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West Europe Report

(FOUO 26/81)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

NEW TACTICAL AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED

Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Apr 81 pp 26-28

[Text] It was on 20 February that Robert Galley made his first visit to the armed forces as minister of defense. During this visit, whose purpose was to assess the new defense programs being implemented on air bases and the new weapon systems being developed, the minister was given a stationary presentation of FATAc [Tactical Air Force] weapons and aircraft.

The Luxeuil Air Base, which was selected for the defense minister's visit, is the home of a tactical squadron with a nuclear mission, the EC 4 [Escadron de Chasse 4: Fighter Squadron 4], equipped with Mirage IIIE aircraft, and a strategic bomber squadron equipped with Mirage IV planes. For this visit, the base and its units were put on red alert, just as they would be in time of war. These were the conditions under which the visitors were able to evaluate the resources that have been assigned, for several years now, for the defense of FATAc bases. These resources have actually been assigned under three main programs concerning the camouflage, toughening and active protection of the bases.

Under the conditions of a possible conflict in Europe, the invulnerability of the bases can in fact be provided in three ways: first, by attempting to conceal the installations in order to make it more difficult to identify and thus to attack them; second, by setting up active defense systems to reduce an attacking enemy's chances of properly executing his mission; finally, toughening the installations to limit the damage caused by any successful attack.

The first aspect, camouflage, is the least spectacular, but its importance cannot be exaggerated, since even when a pilot knows the exact location of his target, he cannot attack it without recognizing it visually. The FATAc's efforts in this respect first involved painting the main operational buildings, runways and taxiways a shade of flat olive green to make them blend better with their surroundings. Trees have also been planted to reduce the size of vacant areas, which are easy to spot, and finally there has been increased use of camouflage nets, which are apparently highly effective when arranged appropriately and not on a taxiway, as was the case at the time of the defense minister's visit!

With regard to toughening of the bases, we are aware of the financial resources that have been allocated for effective protection of the aircraft and vital operational

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installations. The operational centers of certain bases are now underground and plans have been made to eventually build underground shelters for personnel.

A sizable program for building aircraft shelters was launched several years ago and about half of the shelters needed--each aircraft should eventually have its own shelter--have been built at the present time. It is planned that all shelters will be completed between now and 1985-86 and the finances allocated for this program will continue even during the next military long-range appropriations bill. Some shelters do not yet have armored doors, but plans have been made to eventually equip them with such doors when a minimal number of open shelters has been completed. To increase the effectiveness of these operations, "merlans" have also been built near the shelters and important operational installations. "Merlans" are 3- to 4-meter-high walls which force an attacking aircraft to reascend in order to open up its angle of fire, thus exposing it to anti-aircraft defenses.

Another effort, which is just as significant from the financial standpoint, has been made to strengthen active defense resources, specifically anti-aircraft weapons. Each operational base will have to have a battery of Crotale surface-to-air missiles, whose operation will be supplemented by a larger number of double-barrel 20-mm guns and heavy 12.7-mm machine guns. As for ground protection, training of defense and surveillance units has been stepped up and specially trained air commando units now participate in defending the bases.

The second part of Mr Galley's visit concerned the new weapons and equipment which the FATAC will be using. There were new combinations of weapons, in particular Magic air-to-air missiles mounted on Mirage IIIE aircraft for air defense, as well as Matra 530 air-to-air missiles. Beluga grenade dispensers, F3 rocket launchers and JO-6-M2 launchers for runway bombs [for destroying airport runways] were also displayed in public for the first time. But the stationary presentation had two main areas of interest: electronic warfare equipment and the "exclusive" mockup of the new ASMP [medium-range air-to-surface] missile.

With regard to CME [expansion unknown] equipment, it can be summed up in three different and complementary types of materiel: the Phimat foil launcher (chaff) for self-defense, the IR 531 decoy launcher and the CT-51 container, which actually holds two Calmar jammers and which gives the carrier aircraft significant offensive electronic warfare capabilities.

The ASMP missile, which has a nuclear warhead and is intended to equip Mirage 2000 penetration aircraft and 15 reconditioned Mirage IV aircraft, was presented in the form of a full-scale mockup. Slightly more than 5 meters long, this missile will weigh less than 1 ton and its warhead should have a force of 100 to 300 kilotons. Propelled by a ramjet, its inertial navigation system is controlled by the inertial navigation system of the carrier aircraft, which eliminates the requirements of guidance once readjustment has been made prior to firing. This missile has good maneuvering capability, in particular due to the broad control surfaces, and can approach its target at low altitude, using terrain-following radar. The missile's speed will be approximately between Mach 2 and Mach 3 and its range will vary from a few dozen to a few hundred kilometers, depending on the nature of the mission and the altitude of firing. This missile is intended to attack predetermined military targets located far behind enemy lines. Its main targets will therefore be air bases

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and camps, necessary crossing points with assumed high concentrations of enemy forces, important centers of communication, and depots and other storage sites. The first missiles will be delivered in 1985 and the program should be completed around 1990; the first missile should be fired sometime in 1982 or 1983.

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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

COMMENTARY ON MEDITERRANEAN DEFENSE

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 13 April 81 p 13

[Article by Stefano Silvestri: "But Ships Do Not Have Wings"]

[Text] Italy, the Germany of the Mediterranean; Italy that guarantees Malta's neutrality; Italy that PRAVDA accuses of militaristic delirium. Accusations, slogans and treaties oblige us now to assume the role of one of the most muscular countries in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea.

Generals, admirals and polemicists are getting exercised about new scenarios. Oppose the USSR all alone? Do not even mention it. And what if the enemy is Libya? "It is an entirely theoretical possibility," Lelio Lagorio, minister of Defense stated, "and nothing leads to the thought that it might come about in the future. But among so many fanciful exercises that we are making, this one at least might teach us something."

We too have engaged in fancifying. What would happen in the Mediterranean if our "Blues" should clash with the "Greens"? Would everything go smoothly? A strategist replies cryptically: "The Italian Navy would immediately relapse into the Matapan syndrome."

The reference is to an unfortunate naval battle in March 1941. Our ships had already been humiliated several times at Punta Stilo, in Sicily, and in the Taranto roadstead. The British had radar and naval aircraft, while our units had to await the support of the land-based Italian-German Air Force. Coordinations and recognition signals never worked and the Italian ships played the part of defenseless targets. At Cape Matapan, we lost three cruisers and two destroyers. The battleship "Vittorio Veneto" was seriously damaged. The Italian Navy was wounded to death.

Let us come back to the fiction of "strategic games." Libya does not have a large navy, but it has already received the first three of six Russian submarines ordered, and also 14 missile-carrying attack craft capable of sinking warships. It also has 400 combat aircraft, almost 100 more than Italy. It does not have pilots, but it can easily enlist them from allies and clients of Moscow.

Not so bad if Italy had its forces in order. And, instead, 40 years later, we are lacking the same things that we lacked at Cape Matapan: radar (not radar on the ships, but rather radar for defense and coordination of air attacks from land) and aircraft capable of operating at sea. "Pilots are not improvised," a naval

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officer warns. "ours are trained for land battles. They might not find the ships or confuse friendly ships with enemy ships. The Air Force does not yet have anti-ship missiles."

The recent case of the Libyan fighter aircraft that crashed in Calabria without anyone's being aware of it demonstrates the state of the air defenses in the South. "We lack radar," Admiral Torrisi, Defense chief of staff admits. It will not be easy to obtain any. The new American tridimensional radars will cost around 700 billion lire, a truly impressive figure.

"We do not have much money for armament," Lelio Lagorio confirmed to us, "even though this year's Defense budget has been increased by 30 percent. But this is more apparent than real money." Calculations can be made quickly. "Let us bear in mind that the inflation rate has been 22 percent. Very well, in current terms, our expenditures for new armament have increased 8 percent in comparison with last year. In other words, in real terms they have decreased 14 percent. The largest increases are in entirely other sectors. Training has had 59 percent more. The cost of personnel has increased by 36 percent. Infrastructures have absorbed another 27 percent and maintenance has required a 26-percent increase.

And these are also the reasons for a fear of a second Matapan: "Imagine strong air pressure against our almost defenseless bases in the South. The Air Force would have to think about saving itself and defending itself. The Navy would have to take care of itself. But four fighter aircraft suffice for saturating the defense capability of one of our ships. The fifth aircraft can sink it. If we add to the air threat the threat of the missile-launching attack craft..." Our naval officer is pessimistic.

Well then? The most skeptical among our aviators say that the Navy is trying to beat the drum. "They are thinking about aircraft carriers. They want to equip the "Giuseppe Garibaldi" with vertical takeoff aircraft, in order to make a shipborne naval air force for themselves." The admirals deny this (but they go to see the performance of the new Anglo-American vertical takeoff fighter aircraft). Everything seems ready for one of those interservice quarrels typical of our Armed Forces.

There is probably a way out. Why not think, for example, of the possibility of establishing a new service, a "Naval Air Force" consisting of land-based aircraft with mixed capabilities both for action on land and at sea? The idea is circulating in the Baracchini Palace. But the Navy and the Air Force still seem to be skeptical.

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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

DEFENSE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON EUROMISSILES

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 10 Apr 81 pp 24-26

[Interview with Lelio Lagorio by Roberto Palladino: "I Have the Key to the Pershings"]

[Text] The time has come for Italian foreign policy to make a choice: agree with American President Ronald Reagan's aggressiveness or opt for East-West dialogue? The disturbing international picture directly involves Italy which, for the first time, is the target of violent polemics. The Soviets opened the offensive against the Italian policy of security, accusing Minister of Defense Lelio Laborio (a Socialist) of unbridled militarism. Within the governmental majority too, some criticisms regarding the high expenses of armaments have surfaced. Basically though, where is Italy going? What is its strategy? IL MONDO spoke about this with Minister Lagorio.

Question: Tensions and rearmament characterize the international climate. What is your opinion?

Answer: The situation is worrisome. Let us shore it up before it becomes alarming. At the base of it all are the bitter polemics and noncommunication over the question of when and where the military balance was altered. This is the starting point toward new weapons. We Italians are making efforts so that the delicate thread of a reasonable dialogue between East and West does not break. We do not like uncontrolled rearmament.

Question: However, Italy, along with other NATO countries decided to increase its defense expenditures by 3 percent. How come?

Answer: That decision was made in 1978, when Giulio Andreotti was president of the Council of Ministers with the largest majority in Italy's history. It was not applied until 1981, though. The increase affects in large part the conditions of military life rather than weapons. For the latter, an outlay equal to 20 percent of the entire budget coupled with an 8-percent increase over 1980 is being planned. (The figures are in monetary terms, not real terms; the inflation figure is not known)

Question: All in all, however, expenses for defense have increased by 30 percent in 1981.

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Answer: This is explained by recouping the increase not decided upon in 1980 and taking into account the rate of inflation.

Question: How do you answer a critic who stated that you were too amenable in accepting the 3-percent increase demanded by the United States?

Answer: I have no inferiority complex when it comes to dealing with the United States. I firmly believe that the Atlantic Pact is an alliance between sovereign, independent free nations. I didn't think up the 3-percent figure, but I find it just. If we adhere to it, in the 1980' we will no longer have a B-string army, but a flexible and modern army, to be used strictly in a defensive manner.

Question: Some offices of the U.S. government believe a 3-percent increase is insufficient for security: what is your opinion?

Answer: Up to now, no American leader has said anything. We will see how things go in Bonn, on 7 and 8 April, when the European defense ministers meet their American colleague for the first time.

Question: And what will you say in Bonn?

Answer: In Bonn in April or Brussels in May, where the interallied ministers will meet, I will ask my colleagues if they share the idea of a four-member directorate to head the Atlantic Alliance. The hypothesis has been brought up by centers for strategic studies of Paris, London, Bonn and Washington. I will explain that in Italy's opinion it not only is an unacceptable idea but a dangerous one because it could have a centrifugal effect for the alliance.

Question: Was the decision to acquire Euromissiles to balance NATO weapons with those of the East a correct one?

Answer: Atomic weapons are acquired together with an element of reluctance. However, the reasons that led NATO and the Italian Parliament at the end of 1979 to approve Euromissiles are still valid. On the political plain, the choice was not a mistake. We were told that Moscow would take a dim view of this, but it was right after the Euromissile decisions that the USSR agreed to a prenegotiation meeting in Geneva dealing with these weapons. Now, in his own personal manner, Leonid Brezhnev is offering a moratorium. The road to a treaty essentially had not been obstructed. We were the ones who were right and not those prophets of doom, who are all part time pacifists. They talk a great deal about NATO weapons and little of the weapons of others.

Question: Last year you supported German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's proposal for a nuclear missile treaty; then, all initiatives were dropped. Is that a correct impression?

Answer: No. At the Paris European Socialist Conference on Security and Disarmament there was considerable agreement among the Germans, the French and the Italians. We are in favor of negotiation but it isn't possible to negotiate with one hand tied behind one's back. The USSR must agree, in the opening phases of

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negotiation, first of all to discuss the SS-20 problem, which it has deployed in significant numbers, which cannot stay where they are or remain there in the same numbers. This argument is most favorably disposed to a compromise, yet couples the availability of disarmament with that necessary amount of realism, namely that elementary need for security.

Question: A deposition by Christian Democrat Senator Luigi Granelli accuses you of being in favor of adopting the neutron bomb. What is your answer to the charge?

Answer: Granelli is not well informed. With regard to the neutron bomb, there are, for the time being, no initiatives, political or military. American statements on the matter have found no echo within NATO. Therefore all that remains are unilateral statements. Within NATO there is a nuclear planning group that deals with the issues. As Italian minister of defense, I am a member of such a group. This office, which has the final word on the matter, has not even raised a proposal for the neutron bomb.

Question: However, you did not take a stand. As a citizen aren't you worried about a bomb as deadly as the neutron bomb?

Answer: And the Euromissiles? Aren't they deadly weapons? And yet, the government has decided to acquire them for reasons of security. No preliminary judgment is possible. Today the problem does not exist. A weapon, of itself, is never good.

Question: Italy appears closer to Reagan's extremism than Schmidt's policy of detente. Is this true?

Answer: No, However, let us not pay too much attention to preconceived notions. Reagan's policy is still in the breaking-in phase. Germany has not made mention of any major disagreement with the new U.S. administration. With regard to Italy, I already mentioned that we believe in negotiation.

Question: Reagan's policy of East bloc versus West bloc appears to deprive Italy of autonomy...

Answer: Some indications point to a return to concepts of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger based on the dialogue between the two great powers. Neither Europe nor Italy would welcome concepts of this kind if they were to prevail.

Question: Creating a rapid intervention military force, the Italian task force, appears more a measure of rearmament than one for civil defense. What weight does the first hypothesis have? Is it supported by NATO?

Answer: NATO has nothing to do with the Italian task force. It is a force to be used by our country exclusively to satisfy Italian needs. It will be used first of all to partake in civil defense. Its uses therefore are peaceful. But, I have asked myself, what if there were to be a threat from the South? Is it possible that a great nation would not be able to mobilize with great urgency an initial major contingent which was extremely mobile and specialized?

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Question: Is the Italian rapid deployment force in any way related to the American request to transfer NATO task force headquarters to Naples?

Answer: Absolutely not. No one has ever suggested moving NATO task force headquarters to Naples.

Question: You have been active in promoting the sale of arms manufactured in Italy almost throughout the whole world. Isn't there a danger of tarnishing Italy's image, a country that says it wants peace?

Answer: I have not ordered the sale of weapons. As a matter of fact, I said that the manner in which weapons are sold today is wrong. Nowadays we sell arms by following a commercial logic, not a political one. We will sell to whoever pays and not, according to us, to whoever has a valid reason to assure his own safety. This system does not do Italy credit as a country that knows what it wants; it portrays us only as merchants. I am opposed to this. It is necessary to formulate a policy for weapons sales. I spoke about this to our military attaches whom I called back to Rome last March. This was the first time this happened in the history of the Defense Ministry. I spoke about this matter to the representatives of the Defense Ministry in the international committee for export authorization. I stated that our military assistance could not be of a destabilizing nature.

Question: Why do you plan to set up military supply depots in various zones of the country?

Answer: The question somewhat anticipates my thoughts on the matter. I only said that when one concludes that it is necessary to increase the army's mobility, one sustains a truism, however one must not only refer to the rapidity of the forces' deployment, but one should also be aware of supplies which, in place, must be able to be used by units in order to face different situations. This is a matter I spoke about when hypotheses were made regarding the scaling down of our defensive deployment, which is heavily concentrated in the North. With NATO funds, we will be able to build 16 depots capable of assuring adequate ammunition needs for 16 brigades for a week. However, up to now the construction procedures have been set in motion only for 3 depots.

Question: Why?

Answer: There is the significant problem of land taken over for use by the military, which is a burden on the regions, on the municipalities and on the population, which also generates stiff resistance. I am speaking to some of the regions of a realistic program to lighten the burden of some zones. A national meeting to discuss this theme is in the making.

Question: Is it true that the depots will be under direct American control?

Answer: Are you kidding? How is it possible to have supplies for one's own national armed forces under the control of others? This question allows me the opportunity to emphasize a point. We are an independent country. It is therefore not even in the realm of the imaginable that there be intrusions by others in our

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own national life unless within the severely restricted parameters fixed by treaties agreed upon in Parliament. This also has an important effect on nuclear weapons which, even though they are of U.S. production and at U.S. disposal, cannot be used without our consent.

Question: Therefore the key to the Euromissiles won't only be in American hands?

Answer: If we ever install them, to use the Euromissiles two keys, one different from the other, will be necessary: one in the hands of the Italians, and the other in the hands of the United States.

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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

DEFENSE MINISTER REPORTS TO PARLIAMENT ON ARMS SALES

LD161519 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 15 Apr 81 p 9

[Report by Sandro Acciari: "Minister Lagorio Tells Defense Committee: 'We Are Selling the Arabs Weapons, but not in Exchange for Oil'"]

[Text] Rome--Warships, ammunition and aircraft to Libya; tanks to Dubai, anti-aircraft missiles to Mauritania; armored vehicles to Somalia; machine guns to Saudi Arabia; and pistols to Bulgaria. As of yesterday, parliament has a full picture of Italy's weapons supplies to other countries. Addressing the lower house defense committee, Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio broached the very delicate subject of military supplies--a thorny problem because of its international implications and the often condemned repercussions of arms traffic in the terrorist field.

Lagorio admitted that Italy has extensive and substantial interests in this connection, but defended the legitimacy of the supplies, denying the existence of any "oil dependence complex" with respect to the Middle Eastern countries involving the granting of military materials in exchange for oil. Above all the minister denied charges of "deviations" by the secret services, which have been implicated in the National Hydrocarbons Agency-Petromin affair and the Defense Intelligence Service-Mino Pecorelli oil scandal.

So according to Lagorio everything is under control, apart from the following point: "Quantities of Italian-made weapons," the minister said, "have indeed been confiscated by the Turkish authorities.

"Investigations, though as yet incomplete, have enabled us to conclude, with a considerable degree of certainty," that the weapons concerned are pistols manufactured by Italian companies (Bernardelli and Beretta) whose export to Bulgaria and partly to Middle Eastern countries was authorized as normal by the appropriate bodies." As for how the weapons ended up in Turkish hands, there is as yet no answer.

Supplies to Libya and other countries were officially confirmed, however. Al-Qadhafi has received four Corvettes from Italy built by the United Shipyards, ship's weaponry destined for the Libyan Navy and S-260 aircraft from Siai Marchetti, together with Italian instructors.

Dubai has purchased a consignment of OF-40 tanks, while Mauritania has taken delivery of an order for land-to-air missiles (license dated 30 June 1976). Armored cars have been sold to the Somali Government and machineguns to Saudi Arabia.

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As for denials, Lagorio denied that Italy has supplied weapons to South Africa: "As from 1972," he said, "in deference to UN recommendations, increasingly restrictive criteria were adopted in granting export licenses for that country. Following the UN resolution on an obligatory embargo, requests for export licenses representing several tens of billions of lire have been turned down."

If South Africa has any Italian weapons, Lagorio added, it means that it has bought them from third countries. He also denied "most categorically" that the military intelligence and security service has given Libya the names of Libyan dissidents living in Italy, and also dismissed rumors of arms traffic with "Central American countries" and with the PRC.

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TERRORISM

ITALY

ROLE OF 'METROPOLI' IN TERRORISM

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 13 April 81 pp 6-9

[Article by Marcella Andreoli: "METROPOLI Plan"]

[Text] Rather than an ideological periodical, it was an armed gang, it was a center for weapons traffic. Above all, it wanted to become the brain of the whole armed struggle in Italy. These are the explosive discoveries by the Bergamo judges.

So then, Oreste Scalzone has run away. He did it precisely on the eve of the examining magistrate's decision on the case on 7 April. But he has probably run away not only because of this. Another perhaps even more dangerous investigation was being set up, the investigation of the periodical METROPOLI whose inspirers, together with Oreste Scalzone, are also Franco Piperno and Lanfranco Pace, the other two chiefs of Autonomy. Can they also have escaped? Probably so, but with their passports in their pocket, returned to them by the Rome investigators after their release from prison.

Thus, of the three "big chiefs," as Red Brigade member Patrizio Peci has called them, none is probably still in Italy available to the courts. Are all three probably in France? All three probably had more than one good reason for arranging to meet in Paris. The periodical METROPOLI and its secret military organization have been in close contact for some time with Direct Action and with NAPAP [expansion unknown], two expressions of French Autonomy. It has been revealed by more than one penitent, people who know a lot about the true story of METROPOLI, about its double face, legal and illegal, about its weapons traffic, about its infiltration in other armed groups like Red Brigades and First Line. Moreover, is it or is it not true that Marco Donat Cattin had also found refuge in France? And now the reason is known. He too belonged to METROPOLI. When he left First Line, in September 2 years ago, Marco Donat Cattin also entered the mother house of the three "big chiefs."

The METROPOLI organization was no halfway organization. It was supported by the most prestigious intelligence of Autonomy and it was based on a strong military system. Its plan was extremely ambitious. That is what is said by the Bergamo judges who worked thoroughly to uncover the true story of METROPOLI. They comment as follows: "That is a very dangerous, very intelligent plan."

After so much work, those judges were confronted by great surprises that confirmed and added to the ones already made by judges in Milan, Turin and Rome. In short, at a certain point, METROPOLI has intended to dominate the armed movement.

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Now, it is known, because Marco Donat Cattin has confessed it, that the "three big chiefs," that is to say Piperno, Scalzone and Pace, directed Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda within the Red Brigades not only during the 55 days of the Moro case but also before and after. A statement that proved to be anything but fanciful to the Bergamo judges. In fact, it finds verification in the secret story of METROPOLI. The idea on which it is based came into being before the glossy magazine arrived on the newsstand. More precisely, in Bologna, during the famous meeting on repression, in September 1977, in which, among others, French friends of the three "big chiefs," like Felix Guattari, were present. The leaders of Autonomy arrived at Bologna with already clear ideas. In Rome, Piperno and Pace had discussed them; in Milan, Scalzone and Piero Del Giudice. The Rome leaders already had close ties within the Red Brigades through Morucci and the Faranda woman. The Milan leaders were in tune with the COCORI, the Revolutionary Communist Committees, whose founders they were.

Very well, the groundwork for the METROPOLI Plan was laid during the Bologna meeting. Relations between the "big chiefs" and other organizations had become difficult. Toni Negri had quarrelled with Corrado Alunni. Small groups in imitation of Red Brigades had come into being, and First Line was beginning to become a force with which to reckon. Then came the METROPOLI Plan.

A great invention: to infiltrate trustworthy men in the other organizations. Why expose themselves in internal power struggles for domination of the armed movement? Was it not better, instead, to put their own people within Red Brigades, within First Line, and thus try to take them over? The plan succeeded several times. More than one penitent bears witness to this. But the most classic example is, perhaps, the example of Morucci and Faranda, an example from which it turns out that the one who directed both of them knew of the kidnaping of Aldo Moro right from the time of its planning.

But METROPOLI does not limit itself to infiltrating its people in other organizations. It also acts in its own. Naturally by resorting to its usual two faces, the legal face provided by the glossy paper of the magazine and the clandestine face consisting of an armed organization.

Many penitents have spoken of it, starting with Marco Barbone and Paolo Morandini, the two members of the 28 March Brigade that killed newsman Walter Tobagi. Now, the courts discovered that illegal activity was being carried on in two directions. One was unsigned undertakings like robbery and theft, an activity in which they were very expert and that served to rake in money, much money, because especially with money they could buy themselves weapons, fit out bases and, in particular, convince members of other organizations to play the game of METROPOLI. The other direction was the traditional one of the political act: attack, wounding. However, METROPOLI was not inclined to put its name at the foot of these undertakings. Obviously, it had to protect its good public image, that is to say the alibi of the legal front, of the innocuous periodical of ideological discussions, enunciations of theory, an alibi that enabled its men, among other things, to obtain financing even from public institutions. That, then, is why all the actions by METROPOLI were being signed with the acronym for Armed Cells for Territorial Counterpower. The judges found out that the terrorist undertakings claimed by this acronym all belonged to the secret story of METROPOLI.

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Nevertheless, when appropriate, its leaders also decided to adopt convenience signatures. It happened when some members got into trouble. For example, in Bergamo, on 13 March 1979, when members of the METROPOLI military organization killed a carabinieri. Actually he was not the target, but rather the prison physician to whose office the carabinieri had taken his small son for a medical visit. Because the carabinieri had confronted the commando unit with weapons in hand, he was executed. That time, the METROPOLI cells signed themselves Communist Guerrilla Group.

There was, however, a field of activity in which the METROPOLI men never got into trouble. It was the field of weapons traffic. This activity was also directed toward the basic purpose of the domination plan: by providing arms, especially to the smaller groups, they aimed at controlling movements. That was told by Marco Barbone and Peolo Morandini. Barbone said that he had received precisely from the hands of an editor of METROPOLI, Domenico De Feo, a Kalashnikov AK/47 submachinegun, a 9-caliber pistol and a 38 revolver. Morandini added that, by means of these contacts, the METROPOLI people were trying "to make a political proposal with regard to us, a proposal that we interpreted as an intention to add us to the political plan by supporting Scalzone and the other leaders in it."

The weapons in possession of METROPOLI were so many and of such a kind that now the suspicion is also emerging among the investigators that the submachineguns used for the attack in Nicosia Square, in Rome, in which a policeman on duty at the DC [Christian Democratic Party] headquarters was killed, came from that source. METROPOLI's weapons usually arrived from the Middle East by means of a preferential channel that it had succeeded in opening from there. In practice, the group operated as an importer serving every Italian terrorist organization, with the exception of Red Brigades.

Another repentant terrorist, Enrico Pasini Gatti, stated: "I learned that the Palestinians had agreed to sell weapons to Italian subversive groups, provided neither Red Brigades nor First Line were involved. This assurance was given to them. The weapons are supposed to have arrived by sea to a place in Calabria. The money for payment was to be deposited in a Swiss bank, in Italian 100,000-lira banknotes." He added: "About the places where METROPOLI hid the weapons, I remember only that Minervino (he is Claudio Minervino, brother of Roberto, both members of METROPOLI, editor's note) said that they had several sophisticated weapons of Palestinian origin in a place located in a little town in Emilia, protected on a hill and whose name escapes me."

With regard to the structure of METROPOLI, Enrico Pasini Gatti described it as "an armed, nationwide organization relying on known leaders already imprisoned like Piperno, Scalzone, Pace, Faranda and Morucci and others whom I do not know." Lower ranking persons, like Minervino, "enlisted a number of agitated individuals, rallying them around talk of armed struggle and of a movement in which murders and crippling woundings were not expected but, rather, robberies for self-financing and for accumulating weapons, actions against gynecologists, underground economy work centers, enterprises operating in the field of prison building. I know that its group also specialized in robberies of notary offices." In short, widespread terrorism so dear to Autonomy.

METROPOLI succeeded in acquiring for itself strongholds in the Bergamo area, in Brianza, in Venetia and in Latium. Lombardy was its most conspicuous area. It

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seems that its organizations availed themselves here of about 60 persons who were perfectly cognizant of the secret story of METROPOLI. But almost a thousand young persons revolved around that nucleus.

Perhaps also because of this, many repentant terrorists talked about METROPOLI to the judges. Among them is also Maurizio Lombino, from Bergamo, who told, among other things, about a meeting that he had in Bologna with Oreste Scalzone during a meeting on repression. After that meeting, Lombino invited the leader of Autonomy to Bergamo, in order to "explain to our group the motives for the conflict that had exploded between COCORI and No Truce. Two groups that are said to have strengthened METROPOLI.

The Bergamo judges devoted particular attention to Oreste Scalzone. They even went so far as suspect him of an attack on that city's city hall on 25 March 1977.

The secret story of METROPOLI, is probably not all there. The judges already know much about it, but, in spite of the collaboration of many repentant terrorists, they are still running up against an obstacle: the military organization that hid behind the periodical's masthead was very compartmentalized to the effect that the various organizational levels were protected by impenetrable security barriers. More than one METROPOLI militant pointed out that behind the adherence to spontaneity, vaunted so much by the leaders of Autonomy, there was hidden so strict a party program that often an organization member was no longer able to know in which department of the organization he was working. "That is one of the reasons why METROPOLI's organization and plan were especially dangerous," one of the Bergamo judges said.

An ambitious, suggestive plan was involved. Marco Barbone, to give an example, was fascinated by it at first sight. It happened when he began to read PREPRINT, a supplement to number zero of METROPOLI, December 1978. It is very interesting to read that part of his testimony in which he states how he interpreted its plans on reading in it an article by Oreste Scalzone.

"It was an article," Barbone said, "that seemed to me to be a real program of a possible revolutionary organization that hinted at a change in the present situation of the armed struggle in Italy. I recall that there was a first part, in that article, in which, precisely, the situation both of the armed groups and of Autonomy was criticized. Then there was a second part in which a discussion was opened up on what, according to Scalzone, the structure of a possible organization might and should be, in which several levels would coexist, including the social level of publicly displayed struggles and the illegal level, up to the very top level aiming at destruction of the state."

When all three are in Paris, the three "big chiefs," will they dissociate themselves from all this?

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

ITALY

BRIEFS

REGGIO EMILIA TOTAL ENERGY--Reggio Emilia--The national conference on "The Local Entities in the Face of the Energy Challenge: Achievements and Outlooks in the Field of Cogeneration," organized by the local concern Gas-Acqua, opens in Reggio Emilia today. It coincides with the inauguration of the first local-district total-energy cogeneration power plant, "project RETE (Reggio Emilia Total Energy)." The new power plant has the capability of producing, simultaneously, electrical energy, hot water for district heating, or cold water for air-conditioning, with an overall saving of 35 percent of the primary fuel. The structure and purposes of the installation are such that the EEC has granted a contribution of 530 million lire, selecting that of Reggio Emilia from among more than 50 proposed projects, while the CNR [National Research Council], in addition to 35 million in financing, has guaranteed its constant collaboration. The cost of "project RETE" has totaled 3 billion lire, more than 2 billion of which has been entirely borne by the local concern Gas-Acqua. [Excerpts] [Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 9 April 1981, Supplement, p 13-I] 11267

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

INVESTMENT PROPOSAL FOR INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 9 April 1981, Supplement, p 13-I

[Article by Alberto Mucci: "We Report a Proposal Developed for Minister Andreatta by Several Bankers--A 'Chance' for Savers: Investing in Businesses to Be Renovated--The Flight of the Lira Could Thus Be Checked and Recovery Programs Could Be Defined"]

[Text] They call it the "blue project," from the color of the cover. For several days it has been on Ministry of Treasury Andreatta's desk. Some 30 pages, many of them dense with figures. The title: "Problems in the Financing of Italian Industrial Modernization." It has been written by three authoritative bankers. The objective: to formulate a precise proposal for giving life to a policy that would concretely combat inflation (thus arresting the "incipient flight from the lira"), utilizing families' savings to modernize the industrial system, and therefore providing a secure outlook for investment.

Inflation (it has been noted) is also fought by providing "opportunities" for savings, with mobilization of capital as a productive tool.

The "proposal" states: "It is indispensable and urgent to pose the problem of state action capable of priming and multiplying a mobilization of resources through market forces." The state's action should set itself these two objectives:

1--"establishing the general framework of industrial policy (on the example of the French experience) within which the operators' choices could be set and the basic mechanisms of market control could be reactivated" (this is an important theme, but one which remains entirely to be articulated: one thinks of the sector plans, which the producers would have to define, as the first step toward giving life to a true industrial policy);

2--"creating the conditions for rebuilding families' inclination to save and modifying savers' preferences in favor of long-term direct commitments."

These are certainly valid objectives. An economic-policy framework is needed within which industrial policy can be set; there is an immediate need for coherent choices that would remove the roadblocks to recovery (this is the situation with the state-participation system: administering a remedy, the proposal says, but at the same time providing for the necessary subsequent increases in capital, with action by the Treasury, but also with private involvement); measures are needed that would give savers at least some certainties about yield.

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The "proposal" hypothesizes a plan for at least 8-10 trillion lire in financing for industrial modernization. And it adds: "One can set the objective of covering about two-thirds by recourse to the Italian financial market with the stimulus of tax concessions whose cost to the state budget--even without taking into account subsequent positive returns that would come because of the stimulative effects on the economy--would represent a limited fraction of obtainable tax proceeds. Control over the economic efficiency of the allocation of funds, exercised by the market through the intermediary of institutional investors and special credit institutes, would ensure to the investment programs the credibility necessary for obtaining the remaining one-third of the total amount hypothesized by the Community institutions (EIB [European Investment Bank], Ortoli window, etc).

The proposal is an ambitious one. On the one hand, the state provides incentives to families to save for the future, incentives to investment in industrial activity, etc (that is, it mobilizes existing resources, it involves the "family operator" in industrial programs). On the other hand, the state creates the premises for modernization of industry to be carried out. New financial intermediaries are positioned in the market. The signatures on the "blue project" are authoritative ones. It is a good idea to learn the proposals in detail: they concern the business enterprises and the savers.

How to Find 10 Trillion

The "blue project" presents five specific proposals for incentivizing savings and giving investment "opportunities" for modernization of the industrial system. Here they are in detail.

1. Prudential savings--Life-insurance concessions have to be made: the present tax-deductibility of premiums is not effective, since those taxpayers who because of the deduction have a tax credit must wait 3 to 5 years to obtain the refund, in devalued money. There should be immediate and certain refunding of the tax credit upon presentation. Extensive recourse to this form of prudential savings by those categories of persons (managers and higher-level staff) who are subject to marginal and especially high tax rates can be expected. The amount of premiums that the insurance companies could take in is estimated at 2 trillion lire. Investment of these premiums should favor the underwriting of industrial bonds issued by the special credit institutes. The reduction in tax collection--not taking into account the foreseeable positive effects of investment return--can be estimated at about 700 billion.


2. Revival of the Financial Market--The "project" emphasizes bonds: they offer the investor a secure yield and the freedom to subscribe or not to the corresponding stock shares after a period sufficient for judging the validity of the industrial programs on which they are based. The state should give incentives to the convertible bond market by:

- permitting tax deductibility of this form of investment with a maximum ceiling (5 million, for example, with possibly lower limits, depending on income brackets);
- possibly providing, in this case also, for immediate refunding of tax credits that may result from them. In this second hypothesis, there would be full involvement of those who receive incomes that are taxed by withholding at the source, and it would therefore be possible to obtain by this means also a sizable proportion of the annual capitalization of the state-participation system. The state's intervention would

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There Are Still Many Who Can Save



Key:

- Here is a graphic representation of the incomes received by a family in Italy today (a little more than three persons). The broken line divides the family units into two distinct groups: at left, those who spend all they earn, and at right, those who are capable of saving.
- Subdivision of family incomes
- Year 1961
- Total 1981 income (billions of lire)
- Family units (thousands)
- Available income per family unit (millions of lire)
- Mean income of a typical family
- Source: worked out by us from Bankitalia data

have a market effect multiplied by about three times. Thus, with a drop of between 1.5 trillion and 3.8 to 4.6 trillion in tax proceeds (in the two hypotheses formulated) there would be market activation in a total amount between, conservatively, 4 trillion and 10 to 12 trillion.

3. Self-Financing--In order to provide incentive to self-financing by efficient firms with high labor use, the state could permit the setting-up of a tax-exempt investment fund to the extent of, for example, 1 percent of total wages paid. The exemption could be tied to reinvestment within a preestablished period of the sums set aside.

4. Strengthening of the international presence of Italian firms--The "project" suggests sustaining the enterprise system by measures aimed at incentivizing the use of their own resources and by recourse to the international capital market. The following could be provided for:

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(a) restoral of availability of foreign-exchange accounts for firms with the banking system, with a big increase in the quality of foreign-exchange management by introduction of the concept of the "firm's foreign-exchange balance";

(b) granting freedom of reinvestment abroad for a proportion of the net foreign-exchange profits shown on the firms' balances referred to above;

(c) making of stand-by agreements with the European partners and also with the United States for financing of imports;

(d) incentivation of international financing of imports, with a repeat of the 1946 experiment in "importation free of cash."

5. Measures for Italian capital abroad--The "project" proposes taking a conceptual leap in the way of considering the country's foreign position, so that it would include the short-term, medium-term and long-term assets and liabilities declared by residents. The decisive thing would thus become not so much the repatriation of assets already exported but rather the declaration of asset positions that today are clandestine. These available assets would in the last analysis become activable. Technically, this would involve consenting to the underwriting, with funds available abroad (and also through fiduciary companies), of foreign bonds not registered in the principal's name. The subscribers' interest in this form of investment would consist in the possibility of increasing their own credit capacity vis-a-vis the Italian banking system in a period of tight credit.

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ECONOMIC

SPAIN

ANTI-CARRILLO SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL PCE AFFAIRS

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 7 Feb 81 p 93

[Article by Branko Lazitch: "The Fall of Santiago Carrillo"]

[Text] No other communist party chief in Western Europe has defied the USSR as much as Santiago Carrillo, the general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). He is the only one to have refused to attend the three latest CPSU Congresses held in 1966, 1971 and 1976, under Leonid Brezhnev's leadership. In 1971, the peak year of Sino-Soviet tension, Carrillo was the only one to visit China and compliment leaders of the Cultural Revolution. In the days, already gone, of Eurocommunism, he was the only one to write a book favorable to that "ism." He was even able to get the term "Eurocommunism" inserted into the statutes of the Unified Social Party of Catalonia (PSUC or Catalan Communist Party). Lastly, a year ago, after the occupation of Afghanistan, he was the only one to speak openly of the USSR's "hegemonism" and "expansionism."

Moscow has not remained inactive in the face of this challenge which has persisted for more than a decade. Kremlin leaders have attempted several times to stir up opposition to Carrillo inside the Spanish Communist Party. They did this at times through such agents as Enrique Lester, a former Civil War general and member of the political bureau, and also at other times by means of a campaign in the Soviet Press, as was the case in 1977-78. These attempts failed each time. At the Ninth PCE Congress in Madrid in 1978, Carrillo was reelected general secretary.

These Soviet failures thus proved that Moscow was no longer all-powerful within the international communist movement. Yet Moscow has continued to persevere. It remains ready to seize any new opportunity to resume its attacks against Carrillo. Such an opportunity now seems to be looming on the Spanish political horizon.

Carrillo's strategy has led to an impasse. Eurocommunism is dying in Spain and no longer exists in Europe. The strategy of the Spanish style "historic compromise" has failed to bring the PCE any nearer to sharing governmental power. Actually the opposite has happened. Party membership has declined from 200,000 in 1977 to 110,000 today. The PCE's following among the working class is dwindling sharply: in the late January labor union (syndicate) elections, the Workers Commissions, a PCE cover, suffered a four percent loss in votes while the socialist labor unions scored an eight percent gain. The communist and socialist factions are now almost equal for the first time: 30.7 percent and 29.7 percent.

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There is another and even more disturbing development for Carrillo. Until very recently, the only persons challenging him within the PCE were the pro-Soviets, no longer called neo-Stalinists but "Afghans." Early in January, the Fifth Congress of the PSUC, Spanish communism's largest branch, clearly revealed the existence of another very strong faction, namely the "Leninists." The basic tactic followed was to promote an alliance between "Afghans" and "Leninists" for the purpose of ousting Carrillo's Eurocommunists from the party's executive committee. This maneuver was 100 percent successful. As a "bonus," it also succeeded in having the term "Eurocommunist" deleted from the party charter.

Did Moscow have a hand in thwarting Carrillo in this fashion? A few weeks before the opening of the Catalan congress in Barcelona, a Soviet diplomat privately told a Spanish communist leader: "We have a great many friends, as everyone will soon see." And at the same time, the Spanish press was reporting a large percentage of Catalans on Aeroflot's Madrid to Moscow flights, whereas there was no seasonal reason for this flood of tourists into the USSR.

As it has been ritually doing for the past half century, PRAVDA continues to reject all charges of Soviet interference in PCE affairs. But the Moscow daily adds: "The astonishing fact is that within this chorus of backbiters, we hear the voices of certain PCE leaders." This is clearly a pointed allusion to Santiago Carrillo. The latter is personally also beginning to allude to "occult forces" and "those who would like to wipe out Eurocommunism in Spain and other countries." He has even gone further by telling a Portuguese weekly that Soviet propaganda had greatly contributed to having the Catalan PC officially abandon its Euro-communist label.

The next Spanish Communist Party Congress is to be held in July. Yet already there are proposals afloat aimed at pressuring Santiago Carrillo to resign after having continuously held the reins of the PCE since 1960. As his possible successor, some are suggesting Nicolas Sartorius, an aristocrat by birth, but a militant member of the Workers Commissions. Others are recommending a collegial party executive.

The moral of this situation is that the Soviets never give up when one of their operations does not at first succeed. When they meet with a setback, they simply try again. And this is exactly what they have done against Santiago Carrillo.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

OFFICIAL SEES FUTURE OF EC AS EUROPEAN UNION

Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German 10 Mar 81 pp 141-148

[Article by Dr Niels Hansen, head of the Planning Department of the Bonn Foreign Office]

[Text] The Community at the Beginning of the 1980's

There is no doubt that certain setbacks notwithstanding, great advances have been made in regard to the building of Europe. Crucial objectives of the treaties of Rome and Paris have been attained. The Economic Community has made a significant contribution to the historically unprecedented welfare of its members. In regard to articulation of a "unison" foreign policy of 10 member states, significant progress has been made. "In spite of all that could justifiably be criticized, the European Community is the most important cooperative accomplishment in the long history of our old continent" (Foreign Minister Genscher on 21 January 1981 in Rome).

Nevertheless: We must take note of the fact that the European unification project is stagnating in regard to its objectives. The hope--cherished until the 1970's--that the increasing integration of the national economies would more or less automatically entail advances in the political realm has not come true. The "primary objective"--announced at the Paris Summit Conference of 1972--"before the end of this decade...to transform the totality of the relations among the member states into a European Union" has not been attained. Since the resolutions concerning the first direct elections to the European Parliament (1975) and the establishment of the European Monetary System (1978), the member states have increasingly been concerned with little more than maintaining the status quo. Due to the changed economic and world-political conditions, the European integration has become more difficult. To be sure, the community has withstood the stress resulting from the oil crisis, the integration of new member states and unfavorable intra-community economic developments; in this process, however, it has been forced to concentrate on finding pragmatic solutions for acute problems. The political objectives of the European Union were thrust into the background. But this constitutes a threat to the community's inner unity. Should the process of European unification lose the political perspective, this would jeopardize the member states' solidarity--which the "Three Wise Men" in 1979 declared to be absolutely crucial--and thus eventually result in its failure.

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This is all the more serious, as in the 1980's the community and its members will be confronted with increasingly grave external and internal difficulties.¹ In the East-West relations, the elements of confrontation are more strongly pronounced now, what with the unrestrained Soviet armament measures and the Soviet Union's inroads on the Third World that culminated in the occupation of Afghanistan. Moscow has not given up its objective to thwart the unification of Europe and it has been intensifying its efforts to drive a wedge between West Europe and the United States. Due to the energy crisis and the worldwide stagflation, reduction of the disparity between North and South and the dialog on this issue with the developing countries are becoming more difficult. The increasing tensions in the Third World are threatening Europe's supply of vital raw materials.

Internally, the community is faced with the difficult task of revising its joint agrarian policy and--in connection with this--reviewing the structure of expenditures, which task is complicated further by the community's southern expansion. In crucial areas--e.g. the development of joint energy and industrial policies--there has hardly been any progress. Instead of further integration of the national economies, there are now the energy crisis, economic decline, growing unemployment and increasing payments balance deficits--all of which are increasing the danger of escape into national solo runs and protectionist practices.

To effectively meet these increasingly serious economic and international challenges, the community must be externally and internally strong and above all capable of action. What is needed is a political perspective; without such a perspective, the nations of Europe will eventually no longer be ready to commit themselves to the European Community and political compromises will be harder and harder to come by.

The 'Stuttgart Signal'

On 6 January 1981, in the speech he delivered at the FDP's Stuttgart Epiphany Conference, Foreign Minister Genscher urged the gradual realization of the European Union. Proceeding from the government declaration of 24 November 1980, which had declared the maintenance and expansion of the European communities to be the principal task of German policy makers, of a policy "that continuously focuses on the objective of the European Union," Genscher stated:

"The Europeans should seek the answers to the great challenges of our time not only in the indisputably important reform of the agrarian market, in the dispute over market regulations or in the discussions among the organs of the community. For a Europe limiting itself to such an approach, stagnation would mean the beginning of disintegration. Such an approach would be equivalent to Europe's withdrawal from international politics. Europe needs a new political impulse. It must make a marked step toward the European Union.

My question is: Is it not high time now to conclude an agreement concerning the European Union so as to orientate the existing links within the European Community and among the 10 member states more strongly toward this union? And also to strengthen the community's inner unity so as to psychologically enable it to solve the difficult internal problems with which it will be confronted in 1981/82. Such an agreement is needed to consolidate the foundations for joint measures in the field of foreign policy and thus to increase the weight of the community in its

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partnership with the United States and--together with the United States--in the international arena.

The objectives of a European Union must include: development of a joint European foreign policy; expansion of the community's joint policies in accordance with the treaties of Paris and Rome; coordination of security measures; closer cooperation in the cultural sector and harmonization of legislation.

These demands are not new--they can be found in many documents; but the time is ripe for implementing them."

Subsequently, the foreign minister repeatedly paraphrased these statements, e.g. in an address he delivered in Rome on 21 January, in the German Bundestag [Lower House] on 28 January and in interviews with LE FIGARO, LE MATIN and various German dailies and radio stations on 4, 6 and 18 February. On these occasions, he articulated the idea "to integrate the existing links within the EC and the collaboration within the framework of the European Political Cooperation among the 10 member states," but also "if possible to extend them." Genscher stated he considered his suggestion an "impulse toward a discussion that we hope to engage in with our partners. Other suggestions will have to be taken into consideration."

Judging by official statements and press comments outside Germany, the European reaction was for the most part positive. In a programmatic speech held on 28 January, Foreign Minister Colombo picked up the thread and likewise declared himself in favor of a "relance" in regard to the European Union. On 3 February, Foreign Minister Lord Carrington reaffirmed the need for an improvement of the European Political Cooperation (EPZ). On 27 January, President Giscard d'Estaing called Genscher's suggestion worth considering and pointed out that "a concerted European policy should not be formulated on the basis of the weakest standpoint and that it should not follow the slowest advance." The Joint German-French Declaration of 6 February called for the "strengthening of the political unity of Europe" as the "primary task."

That an impulse for the further development of the community is considered to be urgently necessary is indicated by the draft resolution--submitted on 6 February 1981 by 167 European Parliament deputies from all key parliamentary groups and all member states--that calls for establishment of a study team for the purpose of examining the various possibilities of institutional reform. This draft resolution makes reference to previous initiatives launched by several parliamentary groups, above all the resolution proposed by the EVP fraction on 27 September 1979, which was aimed at implementation of the European Union. On 11 February 1981, in a programmatic speech addressed to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of Ministers, the president of the Commission, Gaston Thorn, recommended the drafting of proposals concerning the European Union.

The Unification of Europe as a Design Sui Generis

The political objective of the community--which has always been the principal element of Germany's Europe policy²--has never been called into question by the EC's founding members. Even before the treaties of Paris and Rome, this objective had marked the efforts toward unification of Europe and it was incorporated in these treaties in the demand for an "increasingly close union of its members."

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In the present article, we cannot trace the discussion concerning the--fundamental--conceptional divergences that in the conflict between its "federalist" and "confederative" elements accompanied the shaping of the community's political dimension until the 1970's. The unification of Europe--as it has been developing in a 6- and 9-member framework and as it will be developing further in a 10- and 12-member framework--shows federalist and confederative elements in its institutions and procedures. It represents a combination of supranationalism and interstate cooperation. Undoubtedly, confederative conceptions such as are reflected in the Luxembourg Compromise (1966), in the interstate EPZ (1970) and in the establishment of the European Council (1974) have left their imprint on the development since the mid-1960's and have facilitated the two expansions of the community.

It was on account of these conceptional divergences that the--confederatively oriented--Fouchet Plans failed (1962). Today these divergences have been superseded by the more pragmatic and efficiency-oriented approach that underlies the affirmations of the "European Union" in the communiques of the summit conferences in Paris (1972 and 1974) and The Hague (1976) and in the document on European identity (1973) and that is reflected in the Tindemans Report.

Concentration and Possible Further Development of the European Institutional Framework

Foreign Minister Genscher initially advocated contractually to "concentrate" the institutional framework of the 10-member community. This framework consists of the Brussels "Acquis communautaire" proper, the interstate cooperation of the 10 member states in the field of foreign policy (EPZ) and the European Council which also had not been part of the Treaties of Rome.

Such an integration could fall back on certain elements of the Fouchet Plans of 1961/62, which provided for a "union" characterized by a similar linking of interstate and community elements. As had been envisaged at that time, a "legal arrangement" (Tindemans) in regard to the European Union would provide the framework that would incorporate the--by now existing--European institutions and procedures, without affecting their legal foundations. It should be remembered that the Fouchet Plan and its variants was undone largely by the objections raised--above all by the Netherlands and Belgium--against the "council" of the heads of state and government--objections these countries would withdraw only in the event of England's accession. Today this argument is no longer a factor.

Such a--legally safeguarded--linking of long-standing institutions and authoritative bodies does not constitute the European Union in its definitive form, but it leads up to it. At the same time, it is intended to--and in fact can--lay the foundation for its future completion. In keeping with the initiative of the foreign minister, the integration and legal safeguarding of the existing institutions--which should be accomplished in the document to be drawn up--should be complemented by the further development of community policies and structures and by the opening up of developmental possibilities in new fields--and all this with a view to the European Union. The concrete formulation of an appropriate document will have to be discussed in detail by all of the parties concerned.

A new attempt at establishing the European Union would facilitate solution of the community's pending problems. Only a politically, economically and institutionally

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consolidated community will be able to maintain and improve the results hitherto attained, further to develop the European Monetary System and to cope with the additional strain resulting from the extension toward the south. In his Stuttgart speech, Foreign Minister Genscher touched upon these complex problems in discussing the "development of community policies in accordance with the treaties of Paris and Rome."

Naturally, it would be an illusion to think that all of the pending problems can quickly be solved through the formal step toward establishment of a union; however, such a move would certainly be conducive to the necessary settlement of conflicts of interest and to the solidarity required for such a settlement.

Without clarification of the political objectives of the unification of Europe, it will be impossible to justify before the public a transfer of resources. In a community that considers itself merely a utilitarian association for improving or maintaining the standard of living, every member state will sooner or later act according to the principle of "juste retour," that is to say the member states will invest no more in the community than they can recover from it. But that would be the end of the solidarity on which the community is based and from which it derives its strength.

The same applies to the second sector of the European institutional framework that would have to be incorporated in a union--the European cooperation in the field of foreign affairs (EPZ). In the 10 years of its existence, this cooperation has shown dynamic development on the basis of the reports of Luxembourg (1970) and Copenhagen (1973) and it has led to an extensive harmonization and coordination of the member states' foreign policies. However, all of these advances notwithstanding, there is as yet no concerted European foreign policy; in view of the increasingly serious world-political challenges of the community and its members in the 1980's, such a joint policy would be of crucial importance. "Adoption" of such a policy had already been envisaged in the original version of the Fouchet Plan (whereas the second version provided for a less extensive formulation). In his speech of 6 January, Foreign Minister Genscher--while emphasizing the partnership with the United States³--repostulated it. (In his Hamburg speech of 17 November 1980, Foreign Minister Lord Carrington likewise advocated intensification of the EPZ.⁴) The technical aspects and structures of this interstate cooperation are indeed in need of improvement and the 10 member states are presently looking into this.

It would be important, for example--and this has been emphatically recommended in the Tindemans Report--to extend the interlocking of the EPZ and the community policy proper; in terms of foreign policy, the latter is of increasing importance in regard to the regional cooperation with the Third World (Lome, ASEAN, Mediterranean). Since 1970, gradual advances have been made in regard to this integration (e.g. Paris Summit Conference of 1974: meeting of the foreign ministers within the EPZ framework on the occasion of Council sessions), but it must nevertheless be considered insufficient. In this regard, too, Minister Genscher's initiative would be conducive to further development.

If it were possible to orientate--in practical operation as well--the various instruments of the European unification policy more strongly toward the common objective, it would certainly be an improvement. In this connection, one could

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also consider gradual settlement of very practical problems, e.g. problems pertaining to the siting of the various institutions, improvement of their structures, or their relationship to the European Parliament. These are by no means new problems, but perhaps they may be solved more easily, if they are viewed and accepted as concrete and necessary steps toward the European Union.

Security Policy

In regard to the objectives of a European Union, the Foreign Minister on 6 January named two additional areas that are not yet part of the European institutional framework, namely "the coordination in the field of security policy" and "the closer cooperation in the cultural sector." In this respect, too, one can justly say that "these demands are not new and that they can be found in many documents."

As far as security policy is concerned, Fouchet Plan I had already stipulated one objective of the union, namely "through a joint defense policy in collaboration with the other free nations to fortify the member states against any attack." (Fouchet II then restricted itself--as it had done in the field of foreign policy--to the objective to "assimilate, coordinate and unify" the defense-related policies). One of the reasons of the failure of the Fouchet Plan was the fact that "in regard to defense within the framework of the Atlantic Pact it was impossible to find a formula satisfactory to all" (Minister President Werner in a speech delivered in Bonn on 21 January 1981).

Tindemans deals with this problem primarily in the foreign policy-related part of his report.⁵ In regard to the Atlantic Alliance, which must be credited with having created "in Europe an atmosphere of security and equilibrium,"⁶ Tindemans points out that "security must not be separated from the European Union.... Consequently, as the development of the European Union progresses, the member states must solve the problems that arise in connection with the safeguarding of their external security. The European Union will remain incomplete as long as it does not have any concerted defense policy."⁷

It is precisely the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe that has made it clear--and Tindemans, too, draws attention to this fact--that aside from military elements security problems also comprise political and economic elements that are closely interrelated. Consequently, within the EPZ framework, the 9/10 member states--in discussing CSCE problems (which in NATO likewise have always been settled by way of mutual consultation of the 15 members)--have been dealing with foreign policy aspects of problems concerning security policy.

However, security policy-related problems in a narrower sense, i.e. problems concerning defensive capability and strategy, have been left out of consideration, especially since one community member, Ireland, does not belong to NATO.

A Europe that in terms of population and economic strength is comparable to the United States will want to assume a more specific role in the alliance, the closer it gets to the European Union. It is inevitable that in the course of this process security-related problems with all of their aspects will to a greater extent be included in the European coordination process.⁸

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In the field of security policy, the interests of West Europe and of the United States are identical. Thus the statement by Foreign Minister Genscher--"to increase the weight of the community in its partnership with the United States and--together with the United States--in the international arena"--applies to this vital, sensitive area in particular.

Cultural Cooperation

The second additional area that the foreign minister on 6 January counted among the objectives of a European Union is the cultural cooperation. The Tindemans Report likewise made reference to it: "The European Union...must manifest itself in education and culture, information and communications, youth projects and recreational activities." The report proposes establishment of a European foundation oriented toward youth projects, student exchange, scientific discussions and colloquia, conferences of socio-professional groups and cultural and information-related activities.⁹ In practice, however, such intentions have not gone beyond the efforts made by the member states' ministers of education in regard to gradual coordination in the field of education and even these limited endeavors have only been partially successful. Nevertheless, the European schools and the European University Institute in Florence are showing some promise.

Further expansion of cultural cooperation necessitates new impulses and a well-defined framework, which could be provided by the European Union. In this respect, there are numerous possibilities, but care should be taken to avoid any overlapping with the European Council. In contrast to the economic sector, the primary objective here is not harmonization or even standardization. The European cultural identity manifests itself as a growing diversity based on common values and convictions. In the impressive speech she delivered at the opening session following the direct elections on 17 July 1979, Louise Weiss, the seniority president of the European Parliament pointed out a number of fruitful approaches.

'... So That Europe Can Reassume the Role Corresponding to Its Historical Tradition'¹⁰

The European Union is a dictate of political reason. Today political events are part of global interrelationships. Global forces and factors determine our life and our future. Only global powers or strong regional alliances can influence these forces. If we Europeans want to meet the increasingly serious international and world-economic challenges and if we want adequately to protect our interests, we can no longer do so as members of individual--albeit allied--nations; rather, we must think and act as citizens of a united Europe.

FOOTNOTES

1. See also the sections "Outlook on the Years 1980-1985" and "Threats to the Community" in the report by the "Three Wise Men" of October 1979. Summary in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 3, 1980, pp D 80 ff.
2. See Herbert Mueller-Roschach, "Die deutsche Europapolitik 1949-1977--eine politische Chronik" [Germany's European Policy 1949-1977--A Political Chronicle], Bonn, 1980.

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3. See also Paragraph II, 14 of the Document Concerning European Identity of 14 December 1973, in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 2, 1974, pp D 52 ff; and also Chapter II C2 of the Tindemans Report, in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 3, 1976, p D 63. Foreign Minister Genscher on 4 June 1980: "Perhaps Europe would be listened to more closely in Washington, if our Europe spoke more unequivocally and unanimously and showed greater resolve in concerted action."
4. Text in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 1, 1981, pp D 17 ff.
5. Chapter II, C 3 of the Tindemans Report ("Security"), op. cit., pp D 63 ff.
6. See also Paragraph I, 8 of the Document Concerning European Identity, op. cit., p D 52.
7. However, Tindemans adds the following qualification: "For the time being, I have to say that at present--and probably in the near future as well--our states are not yet in a position to draw up general guidelines, without which a joint defense policy is impracticable." Nevertheless, they should not "remain inactive" and they should "engage--on a regular basis--in an exchange of views on our specific defense problems" and "cooperate in defense production."
8. Then there will arise the question as to how the West European Union (which comprises only seven EC member states) will adapt itself to the process of further unification of Europe. The Tindemans Report touches upon one aspect of this problem in a footnote (Chapter V A 1, op. cit., p D 78).
9. Chapter I A 3 and IV B of the Tindemans Report, op. cit., pp D 58 and D 77; also Chapter III B 2 (Research), op. cit., p D 71.
10. Joint German-French Declaration of 6 February 1981.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

NEW OVERSEAS ACTION PURSUIT SQUADRON ACTIVATED

Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Apr 81 pp 26-28

[Text] Under its policy of assisting French-speaking African countries, on several occasions the French Government has decided to provide military aid to countries requesting it, in order to assure their territorial integrity. We have just learned that a new fighter unit specializing in overseas operations has just been created: the 21st Squadron, stationed at an air base in the southeastern part of France. Here is our exclusive story.

During recent French military operations in Africa, it became apparent that French ground units deployed by air transport or parachute were completely without any air support once they were in the field. More specifically, these units had neither their own reconnaissance capabilities nor adequate limited firepower, since it is difficult for FSA 49/56 aircraft to replace a modern fighter-bomber in terms of firepower. There have been attempts to remedy this situation, of course, initially by purchasing Swiss SiG assault rifles (in particular for units assigned to FINUL) and then by speeding up the introduction of the famous Clairon 5.56 FAMAS [Fusil Automatique de la Manufacture d'Armes de Saint-Etienne: automatic rifle made by the Saint-Etienne Arms Factory] in units with so-called "overseas" missions. But these two attempts had to be abandoned: in the first case, because SiG rifles were invoiced in Swiss francs, which placed a heavy burden on Section 24-8 of Title VII of the armed forces budget because of the Swiss currency's rate of exchange; in the second case, although the FAMAS rifle proved satisfactory from the standpoint of firepower, its capabilities in the area of tactical reconnaissance were still limited.

Other solutions to provide air support to French overseas forces also proved rather unsatisfactory. Although it was possible to request the use of foreign powers' strategic means of transport (the United States in particular), international cooperation in the case of fighter aviation proved impossible because ground forces had no officer who was both an Air Control specialist and a fluent speaker of Lingala and who could thus act as a liaison between French ground troops and the foreign air units assigned to support them (as in the case of the Kolwezi operation).

The solutions considered all proved rather unsatisfactory and this problem of air support for overseas action forces absolutely had to be solved, especially because

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of the fact that since the Libyan invasion of Chad, any French operation in that area would have encountered an enemy with substantial air cover, including MiG-23 and MiG-25 aircraft, for example. The Libyans have solved this problem in a rather rational way: since the fighter pilots and ground officers are all Soviet, there is no longer any language problem. But despite the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force in the United States, it is readily understandable that the French Government did not want its overseas intervention forces to be accompanied by American officers (it should be noted that Lingala, a Zairian dialect, has been taught since 1978 at the DIA [as published] school near Chicago).

Political requirements made a quick solution to this problem necessary and the decision was therefore made to consult not only the "research" departments of the armed forces but eminent European specialists as well. The international scope attributed to this matter proved unnecessary, however, since it was a French noncommissioned officer who proposed the solution that was finally adopted; he had long been interested in the lessons which the U.S. Air Force had learned from its involvement in Vietnam. It followed clearly from the study made by this noncommissioned officer that the Americans had extensively used aircraft of antiquated design, such as the F-100, Skyraider and Cavalier P-51 Mustang. The additional study later made by the Second Office of French Overseas Intervention Forces (2B/FIF) confirmed that this concept was still enticing, although it would have been difficult to follow the American example by purchasing P-51s, Skyraiders and F-100s, which had been used against the Viet Minh, Viet Cong and other Vietnamese factions with a certain degree of success. This matter was subsequently referred to the Research and Planning Office for Overseas Operations, concurrently and coincidentally, by the general staff's Foreign Transfers Office, which was faced with the problem of getting rid of certain fighter and transport aircraft which no longer met French needs, specifically several SMB-2 and Noratlas aircraft. These planes had been stored for several years at Le Bourget (Noratlas) and Chateaudun (SMB-2) awaiting foreign customers. Attempts had certainly been made to export them, to El Salvador in particular, but 24 SMB-2 and 18 Noratlas planes were still on hand.

These two requirements were subsequently reconciled: by equipping overseas forces with an effective combat plane, even of antiquated design, and finding a use for these SMB-2 and Noratlas aircraft whose presence on the parking area of Le Bourget Airport was becoming embarrassing: not only were these planes blocking a part of the airport's parking area--and parking fees go up every year--but the Museum of the Air was also complaining about the unfair competition from these planes, since they were located near its exhibition halls. Finally, it would have been unseemly for these unmarketable planes to remain so visible to foreign buyers coming to admire the latest technological products of the French aeronautical industry at the time of Le Bourget's Aeronautical Show. All of these requirements made it advisable to incorporate these planes into a new polyvalent air unit, whose creation was probably financed by the savings derived from no longer having to pay parking fees to the Paris airport.

The choice of aircraft, imposed by force majeure and the Museum of the Air, completely coincided, by accident, with the specifications issued by the Air Force (Ref. EMAA/Cab/CSAA/8475 of 30 February 1980) to define the characteristics of the "New Overseas Support Aircraft" (NASE): the SMB-2 is actually a safe and reliable plane with good firepower and low maintenance cost. Moreover, the use of such aircraft

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would not run the risk of hindering insurgents with overly advanced technology, nor could it start a new arms race in Africa, since all African countries now have planes that are more advanced, more expensive and which perform better.

Thus it was necessary to establish a structure capable of concurrently providing for the operational use of aircraft as different as the Noratlas and SMB-2. There was the precedent of Border Groups, but they had never incorporated fighter aircraft and organizational problems would have been raised by making "fighters" subordinate to an officer of COTAM [Military Air Transport Command], or worse, of the general staff. A new study (Ref. EMAA/6RA/CSAe/1294) assigned to the Sixth Air Region made possible the solution which was finally adopted: a fighter unit had to be created, to which transport aircraft would then be subordinate. This is how the EC 21 [Escadron de Chasse 21: Fighter Squadron 21] was established, a mixed unit whose name was no longer used by an active unit.

The EC 21 Today

The mixed unit thus created includes four squadrons: three fighter squadrons (1/21 "Cognac," 2/21 "Armagnac" and 4/21 "Muscadet") and one transport squadron (5/21 "Fine Champagne"). Incidentally, it should be noted that the name of 3/21 could not be used because there is a dispute, with regard to patent rights, between the association of wine producers of Burgundy and the Air Force general staff over that unit's name.

The EC 21 is currently stationed at an air base located in a thickly forested area near Nimes, which provides an excellent strategic point of departure for Africa. The base itself, a former hunting ground established at the time of World War II, is being repaired, in particular the runway and technical installations. The planes do not yet have individual shelters, but their construction is planned for the near future.

This unit's command is assigned to a brigadier general, to whom a mixed inter-services staff is subordinate.

Directly subordinate to the chief of staff of the armed forces, use of this unit will be assigned to the inter-services staff of the FIF [Forces d'Intervention Francaise: French Overseas Intervention Forces], which in turn is in command of the 31st Brigade, established to bring together under a central command all ground resources for overseas operations.

Special tactics have been developed to provide the EC 21 with maximum effectiveness as soon as it is deployed. It is planned that its SMB-2 aircraft, which have been rendered capable of in-flight refueling (stationary probe on left side of air intake), will reach the site of operations slightly before the Noratlas planes and will "prepare" the rocket launching site; the Noratlas planes will drop special aeronautical engineering teams assigned to hastily prepare the landing strip. As soon as it is ready, the planes will be able to land, unload their equipment and set up the advance fire-support base (BAAF). With regard to the aeronautical engineering team, its operation will have to be very rapid because of the limited range of the circling aircraft, but it is claimed that this operation can be properly executed.

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We should also note that in addition to their in-flight refueling equipment, the SMB-2 planes will be equipped with SSB/MF [single-sideband/medium-frequency] radios incorporating IL [infralow] devices which can readily be switched to antijamming frequency to assure the security of air-to-surface communications.

The creation of a unit such as the EC 21 is particularly significant because it clearly shows the flexibility of the armed forces' present structures, specifically in meeting new tactical requirements.

There is also a substantial corollary advantage: this unit will provide greater support and protection to ground units, but without forcing the government to engage--and risk losing--exceptionally expensive aircraft such as the Jaguar.

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