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1 June 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 19/81)



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SADAT-QADHDHAF AL-DAM MEETING REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 37

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "A Family Affair"]

[Text] "President Anwar Sadat met with an emissary of Qadhdhafi on 12 February in Paris," read the article in the April issue of the Cairo periodical OCTOBRE by Anis Mansour, an eminent journalist and friend of the Egyptian chief of state to boot. As surprising as it may be, given the scarcely friendly nature of official relations between the two countries and their leaders, the information is true. The Paris meeting at the time of President Sadat's state visit did take place and, JEUNE AFRIQUE can state, the mysterious emissary was none other than Ahmed Qadhdhaf al-Dam, Qadhdhafi's cousin and one of his trusted aides.

Key

The meeting took place on 12 February at the Marigny Palace. It was thoroughly planned well before Sadat's arrival in France on the 11th. The first day was taken up by the usual talks with President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and French officials. However, on the following day, there was a strange "gap" of several hours in the Egyptian president's schedule. First he met with representatives of France's Jewish community, headed by Rene Sirat, the new chief rabbi, and Alain de Rothschild, president of the Representative Council of the Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF). Later on in the day, it was the turn of the Muslim community, led by Hamza Boubakeur, rector of the Paris Mosque.

It was between these two meetings that Sadat saw Ahmed Qadhdhaf al-Dam for over two and a half hours. Following the meeting, Qadhdhaf al-Dam said privately that he had spoken "the language of frankness" with Sadat, stating that Camp David had led to an impasse and that Libya could help Egypt return to the "Arab family." Sadat replied that "Egypt is not for sale." However, Qadhdhafi announced on 28 March in Tobrouk that he was going to withdraw his troops massed along the Egyptian border.

Ahmed Qadhdhaf al-Dam has become a key person in the policy of Qadhdhafi, who often introduces him as his brother. This 38-year-old man, distinguished, seductive and worldly, is gifted with great intelligence. Assigned to the Secret Services in 1969, he lived in Egypt for several years during the time of Nasser and became an aide to Achraf Marouane, son-in-law and confidence man of the leader.

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Later, in Libya, he became a friend and protector of Carlos, then being sought by all Western police. Then, as head of the Secret Services, he was sent as a discreet emissary on several political missions. As the charge d'affaires for international relations abroad, he would meet with Western leaders in France, Germany, Great Britain, and so on. He has often planned other more official meetings for Qadhdhafi, No 2 Abdesselam Jalloud or Abdesselam Triki, minister of foreign affairs.

On Display

Ahmed Qadhdhaf al-Dam often goes to Paris, where he is often seen at the Plaza Athence where he is higly visible. But he is also at home in the back of small shops or sitting down with students.

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AFGHANISTAN

RESISTANCE TO RUSSIANS REPORTED RISING

Hamburg STERN in German 23 Apr 81 pp 242-243

[Text] In the occupied country in the Hindu Kush, resistance against the Soviet army is unbroken. Hundreds of believers stream out of the great mosque in Kabul after religious services. A young man comes out of the crowd and speaks to me: "Shuravi? Russian?"--"No, German."--"East or West?" Only after I had said, "West," did he feel secure enough to whisper to me: "We are fighting against the USSR."

"I don't see any fighting," I said. He explains to me: "Kabul is quiet, but not Kandahar, Jalalabad, Kunar, Paktia. We are fighting the Russians in the provinces."--"Why?"--"Afghanistan is an Islamic country, and the Russians want to make a socialist one out of it."

I pointed to the mosque: "But your government allows the Moslems freedom of religion." My anonymous conversation partner got touchy: "The Babrak Karmal government is nothing. They are vassals of the USSR. We will destroy them." Then he disappears as quickly as he appeared.

Such conversations--I am traveling with German and Swiss journalist colleagues--come unannounced everywhere on our trip through Afghanistan. Sixteen months after the Soviet intervention, the mountainous country at the Hindu Kush is still in a state of war. To be sure, the hard winter has brought about a reduction in fighting, and President Karmal has announced confidently that there is "no front anymore, anywhere in Afghanistan, but the "Mojaheddin" ("freedom fighter") is unbroken in his Islamic resistance. "Without the 85,000 Red soldiers," a Western diplomat in Kabul said, "Karmal wouldn't last a week."

Karmal has used the winter break to work against such impressions. With the foundation of mass organizations on the Soviet model, and with continual indoctrination with attestations of loyalty by Islamic priests, tribal leaders, and village elders, he is putting together a jigsaw puzzle of "broad support for the new phase of the revolution."

But his basic flaw remains: He is the man the Russians brought into the country. And here Karmal has run up against the clear feeling of a people that has rejected all foreign ascendancy--the Persians, the British, the Russians. "We are Afghans," a textile dealer in the bazaar said proudly to me. "We will never accept foreign domination."

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In the night I hear from my window on the third floor of the Kabul Hotel machine gun fire and shots from automatic rifles. The next morning, our attendant Mohammed offers an explanation: "The soldiers sometimes shoot into the air with glee."

The Soviet helicopters cannot be talked away. Roaring, the Mi-24 combat machines rise up from the airport of the capital and fly, always in twos, over the city in the direction of Logar-Tal. Two hours later they return. The rockets on their side wings have been fired off.

We are presented with a display of captured weapons--as "proof of the imperialistic interference in Afghanistan." The rifles and pistols are a colorful jumble of weapons technology from at least 2 centuries: Front loaders and homemade flintlock pistols, decorated Pashtu hunters' rifles and Lee-Enfield carbines from the times of the British army in India, sten guns and U.S. machine guns from World War II, G-3 weapons and Chinese pistols of a recent date, together with simple plate mines and high-explosive bombs as well as--well sorted out as in a department store--rows of ammunition. A "German rifle," according to the stamp, from "Suhl/Thuringen." "Made in Czechoslovakia" is written on one pistol. Omar, our attendant from the Information Ministry, said: "That was stamped in in a Pakistani armorer's."

The collection only proves one thing: The "Mojaheddin" are using everything they can get--recently also captured Russian Kalashnikovs. The only thing they do not have is heavy weapons of the kind that would reach the Mi-24. Perhaps they will get them when U.S. President Ronald Reagan sends them modern weapons. Reagan's announcement is taken by Kabul as confirmation of its conspiracy theory.

"It is good that Reagan is finally admitting it," Vice Premier Sultan Ali Kishmand, member of the Politbureau of the Democratic Peoples' Party (DVPA), declares. "That is nothing new. But the revolution in Afghanistan cannot be defeated or turned around." A few hours later, his Politbureau colleague, Anahita Ratebzad, the most influential woman in Afghanistan, betrays to us what such confidence is based on: "The Soviet Union," she waxes enthusiastic, "is our great friend and helper. With its support we will create a new Afghanistan."

Up to now the government has not accomplished much to improve the living conditions of the wheat farmers and shepherds, nomads and day workers, who populate this underdeveloped country. Seventeen million people live here according to rough estimates (there has never been a census).

Even if no one in Afghanistan is starving and if beggars are seldom seen, their poverty is clear to all: 480 marks a year income, life expectancy 42 years, illiteracy rate 88 percent, too few doctors, too few experts, not enough roads, unfavorable balance of trade, and high foreign debt. "Everything is limited," Kishmand admits. "We have no great reserves."

Karmal is making efforts to establish trust so that the farmers, builders and merchants will invest again. He is seeking a rise in buying power by raising industrial wages and by making a guarantee of purchases in agriculture.

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Just like everywhere else, on the Afghan New Year 1360, the minimum wage was doubled to 1,440 Afghanis in the textile factory Pol-i-Sharki in the outskirts of Kabul. But the factory, which is plagued with lack of raw materials, cannot raise the money for the increased expenditures, in spite of the "surplus fulfillment of the planned debt." "The state will pay it," the director explained.

The result of this policy is a growing debt to the USSR, because the Western countries that give aid have abandoned the country since the Soviet invasion in December, 1979. Kishtmand gives the figures: 800 million marks debt in the West, 3 billion in the East--a total increase of 1.2 billion marks since 1978.

In trade, too, dependency on Moscow is oppressive. The Soviets receive 52 percent of the Afghan exports, above all almost the total production of natural gas--at a ridiculous price that is "secret" in Kabul.

Soviet advisers sit in Kabul in all the ministries. Therefore foreign diplomats do not look upon Foreign Minister Mohammed Dost as the "final resort," but Vasili Safronchuk, the third man of the Moscow embassy. And the Ministry of Information distributes brochures such as "The Truth about Afghanistan"--published by the Novosti Publishing House in Moscow. "I am now going to learn Russian," a Kabul party functionary told me at a banquet. "It will be needed for a long time in Afghanistan."

So that we will not encounter freedom fighters, we must travel the 150 kilometers from Kabul to Jalalabad by air. Shortly before landing, our attendant, Mohammed, becomes strict: "No pictures, otherwise there will be trouble." The reason soon becomes obvious: The Jalalabad airport is a Soviet army depot. About 90 combat helicopters with the rear inscription, "Opasno" ("dangerous") stand here ready for action. The place is teeming with Red soldiers in tropical uniforms and broad-brimmed hats. The terrain is sealed off by tanks and MG nests.

While we wait for the vehicles, we start to talk to a few Russians. One was recently in Herat and describes the position there with a few gestures, but without a possible misunderstanding: He points to imaginary holes above his chest and goes "Ratatatat."

A mustached Caucasian who speaks some German shows me a superficial wound in his left arm. He got it in a raiding party in which he led Afghan soldiers. His Afghans deserted--obviously no exception. According to Western estimates, the Afghan army has shrunk from 80,000 to 30,000 men since the beginning of 1980. Now the government wants to fill the missing ranks with older men by means of a new recruiting law.

The Caucasian reports that the Russians only feel secure as long as they can fight from tanks or helicopters. "Most of them are sick and tired of Afghanistan," he said. "A year's duty without leave, no bars, no wife--only danger and boredom." He takes a "Camel filter" from me, takes a deep drag and moans sadly, "Home, home, home."

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ALGERIA

CULTURAL BERBER AGITATION RESURFACES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 pp 925-926

[Report: "'Cultural Berber' Agitation Resurfaces"]

[Text] The resurfacing of Berber agitation has not come as a total surprise, for the Algerian authorities had not shunned the discussion. An extensive national debate on cultural policy had been initiated at the beginning of March, within the party, trade unions, mass organizations and educational institutions. The press and the radio had reported the event with remarkable frankness, without concealing the differences noted in the exchange of ideas in Tizi-Ouzou and other cities, on the subject of Berber culture and its place in Algerian national culture. The fact that such debates could heat up passions and trigger disturbances in Kabylia country could not be excluded in advance.

Is it a question, as claimed by the party press, of a "criminal attempt to promote a split" (EL MOUDJAHID editorial, 14 March) conceived for the purpose of undermining the entire national structure? Conversely, could everything be reduced to anarchic manifestations of the disappointment of a few special interest centers who had not been given immediate and total satisfaction? Or else, could one interpret the new Tizi-Ouzou incidents as a symptom of the legitimate exasperation of local public opinion dulled by the halfway measures taken by the authorities and losing its patience?

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that, since last spring, the Algerian authorities had shown their wish to calm down feelings through a number of specific gestures. Although it was true that a chair of Berber language and civilization, planned for Tizi-Ouzou, had not been established, popular Berber language and literature could be heard more frequently on the radio and television, and official news mentioned the "Berber action" in Algerian history. What was even more important was that the previously detained active Berber supporters had been released.

The fact that throughout Algeria the FLN members are willing to accept, with some caution, Berber cultural existence may be seen, for example, by the speech delivered by Abdelkrim Abada, secretary of the party's Mouhafadha, in Constantine, on 14 March: "Berber cultural traditions are the patrimony of the entire Algerian people; we are in favor of the preservation and enhancement of some of them, for they symbolize the history and genius of our people. Nevertheless, we must point out the danger that imperialism and its agents may manipulate this problem" (EL MOUDJAHID, 16 March 1981).

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Very Open Debate But Based on the Party's Interpretation Alone

The debates which were started on 12 March in Tizi-Ouzou seem to have allowed, initially at least, and on the express recommendation of the wali and the Mouhafadha secretary, a real freedom of expression. Both within the party and in secondary schools and the university, a number of young people vigorously called for "the preservation of the Berber language," for Berber culture to be better served by television and radio, for encouraging rather than retracting specific local features, and for "talents to be able to express themselves rather than to be forced to expatriate themselves."

The participants in the debates also emphasized their support of Arabic as the national language, even though showing a preference for "Algerian" rather than "classical" Arabic, and condemning "repressive trends" in this area; they also declared their basic loyalty to Islam. Many of them insisted that they rejected "any exploitation of Berber awareness for the sake of secret purposes," and that they rejected the need to contemplate in this respect the adoption of precautionary measures or even of restrictions.

The demands of Kabyle youth were not limited to the Berber aspect of the problems. They included the quality of media programs which were considered regressive and insufficiently popular-oriented and, in general, the "cultural vacuum" felt in the provincial center. The cry from the heart was, "Holidays here are too long!"

All this was hardly subversive. Therefore, what was the reason for the sudden excitement on Sunday, 15 March, triggered by a slogan launched by the "university community?" Why did Tizi-Ouzou merchants and secondary school students go on strike? Why was there a big demonstration at the university "against repression" and for "democratic freedoms?" Why did these disturbances rebound at the university in Algiers?

Although it was a procedural question, in this case it was a matter of capital importance. The debates on culture, sponsored by the FLN, were based on a draft issued by one of its commissions, completed as recently as the beginning of February, marking the beginning of the discussions. However, the Tizi-Ouzou "university community" considered this platform to be too narrow and too hastily drawn up. It asked that the conclusions of the study session it has sponsored in April 1980 in Yakourene be equally submitted to the Assembly.

The authorities refused, citing democratic centralism as a reason: any project submitted to the people should be formulated by the competent bodies within the party. Unable, therefore, to present their views in a complete and coherent manner, the authors of the Yakourene text tried to substitute popular demonstrations to the debate under way. In their view, neither the government nor the party sincerely wished a reform, and the only purpose of a discussion based on the platform drafted by the FLN was to conceal the essence of the problem.

The quick and profound reverberation which developed in the area as a result of the opposition shown by the "Berber supporters" in Tizi-Ouzou, seems to have surprised the authorities. Apparently, the Berber's cultural problems, to the great sorrow of those who considered them artificial, have hardly changed in a year and could not be resolved by mere declarations of intention.

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A General Effort At Self-Criticism and Rectification

The new incidents in Kabylia are taking place in the midst of a many-sided campaign of self-criticism conducted among the Algerian public. The information media are featuring cases of embezzlement, official corruption and severe negligence. Numerous citizens, mostly workers, are reporting cases of waste visible to all: most frequently they involve the spoiling of goods apparently neglected by the state-owned companies to which they were delivered and which shunted them aside.

The regional affairs sections of the press and the radio have pointed out numerous occurrences which their commentators consider typical.

In a wilaya not far from Algiers, the cost of installing a water supply system had an overrun by a factor of twelve; a communal sanitation project had a cost overrun by a factor of six. In both cases no specific studies were made. The insufficiencies of study offices and the insufficient number of governmental technical agents in various administrative centers were emphasized. Such deficiencies in administrative studies have resulted in the fact that in a distant governorate, for example, reference prices for construction materials have been set far below actual costs, worsened by rising transportation costs; several private entrepreneurs, therefore, deemed it preferable simply to drop construction projects, as a result of which the building of housing or of public facilities would be resumed under difficult circumstances by the state sector.

The housing construction program in such settlement, which was interrupted some 4 years ago, has been partially implemented. However, the necessary infrastructures for the housing projects are virtually non-existent; a part of the implementation of the program remains doubtful, for slum housing has existed on it for several decades and there are misgivings on the subject of ousting the population because of lack of alternate housing.

Elsewhere, a settlement lost its water supply when a spring dried out because of a hastily implemented project in its vicinity.

A very large industrial project was built in a large village in the eastern part of the country, situated along a major highway, without corresponding engineering facilities. Paradoxically, this led to a rapid worsening of living conditions. The members of the current APC (Communal People's Assembly) blamed their predecessors. The chief of the military sector, who participated in the inspection of the wali, told them that they had been elected precisely in order to provide better management, and asked them to assume their responsibilities.

In the "Letters to the Editor" section in the newspapers, the public is expressing its support of the control exercised by the authorities. Particularly lively criticism has been voiced at some organs of the health services; in most cases the accused officials have tried to justify their actions, sometimes at great length. This represents a sort of "public opinion rostrum."

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With all this, the state does not consider itself free from taking action at the highest levels. At the end of February the president of the republic inaugurated a "seminar for management cadres," whose proceedings will be aimed at "promoting the efficiency of the production apparatus." Within the framework of the "socialist enterprise management," enterprise directors and elected representatives of the workers studied the reasons for the "counter-performance in some economic sectors and the gradual discouragement" of a large number of cadres and working people.

In its comment on this undertaking, the editorial writer in EL MOUDJAHID unhesitatingly wrote that "imbalances and ill-advised behavior" cannot be explained exclusively in terms of "unsuitable laws or the chronic and dangerous incompetence of hangers-on surrounding some officials" (1 March 1981). This is a formula which, while involving very high officials, nevertheless demands of the technicians in charge to acknowledge their responsibilities. A subsequent article demanded that "the state assume serious control over economic levers."... The recovery program formulated at the Fourth FLN Congress "has unfortunately not been properly taken up by officials in charge of the economy... The recovery wanted and desired by the political bodies in the country has met with virtually no response among those in charge of implementing it."... (EL MOUDJAHID, 7 March 1981).

"In the future," Chadli Bendjedid concluded, "we shall no longer tolerate a production unit to be a burden to the state." The working people will have to be kept informed about the situation of their enterprise and the encountered difficulties and thus given the possibility to make an effective contribution to the common effort. It is also important, he added, for management cadres to join the FLN. This would strengthen its vanguard nature and influence. The primary role of the party, therefore, is being firmly reasserted once again, rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.

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ISRAEL

PEACE MOVEMENT SEEKS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PLO

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Feb/Mar 81 pp 23-26

[Article by Mattiyahu Peled]

[Text]

The fact that Dr. Sartawi, who has recently emerged as one of the PLO's leading personalities, met with many Israelis who proudly present themselves as Zionists, is already widely known. He met more than once with the editors of "New Outlook," and insisted on mentioning the "New Outlook Group" among the peace forces of Israel, in an article he wrote for *Monday Morning* in Beirut. He received Bruno Kreisky's peace-prize in 1979 together with Arie (Lova) Eliav. Last month he created a sensation by sending a letter of congratulations, which was read publicly in a meeting held on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Israel Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. The communique of the French News Service from Beirut stated on 13, January that "it is reasonable to surmise that Mr. Sartawi has sent the letter on the directive of Mr. Arafat himself."

The following article was written by General (reserve) Peled after the meeting of the ICIPP, in which he read Dr. Sartawi's letter in its entirety.

No one who is familiar with the Israeli political scene could read without astonishment the strange resolution of the Fifteenth Post-War Congress of the Socialist International, held in Madrid in November 1980, stating that "the Israeli Labor Alignment, led by Shimon Peres, (is) the only viable force for peace for and with Israel." The political chapter of the new platform of the Labor party, which calls for the "active defence against the PLO both in the security and ideological-political arena," and for the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over approximately fifty percent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the whole of the Golan Heights as a minimal condition for making peace with Jordan and Syria, can best be described as a program for war and not a contribution to peace. For in practical terms what the new Labor platform means is simply that peace has become conditional upon the Arab consent to the elimination of all national aspirations of the Palestinian people and to the territorial expansion beyond the July 4, 1967 borders of

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Israel. This far exceeds what can be called "minor rectifications." No one would believe that the Socialist delegations assembled in Madrid knowingly designated a party announcing such a program "a viable peace force," and the process by which they were persuaded to take their amazing resolution certainly merits a closer examination. Dr. Isam Sartawi, for instance, who attended the International session as an observer on behalf of the PLO, suggests, in his interview to *Monday Morning* (December 15-21, 1980), that the resolution was adopted only because Labor's new platform was not made available to the delegates. He calls it "a deliberate deception of the Socialist International" which resulted in the adoption of a resolution not based on the commitment made by the Labor party before the Israeli public but on some hearsay conveyed by Shimon Peres to some of the leaders of the International.

The Real Peace Group

The gravity of that resolution can be fully realized when it is remembered that by adopting it the Congress of the Socialist International dealt an unnecessary and undeserved insult to genuine peace forces in Israel, whose programs need not be concealed from anyone in order to be recognized as such. It is significant that of all those present at the Congress it was the PLO observer who did not forget the real peace forces in Israel, because for the PLO, the question of peace ceased to be a theory to be tossed around or an empty phrase meant to improve a tarnished image, as is probably the case with the Labor party of Israel. It is therefore not at all surprising that the first protest voiced against the callous disregard revealed in the Congress of the Socialist International of the peace camp of Israel was that of the PLO observer, namely Dr. Sartawi. Referring to the assertion that the Labor party is the only viable peace force in Israel, he commented: "Such an assertion eliminates with a stroke of the pen all the peace forces of Israel, including the Sheli party, the

Peace Now Movement, the New Outlook group and the Rakah party. By stating that the Labor party is the only peace force in Israel, the Socialist International is saying that all the other peace forces do not exist or have nothing to do with peace; it is dethroning those bonafide peace groups and replacing them with the Labor party. This is an act which I believe is beyond the mandate of any international body."

The SI had, of course, an alternative resolution it could adopt. The draft proposed by the Spanish Worker's Socialist Party and the Italian Socialist Party and supported by the delegations of Sweden, Senegal, Venezuela, Austria and others, was undoubtedly a more balanced and realistic position for the SI to take. It insisted on the need to base the peace in the Middle East "on the security of Israel as well as all the other States in the region, and on a definitive solution to the Palestinian problem, founded on the recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights." Stating that "All peace initiatives that have attained important results . . . warrant support" — thus backing President Sadat's peace initiative and its consequences — the Spanish-Italian draft went on to declare that "The problem, however, continues to be the establishment of direct and positive relations between the Israelis and Palestinians, between a State whose sovereignty and integrity must be respected and the PLO, an organization representing the Palestinian people and widely recognized as such on an international level."

This draft resolution was vehemently opposed by the Israeli Labor delegation and actively supported by the PLO observer which, in itself, should have stopped the SI from declaring the Labor Alignment a peace force, let alone a viable one. As for the PLO it is most distressing that having given its support to a draft resolution calling for the safeguarding of Israel's sovereignty and integrity it was not even mentioned in the final resolution, and its willingness to accept peace on the basis of coexistence and mutual recognition had gone totally unrecognized by the SI Congress.

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PLO Now Considered Respectable

The unavoidable conclusion from this questionable position of the SI must be that it has failed to assert itself as a viable organization in so far as the Middle East is concerned. Petty party considerations certainly outweighed any desire to live up to the requirements of the hour. For the time being the EEC initiative, which has yet to gather momentum, seems to be holding greater hopes for the peace forces in the Middle East than that of the SI. But on the level of the bilateral relations between the peace forces and the PLO a great deal has been achieved which merits closer scrutiny.

Taking as a starting point the Paris talks which began in June 1976 between the PLO and the Israeli Council for Israel-Palestinian Peace (ICIPP), the progress made since then can be summarized as follows. On the Israeli side there is clearly a greater awareness among the public of the development that has taken place in the political thinking of the PLO over the last seven years. Contacts with PLO officials is no longer considered a punishable crime and the number of individuals who seek such contacts and obtain them is increasing. No longer does an Israeli who meets a PLO official have to explain his conduct, as did Naftali Feder at the time, because of an accidental encounter with a PLO official during an international meeting. Meeting PLO officials has become in Israel a respected phenomenon which is still vigorously opposed by political circles who maintain that Israel's interests dictate a denial of the Palestinian's legitimate rights. It would be well to remember that the Labor party, dubbed by the SI as the only viable peace force in Israel, is a major champion of the latter position. But neither the Labor party nor the Likud government dares hinder free and acknowledged contacts between Israel and the PLO.

The significance of this achievement may not be readily appreciated outside Israel, but it should not be underestimated. In a situation where an Israeli government might have to consider a new policy toward the PLO, the public will be found ready and willing to support it. The old argument, so much liked by the humdrum politician of Israel, that in whatever he is

doing he is merely following the national consensus is already untrue. The willingness of the public to put to the test a different policy towards the Palestinian problem has risen from some 3% in December 1975, when the ICIPP was announced, to close to 50% in more recent polls.

New Political Realities

But in all fairness these developments inside Israel can hardly be compared to those seen on the Palestinian side. Suffice it to point out, as does Dr. Sartawi in his letter to the ICIPP on the occasion of its fifth anniversary, that Chairman Arafat can state now that talks between the PLO and Sheli have for their purpose the creation of new political facts in the Middle East and that the world accepts this astonishing declaration. This declaration is significant as well for the other elements it contains. The reference, of course, is to the interview Mr. Arafat gave to *Al-Hawadess* of 19, December 1980, where he stated that those very talks were being conducted pursuant to the PNC resolution of 1977 and that he was bound by that resolution to maintain those contacts with the various Israeli political parties mentioned in the interview. Furthermore, he stated that "anyone who is prepared to join these talks is welcome to do so." No clearer invitation to other Israeli parties to join the talks can be offered, considering the open hostility toward the PLO by the Israeli government and of its major opposition, the Labor party.

As for the new political facts alluded to, Dr. Sartawi seems to be in no doubt as to what they are: "Sooner than all our combined enemies think, peace shall reign between the Palestinian and Israeli states and their peoples" he states in his letter. All Israeli commentators with any integrity admitted in their columns that such unequivocal statements have never been heard before and cannot be overlooked. It still remains to be seen, however, how long it will take for the "only viable peace force in Israel" to awaken to the new reality.

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But important and dramatic as these developments are, no Israeli would ignore the profound change that is taking place in the perception of Israeli reality by important Palestinian individuals. In an extremely important article published both in the daily *Falastin al-Thaura* and the weekly by that name, Dr. Sartawi has analyzed the new political program of the Labor party of Israel. In this context he felt it was necessary to distinguish three trends of thought inside the Zionist movement of today: the right wing, led by Likud, which aims at total annexation of the occupied territories and the eventual expulsion of all its Palestinian inhabitants, in accordance with the well known precept that the Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people and has never belonged to others; the Labor school of thought which realizes that the Likud goals are unattainable on practical grounds and therefore is prepared to settle for the annexation of only part of the occupied territories (practically the whole of the Golan Heights and 50% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and leave the Palestinian population in the non-annexed, densely populated, Palestinian areas, deprived of any political rights. The third trend, however, is recognized as one which calls for complete withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967, including Eastern Jerusalem, and supports the right of the Palestinians to establish their own state under the leadership of the PLO.

Growing Awareness to Rapprochement

This was probably the first time that thousands of Palestinian refugees could read in their own newspaper an analysis which shows that their national aspirations can be achieved without necessarily expecting this to be conditioned upon eliminating the Zionist entity. For us Zionists in Israel, who find ourselves recognized in the third trend of Sartawi's analysis, this signals the beginning of a whole new era. Because it has always been of the utmost importance for us that Zionism, as the embodiment of the historical hope of the Jewish people for a secure sovereign existence in its ancient land, should be recognized as compatible with the realiza-

tion of similar aspirations of the Palestinian national movement. That now, after so many years of struggle and suffering for which many must be blamed, this hope seems to be realized, is a development whose importance transcends any political circumstance of the moment. It is perhaps a sign of the rapidly changing attitudes of other parties that the Rakah Arabic paper *al-Itihad* has reproduced Dr. Sartawi's article in full, allowing thereby thousands of Arabs living in Israel to be aware of the great change taking place among Palestinian leaders outside, regarding the nature of Zionism. The flat, two dimensional perception of Zionism as a homogeneous, unified single-colored ideology that bears no variations, is now replaced by a more penetrating perception of that most complex and stirring phenomenon of the resurgence of Jewish national awareness.

Faced with such far reaching developments in the Palestinian camp, what is there on the Israeli side to equal it? The answer need hardly be spelled out: rigidity of thought, egocentrism or even autism which precludes any response to surrounding processes, have become the distinguishing traits of Israeli foreign policy.

In 1975, when the first signals of the dynamics of PLO political thinking became noticeable in Israel, a number of Israeli citizens appealed to the government to signal back that we were eager for further signs of a possible Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement. The appeal went unheeded, so these Israelis decided that the next best thing they could do was form an organization of their own which would undertake the task of signaling back to the PLO that some of us were watching them with increasing hopes for the eventual reconciliation. So the ICIPP came into being in December of that year. Now, confronting a government bent on tenacious hostility to the Palestinians and an opposition which is bent on disallowing any change in that policy, the ICIPP thought the least they could do to signal their appreciation of the dramatic developments in the PLO was to announce their adoption of the Palestinian and Israeli flags posed side by side, as their formal insignia, thus demonstrating their belief in the vision of the two states living in peace sooner than most people expect.

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ISRAEL

ARAB LAND OWNERSHIP DISPUTED IN GALILEE

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Feb/Mar 81 pp 32-34, 60

[Article by Mohammed Watad]

[Text]

Recently, scores of Arab villagers in the center of the country have been summoned to appear before the courts for failing to obtain within six months, building permits for premises they had built, or they would have to demolish the houses themselves. There is considerable restlessness in these villages, as the process of constructing these houses hardly take place in secret: savings are scraped together, relatives are called upon to help with the work, the local engineer makes the plans, the local building commission has been approached for the building permits, and once these are given, work begins.

However, the permit issued by the local planning commission is often insufficient, because only the *district* planning commissions are authorized to approve the plans. The latter include no Arab representatives, and they work "by the book." Thus the violation begins in the local planning commission, which consists of elected local counselors and public figures. But the local commission is never prosecuted — the targets are always the householders, who are charged with building without valid permits. Usually they are made to pay heavy fines, and sometimes the houses are demolished. The demolition orders are rarely carried out, but whenever it happens, the event is given extensive public coverage accompanied by hostile propaganda, in which are blended deep-seated prejudices and deliberate prevarications.

"State Lands"

The commonest argument used is that "Arabs build on the nation's land." This statement is partly untrue from a purely factual viewpoint, and generally misleading. Demolition orders have been carried out on houses built on lands which are incontrovertibly privately-owned. This was the case of the house demolished some months ago in Majd al-Krum in the Galilee, one of twelve built far from any major road, bothering nobody. Another example is the house of the Agbariah brothers in the village of Musmus, which was also built on private land, some fifty meters from the main road, like scores of others along its length. Not long ago a water main, designed to supply water to several communities, was laid beside this road, yet this fact was never brought up when the issue became public, and the planners seemed unperturbed by the fact that the water main would surely impede the future widening of the road no less than the building in question.

Demolition orders were also carried out in Arab al-Soueid, on the grounds that the buildings had been built on State lands. In this district, between Deir al-Asad, Karmiel and Sakhnin, and along the Acre-Safed road, there are lands whose ownership is in dispute between the Lands Registration Office and the local

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Arab villages, including Arab al-Soueid. National and quasi-national bodies have combined to increase the Jewish population in the Galilee, displaying incredible indifference to the future development of the local Arab villages. This is not unlike the policy concerning the black goats of the Arabs, which were declared a menace to the very existence of the State and the nation, and whose extermination was entrusted to the so-called "green patrol." Now it is revealed that rather than endangering the natural vegetation, the black goat helps to promote its growth, and a proposal has been made to encourage Jewish farmers to breed black goats!

It is not only disputed land which has been transferred, in law and in practice, to national ownership — private land, too, has suffered the same fate, as for example the so-called "area 9," which belonged to Sakhnin. Once land has been transferred to State ownership it is immediately declared a national asset, and innumerable "observation posts" are established, in the most provocative manner, accompanied by the usual rigmarole about Arabs trying to seize national land, with the financial assistance of "alien elements" — a sheer fantasy.

The Genuine Needs

The Arab population in Israel is part of the State of Israel. It has grown by more than 300% since 1948. Aside from the historical fact that a large part of the lands which had been owned by Arabs was expropriated by the State, there is also the essential principle that each citizen is entitled to share in whatever the State offers its citizens. Yet this is not the case in matters involving land, construction and housing. Not only privately-owned and "disputed" lands have been transferred to State ownership, but public lands in the Arab towns and villages have also been transferred, by a variety of legalistic and procedural devices, to the Lands Registration Office. The most prominent example in this category are the lands owned by the Moslem *Waqf*, i.e., the religious administration of the Moslem community. These alone could

have solved the housing problem of the Arabs of Haifa, Acre, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh and many other villages. But only in very few cases has the State allocated land for Arab housing, as for instance in the case of the Beduin in the Galilee and now in the Negev, and in both cases only under duress and when a solution was essential for security reasons.

Everything is done quite legally. Concerning this legality, Shekh Hammad Abu Rebiah, MK, (who was murdered in Jerusalem in mid-January. Ed.), said: "In the past, the weak and defenseless citizen could find succor in the law. Today the law persecutes us." This statement expresses the general feeling of the Arab community in Israel. The planning and housing laws are so devised as to be insupportable by the Arab community, and the repeated admonitions to the Arabs to obey these laws, without offering any alternatives, can only undermine the moral authority of the rule of law in their eyes. After all, in a democracy, the law is supposed to serve the citizen, and not the other way around.

A Smokescreen

Among the arguments brought forward to support the demolition orders is the one that says, "One law for Jews and Arabs alike. Houses are demolished in Tel Aviv, too!" Now the case of the Greiber house in Gadera is used to provide an object lesson, yet it is a totally misleading example. Just as Kfar Haroeh and Kibbutz Hama'apil are not Tel Aviv, neither is the Arab village of Baq'a al-Gharbiah. The Arab population in Israel is concentrated in two townships (Nazareth and Shafamar), in five mixed cities and in one hundred and thirty seven villages, as well as Beduin encampments.

Most of the architects engaged in planning in the Arab sector are insufficiently aware of the specific needs of each community. A cooperative farming community has quite different needs from those of a kibbutz, and a semi-agricultural village has entirely different planning problems than a city suburb. The frequent ab-

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sence of a general outline scheme makes it impossible to make use of the six months's extension granted by the courts to obtain a permit. Thus the citizen finds himself guilty of the additional violation of failing to obey a court injunction, and faces the hazard of having his house destroyed at dawn. A house built on private land is placed in the same category as the Greiber house, which was built on State land. Here you have another distortion hidden behind the smokescreen of tendentious propaganda.

Penalty After Penalty

The present situation in the Arab villages is that there are hundreds of houses, standing and inhabited, which were built without legal permit. It is important to distinguish among these between (a) houses which were built on privately-owned land, (b) those which are on State land (a tiny minority), and (c) those standing on land which is in dispute. In the entire "triangle" region in the center of the country there are less than a dozen houses in the second and third categories. Yet the owners of the houses in all three categories have been heavily fined and most have been threatened with demolition.

Not only are the fines heavy, but the owners are barred from obtaining any kind of mortgage. The housing loans available to Israeli Arabs are smaller than those enjoyed by Jews, and their terms are much more severe, even in the mixed cities, such as Acre. Thus the Arab citizen who has been compelled to build his home without a permit is penalized first by the unequal terms of the mortgage, secondly by the legal authorities for building without a permit, and finally punished by demolition. Is there no way out of this predicament?

To Break the Vicious Circle

A new approach to the problem of Arab village planning could easily solve the entanglement and do away with the bitterness and sense of discrimination. The argument that Arabs are not interested in planning is without foundation.

Various generous souls, who are themselves living on State lands, are now proposing to expropriate forty percent of the privately-owned land "for public purposes," and to re-zone a portion of the diminishing reserve of agricultural land for housing. Now, agricultural land which has been thus re-zoned becomes an unbearable financial burden on account of the high property taxes, and a liability to the owners who use it as a home farm. Now that many of the basic commodities are no longer subsidized, the value of the home farm has grown immeasurably, especially in the economy of large rural families. Even if the district planning commission consisted entirely of geniuses, they would still know less than the local inhabitants about their specific needs.

The following principles could help to solve the problem:

- (1) A general amnesty should be given to all who have built houses on their own land within the housing zone proposed by the local council.
- (2) In so far as the land in question is State-owned, it should be leased to the householders under the same terms as those enjoyed by the (Jewish) agricultural communities.
- (3) Where land ownership is disputed, its resolution should be hastened. Where it is determined to be State-owned, it should be leased to its permanent inhabitants.
- (4) Housing zones proposed by the local councils should be confirmed, even before the detailed plans within the zones have been worked out.
- (5) The ratio of expropriation should be reduced to 20%, and devoted chiefly to widening and constructing roads and to public institutions.
- (6) State land should be allocated for public purposes and housing schemes for young couples, to be built by private initiative or by contractors.
- (7) All privately-owned agricultural lots above one dunam (a quarter acre), within the housing zones, should be recognized as home farms, if the owners so wish.
- (8) Building commissions of the local councils should be authorized to issue building permits

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within the proposed housing zones.

(9) The size and terms of the housing loans available to Jewish and Arab citizens should be equalized under the same criteria.

(10) To enable the Arab population to express its particular communal culture in the detailed planning of the outline schemes.

These principles, if applied, would solve a problem which is bedeviling the country as a whole. Some villagers will no doubt prefer to grow onions and potatoes, rather than cultivate rose gardens and lawns on their lands. The endless palaver about planning has obscured the issue, created a general pandemonium of mutual recriminations and vicious incitement. Let us try to disentangle this sorry mess.

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LIBYA

AL-QADHDHAFI DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH U.S., USSR

Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in English 28 Apr 81 p 7

[Interview with Col Qadhafi, "leader of the revolution" in Libya by Asahi Shimbun and TV-Asahi before his visit to Moscow]

[Text] [Question] What is the purpose of your visit to the Soviet Union?

[Answer] As friendly nations, we will discuss the world situation which is in confusion, relations between Libya and the Soviet Union, relations between liberation organizations in various places and the Soviet Union, and so forth. The agenda items will be general, but in the course of conducting discussions, several separate and specific problems may come to the fore. I will visit the Soviet Union for the first time in five years since 1976. During that period, the Soviet Union has supported us, who are faced with the challenge of the US, and friendly relations with the Soviet Union have developed. Measures against the US, which is strengthening its aggressive nature, will be one agenda item.

We Are Non-Aligned, But Friendly Toward USSR

[Question] What is your view on the Soviet Union's world strategy?

[Answer] We are a small power based on neutralism. Therefore, I have no intention of comparing the Soviet Union's policies with those of the US. However, the policy of the US shows the trend to establish military bases in other nations' territory, carry out military intervention, and pose a threat. Also, it supports reactionary, feudalistic governments and takes sides with the capitalist, exploiting system. On the other hand, Soviet military bases cannot be seen in the map of the world, except for the Warsaw Treaty nations. (In reply to a question asking about the situations in Somalia, Ethiopia, and South Yemen). They are not something like US military bases. The Soviet Union does not support reactionary governments; neither does it take sides with feudalism and exploitation. In regard to this point, I can appreciate the Soviet Union.

In some respects, the Soviet Union cannot but take actions as a big power, because it is a big power. Naturally, we are opposed to intervention from any direction. If the Soviet Union becomes an imperialist nation like the US, we will oppose the Soviet Union just as we oppose the US now. If the Soviet Union demands the construction of military bases in our country, we will probably block it resolutely.

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[Question] What is your view on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? You lean clearly toward the Soviet Union. Even so, is it possible for you to say that you are non-aligned?

[Answer] We are against intervention by any foreign forces. Concerning Afghanistan, I think that no one but the Afghan people can lead Afghanistan successfully. The revolutionary government of Afghanistan has not declared aggression, so far. Strictly speaking, we are a 100 percent non-aligned nation. Besides, we are not negatively neutral, but we are neutral in a positive way. This, however, does not mean that there are no friends among neutral nations.

New Government of US Is Better

[Question] What view do you take as to the Reagan Administration of the US?

[Answer] It is still too early to form a judgment. However, I think that the new Reagan Administration will be better than the former Carter Administration. At least, former President Carter exposed the national rights of the Arab nations to danger by signing the Camp David Agreement.

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SUDAN

SOUTHERN LEADERSHIP ARGUES DIVISION OF REGION

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 16-20

[Article by Jacob Akol, southern regional editor]

[Text]

Is it the times that have changed, or merely the tune? Three years ago, as President of the High Executive Council (HEC) of the Southern Region, Joseph Lagu argued forcefully against the notion of administratively dividing the Southern Region into discrete and distinct entities. Recently, however, he has reversed his opinion and is now actively propogating this idea. Whatever the merits (or lack thereof) of this proposal, it is clear that it has provoked a storm amongst Southern politicians, not the least because it re-awakens the issue of the institutionalisation of political power along communal lines. In part this is inevitable, and in part it is contingently tied to one of the proposal's 'justifications': to reduce/ properly re-adjust the alleged dominance of the Dinka in the higher reaches of the state machinery in the South.


THE SOUTH,' President Nimeiri said in his opening address to the meeting of the Central Committee of the SSU late in February, 'has led the Sudan successfully on the path to regionalisation'. Now that the devolution of powers has become a reality in the North, which now has five regions, 'is it not time,' asked the President, 'that we consider the possibility of devolving administration in the South itself?' President Nimeiri added that the proposal had some positive aspects. It would, for example, bring administration nearer to the people and make government more efficient given the vastness of the region. This, the President said, would be in keeping with the revolution's resolve to hand power to the

people. The President also pointed out that a division of the South into more regions might be a good way of avoiding domination of the Southern Region's administration by a single ethnic group. However, the President stressed that he did not intend to let this issue become a source of contention.

It would appear that the driving force behind the proposal to divide the South into three autonomous regions, with borders drawn along the lines of the old provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria, was General (rtd) Joseph Lagu, former leader of the Anya-Nya guerrillas during the civil war and President of the Regional government from February 1978 to early 1980. (See interview). His argument is essentially that the

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- 1 Northern Region
- 2 Eastern Region
- 3 Kordofan Region
- 4 Khartoum Province
- 5 Central Region
- 6 Upper Nile (suggested) Region
- 7 Darfur Region
- 8 Equatoria (suggested) Region
- 9 Bahr el Ghazal (suggested) Region

reasons which dictated that the South present a united front no longer exist. There is, for example, no fear of religious, cultural or social persecution from the North. 'If the South were divided into three regions,' he said, 'Sunday would still remain the day of rest for the Southern Regions. Our Southern identity is guaranteed by the constitution, and the South would still unite if our common interests were infringed upon by the North'.

Reaction from some Southern members of the Central Committee bordered on hostility. They accused General Lagu of naivete, superficiality and power-seeking. Dr Justin Yac, Southern Region Minister of Co-operatives, said in the meeting that any Southerner calling for the division of the region was simply vying for a political post, and that the President would be well-advised to give them posts so that they would cease to make such ridiculous suggestions. General Lagu countered this last accusation by asking why, if he were 'power-hungry', as some of his colleagues had suggested, would he have signed the Addis Ababa Agreement without any prior guarantee that he would be given the top political post in the South, or some leading position in the central government administration?

As hostility against the proposal gathered steam, Northern politicians, who were conspicuously elated by the suggestion, retired to the background and left the argument to Southerners. A petition, signed by 39 Southern members of the Central Committee, requested that the item be removed from the agenda and referred to the SSU basic units to weigh the odds and decide, if they so wished, to bring the matter up at the national level. The Central Committee endorsed the request of the petition, but matters did not rest there.

Following the Central Committee conclave, a meeting called by the Southern Union of Students of the University of Khartoum presented General Lagu as the main speaker on the proposed division of the Southern Region. General Lagu reiterated his previous reasons for the division of the South and dismissed eco-

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conomic arguments used by his opponents as 'myths'. 'The colonialists', he said, 'used the same arguments to dominate others'. The division of the South into regions, he said, would bring leaders from Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal nearer to their people; he added that such a move was bound to improve development in these areas.

Angelo Beda, Speaker of the Southern Region Assembly, followed General Lagu. Painfully aware that what he was going to say might be used against him by his opponents in the next election, Beda said, 'I must have my honest point of view recorded in this matter: I do not think for the moment that dividing the South into more regions is economically feasible, and I do not think that it will solve tribalism in the South. The region,' he said, 'cannot at this stage even collect £3 million from taxes - and the people are already overtaxed. The South lacks manpower: the only surplus manpower in the region is politicians; the only appeal for this division is to create posts for politicians: there is a limit to which you can tax people and we have already reached that limit. To divide the South,' he concluded, 'would defeat the very concept of the Addis Ababa Agreement.'

Othwonh Dak, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, condemned tribalism but refused to accept the idea that dividing the South into regions would solve the problem. 'A handful among the Dinka have talked of Dinka unity the way they talk in Kenya about Kikuyu unity'. The problem, he said, is not the numbers but the institutionalisation of tribalism, which he condemned. Moreover he pointed out that Joseph Lagu became the President of the High Executive Council over two years ago because of Dinka backing.

Peter Gatkuoth, the Southern Region's Vice-President and Minister of Finance, agreed that without Dinka backing Lagu would not have succeeded in removing Alier in 1978. 'If', he said, 'we divide the South into smaller regions we will condemn smaller tribes in Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile to perpetual domination. Being together,' he pointed out, 'may be

the best guarantee of minimising tribalism aimed at minority tribes, because these tribes may bend together to make a majority that even the biggest ethnic group cannot defeat.'

Southern Region MP William Ajal Deng reminded the meeting of General Lagu's speech when he, as newly elected President of the High Executive Council, opened the Southern Region's Assembly in 1978 with the words: 'I wish to call upon every member of this House, and every Southerner to maintain regional unity. We will not allow tribalism to divide us. My election as President of the High Executive Council proves that the South is politically mature and nationalistic enough to rise above ethnic and geographical differences when choosing a leader.' Deng then asked what had happened in only two years to change Lagu's mind so dramatically.

Ambrose Ring, leader of the Southern Region SSU Assembly Body, said that it was nonsense for anyone to suppose that the Addis Ababa Agreement will remain intact after the division of the South into more regions. Having divided the previous three Provinces into six is not the same thing as dividing the South into more regions, nor is it true to say that the creation of more Ministers, above and beyond the number agreed upon in Addis Ababa, is a good precedence for calling for the division of the South. He asked: 'What about the security arrangements with the North? the currency? - in fact, everything connected with the agreement?'

The argument against the division of the Southern Region was basically that it would affect the agreement, throw the constitution into disrepute and destabilise the country. However, given President Nimeiri's address, it is not obvious that Lagu's proposal would either breach the Agreement or the constitution.

Peter Gatkuoth told *Sudanow* later that this idea is not new, that Northern politicians have long called for the division of the South into regions. They proposed division in 1965 during the Round Table Conference. Southern politicians objected to the proposal and it was dropped.

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In 1970 and 1971 the idea was brought up again by Northern politicians as the basis for negotiations with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. Dr Lawrence Wol Wol, who was Secretary to SSLM during the peace negotiations in London and later in Addis Ababa, told *Sudanow* that, 'we made it a condition that the Northern politicians drop the idea of dividing the South into regions, and it was only because this precondition was met that we proceeded to the peace conference in Addis. We had also called for the division of Northern Sudan into regions, but this was rejected by our brothers, and we gave them their way.' Supporters of Lagu's proposal will of course turn this argument against Wol Wol, now that Northern Sudan is divided into regions.

Many influential Southern politicians do not see the call for the division of the South as emanating from a genuine desire by the Southern people to effect an efficient administration for the good of the region and Sudan as a whole. They charge that the idea is still coming from the same Northern politicians who advocated it in the sixties, and that Southern politicians are simply being used in an old game. Said Peter Gatkuoth: 'leading Northern members of the Central Committee, particularly members of the political office, backed this idea during the conference, and were trying to lobby for the debate of the proposal by the Central Committee. But the Southern members of the committee had the upper hand in the matter and the proposal was referred to the Southern Region basic units of the SSU. 'It is a pity,' he added, 'that a man like Joseph Lagu, whose name is synonymous with the agreement, should allow himself to be used in this way.' Gatkuoth's view is that there are some diehard Northern politicians who are not happy to see the South

happy. 'Because we seem to have been successful lately in putting a number of things right with the central government, these Northern politicians are not happy with such progress, and thus the call for the division of the South.'

Bona Malwal, Southern Region Minister of Industry and Mining, sees the call for the division of the region in the same light as Peter Gatkuoth: 'It is difficult to believe', he told *Sudanow*, 'that this sudden call for the division of the South, at the time when issues such as the oil refinery are being discussed, was coincidence. There is a point in suspecting that the call for the division of the South into more regions is being used to detract from important issues about which the South feels strongly.'

The last six months have seen a number of contentious issues arising between the Southern Region government and the central authorities in Khartoum. Last December Kafia Kingi and Hufat El Nahas were returned to the Southern Region's administration after they had been annexed to Darfur by Abboud's regime during the civil war period; the Southern members of the National Assembly, backed by the regional government, fought successfully late last year against attempts by some Northern members of the assembly to legalise a map which Southerners claimed took away land from the South and added it to the North; and these are seen, say Southerners, by Northern politicians as undue victories, not rights, for the South. There is currently unrest in Abyei area where the Dinka community in that district of Kordofan is seeking a referendum to decide whether to become part of the South or remain part of the North. And last but not least, the regional government is not too happy with the central Ministry of Energy's decision to build the refinery in Kosti. ■

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SUDAN

JOSEPH LAGU GIVES VIEWS ON DECENTRALIZATION

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 16-20

[Interview with Joseph Lagu, former HEC [High Executive Council] president, by SUDANOW: "Changing Times?"; date and place not given]

[Text]

Nine years after signing the historic Addis Ababa Accord which brought to an end to 17 tragic years of civil war, three years after assuming the Presidency of the HEC of the Southern Region, and one year after stepping down from this position, Joseph Lagu has again placed himself at the centre of an emerging controversy: should the Southern Region follow the path of the North and formally decentralize its political structures? This question, and many others, were raised when Sudanow interviewed the former HEC President.

SUDANOW: *In the opening ceremony of the Southern Region Assembly in 1978, you said that the South could not afford to be divided. What has prompted you this time to call for the division of the South into more regions?*

JOSEPH LAGU: In my policy statement in 1978, I stated that the South could not afford to be divided and that the Southern Sudanese should be united. In 1978 the North was still a bloc somewhat opposed to Southern regional autonomy. Regionalism was not understood in the northern part of the country, even after several years of self-rule in the South. Regionalism has now been understood and hence the North divided into five regions. There is thus now no need to keep the South as a bloc. It is necessary to improve matters on the basis of this change, and the South should learn to cope with the current policies of the country and not remain a bloc. But had the North been divided into only three regions, it would

then have been justified to keep the South as one — so as to provide a balance with the North.

I feel the South should be administratively divided into three on the pattern of the old Southern Provinces of Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile, so that it is in line with other regions in the North. The advantage which we can derive from this is that the cities of the South like Malakal in Upper Nile and Wau in Bahr el Ghazal will grow up as El Obeid will begin to grow up, as El Fasher will begin to grow up, and the government in the South will be decentralised. Further, the Southern elite and the Southern intellectuals, who are so few and who all rushed to Juba, will evenly be distributed. Some will pull back to Bahr el Ghazal, centering in Wau, others will pull back to Upper Nile, centering in Malakal. They will be nearer to their people who need them at this time for the purpose of development.

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There is no more need for the South to group together because it will be misinterpreted and it will continue to ring in the ears of the people of the North that the South has some hidden objectives. I want to see the fears of the North about the South removed and this is one of the reasons why I called for the South to be divided into three. This is not the same as dividing the Southern people. Southerners will remain Southerners. It was not Addis Ababa which made Southern Sudan; Southern Sudan existed before Addis Ababa, and Southern Sudan will continue to exist. Southern Sudan has been the provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal since before the Turks, and dividing it into administrative units will not change it. Southern Sudan is an ethnic, geographical, and cultural entity. It will continue to be one. And Southern Sudanese will continue to group together in the National Assembly here in Khartoum, defending their common interests.

Q: Looking back over the last nine years of peace in the South: could there have been a better deal that would have safeguarded the special interest of the South as well as the general interest of the Sudan?

A: I can't see what other better deal could have safeguarded the interest of the South as well as the general interest of the Sudan than that of Addis Ababa in 1972. In my assessment that was the best we could do; and it is for the Sudanese people to improve upon it from time to time, that's why I stated in the Central Committee that the Addis Ababa Agreement was not static, that it was something to open the way for understanding. It began to restore confidence between Northern Sudanese and Southern Sudanese, confidence which had been lost over 17 years of the civil war. It was a start for the better and upon the Addis Ababa Agreement we can improve our lot in the Sudan. Southern Sudanese will feel comfortable in the South; that by it they are able to maintain their identity, values and culture within the united Sudan.

Q: Has the integration of the Anya-Nya into the national army forces worked out to your satisfaction?

A: Yes. I felt so because I remained in the armed forces myself so as to participate in the supervision of the absorption and integration of the Anya-Nya into the National forces. To the best of my

memory that has been fulfilled. We agreed at Addis that our interest was to see that Southerners are represented in the armed forces proportionately to the population, and when I visited the different units of the Sudanese armed forces I could see by their appearance that there is a good proportion of Southern Sudanese in the armed forces. And particularly I would draw the attention of my colleagues in the general headquarters to the special consideration of taking young Southern boys from the schools so that they can also go in a good proportion, to the military college, so that they can participate in officering the Sudanese armed forces with their fellow brothers in the North. And if the same proportion is also maintained in the officer corps as it is in the other ranks one would feel a satisfaction that in the armed forces all is going well.

Q: Is tribalism or partisanship a threat to the stability of Southern Sudan. To what extent do they influence political decisions?

A: Tribalism and partisanship is a threat to stability and maybe even peace in Southern Sudan. As I have mentioned in the Central Committee: today 10 out of 20 Ministers in the Regional Government, including the President of the High Executive Council, come from one tribe, the Dinka tribe. This is over-emphasising tribalism. In all African politics tribalism is a disease. The Dinka may not even be one quarter of the population of the South; how can they be represented as half the cabinet? They can meet alone and their meeting can be valid. You can see what a threat it is to stability and maybe even peace in Southern Sudan; because the others are certainly not feeling easy about them.

About partisanship: yes, there is. I can say with authority that since we returned, political groupings in the South have followed the pattern of Southern party politics prior to the peace agreement, that is, the Southern Front people against the SANU people. Each is competing to win the favour of authority in Khartoum, trying to show that they are the right people. There is partisanship in the South and this has to be, one way or the other, brought to an end. We who had been outside, voluntarily dissolved ourselves. We could have also returned on the basis of our external organisations but we didn't

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know much about political activities inside. There is a threat to stability and peace in the South because of tribalism and partisanship and because of the parties which, are tearing the South apart. The Southern Front and the SANU operate within the SSU and they label anybody else as anti-revolutionary and this and that, while they themselves are operating as parties. The Southern Front and SANU are the competitors today in the South and this is something that can not be denied.

Q: Both your government and that of Abel Alier have so far failed to effect Southern Region administration in a number of areas clearly stated in the agreement as part of the South. What has been the difficulty?

A: Well, the areas which are stated in the agreement as parts of the South, or as people of the Southern complex, are 'Kafia Kinji' and 'Hufrat Nahas' in the Northwest of Bahr el Ghazal, which was administratively part of the South until it was added to the North in June 1960 through a government gazette during the military era of Abboud. That was one part of the South which according to the Addis Agreement should have automatically gone to the South, because the Addis Agreement recognized the then standing borders of the 1st January 1956. 'Kafia' and 'Nahas' were added to the North after that. It is very unfortunate that such a matter should have arisen in the national parliament. I felt that it is a matter that we could have quietly solved and that this area would smoothly be transferred back to the South without causing any problem in the National Assembly. However things happened, and the President of the Republic wisely took steps to form a committee. The committee made a suggestion and the President forwarded it to our National Assembly which passed it, and I hope the administration of 'Hafrat Nahas' and 'Kafia Kinji' will be very smoothly transferred to the South, or to the province concerned, Bahr el Ghazal.

In regard to the other areas mentioned as being not of the South by culture and so forth: it was stated clearly that in such areas where the people are culturally and ethnically Southern, a referendum would be held and it is for the

people to choose. If they choose to go to South then they can be added to the South administratively, if they choose to remain in the North it is up to them. The areas in question are really two: one is Abyei and the other is Chally el Feil. Though culturally and ethnically part of the Southern complex, we have never heard voices from Chally El Feil asking for a return to the South. So my opinion is that so long as they don't ask for it, they should be left as they are. We leave the door open so that when they ask for it, a referendum can also be held there. The people we know who have asked to be part of the South are the Dinka Ngok of Abyei. I feel it is in order that they should be given an opportunity to exercise their constitutional right. Let them be justly consulted; do they wish to remain part of Kordofan?

If they wish to remain part of Kordofan, we in the South shouldn't quarrel over it because Kordofan is a part of the Sudan and they are within the Sudan. If, instead, they wish to be added to the South, our brothers in Kordofan or in the rest of the Sudan should also not have hard feelings, because they are not going away, they are still within the Sudan, only preferring to be administered from Bahr el Ghazal.

Q: How do you view the process of development in the Southern Region since the Addis Ababa Accord, nine years ago?

A: One vital thing which I always say, which I never leave out, is that peace has been achieved, as a result of the Addis agreement. It paved the way for stability, and with stability a lot of things have been done in the Southern Region and even in the Sudan as the whole. In the Southern Region it has been possible to set up a regional government centred in Juba. With that, power has been transferred nearer to the people, and confidence has been building up since that time.

In addition our roads, which were destroyed in the 17 years of civil war, have been improved, and more have been constructed. Other development projects like the improvement of Juba airport, so as to handle heavy planes like the Boeing 707 and the 737 have been

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implemented. The buildings of the new parliament and offices for the regional ministries, is a sign of development. As is the bridge over the Nile at Juba and the bridge over the Jur River in Wau, and so forth. Up to this time a lot of things have taken place, though more could have taken place. I think that the nine years of peace in Southern Sudan have seen a great deal of good things happening here and there.

Q: What about the oil discoveries in Bentiu and the controversy concerning the place of the installation of the refinery?

A: The oil discovery in Bentiu area is good news for everybody in Sudan. At least the Sudan, which has suffered poverty for so many years, may in the future see prosperity. It is good news for everybody in Sudan that there are signs of oil here: if it is found in

Bentiu, then tomorrow it will be found in Kosti, around Torit or even around Juba. It is a sign of a good future for the Sudan as a whole. There shouldn't be any controversy over it. We in Sudan should feel happy that we are about to be relieved from our poverty. The politicians should keep their noses out of the site of the refinery. They should leave it to the technicians to decide the correct place. This is in brief what I would really like to say, because if we politicians put our noses in it then we begin to quarrel as to whether it should be here or there. We will be wasting time and the oil will continue to stay underground and none of us benefits when it remains underground. We want it to come to the surface and I would like to put it in my car. My opinion is: let us forget political feelings and leave it to the technicians to decide.

What I could appeal for, in order to remove the fear of Southern Sudanese, is that many young Southern Sudanese should be trained in how to handle this work. No doubt wherever the refinery will be, Southerners will also appear among the technicians. Young Southern fellows are to be taken for courses abroad and so forth, so that any fears will be removed.

Q: What is your attitude to the Sharia Laws? Do you see the necessity of such

legislation for the Sudan?

A: I look at this with fear and suspicion. I am working to remove any traces of fear between the South and the North, that is why I am suggesting that the Southern Region be split into three, so as to remove any traces of fear in the minds of the northern Sudanese that the South still maintains this or maintains that. The *Sharia* laws cause more fears in the Southern Sudanese, and the introduction of *Sharia* laws will make the Southern Sudanese more and more suspicious.

So I really don't see any necessity to talk of *Sharia* as the basis of legislation for the Sudan, because it would mean making us Southern Sudanese second grade citizens in law, without any chance of aspiring for the highest office in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. And I have to be very firm here. People shouldn't even talk about the *Sharia* laws for the Sudan, knowing that the Sudan is a country of diversities. It is causing fears and suspicion among the Southern Sudanese and whoever advocate that should relax or forget about it in the interest of unity.

Q: What is your assessment of North-South relations over the last nine years of peace? Some Northern politicians have expressed the view that the agreement is merely a stepping-stone for future secession of the South? Has the South given them any reason to think this way?

A: Well, over the years after signing the agreement confidence has been steadily restored between citizens of the Southern Region and the North, in many fields and in many areas. We are trying to remove this fear, and one of my objectives in suggesting that the Southern Region be administratively divided into three regions, is to remove these traces of fear and suspicions about the South. Southerners now want to reconstruct, to develop their area and the entire region, to participate with the rest of the Sudan.

In return also, I would want to see fellow countrymen in the North remove any areas of fear and suspicion in the minds in Southerners, so that from all directions we look towards building a truly united Sudan, with the interests of every individual safeguarded.

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SUDAN

OMDURMAN UNIVERSITY FACTIONS ARGUE NATURE OF SCHOOL

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 21-22

[Article by Azhari Abdel Rahman: "Unlearnt Lessons"]

[Text]

The Omdurman Islamic University has often been the battleground for warring factions of students, each with their own interpretation as to what kind of university the Omdurman Islamic should be; but now, it seems, the battle has been carried to the staff and administration. Reporter Azhari Abdel Rahman examines the events which led to the latest round of sit-ins and strikes at the university, and, perhaps more ominously, a reshuffling of senior administrative appointments.

THE DEFEAT OF the Muslim Brothers (MBs) by the Forces of Islamic Solidarity – a coalition composed of Ansar, National Unionists and independent students – in the student union elections of last October, has thrown the Omdurman Islamic University into conflict and brought to the boil some of the serious problems which have been simmering under the surface of the university since 1969.

On the 10th of last month, the men's student union staged a sit-in on the university premises and began a general lecture boycott after months of negotiations with the university administration had 'failed to generate any new material,' Hussein Khaddam, president of the union, told *Sudanow*. The students are complaining about poor educational facilities on the campus – shortage of staff and laboratories, an ever-changing curriculum and so on. Although the MBs refused to join in the sit-in, Hussein Khaddam estimated that about 70% of

the students had participated in the action. Even if this seems a little high, there is increasing evidence to show that the MRs are losing their control of the university – they failed to win a single seat on the executive committee at the regional association elections which were held just after the October poll.

The men's union sit-in came only two weeks after a similar sit-in at the Girls' College of the university, where the MBs have also lost control of the union. Although there is, allegedly, no coordination between the two bodies, their lists of demands are remarkably similar: dependence on visiting lecturers to be reduced, staff appointments to be based on academic not political considerations and an immediate check on the entry-qualifications for all students attending the university. The Vice Chancellor, Dr Mohamed Ahmed el Haj has been abroad several months, undergoing medical treatment, and the chairman of the university administrative council Dr Awn el Sherif

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who is not popular with the MBs – has had to deal with the negotiations himself. Two days after the men-students began their action, Dr Awn appointed Dr Hassan el Fateh Gareeballa, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and not generally considered to be an MB sympathiser either, to the post of Deputy Vice Chancellor. The Muslim Brothers have regarded the sit-in as just a tactical move by the union to win student support for their policies. One MB student-leader went further and told *Sudanow* that he considered the whole chain of events to be a conspiracy cooked up against the MBs by the union and the administration. In support of this theory they claim that the Vice Chancellor was suspended from office last year on charges of academic corruption, but was ordered to resume his duties as dean by the chairman of the administrative council *before* the fact-finding committee had submitted its final report. Further, they point to the fact that one day after Dr Gareeballa's appointment as Deputy Vice Chancellor, the union called off its action.

Hussein Khaddam strenuously denied the existence of any co-ordination between union and administration, and denied, also, any ulterior political motive behind the action. Another student source told *Sudanow* that the MBs have had a grievance against the chairman of the university administrative council, Dr Awn el Sherif, Chairman of the High Council for Religious Affairs and Endowments, and through their pamphlets have accused him of incompetence and called for his immediate replacement. It would be in order, thus, continued the student, for the MBs to be vilifying Dr Awn during

the present crisis.

Staff response to the students' sit-in was varied. During the men-students' action, a hand-out from the so-called 'non-partisan' lecturers was circulated in support of the union's demands. The MB controlled Staff Association – to which all Islamic University staff belong – was quick to denounce the pamphlet. Teaching staff at the women's college, on the other hand, actually declared a strike for three days to punish the girls for being, 'nothing better than communist tools.' According to Dr Gareeballa, the

involvement of both students and staff in the conflict was a matter of little surprise, since everyone realised the importance of the role of the university in serving Islam, but that everyone disagreed on the kind of servitude the university should show; a conflict symptomatic of a wider struggle dominating the whole Muslim world today, according to the Deputy Vice Chancellor.

One student demand, that teaching staff should be appointed on their academic and not political merits, comes as no surprise. One student told *Sudanow* that under the excuse of 'Islamicising' the university, the MBs have been appointing their staff-members to key positions in the academic structure. Another spoke of how the administration had been observing, with the strict Islamic charter of the university in mind, certain students' political activities with keen interest; over a year ago the administration banned the Democratic Front – a coalition of communists and democrats – and the Students' Struggle Front – a Ba'athist organisation – condemning them as anti-Islamic. Furthermore, in an open letter to students issued on February 26th, the Students' Deanship – administrative body responsible for student affairs – warned of retribution when the two banned fronts expressed their opinions on recent events in the university through a series of posters.

Academic reform was the main demand from both male and female students. According to Amal Warrag, president of the women's union, in addition to the shortages of staff, libraries and laboratories, students were also suffering from a lack of stability in the curriculum and a continuous procession of visiting lecturers who were staying a maximum of only a few months. Dr Gareeballa has since said that a revision of the curriculum will take place as soon as possible, but, according to some women students, this will do little to help surmount the difficulty of learning from a lecturer who arrives in the middle of a term and who starts teaching material directly opposite to what they have been learning for the first half of the term.

According to Dr Husham Sultan, head of the Department of Religion, the shortage of teaching staff is now extremely severe, affecting the whole performance

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of the university. In some departments there may be only one lecturer; others do not even have departmental heads. Dr Gareeballa attributes this to the fact that lecturers regularly leave the university for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states where greater salaries are available. The annual university budget of £3 million, contends Dr Gareeballa – six times less than that of the University of Khartoum – is not enough to alleviate the situation. The university receives additional support from Saudi Arabia – aid which is not controlled by the Higher Education Grants Committee who direct finance to all other higher educational institutes. Saudi universities usually finance visiting lectures, but *Sudanow* learns that this finance is in danger of being cut off – certain Saudi universities are reconsidering their policy of donations in the light of recent events on campus, which some interpret as a strengthening of anti-Islamic elements within the Omdurman Islamic university. The situation was hardly improved when a former Omdurman Islamic University Vice Chancellor, working in Saudi Arabia, on hearing that a female leftist activist was going to give a speech on the campus during independence anniversary celebrations, organised a public rally in Riyadh calling for Saudi universities to stop their donations.

The shortage of staff at the university cannot solely be accounted for by the usual reasons of better rewards elsewhere, say many university students. One source told *Sudanow* that there has grown up over the past few years a tendency not to appoint new staff if they happen to be political rivals of the dominating force in the staff and administration. Indeed, it seems that the complex financial and academic problems of running a university have now ceased to be the prerogative of the administration, and loud voices among the student body – supported by some members of staff – have demanded that a complete check should be made on the academic particulars of all students who have entered the university outside the regular channel of entry (that is, graduation from higher secondary school with a School Certificate).

One lecturer told *Sudanow* that while all higher education students in Sudan,

must, by law, be processed through the Central Admissions office for Higher Education, the university has established its own admissions office to deal with the large number of affiliated students, and, as a result, the administration has tended to neglect the needs of the properly qualified higher secondary school graduates. Affiliated students are students who enter the university on a non-regular basis; the university is not obliged to find them housing or provide them with medical care, but they can attend lectures, sit for exams and graduate with a degree. Another group of students, called 'listeners,' who just seem to turn up off the streets and attend lectures in a normal fashion, have also been seen as a source of instability to the smooth-running of the university by regular students, who are petitioning for their expulsion. Some regular students allege that many affiliated students have been admitted without a Secondary Higher School Certificate, an allegation which, if true, constitutes a gross infringement of higher education regulations. Dr Gareeballa denied the existence of an internal admissions office, but defended the right of the university to admit affiliated students – such as the five taken annually from religious establishments – on the grounds that the limited facilities of the university could not provide an adequate education for all the students if they were accepted on a full-time basis. Dr Gareeballa explained that the university accepts 100 affiliated students annually, evenly distributed between the four faculties of the university; and although he denies any charges of admissions irregularities, one of his first acts as Deputy Vice Chancellor was to dismiss the academic secretary responsible for admissions.

Women students have their own particular problems. Amal Warrag claimed that women students' academic problems were being heightened by allegations accusing women of calling for co-education within the university. Mixed study has always been seen, by some people at least, as a possible cure for many of the grass-roots organisational problems on campus (Current, November), but no-one is prepared to take the responsibility for starting off the campaign; co-education contravenes the 1975 law of the

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university. Women also object to the name of their college - 'The Faculty of Women,' which is typed on their Graduation Certificate, and the demand to have this changed was one of the main reasons behind their sit-in. The women's union is asking for their college to be divided into faculties in the same manner as the men's; as envisaged by the 1975 law, claimed one lecturer, but distorted by the academics in charge of the college until the women's section of the university had become a separate entity. Dr Gareeballa told *Sudanow* he was prepared to consider the demand for faculties, but that co-education was not the policy of the university. Furthermore, he said, he would encourage separation of the sexes within the regional associations, where students formerly have had a chance to meet together and mix.

In the latest development, women students on the 15th of last month started a lecture-boycott, claiming that the administration had failed to live up to its

promises. In particular, the students seemed angry that the name of their college would remain on the graduation certificates. In response, the administration has ordered that the women's college be closed until July, when students return to sit for final examinations, previously scheduled for the end of March.

Most of the problems, as outlined above, date back to 1969, and it seems that over the years no concerted attempt has been made to solve them - with the result, as one student put it, that 'Omdurman Islamic has hardly the essential requisites of a university: lecturers, reference facilities and students.' The university is deeply divided between MBs and their supporters on the one hand, and anti-MBs on the other. Political problems have now bitten deep into academic issues and this has exacerbated a difficult situation further. Perhaps the solution is, as another student suggests: 'Turn the Omdurman Islamic into a university again.' ■

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SUDAN

THREE INDUSTRIES DENATIONALIZED

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Alfred Logune Taban: "Under the Hammer"]

[Text]

IN THE LATEST step in denationalisation to be taken so far, three government-owned industries are being put up for sale following a presidential decree issued last month. Prospective buyers, who have paid £s100 for the privilege, are studying the firms' documents prior to the closing date for bids on April 15th. On offer will be the Blue Nile Packing Factory, for a minimum of £s6,000,000; the Krikab Sweet Factory, at a starting price of £s3,000,000 and the Rea Sweet Factory, starting at £s2,000,000. The two sweet factories were originally Greek-owned until their confiscation during the sweeping nationalisation measures of 1970, when the Blue Nile Packing Factory was partly confiscated and partly rationalised. The three industries, which are all in the industrial area of Khartoum North, were later brought into the Food Industries Corporation.

One explanation for the sale came from a government official in the Ministry of Industry, who said, 'The government is getting out of such businesses as sweets, packing, plastic sacks and so on, and is concentrating on the big agro-industries such as cotton, sugar, textiles, leather and probably edible oil.'

A petty trader who was less impressed remarked. 'These industries have not turned out to be profitable, so they are being sold. Can anyone in his right mind think of selling a prosperous business?'

The government has, however, rejected

this allegation: 'The business in these industries is profitable, but the profits are just being swallowed up by the banks' back interest, at 14 per cent, on debts accumulated from the early 1970's. The future owners will be clear of these bank debts, because they have been included in the sale price,' explained Mohamed el Ghagli Suleiman, Director General of the Food Industries Corporation. The corporation, which is now left with only three industries in its care; the Wau Canning Factory, the Babanusa Milk Plant and the Kassala Oil Factory, says it is not happy to lose one particular industry -- the packing factory. 'Packaging is applied so extensively these days and is such a strategic commodity that it should have remained in government hands,' felt the Director General. *Sudanow* understands that the corporation made representations to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, but was unsuccessful in reversing the decision.

The successful new buyers will be contractually obliged to continue in the same business, and will have to shoulder all the industries' current responsibilities, which involve retaining all 650 staff, with the possible exclusion of the general managers, and paying them salaries no less than they receive at present. Furthermore, they will not lack for business competition, there are the Kuwaiti and Salamabi Packing Companies to contend with, as well as the popular Saad, Sara and Sudanese sweet companies.

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SUDAN

WEST GERMANY OFFERS MANY FORMS OF ASSISTANCE

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 p 25

[Article by Nagi Saliem Boulis]

[Text]

SUDAN, WHICH IN the years 1958-78 was the third largest African recipient of West German aid (being surpassed only by Tanzania and Ghana), will continue to enjoy priority in Bonn's development assistance strategy for Africa in 1981 *Sudanow* has learned. This strategy, outlined in the *Policy Paper on German Cooperation with Developing Countries* (FRG, July 1980), centres upon the fields of rural development, energy, protection of natural resources, and education.

Aid from the Federal Republic of Germany is of two kinds: financial and technical. Financial assistance to Sudan, which does not include private sector German investment nor governmental guarantees of credit amounts to about DM 770 million. Since 1978 such assistance to Sudan has been in the form of free grants, and following an exchange of letters between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and President Nimeiri all earlier official German loans to Sudan were transformed into grants. 'The loans which were turned into grants amounted to about DM 335 million,' Mr Bernard Braun, Press and Cultural Attache at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Khartoum, told *Sudanow*. 'In addition, an agreement was signed last month whereby Sudan's outstanding

debts of DM 30 million from individuals' commercial transactions were re-scheduled for 16 years.'

German technical assistance to Sudan totals about DM 253 million. This sum does not include humanitarian aid, cultural and academic aid, or the costs of financing the German Volunteer Service. Technical aid too is given in the form of grants, covering project costs, experts' salaries, equipment, and the training of Sudanese personnel.

Agriculture and education/training are the most heavily financed fields, with more than 50 projects historically funded with German assistance. During recent years the most important projects of German-Sudanese cooperation have been road construction between Nyalá and Zalingei and between Ed Dueim and Rabak; a pilot agricultural project in the Nuba Mountains; and an elementary health service in the Southern Region. The Southern Region has been extended assistance for several other projects, including a veterinary service and a tree plantation project in Yei District. Projects to control the spread of water hyacinths (which threaten irrigation works) and to encourage vocational training have also been funded.

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TUNISIA

BASIC AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH PEUGEOT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 936

[Report: "Basic Agreement Concluded With Peugeot"]

[Text] A basic agreement has been initialled between the Peugeot SA French group and the Tunisian Ministry of National Economy, with a view to strengthening the ties between Tunisia and Peugeot SA. A cooperation agreement was initialled by Mokhtar Chniti, president and director general of STIA, Jean-Paul Parayre, Peugeot board of directors chairman, and Moncef Ben Abdallah, president and director general of the API for cooperation among the Peugeot Company, the Tunisian Automobile Industry Company (STIA) and the Investment Promotion Agency (API), at the Hannibal Palace, on 28 March. The ceremony was attended by Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, Mansour Moalla, minister of the plan and finance, and Pierre Hunt, French ambassador to Tunisia.

According to the agreement, the STIA will increase its production of Peugeot passenger cars and vans. For the past several years the Tunisian company has been assembling Peugeot 404 cars and vans for the Tunisian market (see our special issue on "Automobiles Overseas," of 6 March 1981, pp 558 and 584). Currently 7,000 vans or pickup trucks are assembled annually. Medium-term projections call for reaching at least 10,000 vehicles per year. This is to be accomplished by gradually raising the industrial use of the vans. The basic agreement stipulates that the participation of Tunisian industry in the manufacturing process must reach 30 percent, as compared with 10-12 percent today. Furthermore, the agreement includes a plan for the local manufacturing of automotive parts and a program of purchases by Peugeot of Tunisian industrial products.

In discussing the contract, Lasram stipulated that it was a pilot agreement which will make it possible to undertake operations at an advanced technological level. He expressed the hope that this agreement, which is an actual association rather than a contract between Peugeot and STIA, will mark the implementation of a new cooperation formula between the two countries (see MTM 27 February 1981, p 478).

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TUNISIA

KUWAIT LOANS FOR TUNISIAN PROJECTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 935

[Report: "Kuwait Loans for Tourist Projects, Sidi Salem Dam and Turki-Hammamet Highway"]

[Text] Cooperation between Tunisia and Kuwait, whose importance we emphasized on the occasion of the opening of the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Development Bank, in Tunis, and the appointment of Ali Boukhris as its president (MTM 6 March 1981, p 608), is giving steady proof of its vitality.

Thus, in accordance with an agreement initialed by Abdelaziz Lasram, Tunisian minister of the national economy, and Hamed Douaij, president and director general of the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investments Consortium, in Tunis, on 27 February, the consortium will invest 50 million dinars (500 million French francs) in Tunisia during the Sixth Development Plan (1982-1986). According to AFP these funds will be used to finance several tourist projects in Tunis and its northern suburb, in Sousse, Mahdia (the coastal area of central Tunisia), and Djerba Island.

Abdallah Al Oubeid, the consortium's representative in Tunis, specified that two projects have been agreed upon within this framework. The first will be the construction of a hotel complex next to the Palace of Congresses. It will consist of a four star luxury 600-bed hotel tower similar to the Africa Hotel. The second will include the development of the Cap-Gammarth tourist area where a 1,300-bed hotel complex will be built. It will consist of "hotel apartments" and a conventional hotel. The complex will have a commercial center and an entertainment area.

More recently, in the course of a ceremony held in Kuwait on 28 March, in the premises of the Kuwaiti Arab Economic Development Foundation, Abdellatif El Hamad, Kuwaiti minister of finance and the plan and foundation president, and Mohamed Megdiche, Tunisian ambassador to Kuwait, initialled two agreements for a loan totaling 10.8 Kuwaiti dinars, or about 16 million Tunisian dinars, which will finance construction of the Sidi Salem Dam and the Turki-Hammamet Highway.

The first loan for the financing of the Sidi Salem Dam will total 7.3 million Kuwaiti dinars repayable over 25 years, with a grace period of 5 years and carrying a 3 percent interest.

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The second loan for the financing of the Turki-Hammamet Highway will total 3.5 Kuwaiti dinars repayable over 20 years, with a 5 year grace period, at 4 percent interest.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

PAPERS SUSPENDED--Last week, the newspapers LE PHARE and ERRAI were banned for a period of 6 months according to a Tunisian legal source. The ban on LE PHARE, an independent French-language daily and on ERRAI, an Arab-language legal opposition daily (although close to the authorities) was imposed by the republic's attorney general for "dissemination of false news which reflect on the dignity of the president of the republic, and the publication of photographs of a nature to disturb public order." TUNIS-HEBDO, another newspaper, is reported to have been banned for 1 year. The Arab-language newspaper EL MUSTAKBAL (socialist democratic opposition), which published this information, published a commentary questioning the sense of such suspensions shortly after the Superior Information Council had specifically stipulated that "the press was free to present reality." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 936
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SHOE EXPORTS--Currently the Tunisian shoe industry consists of about 50 industrial and semi-industrial enterprises and many small shops employing some 3,000 people. In 1979 the industry's output reached 10.6 million pairs of shoes and shoe wear. It will be developed further in the future and produced for export, which is scheduled to reach four million pairs at the end of the Sixth Plan (1982-1986). The possibility of marketing this surplus abroad was discussed 12 February last at a meeting on "Tunisian shoe wear for exports," sponsored by the National Leather and Shoe Wear Center and the Export Promotion Center (CEPEX). Specifically, the discussions dealt with the difficulties hindering the promotion of this industry which should play a decisive role in Tunisian exports during the next plan. In turn, the Investment Promotion Agency (API) pointed out in a recent study that Tunisian shoe manufacturing, which totaled 4.5 million pairs in 1972, should reach 12 million this year. Leather production rose from 4.8 million square feet in 1978 to 5.3 million in 1979, or 10 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 3 Apr 81 p 936
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