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# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 14/81)

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USSR REPORT  
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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK DEFENDS SOVIET JEWISH POLICY, ATTACKS INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM

Kiev OBRECHENNOST' POLITIKI I PRAKTIKI SIONIZMA in Russian 1980 (signed to press 2 Apr 80) pp 1-2, 142-151, 171-182, 191-192.

[Annotation, table of contents, and excerpts from chapters 5 and 6 from book "The Doom of the Policy and Practice of Zionism", by Leonid Yefimovich Berenshteyn, Izdatel'skoye ob"yedineniye "Vyshcha shkola", 3,000 copies, 192 pages]

[Text] Through a large number of facts this monograph exposes the racist and anti-communist essence of the ideology, policy, and practice of international Zionism, and reveals the objective factors responsible for the historic doom and failure of international Zionism.

The monograph is intended for teachers, scientists, and graduate students.

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Zionism's Ideological Sabotage of the Forces of Progress, Democracy, and Socialism

[Excerpt] The anti-Soviet political and ideological subversive activities of Zionism, which are conducted on the basis of the theory of the "world Jewish nation" and its conceptions of "universal" antisemitism, the "dual loyalty" and "dual citizenship" of

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Jews, and their "psychological incompatibility" with socialism, have become an inherent part of imperialism's anticommunist struggle.

Capitalizing on all of the possibilities imperialism has to offer for subversive activities against socialist countries, international Zionism has even created its own special centers for this purpose.

Groupings of Zionist organizations, temporary at first, and later made permanent, were created in the mid 1960's: The American Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews, the European Conference of Jewish Communities on the Status of Soviet Jews, the Latin American Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews, and similar congregations of Zionist organizations in Australia and New Zealand.

Recently, in order to intensify its political subversive activities against the USSR and other socialist countries, international Zionism moved its strongpoints closer to their borders. Such Zionist subversive centers and organizations, which maintain close ties with the intelligence agencies of the imperialist states, were founded in West Berlin, Brussels, Paris, London, and Vienna. There are not less than 18 of them, to including a center named after Simon Wiesenthal. The biography of this gentleman is abundant with highly eloquent episodes and facts. Thus back during the occupation of L'vov by fascist troops during World War II, Wiesenthal made a "classical" prison break. A careful study of the circumstances surrounding the "break" showed that Wiesenthal had entered into a secret conspiracy with the Nazis and went over to their service. We were informed of this in December 1975 by the newspaper THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE.

The Polish newspaper ZHOLNEZH VOL'NOSTI described another stage of Wiesenthal's life to its readers: his collaboration with the Israeli embassy in Vienna, and his ties with the intelligence agencies of a number of imperialist countries during his directorship of the so-called "Jewish Documentation Center" in the Austrian capital.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, in which a Jewish department with about 5,000 agents in the USA and in foreign countries has been functioning since 1953, has a direct bearing on his activities. The Jewish department organizes and incites subversive activities and espionage in socialist countries through the use of the five networks organized by the department itself, and individuals brought under the influence of Zionist propaganda.

The American branch of the B'nai B'rith Zionist organization is especially active in the anti-Soviet campaign. The so-called Academic Committee on the Status of Soviet Jews operates as part of this organization. Its special "instructors" meet with tourists intending to travel to socialist countries and "instructs" them on the status of Jews in the USSR and East Europe. Israeli diplomats in the USA play an active role in such preparation of tourists.

JOINT persists in its "touching concern" for the fate of Soviet Jews. Propaganda materials specially fabricated by Zionist pen-pushers are frequently included in clothing packages (they are sent to the USSR by foreign "philanthropists" by way of the English firm Dinnerman & Co., (Mela) in Switzerland, and so on). The clients of Dinnerman & Co. include Zionist organizations such as the Union of Baltic Jews in London, Bukovina Relief in Montreal, the Association of Emigrants From the Soviet

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Union in Tel Aviv, and others. These and other organizations supply Dinnerman & Co. the addresses of potential correspondents in the Soviet Union.\*

Imperialist and Zionist centers have meticulously worked out their tactics of "psychological influence" upon the USSR--anti-Soviet meetings, special seminars and symposiums, publication of slanderous literature on the USSR and other socialist countries, special prayers "to relieve the lot" of Jews living behind the "iron curtain", demonstrations of "protest", picket lines around Soviet embassies and trade delegations, provocations against Soviet diplomats and delegations from the USSR visiting capitalist countries, boycotts of road tours of Soviet performers and exhibits on life in the USSR, and organization of massive letter-writing campaigns and visa applications from Israel to individual Soviet citizens.

Broad use of former Soviet citizens of Jewish origin that had immigrated into Israel and the USA is recommended for "visual agitation and propaganda". Millions of dollars are allocated by the World Zionist Organization to organize this entire infamous campaign and to publish anti-Soviet literature. Monopolist associations of the USA and other imperialist states helped to subsidize these provocations.

As with all anticommunists, Zionists manage their ideological diversions with the following purposes:

to discredit the Soviet structure and the economic system of socialism, and the USSR's foreign policy course aimed at relaxation of international tension;

to distort the CPSU's Leninist nationalities policy, the Soviet way of life, and socialist democracy;

to incite bourgeois nationalism in the USSR, to create "internal opposition", and to erode socialism from within.

The efforts to attain these strategic goals are subdivided by imperialist and Zionist propaganda into a number of tactical operations pursuing the following operational objectives: "neutralizing" the Marxist-Leninist conviction of Soviet people; replacing it with bourgeois, to include nationalist, ideology; inciting anti-Soviet predispositions; creating new value orientations and attitudes among certain population groups of the USSR.\*\*

The ideological diversions of imperialism and Zionism are aimed at distorting the essence of the economic and political system of developed socialist society, and the nature, orientation, and objectives of the party's economic strategy under modern conditions, to compromise the party's decisions on further development of socialist democracy and reinforcement of socialist law and order in the country, and to slander the practice of communist development in the Soviet Union.

Nationalist propaganda is given a special place in the ideological diversions of imperialism and international Zionism. Emigration is broadly advertised in this case as a means for resolving the "Jewish question" and realizing "national-patriotic",

\* For greater detail on the anti-Soviet activities of JOINT, see the book "Chorni sotni sionizmu" [The Terrorists of Zionism] by D. Rozenblyum and V. Savtsov.

\*\* See Volkov, V. P., "Mezhdunarodnyy sionizm na sluzhbe imperializma" [International Zionism in the Service of Imperialism], p 43.

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"spiritual-cultural", and other ideals. Such propaganda also has religious motives. As an example the Voice of Israel compares immigration into Israel with the great migration of Jews out of Egypt 3,000 years ago. This radio station is perpetually providing instructions on how to prepare for emigration, on the trip itself, and on resettlement.

Anti-Soviet propaganda equally capitalizes on cases in which exit visas are temporarily refused to persons of Jewish origin on strictly defined and legal grounds with the purposes of protecting state interests. Zionists spread lies about the USSR's "economic dependence" upon the West, under the pressure of which the infamous "iron curtain" is supposedly raised "to release dissident Jews". It is asserted that the USSR is using emigration in the interest of "trade" with Western countries, exchanging Jews for bread and modern equipment, and that it capitalizes on other economic and political benefits of detente.

But whenever visas permitting exit from the USSR are temporarily refused to certain individuals, slanderous fabrications are spread, asserting that Jews are being detained in the Soviet Union as "hostages". At the same time Zionist propaganda organs subject "renegades"--Jews who do not wish to abandon their motherland--to savage criticism. They accuse them of supposedly losing their "Jewish moral countenance" and acquiring a "Soviet spirit" in the USSR. In this connection Zionist ideologists and politicians are developing and improving psychological methods for brainwashing Soviet Jews, and the mouthpieces of Zionist propaganda are updating their radio programs with the purpose of "improving Zionist indoctrination" among the Jewish public of the USSR and other socialist countries.

Radio Israel is broadcasting a series of programs entitled "Zionism in the USSR". Communicating the goals of these programs, it declares: "It is our moral duty to build a bridge between us and those who are in the USSR."

It is entirely obvious that despite the constant appeals for mass emigration, Zionism is not interested in emigration of all or even most Jews from the USSR and other socialist countries, and it has no intention of achieving this. As with anti-communism in general, Zionism is trying to undermine the Soviet social system from within by inciting nationalism and organizing "internal opposition". It is with this purpose that it raises the issues of the "cultural-national" autonomy of Jews, of averting their assimilation, and of intensifying nationalistic education. It is also hoped in this case that this would elicit mistrust in the Jews on the part of other Soviet citizens, thus sowing the seeds of national enmity and hostility in the country.\*

Imperialists and Zionists cannot find the materials they need for their purposes in the Soviet Union. And so the parasites, swindlers, hooligans, speculators, extortionists, and misappropriators of the people's property, who are enrolled in the "political opposition" by our ideological enemies, become the "heroes" of the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. So-called "defenders of civil rights" have included, for example, the former director of the "Tadzhikistan" company store in Moscow, M. Leviev. He was punished for illegal currency

\* See Volkov, V. P., "Mezhdunarodnyy sionizm na sluzhbe imperializma," pp 44-45.

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operations, for abuse of his official position, for deception of customers, smuggling, embezzlement in especially great proportions, and acceptance of bribes under aggravating circumstances.

For betrayal of the socialist motherland, for providing assistance to a foreign government in its hostile activities against the USSR, and for engaging in anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, Soviet organs condemned a certain A. Shcharanskiy. The latter, a report on the court proceedings against him stated, tried to stimulate the emigration of Jews from the USSR, incited national separateness and enmity, and appealed for pressure upon Soviet organs from without, all in the interests of Zionist circles. Thus in an interview with one of the leaders of the international Zionist organization (Sokhnut), Lerman, who came to Moscow in September 1976, Shcharanskiy persuaded him to use all the possibilities of international Zionism in order to force the USA to halt its grain shipments to the Soviet Union. Thus the discussion centered on organizing economic pressure upon the Soviet state.

In February 1976 Shcharanskiy participated in the preparation of letters to participants of a conference of Zionists held in Brussels; these letters contained knowingly false information indicating "intensification of antisemitism and discrimination against Jews in the USSR". Under this excuse the international Zionist organizations were asked to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and undermine its interests and authority. At the end of 1976 Shcharanskiy and his fellow conspirators sent a letter abroad asking that the Jackson amendment to the trade laws, which was discriminatory in relation to the USSR, be kept in force. The proponents of preserving this amendment to the detriment of the mutual relations between the great powers used this letter and the misleading data it contained as an argument to confirm and justify their reactionary position.\*

Also typical is the fact that imperialist intelligence agencies recruit spies and saboteurs from among "dissidents". Of certain interest in this aspect are the documented disclosures of S. Lipavskiy's activities. Beginning in 1972 he associated himself with a number of persons who were temporarily refused exit from the USSR by the authorities because they had access to military secrets, and who began a noisy slander campaign on the question of civil rights. "They had a single platform and a single leader--American intelligence and foreign anti-Soviet organizations," said Lipavskiy in a meeting with Soviet and foreign journalists in May 1977. "They systematically received instructions, hostile literature, and money via unofficial channels."

S. Lipavskiy said that a number of persons from the American embassy in Moscow (Levitski, Pressel, Natanson) who spoke with "dissidents" asked about certain facts concerning government scientific research institutes, enterprises, and institutions.\*\*

Thus because they were unable to gain the support of the majority of Soviet Jews, Zionists assumed the tack of using individual renegades in the role of spies, under the cloak of "dissidents". This is even greater confirmation of the fact that as with all reaction, Zionism will stop at no methods and resources to fight the forces of progress, democracy, and socialism.

\* See "Belaya kniga" [White Book], p 254.

\*\* See "Belaya kniga," pp 192-200.

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International Zionism does not limit itself to ideological sabotage. It also resorts to open acts of terrorism. A special subdivision for foreign political terrorism entitled "Mitzvah Elohim" was created in the Israeli army for this purpose. It performs acts of terrorism against leaders of the Palistinian resistance, and it incites infighting within Arab states.

The terrorist activities of Israeli special services, particularly of the foreign political intelligence agency Mossad, went beyond the boundaries of the Near East, and assumed an international nature. Zionist gangsterism became a daily phenomenon in many states of the West. The Mossad agency created sabotage groups in a large number of European and American countries; these groups began making attacks on progressive Arab officials and warriors against Zionism, and they assumed the course of breaking, by terrorist methods, the normal diplomatic, trade, and cultural ties of capitalist states with socialist countries.

The terrorist activities of the Jewish Defense League underwent intensification simultaneously. These activities include organizing the bombing and burning of buildings belonging to foreign governments.

Fascist thugs from the Jewish Defense League are conducting an especially unruly campaign of terror and vandalism against representatives of the USSR in the United States of America. Members of the Jewish Defense League have often attacked and shelled buildings belonging to UN delegations from the USSR, UkSSR, and BSSR, and they have performed acts of terror against other Soviet institutions in the USA. For such acts of banditry, the leaders of the Jewish Defense League have created a group of stormtroopers trained in a special school in Woodbourne (New York).

The terrorist acts of Zionist-Israeli agents proceed with the approval of Israel's "security committee", which contains members of the government and the chief of general staff. When planning terrorist acts, the authors of the book "Oko Tel'-Aviva" [The Eye of Tel-Aviv] write, this "committee" "takes practically no account of the probable reaction of the world public, no matter how unfavorable it might be."

Thus all of the facts cited here show that Zionists are actively participating in ideological diversions against the forces of progress, democracy, and socialism. They act primarily against the socialist fraternity and the international communist and workers movement.

The events demonstrate, however, that imperialist reaction, including Zionism, is in no position to influence the laboring masses.

The struggle between socialist and bourgeois ideology is an objective law,\* but it has nothing in common with the "psychological" war and ideological diversions. The experience of history confirms that the bourgeoisie is no longer able to suggest ideas that could win the masses over to its side, and that communist ideology is capturing the minds of increasingly broader masses of laborers, while imperialism lies powerless in the face of this process.

\* See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 6, pp 39-40.

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The ideological struggle of the communists presupposes an open fight against ideological enemies since, as the CPSU Program states, "Marxism-Leninism is winning more and more new victories. It is winning because it expresses the vital interests of the working class and the tremendous majority of mankind aspiring to peace, liberty, and progress, because it expresses the ideology of a new society that is to replace capitalism."\*

The Soviet people wholly and fully reject the fabrications and lies of the enemies of progress, democracy, and socialism. They are devoted to the ideals of communism, they wholly support the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party, and through their selfless labor they are strengthening the world's first society of developed socialism.

Zionists--the Falsifiers of Soviet Reality

[Excerpt] Zionists also believe assimilation of Jews to be a violation of "human rights". They assert that this is being done coercively in the USSR.

Zionists fought against the assimilation policy earlier, at the beginning of the 20th century. Ignoring a law of social development, they declared assimilation to be an illegal, artificially imposed process.

V. I. Lenin revealed the Marxist interpretation of the essence and nature of assimilation in his works "The Bund's Position in the Party," "Critical Remarks on the Nationalities Question", "Response to P. Kievskiy (Yu. Pyatakov)", and others. While it steadfastly defends the right of all nationalities for free development, at the same time Marxism-Leninism does not transform it into an obsession, reducing it to an end in itself. Marxist-Leninists believe that assimilation is a natural and objective process even under capitalism.

Developing capitalism is familiar with two historic trends in the nationalities question. First, the awakening of nationalist life and nationalist movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and creation of nationalist states. Second, the breakdown of all dealings between nations, the breakdown of national barriers, and achievement of international unity in capital, economic life in general, science, and so on. Moreover, V. I. Lenin emphasized, it is precisely the trend of breaking down national barriers, erasing national differences, and assimilating nations, one representing "one of the greatest motive forces transforming capitalism into socialism",\*\* that is manifesting itself with increasingly greater power in capitalism.

V. I. Lenin demonstrated that in the course of swift economic development in a number of regions of Russia, a process of assimilation began, embracing the Great Russian and Ukrainian proletariat as well. And this fact, Lenin emphasized, is doubtlessly progressive. Therefore the proletariat not only has no intention of defending nationalistic development of each nation, but on the contrary it cautions the masses against all illusions, and it welcomes assimilation of nations, with the exception

\*"Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 55.

\*\*Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 24, p 125.

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of that which is coercive or which involves the granting of special privileges. V. I. Lenin taught the party to support all that would help erase national differences and bring down national barriers, all that would make the ties between nationalities more intimate, all that would lead to the merging of nations. To do anything else, in Lenin's words, would mean taking the side of reactionary nationalistic Philistinism. V. I. Lenin demonstrated that the only opposition to assimilation comes from Jewish reactionary Philistines who would like to reverse the wheels of history.

"The better representatives of Judaism," V. I. Lenin noted, "who have achieved world-historic fame and who provided the world with the best leaders of democracy and socialism, never shouted against the policy of assimilation. Only the reverential philosophers of an extremist Jewish minority shout against the policy of assimilation.\* And it is precisely with such philosophers of Jewish extremism that the ideology of modern Zionism is related.

Assimilation manifests itself on a rather broad scale in capitalist countries. The Jewish population residing in the USA, England, France, and other capitalist countries is also being subjected to assimilation.

In the USA for example, only 20 percent of the Jews believe Yiddish to be their native language. In Italy, Jews do not bear Jewish names, they do not represent themselves as Jews in official documents, and they speak in Italian. In a number of U.S. cities the quantity of mixed marriages among Jews reaches 40 percent, and in Australia it reaches 70 percent.

Naturally, assimilation is occurring under socialism. This is promoted by the internationalistic nature of the economic and political system of socialist society, by the consistently internationalistic nature of the nationalities policy of the communist parties, and by the consolidated friendship and cooperation of equal peoples in the socialist countries.

In the USSR, where a developed socialist society has been created and where a new historic community of people has evolved--the Soviet people, development of nations and nationalities is proceeding through their convergence, through brotherly mutual assistance, mutual influence, and friendship. The representatives of many nationalities are working together in internationalist labor collectives and social organizations, which is promoting growth in the number of mixed marriages and objectively leading to assimilation, including of the Jewish population.

Soviet Jews are an inseparable part of the multinational Soviet people, and they are equal citizens of the USSR, in which the roots of antisemitism have been eradicated and the conditions for its resurrection have been eliminated.

It is typical that friendship and brotherhood among all peoples in the USSR, and intolerance of national and racial hatred make up one of the principles of the moral code of the builders of communism. The pretentious idea that some peoples are superior to others, and notions of national or racial discrimination are alien to the Soviet citizen--a patriot of his socialist fatherland and concurrently a consistent internationalist. Lenin's principles for a nationalities policy are embodied within the new Soviet Constitution. "Citizens of the USSR of different races and nationalities possess equal rights.

\* Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 24, p 126.

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"The exercise of these rights," declares Article 36 of the USSR Constitution, 1977, "is promoted by a policy of comprehensive development and convergence of all nations and nationalities of the USSR, by indoctrination of citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility offered for using one's native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR.

"All direct or indirect restrictions of rights, establishment of direct or indirect advantages for citizens on the basis of race and nationality and, equally so, all preaching of racial or national discrimination, hostility, or disdain, are punishable by law. \*\*

The absolute majority of the Jews believe the Soviet Union to be their real and only motherland. Only an insignificant minority of persons of Jewish nationality have left for Israel. In the time from the end of World War II to September 1978, 168,000 Jews emigrated from the USSR.

Resolving the issue of emigration, Soviet organs consider the need for protecting state interests. Those who possess military and military-industrial information or other state secrets are not permitted to depart for an established period of time. However, the number of such persons is negligible. In the time period cited above, only 2,249 persons, or 1.6 percent, were refused departure; 98.4 percent of those who submitted applications to depart did receive such permission.

A decision refusing departure is reviewed at the request of an applicant every half year. In 1977 and 1978 2,000 persons who repeteditioned for emigration to Israel received their visas.\*\*

Spreading fabrications that the USSR is supposedly "limiting" the rights of Jews, Zionists are attempting to distract the world public from issues associated with Israel's violation of human rights in occupied Arab territories and with actions aimed at annihilating the Arab Palestinian people.

Inciting a struggle against this imaginary "lack of rights of Soviet Jews", Zionists are at the same time extending racist Israeli laws to immigrants from the USSR and other socialist countries. Immigrants from the Soviet Union are treated as the lowest grade of citizens in the "Promised Land". Most of them are permanently blacklisted by the rabbinate and the ministry of internal affairs as being half-breeds. All of their progeny are doomed to racial discrimination.

Immigrants from socialist countries are basically sent to occupied Arab territories for permanent residence, where military settlements are created.

So-called "economic integration", conducted in relation to immigrants, is accompanied by retraining (and, in fact, downgrading) of specialists: Engineers become fitters, and physicians become orderlies; many specialists are given temporary and seasonal employment. Immigrants with a higher education in the humanities find it the hardest to gain employment in their specialties. Most of them are forced to live from hand to mouth off of earnings from temporary jobs, not excluding heavy and dirty work.

\*"Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p 17.

\*\*See "Belaya kniga," pp 143-144.

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From the first days after their arrival in Israel, immigrants are persuaded as to the falseness of the propagandist assertions of equality and social justice in the "Promised Land". Contrary to the assurances of Zionist propaganda that they would be "among their own" in Israel, immigrants feel themselves to be an alien element. Questions associated with social acclimatization have mushroomed into a serious social problem, and this is even recognized by the officials. Thus A. Pinkus, former chairman of the executive committee of the European agency and director of its department of immigrant placement affairs, noted that "Israelis are not very eager to get close to the new immigrants."\*

Immigrants from the Soviet Union are called "Russ", implying by this nickname membership to the lowest strata of the population. They are not elected to government organs due to mistrust in them. This is declared even by persons who, yielding to the lies of the Zionists, left the USSR for Israel.\*\*

Jews who had yielded to Zionist propaganda and left for Israel are unable to endure the "Zionist way of life", and they end their lives by suicide. Hundreds of thousands aspire to return to the countries from which they came. In 30 years about a million persons, predominantly immigrants from socialist countries, have abandoned Israel.

Propagating the thesis of the "burdensome status of Soviet Jews", Zionists are indignant because Jews in the USSR do not have a possibility for studying in their native language. H. Morgenthau even asserts that Jews are supposedly being forcibly Russified in the Soviet Union. A. P. Novik has once again dragged out the old lie of forcible assimilation of the Jewish population in the USSR.

The assimilation issue is especially troubling to the Zionists. In an interview with a correspondent from the newspaper LETTSE NAYES, (I. Garkavi), chief of the culture department of the World Jewish Congress, declared: "We are presently concerned by the fact that most Jews in the world possess a high level of general culture. The danger is arising that soon it will be impossible to distinguish Jews from the surrounding population. They do not wear (lapersdaki) and yamulkas, they speak the same language as others, and they lead a lifestyle common to all...."\*\*\*

In the eyes of millions of Jews, a hostile attitude to natural assimilation has no logical grounds. Zionists themselves are forced to admit that they have no intention to shield the cultural interests of the Jews; their main apprehension is that Jews would reject their national independence, which would then mean a loss of the reasons for emigration.

In the first years of Soviet rule the Jewish population was afforded the possibility to attend schools in which classes were given in Yiddish, and to publish books and journals in this language. However, as the Jewish population abandoned its small towns following abolition of the infamous Jewish pale, moved to cities in other regions of the country, and became absorbed in international collectives, the demand for Jewish schools fell off. Even in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, which

\*Cited in MEZH DUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 9, 1975, p 153.

\*\*See "Belaya kniga," pp 26, 29, 46.

\*\*\*Cited in IZVESTIYA, 19 January 1979.

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has a Jewish theater and publishes the newspaper BIROBIDZHANER SHTERN in Yiddish, the Jews themselves have raised the issue of educating their children together with children of Russian and other nationalities.

It is highly typical that during the time of the USSR population census in January 1979, the absolute majority of Jews declared Russian to be their native language. If we consider that during the census the interviewees themselves indicated their nationalities (not necessarily as stated in their passports), it becomes clear how far assimilation of Jews has gone in the USSR. But even despite this, anyone who wishes to has the possibility for using the Hebrew or Yiddish language.

Books by Jewish writers are published in large numbers in the USSR, both in Yiddish and translated into the languages of other peoples of our multinational motherland. Just between 1955 and 1978 over 500 books by Jewish writers were published in the Soviet Union in 15 languages of the country's peoples, for a total of more than 50 million copies. During this same period 60 books were published in Yiddish. Among them is the unique "Antologiya sovremennoy yevreyskoy prozy" [Anthology of Modern Jewish Prose], containing more than 50 works by various authors of Jewish nationality.

In Moscow, the monthly literary journal SOVETISH GEYMLAND acquaints readers with new works by more than a hundred Jewish Soviet writers living in different cities of the USSR.

There are several Jewish theatrical and musical collectives in the Soviet Union that constantly tour the country. Wherever Jews live in close-knit groups, local organs of culture and trade union organizations create amateur art collectives.

In the USSR, no one is prohibited from studying any languages, including Hebrew or Yiddish. Nor does anyone create obstacles to Jewish believers. There are several dozen synagogues and more than 300 meeting-houses in the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the 1970's the number of faithful Jews was only 3-6 percent of the total Jewish population in the RSFSR and Ukraine, 5-9 percent in the Baltic republics, and 12-17 percent in the Transcaucasus.\*

But the Soviet public cannot condone the fact that Jewish nationalists wish to use religious institutions to spread Zionist ideology and to cultivate a spirit of national discrimination and open racism. This also pertains to the aspirations of Jewish nationalists to create, in the USSR, a branched network of circles to study ancient Hebrew language, in order that, as they floridly declare, the young people "could be brought spiritually closer" to "the God of the chosen country" and its state religion--that is, to Israel. Without a doubt the Soviet state, and any sovereign state for that matter, cannot permit interference by imperialist circles, including by Zionists, in its internal affairs.

The apologists of international Zionism falsify the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in relation to peoples of the Near East. In particular they make it appear that from the moment of its arisal, Soviet rule has been aspiring to

\*See "Sovetskiye yevrei: mify i deystvitel'nost'" [Soviet Jews: Myths and Reality], Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, pp 29-30.

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establish its domination over the Near East. But we do know that even in the prerevolutionary period V. I. Lenin, the leader of the international proletariat, condemned the colonial policy of imperialist countries, to include Czarist Russia, in relation to the peoples of the Near East.

It is highly noteworthy that in December 1919 the Commissariat for Jewish affairs under the RSFSR Peoples Commissar for Nationalities published, by order of the Soviet government, an appeal that stated in particular: "In behalf of the laboring masses of Russia, we hotly protest against Zionists attempting to tie the fate of the Jewish people in with the fate of the Entente's imperialism. The Jewish laboring masses in the Russian Socialist Federated Republic have their own socialist motherland, which they are defending on the fronts, together with the workers and peasants of Russia, against the imperialist Entente and all of its agents. Jewish laboring and toiling masses enjoy all civil and national rights. There are no more obstacles of any sort to development of Jewish culture. We do not need any other countries. We do not claim any sort of national rights to the possession of Palestine. We recognize these rights to be wholly those of the laboring masses of Arabs and Bedouins."\*

Following the civil war the Soviet government made a number of declarations emphasizing that the Soviet Union favored a firm peace in the Near East. This position was documented in a declaration by the Soviet delegation to the Lausanne conference on 4 December 1922. "The chief aim of the Russian government and other governments allied with it," it read, "both in relation to the Near East question and in relation to all foreign policy, is to cooperate in the establishment and consolidation of universal peace."\*\*

The Soviet government made a similar statement following declaration of the state of Israel as well.

Statements made by the USSR government concerning the aggression of imperialist states against Egypt and Lebanon in 1948 and 1956 noted the importance of achieving a firm peace in the Near East, and the need for applying the principles of sovereignty, equal rights, and neighborly relations between all states of this region.

A resolution of the June (1967) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the Policy of the Soviet Union in Connection With Israel's Aggression in the Near East", states that the USSR condemns Israeli aggression and supports Arab states in their struggle for liberty, independence, territorial integrity, and social progress. Special emphasis was laid on the fact that the Soviet Union favors conclusively extinguishing the focus of war in the Near East, and that it aspires to establish a valid and strong peace here.\*\*\*

\*Cited in Agurskiy, S., "Yevreyskiy rabochiy v kommunisticheskom dvizhenii (1917-1921)" [The Jewish Worker in the Communist Movement (1917-1921)], Minsk, 1926, pp 212-213.

\*\*"Vneshnyaya politika SSSR. Sb. dokumentov" [Foreign Policy of the USSR. Collection of Documents], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1944, p 686.

\*\*\*See "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh..." [The CPSU in Resolutions...], Vol 9, Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p 284.

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This is also noted in a decree of the April (1968) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, in documents of the 24th and 25th party congresses, in special statements of the Soviet government made in 1967-1979, and in the reports and speeches of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other party and government leaders.

To date, Zionists have represented the activities of the CPSU and Soviet government aimed at affirming the principles of peaceful coexistence as a "tactical ploy" of the Soviet leaders, as a "propagandistic thesis" supposedly called upon to "lull the vigilance" of the West. H. Morgenthau stated many times that to the Soviet Union, the principle of peaceful coexistence and relaxation of international tension is only a means for achieving its own political and economic aims. And he has appealed for a boycott of contacts with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet state is known to have been born as a result of the victory of the socialist revolution. V. I. Lenin formulated the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures as the basis for the Soviet state's foreign policy. "It was precisely Lenin," notes L. I. Brezhnev, "who suggested the premise of 'peaceful cohabitation', or, as we refer to it now, peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures, which today, owing to the consistent policy of the socialist countries, has become one of the most important principles of international relations."\*

Thus the theory, policy, and practice of the Communist Party in the Soviet state, and the socialist realities in general totally refute the deceitful fabrications of Zionist falsifiers.

The Great October Socialist Revolution was an expected phenomenon, a consequence of the consistent revolutionary struggle of the laborers and peasants of Russia for their social and national liberation. "The Great October Socialist Revolution, brought about by the laborers and peasants of Russia under the guidance of the Communist Party headed by V. I. Lenin," states the new USSR Constitution, "overthrew the power of capitalists and landowners, broke the shackles of oppression, established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and created the Soviet state--a state of a new type, the principal implement of defense of revolutionary achievements, and of development of socialism and communism."\*\*

A truly humanitarian, socialist way of life, permeated by historical optimism, comradeship, and the inviolable friendship of peoples, has evolved in Soviet developed socialist society. The new Soviet citizen--laborer, warrior, patriot--has proclaimed himself in all his strength. He was formed and he matured in the course of revolutionary development, in the time of socialism's development, and "by the content of his entire life he came to represent inspired labor in behalf of communism."\*\*\*

\*Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, p 586.

\*\*"Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik," p 3.

\*\*\*"KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh...", Vol 12, p 432.



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The entire heroic history of the Soviet people, their combat and labor victories, and their outstanding achievements are inseparably associated with the activities of the Communist Party. "Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine," declares Article 6 of the USSR Constitution of 1977, "the Communist Party determines the general prospects for the society's development and the domestic and foreign policy line of the USSR, it manages the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and it imparts a planned, scientifically grounded character to its struggle for the victory of communism."\*

The Soviet socialist structure has provided to all citizens, irrespective of origin, social and material status, racial and national membership, sex, education, language, religious attitudes, type and nature of occupation, place of residence, and other circumstances, full socioeconomic, political, and personal rights.

Truly national and racial equality exists in the USSR. It is supported by a policy of comprehensive development and convergence of all nations and nationalities of the country, by indoctrination of the citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility afforded for using one's native language and the languages of other peoples of the Soviet Union.

The greatest achievements of developed socialism are also enjoyed by the Jewish population of the USSR--an inherent part of the multinational Soviet people. The absolute majority of persons of the Jewish nationality are true Soviet citizens, and they actively participate in development of communist society. They reject Zionism and, as with all Soviet people, they support the Leninist course of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are implementing a peace-loving foreign policy, and they favor consolidation of the security of peoples and broad international cooperation. The USSR has no classes or social groups interested in the arms race or in preparation for war. The Soviet Union favors comprehensive and just solution of the Near East problem on the basis of a regard for the interests of all peoples, including the Palestinian Arab people. In this regard, the USSR has no special interests in the Near East, and it favors a firm and lasting peace in this region.

Consequently all Zionist and, in general, all bourgeois falsifications are obvious and intentional fabrications. They are refuted by life. This is evidence that by distorting the facts of history, Zionism is attempting to sow lies and slander about Soviet realities. But falsifiers have never influenced and cannot influence the objective course of social development. Life wards off not only their fabrications, but also those who think them up.

\*"Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik," p. 7.

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U.S. ANALYSES OF SOVIET DEMOGRAPHY CRITIQUED

Moscow ISTORIYA SSSR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 81 pp 219-225

[Article by V. K. Bagdasarov and V. Z. Drobizhev: "New Books by American Demographers about Population Movement in the USSR"]

[Text] The reproduction of the population is a problem which represents a top-priority scientific interest. Data on the birth rate, mortality rate, number of persons entering upon marriage, etc. reflect extremely important shifts in society's socioeconomic structure. On the other hand, the type of population reproduction exerts an influence on the size of labor resources and on the course of the most diverse social processes.

During the last few years there has been an increased interest on the part of Soviet scholars in the problems of the historical demography of the USSR.<sup>1</sup> More and more attention is also being paid to these problems in the West. Active work along this line is being conducted at the Center for the Study of Russia and the Eastern European Countries at the University of Birmingham (Great Britain) as well as at a number of universities in the United States. This is testified to by the publication in 1976--1979 of three detailed monographs devoted to the population of Russia and the Soviet Union during the 19th and 20th centuries; we will discuss them in this survey.<sup>2</sup>

The interest on the part of American historians in population movement within the USSR is explained by the attempt to discover the common factors accounting for the lower birth rate in the contemporary world. Thus, the book by A. Coale, B. Anderson, and E. Harn was written in accordance with the plan adopted in 1963 by the Center for Population Study of Princeton University. This plan has provided for the study of birth rates in Portugal, Italy, Belgium, France, and the USSR.

On the other hand, American authors have turned to the historical demography of the USSR in order to reveal the interconnection between the processes of the so-called "modernization" of society and the change in the country's population. Moreover, it is emphasized throughout that the laws of population do not depend on a society's economic or social structure. Thus, R. Lewis and R. Rowland declare the following: "We have adopted a universal or common approach in analyzing the population changes in Russia and the USSR, inasmuch as we are convinced that population changes...are completely unconnected with the political or ideological system or with the cultural or historical factors inherent to any one country."<sup>3</sup>

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To be sure, there are a number of factors (an increase of cultural standards among the population, women being drawn into production work, etc.) which exert an equal influence on the population's reproduction in countries with differing social systems, but there are also radical differences. Socialism does not know exploitation, crises and unemployment, enormous property differentiation, or any significant gaps in the level of education of various classes and social groups. The social policy of a socialist state is aimed at carrying out the optimum rates of population dynamics. This is why Marxists emphasize the historical conditionality of a population's type of reproduction. "The conditions of human multiplication," wrote V. I. Lenin, "depend directly on the structure of various social organisms."<sup>4</sup> To pose the question in a social-historical context, he stressed, means "studying the principle of the population of each historical economic system individually and studying its connection and relationship with the given system."<sup>5</sup>

Denying the specific influence of the mode of production on the population's reproduction leads to a situation whereby in all the works under consideration here nothing is said about the influence of people's way of life under the conditions of socialism on the demographic processes. The American demographers' field of vision comprises the period from 1897 through 1970, which is regarded as a unity. "Dropped out" herein is such an extremely important milestone in world history as the October Revolution, which brought about radical social transformations in our country.

The books by the American demographers have thoroughly analyzed the results of the Censuses of 1897, 1920, 1926, 1939, 1959, and 1970. And although certain authors make stipulated qualifications concerning the incompleteness of the census data, they regard them, on the whole, as a reliable source base for studying population reproduction. Considerably poorer use is made of materials derived from the current accounting of population movement. Practically no mention is made of the statistical reference works which were published during the 1920's on the birth rate and mortality rate in the USSR, nor of specialized publications on the USSR's population which were issued during the period from the 1950's through the 1970's. The periodical publications of the TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] also remain outside the field of vision. This certainly impoverishes the works under review.

The books by the American demographers have utilized quite an interesting mathematical apparatus to characterize population movement. With the help of computers they have calculated various age indexes of birth rates, mortality rates, marriage rates in regional and republic-wide cross-sections over the extent of the Soviet state's entire period of existence.

One of the basic problems of the **topic** under consideration is the demographic policy of the Soviet state. Several of the American authors pay lip service to the influence of the Soviet regime's socioeconomic policy on the demographic processes.<sup>6</sup> In essence, however, they avoid this question during the course of their investigation. The matter is presented as if the processes of migration and urbanization have been directed by the Soviet state for the sole purpose of strengthening the Russians' domination over the other--non-Russian and non-Slavic--peoples.<sup>7</sup> Of course, such an interpretation of one thrust of the Soviet socialist state's social policy has nothing in common with the actual facts. Well known are the truly titanic efforts of the Soviet state directed at eliminating national

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inequality and strengthening the international unity of all the peoples of the USSR.

A very great achievement of the Soviet system has been the elimination of the economic backwardness of the previously oppressed peoples of Russia; but R. Lewis, R. Rowland, and R. Clem try to present this as merely the result of the fact that the distribution of industry in our country was dictated solely by considerations of defense and the need to move production closer to the raw-material bases. Of course, the factors of economic feasibility and strengthening the country's defense played a role, but in the given instance nothing is mentioned about one of the basic aspects of the Soviet state's socioeconomic policy--a whole complex of measures undertaken to eliminate the economic and cultural backwardness of the former colonial outlying areas of pre-revolutionary Russia. In this connection numerous facts could have been cited from the research of Soviet historians, which are fully accessible to the American authors.<sup>9</sup> In the fact that these facts have been passed over in silence we cannot fail to see bias in the treatment of a number of basic problems.

Finally, the opinion is uttered that the USSR, so to speak, has not worked out a policy with regard to the various aspects of population movement. "In the USSR there does not exist a policy of urbanization in the sense in which we understand it," R. Lewis and R. Rowland point out, "that is, Soviet policy in this regard nowhere mentions that the level of urbanization will increase by such-and-such a percentage in a given year or in a given period."<sup>10</sup>

First of all, it must be noted that Western historians have passed over in silence the widely known measures taken by the Soviet state with respect to regulating demographic processes. Was not the mass development of the virgin and long-fallow lands of Kazakhstan, regions of Siberia, and the Far East, which were successfully carried out in the USSR, the result of the state's activity?! Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to present demographic policy in the USSR as a direct control over the population's birth rate, marriage rate, migration, and urbanization. All attempts at such interference by the state in the extremely complex socio-demographic processes, as historical experience has shown, suffer failure. The state possesses instruments which indirectly influence population movement. This is a matter of specific material, moral, political, and social devices and methods which are capable, in the final analysis, of influencing the development of demographic processes. The American authors refuse to analyze these measures of the Soviet regime, directed at regulating the demographic processes, and they assume the boldness of speaking about the lack of a social-demographic policy in general in the USSR.

The demographic policy of the Soviet state consists of a system of measures (economic, social, legal, ideological), directed at maintaining and increasing the country's human resources, augmenting the life span, forming a new type of population reproduction based on the conscious regulation of family size. Demographic policy is based on population statistics organized on a statewide scale.<sup>11</sup>

The work by A. Coale, B. Anderson, and E. Ham is specially devoted to the dynamics of the birth rate, marriage rate, and mortality rate in Russian and the USSR. This book investigates the processes of population reproduction primarily on that territory which comprised the European part of Russia prior to 1917, and with

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regard to the postwar period numerous data are adduced concerning population dynamics in the eastern republics of the USSR. The authors consider that the most important demographic shifts over the period 1897--1940 were the following: increase in the life span, decrease in the birth rate as a result of improved living conditions, development of medical care, and a fall in the percentage of the mortality rate in all age groups. The book cites interesting tables showing birth-rate dynamics. Moreover, it is pointed out that the reduction in the birth rate was particularly significant during the years of World War I, the Revolution, and the Civil War, on the eve of and during the Great Patriotic War. The data on the birth rate in Russia and the USSR are adduced in comparison with analogous information on other European countries.

Though the utilization of statistical material does not present any objections whatsoever, the treatment of certain data obtained does not always seem convincing to us. Thus, for example, the authors note the reduction in the birth rate in 1940.<sup>12</sup> They mention further that the partial mobilization of 1939--1940, along with the disruption of normal life along the borders, constituted the main reason for the sharp fall-off in the birth rate. But those events mentioned by A. Coale, B. Anderson, and E. Harm could hardly have had a real effect on significantly reducing the birth rate, as observed in 1940. It seems to us that the principal factor has been omitted. At the end of the 1930's the generation of people who were born during the years of World War I and the Civil War were coming of marriageable age. The reduction of the birth rate at that earlier period led to a sharp limitation on the contingent of persons entering into marriage in the late 1930's. This is also testified to by the data on marriages which the American demographers themselves cite.

The monograph by A. Coale, B. Anderson, and E. Harm characterizes the influence of the Great Patriotic War on the birth rate, mortality rate, and marriage rate of the population. Based on the materials of the 1959 and 1970 Censuses, data are cited on the losses among the male population in various age groups during the wartime years. The authors devote a great deal of attention to the regional differences in the population's birth rate and marriage rate during the postwar years. In particular, a high level of birth rate is noted in those territories where the predominant religion is Islam.

In this connection, it should be emphasized that analysis of the factors which influence population reproduction is a problem of top-priority scientific importance which has still not been sufficiently developed neither in the works of Soviet demographers nor in those of foreign researchers. So far this matter is limited merely to postulating the influence of certain factors without a precise scientific determination of the weight to be assigned each of them.

In their book R. Lewis and R. Rowland assert that the reduction of the birth rate in the USSR during recent years has posed a number of serious economic difficulties.<sup>13</sup> It is certainly true that the lowering of the birth rate and the exhaustion of free labor resources has advanced new economic and social problems to the fore. In working out its prospective plans for development, however, the Soviet state has taken these factors into consideration. In the report entitled "Basic Directions for the Development of the USSR's National Economy during the Period 1976--1980" it was emphasized that during the 1980's the natural increase in manpower would be reduced. This comprised one of the fundamentals of the problem set

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forth--to achieve a rational utilization of labor resources during the tenth and succeeding five-year plans. "The more dynamic the national economy, the faster its sectorial and territorial structure changes," the report stated, "and the more acute is the problem of coordinating the development of material production and the non-production sphere with the presently available labor resources."<sup>14</sup> A realistic appraisal of the state of affairs allowed the Soviet state to provide for the difficulties which arose and thus to balance the development of the economy in order to avoid any possible disproportions. A planned economy is a powerful lever for raising the effectiveness of social production and increasing the role of intensive factors of development.

Certain Western specialists have attempted to interpret the factor of regional differences in the birth-rate level from the point of view of increased internal contradictions in the Soviet Union. "The increase in the Muslim population," write, for example, R. Lewis and R. Rowland, "has influenced the nationality composition of the army.... Questions of loyalty and the suitability of the Russian language may pose a threat."<sup>15</sup> Experience has shown that the change in the nationality composition of the USSR in the direction of an insignificant reduction in the proportion of Russians (from 53.3 percent in 1970 to 52.4 percent in 1979) has, to be sure, exerted some influence on the nationality composition of the army, labor groups, etc. But this in no way has led to national frictions or any diminution of the role of the language of international exchange. In this regard data of the 1970 and 1979 Censuses, as adduced in the table below, are characteristic.

Proportion of Persons of a Given Nationality Who Speak Russian Fluently* (in %)					
Nationality	1970	1979	Nationality	1970	1979
Ukrainians	36.3	48.9	Georgians	21.3	26.7
Uzbeks	14.5	49.3	Moldavians	36.1	47.4
Belorussians	49.0	57.0	Tajiks	15.4	29.6
Kazakhs	41.8	52.3	Lithuanians	35.9	52.1
Azerbaijani	16.6	29.5	Turkmens	15.4	25.4
Armenians	30.1	38.6			

\* Population of the USSR according to data from the All-Union Census of 1979. Moscow, 1980, p 23.

One of the most important indicators of population movement is the development of urbanization.

The American investigators acknowledge that in its rate of urbanization the Soviet Union has overtaken all the countries of the world. "The process of urbanization occurred at a rapid rate, not only much more rapidly and higher than the average world level, but even higher than any other developed modern country," R. Lewis, R. Rowland, and R. Clem note in their book.<sup>16</sup> These authors emphasize that the

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Soviet urbanization was the most rapid in the entire world. Its rate slowed down only during the time of World War II, but it increased again beginning in the 1950's and continued to grow over the course of the 1970's.<sup>17</sup>

As confirmation of their conclusion, the American authors adduce data concerning the level of urbanization in the USSR and in the most important regions of the world in 1920, 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970.<sup>18</sup> Particularly high rates of urbanization marked the period from 1926 through 1939. In connection with industrialization the growth of the urban population occurred primarily in the eastern regions of the RSFSR, in Kazakhstan, the Donbass, and the Dnepr Region. Only the period of the Great Patriotic War was characterized by a certain reduction in the rate of urbanization.

The problem of urbanization is examined in the works under review in close connection with an analysis of the migration processes. First of all, it should be noted that in the latest American historical-demographic investigations acknowledgment is made of the groundlessness of the thesis concerning the compulsory nature of the migration processes in the USSR. Bourgeois Sovietologists have frequently attempted to treat the organization of labor in the USSR as if it were based on compulsion. Now R. Lewis and R. Rowland acknowledge that the organized migration "constitutes a process under governmental supervision: the recruitment of manpower, agricultural resettlement, popular appeals, work after the completion of studies, etc. If work after graduating from an educational institution is not considered as obligatory, then it could be said that migration in the USSR is not compulsory."<sup>19</sup>

The period of socialist reconstruction of the national economy, they write, is characterized by mass migration processes, directed, in the first place, from the village to the city, and in the second place, from the western to the eastern regions of the country.<sup>20</sup> During the period from the 1950's through the 1970's a new tendency of migration processes manifested itself. Less than half of all the migrants were now accounted for by rural inhabitants. "Thus," write R. Lewis and R. Rowland, "the USSR attained such a level that the migration from city to city became more significant than from village to city."<sup>21</sup> Noted herein is the effect of the special measures developed by the Soviet state which were aimed at eliminating the excessive outflow of manpower from the village. "Beginning with the Eighth Five-Year Plan up to the present time, the government has continued to significantly increase capital investments in agriculture, raise wages, improve working conditions, raise the level of mechanization and electrification, grant more free time, improve and expand housing construction in rural areas, improve education, transportation, and all types of services, as well as to construct industrial enterprises in rural regions. In brief, all these measures are aimed at fully transforming rural life in the USSR. Great attention was also paid to the non-chernozem zone in the 10th Five-Year Plan."<sup>22</sup>

Along with the realistic analysis of the principal trends of the migration processes in the USSR, the works under review by the American authors also reveal attempts to misrepresent the influence of these processes on the ethnic situation in the USSR.

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During the course of economic development the Russian people rendered fraternal aid to the previously backward peoples of the USSR. In the cities of the country's many national regions a considerable number of highly skilled workers, engineers, and technicians were employed; they were of Russian nationality. The process of the migration of Russian population into the regions of Central Asia, Transcaucasia facilitated the strengthening of friendship between the peoples of the USSR and the mutual enrichment of the cultures of the Soviet nationalities; it also assisted in speeding up the rates of economic and social progress. However, in the opinion of the bourgeois authors, these migration processes led only to an intensification of international frictions. R. Lewis, R. Rowland, and R. Clem declare that the arrival of the "outsiders" in a nationality region and "discrimination in hiring for work in the developed areas of production--all this provoked dissatisfaction among the ethnic groups."<sup>23</sup>

Not a single sentence is true in these utterances. In the first place, it was not outsiders who came into these nationality regions but rather working people, permeated with an awareness of internationalism. In the second place, not a single fact has been registered in Soviet history testifying to any discrimination in hiring against the members of an indigenous nationality. Furthermore, in all the Soviet republics preference was given to training groups of skilled workers and engineering-technical personnel drawn from members of nationalities which had been oppressed in the past. And, finally, we cannot help drawing attention to the fact that the absence of facts testifying to tension in international relations within the USSR as a result of urbanization and the development of migration processes has compelled the bourgeois authors to "predict" certain ethnic frictions in the USSR in the future. Thus, several times in the book cited above, in forecasting the development of demographic processes in the future, the American authors predict that the USSR will be confronted with a serious problem of ethnic conflicts. This will supposedly be caused both by the migration of the Russian population into the national republics as well as by the predicted flow of migration from the Central Asian republics and Transcaucasia into the country's central regions.<sup>24</sup>

"Modernization and an increase in inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic ties," write R. Lewis and R. Rowland, "are leading to a heightened ethnic watchfulness (concern and an increase in the 'we-they' division)."<sup>25</sup>

These "assumptions" contradict the actual facts of Soviet reality, which testify to the increasing unity of the Soviet people and the internationalization of the way of life in the USSR. Since 1971 the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences in conjunction with the republic-level academic institutions, has conducted research on the problem of "Optimizing Socio-cultural Conditions of the Development and Drawing Closer Together of the Nationalities of the USSR." Within the framework of this project mass questionnaires were conducted (more than 30,000 persons) in Moldavia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Estonia, and the RSFSR.<sup>26</sup> This research has demonstrated that the process of drawing cultures closer together during the course of the industrial process and urbanization of society constantly expands the objective base for friendly international exchange. Evening out the levels of education has created a basis for satisfying national interests and has led to an agreement in the acceptance of reality, as well as in supply and demand.<sup>27</sup> The unity of the entire Soviet people is a notable trait of the socialist way of life.

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Analysis of works by American historians regarding population movement in the USSR testifies to a number of positive shifts in American historiography. There are works, based on an analysis of Soviet statistics, which characterize the birthrate, mortality rate, sex-age structure of the Soviet people. They reveal in quite a circumstantial manner the demographic consequences of World War I, the Civil War, and the Great Patriotic War. These works contain a detailed characterization of the processes of urbanization and migration of the population; they apply interesting methods for calculating the specifics for population reproduction at various stages, as compared with other countries and regions of the world. Nevertheless, they also contain a frequently distorted presentation of the processes of the Soviet state's social policy, and they likewise falsify international relations within the USSR often in forms which have become traditional for bourgeois Sovietology.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example: "Problemy istoricheskoy demografii SSSR" [Problems of Historical Demography of the USSR], Tallin, 1977; V. Z. Drobizhev, Yu. A. Polyak, "Population of the USSR and Social Progress," VOPROSY ISTORII, 1974, No 2; S. I. Bruk, "Ethno-demographic Processes in the USSR (Based on Materials of Post-War Population Censuses)," ISTORIYA SSSR, 1980, No 6.
2. I. Lewis, R. Rowland, R. Clem, "Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR. An Evaluation of Census Data: 1897--1970," New York--Washington--London, 1976; R. Lewis, R. Rowland, "Population Distribution in the USSR. Its Impact on Society: 1897--1977," New York--Washington, 1979; A. Coale, S. Anderson, E. Harm, "Human Fertility in Russia Since the Nineteenth Century," Princeton, 1979.
3. R. Lewis, R. Rowland, Op. cit. p 2.
4. V. I. Lenin, "PSS" [Complete Collected Works], vol 1, p 478.
5. Ibid., vol 2, p 104.
6. See: R. Lewis, R. Rowland, Op. cit., p 2.
7. See: I. Lewis, R. Rowland, R. Clem, Op. cit., p 96.
8. Ibid., p 13.
9. See, for example: Yu. F. Vorob'yev, "Vyravnivaniye urovne ekonomicheskogo razvitiya soyuznykh respublik" [Evening Out the Levels of Economic Development of the Union Republics], Moscow, 1965; M. I. Kulichenko, "Natsional'nyye otnosheniya v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiya" [Nationality Relations in the USSR and Trends of Their Development], Moscow, 1972; "Sovetskiy narod--novaya istoricheskaya obshchnost' lyudey. Stanovleniye i razvitiye" [The Soviet People--A New Historic Community of People: Emergence and Development], Moscow, 1975.
10. R. Lewis, R. Rowland, Op. cit., p 15.

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11. For more details about this see the following: A. Ya. Kvasha, "Problemy demograficheskogo optimuma" [Problems of the Demographic Optimum], Moscow, 1974; "Upravleniye razvitiyem narodonaseleniya v SSSR" [Regulating Population Development in the USSR], Moscow, 1977; N. B. Tatimov, "Razvitiye narodonaseleniya i demograficheskaya politika" [Population Development and Demographic Policy] Alma-Ata, 1978.
12. A. Coale, B. Anderson, E. Harm, Op. cit., p 19.
13. R. Lewis, R. Rowland, Op. cit., p 407.
14. "XXV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenogr. otchet" [25th CPSU Congress: A Stenographic Report], vol 2, Moscow, 1976, p 20.
15. R. Lewis, R. Rowland, Op. cit., p 407.
16. I. Lewis, R. Rowland, R. Clem, Op. cit., p 134.
17. R. Lewis, R. Rowland, Op. cit., p 159.
18. Ibid., p 173.
19. Ibid., p 19.
20. Ibid., p 103.
21. Ibid., p 199.
22. Ibid.
23. See; I. Lewis, R. Rowland, R. Clem, Op. cit., pp 94, 346.
24. Ibid., p 173.
25. R. Lewis, R. Rowland, Op. cit., p 346.
26. On the program of research see: Yu. V. Arutyunyan, "Social and Cultural Aspects of the Development and Drawing Closer Together of the Nations of the USSR," SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1972, No 3.
27. See: VOPROSY ISTORIYA, 1979, No 11, p 15.

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BOOK DESCRIBES THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE BASMACHIS

Moscow BOR'BA NA GRANITSE 1917-1928 in Russian 1980 (signed to press 26 Aug 80)  
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[Annotation, table of contents, and excerpt from Chapter 5 from book "The Border Struggle 1917-1928" by Aleksandr Ivanovich Chugunov, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 120,000 copies, 184 pages]

[Text] This book describes the origin and development of the Soviet border guard, and its combat activities in the first decade of Soviet rule, which was dominated by a complex, desperate struggle. The author reveals the class nature of bandit uprisings and their close relationship to intelligence efforts of capitalist states, and he describes the struggle fought by border guards against spies, saboteurs, and other violators of the border. The book illuminates V. I. Lenin's personal participation in resolving the issue of creating border troops.

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Defeat of Armed Bands

In the 1920's, and especially in the first half of the decade, border guards waged a hard struggle against the basmach rebellion in Central Asia together with the Red Army and local volunteer detachments. In the prerevolutionary era, the basmachis

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engaged in plunder, attacking kishlaks and caravans laden with goods. Prior to the revolution the Czarist government and local khans and emirs used the basmachis to suppress worker uprisings. Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the basmachis were exploited by the enemies of Soviet rule as a counter-revolutionary bourgeois-nationalist force. Basmach bands began to be led during this time not only by old chiefs but also reactionary bais and clergy, which were closely associated with various emigrant anti-Soviet centers. For practical purposes basmach counterrevolutionary activities were led by the intelligence agencies of capitalist countries. The dominant role was played by English intelligence, which possessed its own permanent representatives in large basmach detachments, supplied arms and ammunition to them, drew up plans for counterrevolutionary uprisings against the USSR together with them, and directly led the actions of the basmachis.

Bands began their aggressive activities in the time when the laborers of all Central Asia seized power for themselves. Capitalizing on the fact that active operations were not conducted against the basmachis during the civil war, the leaders of the larger bands seized power in some regions of Central Asia and engaged in mass plunder and murder. An active struggle employing arms and peaceful resources was initiated against this counterrevolutionary force in February 1921. This struggle was waged by local party organs and organs of peoples rule, by the laboring public, by voluntary detachments, by Red Army units, by troops of the VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage] and OGPU [United State Political Administration of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars], and by border guards. The principal basmach gangs of Central Asia were destroyed by the end of 1922. Many gave themselves up, and some fled abroad. However, the struggle was not yet ended. It grew more acute at times. Having no support from the laboring public, beginning in the mid-1920's basmach bands began concentrating in the border regions of contiguous states--Afghanistan and Iran--and making raids from there into Soviet territory.

In 1929-1933, when the entire country was undergoing mass collectivization, imperialist reaction and the internal and foreign counterrevolution once again attempted to liquidate Soviet rule in Central Asia through the assistance of the basmachis. During this time rather large bands were created abroad and on Soviet territory. These bands began operating in the border regions of Tajikistan and throughout the territory of Turkmenistan. But the enemies were unable to reach their goal. The laboring masses aggressively defended Soviet rule. The bands operated in total isolation. Basmachis breaking through into Tajikistan were liquidated in a few months. In Turkmenistan the struggle against them was basically completed by mid-1933.

Taking advantage of the class struggle going on in the central part of Soviet Russia, Central Asian counterrevolutionary forces attempted to block development of revolutionary events in Central Asia with the active assistance of the Entente. In January 1918 Dzhunaid-khan (the chief of a Turkmenian tribe, and a henchman of the English bourgeoisie) established a feudal dictatorship in Khiva. But it found itself incapable of halting the historically inevitable demise of the decayed order so despised by the people. Under the influence of revolutionary events in Russia and with the support of the Russian proletariat, the laborers of Central Asia initiated an antifeudal struggle.

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During this struggle the border was protected within the territory of Soviet Turkestan by only two brigades of customs border guards, armed with mountain guns and a significant number of machineguns. The question of protecting the entire Central Asian border was raised as early as in March 1919 in connection with the growing activity of basmach bands and smugglers. But it was impossible to do this at this time. Nevertheless some forces were assigned to the protection of certain segments of the border, and together with the laborers of Central Asia the border guards began fighting the smugglers and basmachis.

Bands led by Irgash, Makhkam-khodzh , Akhundzhan, and others became active. Bands of robbers which had engaged in plunder and terror prior to the revolution rose to the defense of the dying order, despised by the people. Their aid was sought by the bourgeois nationalist government--the "Kokand Autonomy". The basmachis were cordially welcomed by the White Guards ataman Dutov, who referred to the robber gang chief Irgash as "the valorous leader of the glorious Fergana Djigits."<sup>27</sup>

The laborers of Turkestan waged a hard, long struggle against the basmach bands headed by the tribal ringleader Dzhunaid Kurban Mamed, who subsequently pursued his activities under the name of Dzhunaid-khan. In January 1918 Dzhunaid and his bandits broke into Khiva to become, for practical purposes, its dictator. Isfendiar, the khan of Khiva, remained on the throne in formal respects only. Dzhunaid-khan's counterrevolutionary activities were directed from abroad. Tashkent was visited in May 1918 with an anti-Soviet mission by the American consul Treadwell,<sup>28</sup> and in August of that same year by a group of intelligence agents acting as the official English mission: Colonel Bailey, Major Blecker, and the former English consul in Kashgar, MacCartney.

Documents irrefutably prove the existence of a close alliance between the counter-revolutionary Turkestan anti-Bolshevik union, the group of English intelligence agents, and the basmachis. This alliance between these internal counterrevolutionary organizations, hostile to Soviet rule, and foreign intelligence was perpetually supported in different forms. Representatives of the American and English missions and White Guards officers supplied money, weapons, and ammunition to the basmach gangs. Following the orders of the English command, Khodzha Kuli-khan, a lieutenant in the Czarist army, delivered 3,000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition to Dzhunaid-khan.<sup>29</sup>

From the middle of September 1918 to the end of March 1919 the Khiva basmachis made several raids upon the inhabitants of the southern regions of the Amu-Dar'ya. Dzhunaid's bands besieged the city of Turtkul' in November. The basmachis attempted to break the resistance of the people through cruel punishment of captives and Soviet sympathizers among the local residents, but they were unsuccessful. The entire population, both young and old, took up arms. The basmachis suffered high losses in bloody combat, and in December 1918 they were forced to withdraw from the city.

The military-political situation in Turkestan changed in the second half of 1919. Following the destruction of Kolchak's main forces in Turkestan, the Turkestan Front was created under M. V. Frunze's command to fight the counterrevolution. Enjoying the support of the people, by the beginning of April the Red Army liberated the Transcaspian and the Semirechiye, and it opened the road to the central regions of Central Asia.

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With the defeat of the White Guards in Central Asia, the counterrevolution and the imperialist states shifted their principal support to the basmachis. Beginning in spring 1919 the main basmach forces began concentrating in the Fergana Plain. Fleeing after liquidation of the "Kokand Autonomy" to China, Irgash descended to the plain from the mountains (with a band of 500 persons). Other bands, including Khal-kholdzh's gang, which consisted of hardened criminals who had been condemned at different times for robbery and murder, began joining Irgash.

But the counterrevolutionaries and foreign intelligence agencies soon had to replace the chief of the Fergana basmach bands. Irgash suffered one defeat after another. He was replaced as chief of the bandit detachments of the Fergana Plain by Madamin-bek. The latter hammered together several gangs with a total strength of 5,000 men. But several united bands operated in Fergana as a whole: Irgash's--4,000 men, Muettin's--800, Aman-Palvan's--600, and Khal-khodzh's and Makhkam-khodzh's--300 men each. By concentrating sizeable basmach forces in the Fergana Plain, the counterrevolution was able to initiate combat activities on a broad front.

The laborers of Fergana rose to the defense of popular rule under the leadership of communists and local soviets. The headquarters of the Fergana Front, which brought volunteer detachments, militia detachments, and several hundred Red Army soldiers together, was created to fight the basmachis. Despite their low strength, poor training, and inadequate arms, these forces boldly engaged the large basmach gangs in combat.

Large bands concentrated in the foothills of the region of Osh, from where they raided the suburbs of Dzhahalal-Abad and Andizhan. Insignificant military forces which served as the nucleus for organization of the armed struggle against the bandits were sent to the Osh sector to combat them. The local population rose up against the basmachis. Red Army warriors and militants destroyed Osipov's White Guards band and wore out Madamin-bek's forces. The defeat of the basmachis in the region of Osh was more than many of them could take, including the leaders of the bands. Many kurbashis and basmachis gave themselves up to Soviet authorities.

The intensity of the struggle in the south of the Fergana Plain declined noticeably. But the lull did not last long. By fall 1919 the undefeated basmach bands and the so-called peasants army, created to protect Russian settlements against basmach raids and subsequently drawn into a conspiracy with the latter by deceitful means, were united and reinforced through the efforts of the internal counterrevolution and foreign reaction.

The Moslem Bureau of the Turkestan Communist Party mobilized communists for the struggle against the combined forces of reaction, and it intensified its mass agitation work among the public. Fighting detachments were created out of local militants and party members, who played the role of a dependable shield for the laborers against the basmach raids. Containing representatives of various nationalities--Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tajik, Russian, and others, the fighting detachments thus embodied the fraternal solidarity of different peoples in the struggle against the enemies of Soviet rule. The detachments fought steadfastly against the basmachis, but it was difficult to deal with them alone. Party and soviet organs and the revolutionary military council of the Turkestan Front took a number of additional steps to destroy the newly formed counterrevolutionary forces--the basmach bands.

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Hard battles were fought with the insidious and cruel enemy. Bandits burned and destroyed everything in their path. Savage battles for the city of Andizhan were fought in September 1919. The basmachis captured the old quarter of the city at the price of sizeable losses. Enjoying a fourfold superiority, they attempted to capture the city by storm. A small garrison and a detachment formed out of the citizenry held back the enemy's onslaught for 6 days under the leadership of the city's party organization. The city was defended not only by warriors of the Red Army and the armed detachments of citizens; all of the city's residents fought the enemy. They procured and delivered food, they brought ammunition to the positions, and they carried out the wounded. On the seventh day, Red Army units came to the rescue of the city's defenders, and went into combat on the move. For 2 days the battle went on. Unable to hold, the basmachis left Andizhan, and then in the face of the onslaught of the advancing Red Army units and volunteer detachments, they abandoned Dzhahalal-Abad and Osh. The remnants of the bands went into hiding in the mountains.

Following the second defeat of the basmachis in the Fergana Plain, the leaders of the counterrevolution and foreign reaction undertook extreme measures to unite the anti-Soviet forces. In October 1919 Uspenskiy, an Anglo-American henchman who had just come from China, held a conference of the leaders of the basmach bands and White Guards on Soviet territory in a place called Irkeshtam (near the border). At this conference, the so-called Provisionary Government of Fergana was formed with the purposes of uniting the activities of all counterrevolutionary forces. Madamin-bek was appointed chief of this "government", the White Guards officer Monstrov was appointed commander in chief of the nonexistent armed forces, and Mukhanov was appointed his deputy. English intelligence began hastily supplying arms and ammunition to the Fergana "government". Chinese and Afghan troops were drawn up to the Soviet border to provide support to the basmach and White Guards bands.

Despite the steps taken, the counterrevolutionaries and imperialist intelligence agencies never were able to hammer together significant bandit formations. Nevertheless the basmachis once again began raiding border cities and kishlaks. In November 1919 bands led by Madamin-bek and Khal-khodzh totaling 1,400 men attacked the city of Dzhahalal-Abad and the Russian settlements adjacent to it. A small detachment of Red Army soldiers and local residents took the bandits on in unequal combat.

Prior to fall 1919 the Soviet government was unable to provide any major assistance to the laborers of Central Asia in their struggle against the basmachis. All efforts were directed at this time toward the defeat of the White Guards armies. Moreover Central Asia was cut off from Soviet Russia by Kolchak's troops. After the blockade was broken and Kolchak's army was defeated, the Soviet government began providing full support to the laborers of Central Asia in the struggle against the counterrevolution. This permitted the Fergana party organizations and the Revolutionary Military Council of Turkestan and the Fergana region to develop and implement an entire system of economic, political, and military measures aimed at defeating the basmachis in the Fergana Plain. Party and soviet organs initiated an aggressive effort among the public to explain the tasks and aims of the Soviet government and the antipopular intentions of the basmachis, and they intensified their surveillance over the implementation of Lenin's nationalities policy. Armed

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detachments consisting of communists, Komsomol members, poor peasants, and farm laborers were created to protect the public against bandits in the kishlaks, which were frequently raided by the latter.

The 2d Rifle Division was concentrated in the Fergana Plain in early 1920 to fight the basmachis; concurrently, military units were formed out of laborers representing the indigenous nationalities, and the International Brigade, formed out of volunteers from among prisoners of war, came to the aid of the dehkanis. Combined with the economic, political, and ideological measures, significant reinforcement of the military forces made a switch to the offensive against the basmachis possible in the entire Fergana Plain. V. V. Kuybyshev and M. V. Frunze managed the entire effort against the bandits in the Fergana Plain.

The first strike was made against Irgash's and Kurshirmat's gangs. Some large bands voluntarily laid down their arms, to include detachments headed by Khamdam, Akbaral, and Makhkam-khodzh, totaling more than a thousand men. Other basmach groupings began to break up as well. The rank and file of the bands, and some kurbashis as well, turned themselves over to organs of Soviet rule. Madamin-bek's band surrendered in early March 1920: One thousand two hundred armed rebels laid down their weapons.

But the long-awaited peace was still to come. Small bands consisting mainly of professional murderers and robbers, few in numbers but cruel and dangerous, remained. Nevertheless the command and the party and soviet organs did everything to avoid bloodshed, and they attempted to persuade the chiefs to lay down their arms. Two representatives--former band leader Madamin-bek and regimental commissar Sukhov--were sent to Kurshirmat, a basmach leader, for peace talks. The basmach chiefs refused the peace proposals and dealt savagely with the delegates--they chopped their heads off.

Following destruction of the main basmach forces in the Fergana Plain, the remnants of the defeated bands fled into the mountainous border regions of Kirghiziya and the Alay Plain. There, with the active assistance and under the actual guidance of imperialist intelligence agencies, mainly English, the gang chiefs began gathering their forces together for a new campaign on Fergana, mainly on the oilfields and coal mines of Kizyl-Kiya and Suliyukta, and the cotton plantations.

In mid-summer Kurshirmat, who assumed the title of amir al-Muslimin, united (though not firmly) more than two dozen bands with a total strength of about 6,500 men. Placing high hopes on Kurshirmat, English intelligence sent significant quantities of resources to him. But once again, the basmachis were unable to penetrate deeply into the Fergana Plain. Combat activities went on in the mountain regions of the Alay Plain, in the regions of Tamash, Karaul, and Pap. The leader of the bandit grouping, Kurshirmat, escaped total defeat several times, and he continued to make raids into the Fergana Plain. In July 1920 he even tried to cut the Kokand-Fergana and Andizhan-Namangan railroads. But even this attempt failed. The main basmach forces were destroyed, and survivors fled to the Balykchi-Chinabad region.

The International Detachment under the command of E. F. Kuzhhello distinguished itself in the fight against Kurshirmat's bands. The detachment operated confidently in the hardest and most important sector--Tagralyk pass and an area called Sufi-Kurgan on the road to the high-mountain Alay Plain. It occupied the pass and the surrounding



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area, thus limiting the actions of the basmachis. The population of mountain kishlaks in which basmachis made camp offered active opposition to the bandits. As an example the residents of the kishlak of Porshnev attacked them, seized a cache of weapons and ammunition, and then destroyed the gang together with an arriving volunteer detachment; prisoners were turned over to government authorities.

Toward the end of 1920 some new recruits replenished the thinning ranks of the basmach bandits. As a result their strength reached 5,600 men in the mountainous regions and foothills of Uzbekistan. Acting on instructions from the intelligence agencies of imperialist countries, the armed gangs initiated offensive operations against Namangan, Andizhan, Osh, Kokand, and Dzhahal-Abad Station. Fierce battles were waged against the basmachis here throughout all of October 1920. Red Army garrisons and volunteer detachments defended stubbornly with the active assistance of the public.

It was not long before the basmach offensive ground to a halt. Having no support from the people, the bands fell apart in the face of the blows of the Red Army and volunteer detachments. It was at that time that basmach kurbashi of the Fergana Plain and the mountainous regions of Uzbekistan turned to counterrevolutionary elements in Bukhara for assistance. Meanwhile, winter set in. Mountain huts could no longer serve as shelters. The bands experienced considerable difficulties in finding food, and frequent avalanches made the already-complex position of the basmachis even worse. The gangs attempted raids against mountain and foothill kishlaks for the sake of plunder.

More than 1,200 basmachis sought refuge in southern Kirghiziya, in Narynskaya Volost'. They intended to replenish their depleted force reserves by plundering the population of remote high-mountain regions of Tien-Shan. But their plans were foiled by Red Army detachments coming to the defense of the public. Within short time and with the aid of poor peasants, the Red Army detachments liquidated three bands and inflicted considerable losses upon Parp's large band.

The number of basmach bands in the southern regions of Uzbekistan and Kirghiziya diminished. Isolated gangs (with a total strength of not more than 4,000 men) roamed the mountains, attacking remote kishlaks and auls from time to time. But volunteer, militia, and self-defense detachments created out of the local public (containing more than 15,000 persons by the end of 1920) successfully repelled the raids of the bandits, and defeated and disarmed them.

By the beginning of 1921 the basmachis were no longer a serious threat in the Fergana Plain. They were fought by volunteer detachments and units of the 3d Turkestan Division. In the first months of 1921 they successfully conducted two operations against Parp's still-surviving band. Simultaneously several small bands were liquidated in the vicinities of Shakhimardan, Karaul, Kizyl-Kiya, Fergana, and Bulak-Bashinsk.

While implementing military measures against armed basmachis, the party and soviet state organs simultaneously employed peaceful means on an increasing scale. After being given many chances to surrender, and thus to atone for their guilt before the people and the Soviet government, the basmachis were once again offered such a possibility in April 1921 by the Ferganskaya Oblast' Revolutionary Military Council. Some

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of them, including chiefs, took advantage of this humane act, and surrendered voluntarily.

But there were also some among those who surrendered who exploited the peace offerings for hostile purposes. They reformed new bands behind the back of the Soviet government. To keep them from developing, the Red Army command of the Turkestan Front took active steps jointly with party and soviet organs to halt the actions of the basmachis. The main efforts were directed against gangs led by Kurshirmat and Israil. Israil's band suffered a major defeat in its first encounters. Kurshirmat, meanwhile, was able to maneuver himself away from the blows. He was proclaimed "khan of Fergana" for his "successes", but he did not hold this position for long. Arriving Red Army units caught him in the act of his coronation. Kurshirmat was forced to stop the ceremony and flee his pursuers.

While the bands led by Israil and Kurshirmat were being fought, Muetdin, the leader of a third major gang, bided his time. He hoped for mutual weakening of the warring sides, so that he might be able to seize power. But his hopes were unjustified. After destroying Kurshirmat's and Israil's bands, Red Army units and volunteer detachments moved against Muetdin's gang. In just a few days the band was destroyed, and its pitiful survivors fled together with their chief into the snow-covered mountains of Kirghiziya.

Small gangs concentrated in the high-mountain Alay Plain at the end of 1921. From there, they made raids on mountain kishlaks, and blockaded the Pamir border post. For 1 month the border guards found themselves totally isolated, and under fire from the basmachis. But the garrison, exhausted by cold and hunger, held on steadfastly and bravely. Red Army soldier Mamedbek Gul'bekov managed to make his way through the enemy outposts and get a message through to the command of the border unit. Arriving reinforcements destroyed the band.

But the counterrevolution was still reluctant to lay down its arms. Nationalist elements sought out new ways to revive the bands. At the end of 1921 they held an illegal meeting at which they agreed to support the basmachis and initiate aggressive activities aimed at disorganizing economic and political life. They laid their main hope on Kurshirmat once again. In late April 1922 he organized a secret assemblage of surviving kurbashis in Kokandskiy Uyezd. In their message to the population of Fergana, the conspirators resorted to a direct threat. "Whoever refuses to do the will of Kurshirmat," the message stated, "will lose his head, and his home will be burned together with his property and family."<sup>30</sup>

The adult male population was forced to join the bands in fear of reprisals against members of their families. But these "basmachis" did not wish to fight. They deserted the gangs at the first opportunity. Considering the circumstance, the Central Asian Bureau of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee ordered party organs to initiate aggressive political work among the masses as the most important means for fighting the basmachis. Communists were sent to regions in which the bands were active. As a result of the mass agitation work, cases of voluntary surrender of basmachis became more frequent. Disconcerted by these facts, the organizers of the anti-Soviet struggle held another conference near Kabul. They decided to increase their sabotage activities against the railroads, and to make mass attacks upon Red Army garrisons and Soviet institutions. But their

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plan was written in the wind. The basmach gangs fell apart in response to propaganda and the blows of Red Army and volunteer detachments. From February to mid-October 1922, 119 out of 200 bands with a total strength of more than 4,400 men ceased to exist.

In this connection the Fergana Front was disbanded, and the volunteer detachments were reduced significantly. A special commission was created to mop up the last remnants of the basmachis in this region. Under its guidance, Red Army units, GPU organs, and borderguards liquidated all remaining bands in the Fergana Plain by mid-summer 1923 with the active support of the local public.

The bulk of the small gangs were now concentrated in the Alay Plain. The Red Army command and Soviet government organs sent special detachments into this area under the command of Abdull Yarmukhamedov and I. F. Malikov. They blocked the exits of the bandits from the plain, and they tried to talk them into surrendering. Because the basmachis refused to surrender, the Red Army detachments went over to the offensive. In the short battle that followed, some of the bandits of the Alay Plain were killed or captured, and some fled abroad.

The struggle against the basmachis in Central Asia still had a long way to go. Beginning in 1926, bais began uniting for an anti-Soviet struggle in the mountainous regions of Kirghiziya. Setting forth in pursuit of their goal, they decided to organize an attack by a basmach band against the border outpost of Oy-Tal, intending to seize the small border garrison of 19 men by surprise, and then attack the border kishlaks. On learning of these plans the command of the border detachment withdrew the personnel of the Oy-Tal outpost to a neighboring outpost in time. Only the post at Kashka-Su, which was far up in the mountains, was left uninformed. The basmachis attacked this post. Seven border guards under the command of Andrey Sidorov heroically fought the band. For 8 days they repelled one attack after another, engaging in hand-to-hand combat. The infuriated bandits drenched the winter cabin with kerosene and put it to the torch. Valorous soldiers Andrey Sidorov, Yakov Berdnikov, Vladimir Okhapkin, Ivan Vatnik, Valeriy Svishchevskiy, Nikolay Zhukov, and Iosif Shagan were burned alive in the cabin, refusing to give themselves up to the enemy.

The besieged outpost at Ishik-Art exchanged gunfire with basmachis for 8 days. Basmachis under the command of Dzhany-bek were unable to reach their goal here either. Following this defeat, the bandits fled abroad. The bai conspiracy fell through.

While the bands on the Fergana Plain and in the south of Kirghiziya were being fought, a struggle was going on against basmachis in the mountainous regions of modern Tajikistan. One of the main bandit bases was the so-called Matchinskoye Bekstvo, located in the upper reaches of the mountain river Zeravshan. It was selected by the basmach leaders as a base not only due to geographical considerations. The positions of the reactionary clergy and the bais were especially strong here.

Though the Matchinskoye bands were of insignificant strength, they were dangerous because they provided shelter to large bandit groups from the Fergana Plain and the Bukhara emirate. Uniting with these gangs, the Matchinskoye basmachis attempted to capture nearby kishlak several times. Bands operating from the territory of the Matchinskoye Bekstvo in 1919-1923 were opposed by light Red Army detachments which were only able to fight in a single sector at a time. Volunteer detachments were created to protect the public from the devastating raids of the basmachis.

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In September 1919 the Matchinskoye bands initiated an offensive against the city of Pendzhikent. They managed to capture 13 kishlaks while en route. A small detachment of Red Army soldiers (150 men) was sent out to fight them. The Samarkandskaya Oblast Party Committee allocated arms and ammunition to militants in kishlaks that were frequently subjected to basmach attacks. Armed militants and the Red Army detachment liberated some of the kishlaks and blocked the passes into the Zeravshana Plain. However, these forces were not enough to destroy the bands. The basmachis withdrew and went into hiding in the Matchinskoye Bekstvo. There they replenished the bands with fresh horses and resumed their attacks on surrounding kishlaks. So it went on until spring 1923, until the arrival of a detachment from the XIII Rifle Corps, specially formed to liquidate the Matchinskoye basmachis, and volunteer detachments from Pendzhikent, Ura-Tyube, and other places.

The operation to annihilate the Matchinskoye base took less than a month. The local public even rose together with Red Army units and volunteer detachments to fight the Matchinskoye basmachis. Residents of the kishlaks restored bridges destroyed by the bandits, they served as guides in the mountains, they carried weapons and ammunition over the passes, they removed casualties and cared for them, and they provided security to kishlaks liberated from the bandits. Basmach gangs escaping destruction committed crimes, rape, robbery, and murder. The fight against them in the upper reaches of the Zeravshan continued until the 1930's. The duration of the struggle in this region can be explained to a great extent by the uniqueness of bandit tactics. Basmachis lived in their own kishlaks, and they gathered together in secret for plunder. After committing their crimes they once again dispersed to their own kishlaks and engaged in "peaceful pursuits". Moreover "regular" small basmach gangs remained operational. They consisted of hardened criminals. Considering all of this, the party and soviet organs of upper Zeravshan did everything they could to strengthen Soviet rule in the kishlak: They selected devoted, competent personnel for work in them, they supported economic activities, they conducted educational work among the public, and so on. As a result of all these measures the basmachis gradually ceased their active operations. Soon after, the gangs of Azam-khodzh, Sapar, and others were liquidated.

The struggle against basmachis on the territory of the Khorezm and Bukhara republics lasted even longer, which was explained by their social and economic features. Tribal relationships dominated here. The large segment of tribal leaders and their followers, reactionary clergy, khans, bais, and biys provided a rather sizeable base for counterrevolutionary basmachis. The counterrevolution and foreign intelligence also capitalized on intertribal warfare. But the working public constantly grew more aware of the need for casting off the yoke of the exploiters and their active defenders--the basmachis. In January 1920 the laborers of Khiva overthrew the basmach dictatorship of Dzhunaid-khan, and in April 1920 they proclaimed the Khorezm Peoples Soviet Republic.

In summer 1920 the laborers of the Bukhara emirate initiated a struggle against the despised order. The people seized power with the help of Red Turkestan troops, and in October 1920 they proclaimed the Bukhara Peoples Soviet Republic (BNSR).

But feudal bai elements in Khiva and Bukhara would not surrender. Dzhunaid gathered together significant basmach forces by as early as October 1920. The bands seized Kungrad, where they inflicted cruel reprisals upon party and soviet militants. In

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late 1920 they surrounded the city of Nukus. The garrison in the city and the party-soviet militants held their defenses for 14 days with the support of the population, perpetually repelling the enemy attacks. Being surrounded, every soldier and every member of the volunteer detachment fought the enemy with a profound resolve to endure and vanquish. Red Army soldier E. Ruzmetov volunteered to punch his way through the tight enemy ring to deliver a message to the Red Army command in Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Arriving reinforcements struck the bands from the flanks and rear. The basmachis withdrew with heavy losses.

But Dzhunaid-khan continued to raid the kishlaks, to plunder and murder the laboring dehkans (peasantry) and terrorize party and soviet militants. His bands operated not in a continuous front but in isolated sectors. The command and the party and soviet organs decided to conduct a number of operations to seek and destroy the gangs operating on the territory of Khorezm. Two Red Army groups consisting of five companies and three squadrons were formed for this purpose.

In spring 1921 Dzhunaid's bands concentrated at a base camp at the Adzhi-kul' well. The Red Army detachment traveled there as well. In a savage battle the main enemy forces were destroyed, but some of the basmachis were able to get away together with Dzhunaid.

For some time Dzhunaid did not engage in active operations. Meanwhile Soviet power grew stronger in Khorezm, as in all Central Asia. Land and financial reforms were enacted, problems associated with education were resolved, and so on. But the counterrevolution tried to hinder these measures in every way possible. Having infiltrated into organs of the peoples government, counterrevolutionary elements prepared a conspiracy headed by secret nationalists--KhNSR [Khorezm Peoples Soviet Republic] Central Executive Committee Chairman Ata Maksumov and Peoples Nazir for Foreign Affairs Mulla Niyaz. But the conspiracy was found out. Ata Maksumov, Mulla Niyaz, and their followers fled to the basmachis.

In late January 1922 Dzhunaid-khan began concentrating the basmachis at the very border. His gangs contained dehkans who were forced to fight against Soviet rule mostly by blackmail, deceit, and coercion. But for the most part the bands consisted of kulaks, bais, and other elements hostile to Soviet rule. A savage struggle was waged against them.

In late May 1922 the combined forces of the basmachis under the command of mullah Abbu Kagarom, about 3,000 men strong, surrounded a small border garrison. For 2 days the soldiers repelled several attacks and inflicted large losses upon the enemy. With the support of arriving reinforcements the border guards forced the bands to abandon the siege of the garrison and withdraw. Suffering defeat, the united bandit formation broke up into small gangs.

In October 1923 Khorezm was proclaimed a socialist republic by the Fourth Kurultay of the Soviets. This was clearly not to the liking of the opponents of Soviet rule. The activities of basmach bands grew somewhat more intense by this time. Dzhunaid-khan "rectified" some mistakes made in the campaign to deprive the clergy of its land allotments and political rights. As a result, by adding reactionary clergy and fanatic believers to his band, he was able to increase its strength to 9,000 persons.

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At the beginning of January 1924 the basmachis seized several kishlaks and besieged Novo-Urgench and the capital of the Khorezm republic, Khiva. About 300 warriors and commanders of the Red Army and a volunteer detachment of 500 men stubbornly defended the capital. The basmachis stormed the walls of ancient Khiva many times. To deter the defenders, they subjected Anzhello, a captured wounded squadron commander, to savage reprisal before the fortress. His hands were chopped off, his eyes were gouged out, and his head was cut off, stuck onto a pole, and planted at the city gates. But the atrocities did not break the spirit of the Red Army warriors. Khiva's defenders held on heroically until the approach of Red Army subunits and volunteer detachments. With their assistance the bands were thrown back from the capital of the Khorezm republic by the end of January 1924.

By the end of spring 1924 all large basmach bands in this republic were liquidated, and a time of peace set in. Under the leadership of party organs and with the active assistance of the governments of the USSR and the Russian Federation, the toiling public actively joined the socialist competition. Steps were taken to hasten rehabilitation of agriculture, transportation, and communications, and to collect taxes.

These measures strengthened Soviet rule locally, and undermined the basis of the basmach rebellion. Nevertheless, it did manage to revive at times. Many bands operating in Khorezm voluntarily surrendered to Soviet authorities following serious defeats. In spring 1925 even Dzhunaid-khan gave himself up. But other band leaders, capitalizing on the democratic and humane laws of the Soviet government, became law-abiding citizens in order to win time, straighten out the tribal quarrels between the leaders of the basmach movement, and then once again initiate anti-Soviet activities. The base for such activities remained intact: It consisted of small scattered bands with a total strength of up to 2,000 men. This was foreseen by the command of the Red Army and by the leadership of VChK organs and the border guard, and appropriate preparations were made in the event of the resumption of combat activities. The necessary coordination was established between the army, volunteer detachments, militia detachments, and border guards, tentative operation plans were written, and state border security was reinforced.

The struggle against the basmachis in the mountainous regions of Bukhara was complex and difficult. The bands in this area were headed by high emirate officials, reactionary mullahs, beks, and tribal leaders. The aggressiveness of basmach gangs grew dramatically beginning in spring 1919 on the territory of eastern Bukhara in connection with the migration of several large basmach formations to this area from the Fergana Plain.

One of the most dangerous centers of the bandit gangs was the Lokay region. The Lokay basmachis were headed by Ibragim-bek. He was supported by the former Bukhara emir Seyid Alim-khan. Following his deposition from the throne, the emir established himself in Dyushambe, from where he intended to wield power over eastern Bukhara with the assistance of the basmachis. Several caravans of English weapons and ammunition arrived in support of Ibragim-bek.

The basmachis initiated combat activities in November 1920, seizing Baysun and Shirabad. They began forced mobilization of the bands. As a result their strength increased to 15,000 men. But the violence of the basmachis did not paralyze the

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people's will to fight; on the contrary it elicited anger and resistance to the basmachis, as is evidenced in particular by the dehkani uprising in Karateginskaya Volost' and the insurrection of the residents of Shirabad.

The Central Committee of the Bukhara Communist Party and the Bukhara Revolutionary Committee initiated extensive political work among the laboring public, mobilizing their best personnel for this purpose. Formation of the Bukhara Red Army began at the end of 1920. The steps taken promoted reinforcement of the republic's defense capabilities. But Bukhara's own forces were not enough to suppress the counter-revolution and liberate all territory from the latter, and therefore the government of the BNSR appealed to the Soviet government for assistance. Five Red Army brigades arrived in the Bukhara Peoples Soviet Republic by January 1921.<sup>32</sup>

In December 1920 Red Army units began an offensive against the basmachis on a broad front with the assistance of the local public. By as early as late September of this year, Shirabad, Kitab, and Yakkobag were liberated. By the end of February 1921 the Red Army units reached Gissar and soon occupied it, and liberated Dyushambe, Kulyab, and Garm; individual regiments and battalions reached the state border. The remnants of the defeated bands settled down in the vicinity of Karategin and in Vakhsha valley. Former emir Seyid Alim-khan and band leaders Ibragim-bek and Davletman-biy fled to Afghanistan.

With the onset of spring the Red Army resumed its efforts to mop up the rest of the territory of the Bukhara republic. In March 1921 the 1st Brigade under the command of Ya. A. Mel'kumov and Commissar Loginov defeated bands led by Kurshimat and Maksum Fuzayl; the former fled to the Alay Plain while the latter fled to Darvaz. But the situation in the Bukhara republic continued to be complex. Years upon years of lawlessness, religious stupefaction, and unquestioning obedience to tribal leaders and bais had their consequences. Playing upon the religious sentiments of the population, the counterrevolution attempted to introduce anti-Sovietism into the consciousness of the illiterate dehkans. It represented Soviet rule as a creation of the "kyafirs" (infidels), and basmach bands as the defenders of Islam.

Having infiltrated into the administrative machinery of the young Bukhara republic, counterrevolutionaries actively assisted the leaders of the basmach movement to once again collect the armed bands together. Representatives of the former Bukhara emir played an important role in this effort. They were the political advisors of the band leaders, and they coordinated their actions. Through them, the former emir sent personal letters to the band leaders, in which he wrote out his instructions and directives. In one letter to Ibragim-bek he wrote: "...your reports were received. It has become clear from them that you are a sincere servant."<sup>33</sup>

Creation of basmach bands in Bukhara was also promoted by an influx of unemployed, some of whom joined gangs on being unable to find shelter, and by grazing ground disputes between herdsmen of the Gissar and Lokay valleys and residents of the Garm and Karategin areas. Under the excuse of protecting the interests of their fellow tribesmen, the bais gathered bands together, mainly from the prosperous strata.

The treachery of Bukhara Peoples Soviet Republic Central Executive Committee Chairman Usan Khodzh Pulatkhodzhayev and his brother, Atakhodzhayev also assisted the development of the basmach movement in Bukhara in the early 1920's. They

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filled responsible posts in Soviet institutions to many kurbashis, and they suppressed organization of Soviet rule in the kishlaks. A "holy war" against the infidels ("gazavat") became the principal slogan of the basmachis. The band leaders and their foreign inspirers kindled nationalistic enmity between Tajiks and Uzbeks, thus attempting to split the unity of these peoples in the struggle for Soviet rule. As an example basmach band leaders of Garm, Karategin, and Darvaz demanded that the Bukhara government remove all non-Bukharans from their posts.<sup>34</sup>

Because of the complex situation, the Revolutionary Military Council, the Executive Bureau of the Bukhara Communist Party Central Committee, and the Soviet of Nazirs turned to the government of the RSFSR with a request for armed assistance. Itself being exhausted by a protracted war, the Russian Federation did not possess the necessary possibilities with which to help the peoples of Central Asia in their struggle against the basmachis; nevertheless it shared with them all that it could, in brotherly fashion.

Meanwhile in spring 1921 the basmach bands became active. The greatest danger came from the gangs led by Davletman-biy, Maksum Fuzayl, and especially Ibragim-bek, since he enjoyed the greatest assistance from imperialist states and Bukharan emigrants. Bands led by Ishan Sultan and Maksum Fuzayl joined together under the command of Ibragim-bek in summer, the total force rising to 1,700 strong. The main basmach forces were concentrated in the Garm sector. Abdu-Khafiz's gangs, with a strength of 2,500 men, joined them in mid-June 1921. The basmachis surrounded Garm, which possessed a Red Army garrison of just 50 warriors. These forces were clearly not enough to restrain the onslaught of the enemy, or to break out of the encirclement. Nevertheless the garrison held out until the approach of the 1st and 3d cavalry regiments. The arriving Red Army units destroyed Abdu-Khafiz's band. He himself was taken prisoner.

In August 1921 Ishan Sultan, the chief of the Darvaz basmachis, attempted to take revenge for the defeat of Garm. Under his leadership an armed formation of up to a thousand men invaded the territory of Garm. But it suffered the same fate as Abdu-Khafiz's band. Of course Ishan Sultan managed to get away by donning women's clothing. Other basmach bands attacked the Kulab garrison, which contained 80 Red Army soldiers and 12 local militants. Suffering hunger and a shortage of ammunition, the besieged garrison held the defenses for 11 days. On the 12th day Red Army sub-units and detachments of peoples volunteers came to the rescue of the besieged garrison. The garrison and the arriving reinforcements fought stubborn battles with the basmachis for a few days more, finally forcing them to withdraw.

Following the defeat of these bands a temporary lull set in over eastern Bukhara. Capitalizing on it, local party and soviet organs intensified their explanatory work among the public. Kurultais, to which influential tribal and spiritual leaders were invited for frank discussion, were conducted. This produced positive results. Some of the tribal leaders and clergy broke ties with the counterrevolution, condemned the basmach movement, and went over to the side of Soviet rule.

Establishment of proper relations between the Russian Soviet Republic and the Peoples of Central Asia had tremendous significance during this time. V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to this issue, and he appealed to communists "to apply all efforts to establish, through example and deeds, comradely relations with the peoples of Turkestan, to demonstrate to them the sincerity of our wish to eradicate all

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traces of Great Russian imperialism so as to free our hands for a whole-hearted struggle against world imperialism, with British imperialism at its head...."<sup>35</sup>

The new constitution adopted in September 1921, which reflected the basic provisions of the RSFSR Constitution, played an important role in strengthening popular rule in the Bukhara republic. The reelected Central Executive Committee and the newly formed government, with Fayzulla Khodzhayev at its head, did a great deal of work.

But the counterrevolution and the basmach leaders of Bukhara prepared new forces. Striving to impart the appearance of a "popular movement" to their actions, they decided to create bands along tribal lines, with tribal chiefs at their head. All tribal bands were to be subordinated to the overall command of the Lokay valley, headed by Ibragim-bek. This forthcoming uprising of Lokay basmachis rested its hopes mainly on help from England and emigrants abroad. The aim of the uprising was to restore the power of the emir of Bukhara. With this in mind, former emir Seyid Alim-khan placed his own agents in Ibragim-bek's staff, so that if he were to win, the adventuristic Ibragim would not have the possibility for seizing power himself. It was with the same design that the deposed emir negotiated with Turkey's former war minister Enver-pasha, intending for him to take charge of basmach bands in the Bukhara republic.<sup>36</sup> Thus the former emir was playing a double-cross.

While persistently encouraging Ibragim's subordination to Enver-pasha, Seyid Alim-khan simultaneously did what he could to limit Enver's power. This is what he said in one of his letters to Ibragim-bek: "For the sake of the religion, you are to maintain solidarity with the commander in chief (the reference is to Enver-pasha.-- *A. Ch.*), and all you intend to do should be done together with him in unanimity... out in no case are you to surrender to him all of your will and power over the okrug troops (this is how the former emir of Bukhara referred to the basmach bands.-- *A. Ch.*), only seeking counsel with Enver-bek in all matters."<sup>37</sup> Most of the basmach bands were unified under Enver-pasha's charge by the end of 1921. Their strength reached 10,000 men.

In the second half of September 1921 the basmachis initiated combat activities in the eastern part of Bukhara. The main forces (4,000 basmachis) moved against Dyushambe. They beseiged the city, but they could not capture it. The kishlak garrison defended courageously for more than a month. Arriving Red Army units helped to relieve the seige of Dyushambe.

In other sectors where there were no military garrisons or where they consisted of a few persons and could not oppose the large, well-armed band with the assistance of small volunteer detachments, the basmachis seized population centers in the vicinities of Fayzabad, Kulyab, Garm, Kurgan-Tyube, Kafirnigan, Gissar, and Karategin.

In December 1921 the basmach bands once again attempted to seize Dyushambe. Concurrently the pan-Turkists prepared a conspiracy. Their henchmen acquired important positions in one way or another. As an example the post of military nazir was occupied by the rabid nationalist Abdulkhay Arifov, and the republic's militia was under the charge of a former Turkish colonel, Ali-Riza. The Central Executive Committee of the Bukhara republic was headed by a rabid enemy of Soviet rule, Usman Khodzhi Pulatkhodzhayev. Muetdin Maktum Khodzhayev, the chairman of the ChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage], was also in the enemy camp.

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They prepared a blow at the back of the Red Army and volunteer detachments. On 9 December the counterrevolutionary leadership in Dyushambe attempted to disarm the garrison. A banquet was organized in Usmankhodzhayev's quarters under a harmless pretext, and garrison chief Morozenko and RSFSR Counsel General Morozov were invited. They were both arrested on the spot. Then the traitor Daniyarov (the chief of the local militia) gave orders to disarm the garrison. But the subunit commanders and the Red Army soldiers refused to lay down their arms, and they offered resistance. Military activities began in Dyushambe at dawn. The exchange of gunfire went on for 2 days. Having no support from the city's residents, Usmankhodzhayev and his accomplices fled into the mountains on the third day in the hope of joining the basmachi gangs. But misfortune befell them at this time. Usmankhodzhayev failed to reckon with the ambitiousness of the head of the Lokay basmachi, Ibragim-bek, who aspired to supreme power over eastern Bukhara. Usmankhodzhayev himself, meanwhile, demanded a joint struggle aimed at creating a Moslem state with the former emir of Bukhara at its head. Ibragim-bek rejected these demands. An armed conflict arose between them. At this time a Red Army detachment came upon the battleground between the basmachi and Usmankhodzhayev's bands. Usmankhodzhayev's group found itself in a ring between the basmach gangs and the Red Army units. Abandoning his booty and some of his arms, Usmankhodzhayev and his entourage fled into the mountainous border regions.

Following the unsuccessful attempt at usurping power in Dyushambe by counterrevolutionary conspiracy, Enver-pasha, who possessed sizeable forces, decided to capture the kishlak by storm. But the garrison (containing only about 600 soldiers and commanders) repelled all enemy attacks in 3 days of battle. The bands halted their storm and went over to a lengthy siege. In the course of several days, before the food and ammunition ran out, the garrison would not surrender the city. It was only after an order was received from the command of the Turkestan Front, which could not offer any assistance, that the garrison forced its way out of the encirclement in battle on the night of 15-16 February.

The success of the joint actions of Enver-pasha and Ibragim-bek went to the heads of the reactionary elements. Enver-pasha began receiving large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and food from abroad. Counterrevolutionary forces significantly replenished the basmach bands. Their strength rose to 20,000.

Capitalizing on the low strength and, in a number of areas, the absence of Red Army garrisons, bands headed by Enver-pasha advanced deep into the Bukhara republic. New gangs joined him en route. In spring 1922 Abdulkhay Arifov, the military nazir of the Bukhara republic and a pan-Turkist, went over to the side of the basmach gangs; Enver immediately appointed him his deputy.

The reactionary press in the West trumpeted the imminent "unavoidable" demise of Soviet rule in Central Asia, and Enver-pasha had already proclaimed himself to be its supreme ruler. In May 1922 he submitted an ultimatum to the Soviet government of the Russian Federation to withdraw the Red Army units from Khiva, Bukhara, and Turkestan. The basmachi dealt cruelly with all who assisted and sympathized with Soviet rule. Plunder, violence, and humiliation of the people attained unprecedented proportions.

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In this difficult period the Bukhara Communist Party joined the RKP(b). Unification of the communists of the Bukhara republic and Russia had enormous significance. Unified ideological and political leadership over the struggle against the counter-revolution in the Bukhara republic became one of the sources of victory and consolidation of Soviet rule. Prominent party and state officials--G. K. Ordzhonikidze, Ya. Kh. Peters, and S. S. Kamenev--were sent to the Bukhara republic with the purpose of organizing the struggle against the basmachis.

In winter and spring 1922 party and soviet organs and the Red Army command made meticulous preparations for an offensive against Enver-pasha's bands. But with the assistance of international imperialism, Enver-pasha initiated active operations first, intending to foil the offensive of the Red Army units, and thus raise his authority among the basmachis.

But Enver-pasha's glory faded with the very first blows against the basmachis. Bands under his overall leadership began breaking up and operating independently, each in its own area. One of the bandit formations, which had a total strength of 5,000 men, attempted to break through to the border in the hope of obtaining the help it needed to continue its struggle against Soviet rule. The path of the retreating basmachis was blocked by the 16th Cavalry Regiment. A battle occurred, in which the basmachis suffered serious losses. Enver-pasha and the survivors fled in the direction of Bal'dzhuan. Davletman-biy's band was surrounded in the kishlak of Obdara, where Enver-pasha was as well. The basmachis attempted to break out of the encirclement. Enver-pasha and Dvletman-biy were killed in one of the battles.

However the scattered basmach gangs continued to operate in western and eastern Bukhara, especially in the vicinities of Kashkadar'ya, Surkhandar'ya, Karategin, Kulyab, Kurgan-Tyube, Gissar, and Shirabad. Ibragim-bek's influence in eastern Bukhara grew. But he was not entirely to the liking of counterrevolutionary emigrants abroad and international reaction, especially English reaction. They would have preferred to have a more reliable henchman. As such a person, they selected a Turkish officer and an English intelligence agent, Selim-pasha. In fall 1922 he and a group of officers arrived in eastern Bukhara and set immediately to establishing ties with Enver-pasha's basmach followers.

Uniting several bands, Selim-pasha moved against Kulyab and Dyushambe. For 15 days 600 basmachis unsuccessfully stormed the Red Army garrison of 60 men in Kulyab. It was only on the 16th day, when ammunition ran out, that the warriors abandoned the city, though not for long. An arriving cavalry regiment pushed the enemy out of Kulyab. Then Selim-pasha sought an alliance with Ibragim-bek. Four thousand basmachis headed by Selim-pasha moved against Bukhara, and 2,000 under the leadership of Ibragim-bek moved on Dyushambe.

Two cavalry regiments were committed against them. In just a few days the Red Army units dealt shattering blows on the bands. Selim-pasha took refuge in the Matchinskoye Bekstvo together with the surviving unbeaten gangs. Some of the bands went with Maksim Fuzayl. Ibragim-bek stayed in the Gissar valley.

These three rather large centers of basmach resistance continue to cause tension in the Bukhara republic. Additional steps had to be taken to fight the gangs. New

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volunteer detachments were formed, and new Red Army units came to the Bukhara republic.

As a result of short battles the bands led by Selim-pasha and Ibragim-bek fell apart, suffering heavy losses. More than 12,000 basmachis returned to their kishlaks voluntarily.<sup>38</sup> Ibragim-bek and a small band fled to the left bank of the Vakhsh. Selim-pasha was also able to hide. Some basmachis who for all appearances had returned to a peaceful life rejoined him from time to time. Some of the bands fled abroad, from where they continued to make raids on Soviet territory.

The position of the basmach gangs that stayed in the Bukhara republic became more and more critical. Avoiding armed collisions with Red Army units and volunteer detachments, they hid in desert and mountain regions, plundering the population.<sup>39</sup>

In September 1923 Ibragim-bek attempted to seize power in the Lokay valley (there were no Red Army units there at this time). Several bands that had fled abroad made preparations to help him. Ibragim-bek began his campaign by attacking a small garrison in the kishlak of Naryn. The population came to the aid of the garrison. For 2 days a group of Red Army soldiers and dehkanis fought off the basmachis. Relief came on the third day--22 Red Army soldiers. They encountered Ibragim-bek's band of 400 men at the approaches to the kishlak. Dehkanis joined the Red Army soldiers. Through their combined efforts they defeated the bands and forced them to flee. So ended the next adventure of the enemies of Soviet rule against the Bukhara republic.

Despite the constant struggle against the basmach movement, steps were taken in the republic to consolidate and develop socialist achievements. In November 1923 a land reform was conducted in the Lokay valley. It undermined the economic roots of the feudal bai oligarchy and improved the lot of the impoverished dehkanis, who received land as a result. The tax reform was continued: Taxes paid by the middle income group were reduced, and the poor were totally exempted. These and other steps taken by the Soviet government not only improved the economic position of the laborers but also dealt a blow on the basmachis. Many of them left their bands.

Ibragim-bek used the few recruits that did join his gangs for raids against individual densely populated regions. But this did not produce the desired results. Even in the course of a raid itself, large groups of basmachis would voluntarily surrender to Soviet rule. For the first time, 113 religious officials signed an appeal to the faithful public demanding that the basmachis cease their bloodletting. In the event of refusal, the signatories proposed taking the most decisive steps against the basmachis, and they appealed to the faithful to provide active assistance to the authorities.<sup>40</sup>

Red Army units and subunits continued their constant search for surviving bands, they attacked them, and they liquidated them. In the beginning of 1924 they struck the remaining large gangs on the territory of the Bukhara republic. Ibragim-bek fled into the hills under the cover of small groups. Evading the pursuit of Red Army detachments, he made new attempts at organizing the bands, but few would join. Criminal elements either fled abroad or received their just reward, while honest laborers began opposing the basmach movement more and more actively. Ibragim-bek was barely able to gather 600 persons together by summer 1924. With them, he

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"dared" only plunder and terror. Raiding the kishlaks, the bands avoided encounters with Red Army detachments and peoples volunteers. But the basmachis were unable to escape unpunished. Small in number but experienced, cavalry groups consisting of Red Army soldiers and peoples volunteers sought out the criminals and dealt them tangible blows. In just a single battle in the vicinity of Aral-Tugay, Ibragim-bek's band lost 30 basmachis killed and 50 wounded.

In fall 1924 the basmach movement returned to life in eastern Bukhara. An intense drought promoted this. About 72,000 persons were starving in eastern Bukhara.<sup>41</sup> Driven by hunger, some dehkanis, especially those who had been in gangs at different times, left for the bands. Emergency steps were taken to halt the growth of the basmach movement and to prevent it from developing. Party and soviet organs and the Red Army command, which had considerable experience in fighting the bands, assumed the strategy of close coordination of all ideological, political, and military forces and resources. On their part, foreign reactionary forces did everything they could to resurrect active operations of the basmachis on the territory of the former Bukhara emirate. Large foreign bands began crossing the border in December 1924. In just the Karshi sector more than 350 basmachis invaded Soviet territory between 15 and 23 December.

Ibragim-bek went to the Lokay valley, where he once again began feverishly organizing bands. But this time he was able to gather only about a thousand men. Even so, the chief could not trust many of them completely. Those who were known to be unreliable he placed into "penalty" groups, in which he included his most trusted servants. But the steps taken by Ibragim-bek could no longer rescue the decaying basmach movement. Evidence of this can be found in particular in Ibragim-bek's correspondence with anti-soviet emigrants abroad. In letters written in 1921-1923, Ibragim-bek, exaggerating the successes of the basmach bands, boasted of the support he was receiving from a certain segment of the population. The content of letters written in 1924-1925 was entirely different. In them, Ibragim-bek was forced to admit the absence of any support to the basmachis on the part of the laboring dehkanis. Local residents did not yield to the deceit, blackmail, and threats of the band leaders, their protectors, and their inspirers. They refused to go with the basmachis, and those who were taken by force fled at the first opportunity. The population refused to give food to the basmachis, and it detained and turned over to local authorities any foragers and recruiters from the bands.<sup>42</sup>

The united bands of Ibragim-bek and Khuram-bek remained the most stable. In spring 1925 they were still trying to demonstrate their power, and concurrently making overtures to the public. Basmachis attacked small military garrisons, where they destroyed telegraph lines, but they no longer pillaged and plundered the kishlaks so frequently; sometimes they paid for food gathered from the public, and they even distributed some of their plunder among dehkanis in agriculturally poor regions. But such "loyalty" to the people and the aggressive offensive actions by small forces against military garrisons did not last long. They soon shifted from open attacks to ambushes, and they once again began resorting to savage terror against the dehkanis loyal to Soviet rule. In the vicinity of Kafirnigan, bands shot several residents suspected of betraying the kurbash Afganek to Soviet organs. In the vicinity of Yavan a gang butchered five dehkanis for sympathizing with Soviet rule.<sup>43</sup>

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Local Soviet government organs took additional steps to halt the actions of the basmachis; the first thing they did was to provide greater assistance to dehkans in starving regions, and increase their agitation efforts among different strata of the population. In many regions the popular masses began fighting the basmach movement more aggressively. The bands continued to break apart. In just the first 10 days of June 1925 142 persons surrendered voluntarily, to include seven kurbashis. In an effort to keep their personnel intact, the band leaders avoided battle more and more frequently, leading the bands to remote locales. Terrorist actions against the local public intensified dramatically. In June 1925 Ibragim-bek conducted a number of conferences, in which he set the stage for mass terrorism going as far as burning down kishlaks, and for creating ambushes and barricades on the paths of possible defection of basmachis from the gangs for voluntary surrender to Soviet authorities. But even these cruel measures could not save the situation. The breakdown of the bands did not cease, the frequency of voluntary surrender increased, and most of those who did surrender brought their arms with them. But the leaders of the basmachis continued to make their preparations for fall operations, feverishly procuring food and forage. Their center of operations was moved to the border regions.

In early September 1925 Ibragim-bek came to the Lokay vicinity. This caused anxiety and alarm among the public. Some dehkans fled to the safety of the hills, or moved their households to kishlaks in which military garrisons were stationed. Ibragim-bek organized several raids on kishlaks, in the course of which he committed savage reprisals.

In late September the armed encounters with basmachis became almost a daily occurrence. As was noted on 20 January 1926 at a meeting of a commission to fight the basmach movement, the social preconditions for the movement's rebirth were satisfied by the presence of basmachis who had already surrendered, and by the preservation of numerous privileged classes. The conference indicated the need for continuing the struggle against the remaining gangs, and for preventing creation of new gangs. Special attention was turned to the left-bank Vakhsh, where bands under Ibragim-bek's leadership were hiding, and to the border regions of Surkhandar'inskaya Oblast. Basmachis operating in these places maintained close ties with counterrevolutionary emigrants abroad, receiving ammunition, weapons, and manpower from them. In Tajikistan, bands led by Ibragim-bek totaling 300 men concentrated in Dzhilikul'skiy Rayon. In Uzbekistan, the main forces of the basmachis under the leadership of kurbash Khuram-bek, 150 men strong, concentrated in the southern part of Babatag and along the lower reaches of the Surkhana.<sup>44</sup> Berdy-Dotkho, the leader of the Kashkadar'ya basmach movement, made his way to these same regions together with his bands.

Gangs based near the border were able to cross over the state border in both directions, which created a tense situation in these regions. In most cases the bands avoided collisions with border guards and Red Army subunits. On encountering Red Army soldiers, they scattered in the hills, but they continued to terrorize and plunder the local population. Supported by the population, the border guards and Red Army subunits continued to successfully destroy the remaining bands. Just between December 1925 and February 1926 22 kurbashis were killed and captured.<sup>45</sup> Some basmachis surrendered, and some fled abroad. The leader of the Lokay basmachis, Ibragim-bek, also went into hiding abroad. But Khuram-bek's gangs were still on Soviet territory.

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To create normal conditions in the border regions, in June 1926 the Central Commission for the Struggle Against the Basmach Movement adopted a decree forming a special government organ for the purposes of conducting a campaign to liquidate the bands. The commission wrote up a package of economic, political, and other measures. Their implementation united the laborers around Soviet rule even more closely, and hastened the destruction of bands in Tajikistan and in the Samarkand and Kashkadar'ya regions. While at the beginning of the campaign there were 28 bands in Tajikistan and 48 in Uzbekistan with a total strength of 593 basmachis, as of 1 September only six bands were left. But the supreme leader of the bands, Khurambek, who was operating in the vicinity of the Surkhandar'ya, managed to cross the border with the survivors of the gangs.

The gangs that fled abroad and their principal inspirers enjoyed possibilities for creating new gangs out of counterrevolutionary emigrants, and raiding Soviet territory. Some bands went underground, and under certain conditions they could once again make their presence known. Therefore party and soviet organs, the leadership of the OGPU in Central Asia, and the command of the Red Army and the border troops continued to keep volunteer detachments and military units combat ready as required.

A number of agreements and treaties signed with Afghanistan in 1926 and 1927 helped to improve the situation in the Tajik sector of the border. Border commissar positions were introduced as of April 1926 in order to resolve local border incidents arising along the border.

On 31 August 1926 a Soviet-Afghan treaty on neutrality and mutual nonaggression was signed. Because a large number of counterrevolutionary emigrants were present in Afghan territory, the Soviet-Afghan treaty indicated the need for mutual restraint from armed or unarmed interference in the internal affairs of the other country, and prohibition of activities on Soviet and Afghan territories aimed against the other country (recruitment of troops, shipment of weapons and ammunition, and so on).

Nevertheless, capitalizing on the sociopolitical difficulties in Afghanistan (internecine warfare kindled by English imperialists and internal reactionary forces adhering to an anti-Soviet line), counterrevolutionary emigrants in Afghanistan continued not only to maintain bands fleeing abroad, but also to create new ones. They organized attacks on Soviet territory, especially in regions in which either there were small border garrisons, or the border was not protected at all.

The basmach movement revived in October 1926, especially at the Khorezm oasis and in Tashauzskiy Okrug. The bands engaged primarily in plunder. Their strength was not great (57 men at the Khorezm oasis, up to 100 men at the Merv oasis, and 13 men in the vicinity of the Vakhsh ), but they were a part of the foreign basmach movement, prepared to resume activities on a larger scale, imparting a political nature to them. In this connection the OGPU proposed to the USSR Council for Labor and Defense to reinforce border security, especially in poorly inhabited regions. This proposal was supported by Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin. At the end of 1926 the Soviet government allocated resources with which to reinforce border security in Central Asia.

Steps were also taken along diplomatic lines. On 16 November 1926 the USSR Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs asked Makhmud Bek-tarzi, the minister of foreign affairs of Afghanistan, to take the appropriate steps to suppress the activities of

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basmach bands operating against the USSR from Afghan territory. In response to this and other notices, the Afghan government took certain steps to prevent attacks by basmachis on Soviet territory. But they were not always effective in connection with the complex internecine struggle. At times the actions of foreign bands abated, and at times their intensity grew.

In spring 1927 the state border in the Tajik sector was violated daily by an average of up to 40 persons. Among the violators there were many basmachis who had made their way on to Soviet territory for reconnaissance, plunder, or other hostile purposes. From 1928 on, Utan-bek's gangs were the most active in this area. In just July, August, and September 1928 they invaded Soviet territory four times. However, encountering the stubborn resistance of border guards, Utan-bek's bands were unable to penetrate into the deep rear. Suffering large losses, they would hastily return abroad.<sup>46</sup>

In 3 years (from 1926 to 1928), when combat activities against the basmachis shifted to the border regions, border soldiers inflicted tangible losses upon the bands.

The basmach movement was not as dangerous in the 1920's in Turkmenistan as it was in Kirghiziya, and especially in southern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the early 1920's, when large united bands were operating in the Fergana and the high-mountain Alay Plain, in the Naryn sector, and on the territory of Khorezm and Bukhara, the struggle in Turkmenistan centered on scattered gangs with a strength of from 20 to 300 basmachis. These gangs attacked military garrisons, border posts, militia organs, and revolutionary committees. In the first half of March 1923, when Selim-pasha initiated aggressive combat activities on the territory of the Bukhara republic, local and foreign bands with the total strength of 10,000 men came together in the vicinity of Kerki.<sup>47</sup> But their plans were foiled by the steps taken by the Red Army command. Foreign basmach groups were detained at the border, and the actions of the local gangs were contained. Subsequently the bands began operating mainly as scattered units. Ishan Khalifa tried to coordinate their activities on Turkmen territory.

In December 1923 a gang with a strength of 250 men attacked the kishlak of Baba-Sakal, plundered it, and departed for the hills. A platoon of border guards under the command of Klimov pursued the band, which was several times stronger, caught up with it, and engaged it in battle. In the unequal battle the border troops killed and wounded several basmachis. But the enemy surrounded Klimov's platoon. The situation of the Red Army soldiers was grave. Cavalry soldiers Krylov and Ivanchenko were sent to the command with a message. The basmachis pursued them, and killed Ivanchenko's horse. Taking shelter behind the body of the horse, Ivanchenko, who was seriously wounded, opened fire on the basmachis. In the unequal skirmish he fell the death of a hero, insuring fulfillment of a combat order at the cost of his own life.<sup>48</sup>

Such collisions with the basmachis were not infrequent on the territory of Soviet Turkmenistan in the first half of the 1920's. As a result of stubborn warfare, the bands were destroyed by the end of 1924. Dzhunaid-khan, the leader of the Turkmen basmachis, recognized that the remnants of the small defeated bands were not in a position to continue hostile activities. Under these circumstances he decided to call a halt to the armed struggle. Desiring peace, the Soviet government pardoned

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Dzhunaid-khan and his accomplices. As it turned out, however, Dzhunaid conducted insincere negotiations with Soviet government organs. Capitalizing on the lull, he continued to maintain close ties with English intelligence and with counter-revolutionary emigrants, and he brought new bands together, creating bases near wells on the Karakum desert.

The basmachis noticeably revived in spring 1925; this was a time of continuing national demarcation in Central Asia, which was destroying the foundations of feudal mutual relations and annihilating the supremacy of tribal leaders. Basmach band leaders Yakshi-Gel'dy and Gulyam-Ali spread rumors that the demarcation was being conducted allegedly to the detriment of fundamental national interests.<sup>49</sup>

A significant proportion of the bands concentrated in the vicinity of Tashauz. But their situation was unstable. Some tribal leaders abandoned the camp and returned to their places of permanent residence under the influence of the Soviet government's agitation, and as a result of the defeat of certain gangs. Of course they did take up arms again from time to time, committing criminal acts against the laboring dehkans and the socialist structure. Thus for example at the beginning of August Durdy-Klych's band, consisting of 70 persons, asked the revolutionary committee for permission to take up residence in the vicinity of Kulya-Urgench.<sup>50</sup> The revolutionary committee satisfied this request. But a few days later it resumed its criminal activities. The Red Army command and the Tashauz revolutionary committee were forced to conduct a special operation to hunt down and liquidate Durdy-Klych's gang.

Bands hiding out in the sands of the Karakum began making raids on border posts in spring 1926. On 11 May a basmach gang with a strength of 250 men attacked the post at Beder. Thirteen border guards under the command of Nesterov committed themselves to the unequal battle. For 3 hours the valorous soldiers restrained the continuous attacks of the enemy, and then with the help of reinforcements from a neighboring outpost they forced the band to withdraw.<sup>51</sup>

Temporary border posts were set up to eliminate basmachis hiding in the Karakum desert; throughout all of 1926 and part of 1927 these posts fought the bandits stubbornly for every well, for every rain pit.

Following the liquidation of the principal bases of the basmachis in the Karakum desert, Turkmenian land was cleared of organized bandit gangs, the remnants of which fled across the border. The basmachis raided the territory of Soviet Turkmenistan from across the border in relatively small groups of 10-50 men with the purposes of reconnaissance and plunder. Thus in February 1928 border guards fought a basmach band of 40 men, and in June 1928 they fought a band of 15 men.

Utan-bek's bands violated the border most frequently. Many of them were unable to reach their goal, and following the first engagements with border troops they returned across the border. Using mountain trails, however, some of them did manage to penetrate to the nearest population centers, which they plundered. In February 1927 a foreign band of 80 sabers attacked a caravan of the State Import-Export Trade Office, taking 162 pack camels laden with goods, and 2,000 sheep.

The following figures attest to the intensity of the struggle waged by border guards against various bands and individual basmachis on the border in 1926-1928: More

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than 5,000 persons were detained just in the Kaakhka sector alone. Border guards frequently engaged enemy forces exceeding their strength by several times, and they emerged the victors. On 10 January 1928 a mounted patrol of 12 men discovered a band of 60 men and engaged it in battle. In the exchange of gunfire, the bandits lost 29 basmachis, and the rest fled across the border.<sup>52</sup>

Efforts by reactionary forces to encourage emigration of the population, especially from border regions, created many difficulties for border guards and local government organs in the 1920's. Emigration from Central Asia, which began long before the 1917 revolution, increased in its intensity somewhat following the October Revolution. This was explained in many ways by the flight of representatives of the dominant classes and religious officials, who provoked mass migration from across the border. Emigration was advantageous to the former Bukhara emir and to the counterrevolution as a whole. To them, the emigrants were a work force through which they could enrich themselves, and they exploited some of them for anti-Soviet purposes.

Two of the emir's henchmen busied themselves with the training of the emigrants: Togay-bek, who lived in Khanabad, trained Bukharan and Turkmen emigrants, and Ishan Khalifa trained Uzbek emigrants. But by as early as 1926, by which time the main basmach forces in Central Asia were defeated, and after a number of political, economic, and other measures were implemented under the guidance of the communist party and the Soviet government, fundamentally changing kishlak life, significantly improving the material status of the dehkans, raising their cultural level and strengthening state border security, mass emigration practically ceased. Re-emigration began, which required high alertness on the part of the border guard: First, illegal crossing of our borders could not be permitted; second, the leaders of the basmach movement had to be prevented from capitalizing on re-emigration as a means for moving their bands into Soviet territory, and intelligence agents representing the imperialist countries had to be kept from performing their activities. Incidents associated with these problems did not occur infrequently.

It would be impossible to list all of the names of Soviet border guards and the deeds they performed while protecting and defending the state border. It would be safe to say that everyone who served on the border of Central Asia in those years had participated many times in engagements with the enemies of the Soviet motherland, courageously defending its freedom and independence. It was in these battles that the great friendship of the peoples was forged.

## FOOTNOTES

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REGIONAL

CONFERENCE ON RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION AT UKRAINIAN VUZ'S

Kiev RUSSKIY YAZYK I LITERATURA V SHKOLAKH USSR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 81 pp 78-79

Article: "A Big Talk on the Training of Teachers"

Text: The Republic Scientific Conference "Ways of Improving the Training of Russian-Language Teachers at the Higher Educational Institutions of the Ukrainian SSR in Light of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers 'On the Further Development of the Higher School and the Increase of the Quality of the Training of Specialists'" was held on 3-4 December 1980 in Poltava.

Scholars of the Academy of Sciences, pedagogical institutes and universities of the republic, representatives of oblast departments of public education, instructors of Russian linguistics and students of the philology faculty of the local VUZ gathered in the assembly hall of the Pedagogical Institute imeni V. G. Korolenko.

UkSSR Minister of Education M. V. Fomenko opened the conference. "Elation--it is probably possible to define more accurately in this way the feelings of the Soviet people who are living today on the preparation for the party forums. This is also leaving a mark on our conference, for it is devoted to such an important problem as the improvement of the quality of the training of the teachers of Russian, the language of international intercourse. Our 'great, mighty, truthful and free' Russian language."

Yu. Yu. Krivoshey, chief of the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Poltavskaya Oblast Party Committee, cordially greeted the conference participants at the first plenary meeting. He told about the glorious past and heroic present of the oblast and about the development of its economy and culture.

Then UkSSR Minister of Education M. V. Fomenko delivered a report.

Doctor of Philological Sciences Academician I. F. Protchenko, professor and chief academician secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, devoted his report to the theme "The Russian Language Is the Language of the Friendship, Mutual Understanding and Cooperation of Peoples." The speaker characterized the Russian language as the great historical and cultural property of all the fraternal peoples of our country. The national languages are being developed on the basis of equality and mutual enrichment. In this connection the constant enrichment of the Russian language itself and its lexicology is also taking place. The highly developed multinational state at a certain stage is always faced with the

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problem of selecting a single language as the means of international intercourse. The Russian language has always played an important role in the development of world culture. It is well known how the interest in it increased back in the 19th century. The works of Pushkin, Lermontov, Chekhov, L. Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy were actively translated into other languages; at that time an appreciable interest in the study of the Russian language was noted in other countries. It would not be out of place to recall that K. Marx at the age of 52 took up the study of the Russian language and mastered it in 6 months, which enabled him to read Pushkin, Gogol', Saltykov-Shchedrin and Chernyshevskiy in the original. And how many sincere, enthusiastic propagandists of the Russian language our history knows among the leading minds, the representatives of the most diverse nationalities! Akhundov, Nalbandyan, Chavchavadze, Shevchenko, Franko, Luchina, Raynis and Zhemayte always called upon people to study, to love the Russian language, the culture of the fraternal people. Abay, appealing to the Kazakh people, said that a knowledge of the Russian language would play an enormous role in the development of the culture of the Kazakh people and would broaden their horizons. In tsarist Russia by 1917 only 21 percent of the people were literate. In the Ukraine there were not even schools with instruction in the native language. The Far North and Central Asia were a zone of almost complete illiteracy. Scholars presumed that centuries and even millenia would be required to eliminate illiteracy. Tsarist Russia was inhabited by 130 peoples, of them only 20 had a developed written language. Since the first days of Soviet power the Communist Party has displayed untiring concern about the equal development and growth of the languages of all the nations and nationalities of our country. In this direction we have made remarkable, truly historic gains. Many languages of the peoples of prerevolutionary Russia, which previously did not have a writing system, not only have acquired a written culture, but in the past decades have formed highly developed languages, in which the instruction in schools and VUZ's is conducted, science and literature are being developed, newspapers, books and journals are published. Distinctive national socialist cultures, which are closely interconnected ideologically and creatively, have flourished. And in all this lies the enormous role of the Russian language, which has been voluntarily recognized by all the nations and nationalities of our homeland as the language of international intercourse. The Russian language is tirelessly performing this function of its own, generously bestowing the gifts of its great friendly respect and affection on all the national languages and cultures of the Soviet Union.

The report of Professor G. P. Izhakevich was devoted to "The Methodological and Linguistic Principles of the Course in the Modern Russian Language at Philological VUZ's of the Ukrainian SSR."

The teaching of the Russian language under the conditions of bilingualism has many peculiarities. The Institute of Linguistics of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences is fruitfully studying and elaborating the problems connected with the comparative study of the Russian and Ukrainian languages. Much attention is being devoted to questions of the culture of Russian speech in the Ukraine. The problems of the functioning of the Russian language in the closely related linguistic environment are also in the purview of linguistic scholars. A monograph soon to be published is devoted to this. A work on the problems of the comparative linguistics of East Slavic languages has been prepared in conjunction with the scholars of the VUZ's of the republic. The speaker dwelt on questions connected with the similarity of the Russian and Ukrainian languages in vocabulary and stylistics, having indicated that the closeness of the languages also creates certain difficulties. Therefore, under

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the conditions of bilingualism great efforts and ability are required of instructors, in order to help students master the literary norm. The comparative historical method in the study of languages can promote this; the instructor will find abundant illustrative material by turning to dialectology. When studying the course in the modern Russian language at a VUZ it is necessary to bear in mind its inseparable connection with "The Introduction to Linguistics" and "Comparative Grammar."

"The Educational Potentials of the Russian Language and Their Realization in Light of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee 'On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Educational Work'" was the theme of the report of Doctor of Philological Sciences Professor M. A. Karpenko. The speaker touched upon questions of the unity of instruction and education at the VUZ and the place of the Russian language in the curriculum. The study of the Russian language is conducive to the formation in students of dialectic thinking and develops the culture of speech. In the process of instruction the instructors master new facets of patriotic and international education. Each day gives rise to new words, terms and word combinations. Society reveals new qualities of words and reflects in language the phenomena of science, technology and culture. The speaker analyzed thoroughly and comprehensively interesting linguistic phenomena of recent times, illustrating them by facts which have been reflected in the press, belles-lettres and colloquial speech.

Professor V. A. Gorpinich gave the report "The Improvement of the Forms and Methods of Work of the Chair on the Organization and Management of the Training of the Russian-Language Teacher." The work experience of the chair of the Poltava Pedagogical Institute was at the basis of the report. The training of the teacher in Russian linguistics begins, in the opinion of the speaker, back in school. It continues at the level of the graduating student (when the selection of the future occupation is made), then within the walls of the VUZ, and finally there is the stage of the self-instruction of the teacher. The main task facing language and literature teachers today is the increase of the methodological level of training. The main sections of the course on the modern Russian literary language should be studied in inseparable unity. Special courses and special seminars provide an invaluable service when training the future teacher. Precisely here the students learn to generalize, analyze and see in the themes being studied not the particular, but the main thing. On the basis of the attended special courses the young teachers conduct elective classes in the schools. In the report the emphasis was placed on the reinforcement in procedural recommendations of the psychological aspect, the need for the joint work of the chairs of language and pedagogy of VUZ's was indicated. The VUZ should not only provide the student with knowledge, but also cultivate in him the qualities necessary to a teacher: to be an interesting party in conversation, to master the art of oratory, it is quite good when the teacher knows by heart poetry, prose excerpts, the letters of writers and so on. The VUZ is faced with the task of teaching students the skills of oral language and written speech.

Later the work of the conference took place in sections, in which reports and communications on the themes of the ideological and political education of students, the linguistic and pedagogical training of Russian-language teachers and the relations between subjects in the process of this training were heard and discussed.

The statements of N. N. Arvat, V. I. Kononenko, V. I. Makarov, L. I. Makarova, M. N. Nesterov, V. M. Mikhaylov, Zh. P. Sokolovskaya, N. A. Pashkovskaya, N. G.

Ozerova, F. K. Guzhva, R. P. Zhivoglyadova, L. M. Vorob'yeva and others attracted particular attention of the participants.

The conference participants familiarized themselves with the work of the Chair of the Russian Language and Literature of the Poltava Pedagogical Institute and visited the memorial literary museums of Poltava.

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