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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 16/81)



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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK DESCRIBES SOVIET VIEWS ON HELSINKI ACCORDS

Moscow KURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY in Russian 1980 pp 1, 2, 3-6, 63-112, 217-219, 224

[Table of Contents, Introduction, the Chapter on "Military Detente: An Urgent Task of the Present Time" and the Conclusion from the book by S. Vladimirov and L. Teplov, edited by V. I. Stupakov]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: KURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY (On the Course of the Helsinki Accords)

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Brief Description:

The book discloses the specific content of the peace-loving initiatives which have been undertaken by the Soviet Union along with the other countries of the socialist commonwealth for implementing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it unmaskes the activities of NATO and the military industrial complexes of the Western powers, primarily the United States, which are acting against the Helsinki Accords.

The book is designed for specialists in international affairs and readers who are interested in urgent problems of international life.

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[Introduction]

1 August 1980 marks the 5th anniversary of the signing in the Finnish capital of Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The conference was called upon the initiative of the socialist countries. Signed by the leaders of 33 European states as well as by the United States and Canada, this document is of truly historical significance for the fates of the peoples of Europe and the entire world. In taking a long view of the Final Act, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, emphasized in his speech at the all-European conference: "The document being signed by us is a broad but clear platform for the actions of states on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis for years and possibly decades to come."¹

It can be said that literally from the first day of signing the Final Act, the Soviet Union, together with the fraternal socialist nations, have fought steadily and consistently for the unswerving and strict fulfillment of all provisions of this document, without exception, fully and in all areas--political, economic and humanitarian. The USSR has fought to extend political detente and complement it with military detente. Precisely the policy of primarily the socialist countries can serve and actually does serve as a model of an honest, conscientious and creative approach to carrying out the Helsinki Accords.

In acting in accord with the letter and spirit of the Final Act, the countries of the socialist commonwealth in recent years have made a whole series of important constructive proposals aimed at implementing and developing the provisions contained in this document. At meetings of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC], at sessions of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization and at other joint forums and meetings, the socialist countries by concrete deeds and initiatives convincingly affirmed and today affirm the significance which they give to the questions of strengthening European security and developing cooperation among states with different social systems in a spirit of the Final Act. This is understandable. For this is the fixed and principled policy of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, the policy of the struggle for peace bequeathed by V. I. Lenin and reinforced in the decisions of the fraternal party congresses.

Detente in Europe is naturally a collective concern which requires the efforts of all the involved states. In recognizing that under present-day conditions, when weapons capable of destroying all living things on our world have been developed and stockpiled in enormous quantities and that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of detente, the Western countries who showed a feeling of realism in

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the course of the European-wide conference, made a corresponding contribution to the common noble cause, having put their signatures to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. All of this, of course, has helped to improve the political climate on the European continent and beyond it.

However, at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, the imperialist circles of the West, and primarily the United States, have intentionally followed a policy of exacerbating the situation in the world and undermining a lessening of international tension; they have begun intensive sniping at the Helsinki Accords.

What is the reason for such a change in Washington's policy? The main thing is that imperialism and the international reaction do not want to accept the steady change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism and peace or the further strengthening of the worldwide positions of the socialist commonwealth. Facts speak for themselves: the 50 million people of heroic Vietnam have victoriously established themselves as the reliable and strong outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia. The courageous peoples of Laos and Kampuchea have set out on the path of building the foundations of socialism.

The struggle of peoples for national and social liberation has grown wider and is continuing to develop. Liberation movements have been victorious in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe and Guinea-Bissau. This has been a great blow against imperialism. A mass movement is growing in South Africa, the last bastion of colonialism and racism in the south of Africa. This is the objective course of history. "The more the opportunities of imperialism are reduced to rule over other nations and peoples," said L. I. Brezhnev on 22 February 1980 in the Kremlin, "the more rabidly its most aggressive and shortsighted representatives respond to this."²

The situation in the 1970's was very complex. It was characterized by a deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. Economic instability, financial disturbances, a steep inflationary spiral, the growth of unemployment, enormous military outlays and the energy crisis--all of this exacerbated the sociopolitical situation in the capitalist countries.

In this situation, in benefiting from events in Afghanistan, the ruling imperialist circles in the West, and primarily the American Administration, began an offensive against detente. "The present U.S. leadership," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is carrying out a line of subverting detente and exacerbating the international situation. It is endeavoring to impose its will on the socialist states and other countries."³

However the USSR--and this has been repeatedly stated on the highest level--in the future will consistently follow its peace-loving foreign policy and steadily struggle to fully implement the accords of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to check the aggressive forces and reaction. This course has been defined by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and has a long-range, principled nature.

In an interview with the newspaper PRAVDA on 13 January 1980, L. I. Brezhnev, in describing the prospects of the struggle for European security, emphasized: "In Europe much can be done that is constructive in favor of peace in the not-distant future, in particular, in line with the coming meeting in Madrid and the proposal

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of the Warsaw Pact countries to hold a conference on military detente and disarmament. We are decisive supporters of strengthening and adding to all that is positive which has been achieved over the years on the European continent by the collective efforts of states, large and small. In the future we will carry out a policy of peace and friendship among peoples. In contrast to the present extremist position of Washington, our policy consists in continuing the talks started in recent years in many areas for the purpose of halting the arms race. This, of course, also touches on the problems of lessening the military confrontation in Europe."⁴

The unswerving determination of the USSR and the other socialist countries to follow this course has gained new vivid expression in the work and the results of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC held on 14-15 May 1980 in the capital of socialist Poland.

The meeting which was held during the days of the 25th jubilee celebration of the Warsaw Pact put forward major peace initiatives which should, as was pointed out in the document of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, provide a new, strong impetus to the process of detente.

"The strength of our party," said L. I. Brezhnev in his speech on 15 May 1980 in Warsaw, "lies in the fraternal unity of our countries, our parties, our peoples and in our loyalty to the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of socialist internationalism. The strength of our party lies in the fact that it meets the vital interests of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, of everyone who needs peace and not war...."⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Speeches and Articles, Vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 339.
2. PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.
3. Ibid.
4. PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.
5. PRAVDA, 16 May 1980.

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Military Detente: An Urgent Task of the Present Time

Having approved the basic principles which will guide the signatory states in their mutual relations, the European-wide conference created a good foundation not only for developing broader cooperation and mutually advantageous ties. At the same time a solid basis was put down for extending detente into the military area. Thus, a strategic area was pointed out for further efforts aimed at the final elimination of the threat of wars in Europe.

Of course, the unswerving observance of the approved principles of state relationships by all the conference participants is an indispensable condition for greater trust among them, and this, in turn, is extremely important for subsequent steps which involve security interests. But another thing is also obvious: factors favorable to the cause of peace in no way lead automatically to military detente. They merely open up real opportunities for the approval of specific measures in the given area.

There is also another interdependence: each success in the area of military detente helps to strengthen political detente, since without implementing the military detente measures the process of improving political relations between the states can be impeded.

The concept of "military detente" encompasses a number of areas which are largely interrelated. The basic specific components of military detente were clearly formulated in the Decree of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" of 7 August 1975. Here are these components: the reduction and then the halting of the arms race, advancement along a path leading to universal and complete disarmament; the reduction of the military confrontation on the European continent; the overcoming of the division of Europe into opposing military blocs.

The European-wide conference, as is known, was not specially concerned with the specific questions of disarmament and the military situation in Europe. But, in examining the problems of security and cooperation, the conference paid attention as well to certain questions which relate to the military sphere: the questions of strengthening stability and trust.

At the conference, and this was stated in the Final Act, important measures were approved aimed at strengthening trust and stability. They all help to reduce the danger of the outbreak of an armed conflict in Europe, and most importantly prevent an incorrect understanding or incorrect assessment of military activities by one or another state. This can occur, in particular, under conditions where the member states lack clear and prompt information on the nature of the military activities of other states.

Here is a striking example that it is a question of measures which are of exceptionally great significance. On 9 November 1975 at the headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, an alert was announced of an "assumed nuclear attack on the United States." Fighter interceptors took to the air upon command from air bases in Oregon, Michigan and the Canadian

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Province of British Columbia. The missile bases in the United States were brought to a state of combat readiness. Only 6 minutes later was it established that the alert announced by the NORAD early warning system was erroneous and an order followed to countermand it.

The UPI Agency pointed out at that time that if the alert had lasted 1 minute longer, the warning of a "nuclear attack" on the United States would have reached President J. Carter who could have given the order for the take-off of nuclear bombers and preparations to launch the intercontinental missiles.

Among the measures relating to trust and stability, the Final Act provides, in the first place, preliminary notification of major military exercises. It goes without saying that such exercises, particularly those conducted near frontiers, can actually cause definite concern in neighboring states and this should be eliminated as much as possible in the interests of strengthening mutual understanding.¹

An accord was reached that "notification will be given of major military exercises by ground forces with a total number of over 25,000 men conducted independently or jointly with any possible air force or navy components (in this context the word 'troops' includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the event of independent exercises of amphibious or airborne troops or joint exercises in which they are involved, the designated troops will also be included in this number."²

Another aspect of the same measure concerns the zones where exercises requiring notification are conducted. It was provided that "notification will be given on major military exercises which are conducted in Europe on the territory of any signatory state, as well, if applicable, in the adjacent maritime area and airspace. In the event that the territory of the signatory state extends beyond limit, preliminary notification should be given only for exercises which are conducted within 250 km of its frontier facing any other European signatory state or common to it."

This means that the states participating in the conference--with the exception of the USSR and Turkey--would notify each other of major military exercises conducted on any part of the territory of European states. For the USSR and Turkey, notification zones were established within the limits of 250 km from their frontiers facing any other European signatory state or common with it.³

As for the time of notification for major military exercises, an accord was reached that notification of such military exercises would be sent 21 days or more before the start or upon the closest opportunity before the date of its start, if the exercise is set in a shorter time. The notification will contain information about the name, if such is to be assigned, the general purpose of the exercise, the states involved in it, the type of types and the number of involved troops, the region and the proposed date for conducting it. The signatory states will also, if possible, provide the appropriate additional information, in particular, that concerning the components of the participating forces and the time for using these forces.

The importance of such an accord on preliminary notification of major military exercises is emphasized by the fact that never before was such a practice achieved in international relations. Undoubtedly such a procedure will help to strengthen mutual trust.

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The Soviet Union has unfailingly carried out the accord of the Final Act--like all its remaining provisions--on preliminary notification of major military exercises. In those instances when military exercises were conducted in the USSR within the parameters stipulated by the Final Act, preliminary notification of them was given.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the other participants of the European-wide conference more than 50 times have given notification on military exercises conducted by them, and such countries as Hungary, Norway, the FRG, Sweden, Denmark and a number of others have sometimes provided notification on exercises involving less than 25,000 men, the number provided by the Helsinki Accords.

Another measure of trust and stability stated in the Final Act is the exchange of observers at exercises by the armed forces of the signatory states, including those with different social systems. This is a rather new matter. In the past, in particular in the 1930's, there were individual instances of reciprocal invitations by states for observers to attend military maneuvers, but an agreement on a European-wide scale never existed in this area.

The inviting of observers to major exercises is a manifestation of good will by the state conducting the exercise, and for this reason notification of them does not mean the automatic inviting of observers. Obviously it would be advisable to invite first observers from neighboring countries to major national exercises.

The accord reached on this question states that one or another state in each individual instance is to determine whether or not it will send invitations to other signatory states. In the affirmative case, it will determine the number of observers, the procedure and conditions of their participation and provide other information which it feels useful. It will also provide the appropriate conditions for the invited persons and extend them hospitality.

Thus, the accord on the inviting of observers to military observers--like, incidentally, the other measures of stability and trust--rests on a voluntary basis.

The steps of the USSR, as any other sovereign state, on this question have been determined by specific circumstances. Here are the facts.

1976. Invited to the "Kavkaz" [Caucasus] Exercise conducted from 25 January through 6 February were observers from the signatory states located in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

In the same year, from 14 through 18 June, the "Sever" [North] Exercises were held. This time invitations were sent to the countries located near the region where they were held, that is, Norway, the GDR, Poland, Finland and Sweden.

1977. Invited to the "Karpaty" [Carpathians] Exercises (11-16 July) were the representatives of the FRG, GDR, Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

1978. Invited to the "Berezina" Exercises (6-10 February) were the representatives of Belgium, the GDR, FRG, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, England, the United States, France, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.

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Incidentally, in the practice of invitations for foreign observers to military exercises there have been instances when for various reasons one or another signatory state refrained from accepting the invitation. Thus, Luxembourg did not send an observer to the "Berezina" Exercises. This, certainly, did not cause any condemnation or criticism from the USSR.

A third "measure of trust and stability" is the exchange of military personnel, including visits by military delegations. It was assumed that the signatory states, again acting voluntarily, could achieve better mutual understanding and this would aid their common objectives on the questions of strengthening peace.

Within this accord, the contacts of the USSR with other states have noticeably increased. Such a conclusion is confirmed by data for the second half of 1979.

In July, Odessa was visited by the Italian Navy destroyer "Impavodi." At the end of August of the same year, the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation of French military pilots from the famous "Normandie--Neman" Air Regiment. Contacts between Soviet and French aviators have already become a tradition. As was pointed out in the communique, this visit was carried out "within normal bilateral relations between the air forces of the two countries."

In September, a detachment of ships from the Swedish Navy arrived in Leningrad. In November, the commander of the Swedish Ground Forces, Lt Gen N. Skjold, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union.

During the past, visits were also made by Soviet military delegations to signatory countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In September, Finland was visited by a delegation from the USSR General Staff, and in October Helsinki was visited by representatives from the Leningrad Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze.

One should also point out such a form of strengthening trust as the organizing in September 1979 by the USSR Ministry of Defense of a trip to Kiev for foreign air force attaches during which they visited the Kiev Higher Air School.

All of this makes it possible to conclude that the approved measures as a whole have been not badly carried out and actually contribute to the growth of trust in the military area. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in deed have shown that they are faithful to the Helsinki Accords.

In acting in the spirit of the Final Act, the Soviet Union has consistently come forward with specific initiatives the realization of which would lead to progress on the question of military detente in Europe and throughout the world. These initiatives were contained in a number of speeches by L. I. Brezhnev and in the documents of the Soviet government and the Warsaw Pact. Let us mention the most important ones.

On 21 October 1977, L. I. Brezhnev, in his speech in the Kremlin, put forward a program for military detente. This was a platform of actions which would supplement political detente with military detente. Its basic provisions came down to the following:

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In the first place, to conclude between the participants of the European-wide conference a treaty on not being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other;

Secondly, to agree at least not to expand the membership of the opposing military-political groupings and alliances in Europe;

Thirdly, to consistently carry out such measures envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act as notification of major military exercises, the inviting of observers to certain of them and the exchange of military delegations; moreover, to agree not to conduct exercises above a certain level, for example, 50,000-60,000 men;

Fourthly, if the countries in the southern part of the Mediterranean basin desired that the military measures of trust provided in the Final Act would also extend to this region adjacent to Europe, to give consideration to this;

Fifthly, to discuss all these problems thoroughly in the near future, in parallel with continuing the Vienna talks, at special consultations jointly by all participating states in the European-wide conference.⁴

This platform of actions envisages, as is seen by a comparison of it with the provisions of the Final Act, a significant quantitative and qualitative broadening of the scope of already active confidence measures. It was actively supported by the Warsaw Pact states. Broad circles of the progressive community in all the countries participating in the Helsinki conference also supported it.

The Soviet delegation advanced these proposals for review at the meeting of the representatives of the signatory states in Belgrad on 4 October 1977--9 March 1978. However, the United States and the other NATO countries were unwilling to examine these truly important, constructive initiatives.

Such a position by the NATO countries certainly did not halt the efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to further work out peace initiatives aimed at ensuring detente on the European continent.

In full accord with the requirements of the Final Act, in being guided by a sincere desire to strengthen European and international security, the Soviet Union, along with the other Warsaw Pact countries, in May 1978 put forward a number of important proposals. The particular feature of them is that they lie as it were on the boundary area of political and military areas of detente. They provide treaty law measures which, without being disarmament in the direct understanding of this word, create a more favorable basis for practical steps to reduce the military confrontation and to lessen the possibility of military clashes between states.

The Moscow (1978) Declaration approved at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC proposed the implementing of the following measures:

- 1) The concluding of a world treaty on the renunciation of force in international relations. This treaty would envisage an obligation of all states to renounce the use of force or the threat of force in all its forms and manifestations, including a ban on the use of nuclear weapons;

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- 2) The strict carrying out by all signatory states of the obligation not to employ force or the threat of force in relations with one another;
- 3) The carrying out of proposals that all signatory states would assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and that the NATO and Warsaw Pact states would not broaden the membership of both alliances;
- 4) Measures to strengthen the guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states, including the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory and equally the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they presently do not exist.⁵

It was perfectly apparent that all these initiatives--naturally, in the event of their implementation--would help to overcome the dividing of Europe into blocs, and the preventing of this had been a constant aim for the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries for many years.

In May 1979, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee again proposed that practical steps be taken the implementation of which would make it possible to rise to a new level in strengthening trust between the states, to achieve political detente and integrate it with military detente.

As an essential step aimed at achieving these objectives, the Warsaw Pact countries proposed that a treaty be concluded between all the signatory states on not being the first to employ either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other. The concluding of such a treaty would fundamentally strengthen the political and legal foundation for observing the principle of the renunciation of force or the threat of force in Europe, it would raise its effectiveness and thereby create new guarantees against the unleashing of military conflicts on the European continent.

At the same time the Warsaw Pact countries stated that they were ready:

- 1) To agree on preliminary notification of significant troop movements in Europe and on large-scale air force and naval exercises conducted close to the territorial waters of other Helsinki signatories;
- 2) To agree on the nonextension of military-political groupings in Europe, on limiting the level of military exercises and on extending the confidence measures to the region of the Mediterranean.

Particular attention among the governments and public in the West was focused on the proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries to convene a conference on the political level with the participation of all the European states, the United States and Canada for reviewing specific steps for the purposes of lessening the military confrontation and advancing military detente in Europe.

Seemingly, having in front of them such an extensive range of proposals by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, the Western Helsinki signatories would act as the Helsinki Accords require and to which their signatures were affixed. Certainly no one could dispute the fact that all the mentioned proposals conformed to the spirit

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of the Final Act which urged that everything necessary be done to ensure the development of European international relations along a path of the consistent strengthening of peaceful coexistence and the supplementing of political detente by military detente.

Unfortunately, by the end of 1979, the question of the further development of international relations in Europe had not only not approached its solution, but, on the contrary, had taken on particular acuteness. This was due to the plans to produce and deploy on the territory of a number of the Western European NATO states qualitatively new American medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and its allies.

The carrying out of these militaristic plans would substantially alter the strategic situation in Europe, as this would shatter the equilibrium existing on the continent between the military forces of the two social systems, socialist and capitalist. Certainly the Warsaw Pact which would never permit NATO military superiority would be forced to take measures in response and a new increase in the arms race would be inevitable.

In order not to permit such a dangerous development of events for the cause of European and universal peace, the USSR, together with its Warsaw Pact allies, showed true political boldness and set an example of good will, having proposed, it can be said, a program for strengthening peace in Europe. This, without exaggeration, historic initiative was contained in the speech given by L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979, in Berlin during the days of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the GDR.

The contents of the Program for the Strengthening of Peace in Europe encompass all the basic aspects of military detente. It contains an appeal:

a) To reduce the number of nuclear weapons on the European land. An effective way to this exists, and the Soviet Union has stated its readiness to do its part. Moreover, as a gesture of good will, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to unilaterally reduce, in comparison with the present level, the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western regions of the USSR, but, of course, only in the event that Western Europe would not deploy additional medium-range nuclear weapons.

Simultaneously the Soviet Union proposed an immediate start to talks on reducing medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. It was also stipulated that the previously made proposals to pull out of the Mediterranean the Soviet and American ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons would remain in effect and that the USSR supported the plan proposed by the President of Finland U. Kekkonen to turn Northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone.

b) To renounce--for all states participating in the European conference--the use of both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons against one another. In this regard it was clearly stated that the Soviet Union would never begin to employ nuclear weapons against those states which refused the production or acquisition of such weapons and did not have them on their territory. The Soviet Union was ready to draw up a corresponding obligation with any interested state.

c) To reduce the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe, an issue which had been under discussion in Vienna since 1973. In order to make headway in these talks

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and give them a new impetus, the Soviet Union took the decision--with the agreement of the GDR leadership and after consultation with the other Warsaw Pact members-- to unilaterally reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe (specifically it was a question of pulling back up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks as well as a definite quantity of other military equipment from GDR territory onto Soviet territory within a period of 12 months).

d) To carry out measures aimed at strengthening trust, such as: to provide notification on major troop exercises of ground forces not 21 days before, as had been agreed upon in Helsinki, but a longer period before, and not on a level of 25,000 men but rather 20,000; not to conduct exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 servicemen; to provide notification on major air force exercises and naval maneuvers conducted close to the territorial waters of the other signatory states; to provide preliminary notification on movements of ground forces numbering more than 20,000 men in the zone defined in the Helsinki Act.

The Soviet Union considered a European-wide political conference on military detente and disarmament to be the most appropriate place for discussing the broad range of measures relating to military detente and hence confidence-building measures.

The carrying out of the program for strengthening peace in Europe as proposed on 6 October 1979 would not provide any unilateral advantages for the USSR or any other socialist country. All the nations of the continent would gain from its realization. The military threat in Europe would be reduced and a lessening of tension would be deepened and broadened.

The program for the strengthening of peace in Europe proposed on 6 October 1979 in Berlin was unanimously supported by the fraternal socialist countries.⁶ A session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee held on 5-6 December in the capital of the GDR noted that the new initiatives contained in the speech of L. I. Brezhnev of 6 October 1979 were a major contribution to solving the problems of military detente on the European continent.

On behalf of their states, the ministers participating in the session appealed to the governments of the NATO nations to reexamine the situation which existed in Europe and not to undertake actions which would complicate the situation on the continent. At the same time it was stated that the taking of the decision by the NATO Council to produce and deploy the new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and the acting on such a decision would destroy the basis for talks.

The ministers had grounds for such a statement as the preliminary taking of a decision for a "build-up" would mean an attempt by NATO to conduct the talks from a "position of strength." This was fully and frankly admitted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint NATO Forces in Europe, Gen B. Rogers, who stated: "In order to be able to conduct successful talks (with the USSR--Author), we must have strength. We can obtain it by a decision to produce and deploy the new weapons." But the Western powers knew and had been repeatedly convinced that talks from a "position of strength" were fundamentally unacceptable for the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states.

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The final document, a communique, from the session of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers reaffirmed the peace-lovingness of the socialist states and their desire, along with all the states which had signed the Final Act in Helsinki, to make detente a continuous process which was evermore viable and universal in scope and to strengthen security and peace in Europe.

Very significant was the fact that precisely on the opening day of the session, 5 December 1979, the first Soviet troop formations numbering 9,500 men along with their weapons and military equipment began to pull out of GDR territory in full accord with the announcement made by L. I. Brezhnev on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the formation of the GDR.

The pulling out of Soviet troops was not a manifestation of weakness and not a propaganda ploy. Any attempts to distort the objectives and essence of this peace-loving step are doomed to failure. By its actions the Soviet Union opened up the way for practical measures to supplement political detente with military detente.

The foreign ministers' session felt it necessary to reaffirm a number of important proposals which had been put forward in the Moscow declaration of the PCC of 23 November 1978, including:

- 1) The concluding between all the signatory states of a treaty not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other;
- 2) To observe the principle of the renunciation of force or the threat of force in Europe;
- 3) Not to extend the membership of the North Atlantic bloc and the Warsaw Pact;
- 4) To agree to the simultaneous disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and as a first step, to eliminating their military organizations, starting with a reciprocal reduction in military activities.

The session of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers also proposed a number of specific measures in the area of military detente in Europe. Some of them clarified already known proposals by the socialist countries and others were made for the first time.

Among the important initiatives which were further developed and made more concrete, at the session a special place was held by the proposal to convene a European-wide political conference on military detente and disarmament.

The subject of discussion at the conference was clearly defined: this could be both measures to strengthen trust between the states in Europe as well as measures aimed at reducing the concentration and curtailing armed forces and weapons on the continent.

The participants at the session voiced the view that the examination of the corresponding questions and the approval of specific accords on them should be carried out stage by stage, beginning with the simpler measures and moving step by step to the more important and more profound ones.

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The work of the conference should be organized in such a manner so as to form a succession from one stage to another in achieving progress in the area of the measures to strengthen confidence, to lessen the military confrontation, to reduce the concentration and curtail the armed forces and weapons as well as other disarmament measures. Here the aim was that progress in one area would create greater opportunities for achieving success in other areas.

The first stage of the conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe should focus work on the confidence-building measures, considering that the conference would be concerned with real disarmament measures in the second stage.

The preparations for the conference, in the opinion of the session participants, should be carried out in relation to the measures being implemented within the framework of the European-wide process, the most immediate being the forthcoming Madrid meeting of representatives from the signatory states. They felt that consultations between all the signatory states should play a substantial role in achieving general agreement on the convening of the conference and its preparations. Such consultations conducted on a bilateral basis could then, as experience of preparing for the European-wide conference has shown, be shifted to a multilateral basis. It was the conviction of the session participants that this should be done as quickly as possible to convene a multilateral preparatory working meeting in the first half of 1980.

The recommendations resulting from the preparatory work on the basic questions of organizing the conference, including the agenda of its first stage, could be reviewed at the Madrid Meeting of the signatory states in the aim of approving final decisions on the convening and procedure for conducting the conference.

The states represented at the session urged all the participants of the Helsinki Conference to carefully study the above-given considerations concerning the objectives, contents and procedure of work for the conference on European detente and disarmament in Europe and on its preparations and to respond affirmatively to them in order to begin to reach agreement on these questions. In this manner a new real step was taken to strengthen mutual confidence, security and peace in Europe.

Why is military detente in the center of the European continent today more vitally necessary than ever before? This question could be briefly answered as follows: it is extremely dangerous that Europe continues to be a "powder keg," for the continent is literally "larded" with the most modern types of weapons.

Europe is a comparatively small part of the world. In territory it is almost 3-fold smaller than Africa and 4-fold smaller than Asia and America. But nowhere else in the world are there so many nuclear and atomic weapons concentrated as on the European continent. According to the data of the bourgeois press, in Europe there are over 3 million soldiers of the Western European countries alone comprising 56 army divisions and more than 150 regiments, over 750 fighting ships and more than 2,500 combat aircraft. More than 8,000 nuclear warheads and more than 3,000 carriers are located at American bases and military installations in Western Europe.

The Helsinki Conference affirmed the importance of solving the problem of reducing armed forces and weapons in Europe, stating in the Final Act: "The participating

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states recognize the interest of all of them in the efforts aimed at reducing military confrontation...."7 The nations which signed the Final Act expressed their conviction of the need to take effective measures in this area.

Even in the course of the preparatory consultations (31 January--28 June 1973), the basic principles were set out for solving the problems of reducing armed forces and weapons. These were: the nonimpairment of the security of any of the parties, reciprocity of reductions and their coverage of both troop personnel as well as weaponry. Then also the objective of the talks was set, namely, to reach an agreement on reducing the concentration of troops in the center of the continent and thereby advance the cause of detente in the military area.

An accord was reached that 11 states would participate in the discussion of the problem. These were: the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia as well as the United States, England, Canada, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. These 11 states which would be termed the direct participants at the talks would have the right to participate in taking decisions on the essence of the cut-back questions. The decisions would be taken on the basis of general agreement (the consensus of 11 states). The other eight nations which participated in the preliminary consultations were Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Turkey. They would receive special status which gave them the right, without participating in decision taking, to make their contribution to the course of the discussion, in particular to distribute documents on the questions under discussion.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist nations were in favor of allowing all the European states so desiring to participate in the talks, including neutral states, as the solution to the question of reducing armed forces should not be the prerogative of the existing military-political alliances in Europe. However, since the Western nations were against broadening the range of possible participants in the talks, the socialist countries did not insist on their proposal and reserved the right to raise this question subsequently.

The talks opened in Vienna in October 1973. On 8 November of the same year, the socialist countries submitted for discussion a draft agreement which, in full accord with the provisions agreed upon in the course of the preliminary consultations, envisaged a reduction in the armies of the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Luxembourg by 20,000 men in 1975, by 5 percent in 1976 and by another 10 percent in 1977.

Thus, the proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries envisaged a reduction in both the foreign and national armed forces and weapons at strictly agreed-upon dates. The ground and air forces and their weapons, including nuclear weapons, would be subject to reduction. As a whole the reduction was to be carried out in three stages in order to reduce the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe by approximately 17 percent in 1975-1977.

The counterproposals of the Western Powers had a fundamentally different nature. The "scheme for troop reductions" introduced by them on 22 November 1973 came down to limiting the reduction only to ground forces, and in an unequal proportion which

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was detrimental to the socialist states. The NATO armed forces were to be reduced almost 3-fold less than the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states.

The scheme did not indicate what Western states were to reduce their troops, in what amount or by what time. The Western scheme disregarded a reduction in air forces and nuclear weapons, as if it was not apparent that precisely these forces represented the greatest threat to the densely populated regions of Europe. The reduction involved only the ground forces and was to be carried out in two stages. In the first stage, agreements were to be reached on reducing the ground forces of only the USSR and the United States stationed in Central Europe. After the carrying out of this measure, the second phase was to begin where it would be a question of reducing the ground forces of the other participants in the talks.

Thus, the reduction scheme proposed by the Western countries was aimed at obtaining unilateral advantages and did not conform to the approved objective of the talks which was a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and weapons. In essence, it envisaged a change in the existing balance of forces in Central Europe in favor of the Western countries.

In full accord with the letter and spirit of the Final Act and in the aim of advancing the talks and bringing them to practical ends, on 19 February 1976, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies put forward a proposal which took into account a number of requests of the Western partners. The essence of the new proposals was that in 1976, there should be reductions by an equal percentage in the troops of just the USSR and the United States out of the total number of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, while the level of the armed forces of the other participants in the talks would be "frozen" and reduced in the second stage, in 1977 and 1978. These proposals also gave a specific number of Soviet and American tanks, nuclear weapons-carrying aircraft and missile launchers which would be cut back along with a definite number of nuclear ammunition for these delivery systems.

It was important that the new initiatives by the socialist countries envisaged a reduction of both the ground forces and the air force, including nuclear weapons, with the understanding that this would include both personnel, the weapons and the military equipment. The socialist nations proceeded from the view that proposals based on a different approach such as on a reduction of selective, individual components, as the Western powers sought hoping to obtain unilateral military advantages for themselves, could not comprise a basis for a mutually acceptable agreement.

As in all the other instances of the advancing of initiatives by the socialist countries at the Vienna talks, these proposals conformed fully to the principle of nonimpairment of the security of anyone; they envisaged an equal reduction which would not lead to an altering of the balance of forces in the region of Central Europe in favor of any of the participants in the talks.

The specific obligations in the agreement on the first stage of reductions were made in detail only for the USSR and the United States, while the remaining states who participated directly in the talks in the first stage would "freeze" the number of their armed forces and limit themselves only to obligations of a general sort on their reductions in the second stage. Certainly the purpose was a "freezing" which would in fact not allow an increase in the number of armed forces in the

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states possessing troops in Central Europe. This must be emphasized particularly due to the fact in recent years there have been obvious attempts to increase the national armed forces and weapons in individual European NATO countries as well as shift armed forces and weapons from the United States to Europe.

In describing these proposals, L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 25th CPSU Congress: "Our proposals are based on the only realistic foundation for maintaining the balance of forces which has come into being in the center of Europe, in essence, an equilibrium. Their realization will not harm the security of a single country. It would be hoped that this would encounter a due response among the Western countries and that it would be possible to finally move from discussions to realistic measures aimed at reducing armed forces and weapons."⁸

Being unable to refute the objective and just nature of the proposals by the socialist countries, Western propaganda began to stress that the stumbling block in the talks was the refusal of the socialist countries to name the number of troops stationed in the area of reduction. The socialist countries convincingly showed that it was not a question of figures but rather one of reaching agreement on the key questions of the cut-back upon which the working out of the agreement primarily depended.

Nevertheless, in endeavoring to provide progress at the talks, the socialist states accommodated the Western Nations. On 10 June 1976, numerical data were provided on the total number of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in Central Europe and on the number of ground forces stationed there. The figures, respectively, were 987,300 and 805,000 (on 1 April 1976).⁹ The NATO representatives in Vienna, in turn, announced that their nations had stationed in Central Europe armed forces numbering 981,000, including 791,000 ground forces.¹⁰

These figures convincingly confirm that in Central Europe an approximate equilibrium had developed in the number of personnel from the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations.

However, the NATO countries as before sought unilateral advantages for themselves to the detriment of security for the socialist countries. For example, they proposed that the Soviet Union pull an entire tank army out of the reduction zone. In response they promised a selective pull-out of 29,000 servicemen and a certain quantity of American nuclear weapons deployed in Central Europe.

Seemingly it should be clear to anyone that the approved principles of reciprocity and nonimpairment could not be observed if noncompatible troop elements are reduced, if one magnitude of reduction, that is, troop formations, is used for some states and another, that is, individual servicemen from different units, is applied for others. In the first instance, when it is a question of the socialist states, the Western nations propose a true troop reduction. But for themselves they provide a "reduction procedure" which would fully serve the purposes of reorganizing and modernizing the troops. For example, without harming their combat readiness, the reduction could be made from service personnel (barbers, cooks and so forth).

The proposed reduction in a certain portion of the American nuclear weapons in Central Europe did not alter the essence of the matter. It was known that, outside

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the scope of the Vienna talks, there was a plan to modernize the American nuclear weapons and their deployment system under which a certain number of obsolete types of U.S. nuclear weapons could be withdrawn from the center of the European continent. And where was the guarantee that such a withdrawal would not be compensated for by an increase in the nuclear weapons of the Western European NATO members?

In the opinion of the socialist countries, a reduction in nuclear weapons should not have the nature of a limited, single action, as the Western countries had insisted. The components of the nuclear weapons should be reduced in both stages by all states possessing these components. A situation could not be permitted whereby any of the states which possessed, for example, nuclear weapons delivery systems would maintain their freedom to increase these weapons, while other participants to the agreement would reduce them.

During the entire period of the Vienna talks, the socialist countries repeatedly and convincingly showed good will and a readiness to reach agreement. At the beginning of 1975, they had made a proposal that all the direct participants in the talks would assume an obligation not to increase the size of their armed forces in Central Europe during the talks. The importance of such an obligation is hard to overestimate as it would help to improve the situation in Europe, to strengthen confidence between the participants in the talks and to create conditions for reaching accord on troop reductions. This proposal by the socialist states was on the agenda of the talks. However, the NATO countries, without accepting it, continued from time to time to raise a propaganda campaign over the increase in the Soviet troops in Central Europe. Under this pretext they increased their own armed forces in this region (for example, in 1976 alone, two additional mechanized brigades were created in the American troops and one division in the FRG troops).

"In contrast to the NATO countries, for a long time we have not increased our armed forces in Central Europe and we do not intend--and I want to emphasize this strongly--we do not intend to increase them in the future by a single soldier or a single tank,"¹¹ stated L. I. Brezhnev.

In April 1978, the NATO countries made certain changes in their scheme. For example, they agreed to set dates for the reduction of the troops of the European nations and Canada in the second stage. However, as a whole their approach remained unaltered.

In endeavoring to get the talks off dead center, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states which were direct participants in the Vienna talks (the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia) on 8 June 1978 came forward with new important proposals, the essence of which came down to the following:

In the first place, as a result of the reductions equal collective levels should be established in the sizes of the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Central Europe with 900,000 men in each, including 700,000 in the ground forces; secondly, the reduction in the armed forces personnel should be limited to the ground forces, while only an upper limit should be set for the number of personnel in the air force, that is, the air force levels would be "frozen";

Thirdly, in the first stage, when only the USSR and United States would reduce their troops, a selective reduction and limitation of weapons would be carried out, and

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for those types which were named by the Western side (the USSR would reduce the number of tanks and the United States would reduce a certain number of nuclear ammunition and certain types of delivery systems);

Fourthly, in the first stage the reduction of Soviet troops would be carried out with those formations which had been proposed by the West, that is, by divisions;

Fifthly, the reduction of Soviet and American troops would be carried out proportionately to their numbers in Central Europe, as the NATO countries had sought.

A new manifestation of good will by the socialist states was their proposals of 30 November 1978 not to increase the size of the armed forces of the participating states during the Vienna talks. Such an accord would be based on collective (within both military groupings) or individual obligations.

In the aim of bringing the positions of the parties closer together and facilitating the reaching of agreement for the West, the socialist countries made yet another step toward the NATO states. On 28 June 1979, the delegations of the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, upon instructions from their governments, made a proposal which envisaged that all the direct participants both from the West and from the East would assume an obligation in the agreement to reduce their ground forces to equal collective levels of 700,000 each and that each of them would make a substantial contribution to the achieving of this goal, being approximately proportional to the total number of its forces in the region of action of the agreement. At the same time, considering the position of the Western countries, the proposal pointed out that the individual amounts of the cut-back of troops would be determined by each individual participant to the agreement within the limits of the corresponding alliance: in NATO for the Western countries and in the Warsaw Pact for the socialist ones.¹²

In endeavoring to establish the necessity of an unbalanced reduction in the armed forces in Europe in favor of the West, the bourgeois press and the representatives of the West in the talks continue to emphasize the so-called geographic factor. They argue thus: if one of the subunits of American troops is pulled back 3,000 miles, then for maintaining equilibrium the Soviet Union should pull back six of the same subunits, as they will be moved back just 500 miles. But if one takes a more objective and broader look at the "geographic factor," the picture is somewhat different.

The Soviet Union, in possessing enormously long ground frontiers, is forced to keep the corresponding forces for their defense not only in the west, but also in the east and in the south of the nation. For this reason, if the Soviet Union has to move its troops to the west, for example, from beyond the Urals or from beyond Baykal, these distances would be greater than, for example, from New York to London.

As is known, the organizational development of the armed forces in the region of the proposed reduction was carried out by the nations directly participating in the Vienna talks over the entire postwar period in accord with the interests of their security. Understandably, the parties took the "geographic factor" into account among many others and this was done long before the start of the talks in Vienna. This circumstance was considered in the course of the preparatory consultations which outlined the region of the reduction and thereby terminated a discussion

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of the question of the "geographic factor." To involve it in the discussion meant to attempt to distract the participants of the talks from discussing urgent problems.

A real way out of the blind alley in which the Vienna talks found themselves was provided by the new important proposals advanced on 10 July 1980 by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries directly involved in the talks.

The socialist countries, considering the proposals of their Western partners, proposed a reduction in the number of Soviet and American troops in this region during the first stage by 20,000 Soviet servicemen and 13,000 American ones. This proposed reduction did not include the 20,000 Soviet servicemen and 1,000 tanks which had been withdrawn from the GDR unilaterally.

Moreover, the socialist nations proposed a compromise procedure for maintaining the collective levels of the number of Warsaw Pact and NATO troops in Central Europe and which should be established as a result of the two stages of reduction. With this procedure, on the one hand, consideration was given to the demand of the Warsaw Pact nations that individual nations would not infinitely increase the size of their troops in the future. On the other hand, the desire of the Western participants in the talks was observed of not imposing individual restraints on the size of the armies of one or another nation in establishing the same level of armed forces for both military-political groupings.

The socialist nations stated that in the event of a positive response to their proposals by the NATO nations they were ready to immediately begin to work out the text of the agreement on the first stage.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, in speaking at the Helsinki Conference, pointed out: "Precisely the materialization of detente is the essence of the question.... And here we put the focus on the task of preventing an arms race and achieving real results on the question of disarmament."¹³

The time which has passed since this speech has been full of a constant and purposeful struggle by the Soviet Union to make progress on the question of disarmament. "No nation," L. I. Brezhnev rightly pointed out, "has presented mankind with such a broad, concrete and realistic program aimed at lessening and then fully eliminating the danger of a new war as has the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Union is guided by a carefully elaborated and weighed concept of disarmament, which is an extremely complicated and multi-level problem as it involves the fundamental interests of states, including their national security.

The approach of the USSR to this problem has a comprehensive, all-encompassing character. Soviet foreign policy, in being realistic, considers that the achieving of this goal requires great efforts and time. In working for the most radical measures, the Soviet Union at the same time seeks opportunities for partial, intermediate measures. Such a realistic approach makes it possible, without overlooking the main objective of universal and complete disarmament, of achieving a practical, piecemeal resolution of this problem.

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In the foreign policy program approved by the 25th CPSU Congress, in representing an organic continuation and development of the historic Peace Program, the following task was clearly formulated: "to achieve a halt in the growing arms race which is dangerous for peace and a transition to a reduction in the stockpiled weapons and to disarmament."¹⁵

With the ratification of the new USSR Constitution (Basic Law) on 7 October 1977, the struggle for "achieving universal and full disarmament" was elevated to the rank of a state law of the USSR.

In the extensive and diverse problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states consider nuclear disarmament to be the most important and immediate task, for precisely the nuclear weapons represent the greatest danger for mankind. There has certainly been no other area of disarmament in which the socialist nations would have put forward such important and constructive proposals as in the nuclear area, clearly realizing that there are many difficulties, including objective ones, on the path to solving this problem.

Nevertheless the Soviet Union is convinced that nuclear disarmament is not only possible but also necessary. This can be seen from the experience of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

By the time the Final Act was approved, there already existed the 1974 Vladivostok summit agreement between the USSR and the United States. This opened up an opportunity for limiting the strategic forces of the two nations both in quantitative and qualitative terms. In the course of the talks, the Soviet Union consistently and constructively worked to sign the corresponding documents as rapidly as possible and in strict accord with the principle of equality and equal security for the parties. Both parties were agreed that such documents should include a treaty on strategic arms limitation running up to the year 1985, a 3-year protocol on certain provisional measures which was to be an inseparable part of this treaty as well as a possible joint declaration on the basic directions for further talks on new measures in the area of limiting and then reducing strategic weapons.

In the course of the Soviet-American meetings in Moscow in March 1977, in Geneva of May of the same year, in Washington in September and again in Moscow in April 1978, the Soviet Union steadily, patiently and in a principled manner worked to conclude the practical elaboration of the corresponding documents.

However, the process of talks initially was totally blocked and then serious difficulties arose one after another caused by the United States. The American side placed such demands on the USSR which could only be construed as obtaining unilateral advantages for the United States.

The Carter Administration showed indecisiveness and inconsistency. In giving way to the pressure of the opponents of detente, and primarily from the military-industrial complex, it again and again endeavored to alter in its favor what had already been agreed upon.

In the spring of 1978, in U.S. policy, and this was fully reflected in the SALT talks, there began to be a tendency to link completely different political problems and this also did not aid the successful development of the talks.

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As for the Soviet side, as was emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev on 7 April 1978, the USSR "is in favor of the most rapid achieving of an agreement, but only one which would strictly accord to the principle of equality and equal security and which would truly embody this fundamental principle.... There can be no other solution."¹⁶

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) was signed in June 1979 in Vienna in the course of the talks between L. I. Brezhnev and the U.S. President J. Carter. "An event has occurred," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "which has long been awaited by the Soviet and American peoples, by the peoples of other countries, by everyone who wishes a lasting peace and recognizes the danger of a further rise in nuclear arsenals. In signing this treaty, we help to defend the most sacred right of each man, the right to life."¹⁷

The new treaty and the documents accompanying it provide a range of measures to restrict strategic offensive weapons of the world's two most powerful states both in quantitative and qualitative terms, and are also a good basis for seeking out solutions to other burning issues in the arms race.

The SALT-2 Treaty undoubtedly is the most all-emcompassing and detailed treaty which has ever been signed on arms limitation, and, most importantly, it covers not any peripheral military systems but rather the weapons complexes which comprise the basis of the military might of both countries.

The quantitative reductions provide for the freezing of the number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launching units, the launching units for submarine-based ballistic missiles (SBBM), heavy bombers as well as air-to-ground ballistic missiles (AGBM) on a level of 2,400 units effective the moment the treaty comes into force, and during 1981 this total ceiling should be lowered to a level of 2,250 units. The treaty also introduces special quantitative limitations on the strategic systems equipped with multiple individually-targetable reentry vehicles (not more than 1,320 units).

The treaty contains around 20 qualitative limitations. These include a limitation on the power of missiles, the possibility of their modernization, a ban on the re-equipping of light ICBM as heavy ones, a ban on the development of high-speed reloading devices for ICBM launchers and other restrictions.

Of particular significance were the provisions stated in the Joint Soviet-American communique of 18 June 1979 that a world-wide military conflict is not inevitable and at present there is no more important and immediate task for mankind than the halting of the arms race and the preventing of war. Here the sides expressed an intention to make every effort to achieve this goal.

It is fundamentally important, and this is stated in the joint communique, that each of the sides is not to endeavor and will not endeavor in the future to achieve military superiority, as this could only lead to a dangerous instability, giving rise to a higher arms level and not contributing to the security of either side. The carrying out of this agreement is difficult to overestimate from the viewpoint of the prospects of a mutual deterrence of the arms race and the further strengthening of confidence and international security. The principle of equality and equal security stated in the SALT-2 Treaty, combined with the mentioned agreement, creates a good basis for cooperation in the area of disarmament, including nuclear.

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Certainly the SALT-2 Treaty would not put an end to the arms race, but it does become an indisputable brake on it. For this reason the international community with satisfaction took into consideration the common viewpoint voiced by L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter that the signing of the treaty should have a positive effect on talks relating to other questions involved with the restricting of this race.

An assessment of the SALT-2 Treaty and the other materials related to it was given in the document of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. "The Vienna meeting marks an important step ahead along the path of improving Soviet-American relations and the entire international-political climate," it points out. "The full realization of the documents signed in Vienna opens up new opportunities to halt the increase in the arsenals of nuclear missiles and to provide their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation. The carrying out of this task would be a new stage in curtailing the nuclear arms race and would open up the path to a substantial arms reduction and to the realization of the highest goal of the complete halting of the production and elimination of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons."¹⁸

The USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko at a press conference on 25 June 1979, in taking up the relationship between the SALT-2 and SALT-3 talks, commented: "...The present treaty creates bridges to the next treaty. We are in favor of not stopping at the achieved level, we are desirous of moving forward, sparing no effort to achieve a further reduction in nuclear missile weapons."¹⁹

The conclusion and realization of the SALT-2 Treaty and its provisions was a good incentive for the presently conducted both multilateral and bilateral Soviet-American talks in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. This applies primarily to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union, and it is supported by all the Warsaw Pact members, has advanced a concrete, realistic and clear plan for nuclear disarmament. This plan has been stated in the speeches of L. I. Brezhnev and in other documents of the Soviet government and joint statements of the Warsaw Pact countries. The essence of this plan comes down to the following.

A beginning to a real process of nuclear disarmament should be the halting of nuclear weapons production, a ban on the arming of the armed forces of states with them and a stop to the development and creation of new models and types of these weapons. This simple and at the same time effective measure in fact should put an end to the nuclear arms race and become a dependable basis for subsequent nuclear disarmament measures.

Directly after the halting of nuclear weapons production there should follow measures to reduce their stockpiles with the turning over of the freed nuclear materials to the peaceful sectors of the economy.

The ultimate aim of the reduction is the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. Along with the stockpiles of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs, there should be a reduction (by disassembly or turning over for use for peaceful purposes) in the delivery systems, that is, the missiles, launchers, bombers, submarines and surface vessels.

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To free all mankind from the unforeseen consequences and instability related to a continuation of the nuclear arms race and from enormous expenditures--this is the goal of this plan.

In November 1977, the year of its 60th anniversary, the Soviet Union made an appeal to the nuclear states to agree on a simultaneous halt to the production of nuclear weapons, be they atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or shells. Simultaneously the USSR proposed that the nuclear powers assume an obligation to begin a gradual reduction in the already existing stockpiles, progressing until the complete "100-percent" elimination of them. This proposal was reflected in one of the resolutions approved by the 32d UN General Assembly Session.

In advancing such precise and constructive proposals, the Soviet Union was ready at any time to sit down at the conference table with all the nuclear powers in order to thoroughly review the entire scope of the problem of nuclear disarmament and in common to work out concrete paths for its practical solution. The Soviet Union had no arguments against the nonnuclear states participating as well in such talks, since all nations and all peoples of the world are interested in nuclear disarmament.

It goes without saying that nuclear disarmament could be carried out only in the instance that all the states which possess nuclear weapons would participate in it, for it would be unjust if only the nuclear powers moved toward eliminating their nuclear weapons while others stockpiled and improved them.

In 1977, there was extensive publicity for the plans which had been concealed for a rather long time to produce neutron nuclear weapons in the United States and deploy them in the European NATO countries. Neutron weapons are the most monstrous type of weapons in the entire history of mankind. The adopting of them by states would strengthen the threat of a torcherous death for millions of people and their deployment on the territory of densely populated Western Europe would make the unleashing of a nuclear war more probable.

The Soviet Union was decisively against the development of the neutron bomb and warned that if the bomb was developed in the West, the USSR would not remain a passive observer and would be confronted with the necessity of making a reply to this challenge for the purposes of ensuring the security of the Soviet people, their allies and friends.

The Soviet state did not limit itself to condemning the plans to produce the neutron bomb or issuing warnings over the dangerous plans of the West. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, on 24 December 1977, officially put forward a clear and concrete proposal to agree on the mutual abandoning of neutron weapons production.

On 9 March 1978, the Warsaw Pact states made a new initiative: they submitted for review to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva a draft convention on banning neutron weapons. This draft envisaged that the signatories to the convention "would pledge not to produce, not to stockpile, not to deploy anywhere and not to employ nuclear neutron weapons."

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The draft stipulated that control over the observance of the convention should be carried out by the signatory states by employing the national technical devices at their disposal in such a manner as to conform to the generally recognized standards of international law.

Although a discussion of the draft convention in essence had not even commenced, certain representatives in the West, and in particular in the United States, hurried to express a negative attitude to the very idea of the proposed convention.

The plans to arm NATO with the neutron bomb evoked indignation throughout the world. The movement against the neutron bomb assumed unprecedented scope. It included tens of millions of people and the most diverse social organizations. The small NATO countries stated their refusal to deploy neutron weapons on their territory.

The actions of the world community and the protests in the United States itself led to a situation where President J. Carter announced on 7 April 1978 his decision to "defer production" of neutron weapons.

Considering the decision of President J. Carter, L. I. Brezhnev stated on 25 April 1978 that the Soviet Union "also would not begin production of neutron weapons, if the United States did not do this. The future would depend on Washington."²⁰

As events were to show, the United States continued to pressure the USSR in the hope of achieving concessions which would be detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. On 25 October 1978, J. Carter signed a draft law on providing allocations to produce the basic components of the neutron bomb. Hence the question of the possibility of deploying this barbarian type of weapon in Western Europe has in no way been removed from the agenda.

The 23d UN General Assembly Session (1978) supported the proposal of the Soviet Union and called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to begin consultations on the rapid commencement of talks on halting the nuclear arms race.

At the beginning of February 1979, the USSR, together with the other socialist countries, submitted to the Disarmament Committee a document containing specific proposals entitled "On Talks to Halt Nuclear Weapons Production in All Forms and Gradually Reduce Their Stockpiles Until Complete Elimination." The essence of these proposals came down to the following.

The corresponding talks should be conducted with the participation of all states possessing nuclear weapons as well as a certain number of states which did not possess nuclear weapons.

The subject of the talks was to be the halting of nuclear weapons production in all their forms and a gradual reduction of the weapons stockpiles down to their complete elimination. In the various stages of the talks it would be possible to examine, for example: the halting of a qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons; a halt to the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; a gradual reduction in the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems; the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Here the necessary control measures should be approved.

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The halt in production, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out stage-by-stage on a mutually acceptable and approved basis. The contents of measures in each stage should be a matter of agreement between the participants in the talks. The degree of participation in carrying out each stage by the individual nuclear powers should be determined considering the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the states possessing nuclear weapons and the other corresponding states. In all the stages, the existing balance in the area of nuclear power should be left undisturbed with a gradual reduction in its level.

The proposal by the socialist countries evoked great interest. All the member states of the committee participated in the discussion. A special statement by the group of nonaligned and neutral states expressed satisfaction with the initiative of the socialist countries. The nonaligned states were in favor of agreement being reached in the course of the 1979 committee session on the "preliminary conditions and elements of multilateral talks on nuclear disarmament and the sequence of actions was generally outlined for the purpose of obtaining the designated goal."

Extensive approval was given to the principles proposed by the socialist nations and on which the talks should be based. These were: nondetrimentalness to the security of the parties, the participation of all five nuclear powers, the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees for the security of states, the continuing of other talks on the problems of nuclear disarmament and so forth.

The United States and the countries allied with it in essence were against halting the nuclear arms race under the pretext that talks on this problem at the given stage were supposedly "premature," although a majority of the committee members were in favor of continuing and intensifying the exchange of opinions on the given question. Due to the resistance from the Western states, the committee was unable to carry out the required preparatory work and make a beginning to the talks in 1979. An agreement was reached that an examination of the question of halting the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament would be continued at the following committee session. Support for the commencing of talks on disarmament in the nuclear area involving all the nuclear powers was voiced also by the 34th UN General Assembly Session which approved, under a Soviet proposal, a special resolution on this question.

A ban on all nuclear weapons testing has been a long urgent question the solution to which would largely determine a halt in the arms race. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact feel that this problem must be solved without waiting for the outcome of the talks on full nuclear disarmament. The reason for this is that a ban on all nuclear weapons testing would put an end to their qualitative improvement and would stop the appearance of new types of these weapons. After the first important step of the concluding in 1963 of the Moscow Treaty on Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Atmosphere, in Space and Underwater, the next achievement in this area was the signing in 1974 of the Treaty on Limiting Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing by the USSR and the United States. The treaty, starting on 31 March 1976, prohibited any underground explosions of nuclear weapons with a power of over 150 kilotons and restricted the number of explosions below this level.

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But both the Moscow Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Atmosphere, in Space and Underwater and the 1974 Treaty between the USSR and the United States on restricting underground nuclear weapons testing only partially solved this problem. Moreover, two out of the five nuclear powers did not sign the Moscow Treaty and one of them, China, continues even now to carry out test nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

After the Helsinki Conference, the Soviet Union became even more active in working for a full halt on nuclear weapons testing.

At the 30th UN General Assembly Session in 1975, the Soviet delegation, as an important and timely step, proposed a discussion of the question of concluding a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing. A draft of such a treaty was then submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations and the General Assembly was in favor of holding specific talks with the aim of reaching an agreement on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing. Due to the negative position of certain nuclear powers, however, these talks were not commenced. As is known, for a long time the question of halting underground nuclear tests has been complicated by certain states through the artificial exaggeration of the control question. It was steadily maintained, in particular, that supposedly without an on-the-spot check it would be impossible to distinguish seismic phenomena of natural origin (earthquakes) from analogous phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions, and consequently, it would be impossible to monitor the states' observance of their obligations in banning underground nuclear weapons tests.

A majority of specialists have never agreed with this viewpoint, feeling that national monitoring equipment is sufficient for controlling the observance of a treaty on an underground nuclear weapons test ban in addition to the international exchange of seismic data. With the development of equipment for detecting seismic phenomena, this viewpoint now has virtually universal support by all scientists. However, at present certain states are in favor of a provision for the possibility of investigating actual circumstances on the spot, if doubts arise on the observance of obligations to halt underground nuclear tests.

In showing good will and endeavoring to move things off dead center, the Soviet Union at the 31st UN General Assembly Session in 1976 stated its agreement to participate in working out such a compromise basis for an agreement, where voluntary limits would be observed in taking a decision to investigate the pertinent circumstances on the spot and at the same time all the signatories of the treaty would be certain that the obligations were being carried out.

The Soviet Union made a great effort to conclude a new Soviet-American treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in 1976. The treaty established a procedure for conducting these explosions whereby there would be no possibility of using them for the purposes of improving nuclear weapons. This was a weighty contribution by the USSR to the cause of a complete ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

In November 1977, the Soviet Union took a new important step in agreeing that in parallel with a ban, at a certain time, on all nuclear weapons testing a moratorium

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was to be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The purpose of this proposal was to facilitate the reaching of agreement on a full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing since the Western partners had asserted that supposedly it would be difficult to determine the nature of the explosion.

In the aim of achieving agreement on a complete and universal ban on nuclear weapons testing, the Soviet Union agreed to the conducting of an inspection on a voluntary basis and that a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing would come into force even in the instance that not all five nuclear powers would initially join it, but only three, the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. Moreover, the Soviet Union made a gesture to its partners in proposing a 3-year period of action for the agreement. The Western powers proposed a 5-year term, and then the United States revised its position and announced that in any event the agreement should not be in effect for more than 3 years. The duplicity of the American position could also be felt in the fact that, on the one hand, it was aimed at a complete ban on testing, and on the other, envisaged a continuation of "low-power nuclear explosive experiments."

The USSR steadily continued to work for a rapid conclusion to the elaboration and signing of a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing. At the 34th UN General Assembly Session, the USSR delegation voted in favor of a resolution supporting such a treaty.

The problem of strengthening the conditions for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is most directly linked to the question of banning all nuclear weapons testing. 5 March 1980 marked the 10th anniversary of the coming into force of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. The pledge to abandon the proliferation of nuclear weapons had become a standard of international law.

The Warsaw Pact countries made a serious contribution to the elaboration of the designated treaty and are its active participants. They proceed from the view that the appearance of new nuclear states would lead to an outburst of the arms race and would cause a corresponding response in other countries. Under such conditions the question of eliminating nuclear weapons would be greatly complicated. For this reason it was important to see to it that the nonproliferation treaty became truly universal.

In recent years, the sphere of action of the nonproliferation treaty has broadened. In particular, it has been signed by nations which possess a highly developed atomic industry such as the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan. Presently more than 100 states have signed it.

However, up to now a number of states remain outside the treaty, including those which could be termed quasinuclear. Among them are South Africa and Israel which are conducting an expansionist policy. Undoubtedly, the treaty could have played an even greater role if it had been signed by all states possessing an atomic industry or planning to create it in the near future.

In this regard one cannot help but be alarmed by certain of the international deals concluded in recent years in the nuclear area. Thus, the FRG has sold nuclear equipment and technology totaling 10 billion marks to Brazil which has not

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signed the nonproliferation treaty. The United States has proposed the sale of two nuclear reactors by General Electric to the racist regime of South Africa.

Such actions are detrimental to the international community's efforts aimed at restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem is that in the process of operating nuclear power plants, as is known, a fissionable substance, plutonium, is formed as a side product and is accumulated. This substance can be used for creating a nuclear weapon.

Facts show that the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a real one. In September 1977, the South African Minister of Finances O. Horwood stated at a congress of the ruling National Party that his country "maintains the right to employ its own nuclear potential for military purposes."

The Soviet Union in a TASS Announcement of 9 August 1977 condemned the plans for the development of nuclear weapons in South Africa and drew the attention of the world community to the fact that their realization would have the most serious, far-reaching consequences for international peace and security.

Further events fully affirmed the validity of the concern and anxiety voiced by the Soviet Union over the South African nuclear weapons plans. According to announcements of foreign agencies, on 22 September 1979 a low-yield nuclear explosion conducted by racist South Africa was recorded in the South Atlantic. This explosion caused a stormy response by the dependent African countries and many other states of the world.

It is perfectly obvious that for the South African racists, the atomic bomb represents a means of blackmail and intimidation against the independent African states and a means for strengthening the apartheid system at home. Unfortunately, judging from everything, South Africa is capable of producing nuclear weapons. American and West German companies have designed, delivered equipment and built an experimental nuclear reactor in Pelindab. A French consortium in 1976 concluded a contract to build a nuclear power plant in the region of Cape Town. South Africa is cooperating in the nuclear area with Israel which has helped Pretoria acquire technical information on the production of nuclear weapons in exchange for South African uranium.

Other countries are also working to achieve nuclear weapons. Hence a further strengthening of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has assumed particular significance. Under the conditions of the exacerbation of the international situation it is all the more essential to work out new measures to develop international cooperation in this area and to create conditions which would provide an opportunity for all nations to obtain good from the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Closely tied to the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the question of the security of nonnuclear states and the preventing of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they are not presently found. In 1978, at the 33d UN General Assembly Session, the USSR proposed that an international convention be concluded on strengthening the guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states and submitted a draft of such a convention.

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The implementation of this new Soviet initiative would lead to a strengthening of the security of a predominant majority of states which do not possess nuclear capacity. The measure proposed by the USSR is effective, and its significance would remain until the realization of full nuclear disarmament. This measure could also assist in strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons by weakening the incentive throughout the world to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet proposal caused a broad positive response in the General Assembly, and was approved by a predominant majority of the delegations. The Soviet Union, on its behalf, affirmed that it would never employ nuclear weapons against those states which refuse to produce and acquire such weapons and did not have them on their territory.

In 1979, in developing this Soviet initiative, a group of socialist states including the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, submitted to the disarmament committee, a draft international convention on strengthening the guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states. The idea of concluding a multi-lateral international agreement on this question was greeted with fervent support among a broad group of states on the committee, and primarily the nonaligned.

The socialist countries proposed that the guarantees be given both to nonnuclear countries which do not participate in military-political alliances as well as to countries which, although tied by allied obligations to nuclear states, do not possess and do not produce nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory.

In the course of the discussion, it was pointed out that the formula contained in the draft of the socialist countries considered the interests of a broad range of states. In the first place, it encompassed the maximum possible number of states which could, considering the real situation in the world, be given a guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons; secondly, it encouraged the states to refuse to possess nuclear weapons, to deploy them on their territory and thereby helped to narrow the possible sphere of use of nuclear weapons, to strengthen nonproliferation and, consequently, reduced the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

For holding specific talks and working out a corresponding international convention, the committee set up a special work group which was given all the documents and proposals submitted to the committee. However, the achieving of agreement on this question was in essence blocked by the delegations of the United States and the other Western powers who were against the concluding of an international convention on strengthening guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states. The committee will continue talks on this question in 1980.

At the 34th UN General Assembly Session in 1979, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries proposed that the UN member states study the possibility of concluding an international agreement on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they do not presently exist.

The USSR has been a decisive supporter of strict guarantees that international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy does not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is not a commercial question, rather it is a question of policy, a question of international security. At the

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31st UN General Assembly Session, the Soviet Union, together with the other Warsaw Pact members, acted decisively in favor of improving the control system for nuclear units and materials which was being carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It stated its readiness to cooperate with all interested states in these areas.

The USSR has been a consistent supporter of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe and other regions of the world. It views their creation as one of the measures for strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, for reducing the threat of nuclear war and for regional military detente. It is essential that such zones be actually free of nuclear weapons and the corresponding agreements must not contain escape clauses for violating the nuclear-free status of the zones.

In accord with its principled line of reducing the threat of nuclear war, on 25 April 1978 the Soviet Union approved a decision in the appropriate form to adhere to the international treaty on the banning of nuclear weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty). In this manner, the Soviet Union, like the other powers which possess nuclear weapons, assumed an obligation not to help the Latin American countries acquire nuclear weapons as well as not to employ such weapons against the signatory states. Thus the USSR has helped to strengthen the first and as yet only nuclear-free zone in the world, a zone encompassing a majority of the Latin American states.

The Warsaw Pact countries, in being decisive supporters of prohibiting the creation of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, view this problem as one of the most acute and immediate problems of world policy. As was stated in the Bucharest (1976) Declaration of the PCC, they consider international agreement on this question essential. The rapid development of the scientific and technical revolution has posed a dilemma for mankind: either the scientific discoveries will serve the good of peoples or they will be put to serving the arms race.

As is known, military equipment in an unprecedentedly short time has traveled a distance from atomic to thermonuclear weapons, from strategic bombers to ICBM, from missiles located on the earth's surface to missiles in silos and on submarines, from single-charge missiles to missiles with multiple atomic warheads.

Since at present there are no restrictions on the use of science for military purposes, at any time the most unexpected changes of events can occur and their consequences cannot be predicted. It is impossible to exclude the appearance of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction with unprecedented destructive power. It is quite realistic to assume that there is the real danger of the development in the foreseeable future of weapons which can be commensurate in terms of destructive effect with the nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons or even surpass them.

As has been stated in the Western press, the military-industrial complex of the United States and the other NATO countries is working on the development of weapons that are truly monstrous in their effect. It is technically feasible to create the so-called gigaton nuclear bombs with a power of 1,000 and more megatons. One can imagine the destruction and human losses caused by such bombs in realizing that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 50,000 times less powerful.

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The Western press has also announced work on the development of so-called psychotropic weapons by which it is possible to influence the human psyche and stimulate a loss of memory, a disruption of correct perception and other mental disturbances leading to the demoralization of people. Announcements have also appeared on ray weapons using ionizing radiation of special devices or radioactive substances for acting on the human organism (on the blood and intracellular plasma) for the purpose of both the rapid and gradual exposure of it to radiation sickness. The work being done in the area of molecular biology is capable of leading to the development of bacilli which are immune to any modern medicines and vaccines. They also can be used for military purposes.

In speaking on 14 October 1975 at a dinner in honor of the President of France Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "Ever-greater urgency, we are convinced, attends the attainment of a broad international agreement which envisages the strict obligation of states not to develop new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons."²¹

At the 30th UN General Assembly Session, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, on behalf of the Soviet government, made a proposal to include on the agenda of the session as urgent and timely the question of prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The essence of the Soviet proposal consisted in having all states, primarily the large states, conclude an agreement based on a pledge not to develop and not to produce new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, not to aid and not to encourage any activities aimed at this.

The 30th UN General Assembly Session adopted a resolution "On Banning the Development and Production of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons." Voting in favor of it were 112 nations, that is, a predominant majority.

In accord with this resolution, in Geneva, in the Disarmament Committee, talks were started on the given question. Since in the course of the talks, a desire was voiced to concretize the subject of the ban, that is, to define the new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union proposed that new types of weapons of mass destruction include any types of weapons based upon qualitatively new principles of action in terms of the method of use or the objects of destruction or the nature of the effect.

At the 32d UN General Assembly Session, the nations of the socialist commonwealth again urged the Disarmament Committee to work out an agreement prohibiting the use of scientific and technical achievements for creating and producing new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The 33d UN General Assembly Session approved a resolution urging the Disarmament Committee to actively continue talks for the purpose of working out the text of an agreement to ban the development of new types and systems of such weapons.

The Soviet proposals on this question have been a subject of bilateral Soviet-American talks in the Disarmament Committee. The greatest headway has occurred over one of the new types of weapons, radiological. The Soviet and U.S. delegations,

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in accord with the agreement reached at the Vienna summit meeting, on 10 July 1979 submitted a joint proposal on the basic elements of a treaty for banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The draft treaty on the banning of radiological weapons was a result of 2-year (from May 1977 through July 1979) Soviet-American talks. This document distributed in the committee in parallel by the USSR and U.S. delegations was aimed at preventing the appearance of one of the types of weapons of mass destruction, radiological weapons, which in the event of their development and use would cause mass human casualties and have extremely dangerous consequences for mankind.

The Soviet Union views a ban on radiological weapons as a partial solution to the problem of an all-encompassing ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The treaty on banning radiological weapons, thus, can become still another important contribution to limiting the arms race and saving mankind from this danger. In this manner a major step will be taken which will prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for the purposes of developing new types of weapons of mass destruction.

In approving the idea of concluding a treaty on banning radiological weapons, a number of delegations, in referring to the newness and complexity of the problem and the necessity of carefully studying it, were in favor of extending a review of the submitted Soviet-American proposals and the talks on them to the following session of the Disarmament Committee. This viewpoint was supported by the other committee members and the talks will be continued.

In December 1979, upon Soviet initiative, the 34th UN General Assembly Session adopted a resolution calling for the conclusion of an all-encompassing agreement on banning new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The assembly pointed to the importance of preventing a qualitative arms race so that the achievements of scientific and technical progress could be employed only for peaceful purposes.

In the opinion of the Warsaw Pact, the task of completely banning and eliminating a dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, has assumed particular urgency in the struggle for military detente. As is known, the use of these weapons even during the years of World War I caused heavy suffering and the mass death of people. Since then military chemical technology has moved far ahead, and new types of chemical weapons have been developed capable of causing even more torturous death for people. In December 1979, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement which, in particular, said: "The entire world knows that during its aggressive war against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, the United States widely used chemical toxins which led to the death and poisoning of a large number of peaceful inhabitants and caused enormous destruction to the environment that is still felt. The facts of these barbarian crimes have been repeatedly confirmed by many prominent scientists and public figures from different nations."

The socialist countries are waging a consistent struggle to outlaw chemical weapons. Even in 1972, the USSR and the other socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact submitted to the Disarmament Committee a draft convention on the question of the complete and universal banning of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well as the destruction of their stocks. The Warsaw Pact

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members have done everything in their power to make an international agreement on banning and destroying chemical weapons a reality. This is also the purpose of the Bucharest Declaration (1976) of the PCC which directly states that the Warsaw Pact members "consider essential an international agreement on the banning and destruction of chemical weapons."

Unfortunately, representatives of the NATO countries, without acting in principle against a ban on chemical weapons, have endeavored to draw the question into a quagmire of drawn-out and futile discussions over the technical aspects of the problem. It is apparent that there are not and cannot be any reasons for a delay on the question of banning chemical weapons. Here it is merely a question of showing political will and a desire to achieve a reasonable, generally acceptable agreement.

The Soviet Union has set a good example on this question. The Soviet delegation proposed that the 31st UN General Assembly Session start by discussing the question of the ban and elimination of the most dangerous, fatal types of chemical weapons. Here a substantial contribution could have been made by realizing the Soviet-American agreement on a joint initiative to conclude a convention on the most dangerous, fatal chemical weapons.

As for control over the observance of the ban on chemical weapons, it should be based upon national procedures. In this regard there is the positive precedent of the Convention on Banning Bacteriological Weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to examine the possibility of using additional control procedures, and in particular, to discuss a method for monitoring the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons which were to be excluded from the arsenals of the states.

The resolution sponsored by Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and adopted by the 31st UN General Assembly Session drew attention to the risk related to the further development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons under conditions when there was no international agreement which would not only fully ban but also provide for the destruction of such weapons. The resolution pointed out that the achieving of the corresponding agreement would contribute to the cause of complete and universal disarmament under effective international control.

Upon the proposal of a number of the socialist and other countries, the 32d Session urgently called on all states to make an effort to quickly reach agreement on an effective ban on the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and their destruction and requested that the Disarmament Committee in Geneva be first concerned with working out an appropriate agreement considering all the existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its review.

In the course of the Vienna meeting in June 1979 between the Soviet and U.S. leaders, both sides affirmed the importance of an universal, complete and supervisable ban on chemical weapons and agreed to increase their efforts to prepare a coordinated joint proposal for submission to the Disarmament Committee. Soon after the Vienna meeting, the committee was given a Soviet-American statement on the course of the bilateral talks from which it could be seen that definite, and in a number

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of instances, significant progress had been made in the talks. At the same time, slow progress was being made on certain important points.

A majority of the committee members expressed satisfaction with the bilateral announcement and participated in the discussion. The line of the more active involvement of the committee in the work on the basic proposals of the future convention was fully and completely supported by the Soviet delegation which recalled that the Soviet state virtually from the first days of its existence had demanded a ban on chemical weapons. In particular, it was stated that the Soviet Union fully share the opinion of the broadest group of states on the urgent need for an immediate ban on chemical weapons as well as their concern over the absence of an international agreement on this matter.

The Disarmament Committee, proceeding from the view that a ban on chemical weapons was one of the most immediate and vitally important problems in the disarmament area, decided to continue talks on this question in 1980 as well.

The USSR was among those UN member states which at the 34th UN General Assembly Session urged an immediate conclusion to an international convention on banning nuclear weapons.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members, a limitation on the so-called conventional types of weapons could also serve well the cause of military detente. Their diversity and power and their lethal strength had risen manifold in comparison with the period of World War II. As was shown by the example of Vietnam, bombing raids with modern so-called conventional bombs have such consequences that for measuring their destructive force it would be possible almost to employ those criteria for assessing the destructive might of nuclear weapons.

In the postwar years all acts of aggression have been carried out exclusively with the use of conventional weapons. And at present the peoples fighting against colonial suppression are the victims of the use of precisely conventional weapons. Israeli aggression against the Arab states and peoples was also carried out, as is known, using conventional weapons.

"Certainly it is a fact," said A. A. Gromyko, "that 80 percent of the world expenditures on military needs go for conventional arms. How many people in the postwar period alone have become victims of the use of weapons which are termed conventional but which now possess--due to the amazing accuracy as well as the complete destruction of large areas--the most lethal power!"²²

For this reason the task of approving real measures to reduce aviation, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional arms, and likewise the armed forces equipped with them, has in no way lost its urgency. The Warsaw Pact members were proceeding from this when they pointed out in the Bucharest Declaration (1976) that they "gave great significance to concluding agreements on reducing armed forces and conventional arms."²³ The socialist countries, as is known, have repeatedly made specific proposals on this question.

The Soviet Union is sincerely ready to conduct talks on reducing armed forces and armaments. It has repeatedly stated this on various levels. The readiness for

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talks on this question was mentioned, in particular, in the memorandum of the Soviet Union on the questions of halting the arms race and disarmament submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 1976.²⁴

On 25 April 1978, L. I. Brezhnev came forward with a proposal to give up the enlarging of armies and increasing the conventional weapons of the states which were permanent members of the Security Council and the countries linked to them by military agreements.

If there were a desire by all states possessing large armed forces to conduct talks on the conventional types of weapons, then positive results and constructive accords could be reached.

The Soviet Union, in acting in the spirit of the Final Act, together with its allies has worked actively to eliminate all foreign military bases on foreign territories and for the withdrawal of foreign troops from them. The urgency of this problem has been emphasized by the fact that by the autumn of 1979, an enormous number of such bases existed throughout the world, including in Western Europe. The U.S. President J. Carter stated: "We have created too many military bases overseas." According to official data alone, the Pentagon had approximately 2,500 various military installations located in more than 30 nations of the world, including in nations which signed the Final Act.²⁵

In Western Europe the American military bases in 1979 were manned by 340,000 American soldiers and officers, including around 240,000 in the FRG, more than 20,000 in England, more than 12,000 in Italy, 4,800 in Turkey and 3,700 in Greece. The U.S. President stated that the Pentagon was maintaining its troops on the territories of other countries as well and "some of them are very close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union."

The Warsaw Pact has acted decidedly to solve this question both on a global scale and in terms of the individual continents. But there has been no progress here, and this cannot help but cause concern. The Soviet Union, together with the other Warsaw Pact nations, is ready to collaborate actively and constructively in settling the given question. In November 1976, great attention was given to it again at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC in Bucharest.

Two years later, in November 1978, the Warsaw Pact nations, in the Moscow Declaration of the PCC, reaffirmed their consistent position in favor of eliminating military bases on foreign territories and pulling foreign troops out of the territories of other states, including European ones.

The ensuring of security in the Mediterranean would be a major contribution to deepening the process of military detente in Europe as well as beyond it as this region encompasses more than 20 nations of Europe, Africa and Asia. The Soviet Union is a supporter of moving on to constructive talks and practical steps in a direction of extending military detente into the Mediterranean.

"We want," said L. I. Brezhnev, "the Mediterranean Sea to become a sea of peace, good neighbors and cooperation."²⁶ The Soviet Union and the other socialist nations are ready to increase their contribution to the practical embodiment of this noble task which meets the interests of all the Mediterranean peoples.

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At the Bucharest Session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee in May 1979, the USSR and the other socialist countries stated their readiness to extend all measures which would strengthen detente and confidence in Europe as well to the Mediterranean. The Soviet proposal remained in effect to withdraw from the Mediterranean the Soviet and American ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons; this had been proposed by L. I. Brezhnev in July 1974.

The vital importance of the proposals of the USSR and its allies vis-a-vis the Mediterranean is obvious. It has been proposed that new types of nuclear missile weapons--Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles--be deployed in one of the nations of this region, Italy. And this in addition to the American forward based weapons which already exist there! Understandably, such actions could only be detrimental to the security of the Mediterranean and to all the nations of Western Europe which signed the Final Act. To prevent such a development of events is the aim of the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union and all the Warsaw Pact members, an effective measure in the area of military detente would be a reduction in the military budgets of the states which possess a great military and economic potential. The resources released in this instance could be channeled into the economic and social progress of peoples, at raising the economic growth rate, providing employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating diseases and building new schools and institutions of higher learning.

A reduction of a military budget is a most visible indicator of in what direction one or another nation intends to work on the world scene, that is, toward war or toward peace. The share of military expenditures in the budget of the Soviet Union itself in recent years has systematically declined. In 1976, expenditures were 17.4 billion rubles, or 7.8 percent of all the expenditures of the budget, in 1977, 17.2 billion, or 7.2 percent, in 1978, 17.2 billion, or 7 percent, and in 1979, 17.2 billion rubles were allocated for these purposes, or 6.8 percent.²⁷

The Warsaw Pact countries, starting in 1973, have repeatedly made proposals to reduce military budgets and by their actions have set an example in this regard.

At the 31st UN General Assembly Session the Soviet Union reaffirmed its proposal to reduce military budgets and, in endeavoring to put this important matter on a practical basis, stated that it was ready to assume a flexible position on the issue of the specific figure from which the reduction in military budgets should start. It would be possible to agree both on a larger figure than 10 percent or on a smaller one as the first step. However, it was important to make this question more rapidly a matter of business-like talks between the concerned states. At the Bucharest Conference of the PCC in November 1976, the Warsaw Pact affirmed its support for the idea of reducing the military budgets of states.

The socialist countries are convinced that it is possible and necessary to replace the current constant rise in the military expenditures of many states by their systematic reduction. The Soviet Union favors having the nations which possess a great economic and military potential, including the permanent members of the Security Council, agree on specific amounts for reducing their military budgets either in a percentage or in absolute terms. It insisted that such a reduction

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Start in 1979 and cover a 3-year period. Some 10 percent of the funds freed from the reduction could be spent on increasing aid to the developing nations. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union that this vitally important question continues to remain unsolved.

A number of useful initiatives in the area of disarmament were proposed by the socialist nations which signed the Helsinki Accords in the course of the 34th UN General Assembly Session, having demonstrated their leading role in the struggle to halt the arms race. The General Assembly approved the declaration proposed by the Czechoslovak delegation on international cooperation for the purposes of disarmament. This declaration represents an unique code of standards for conducting disarmament talks. The GDR played an active role in the drafting and adopting of a resolution on increasing efforts aimed at disarmament and checking the arms race.

FOOTNOTES

1. See PRAVDA, 2 August 1975.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See PRAVDA, 22 October 1977.
5. See PRAVDA, 24 November 1978.
6. See PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
7. PRAVDA, 2 August 1975.
8. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 24.
9. See PRAVDA, 23 July 1976.
10. See MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 11, 1977, p 113.
11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 7, Moscow, 1979, pp 297-298.
12. See PRAVDA, 29 June 1979.
13. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 5, pp 337-338.
14. Ibid., Vol 6, p 292.
15. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 38.
16. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 266.
17. "Radi Mira na Zemle: Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya Vstrecha na Vysshem Urovne v Vene, 15-18 Iyunya 1979 Goda. Dokumenty, Rechi, Materialy" [For the Sake of Peace in the World: The Soviet-American Summit Meeting in Vienna, 15-18 June 1979. Documents, Speeches, Materials], Moscow, 1979, p 32.

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18. Ibid., pp 68-69.
19. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.
20. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 296.
21. Ibid., Vol 5, p 377.
22. A. A. Gromyko, "Vo Imya Torzhestva Leninskoy Vneshney Politiki. Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i" [In the Name of the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1977, p 540.
23. "Soveshchaniye Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta Gosudarstv--Uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora. Bukharest, 25-26 Noyabrya 1976 Goda" [Meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC. Bucharest, 25-26 November 1976], p 14.
24. See PRAVDA, 30 September 1976.
25. See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 September 1979.
26. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 448.
27. See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 2, 1979, p 102.

[Conclusion; pp 217-219]

In May 1980, international life celebrated a major event, the meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC. The conference was a new affirmation of the profound adherence and firm determination of the fraternal countries to continue the struggle to strengthen security and to develop cooperation in Europe, for universal peace, liberty and independence of peoples, for international detente, for halting the arms race and for disarmament.

The conference unanimously approved documents of enormous political significance. These were the Declaration and Statement which give a complete program for detente, and they indicate the ways and means for strengthening European and world peace. The socialist countries reaffirmed their readiness for a constructive dialogue with all the interested states. They advanced an exceptionally important proposal to agree that, beginning at a definite, approved date, no state or no grouping of states in Europe would increase the size of their armed forces in the region defined by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact members favored careful and intensive preparations for the Madrid Meeting set for the end of 1980 and for conducting it in a constructive and business-like spirit. The Declaration firmly and clearly stated that the conclusion of the Madrid Meeting by positive and concrete results would have a beneficial effect on the overall state of the international atmosphere.

The Warsaw Pact countries favored accelerated preparations for a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe and the holding of multilateral

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preliminary consultations by the representatives of the states which would participate in the proposed conference. They were in favor of the Madrid Meeting approving practical decisions on the tasks of the conference, on the dates, place and procedure of its holding and on the agenda for its stage having concentrated the conference's work on confidence-building measures. As for the place of holding the conference, the conference participants supported the proposal to convene it in the capital of Poland, Warsaw.

They also pointed to the necessity of increasing efforts for the purpose of rapidly achieving agreement on various areas of limiting and halting the arms race.

The immediate tasks in this area, along with ratification of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2), were the rapid bringing to a successful conclusion of the talks on:

- 1) Complete and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing;
- 2) Banning radiological weapons;
- 3) Banning chemical weapons and destroying their stocks;
- 4) The nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states who do not have them on their territory and the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of states where they do not presently exist.

The reaching of agreement on each of these measures, the Declaration emphasizes, would help to improve the international situation and the successful conclusion of the talks would be a major achievement for the good of mankind.

The socialist countries proposed an immediate start to business-like talks on the following urgent measures in the area of halting the arms race and reducing the threat of war:

- 1) The concluding of a world treaty on the renunciation of force;
- 2) The halting of nuclear weapons production and a gradual reduction in their stockpiles until their complete elimination;
- 3) Banning the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction;
- 4) Reducing military budgets, primarily of the large states;
- 5) Restricting and reducing the level of military presence and military activities in the corresponding regions, be it the Atlantic, Indian or Pacific oceans, the Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf.

At the meeting in Warsaw, in addition, a separate Statement was approved. The higher leadership of the countries represented at the conference proposed that in the immediate future a summit meeting be held for the leaders of states from all regions of the world. Such a meeting could focus attention on the key questions of

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international life and outline the ways for eliminating centers of international tension.

The documents of the Warsaw meeting were permeated with a profound belief that even the most confused and complicated problems, global or regional, could be settled by political means. This applies also to the problems of a Near East settlement and to the American-Iranian conflict.

In speaking after the signing of the conference documents, L. I. Brezhnev said: "In the present complex situation, when millions of people fear for the fate of detente and peace, from Warsaw there rings a clear warning against a policy of military adventures and feverish arms race; there rings a voice of reason and peace and an affirmation of will to cooperate in solving acute problems of the modern world."¹

FOOTNOTE

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 5, p 339.

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MIRZA IBRAHIMOV DISCUSSES ROLE OF SOVIET WRITER, CPSU CONGRESS

Baku LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN in Russian No 2, 81 pp 13-15

[Article by Mirza Ibrahimov: "The High Duty of the Writer"]

[Text] Throughout the entire history of mankind the artistic word has played an enormous role in the life of society as an integral, organic component of the culture and spiritual life of peoples.

Literature is a powerful means of exercising a spiritual influence on people and of developing the human intellect, morality and character; it is a conduit for philosophical ideas and a propagandist for social ideals.

Bourgeois society, on the one hand, strives to make artistic literature an instrument for deceiving the popular masses and justifying bourgeois morality and bourgeois social relations as "just" and "progressive," that is, a mouthpiece for its ideas; on the other hand it proclaims the theory of "absolute freedom" from ideas, of a supposedly apolitical literature, of art for art's sake. Seventy-six years ago now, V. I. Lenin in exposing this bourgeois pharisaism foretold the birth of a truly free literature, one permeated, not with careerism and a passion for profits, but rather with the ideas of socialism and sympathy for working people.

Multinational Soviet literature, brought to life by the Great October, is a literature devoted to the ideas of Lenin's revolution, one reflecting the thoughts and hopes of the working masses and serving the welfare, progress and happiness of the peoples. Our literature sees its sacred duty to lie in service to the building of a new life and a free socialist society and in the compilation of an artistic chronicle of this victorious struggle.

In proclaiming the ideas of the revolution, the heroic struggle of the peoples for the establishment of socialism and the worldwide struggle for liberation, this literature marked a new stage in the artistic development of mankind. It brought to light the image of a new man in history--the builder of socialism. A man whose credo was to cleanse the world of the rubbish and filth of the old exploitative society and its parasitic classes. Embarking on such a grandiose historical mission, the new man then selflessly devotes himself to the struggle to establish a world of brotherhood and equality in which free labor triumphs.

It fell to Soviet literature to embody the achievements of this creative man in all their multicolored variety and for the first time to portray his artistic image. It was for precisely this reason that it has become the standard-bearer and vanguard for progressive artistic thought throughout the world.

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To portray the great revolutionary pathos and express the profound universal, humanistic essence of Soviet literature and the grandeur of the ideals it embodies there appeared in world literature a writer of a new type--the Soviet writer. The Soviet artist sees the mission of the artistic word to lie in the reflection of historical truth. That is, the truth serving the interests of the working man, the working people, the truth securing his freedom, progress and happiness; in embodying this truth the Soviet writer serves the cause of the final triumph of the ideals of freedom and happiness throughout the world. As the great Lenin foretold, our literature is a free literature, one truly serving the toiling masses.

The literature of not a single bourgeois country of our time can compare with Soviet literature--in the purity of the moral and ideological qualities it demonstrates, in the great number of solid, full-blooded human figures it presents capable of serving as models for millions, in its crystalline esthetic beauty and in the strength of its faith in the mind and conscience of man and his future.

We Soviet people are fortunate to be witnesses, daily, hourly, to brilliant displays of the great and abundant spiritual potential of the millions of Soviet people in different walks of life; we feel the beating of their hearts and the breathing of their feelings and hopes; we draw inspiration from their accomplishments. This gives wings to our creative thought; it expands its horizons, stirs and increases our passion to create....

I would like to recount two or three incidents from the lives of people I know, things passing in the course of personal meetings with them.

On 22 October 1980, at a regular session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I had occasion to sit in the illuminated hall of the Great Kremlin Palace beside a noted countrywoman, Shamama Gasanova, twice Hero of Socialist Labor and chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni 1 May. We had known one another for 30 years.

Soon after the end of the war, when work on restoration and construction were only just getting under way and our technical capabilities were still limited, Shamama was telling me as we passed along dusty village side streets filled with her antediluvian countrywomen about a plan to build an entirely new village. I caught sight of some kolkhoz women with their pitchers standing in line at a well. Grasping what I was thinking, Shamama declared that she was dreaming of a pipeline for the village. She even took me to a nearby hill several kilometers outside the village where there were some springs. I was delighted to hear of these dreams about water, although they did, in fact, still seem a little far removed from reality. Who knows when they can ever be transformed into reality, I thought then. Shamama struck me as a beautiful heroine living out romantic dreams.

But what do we see today?

After a look at the village today, those "utopias" now seem quite modest visions. Shamama-khanum speaks with pride about the new village with its lights, televisions and stone houses, its straight asphalted streets lined with green trees, the machine-tractor park and the girls who have become equipment operators. At the sight of these women in leading kolkhoz positions, women like Shamama or the women managing industrial enterprises, directors, chief engineers and operators, I involuntarily recall the joyless lot of prerevolutionary Azerbaijani women deprived of rights. But then I myself think this recollection not altogether appropriate: for considering the rate and scale of the progress we see today, any comparison at all with a state of affairs of 60 and more years ago may seem a hopeless anachronism.

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The spiritual and cultural elevation of our people commensurate with our country's unprecedented economic and cultural progress puts the writer onto some fascinating, interesting ideas. Here now in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses only a short distance from me sits a sharp-eyed, dark-browed, dark-complexioned young woman. That is Tarlan Musayeva, an equipment operator and team leader. She is listening closely to the deputies speaking from the platform. I have known her about two years. She represents the new generation of our young Azerbaijani women. The generation which has taken up the torch from Shamama Gasanova!

This generation characterizes a new stage in our development; we are astonished by its critical thinking, the breadth of its knowledge and interests and its rejection of any ideas and customs which have outlived their usefulness! A woman, a young lady an equipment operator?! Not 50, but even 20 or 30 years ago this would to many have been absurd and immoral. But in the villages of Azerbaijan there are now hundreds of women working as equipment operators!

Readers will be aware that it has now been a decade since Azerbaijan entered the front ranks of all-Union socialist competition. Gratifying results have been achieved in all spheres of national economic and social life. Cotton and grape cultivation have been raised to unprecedented levels in the republic. The republic has been awarded the Red Challenge Banner 10 years running.... But the picture of all these successes would be incomplete if behind them there did not stand real live people and the growth in their consciousness, their skills and in their level of cultural development. This growth has been substantial, it has been magnificent!

Now again my memory takes me back to the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses. A session of the foreign affairs commission of both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR convened there at the beginning of November 1980. It met to discuss the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance concluded between our country and the Syrian Republic.

The prominent figures of our government, party and society speaking at the session pointed to the importance of this treaty for the strengthening of peace, not only in the Near and Middle East, but throughout the entire world. The session chairman, comrade M. A. Suslov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave the floor to Aliya Takhmasib. If the truth be known, I was seized by a strange emotion; it is difficult to remain indifferent when one of your countrywomen is speaking. Aliya-khanum words were of substance as well as interest; the Russian language flowed from her lips cleanly and freely; the faces of all her listeners were set aglow; it was a glow of proud satisfaction with our com-patriot!

The figures of my notable female contemporaries now rush through my mind.

I know many of them, of course, many, both young and white with age, who enjoy no less of a reputation and who have also honored with awards. But my pen has now been leading me into an area where female fortunes and heroism attract the most attention.

They all have one quality in common: they are devoted heart and soul to their work.

This quality brings me to recall the fortunes of one other woman. L. Ya. Sharova, a resident of the town of Aleksandrov in Permskaya Oblast, wrote me a letter about my novel, "Sliyaniye vod" [The Waters Combine]. She writes: "I am 25 years old. I have been working as a cook for eight years now. How much I had squandered, how little I had accomplished. It seems I was never able to get anything done. I am prepared to

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devote my whole life to cooking for my people. When they eat and then leave with smiles on their faces, the cook is content... All things considered, I am satisfied with this work. I just wish everybody loved their work...."

"...that everybody loved their work!" A beautiful wish. For L. Ya. Sharova to love one's work means to love people, "my people," as she writes in her letter. My thought is: what light, what purity in the heart of our Soviet man. And if an ordinary young Russian woman from the far-away Urals feels the need to share her thoughts about an Azerbaijani novel and its heroes, if her heart lives on such lofty, compassionate sentiments and international interests, this cannot but inspire!

As I write these lines I recall the great programmatic requirements Comrade L. I. Brezhnev imposed upon Soviet literature at the 25th Congress of our party. Among them special attention was drawn to the matter of "moral questing" and the role of the embodiment of the highest human spiritual qualities. And then what concern for the human being permeates Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report at the October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1980)! It shows a love for the Soviet people.

I have devoted more than a half-century of my life to literature. In addition to prose, poetic and dramatic works I have also published my literary criticism and journalistic works. Over a period of many years I have maintained active, creative communication with comrades involved with our multinational Soviet literature; I have read and I continue to read, I have followed and I continue to follow the creative work of writers I know personally.

I am not saying all this for my own benefit, but rather in order to illuminate the sources supporting my belief in the importance and the force of our artistic word.

Yes, on the basis of concrete personal and creative artistic experience and of the possibility of making great and powerful artists accessible to the entire world, I have become convinced that the highest mission and ideological and esthetic value of literature lies in the people's need for it, in its enrichment of their spiritual world, in its strengthening of their courage to wage the struggle for truth and justice and in its development of nobility of character, love and an elevated sense of beauty.

Only when literature is bound by all its roots to the life and times of the people, to their life with its struggles and passions, its driving forces, only then will it be able to fulfill this mission fully and successfully. Without this there can be no great art--neither realistic nor romantic.

Feverish creative activity is now under way in all corners of our motherland. The people in their millions are making their contributions to the material wealth and spiritual assets of the country. Bright horizons lie ahead.

The basic directions of our country's economic and social development for the period 1981-1985 and ahead to 1990 open up a vast, majestic, brilliant panorama. It all gives wings to the writer's imagination and spurs him to new creative achievements.

Our whole life, the friendship and brotherhood of our peoples, their inspired and unified labors, the far-sighted course and radiant ideals of Lenin's party give ever renewed spiritual energy to Soviet masters of the literary craft.

This imposes upon us the obligation to create a full-blooded artistic image of present-day man, the builder of communism and the fighter for peace throughout the world. In

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- carrying out the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, Soviet writers should strive in their work for maximum output in order to meet the spiritual needs of the people.

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