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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 725

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REACTIONS TO FRENCH VOTE IN AFRICAN NATIONS

Giscard Preferred by French

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 p 26

[Article by Philippe Simonnot: "Giscard Reelected in Africa"]

[Text] By a very large majority (70.38 percent of all votes cast), the French people in Africa "elected" Giscard on 10 May, thereby confirming their first-ballot vote (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1062). A total of 49,796 votes were cast in the embassies and consulates, not counting absentee ballots (counted in France).

In three African countries, only the French agreed with the national choice: Francois Mitterrand won in Algeria (52.15 percent), Ghana (52.94 percent) and Zambia (13 to 10 for Valery Giscard d'Estaing). Elsewhere, Giscard was largely "reelected," achieving his best percentages in Mauritius (88.18), Madagascar (86.46), Gabon (81.99) and Zaire (80.74).

Despite this "counter tidal wave," there was nevertheless a very clear surge by Francois Mitterrand on the second ballot, especially in the Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Senegal. It would appear that in Africa as in France, the new president not only harvested all the votes of the left and the minor candidates (especially the ecologists), but also got a substantial bite of the Gaullist backing that is well-established in Africa. The national delegate from the Socialist Party in charge of the French abroad, Guy Penne, explains this clear increase, not only compared with the results on the first ballot, but also with the European elections in 1979. He sees in it the results of the "awareness" efforts made by his party for a year among expatriates and the increase in number of Mitterrand support committees among the main French "colonies" abroad.

However, Penne recognizes that despite its recent efforts, the Socialist Party must counter the antileft trend among expatriates in Africa, a veritable "preserve" of the former Giscardian-Gaullist majority.

The vigilance of the Mitterrand delegates has made it possible to denounce certain fairly discreet pressures exercised by the administration, politicians or "economic lobbies," as well as certain irregularities. For example, there was that electoral meeting on behalf of the outgoing president organized on 5 May in Libreville (Gabon) by Jean-Pierre Fourcade (former minister of finance under

Giscard), in violation of the 1976 law on French voting abroad and despite the reticence of President Bongo himself!

In Mauritius, speeches by prominent persons favoring the old majority were also denounced by representatives of the socialist candidate. Likewise, the "visits" by Edgar Faure to Tunis and Gen Marcel Bigeard to Abidjan during the election campaign did not escape Mitterrand's supporters.

Furthermore, the poor results in Madagascar have puzzled the Socialist Party, which plans to investigate voting conditions on the spot. It would appear, however, that because of sociocultural considerations, French citizens "at the other end of the world" will remain an election hotbed for the right. Combining all the countries, they granted 69.69 percent of their votes to Giscard d'Estaing. Often well-off materially speaking, French people abroad do not experience the same difficulties as their fellow citizens at home (unemployment, high cost of living). They therefore lose some of the meaning of the election stakes. And yet, if the "legitimist" reflex were to continue to play a role abroad (in the sense of identifying France with its government), the Socialist Party candidate would undoubtedly have a very good chance with the French in Africa...in 1988.

How They Voted in Some African Countries (Votes Cast in Africa Only)

10 May 1981	Giscard	Mitterrand
Algeria	47.85%	52.15%
Cameroon	73.02%	26.98%
Ivory Coast	69.48%	30.52%
Gabon	81.99%	18.01%
Madagascar	86.46%	13.54%
Morocco	69.05%	30.95%
Senegal	72.00%	30.95%
Tunisia	61.92%	38.08%
All French in Africa	70.38%	29.62%

For the Record	Giscard	Mitterrand
Metropolitan France	47.77%	52.22%
French abroad	69.69%	30.31%
Overseas departments	71.57%	28.42%
Overseas territories	74.21%	25.78%
Overall results	48.25%	51.75%

Change in Governments Followed by Africans

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 pp 27-29

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "The Alternation They Dream Of"; and commentary by Jacques Gautrand: "Cooperation: Celebration and Moving Out"]

[Text] Rarely has a political event been followed with so much interest by Africans. For the second ballot of the presidential election, Radio-France Interna-

Internationale (RFI) and its junior colleague, Africa No 1, beat all listening records. From Dakar to Libreville, Niamey to Kinshasa and Yaounde to Abidjan, tens of millions of listeners tuned in to the French stations at 1900 hours on Sunday, 10 May, stations that already tend to win out over national radio stations.

In Morocco, French radio stations achieved listener ratings at least equal to those registered 2 days earlier on the occasion of the rebroadcast, from Cairo, of the Egypt-Morocco soccer game, a World Cup elimination match.

In Cameroon, the election of the president of the French Republic practically eclipsed the other event of the day: the elimination games for the Africa Cup, pitting champion clubs against one another. In Douala, Canon of Yaounde, reigning champion, played ASSEC of Abidjan. "My friends came to wake me up at two in the morning to break out some champaign," one Douala entrepreneur recalls, "to celebrate Francois Mitterrand's victory!"

The explosion of joy that greeting the announcement of the results was on a par with the tension that reigned here and there during the waiting period. Betting was heavy. From 1930 hours, the "Mitterrandists" -- the most numerous -- were already convinced of the victory of "their" candidate. And the reason for their optimism? The announcer on the RFI spoken newspaper had said that he could not get to the Rue de Marignan (where Giscard's campaign staff was located).

On the other hand, on Rue de Solferino (headquarters of Mitterrand's Socialist Party), the newsman revealed that the buffet was ready and the champagne on ice. Nothing more was needed to sharpen the imagination of those who, overseas, had followed the vicissitudes of the French election campaign so closely.

In Dakar, Abidjan, Libreville and Rabat, the televised 5 May debate was seen directly by many viewers. The duel had been partially broadcast in Tunis on a delayed basis. In Cameroon, video tapes replaced television, slow in appearing. Ministers, high officials and merchants asked their friends in Paris to record all the debates, including those organized on the evenings of the two ballots. A bank director assigned to Paris quitely simply delayed his return by 48 hours in order to see the 10 May election broadcasts in person.

Followed closely and with passion, the 10 May vote had results that responded to the expectations of most Africans. "Imagine, we have lived under the same regime for 23 years," commented one executive who was once a member of the tumultuous FEANF (Federation of Students From Black Africa in France). "Over two generations have not been able to see the virtues of alternating governments."

At first, such remarks may seem meaningless. Actually, the general feeling is that changes that occur in France cannot fail to have an effect on French-speaking Africa.

Official circles share this opinion, as shown by the congratulatory messages sent to the new occupant of the Elysee Palace. There are obviously chiefs of state who simply did what they had to do, as in the case of presidents Mobutu (Zaire), Sekou Toure (Guinea), Dacko (Central African Republic) and Mengistu (Ethiopia) (JEUNE AFRIQUE, Nos 1062 and 1963).

But outside of these leaders "on the fringe," there was a chorus of approval, as illustrated by the warm nature of the official messages and newspapers comments. "Your election is of considerable importance for Ivorians," Felix Houphouet-Boigny wrote in his message to Francois Mitterrand. "The changes announced can only have positive effects on French policy in Africa," declared Mauritanian Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla.

That is obviously not the opinion of the Moroccan Royal Palace, but AL MOUHARIR, the socialist newspaper, nevertheless ran this headline on Tuesday, 12 March: "Historic Day in France: Victory of Socialism and Democracy!" As for L'OPINION, the organ of the Istiqlal, it took pleasure in recalling that "at the beginning of the century, Jean Jaures, and later, Leon Blum, pleaded for the unity and independence of Morocco."

That mitigated sentiment is found in Tunisia. While the authorities are apprehensive about the Middle Eastern policy of Francois Mitterrand, the leaders of the opposition believe that the success of the French socialists could accelerate the Tunisian process of democratic opening. A leftist French government would, it is said, encourage such an important measure as general amnesty.

If there were any need of proof, one has the French influence on African affairs, This is the reason why the English-speaking countries themselves did not fail to react with the greatest clarity.

In Zimbabwe, the government daily HERALD hopes that "Mitterrand's victory will open up an era of confrontation between France and South Africa." Finally, the newspaper hopes that "the French policy will be based more on morals than on profit."

The same feeling is found in Nigeria, where the DAILY TIMES writes: "Mitterrand comes to power at a time when France is viewed with suspicion and even distrust by most countries in Africa and the Third World." The government daily concludes: "France must become the main salesman of manufactured goods instead of being the largest seller of arms going for the destruction of the masses."

A paradox of history, it was in Nigeria, an English-speaking country, where Martin Kirsch, adviser to Valery Giscard d'Estaing for African affairs, made his official farewell -- although he did not know it at the time -- to Africa. On 30 April, following a lightning visit to Lagos lasting one day, he met with President Shehu Shagari.

On the evening of 20 May, the grey eminence packed his bags and has since been resting at his Sceaux villa in the region of Paris. Previously, Kirsch had been on the telephone with practically all the African chiefs of state, who wished to express their sympathy to the outgoing president. The messages of his correspondents did not have the same tone: Everything depended on the quality and closeness of the bonds woven since 1974, during a 7-year term marked by dissent.

In Africa itself, the debate is far from over. On the whole, the intelligentsia boasts about the humanism of the French socialists. With respect to upper-level personnel, by dint of emphasizing the dangers of collectivism, the old majority lost all credibility.

Whence the comment of the ENA [National School of Administration] graduate, who has a number of former classmates on the staff of the mayor of Paris: "If Chirac does not change his propaganda themes, the left will remain in power for 20 years."

However, one cannot thereby conclude that Mitterrand's victory is unanimously supported. In Dakar, for example, there is an astonishing convergence of opinions of a veteran, nostalgic for the past, and an economics student, who looks resolutely to the future: "Mitterrand's election is a bad sign," the former says. "It is Gaullism that has always saved France since 1945. It is a betrayal to elect a non-Gaullist. France without the Gaullists will never be able to face its African responsibilities."

The second starts from opposite reasoning and ends up with the same conclusion: "Mitterrand will not be able to distinguish himself, within the framework of his country's African policy, from the neocolonial style begun by General de Gaulle."

It is up to the 21st president of the French Republic to take up the challenge.

Cooperation

The address is 20 Rue Monsieur, in the 7th arrondissement of Paris. The gendarme posted at the door absent-mindedly watches those who come and go: It is rather quiet at this hour of the day. The car of an African diplomat leaves by the main gate. Everything is absolutely normal at the central headquarters of the Ministry of Cooperation.

On this Friday, 15 March, who would ever suspect, at first sight, that 5 days previously, France had elected a new president? An ordinary visitor would have trouble seeing any change. And yet, in the office of the "half-time" minister (Robert Galley had, since 22 December 1980, divided his time between the Ministry of Cooperation and the Ministry of Defense), bags were being packed, although regular affairs were being handled.

"The minister continues to function as in the past," reassured one of Galley's aides. "Nothing has changed, except that now we are merely handling administrative affairs. We are making no political decisions, while awaiting the appointment of the new government."

And yet, the head of the press service would not receive me: "No, no; this is not the time." Apparently there is nothing to say to the press during the interim period. The weekly meeting with newsmen is "suspended until further notice," says a circular.

Everyone faces the changes in his own way. Two days after the election of Francois Mitterrand, moving trucks disappeared into Rue Monsieur and reappeared with dossiers and documents so that they would not fall into the wrong hands. "Personal documents of the members of the Cabinet," it was claimed.

I am told that high officials are drawing up their reports (the outgoing president asked the Ministry of Cooperation and other ministries for a balance sheet of the 7-year term) for their new bosses or...their own successors.

Among those whose posts are in danger are Christian Joudiou, Michel Van Grevenynghe and Antoine Frasseto, heads of the three main pillars of the ministry: the Directorate of Economic Development (DDE), the Directorate of Cultural and Technical Cooperation (DCCT) and the General Administration Department (SAG). Among the possible new arrivals is Jean Audibert, formerly in the ministry and a member of the African Group of the Socialist Party.

In the different departments, there is an atmosphere of anxious expectation. However, the "rank and file" welcomed Mitterrand's election with a certain satisfaction: The CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] organized a cocktail party to celebrate the victory of the leftist candidate. The trade unions expect employment guarantees for contract employees from the new government.

But more than the status of employees is at stake. There is also some question about the future of cooperation with Africa following the June legislative elections. Will there be a restructuration or will it disappear?

"At any rate," one young civil servant told me, "if the Ministry of Cooperation were to disappear, I believe that many African countries would be disappointed."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

NEW MOROCCAN AGREEMENTS--The Nigerien-Moroccan Commission on Cooperation met on 22 and 23 April at Niamey under the leadership of Mr Sani Bako, secretary general of Niger's ministry of foreign affairs and cooperation and Mr. M'Hamed Faouzi, ambassador of Morocco. Concerning the training of high personnel, Niger requested 35 places in Morocco's schools of higher education for the 1981-1982 school year. On the subject of primary and secondary education and professional training, many programs were extended, mainly implementation of teaching in Arabic starting in October 1983, furnishing of textbooks and teaching material in Arabic and training of mechanical technicians. Both parties signed several technical and economic agreements, especially in aeronautics, and decided to continue negotiating the tariff proposal initially submitted by the Moroccans. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1249] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

CHADIAN PROTEST--In a letter dated 22 April and addressed to the president of the UN Security Council, the Chadian charge d'affaires at the United Nations, Mr Ngare Kessely, stated that if Egyptian and Sudanese threats persist, his government reserves the right to bring the matter to the Security Council. These Sudanese-Egyptian "threats, encouraged and financially and militarily backed by certain powers, have the sole objective of immersing Chad in war again, something which, in addition to the suffering it would entail for the Chadian people, would dangerously threaten the peace and security of the region," Mr Ngare Kessely says in his letter. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1253] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

LIBYAN-CHADIAN TREATY--The contemporary magazine AFRIQUE, published by Documentation Francaise, has just published in its issue number 113 (Jan-Feb 1981) the French text of the treaty of friendship and alliance signed by Libya and Chad at Tripoli on 15 June 1980. The text alludes especially to "essential bonds rooted in a common destiny, common objectives and common aspirations beyond all the obstacles" between the two parties, "in the framework of the alliance between the great revolution of 1 September and the Chadian revolution led by the Frolinat." The treaty was signed for

Libya by Dr Ali Treki and for the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government of Chad] by Mr Ibrahim Yusef, advisor to the late Mr Goukouni Weddeye. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1253] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

CHADIAN REFUGEES IN CAMEROON--Correction--A misprint in our issue of 17 April, 1981, page 1136, stated that there were still 8,000 Chadian refugees in Cameroon. Obviously, it should have read 80,000. Cameroonian officials consider this figure weak and estimate there are 100,000 persons at the Kousseri refugee camp alone (opposite Ndjamena) and nearly 150,000 Chadian refugees throughout Cameroon. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1253] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

CSO: 4400/1174

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

UNITA PRISONERS RELEASED--The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] has announced that it would soon free the 26 Portuguese nationals it is holding and who were taken "during combat operations." This release, added the movement which opposes the Luanda regime, was made possible by the ending of the period of disinterest if not hostility shown by some Portuguese authorities toward UNITA. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1263] 9516

MOCAMEDES FISHING FLEET--The fishing fleet of the Angolan province of Mocamedes consists of 214 small craft, some belonging to state-owned companies and others to private companies. It is operating at 75 percent of potential (counting Mocamedes, Porto Alexandre, Lucira, Cabo Negro, Bata, and Baia das Pipas). The province has four plants for the manufacture of fish-meal. The fish oil extract is difficult to market. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1264] 9516

LOBITO PORT TRAFFIC--In 1980, traffic at Lobito amounted to 467,200 tons; the port was visited by 593 ships, most fo them from northern Europe. In 1981 traffic is expected to reach 785,000 tons. The investment of 74 million kwanzas is scheduled for purchase of handling machinery and equipment, as well as spare parts; the current year will also see construction of a new 1,000-m long pier. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1264] 9516

BELGIAN BUSES--Belgian buses known as the "flexi-bus," or more commonly "the accordion bus," are being called "machimbombos articulados" in Angola. VAN HOOL already delivered an initial order of these "flexi-buses" in 1979 to the Angolan capital's public transportation services. A second order of 50 "machimbombos articulados" has just recently arrived. It had been indicated during the visit to Koningshooikt by Mr Muteca, the Angolan minister of transportation, that new "flexi-bus" orders would follow those of 1979, provided that the driving and maintenance results obtained by these buses were satisfactory. Two years of extensive bus use in Luanda, a city of more than 1 million people, was convincing since the Angolan authorities ordered a second delivery of buses. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1207] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745

AGREEMENT WITH FRENCH AIRLINES--The UTA (Air Transportation Union) company and the TAAG (Air Transportation of Angola) national Angolan company have just signed an agreement where both companies jointly undertake bi-weekly roundtrip flights beginning 20 April; one of them is a direct Boeing 707 flight; the other is a DC-10 stopover flight at Libreville. This cooperation between the two companies seeks to offer capabilities congruent with Angola's economic development. Also worth noting is that from now on, UTA is insuring TAAG's commercial representation in France. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1208] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745

SONANGOL AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION--The Dutch firm FOKKER recently delivered an F-27 Mark 500 Friendship to SONANGOL, the Angolan oil company. This equipment, ordered last year and destined to replace the Dokota DC-3, is a combined passenger-cargo model. It will be able to transport 56 people and will assure SONANGOL and other oil companies of the reliable transport of personnel and freight between Luanda and the drill sites in northwest Angola (Soyo and Cabinda). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1208] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745

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CHAD

BRIEFS

CLASHES CONTINUE BETWEEN FACTIONS--Qadhdhafi's troops are watching Habre's underground forces, while the pro-Libyan soldiers of d'Acyl blame Goukouni's men. Scarcely 5 months ago, Hissein Habrè's FAN [Northern Armed Forces] started its long march towards the East, driven out of Ndjamena by Goukouni Oueddei's FAP [People's Armed Forces] and Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's men. From summits which have collapsed in verbal condemnations, the Libyans, taking advantage of disagreement among those who condemn them, have established themselves in Chad since then. "Called upon"--like the Cubans in Angola--by a fraction of the ruling team, 5,000 soldiers from Tripoli camp today in garrisons named Ati, Mongo, Bangar, Fanya. If they are prudently absent from a South that fears and rejects them, the green soldiers of the popular army are particularly present in the Center-East: already 2,000 are at Abeche and Biltine. In fact, 1,500 to 2,000 guerrillas who remain loyal to Hissein Habrè are still fighting there. On 16 April, the FAN's commissar on foreign relations, Mahamat Saleh, and some persons qualified as "pro-Nigerians" such as Mustapha Maitchari and Odoum Idriss, announced the "withdrawal of their confidence" in Habrè. A first step, without doubt, towards rallying behind Goukoumi by a (minimal) party of the FAN. But the Chadian president could hardly rejoice for long: 3 days later, on 19 April, at Abeche, violent fighting opposed his own partisans of the pro-Libyan guerrilla of his own Foreign Minister Ahmat Acyl. The clashes were acknowledged, for the first time, at Ndjamena itself by the Council of Ministers. Qadhdhafi's legionaries, assigned to their quarters, remained spectators. The outbreaks of meningitis and chicken-pox in the Chadian capital obliged the authorities to decree a stage of sanitary emergency. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1981] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 p 26] 9765

CSO: 4400/1170

CONGO

RESULTS OF 22 APRIL CABINET MEETING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 pp 1254-1255

[Excerpts] On 22 April the Congolese cabinet, meeting under the leadership of Col Sassou Nguesso, adopted two regulatory bills related to the realignment of the Congo-Ocean Railroad (CFCO): one agreement involves nearly $8 million, the other almost 5.7 million Kuweiti dinars.

In addition the cabinet studied and adopted a protocol between the Congo and the ELF Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise] companies to create a research enterprise to exploit the Congo's potential gas resources.

Financial Agreements With France

On 21 April three financial agreements amounting to a total of 350 million CFA francs (7 million French francs) were signed in Brazzaville between the French minister of cooperation, for the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC), and the People's Republic of Congo.

The first agreement, for 140 million CFA francs (2.8 million French francs), involves the planning of an "agroindustrial complex." The second, for 160 million CFA francs (3.2 million French francs), will permit transportation to the CFCO of citrus fruit and other agricultural products cultivated in the regions of Lekoumou and Bouenza. And the last one, for 50 million CFA francs (1 million French francs), will assist Public Health hospitals and endemic-disease clinics.

On 24 April two other financial agreements amounting to 175 million CFA francs (3.5 million French francs) were signed in Brazzaville between France, represented by Mr Darge, chief of the French cooperation mission, and the Congo, represented by Mr Tsikabaka Lupey, secretary general of the Congolese ministry of cooperation.

The first of these two grant agreements involves the overall planning of the distribution of electricity in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire and study of the expansion of the diesel power plant in Pointe Noire; the other involves the establishment of a mining plan.

These are some of the details of the projects covered by the different agreements:

Mantsoumba Agroindustrial Complex: a grant of 2.8 million French francs, that is, 120 million CFA francs. The accord aims to make possible the creation of an agroindustrial complex in Mantsoumba for the production of manioc flour (fou-fou) from local produce.

The FAC financed for some 5 years a technical support group (233 million CFA francs) and, since 1979, has been helping to rehabilitate the factory. The FAC's contribution to this rehabilitation reaches 325 million CFA francs, giving a total, since 1973, of 558 million CFA francs for Mantsoumba. FAC funds take care of agricultural and industrial technical assistance, equipment purchases and research; the Congolese budget is responsible for exploitation expenses and large part of the investments. Production of manioc flour began in February 1981.

Study of the Bihoua-Loudima Road: a grant of 3.2 million French francs, that is, 160 million CFA francs. The road will make possible to transport to the CFCO timber and agricultural products grown in the regions of Lekoumou and Bouenza. It will also make possible the exploitation of the Zanaga forest, rich in okoume. The work will include hydrologic, lay-out, geotechnical and economic studies of the rolling and highly wooded area, as well as drafting implementation plans and establishing documentation to call for bids.

Therefore, Congolese authorities will be ready to launch the call for bids as soon as the EDF establishes the necessary investment credit. In fact, that financial organization has retained the Bihoua-Loudima highway construction project among its priorities under Title V of the EDF program.

Mining Plan: a grant of 2.5 million French francs, that is 125 million CFA francs. This project resulted from conversations during the last French-Congolese Commission (January 1980) and some working sessions which took place in May 1980 between a Congolese delegation and representatives of the BRGM (Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office).

Two operations are planned: establishment of a mining plan and study of the Mayombe. The first is the subject of this contract, and the second must be financed under the annual subvention that the FAC allots the BRGM. As for the mining plan, it will consist of putting together all geographic and mineral studies in existence. Field inspections will help verify the value of the studies. There are also provisions to carry out chemical and geotechnical analyses and metallurgical tests if needed. A final report, including photographic documents, will be published. The project is expected to take 1 year.

Development of Electricity (Second Stage): a grant of 1 million French francs, that is 50 million CFA francs. This is the second stage of a credit opened in 1979 with 90 million CFA francs. The objective is to insure maintenance and development of electricity generation and distribution in southern Congo.

The contract will make two studies possible:

1) Establishment of an overall plan for the Brazzaville and Pointe Noire network: It involves short- and middle-term planning of the distribution networks in the two cities, as well as the possibility of connecting certain secondary centers to the plant of one or the other of these cities.

2) Study to expand the diesel-powered power plant at Pointe Noire. These studies must include a detailed draft of the project, a call for bids in the civil and electromechanical fields and the examination and comparison of these bids.

Public Health Assistance: a grant for 1 million French francs, that is 50 million CFA francs. In this field, FAC involvement since 1971 has made possible the modernization and equipment of some hospitals (Brazzaville, Pointe Noire and Mossendjo) and has contributed to the operation and equipment of endemic disease centers. Ten contracts amounting to 650 million CFA francs have been signed. In addition, technical medical assistance plays an important role in some organizations.

The current contract has two parts: assistance to endemic disease clinics for 20 million CFA francs and assistance to hospitals in the amount of 30 million CFA francs, making it possible to completely furnish the Brazzaville Pointe Noire and Mossendjo hospitals with technical equipment.

Large Transportation and Telecommunications Projects

Congolese authorities have been involved for some time in operations aiming to develop domestic and international transportation and telecommunications.

These are the projects under consideration or currently in progress:

Roads: Since the Congo only has 547 km of paved roads outside urban centers, work will begin in 1981 on three branches of the North road: Owando-Makoua, Makou-Ouesso and N'Go-Djambala-Lekana.

CFCO: The CFCO's current problems stem from the decay of the equipment and the need to realign the track if traffic is to be increased.

Ten locomotives have just been reconditioned. In addition, realignment work, which started in 1976, ought to be completed in April 1982 at the earliest, at a cost of 75 billion CFA francs (compared to an estimate of 33 billion CFA francs in 1976).

This realignment work is financed as follows:

Financing Organization	Billion CFA Francs
The Congo	8.8
Local banks	2
FAC	4.6
CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation]	2.68
ADB	3.554
World Bank	13.12
EDF	10.296
CIDA	3.58
Italy	2
Arab countries	24.755
Total	75.385

Airports: The CRETH (Center of Environmental Research and Technical Studies) is still considering a project to provide Pointe Noire, economic capital of the Congo, with a new airport capable of accommodating large "Boeing 747"-type carriers. Two options are to be offered: the construction of a runway parallel to the present airdrome and the construction of a new airport on Mont Kamba. This last possibility, technically preferable, poses some problems since the site could be set aside for other projects. The only decision already made involves paving 2000 meters for mid-sized carriers (70 to 80 tons): the work is now in progress.

In Brazzaville Maya-Maya, a call to bid has just been launched for works to reinforce some runways and prepare them for large carriers. Financing is assured by the ADB, the BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development], the BDEAC [Development Bank of the Central African States], the French FAC and the Congolese state.

Finally, the ASECNA [Agency for Air Navigation Safety] is studying the secondary airports of Ouesso-Loubomo-Djambala and Sibiti with a view to making them fit to receive mid-sized carriers such as the "Boeing 737."

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CSO: 4400/1174

CONGO

BRIEFS

PROMISING PETROLEUM PROSPECTS--The reserves of that country will exceed, according to French experts, all the reserves of its neighbors, and offshore exploitation will cost less than possible drillings in the Ivory Coast (in the forest) or in north Cameroon (savannah zone). [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1981] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 p 19] 9765

CSO: 4400/1170

GABON

BRIEFS

FRANCO-GABONESE NAVAL MANEUVERS--Two French naval ships, the frigate "Duguay-Trouin" and the "D'Estrees," a squadron escort vessel, sailed into the Gabon harbor on 15 April. These ships are expected to participate in the Franco-Gabonese exercises named "Okoume 81." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1198] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745

BDEAC ROAD LOAN--The BDEAC (Bank of Central African States) has just granted a loan to Gabon for the placement of a 70-ton reservoir in Eboro, and within the framework of the reconditioning program, the construction of concrete access ramps for the highway servicing north Gabon, from Bifoun to Ndjole, Mitzic, Oyem, and Bitam. The total amount of the loan is 146 million CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1199] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745

CSO: 4400/1140

GHANA

BRIEFS

GASOLINE RATIONING COUPONS--The Ghanain Government on 13 April issued new gasoline rationing coupons which will be valid for 4 weeks starting 1 May. Sales outlets for the coupons were announced to the populace so they can acquire the coupons on a timely basis. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1251] 9516

JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL AID--In early April Japan agreed to provide a 30-million yen credit (more than 410,000 credis) to Ghana for the purchase of educational equipment. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1251] 9516

TEMA REFINERY CLOSED--The Tema oil refinery, which has been in operation for 18 years, was closed on 9 March for maintenance work and should not be reopening before the middle of April. Also, the government recently prohibited the distribution of certain oil products determined to be unfit for consumption, after a suspicious substance was discovered. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1251] 9516

CSO: 4400/1167

GUINEA

BRIEFS

PEACE MISSION--With the intent of making peace with Francois Mitterrand, Sekou Toure has dispatched his brother-in-law Mamady Keita to visit the entourage of the new French president. The Guinean leader has thus notified him that he will make a resounding statement in his favor, after having publicly called him a "scoundrel" in the past. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 p 51] /COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981/

CSO: 4400/1271

IVORY COAST

PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 pp 1246-1248

[Article: "Economic and Financial Situation in the Ivory Coast"]

[Excerpts] The years 1980 and 1981, as a part of what Mr Henri Konan Bedie, the president of the national assembly, recently described as "this phase of uncertainty and instability," will doubtless see a turn to new directions for the Ivory Coast.

After 15 years of sustained and regular growth, Ivory Coast was inspired in 1976-1977 by the increase in the market price of coffee and cacao, its two major export products, to further accelerate its investment programs, which in 1978 reached the unprecedented level of FR CFA 480 billion, or more than 25 percent of the GDP [gross domestic product]. Imperfect control over the projects undertaken, underestimation of the expenses that would be incurred, and an exaggerated swelling of the public sector placed the Ivory Coast in a position of serious imbalance from the moment the terms of trade turned against them.

To get out of this predicament, Ivorian authorities tried to resist the trend toward the decline in the market price of cacao by withdrawing from the market at the start of 1980. But this effort failed, like the initiative of the Bogota group, which tried to make itself a buyer on the futures market in order to arrest the fall of coffee prices. Thus the 30 percent decline of its two leading products in 1980 deprived the Ivory Coast of important export earnings, which were estimated to be Fr CFA 360 billion below the high levels of 1977.

Today the Ivorian state is confronted by an alarming situation. The balance of payments will, for the third year in a row, have a deficit of between 160-180 billion. External assets were believed to have fallen to Fr CFA -240 billion by the end of 1980, while the net position of the government remains just barely in the black. The high level (29 percent) of the "export debt service ratio" disturbs international private financiers (responsible for 50 percent of the credit provided to the Ivory Coast). And the balance of trade will probably come to +70 billion, a fall of 30 percent from 1979.

This state of affairs required resorting to the International Monetary Fund, which in exchange for temporary assistance amounting to 484.5 million SDR's [special drawing rights] (stretched out over three years) obtained the enactment of a "structural adjustment" plan.

Rehabilitation of the public finances and the current external account are the primary objective of that plan, and in light of it the following measures are envisaged: controls on budgetary expenditures, regulated growth of the money supply, revision of the tax system, and dynamization of the financial flows in order to curb capital flight.

Restrictions on investment were established in mid-1980, and the special investment and infrastructure budget scheduled for 1981 (273 billion) will be lower than the one for the previous year. Similarly, a reduction in real operating expenditures (general operating budget: 376 billion) is accompanied by the traditional odds and ends of neo-liberal policy: truth in public pricing, reduction of subsidies, dissolution of the state-owned companies.

But one may hope that the "structural adjustment" desired by the international monetary authorities will not cripple the process of development. In effect, the growth rate planned for 1981 is only 1.5 percent, compared to the normal 7 to 10 percent. A young country, and one which up to now has been in a privileged position, the Ivory Coast is not accustomed to austerity andhas no taste for it: thus the realignment of worker's salaries in the state-owned companies with those in effect for civil servants caused such dissatisfaction that the measure had to be postponed. Too harsh a recession would have regrettable repercussions on Ivorian economic and political structures, at a time when the future seems promising.

In addition to its rich agricultural patrimony, the Ivory Coast can from now on take advantage of its hydroelectric capacity and the oil deposits which lie hidden on its coasts. It seems almost certain that within the next 2 years the Ivory Coast will be completely free from its energy constraints: 80 percent of the electricity it produces already comes from water sources and "Belier" will produce 1.5 million tons of oil in 1981. Moreover, as the FINANCIAL TIMES pointed out in its supplement on the Ivory Coast, that the "Espoir" deposit, believed to contain 500 million tons, holds excellent prospects for the country to become one of black Africa's leading exporters. Now, in early 1981, the Ivory Coast must deal with a delicate situation, as can be seen clearly from available projections for the upcoming fiscal years and a rapid review of 1980.

Agricultural Production: One-Third of GDP

Agriculture in 1980 performed unevenly in the various sectors, but its weight in the national economy continues to increase: 24 percent in 1977, 24.5 percent in 1978, 29 percent in 1979, it represented 31 percent of GDP in 1980 and should stabilize at that level through 1983, as its rate of growth is declining in relative terms.

The cacao crop in 1980 reached the record level of 380,000 tons, or up 22 percent from 1979. Statistics have established the fact that cacao production in the Ivory Coast is correlated strongly with two variables: the area harvested and the purchase price to the producer. Between 1979 and 1980 the area cultivated increased 12 percent and the price to the producer went from 250 to 300 Fr CFA per kilo, which explains the strong growth that was recorded. By contrast, a very mild decline is predicted for 1981, even though here one should note the determination of the Fund for Stabilization of Prices of Agricultural Products to leave buying agents in doubt rather than to accentuate the fall in market prices by announcing too good a harvest: somewhere in the 370,000-400,000 ton range is an educated guess at the 1981 harvest for the world's biggest producer.

Coffee production, which in 1980 was 245,000 tons, was down 12 percent, while market prices, which had a brief upsurge in June, were down 35 percent from the previous year. In 1981, the Ivory Coast, the third largest producer in the world, claims it will be able to export more than 250,000 tons, but its quota by terms of the international coffee agreement is only 190,000 tons. Thus, desirous of fighting against "arbitrary allocations" of quotas and inadequate floor price levels, Ivory Coast is now taking a very forward position at international meetings, both on coffee as well as on cacao, the agreement on which it still refuses to sign.

Forest exploitation, traditionally one of the principal economic activities of the country, is going through a difficult period. The erosion of production and exports in 1980--which were respectively 4.8 million cubic meters and 2.75 million cubic meters, representing declines of 4 and 12 percent from 1979 levels--requires a two-fold explanation: after the good performance shown in the first half of the year, the tropical wood market plunged in May into a profound depression, and no resurgence is expected before next September. To this temporary problem is added the threat of exhaustion of the forest patrimony, unless the massive land clearing is counterbalanced by a program of reforestation.

The situation in the palm-tree/coconut tree sector also shows worrisome signs. After the exceptionally high level of palm oil production in 1980 (171,000 tons), the 1981 forecasts call for a decline to the 1979 level: 120,000 tons, some 30 percent less. By contrast, copra (43,000 tons in 1980) continues its improvement: up 42 percent in both the 1979-80 and 1980-81 seasons. But it may be necessary to increase the price paid to the producer to halt a growing disinterest on the part of village planters in such speculative ventures. Finally, a general reorganization of this sector is under consideration to enable the Ivory Coast to preserve its potential for production of oily substances up to 1990.

The cottonseed harvest in 1979-80 amounted to 143,000 tons, or 25 percent more than for the 1978-79 season, while the area seeded, 123,000 hectares, only grew by 15 percent. The yield per hectare in cottonseed--1.16 tons--thus improved, as well as the yield from extraction: 41.3 percent, compared to 40.5 percent.

The sugar program, deemed risky because of the very large investments it required, has undergone rapid expansion: 32,400 tons of sugar in 1978, 53,700 tons in 1979, 103,000 tons in 1980, and 138,000 tons anticipated for 1981, to which must be added 94,000 tons of treacle. Despite the strong increase in sugar prices in 1980, the net production cost, estimated by President Houphouet-Boigny at Fr CFA 250 per kilo, remains higher than the international market price: Fr CFA 160 per kilo. But the cost is coming down as production from the sugar complexes increases, and this will eventually result in profitability.

Industrial Production: Predominance of Agro-Industry

Industrial production was 26.9 percent of the GDP, or Fr CFA 600 billion, in 1980. It is becoming a larger factor in the Ivorian economy: 21.5 percent in 1978, 24.8

percent in 1979, and 29.8 percent estimated for 1980. The interdependence with agriculture is clearly shown by the existence of major agro-industrial activities such as the pineapple canneries, the factories for processing of cacao, coffee, and cotton, industries tied to wood and edible fatty substances, and the sugar complexes. Development in these industries is closely tied to that of agricultural products whose processing these industries assure. Agro-food expansion in 1979 was close to 29 percent, mostly as a result of the going into operation of several new units (the sugar-works, de-barking); growth in textile production was slower in 1979 than growth in the domestic market, and growth in wood production follows the vagaries of the international market. Oil refining and the chemical industries, because of the increase in the cost of the raw materials employed, have grown considerably in value, but real growth is probably only about 10 percent.

Balance of Trade and Monetary Situation

The performance of agricultural and industrial production as well as variations in the international market for the raw materials have an impact on foreign trade. Exports for 1980 should be between 610 and 640 billion Fr CFA, or a 6 to 11 percent increase over 1979, with imports reaching 540 billion, exceeding the 1979 level by 15.4 percent. The balance of trade, not counting the freighting expenses, which are responsible for a 50 billion deficit, will come to between +70 and +100 billion Fr CFA, compared to +110 billion in 1979. Foreign trade statistics for the first 5 months of 1980 confirm the predominance of coffee (58 billion), cacao (53 billion), and wood (47.5 billion); these three items account for 70 percent of export earnings. France remains by far the country's largest trade partner (45 percent of Ivorian imports and 24 percent of its exports), ahead of the FRG, the second largest supplier, providing 5.5 percent of the Ivory Coast's imports. But its leading position in the automobile sector has been taken away by Japan, which in 1980 supplied 60 percent of the Ivorian fleet, compared to 30 percent for France. The Japanese threat, however, remains limited to 4.7 percent of total imports. The balance of payments deficit will substantially exceed 100 billion for the second year in a row, if the pessimistic projections for the trade balance are confirmed. Faced with a constrained monetary supply and wanting to conform to the recommendations of the IMF mission, the government determined to present an austere budget in 1981.

In accordance with Article 51 of the Ivorian constitution, the general operation budget for 1981 is balanced, this year at Fr CFA 376 billion, or an increase of 11.1 percent in current francs over 1980 (338.4 billion), which is a decline in real terms but a slightly larger portion of the GDP (15.5 percent in 1981, compared to 15.2 percent in 1980). Fifty-seven percent of the general operating budget--which is sustained solely by tax revenues--will go to personnel expenditures (215 billion), and it should be noted that training gets a high budgetary priority (110 billion, or 20 percent more than for 1980).

At the end of 1979, the overall total of external debt had gone beyond the Fr CFA 1,000 billion mark, the more precisely had gone up to 1,074 billion, or 11 percent more than in 1978 (968 million). With this growth continuing in 1980, the actual total is probably now close to 1,300 billion. However, fresh commitments made by the Ivory Coast have been declining steadily since 1977, the year when they suddenly shot up to 492 billion. They went down to 366 billion in 1978, then to 329 billion in 1979, and approach 240 billion for 1980. But this decline will only have an effect in the medium term, and for the moment, because of the quick maturity of the loans contracted under the most pressing circumstances, Ivory Coast must sustain a heavy debt service: this increased from 71 billion in 1977 to 94 billion in 1978, 120 billion in 1979, and 183 billion in 1980.

Report on Companies in the Ivory Coast

New Companies

--Ivorian Explosives Company (IVOIREX). S a RL [limited liability company] with a capital of Fr CFA 8 million. Headquarters at Abidjan 01 (BP 1593). Activity: importation and manufacture of mine explosives. Management: Explosives and Chemical Products Company, French Explosives Corporation and Company, Nitrochimie, general partnership company in Paris 8, 61, Rue Galilee, associates.

--Ivorian-Lebanese Brokerage Insurance and Re-Insurance Company (SILICAR). SA [business corporation] with a capital of Fr CFA 6 million. Headquarters in Abidjan 05 (BP 789). Activity: agent for insurance companies. Board of directors: Mrs Maurani Najwa, secretary, in Abidjan-Marcory 05 (BP 789) and Blal Haydar, merchant, at Grand-Bassam (BP 246).

--Piscine Service. S a RL with a capital of Fr CFA 5 million. Headquarters in Abidjan 04 (BP 809). Activity: Importation of swimming pools and accessories. Management: Mr Bruzzese Diego Philip, in Abidjan, partner.

--CBLH. S a RL with a capital of Fr CFA 2 million. Headquarters in Abidjan 04 (BP 380). Activity: importation of electric generating sets. Management: Mr Le Hur Pascal, dieselist, in Abidjan 04 (BP 380), partner.

--Ivoire Marine Service. S a RL with capital of Fr CFA 2 million. Headquarters in Abidjan 01 (BP 4068). Activity: Supplying navigation equipment.

--Abidjan Technical Company (CAT). S a RL with capital of Fr CFA 1.5 million. Headquarters in Abidjan 08 (BP 2066). Activity: construction research. Management: Miss Petit Claude, Jeanne Josette, in Abidjan, associates.

--Ivorian Industrial Watch and Clock Company (SODORIV). S a RL with a capital of Fr CFA 1 million. Headquarters in Abidjan 01 (BP 899). Activity: import and sale of watches. Management: Fetouni Selmane, in Abidjan, partner.

--Promotion Exploitation Hoteliere Immobiliere (PROMOTEL). S a RL with capital of Fr CFA 1.5 million. Headquarters Abidjan 11 (BP 1071). Activity: restoration. Management: Mr Aka Jacques, Abidjan, partner.

--Societe Auxiliare d'Etudes Techniques et de Travaux de Cote d'Ivoire (AUXITEC-CI). S a RL with a capital of Fr CFA 1 million. Headquarters: Abidjan 01 (BP 1271). Activity: real estate research and construction supervision. Management: Mr Rene Tocqueville, Abidjan, partner.

9516
CSO: 4400/1167

IVORY COAST

PRESIDENT EXHIBITS PRUDENCE IN PROSPECTIVE OIL BOOM

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 pp 38-39

[Article by Pierre Gaillard: "Ivory Coast: Everything Can Change"]

[Text] The Ivory Coast, this year, is evoking a number of cliches and grandiloquent images in true "nouveau Texas" style.

Ivorian oil is on the way. Is this euphoria justified? Of course; but the exact size of the new Ivorian riches cannot be measured at present. The secret is too well kept at this time by the U.S. company Phillips Petroleum, which is in charge of the Espoir deposits, reputed to be able to produce 300,000 to 400,000 barrels per day in 1988. The secret is so well kept, in fact, that Ivory Coast officials themselves only know what Phillips is willing to tell them, and even this is not much. The rumor is of a production amounting to about 20 to 25 million tons in 1985. It is known that Phillips--which has only one branch in Abidjan--has just offered itself approximately 4,000 square meters of office space. It is rumored that the Belier deposits alone amount to about 20 million tons. It is known that four new exploration permits have been granted between March and November 1980.

Exact information is still lacking, but one thing is certain: the oil is really there, and doubtlessly in quantities sufficient to make the Ivory Coast the second most important producer in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ivorian problem could thus be easily solved. Oil expenditures now account for 135 billion francs CFA: a heavy burden indeed.

Debt

Moreover, the country's finances are in bad shape. Debts have reached the danger point. Income from cocoa and coffee has not fulfilled expectations; as a matter of fact, the attempts to protect the price of these basic export products have worsened the outlook for immediate profits. Due to the lack of money, the whole economic system is suffering. Investments are becoming rarer and so are purchase orders, notably in the construction field.

With oil, all this can change. It will then be a matter of cashin in, not paying out. The economy will improve. The debt will not be reduced accordingly--on the contrary, it will be necessary to borrow in order to develop petroleum exploitation--but it will not rise to a critical level. The Ivory Coast will feel more secure in its struggle on the cocoa and coffee front when it will be less dependent on these two resources. In general, the entire Ivorian economy will be stimulated, or will at least be able to catch its breath. Oil investments will of course play a big part, but so will other investments that a newly affluent state will be able to afford. The prospect of an economic boom should even attract new candidates for investment within the country.

Is this the Ivorian miracle? Let us not exaggerate the advantages of oil. Gabon's example should be indicative that riches can be poorly employed. Other examples also show that an oil boom brings as many problems as those it solves. Let us simply say that the Ivory Coast is given an additional chance. At any rate, this is always pleasant. However, it will be necessary to go and look for the oil. Preliminary information is clear: there is no easy access to Ivorian oil. The Belier deposits, for instance, are widely dispersed and therefore costlier. The depth of the Espoir deposits, on the other hand, is 360 meters, entailing significant investments. As for the oil shale in the southeastern part of the country, oil reserves (probably 3.5 billion barrels) are too expensive today to be profitably exploited. In other words, a miraculous manna is not about to rain on the country. A great deal of industrial activity must be developed, and in the proper order.

The Trump Card of Gas

As in the judicious use of these new riches, the utilization of gas can apparently be safely entrusted to President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He has always proclaimed that agriculture has priority. He apparently intends to continue this prudent policy without giving in to the oil euphoria. His peasant temperament plays a part, as does his judicious mind: a brutal acceleration of the rural exodus, a potent but anarchical development could well undermine the very foundations of his power. There is no reason why the Ivorian president cannot understand what the Cameroonian president has already understood: he has also been touched by the miracle of oil, but has been careful not to let himself be carried away by it.

The comparison with Cameroon, actually, does not stop there. Oil is the order of the day. This is normal when discoveries are recent and their extent still unknown. However, there are already some rumors to the effect that, all things being equal, the trump card of gas could well become as important as oil. Is African gas arriving?

CSO: 4400/1271

IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

OIL FIND CONFIRMED--The discovery of exploitable oil and gas fields throughout the Ivory Coast were confirmed according to a 21 April report published in London by the American oil company, Philips Petroleum. A third drill site 135 m deep and approximately 5 km northwest of the first drill has just been successfully completed. The first drilling took place approximately 20 km from the coast and 56 km southwest of Abidjan. A second drill site had been conducted 4 km east-southeast of the first site, and a fourth site east of this one has just been undertaken. Philips Petroleum adds that many other drillings are being projected from now until the end of the year to determine the extent of the oil-field. Due to the transformation of the DAN DUKE drilling site into a temporary production site, and its location in an oil storage tank area, present and future plans are being made to rapidly undertake exploration. In these explorations, Philips Petroleum heads a group in which it holds 57.5 percent interest, and of which the other members are AGIP (22.5 percent), SEDCO (10 percent), and PETROCI (National Ivory Coast Oil Company: 10 percent). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1186] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745

CSO: 4400/1140

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

CABORA BASSA REPORTEDLY IMMOBILIZED--An official Johannesburg source indicated on 15 April that the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric dam, which furnishes approximately 10 percent of South Africa's consumed electricity, stopped functioning 10 April. An ESCOM [Electricity Supply Commission] company spokesman responsible for the distribution of electricity in South Africa, confirmed that many electrical interruptions from the Cabora Bassa have been experienced in the past, but that the center was now entirely disabled. Onlookers note that this could be due to acts of sabotage conducted by the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), which is struggling against the Mozambique National Liberation Front (FRELIMO), currently in power in Maputo. The MRM had already claimed responsibility for the partial destruction of the Cabora Bassa last November. The electricity purchasing contract between Mozambique and South Africa is regularly cited as the best example of economic relations between neighboring countries of diametrically opposed ideologies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1208] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745

CSO: 4400/1140

NIGER

BRIEFS

REMISSION OF PENALTIES--This 17 April, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Nigerien armed forces' takeover of power, some prisoners were granted pardons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1249] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

CSO: 4400/1174

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

ABUJA POSTPONED PAST 1982--The Nigerian Government will not be able to establish its future capital in Abuja in 1982 as anticipated. Work on the project has in fact been delayed for several months. Also, a number of newly constructed buildings have developed cracks. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 May 81 p 43] 9516

CREDITS FOR PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT--In accordance with the recommendations made by the parliamentary committee on energy and oil, headed by Dr J. Taribo Sekibo, the federal chamber of representatives approved substantial credits in April to the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for development of its three existing refineries at Port-Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna. It took this step in spite of criticism about the corporation's inefficiency. It is also known that, following the famous "Oilgate" that involved the disappearance of funds from its accounts, a complete reorganization was contemplated. The affair seems at the moment about to be forgotten, but the NNPC was not in any case able, it is being emphasized, to utilize the credits it previously had for the expansion of the first refinery at Port-Harcourt. Out of the 60 million it had been provided in 1980 to increase the production capacity of the said refinery from the current 60,000 barrels per day to 200,000 barrels per day by the end of 1983 or beginning of 1984, it reportedly made use of only 300,000. In any case, it is difficult to see under these conditions how the NNPC could carry out its plans for a fourth and even a fifth refinery (on this subject see MTM of 24 October 1980, p 2620 and 16 January 1981 p 140). [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 1251] 9516

PHILIPPINE OIL PURCHASE--The Nigerian federal minister of mines and energy, Alhaji Mohammed Ibrahim Hassan, went to Manila the second half of April to negotiate with his Philippine counterpart, Mr Geronomo Velasco, on Philippine purchase of Nigerian oil. An accord is expected to be concluded shortly. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 1251] 9516

CSO: 4400/1196

SENEGAL

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, SUPREME COURT ROLE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1243

[Text] On 24 April the Senegalese national assembly adopted a constitutional revision bill introduced by the government. The number of political parties allowed in the country had been limited to four since 1976. The new bill abrogates this limitation and, by this act, establishes an outrightly multiple-party system.

The constitutional revision also eliminates the requirement that these four parties adopt one of four labels: socialist (Socialist Party, in power), liberal (Senegalese Democratic Party), Marxist (African Party of Independence) and conservative (Senegalese Republican Movement), but it forbids political parties to identify themselves with a race, ethnic group, sex, language, sect or region.

The multiple-party system existed in Senegal before 1976, but successive merging of political parties had in fact made the socialist party the sole party for 8 years.

Favoring a revival of the multiple-party system, the government had, in contrast, estimated in 1976 that it was convenient to limit the number of parties to avoid the proliferation of political groups. It appears from the parliamentary debates that the current government believes it is possible to open up the political field without danger of anarchy.

The main beneficiaries of the constitutional revision, to be accompanied by a broad amnesty (mainly for political crimes, press offenses and minor infractions), will undoubtedly be Egyptologist Cheich Anta Diop's Democratic National Rally, former Premier Mamadou Dia's socialist followers and the marxist groups.

Revision of the Supreme Court's Role

In addition, the bill revising the constitution gives the supreme court a broader role from now on: it will be responsible for verifying the legality of the electoral campaign and of the voting in both legislative and presidential elections.

The constitutional reform also deals with the period of time between both rounds of voting in the presidential election. This time period was increased from 10 to 15 days to accommodate appeals against the second round of voting and to give the supreme court time to settle any possible claims. Finally, the swearing-in of new chiefs of state will be public from now on.

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CSO: 4400/1174

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

NEW PARTIES, AMNESTY MEASURE--Since 24 April Senegal is the first French-speaking black African state to recognize the total multiple party system. The national Assembly has ratified in fact a constitutional revision of a draft bill introduced by Mr Habib Thiam's government. Thus, the famous article 3 promulgated by Leopold Sedar Senghor in 1976 came to an end. The former President had limited the Senegalese democracy to four parties (J.A.n°1061). His successor, Mr Abdou Diouf, has decided to play the game of an open democracy. One restriction: no party will claim itself to be of a race, region, ethnic group, sex or language. Religion, in turn, is excluded. Since the 27th the National Democratic Rally (RND) of Pr Cheikh Anta Diop has requested recognition. It was followed by the Maoist movement And-Jef, the socialist Autonomy Movement of Mamadou Dia, the Proletarian Democratic Organization of Abdoulaye Ly, the African Party of Senegalese Independence of Amath Dansokho and Maguette Thiam, and finally the Democratic League. At the same time that it formalized this overture, the Assembly adopted an amnesty measure regarding political and press offenses. The deputies also approved the suppression of exist visas for Senegalese going abroad. Less than 4 months after his accession to power, Mr Abdou Diouf, of whom some said that he would be the man of continuity, seems to have decided on the contrary to assure change. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 p 25] 9765

TECHNICAL, PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS' SCHOOL--On 15 April, the Senegalese minister of education, Mr Abdel Kader Fall, laid the foundation stone of the future technical and professional teachers' training school at the University of Dakar. For 5 years the institution has been operating on the premises of the university with some 100 student-teachers, some of which are citizens of other African countries. This year 18 of them make up the first graduating class. The new school will open its doors in August 1982. The first stage of construction will cost 1.7 billion CFA francs. The complete unit including complementary infrastructures will cost some 2.5 to 3 billion CFA francs. Mr Abdel Kader Fall also announced that he will soon lay the foundation stone of the technical and professional industrial high school of Diourbel. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 1243] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

DROUGHT AID DEDUCTION--On 24 April the Senegalese national assembly passed a law imposing a solidarity deduction corresponding to 12 day's pay. This tax, which should bring some 6 billion CFA francs, will help purchase foodstuffs for the farmers affected by the drought or finance the transportation of the international food aid that Senegal has been granted. This year the food shortage in Senegal is estimated at 140,000 tons; 73,000 tons of international aid are expected. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1243] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

ENAM GRADUATING CLASS--The ENAM [National School of Administration and Magistrature] graduating class of 1980 received their diplomas during a ceremony presided by the chief of state, Mr Abdou Diouf. The class of more than 70, of which four are women, is made up of 32 civil administrators, 15 magistrates, 6 customs inspectors, 6 treasury inspectors, 5 foreign affairs secretaries, 4 tax and property inspectors and 2 labor inspectors. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 1243] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

NATIONALIZATION OF AUTOMOBILE SECTOR--The Tanzanian state enterprise State Motor Corporation (SMC) which, among other activities, monopolizes import licenses for vehicles and automobile spare parts, expects to have complete control of the country's automobile sector in the long run. SMC holds 90 percent of shares in the Saab Scania factory of Dar-es-Salaam which manufactures industrial vehicles of 8 tons or more. This plant was to be completed in 1980. SMC is also negotiating with foreign companies to establish in Tanzania an assembly plant of light commercial vehicles ranging from one to seven tons. In addition, SMC wants to manufacture an increasing number of the replacement parts that are now being imported. The first stage of this project would involve controlling and distributing the imported parts through an SMC branch. These long-term measures reveal the will of Tanzanian officials to reduce the importance of automobile and replacement-parts imports in their balance of trade as part of a policy that aims to replace imports. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1258] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

IDA LOAN--The International Development Association [IDA], a branch of the World Bank, has just extended Tanzania credit for 49.9 million SDR's [special drawing rights] ($50 million) to finance imports of agricultural machinery and equipment and vehicle spare parts, in order to increase production and improve marketing of the main food crops intended for domestic consumption and for exportation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1258] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341

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TOGO

FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR 1981-1985 REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 pp 1188, 1193

[Text] Togo's fourth 5-year plan for economic and social development, covering the 1981-1985 period, is viewed as a program of great achievements which, when completed, should open the way for Togo's economic takeoff.

The plan will help guarantee real independence of the national economy, the transformation of the administration into a genuine instrument of development, the increase of the means and productive capacity of the factors of production, the regional balance and the adaptation of outlooks to fit the new type of citizen.

The gross domestic product [GNP] should increase, at the prevailing prices, from 260 billion CFA francs in 1980 to 356.2 billion in 1985 with the primary sector contributing 26 percent of that sum (28.1 percent in 1980), the secondary sector 32 percent (28.3 percent) and the tertiary sector 42 percent (43.6 percent).

Therefore, the fourth 5-year plan aims to bring about a GDP annual rate of growth of 6.5 percent at constant prices. Taking into account the population growth (up 2.7 percent in 1980), the per capita income will rise from 96,375 to 125,435 CFA francs.

The first 5-year plan, which was 82.1 percent completed, ended in 1966 having created the basic structures. The second plan, 64 percent completed, represented a necessary stage while the third plan, 78 percent completed, was characterized by a program of diversified production.

The 1981-1985 plan totals of 368.5 billion CFA francs and consists of a minimum priority program and an optional supplementary program broken down as follows, in billion of CFA francs:

	Minimum Priority Program	Optional Supplementary Program
Production:		
Rural Development	66.6	49.8
Industrial Development	73.4	25.2
Equipment:		
Infrastructure	74.1	26.6
Social	23.7	9.7
Employment	1.2	1
Administrative Organization	12.0	5.2
Total	251.0	117.5

The financing of the plan will be covered by the yearly investment and budgets, by capital and credit investments from the private sector and from quasi-public organizations, by people's savings and by all kinds of foreign aid.

During the 5 years covered by the plan, the overall allocation for the investment and budgets cannot be less than 44 billion CFA francs. The volume of public and private savings in the country should reach 38.8 billion CFA francs in 1985, that is to say, 10.9 percent of the GDP.

By 1985, Togo will have a population of over 3 million people and Lome, its captial city, will have 300,000 inhabitants.

By the year 1985, the aspect of the countryside will have radically changed offering improved farming methods and yields per hectare which will be double or triple; carefully tended, coffee and cocoa plantations will have yields of 1 ton per hectare. Furthermore, thanks to the exploitation of two agro-industrial poles of development (in the north, the high valley of the Oti River and, in the south, the low valley of the Mono River), the earnings of the Togolese farmers will not be lower than those of the urban wage earners.

The plan also calls for palm-based industries in Tabligbo, Kpalime and Atakpame; a sugar complex (refinery, distillery and yeast plant) processing the cane from intensive cash crops; a plant producing cattle feed; a cottonseed mill. Rice-processing plants will treat the paddy rice from irrigated areas to compete with the rice imported from the Far East. After conclusive tests, the wheat grown in the north of the country will supply a flour-mill, a biscuit factory and a pasta plant but in the initial stage these plants will use imported wheat.

Several important projects which could not be carried out during the third plant will be realized during the fourth plan, among others, the dam on the Mono River, a phosphate fertilizer plant, canning, tanning and cigarette factories and machine tool shops.

To see these projects through, the government is authorized to negotiate all the necessary loans, to make all the required administrative and financial changes, to reorganize the state-owned companies and to acquire equity in the companies or agencies taking part in the execution of the plan.

At the same time, it is imperative to seek a surplus in the trade balance, to encourage private savings, to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and to keep foreign aid flowing at a satisfactory level. Greater domestic production of goods and services, less imports of unnecessary foodstuffs and the introduction of strict price controls and of an effective distribution system will also help to curb an inflation which remains disturbingly high.

Data for the Various Sectors

Agriculture is the authorities' top priority.

In addition to self-sufficiency in the production of food supplies, the plan has set the following targets for 1985: 50,000 tons of cottonseed, 13,050 tons of coffee, 10,700 tons of cocoa. Soya farming, with a crop of 17,200 tons of soya beans, should yield 3,300 tons of oil and 14,500 tons of oilcake. The expansion and improvement of palm groves grown as cash crop will result in the production of 35,000 tons of clusters of dates which, after grinding, will yield 6,500 tons of palm oil and 1,750 tons of palm kernels. The agro-industrial sugar complex of Tchaoudja will produce, on an average year, 53,000 tons of sugar, 26,000 hectoliters of alcohol and 5,000 tons of molasses. The Chinese sugar program in the Anie area calls for the exploitation of 2,000 hectares of cane fields which should yield 6,000 tons of sugar, alcohol for medical purposes and molasses for the livestock. When the coconut programs gets underway, it will produce an average of 5,000 tons of copra.

The program also contemplates planting more tobacco crops, a return to peanut farming, improvements in stockbreeding, reforestation measures, the modernization and expansion of sea fishing, the improvement of grain storage facilities and the creation of a refrigeration system.

Projects involving the savanna areas, the Kana region and the plateaus of the central and maritime regions will be financed out of the 66.6 billion CFA francs earmarked for rural development in the minimum priority program and the 49.8 billion CFA francs allocated to the optional additional program. Two new cotton ginning plants, located in Notse and Atakpame, will require an investment of 2.1 billion CFA francs.

In the industrial sector, several important projects have been completed or are underway, among others: Cement of West Africa, expanding the Togolese Mining Company of Benin (phosphates), the Cement of Togo company and the Lome oil refinery. The electrical steel plant of the National Iron and Steel Company went into operation during 1979. The plant was built by a Swiss, Austrian and Swedish consortium (cost: 9.8 billion CFA francs).

The 1981-1985 fourth plan also includes a study on the mining of iron deposits located in the central region where reserves are estimated to be close to 1 billion tons with an average iron content of 50 percent and even 65 percent in some locations. Other projects involve prospecting for mineral and oil, reorganizing and expanding the Potash Company of Togo; a study to increase from 1.2 to 1.8 million tons the output of the Cement of West Africa multinational company; diversifying and expanding the food industry; creating a sugar industry; producing alcohol and proteins from manioc; setting up canneries for pineapples, vegetables, tomatoes, meat and fish; reorganizing the Ganave starch plant owned by the Benin Company; starting an instant coffee plant; building a second brewery in Lama-Kara; producing fruit bottling mineral water; starting a sawmill and two packing-case plants; restructuring the Togolese Textile Industry company to boost its production and make it more cost efficient; manufacturing bandages; reorganizing the Togolese Detergent Company and paying off its liabilities; building an industrial complex to produce phosphoric acid from local phosphates (estimated cost: 70 billion CFA francs); manufacturing pharmaceutical supplies; creating a medium-sized paper industry using recycled materials; producing compost; increasing the annual output of the Cement of Togo company to 850,000 tons; building a brick factory in Lama-Kara; making farming tools, corrugated and galvanized iron sheets, metal frames, metal boxes, small electrical appliances; producing cattle feed. Some of these projects are included just for the record without giving their estimated cost.

Included in the investments allowed for industrial development under the minimum priority program (73.4 billion CFA francs) and under the optional additional program (25.2 billion), the main projects are: a study of mining and energy resources (1 billion CFA francs); the industrial section of the Anie sugar complex (2.3 billion); a multiple-use pressing plant for the port of Lome to process palm kernels and cottonseeds (1.5 billion); a vegetable cannery (1 billion); an industrial complex to produce phosphoric acid (70 billion); the expansion of the Cement Company of West Africa (2.9 billion); a brick factory in Lama-Kara (1.2 billion); the building of a commercial center in Lome (5.6 billion); the modernization and refurbishing of commercial and service enterprises (3.5 billion). Part of the investments required will be provided by the private sector.

Investments allocated to the chapter of infrastructures for communications and for urban and tourist facilities amount to 74.1 billion CFA francs under the minimum priority program and 26.6 billion under the optional additional program.

The main projects planned are building a second jetty in the autonomous port of Lome (16 billion CFA francs) and creating a fishing port (3 billion); expanding and improving the network of asphalt roads (5.5 billion); building new highways and a cross-country link, building bridges and so on (8.4 billion); improving the central railroad line and extending it to Bandjelli (3 billion); purchasing rolling stock (1.3 billion); relocating and rebuilding Lome's Central Rail Station (1.5 billion); creating a national mass transit company and purchasing 50 buses (1.8 billion); building and expanding the telephone exchanges and circuits of district capitals (1.5 billion); building the Nangbeto dam on the Mono River (22 billion); bringing electricity to upcountry areas (1 billion); improving and expanding the electric power network of Lome (1 billion); building high-voltage power lines which start in Lome and in Lama-Kara (5 billion); supplying water for the town of Dapaong (1 billion); improving and expanding the water supply system in Lome (2.5 billion); expanding the water supply system in secondary towns (1 billion); drilling, 1,500 pump-operated wells in rural areas (3 billion); making improvements in the city of Lome (3 billion); doing road maintenance work in the port of Lome (1.5 billion); building the Akodessawa road (1 billion); building 4,000 housing units in Lome and in major towns of the interior (4 billion); purchasing and developing plots of land in towns (2.5 billion) and so on.

As for projects in the social and cultural sector, here is the breakdown of investments amounting to 33.3 billion CFA francs for the minimum program and the optional program put together--figures are given in billion CFA francs:

Public Health	2.2
National Education	21.6
Social Affairs and Women's Condition	0.8
Information	4.5
Youth, Sports, Culture	4.1
Nutrition	0.1
Total	33.3

These projects involve medical facilities and equipment, educational centers and equipment (including 2.5 billion CFA francs earmarked for five agricltural education centers and 1 billion CFA francs to build a technical school in Pya), and the building of an olympic stadium in Lama-Kara (3 billion) among other projects.

Under the chapter of administrative organization for development, 17.2 billion CFA francs are allocated for both the minimum program and optional program with the money going chiefly to: National Defense (8.4 billion CFA francs which will be used primarily to build a military camp and expand four other existing camps), interior (2.6 billion for various buildings in Lome and in the interior), Foreign Affairs (1.2 billion to purchase diplomatic representation buildings in Lagos, Ottawa and Libreville).

The receipts of the state budget will jump from 70.7 billion CFA francs in 1981 to 92 billion CFA francs in 1985 and the source of this increase will be direct taxes and customs duties and taxes. Expenses will show the same rate of increase.

The minimum priority program will be financed as follows--with figures in billions of CFA francs:

Domestic Resources	89.6
State	44
Quasi-public companies	10
Secondary communities	12.6
Private sector	23
Foreign resources	161.3
Bilateral grants and loans	93
Multilateral donations and loans	63.3
Total	250.9

The accompanying measures attached to the 1981-1985 fourth plan to prevent bottlenecks include an administrative reform to reorganize the Treasury and tax departments, a reform of the tax legislation, a revision of the investments' code, steps to harmonize the plan and the budget, the preparation of budgets which will offer better guidance to the economic policy, the creation of a land bank specializing in the financing of housing, the creation of a consumers' institute and of a higher council of arts and crafts, the reorganization of some state-owned companies.

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ZAIRE

EX-PRIME MINISTER TALKS ABOUT REASONS FOR LEAVING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 pp 17-18

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] /"Except for God, I am the only arbiter of my fate."/ From his private Rhodes Saint Genese residence in Brussels (Belgium), Nguza Karl I Bond for the first time lifts up a corner of the veil over his surprise resignation announced 16 April.

When the first commissar of the state (prime minister) left Kinshasa on 10 April, nobody suspected he had decided to take the path into exile. With the authorization of President Mobutu, he went to La Haye (Netherlands) to accompany his wife who needed a surgical operation at Bronovo hospital.

On 16 April, the couple left the Dutch capital for Brussels. In the meantime, Karl I Bond called the Zairian ambassador in Paris, Mokolo Wa Mpombo, to meet with him in the Belgian capital. And to request him to transmit to the Zairian president his letter of resignation. Officially, the former prime minister explains his decision by /"reasons of personal convenience."/

Stricken with cancer of the uterus, Mrs Karl I Bond, who underwent a surgical operation (successful), needs to be close to her loved ones. The Zairian politician explained this at great length in his letter of resignation. But in Kinshasa no one seriously thinks that the state of health of his wife was the only thing motivating Karl I Bond. And for good reason! As Mobutu's prime minister, Nguza was considered his hostage.

When Nguza Karl I Bond, who had formerly been a minister of foreign affairs, returned to government on 6 March 1979, the move was perceived as a rehabilitation. Accused of colluding with the Shaba insurgents--he is a native of Shaba--he was arrested on 13 August 1977. Condemned to death on 13 September, he was pardoned and freed several months later, under pressure, it appears, from certain western powers. He subsequently got back his position as minister of foreign affairs. /"In reality,"/ he says, /"Mobutu never rehabilitated me. He acted under the pressure of events and I laid down conditions for rejoining the government. They were accepted."/

Having taken up his pilgrim's staff, Nguza Karl I Bond flies around the world to talk about the "Zaire dossier," which is at present characterized by a particularly troublesome economic conjuncture. It is no exaggeration to say that he was the principal architect of the country's recovery from its financial predicament. His designation on 28 August 1980 as prime minister tends to confirm this idea. Was it success that brought about the split between Mobutu and his closest collaborator? To tell the truth, the mutual suspicion never dissipated. Karl I Bond's rise drew hostility from the president's entourage. Mentioned several times as a possible successor to Mobutu, the former prime minister believes he was the victim of a /"cabal mounted by the president's special security affairs adviser, Seti Yale."/

The latter was reported to have convinced Mobutu that /"Karl I Bond's loyalty was only an appearance...And that he supported the regime like the rope supports the hanged man."/

According to his political enemies, the former prime minister was mostly involved in building up a constituency in regions other than his native Shaba. Thus, he was accused of showing favoritism to regions with the highest percentage of school-age children attending classes, by handing out 180 of the 300 scholarships given out by the state last year to Kasai students. Now Karl I Bond maintains that, /"since independence (1960) the United States has provided only 200 scholarships to Zaire."/

It is in this context that we come to the ministerial shake-up of February 1981. Unlike his two predecessors, Mpinga Kassenda and Boboliko Lokanga, Nguza Karl I Bond was given a vice-prime minister, Bomboko Lokumba.

The decision to name a vice-prime minister was supposedly made in January while Karl I Bond was taking 2-weeks' leave in Europe. /"The rumor was spread that I had decided not to return to Zaire,"/ he says.

Whether rightly or wrongly, Bomboko's nomination was minister of foreign affairs and as vice-prime minister was interpreted as a maneuver by President Mobutu intended to neutralize the prime minister.

The Zairian head of state, according to friends of Karl I Bond, did not want him to receive all the credit for the success of the recovery program. This gave rise to his decision to put at his side someone thoroughly familiar with international negotiations. Karl I Bond saw in this last maneuver a desire by President Mobutu to remove him from events by marginalizing him.

Feeling the vise tighten, Nguza Karl I Bond was convinced that the scenario that unfolded in 1977, which had at that time led to his ejection (and to his death sentence) was going to begin again. So he took the initiative, this time, to slam the door shut. To avoid having it shut on him.

In Kinshasa, Karl I Bond's departure created a furor in the ruling circles, who were surprised by an event that no one had anticipated. Following a special meeting of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) held on 17 April, the Zairian Press Agency (AZAP) wrote: /"This is an act that bears the mark of the most gross cowardice."/

The government in Kinshasa, which we have questioned, criticizes Karl I Bond for not having informed President Mobutu of any possible impediments he may have encountered in carrying out his duties. /"He left because of his own prejudices,"/ we were told.

As one would expect, this resignation is read by President Mobutu as proof of his former prime minister's lack of loyalty. /"The nomination of Bomboko,"/ maintains the Zairian head of state, "was not intended to neutralize Karl I Bond. On the contrary, given the scope of the task, it was a matter of giving him an assistant who likewise had international stature."/ Also, President Mobutu believes that it was he who made it possible for Nguza Karl I Bond to acquire international stature by naming him to foreign affairs. So the chief of state thinks he has been paid back with ingratitude by a man who deserted a position which carried important responsibilities. The Kinshasa government states that /"Nguza does not have a monopoly on international credibility, there have been other prime ministers before him, and there will be others after him."/ And to prove conclusively that /"no one will miss Karl I Bond,"/ a new prime minister, Nsinga Udjuu Ongwakebi Untube, was named on 23 April.

Obviously, the buried hatchet has been exhumed, and the conflict between Mobutu and Karl I Bond has taken on new proportions. However, the latter is refusing to join forces with Zairian opposition figures who find a special welcome in Belgium.

But in Kinshasa it is regretted that Karl I Bond chose Brussels, the former colonial capital, as the site for the announcement of his resignation. And people are not reluctant to insinuate that Belgium is mixed up in it. /"Those who give asylum to this kind of people are only allowing themselves to be taken in by Nguza's rhetoric. This kind of bird always flies in the same direction."/

Was Nguza, who will be 43 in August, assured of the support of certain European friends before venturing, by leaving Zaire, into what surely looks like exile? On the eve of his flight to the United States, where he will spend several weeks, the former Zairian prime minister confided to us quite simply: /"It was putting myself in the voluntary reserves."/ Suddenly everything was clear: Nguza put himself "in the reserves...of the republic."

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END