover the lost position, we went to the Pearl of the South. Cooperation by the party and the People's Government was not late in coming. Thus, representatives of the different agencies that by their actions decide the results, positive or not, along with representation from the labor movement, met there and candidly analyzed the problems while also disclosing commitments already undertaken to remedy the critical situation.

Panelists were Roberto Tiel de Leon, vice president of the chain and member of the Executive Committee of the People's Government in Cienfuegos Province; Enrique Mena Exposito, director of the Mambisa Terminals Enterprise, Central Region; Carlos Manzanares Carrabeo, administrator of the Mambisa shipment agency; Ignacio Nualla Alvarez, administrator of the Cuban Freight Enterprise--CUFLET--agency; Isidoro Monzon Diaz, provincial director of the Ministry of Transport's Expediting Enterprise --EXPEDITRANS; Manuel Matienzo Abuela, chief of railroad distance and operations office in the province, Central Division; Nelson Gomez Rosell, administrator of the Cienfuegos Truck Depot; Ricardo D'Escoubet Nerey, director of the Cienfuegos Cereals Combine, belonging to the Ministry of the Food Industry; Bruno Rodriguez, vice director of production at the Karl Marx Cement Enterprise, belonging to the Ministry of Construction; Enrique Garcia Ramos, deputy insurance office from the Ministry of Agriculture in the southern province. A representative of the Ministry of the Sugar Industry was invited but unfortunately could not attend.

Also present at the round table was Fernando Eras, chief of the Transport and Communications Department of the party's Provincial Committee, as well as Angelica Robillo and Luis Sarria, respectively officials of the Cereals Combine and the Mambisa Terminals Enterprise, Central Region.

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The meeting included vigorous mutual criticism as well as self-criticism. No one held back. At any rate, our conclusions appear at the end. The reader can judge for himself.

Here, then, is the round table.

[BOHEMIA]: Cienfuegos Province, which held a leading position after the state of emergency for the port-transport-domestic economy chain was decreed, has fallen to sixth place nationally. What's the reason for this sudden shift?

Roberto Tiel: Basically, the reason is the delay in the loading and unloading of goods by a group of enterprises involved in the economy. The most notable in this regard were those related to sugar and nonsugar agriculture, in the loading of fertilizer. This led to unfavorable work results.

Another enterprise was the Karl Marx Cement Factory, in loading for export, because of problems the enterprise caused. These, as basic enterprises. There are others, such as the Cereals Combine, which also affected the situation in the province.

Another factor is problems with notices, in the case of the equipment that should be received. All this has led to delays and, therefore, has affected work results.

[BOHEMIA]: What's the cause of the high level of goods stored at the port during the first quarter of the year, and what measures have been taken to remove more of what is unloaded?

Enrique Mena: During the first quarter of the year 1980, the port of Cienfuegos handled 65,600 tons, and during the first quarter of 1981, this was 100,800. That is, during the first quarter of '81, 35,000 tons more was handled than in the same period the year before. However, during the first quarter of 1980, although less cargo was handled, the average was 12,200 tons stored at the port; and in the first quarter of '81, when 35,000 tons more was handled, the average stored was 10,735--that is, 2,000 tons less. March, to be specific, ended with 7,200. These figures are not alarming in the case of the port of Cienfuegos because of the limited storage capacity, especially roofed capacity.

The basic causes that gave rise to this situation are the following: During the first quarter of the year, several ships arrived at the port whose cargos were deposited at our warehouses and docks because of lack of distribution, though that's not the present situation, for 90 percent of the cargos are distributed.

One of the ships was loaded with pulp. This cargo stayed for over a month and a half in the port warehouse, and it turned out that the pulp was for Havana. The same thing happened with the vessel "Sandino," which had to leave 3,500 tons on our docks because of lack of distribution.

Something similar happened to us with a ship loaded with rice. We had to put a goodly amount of that tonnage in our warehouses because part of it could be distributed, and the rest couldn't. The same thing happened with ships loaded with containers.

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Also, our own deficiencies have hampered us. We've had equipment breakdowns; we haven't been skillful at times in utilizing all the transport facilities given us.

[BOHEMIA]: What factors contribute to the delay in the processing of the documents necessary for the port to carry out, promptly and properly, the unloading of the ships?

Carlos Manzanares: We want to clarify two points. The first is that the documents that the steamship agency delivers to the port should involve the manifest, the stowage plan, and the cargo list by hold, but not other documents that also affect the port. Second, we're a national, not a provincial, enterprise.

The basic factor that leads to some delay that might take place in the delivery of the documentation to the port is its failure to arrive at our enterprise in time for us to do the translations and get them to the port. It's impossible for the steamship agency to do the translations in time when the documents arrive right on board the ship, as happens on occasions.

Another issue is that, although the enterprise already has the original documentation and does the translation in time, it has to wait until the ship is told the port of destination before sending it the translated documents.

Occasionally, when a ship arrives with a maximum of 40 or 50 lots, the units can do the translation, but not when there are manifests for 400, 500, or 600 lots.

[BOHEMIA]: Isn't there another solution?

Carlos Manzanares: We can't offer another solution, or any answer.

[BOHEMIA]: Undistributed goods, especially in containers, have come to account for 33 percent of cargos stored at the port. What's the justification for this?

Ignacio Nualla: During the first 10 days of April, at the port of Cienfuegos, of an inventory of 9,031 tons, 2,938 were awaiting distribution. Of these, 2,728 involved containerized cargos--176--containers and 200 general cargos, which constituted 33 percent of undistributed cargos at that time.

This abnormal situation was due to the late delivery of forwarding notices, OPE-2, by the enterprises for which those shipments were intended; and they are: Maprinter [Cuban Enterprise for Import of Raw Materials and Intermediate Products], Quimimport [Cuban Enterprise for Import of Chemical Products], Medicuba [Cuban Enterprise for the Import and Export of Medical Products], Cubametales [Cuban Metal Importing Enterprise], Fecoimport [As published: ?Fecuimport: Cuban Railroad Importing Enterprise], Cuwatex [Cuban Enterprise for Import of Fiber, Fabrics, Hides and Their Products], and Consumimport [Cuban Enterprise for the Import of General Consumer Goods].

Although they knew about the arrival of these goods, the enterprises I named had not prepared the corresponding forwarding notices. There are still five containers without notices from the enterprise Maquimport [Cuban Enterprise for Import of Machinery and Equipment] that came from the ship "Abel Santamaria," which arrived at the port on 8 March of this year.

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At present, the distribution situation at the port of Cienfuegos represents 90 percent of the cargo, but there's still 10 percent not distributed that belongs to the enterprises Maprinter, Exiquin [Expansion unknown], Eximal [Expansion unknown], Medicuba, Maquimport and Quimimport. That is, the same enterprises that were found to have problems during the first quarter are in that situation.

[BOHEMIA]: Expeditrans, the central factor and coordinator of work in the chain, plays an essential role. What have the problems been that have affected the province most, and what measures have been proposed to remedy them?

Isidoro Monzon: The port-transport-domestic economy chain in our province has been affected by the following factors:

Deficiencies in daily operational planning, which has caused great delays in the loading and unloading of the means of transport.

The failure to establish staggered schedules for the placement of the vehicles to be loaded at the port's different loading sites and those for the domestic economy.

The lack of systematic management and disposition of the vehicles arriving in this province empty on the basis of demand for transport.

At the same time, there's the violation by the supplying and producing enterprises of some clauses that establish the times and sizes of deliveries to their customers, and, in fact, the failure of the enterprises receiving the goods to demand adherence, which has allowed violation of such clauses in contracts.

Forwarding of goods, especially in the enterprises Universal, of the CEATM [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply]; and in Supply and Transport, of the Ministry of Construction; the sugar and agricultural enterprises belonging, respectively, to the Ministries of Sugar and Agriculture, has also affected the chain in the province because of the delays it has caused and irrational use of means of transport. Combined with all this we should note the lack of information concerning expected shipments and defects in giving of prior notice to achieve greater certainty in the unloading of the means of transport.

Deviation from truck-loading schedules also has hampered work in our province, for the units arrive outside of the scheduled times.

To solve these problems, a work plan was drawn up and discussed by the executive committee of the chain's provincial committee. It sets forth the specific measures to be carried out by each of the links in the aforesaid provincial chain.

[BOHEMIA]: For 6 months, Cienfuegos has maintained the watchword of zero demurrage. What factors have made it possible to achieve these results in the railroad?

Manuel Matienzo: There are three basic factors in the achievement of these positive results--zero demurrage--in the railroad: First is the level of discipline and awareness reached by the railroad workers in this segment of the chain, which has enabled us, working closely with our Central Division's freight department, to begin coordinating the loading or unloading with the users as soon as they notify us that the cars are on the way, maintaining constant monitoring of the cars from division level to the station of destination.

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Another factor is the daily meeting held by the managers of the chain with its different members in which discussions take place and operating agreements are made about the work plan to be followed the next day, They insure the loading or unloading of the units.

And finally there is the effort made by the stevedores' brigades from the different enterprises using the railroad and the freight center, which have achieved these successes.

[BOHEMIA]: How has the use of truck transport been? Has there been a positive or negative outcome in the loading and unloading?

Nelson Gomez: Regarding the use of truck transport, we can report the following: In number of tons per vehicle/days worked, we've gone from the 21.4 we were getting before the emergency was declared to 33.5.

Trips per vehicle/day worked, from 1.4, which we were getting, to 2.4.

Wage cost per trip, from 19 pesos to 15.36.

Hours' delay in loading and unloading, we have: before July 1980 there was a monthly average of 31,436; and now that average is 17,362 hours.

Before July, as a monthly average, 25,000 tons was moved, and now 55,800 has been reached.

I think we should go to systematization of all factors in the chain, avoiding last-minute marathons by all means. Moreover, our port should consistently maintain a minimum of its facilities, regardless of how critical the arrival of ships may prove to be.

At the same time, we should punctually transport everything contracted for by virtue of better use of our units' capacities and rotation cycles.

Regarding the domestic economy, we should lay the foundation for improved organization and planning of its storage capacity, bearing in mind the variability of our exports and imports.

[BOHEMIA]: What control measures does the provincial delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture carry out to improve the efficiency of loading and unloading the means of transport through the Farm Supplies Enterprise?

Enrique Garcia: Our ministry has been encountering some problems, primarily in the unloading of trucks. Various measures have been taken to remedy this situation.

First of all, we held a seminar with all our enterprises, with participation by Expeditrans. A standing representative was named to the committee that manages the chain every day. Another measure, of great importance, is participation in the chain meetings that are held at both provincial and national level by those directors of our enterprises who have encountered problems with loading and unloading.

Another measure is the one requiring that the official responsible for the demurrage will pay the fine with his own wages and not with the enterprise's funds, as was happening.

We also encountered some difficulties with the cars loaded with fertilizer from the Frank Pais factory in Matanzas. We visited the factory and altered the program, and a 10-day delivery schedule for fertilizer was established. Since that visit, the problems we had with the arrival of trucks from that factory have been solved.

[BOHEMIA]: The Karl Marx Cement Enterprise has caused delays in the loading and unloading of trucks and late loading of ships. Will it be possible to efficiently insure the delivery of the cement for export without the payment of demurrage?

Bruno Rodriguez: You have to consider that the Karl Marx factory began to produce on 8 March, and in April we started delivering cement for the domestic economy, and in May for export.

The delays our factory has caused in the loading and unloading of trucks have been, in our opinion, first of all because of the adjustments it's been necessary to make in the bagging machines, and, besides that, there's our personnel's inexperience in the handling of the cement for export and for the domestic economy.

For a year, we have been taking measures in the factory to solve this problem, and they actually haven't worked out as we wished.

At present, measures have been taken to insure that work goes on 24 hours a day in the shipping building. The comrades who work there are being coordinated, and an effort is made to meet the goals for the shipping building. They also work to maintain the equipment, and at present three cement-bagging machines are being used.

We think that from now on the factory will be able to solve all the problems and avoid payment of demurrage for the cement we have to export in 1981.

[BOHEMIA]: What factors have caused this combine, which had operated successfully for 5 months, to fall back and cause delays in transport beginning in April?

Ricardo D'Escoubet: As a concrete answer, we can point to three factors:

The staggering of transport we were receiving in April, which affected us.

Second, the changing of norms in accordance with Resolution 236, to overfulfill above 120 percent.

And, third, the temporary departure of 35 comrades to do other jobs, which affected two stevedores' brigades, each one consisting of 5 comrades. The absence of a stevedor in each brigade means 27 fewer tons handled.

Now the brigades are full. We've held ongoing discussions with the comrades, and they have already fulfilled norms above 100 percent.

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[BOHEMIA]: What motivates the labor movement in terms of emulation so that Cienfuegos will regain the vanguard position it occupied nationally in the chain?

Diosdado Villaurrutia: We have to say that the labor movement in the province was receptive to the directives issued by the CTC [Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions], in the light of the party's call, with respect to intensifying and giving impetus to emulation-oriented activities intended to enthusiastically and productively increase the motivation existing in the port-transport-domestic economy chain in Cienfuegos Province.

Basically, we've practiced emulation in the transport, merchant marine and port sectors. We think it is time to encourage this emulation in the farming sector, and they are already at work in the sugar sector. We also include another activity, as in the case of the comrades who work in the Cereals Combine.

We've foreseen that it's necessary to vigorously insist that the workers in the enterprises and units learn the problems of their area, what problems the chain is having. To actively make use of the favorable setting of the production and service meetings; the workers should be told what they can work on, where their effort is wanted.

The workers of Cienfuegos won't be responsible for the province's failure to attain its rightful position.

[BOHEMIA]: We would like the representative of the president of the provincial chain to provide a commitment for the near future concerning effort and positive results.

Roberto Tiel: Concerning commitment, the province's basic objective is to again succeed in occupying the outstanding position it deserves. That is, recover what has been lost and retain it with systematic labor, systematic monitoring by all the links in the chain and enterprises belonging to the domestic economy. If you will, also challenge the other provinces to maintain zero demurrage.

Our Opinion: For this round table with the Cienfuegos chain, we intentionally invited two agencies that normally have not been present at these journalistic sessions. We are speaking of CUFLET and the steamship agency. Our readers must have realized their importance to the chain's efficiency through distribution of the cargos from the ships that arrive at our ports and the prompt delivery of documentation for their dispatching.

At the same time, we have observed the success shown by the means of transport in the use of both rail and truck movement, as well as the relative stability of port management despite the excess goods in their warehouses. However, there is the phenomenon that the principal agencies of the domestic economy are presenting problems themselves that clearly lead to the province's reduced efficiency in relation to others in the country, especially when there were times when it was thought that Cienfuegos was going to squeeze Pinar del Rio out of first place.

Problems caused by the unscientific linking of output with wages in the Cereals Combine; the lack of adequate training for a certain key employee in the inner workings of the cement factory.

Agriculture had to take drastic steps with those who, by their negligence, caused the payment of demurrage. . . .

In the sugar industry, there were also problems that affected the chain's efficiency, although we did not have the opportunity to hear the views of that sector's representative.

That is, from what we can see, these sectors were essentially those that had a negative influence on the position of the chain in the province, not to mention what can happen to the economy, especially at the port, in terms of loss of foreign exchange, if there had not been a favorable balance between the payment of demurrage and earnings from prompt dispatching.

At the round table there was a commitment to efficiency. When the next check is held, we will attempt to learn about its results, and we promise to comment critically if that commitment has been fulfilled.

Will Cienfuegos rise? We will wait and see.

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EL SALVADOR

EL SALVADOR REBEL ON U.S. ROLE, POLITICAL OPTIONS

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[Interview with "Major Xavier," chief of international relations of the El Salvador People's Liberation Forces by Guillermo Papussy: "The United States and the Junta Want to Maintain the Status Quo to Perpetuate the Old System of Exploitation and Repression"--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] What is the revolutionary movement's present strategy following the general offensive in January 1981? What are its future objectives?

[Major Xavier] The general offensive in January represented a stage, a step forward for the revolutionary movement. Not only did we maintain our positions but we also won new ground. The situation inside the country has changed and the class struggle has undergone a qualitative improvement. That is largely why we decided on a series of tactical and strategic changes following three fundamental axes: resisting, consolidating and advancing.

Resisting: Our forces have already repulsed more than 100 offensives whose objective was to wipe out the revolutionary movement, the enemy has met with glaring defeat.

Consolidating the "local people's power" in the zones under the revolutionary forces' control means organizing the population's social and political life according to revolutionary rules and laws. As regards the third point--advancing--we have opened up two new fronts in the north of the country and a third 25 km from the capital since January.

[Question] There is talk of mediation at present. What does that mean in practical terms? Would not a possible "agreement" with the enemy be likely to turn against the revolutionary movement?

[Major Xavier] First, we are convinced that our revolutionary plan is, at present, the only possible solution for our people and their problems. There can be no question of going back on this plan. Our people are forced to wage an armed struggle for their liberation because of our obligarchy and the United States, which have prevented any other solution from being found. The war and the class struggle which are shaking our country have claimed several thousand victims, but we think that we must take an open attitude and consider any possibility of settling the conflict with as little bloodshed as possible. Even outside the

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country those people who are interested in El Salvador are aware of the massacre; we have contacted international forces which are considering the possibility of less violent and painful solution to the conflict. Our mediation initiative is in keeping with this aspiration of ours. Unfortunately we are convinced that the United States and the junta do not at present want to find any solution which is likely to fulfill our people's aspirations. Indeed, their interests depend on the "status quo" thanks to which they are maintaining the old system of exploitation and repression. These are not suppositions. I am merely referring to the official statements made by junta representatives to members of the socialist international.

In short, we now know that neither Washington nor the Christian Democratic dictatorship is prepared to seek a solution to the conflict, thus clearly showing the real objectives of their political plan. The enemy's refusal to open serious discussions can only make us follow through our course and pursue the war to its logical conclusion.

[Question] The democratic and revolutionary front is a coalition of democratic forces and mass organizations. What composition and role do the latter have?

[Major Xavier] The special characteristic of the mass organizations is, on the one hand, that they are fighting for the immediate demands of the people they represent and, on the other, that they form part of the politico-military strategy. The mass organizations not only support but complement the military organization. The mass organizations' struggle is at present centered mainly on the impact of the economic crisis, trying to stop this burden being placed on the proletariat's back; they are showing that the junta's economic plan is not viable and cannot solve the problems facing the various social strata.

These organizations chiefly make it possible to show the masses that there is no workable solution outside the people's revolution. The fundamental role of these organizations, therefore, is to gradually incorporate the various urban and rural social strata into the revolutionary struggle.

[Question] What place do strikes have in this type of mass struggle?

[Major Xavier] We consider that the legal place of strikes has been virtually eliminated, and we observed this clearly in January when even the smallest demands were violently stifled. Since then the junta has reshaped the labor code in such a way as to legalize its own excesses. Indeed, this reform means that the trade union must request permission from a higher body for any strike initiative. This body will in turn decide whether the economic sector affected by the strike is of crucial importance to the country. If it is, and if the strike movement were to continue its struggle, it would immediately be acting illegally. The economic sectors declared to be of crucial importance are not clearly defined, and this gives the government complete freedom to interpret the law...

[Question] Does the intervention by North American advisers change the existing balance of forces?

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[Major Xavier] First, the North American intervention in the country has been going on for some time. From the economic viewpoint, large amounts of American aid are enabling the country to face the most serious crisis it has ever experienced and are preventing the national economy from collapsing completely. In addition, the U.S. support is enabling the Christian Democratic dictatorship, which has no social backing, to remain in power.

From the military viewpoint Washington's intervention is more obvious and extensive each day. We calculate that there are several hundred North American "advisers" with responsibility at various levels: from the armed forces general staff to the command of the regional forces. During the major antiguerrilla operations we noticed that on each occasion there were more North American officers physically present leading the operations. The North American presence has also been observed in military training both in El Salvador and in other countries: the United States and Panama. Most of the yankee "advisers" are Vietnam veterans.

The United States is supplying very large amounts of arms and equipment: we have suffered napalm and poison gas attacks.

It is important to stress that the North American presence is spreading to other Central American countries: Honduras and Guatemala.

There is a very large North American presence in Honduras. The military equipment which the United States is supplying to that country far exceeds its national needs and can only be explained by an attempt to make that country a base for intervention in El Salvador and possibly in other countries in the region.

It is obvious, therefore, that there is a change in the correlation of forces because we consider that, without the U.S. intervention, the dictatorship in El Salvador could not survive.

[Question] What are your grounds for asserting that there are "several hundred" North American military advisers when according to official statements there are only 50?

[Major Xavier] It is easy, you just have to add up the places where they appear and bow to the evidence, because they cannot be in two different places at the same time. So, if there are some in headquarters, some involved in training and some taking part in operations, it is not very difficult to calculate how many there are. That is an initial calculation based on common sense, but we also have our sources of information. Moreover several journalists have informed us of a large North American presence in some of the capital's residential districts. Now everybody knows that El Salvador is not a tourist attraction at the moment...

[Question] What political and diplomatic repercussions will this North American intervention have?

[Major Xavier] It is obvious that the North American presence has direct repercussions on the political and diplomatic strategy. Indeed, we think that there are three basic fronts for the struggle: the military front, the political front and the diplomatic front. Although the objective is the same for all three fronts,

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strategy now requires us to contain and stem the imperialist escalation to defend our people's right to self-determination.

To do this we rely greatly on international support. But, in the final analysis, we think that even a direct intervention will not be able to prevent our people's victory, because the people themselves are part of the struggle and the United States would thus have to confront the entire population.

[Question] Another topical subject is the elections proposed by the junta. Is this a maneuver, or is it possible to talk of "good intentions?"

[Major Xavier] It is obviously a maneuver. They tried with the agrarian reform but did not succeed. They wanted to stamp out the trade union movement in the rural districts once and for all, the better to implement their reformist plan. They failed and completely lost their social base.

At the present time the elections are merely an additional method used demagogically by the government to find the minimum of support which the dictatorship needs. But I repeat that at present conditions are not right in El Salvador for free elections to take place. In conclusion, the masquerade is an attempt to obtain some legitimacy to legally justify the junta's constant violence and to enable it to be formally in harmony with the "democratic" doctrines upheld by the United States. In a word the elections are an attempt to win international legitimacy according to the rules of democracy.

In conclusion, I would like to appeal to all progressive, democratic and revolutionary governments in the world, and to parties and political forces, especially to African and Asian peoples and governments, to support our revolutionary struggle, because we think that El Salvador's present struggle is a struggle for democracy, peace, justice and the right to self-determination. In this sense it is not just the El Salvador people's struggle but the struggle of all peoples in the world, and it is part of the great tide of freedom affecting all the peoples in the world. The victory of the democratic movement in El Salvador will be a victory for democracy and self-determination throughout the world.

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