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Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 3/81)



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KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON AID TO KOREA REPORTED

Tokyo TOKYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] The Government, on the 15th, firmed up the Japanese side's policy for coping with the Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Conference, slated to be held in Tokyo on the 20th and the 21st. According to a clarification made by a Government source, its policy is to make clear the nature of aid for "mutual inter-dependence and humanitarian consideration," in regard to the problem of economic co-operation toward the ROK, which has become the biggest focal point, due to the ROK side's strong requests, and to decide on increasing the amount of economic assistance (yen loans) to the ROK in the next fiscal year by about 50 percent, and on increasing the amount from 19 billion yen for the current fiscal year to a little less than 30 billion yen. Meanwhile, as regards the security problem, the Government intends to transmit to the ROK side the posture of the Japanese side that (1) Japan is also contributing to the peace and security of the Far East and Asia, including the ROK, through the firm maintenance of the Japan-US Security Treaty, and (2) Japan cannot offer economic co-operation intertwined with security, and to seek the understanding of the ROK side.

As for defining the nature of aid to the ROK as "for interdependence and humanitarian consideration," the Government source explains that "it aims at giving humanitarian consideration, while fully recognizing the importance of diplomatic and economic relations with the ROK." It is viewed that this has the aim of carrying through our country's posture in regard to foreign economic co-operation, which has been to place emphasis on the stabilization of the people's livelihood and welfare, and also to give consideration to the ROK's position, which emphasizes the ROK's "contribution to security," by adding "inter-dependence" which has the implication of security, and to use this, at the same time as the grounds for increasing the aid amount.

As for the standards for its decision to increase the amount of aid to the ROK in the next fiscal year by about 50 percent, compared with the current fiscal year, and to set the amount at slightly less than 30 billion yen, the Government source explains as follows: (1) When the amounts of aid for the current fiscal year to various nations are compared, the aid amount to the ROK (19 billion yen), where the per capita GNP is 1,310 dollars, is small, when compared with the aid amount of 21 billion yen to Malaysia (per capita GNP is 1,150 dollars) and the aid amount of 30 billion yen to Mexico (per capita GNP is 1,400 dollars); and (2) consequently, it is viewed that the proper amount would be between 27 to 29 billion yen, which stands midway between the amounts for Malaysia and Mexico.

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In carrying out the increasing of the amount of aid to the ROK in the next fiscal year, the Government will not agree to the "package-grant formula," which is being sought by the ROK side, and intends to maintain firmly the "accumulation formula," which it has been following up until now, and under which each project, centering on projects connected with the strengthening of the social foundation, such as hospitals and schools, will be carefully checked. It wishes to present the Japanese side's policy at the administrative-level negotiations to be held between the two countries, on the 22d, immediately after the Foreign Ministers' Conference, if possible, and work out the details by the Japan-ROK periodic Ministerial Conference, slated for September.

As for the security problem, our country, even while showing understanding for the severe military situation on the Korean Peninsula, which is being asserted by the ROK side, will transmit to the ROK side its position that it cannot offer military co-operation or economic co-operation for that purpose, in the light of its Constitutional restrictions. At the same time, the Government intends to show clearly its perception that our country is also contributing to the maintenance of security on the Korean Peninsula, through its efforts for the firm maintenance of the Japan-US Security Treaty.

Toward this policy of the Japanese side for the handling of the problem, the ROK side has been showing, through various kinds of unofficial channels, the basic posture that (1) the ROK is using one-third of its national budget for defense, and this is contributing to the security of Japan, (2) it is hoped that Japan will recognize this point and increase its economic co-operation toward the ROK, which is having difficulties, and (3) it hopes to establish new Japan-ROK relations, standing on a common perception of security. As a concrete increase in aid, it is sounding out the Japanese side for two billion dollars (about 470 billion yen) a year for the five year period for the 5th Five-Year Economic Plan, which it will start in January of next year, or a total amount of 10 billion dollars (about 2,350 billion yen), as economic co-operation. The Japanese side's policy, firmed up on the 15th, takes the form of rejecting the ROK side's request, in general outline, even though showing some concessions in part, and hard-sailing at the negotiations between the two countries in the future, including the foreign Ministers' talks, is becoming unavoidable.

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Development of Economic Co-operation toward the ROK over the Past 10 Years				
Reimbursible Aid (Yen Loans)			Non-reimbursible grants	
FY	Amount	Main Objects	Amount	Main Objects
1971	38,040	Fostering of export industries; subway lines	130	Construction of technological senior high-schools
1972	21,600	Raw materials and machines for industrial use; expansion of communications facilities	394	Construction of technological senior high-schools
1973	21,600	Raw materials; machine equipment	563	Construction of technological senior high-schools
1974	31,320	Agricultural development; dams	500	Building of Engineering Dept., Seoul University
1975	23,420	Promotion of agriculture; ports and harbors	500	Building of Engineering Dept., Seoul University
1976	23,500	Railways; promotion of agriculture	1,000	Building of Engineering Dept., Seoul University
1977	24,000	Promotion of agriculture; super-high-voltage electric power transmission dam	717	Research institutes; medical treatment materials
1978	21,000	Machinery for agricultural use; medical treatment facilities	415	Medical treatment materials
1979	19,000	Educational facilities; city sewerage and disposal facilities	---	
1980	19,000	Hospital facilities; educational facilities	---	

(Note) The monetary amount is shown in the unit of 1 million yen.

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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILES OF LEADERSHIP OF CHON TU-HWAN REGIME ANALYZED

Tokyo KOKUBO in Japanese Aug 81 pp 39-51

[Article by Yagasaki Sei-ji: "The Mentality of the Chon Tu-hwan Regime"]

[Text] Prologue

The Chon Tu-hwan regime of the Republic of Korea, now engaged in real earnest in building a Fifth Republic, constantly emphasizes that the Republic of Korea has entered "a new age," calling the days of the preceding Pak Chong-hui regime as "the old age." To be sure, from the Japanese standpoint, there was an easy-to-approach, easy-to-befriend feeling toward the key personnel of the Pak regime because they were all proficient in the Japanese language, forced to learn it under the Japanese rule in prewar days, but most of the key personnel of the present Chon regime, because they have received postwar Korean education, no longer understand the Japanese language, as to be expected, and there is no denying that this makes it somewhat difficult to take easily to them.

But between President Chon and the late President Pak, both dyed-in-the-wool elites of the Army, there are more similarities than dissimilarities in the basics of their policies: "building up a rich country with a strong army by means of industrialization." For this reason, certain quarters still regard President Chon as "a second Pak," that is, heir to President Pak.

Now, then, is the Chon regime really "new?"

For the answer to this question, it is indispensable to make an analysis of the character of the Chon regime, an analysis of the mentality of the Chon regime, based on objective data.

What is essential first of all in making an analysis of the character or mentality of a regime, is picking out and examining the key persons in the pivotal positions of the regime. In the case of the Chon regime, they are graduates of the ROK Military Academy (hereinafter the academy), graduates after the academy had become a four-year school--so-called "O.Bs." [old boys--reserve or retired military officers] still in the prime of life or currently active young military officers. Of course, there are also graduates from the Naval Academy or Air Force Academy and technocrats who are graduates of first-class universities such as the Seoul National University, who are playing important roles in various areas.

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But they are not given the right to make a final decision on any national policy. This is reserved for the academy O.Bs. In consequence, the key persons of the Chon regime are exclusively academy O.Bs. Therefore, the following analysis is focused on the academy O.Bs.

1. Their Background and Its Effects

(1) Their Background

The academy O.Bs. forming the nucleus of the Chon regime are regarded to be graduates of the 11th class, the 1st class of the 4-year system, to the 18th class. The 11th class, needless to say, includes President Chon and among the graduates of the 18th class is Yi Hak-pong, senior secretary to the President for civilian affairs.

Graduates of the 11th class, who had entered the academy without hitting a snag in academic advancement, were all born in 1934 (President Chon was 3 years behind for he had gone to Manchuria in his primary school days), and are now 47 years old. They are members of the generation who completed their primary school education under the Japanese rule in prewar days, entered middle school in 1946, the year after the end of Japanese rule, and escaped the Korean War by a hair because they were still high school students. They entered the academy during the Korean War and graduated in 1955, 2 years after the armistice.

Meanwhile, graduates of the 18th class, who had entered the academy without hitting a snag in academic advancement, were all born in 1941, and are now 40 years old. They became primary school students in 1947, 2 years after liberation from Japanese rule, entered middle school during the Korean War, advanced to high school after the armistice, entered the academy in 1958, participated, when seniors, in the march in support of the revolution at time of the military revolution, and graduated the following year, 1962.

In other words, graduates of the 11th to 18th classes are in their 40's, the most productive years of life.

From what localities, from what strata of society have the O.Bs. come? According to "The 30-Year History of the ROK Military Academy" (compiled by the Committee for Compilation of the 30-Year History of the ROK Military Academy, 1978), the places of birth by locality for the graduates of the 11th to 13th classes (as of 1954) are as follows:

	<u>11th Class</u>	<u>12th Class</u>	<u>13th Class</u>
Kyongsang provinces	(1) 49	(1) 44	(1) 69
Ch'ungch'ong provinces	(2) 30	(2) 37	(3) 45
Cholla provinces	(3) 26	(3) 31	(2) 66
Kyonggi Province	(4) 16	(4) 21	(4) 24
Seoul	(5) 12	(6) 17	(5) 22
P'yongan provinces	(5) 12	(5) 19	(6) 12
Hamgyong provinces	(7) 9	(8) 3	(9) 3
Hwanghae Province	(8) 5	(7) 4	(9) 3
Kangwon Province	(9) 4	(10) 2	(8) 7
Cheju Province	(10) 3	(8) 3	(7) 8
Total	166	181	259

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(5) Professional work	5.34
(7) Military and police	2.35
(8) Large business, mining	2.20
(8) Real estate income	2.20
(10) Other	<u>0.31</u>
Total	100.00* percent [*as given]

Next, their father's schooling is given as follows:

(1) Primary school graduates (including dropouts)	42.86 percent
(2) Middle school graduates (-do)	18.84
(3) High school graduates (-do-)	12.56
(4) College graduates or university dropouts	10.36
(5) No schooling	9.73
(6) University graduates	4.87
(7) Postgraduate university graduates	<u>0.78</u>
Total	100.00 percent

This shows that most of the academy cadets of the 11th to 25th classes came from poor agricultural and fishing villages. President Chon too hails from a mountain village in Hyopch'on County in the northern part of South Kyongsang Province. In this respect he is similar to the late President Pak who had hailed from a hamlet (Sonsan, North Kyongsang Province). The tenure of the late President Pak was known as the "Kyongsang era," because he had surrounded himself with his juniors from Kyongsang; here again, there is no denying similar tendencies of the Chon regime.

(2) A Sense of Justice

In general, those hailing from agricultural and fishing villages usually entertain antipathy against the wealthy urban classes and many of them have such a strong sense of justice that they are particularly allergic to those who have unethically accumulated wealth. President Chon and company are no exceptions.

It was a manifestation of this sense of justice that on 17 May of last year the Chon regime arrested as many as nine big-shot politicians including former prime minister Kim Chong-p'il on charges of having unethically accumulated their wealth, followed by a sweeping purge in the summer and autumn of the same year on the biggest scale ever. By this purge were dismissed 232 high-ranking civil servants, 400 financial executives including 4 bank presidents, 387 executives of state-operated businesses, 1,212 executives of agricultural and fishing associations, 611 education committee members, 46,000 gangsters and undesirables. (On 23 June 1981 the high-ranking civil servants and state-operated business executives were depurged, thus opening the way to their reemployment.)

(3) A Sense of Mission

Again, as the academy provides education at no cost to the cadets, it has been flooded every year with applications from outstanding children of poor agricultural and fishing villages and as a result, competition has been keen every year. According to "From the Hwang River to Pukak," a biography of President Chon (by Ch'on Kum-song, 1981), in the autumn of 1951 the ratio of competition was 7 to 1 for the 11th class.

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Also, according to the "30-Year History," the ratio of competition from 1952 (the 12th class) to 1972 (the 32d class) was as follows (ratio for the 14th and 15th classes is unknown):

1952 (the 12th class)	11 to 1
1953 (the 13th class)	16 to 1
...[1954]	Unknown
...[1955]	Unknown
1956 (the 16th class)	22 to 1
1957 (the 17th class)	23 to 1
1958 (the 18th class)	18 to 1
1959 (the 19th class)	16 to 1
1960 (the 20th class)	15 to 1
1961 (the 21st class)	13 to 1

Having broken through such barrier, the academy cadets of those days took pride in themselves even more than Seoul National University students, bursting with an elitist consciousness.

How strong was their sense of mission based on the elitist consciousness is well manifested in the speech President made at the ceremony of his retirement from military service, viz.:

"After the war (the Korean War) the chaos of society reached the extreme but bursting with a sense of mission that we must establish the tradition of the academy and become soldiers of the national salvation column, and reaffirming our oath at time of admission to the academy that we must dedicate our passion to the altar of the country and the nation...." (22 August 1981)

2. The Academy's Education and Its Effects

(1) The Academy's Education

Next, the education these O.Bs. received at the academy have played a major role in the formation of their mentality. As opposed to their senior O.Bs. up to and including the 10th class who had received a quick, short-term training from 3 weeks to 1 year at the most, the O.Bs. from the 11th class on down received 4 full years of cadet training with characteristics directly imported from the United States, as follows:

(i) The Thayer System

This is the education system devised by Col Sylvanus Thayer, father of West of Point (Superintendent for 16 years from 1817). Its characteristics are emphasis on self-study, formation of small classes by academic achievements of students, and habituation of voluntary study by means of daily examinations.

(ii) The Self-Rule System

This system is aimed at the self-rule of in-academy unit life, establishment of military discipline, and nurturing of habits as regular army officers through unit command. Out of the cadets are selected a student battalion commander, student company commanders, student platoon leaders, and student squad leaders, who are charged with the duties of self-rule.

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(iii) The Honor System

This is a system devised for the cadets to nurture a high sense of honor, detest falsehood and injustice, and cultivate a fresh spirit of fairness and justice. Its basic principles are: (1) tell no lies; (2) no cribbing; (3) no stealing; (4) report on other cadets' violation of the code of honor. In connection with this honor system, the [ROK] academy's motto of "ch'ung" [loyalty] and "yong" [courage] up to that time was replaced by "chi" [wisdom], "in" [benevolence], and "yong" [courage]. This was modeled on the West Point's motto: Duty, Honor, Country.

In other words, what this means is that every day of their life, every move of theirs is strictly governed by stern rules in a world of competition based on real abilities where there is no room for favoritism.

(2) The Right-Angled Thinking

As a result of such education, what the cadets of the 11th class on down have acquired is the "right-angled thinking." What is meant by the "right-angled thinking" is an attitude of thinking out things literally at a "right angle," that is, strictly on the basis of principles and rules. This is indeed an educational result that can be achieved only by a military school which holds faithfulness to principles, absolute obedience to orders as the highest honor.

In particular, the 11th class, because it was the first class under the new system, became the object of stern experimentation. Kang Chae-yun, who is a classmate of President Chon and currently Deputy Director of the East-West Research Institute of the evening paper CHUNGANG ILBO, wrote an essay "Reminiscences of Military Academy Cadets as Principled Second Lieutenants" (the monthly CHUNGANG, January 1980 issue). Excerpts:

"The cadets, on the first day of admission, were ordered to put on their academy uniforms. The order spelled out detailed procedures how to wear the trousers (specifying which side the testicles should be) and the cadets were bewildered at first. Still, it was essential to shape the youths who had been brought up in different ways, the academy way. For the first few months they were confined to the academy, with no contact whatsoever with the outside world, no leaves, no overnight passes, and they were forbidden personal, individual contacts with officers, except with fellow cadets.... No flexibilities, no expediencies were allowed; they were educated to rise above worldly affairs. For example, to comment but on diction, they were encouraged to pronounce each word clearly, and any mordent diction was discouraged. Any flexibility such as 'it may not be according to the law but it stands to reason that it should be so' was repudiated. As a result, everything had to be 'right-angled'--not only 'right-angled work' in which the cadet draws in his chin, stares the front, and walks arching back his chest to an unnatural degree, but also 'right-angled eating' and 'right-angled dressing.'"

What is meant by the "right-angled eating" is eating, moving your elbows literally at a right angle. This, it is reported, caused many comical scenes. President Chon, too, in an interview by the SHOKUN (October 1980 issue), reminisced as follows:

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"Accustomed to using a knife and fork in cutting up meat and eating it, there is nothing to it for them (U.S. cadets), but we are accustomed to eating rice and soup with a spoon. So, when we tried to eat, bending our elbows at a right angle, frequently there were comical scenes that here and there at the tables the soup was spilled."

On the other hand, such strict observance of principles lacking flexibility isolated the academy from the society at large and branded it as a "lonely island of morality." In consequence, all the good intentions, policies went round and round and got nowhere. It was also a lack of flexibility that caused the industrial readjustment against large financial cliques, which was carried out in parallel with the large-scale purge, to run into a dead end. It would seem that it was their judgment that in order to uproot the cause of rivalry of financial cliques for excessive investment, there was no other way but to issue an uncompromising order, but inasmuch as the ROK economy is a complex one intricately entangled with the world economy, the action was much too "right-angled."

(3) The Organizational Sense

Again, inasmuch as they had been thoroughly trained to act efficiently in an organized manner at command, the academy graduates alone became an unusually well-disciplined collective in the ROK society where "individualities are too strong to get together." So it is that Gregory Henderson, in his renowned book "Korea the Politics of the Vortex" (1968) summarizes the ROK military characteristics as follows:

"No civilian group or institution has come close to it [the Korean Army] in the development of a definite and comparatively fairly administered career service. It is the only Korean group...which...succeeded...attention over a long period to achieve effective influence," "...the Korean Army became the first Korean organization...that eliminated most of the sources of fluidity and disunity..." and "It [Korean Army] became the strongest organization of the country...."

In particular, the academy cadets had to maintain unity of action 24 hours a day on an in-academy unit basis. In his earlier mentioned essay, Kang Chae-yun reminisces:

"Even within the academy no cadets were allowed individual actions except when summoned by instructor officers. Even when nature called, they had to go to the bathroom in a group."

As a result, their buddy-consciousness, their comrade-consciousness could not but heighten and even after graduation, has come to continue all this time. As is widely known, President Chon on 12 December 1979 seized the real power of the military by coup d'etat known as "12 December military purge." Behind the success of this sink or swim gamble was action taken without notice to the U.S. Command to mobilize troops by the president's classmates--Kim Pok-tong, a member of the president's in-academy unit, and Kim's matrimonial relative No T'ae-u, and another classmate Chong Ho-yong.

But such buddy-consciousness frequently tends to take on a factional nature. In particular, in the Republic of Korea where a hometown consciousness still remains strong, there are tendencies to form factions on a hometown or high school basis.

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As a matter of fact, there was a case in which Yun P'il-yong, of Kyongsang province, of the 8th class of the academy and Capital Garrison Commander, (currently President of Korea Highway Corporation) had rallied a number of his academy juniors, of Kyongsang province and threatened the [then] president, which proved his undoing.

In this sense, three among those close to President Chon--Ho Hwa-p'yong (aide of the Presidential Secretariat, of the 17th class, of P'ohang), Ho Sam-su (senior secretary of the Presidential Inspector's Office, of the 17th class, of Pusan), and earlier mentioned Yi Hak-pong (of Pusan)--are all from South Kyongsang Province, and there are certain quarters which suspect the existence of a South Kyongsang clique. There is a rumor to the effect that the three generals mentioned, No, Kim, and Chong, who together with President Chon participated in the 12 December coup d'etat, are not getting along with President Chon quite as well as supposed to be. It appears the rumor is not entirely groundless in light of the fact that the three generals are all from Taegu, North Kyongsang Province whereas President Chon is from South Kyongsang Province. (Later, General No was promoted to the rank of a full general on 11 July only to be placed on the reserve list and appointed on the 16th as No 2 Minister Without Portfolio in charge of security. It would seem to mean that the rivalry of Chon versus No has ended in the victory of President Chon that General No who had been in No 2 post next to President Cho has been placed on the reserve list.)

By the way, Kwon Ik-hyon (of the 11th class) and Pae Myong-kuk (of the 14th class), both currently National Assemblymen, and Chong Tong-ch'ol (of the 12th class), Deputy Minister of Labor, who had all been removed from office for implication in the earlier mentioned Yun P'il-yong scandal, are among those who have been rehabilitated by the birth of the Chon regime.

3. The Military Revolution and Its Effects

(1) The Military Revolution

Next, it was the military revolution of 16 May 1961 led by the late President Pak which exerted great influence on the mentality of young officers. At the time of this revolution, the 11th class was 6 months after graduation from the academy and generally in the company officer grade of captains. President Chon was also a captain and was serving as an ROTC instructor at the Seoul National University.

The greatest of influence exerted by this military revolution on young officers was the skepticism about the creed of civilian control and the growing belief in power with emphasis on national interests.

The academy, as does the U.S. Military Academy, has taught the importance of civilian control, the political neutrality of military officers. In particular, Lt Gen Yi Hal-lim, superintendent of the academy for 2 years from 1957 to 1959 (former ambassador to Australia), was known for his reiteration of the importance of civilian control. This was so because Lieutenant General Yi had been particularly critical of the way the then President Syngman Rhee was manipulating military officers to his advantage, dragging them into politics.

As a result, when the military revolution broke out, some of the senior cadets who had been trained by Lieutenant General Yi were so beset by vexation as to how to view this revolution that they sought the advice of Lieutenant General Yi now commander of the 1st Army in a move, if necessary, to take part in putting down the military revolution.

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But the move of the senior cadets was discovered and checked beforehand by the revolutionary officers and Lieutenant General Yi was also arrested. Thus an internecine clash between the ROK military personnel was avoided and the military revolution succeeded.

(2) The Creed of Power and Political Training

This success implanted in most of the young officers the thinking "When it is judged a national crisis, military officers may break the principle of political neutrality, wage a military revolution, and suspend the Constitution by armed force." The same thinking justified the yusin coup d'etat of October 1972 and the coup d'etat of 12 December 1979.

As to this kind of thinking, the U.S. Military Academy is thorough in teaching civilian control, and the oath at time of admission clearly states in the beginning "I, _____ do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States and bear true allegiance to the National Government;..." whereas the oath of the ROK Military Academy at time of admission merely states "I swear to observe the cadet creed and rules of morality."

"The cadet creed and rules of morality," according to the "30-Year History of the ROK Military Academy," contains the following five major points and makes no mention of the Constitution:

- I. The cadet tells the truth and nothing but the truth.
- II. The cadet's behavior is always fair and just.
- III. The cadet always practices what he says.
- IV. The cadet accepts nothing unethical.
- V. The cadet holds himself responsible for his word and behavior.

In a nutshell, as mentioned earlier the ROK Military Academy too taught about civilian control but was not thorough enough to make it a prerequisite of admission to support the Constitution.

Regarding this point, one could anticipate from the side of the ROK statemen a counter-argument "In the emergency situation of hostile confrontation with north Korea it is unreasonable to demand civilian control identical to that of the United States." To be sure, in such counter-argument there is an element of truth. But when the question boils down to the proposition that it will be impossible to stand up to north Korea unless civilian control is discarded, the opposition within the Republic of Korea voices doubts and there seems room for further arguments. In that sense, this has to be pointed out after all as one of the questions.

Again, the military revolution assigned a large number of young military officers to parts of the administration under military government in the name of the Supreme Council for National Construction, and as a result, the young officers trained themselves politically, in the process. Captain Chon Tu-hwan also impressed Pak Chong-hui,

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then chairman of the Supreme Council, and became a secretary to the chairman for civilian petition and then chief of personnel, Central Intelligence Agency. Captain Chon returned to the army on the transfer of military government to civilian administration, declining the advice of Chairman Pak. But there is no doubt that Captain Chon had gained considerable political experience meantime. At first when President Chon suddenly reemerged this time, it was said to be "the entry of a dyed-in-the-wool military officer who only knows war, completely ignorant of politics," but looking back now, it was far from the truth.

Moreover, it had remained a sort of conundrum how Captain Chon had come to impress Chairman Pak, but according to "From the Hwang River to Pukak," it all began the day after the outbreak of the military revolution when Captain Chon personally asked Chairman Pak about the objective of the military revolution. Captain Chon had gone to the army headquarters where Major General Pak was, prepared to kill him as well as himself should it turn out that the revolution had been motivated by personal interest and gain. But after forcing his way into seeing the general, the captain came to know the lofty objective of the revolution and find himself in complete sympathy with it. Thereupon he flew back to his alma mater, the academy, posthaste and laid the groundwork for the march in support of the revolution, it is reported. This episode, it is said, had remained a secret solely because President Chon himself had never wanted to make it public. If true, then it must be said that even when he was a mere captain, Chon Tu-hwan was already a man accomplished in politics as well.

4. Participation in the Vietnam War and Its Effects

(1) Participation in the Vietnam War

When commenting on the mentality of the young military officers, another thing that must never be overlooked is their personal experience in the Vietnam War. This experience has exerted great influence on them no less than did the experience in the Korean War on the veteran military officers.

The participation of ROK combat units in the Vietnam War stretched over 8 years from 1965 through 1973 with an approximate aggregate of 300,000 ROK officers and men. (Special report "The Triumphant Return of the ROK Army from Vietnam," March 1973 issue of the ASIA KORON)

How many of the O.B. officers of the academy were among the participants? How many of them were killed in action? There is no data available. But according to the "30-Year History," the first O.B. group was a dozen academy graduates dispatched to Vietnam in July 1964 as instructors for the mobile surgical hospital and T'aegwondo martial art, followed by another group of 30 as members of the ROK Military Assistance Team (the "Dove" unit) for Vietnam in February 1965; 250 as members of the Capitol Division (the Tiger unit) in September 1965; about 150 as members of the 9th Division (the White Horse unit) in September 1966. In other words, within no more than 2 years a total of 500 of the academy O.Bs. was dispatched to Vietnam.

In the case of the 1st Regiment of the Capitol Division, platoon leaders, company commanders, and regimental staff officers were all academy graduates; in the case of the armored unit, 12 company commanders out of 14 companies were O.Bs. and so were 70 percent of the platoon leaders.

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As a result, most of the O.Bs. up to and including the 26th class (1966) saw action in the Vietnam War, and some of them even reenlisted, it is reported.

Meanwhile, according to Vol 3 (published in October 1971) of the "War History of the ROK Army Dispatched to Vietnam" by the War History Compilation Committee, there was a total of 25 officers killed in action in a half-year period from July to December of 1967: 3 each of lieutenants and second lieutenants of the Tiger unit; 1 captain, 5 lieutenants and 10 second lieutenants of the White Horse unit; 1 each of major, captain, and lieutenant of No 100 Supply Command. In addition, according to Vol 4 (published in October 1973) of the same war history, a total of 19 officers was killed in action in another half-year period from January to June 1968: 12 Tiger officers (3 captains, 6 lieutenants, 3 second lieutenants), 6 White Horse Division officers (1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 second lieutenants), 1 major of the Construction Aid Team. This means that in a 1-year period from 1967 to 1968 a total of 44 army officers of the grade of second lieutenant and up was killed in action. There is no doubt that most of the officers were the aforementioned platoon leaders, company commanders, and regimental staff officers, and therefore, it could be said that most of the officers killed in action were academy graduates.

By the way, President Chon participated in the war as commander (colonel) of the 29th regiment of the White Horse unit for 1 full year from November 1970 when the Paris peace conference was in a stalemate. He was the first regimental commander out of the 11th class. This was a period when the Laotian battle was under way along the Vietnamese-Laotian border areas, a battle which proved to be the final large-scale operation of the U.S. ground forces. In this operation the ROK forces did not participate but were solely engaged in searching and destroying Vietcongs throughout Ninh Hoa County, Khanh Hoa Province north of Nha Trang on the central coast. According to the "From the Hwang River to Pukak" by Ch'on Kum-song, President Chon during his 1-year service in Vietnam commanded three major operations--"No 25 Operation Bat" (9 days), "No 1 Operation Eagle 71" (20 days), and "No 26 Operation Bat" (35 days)--in which 258 enemies were killed and 24 prisoners and suspects taken, for which he was conferred a Ulchi Medal. But his regiment also suffered casualties: nine dead and a dozen wounded.

(2) The Anticommunist Spirit

The greatest of influence exerted by the experience of the young officers in the Vietnam War on their mentality was their political ideology more than anything else. That is, it was their conviction that the political confrontation between the government and opposition forces within South Vietnam had invited the aggression of North Vietnam, and an extremely sensitive reaction to political confrontation has since become their habit.

Such mentality was most graphically manifested in the trial of Kim Tae-chung. In August of last year after the indictment of Kim Tae-chung and others, President Chon said:

"Didn't Vietnam give us the best lesson? When the students, religious personalities, journalists persistently indulged in reckless criticism as if they did not have a country to worry about, they merely hastened the fall of their country in the end. Now that they are under the communist rule, what kind of criticism are they making?"

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It will never do to put our minds to ease in the belief that ours is absolutely different from that of Vietnam when actually we are under the threat of the north Korean communist collective with vigilant hostility targeted on our shortcomings. One must never forget that only when the country and people are wholesome is there room for intellectuals as well." (Interview by the KYONGHYANG SINMUN, 11 August 1980)

It is because of the big influence of the experience of theirs in the Vietnam War that the military O.Bs. in their prime of life, the nuclear force of the Chon regime, are maintaining an unusually stern stance against any pro-communist word or deed.

Epilogue

The above is an analysis of the character or mentality of the academy graduates formed through their family and social backgrounds, their education at the academy, and major events that took place after they had been commissioned as officers. It would appear that their sense of justice, their sense of mission, and their anti-communist spirit are little different from those that prevailed at the time of the Pak regime. To be sure, compared with the academy graduates of the 2d class through the 8th class who had received education at the academy for short periods (from 3 months to 1 year), the cadets of the 11th class on down received 4 full years of education and are accomplished in scientific knowledge and scientific way of thinking. But such are merely technical elements and essentially, it may not be amiss to say, they all have a similar mentality.

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