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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 5/81)

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

BOOK DISCUSSES PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

Moscow O PROBLEMAKH RAZORUZHENIYA in Russian 1980 (signed to press 19 Sep 80)
pp 1-2, 63-77, 270

[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, and chapter three from book "The Problems of Disarmament" edited by G. M. Korniyenko, Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 10,000 copies, 272 pages]

[Text] Prepared by a group of well-known Soviet diplomats and specialists in international affairs, this collection offers a deep analysis of the complex problem of controlling the arms race.

The authors persuasively demonstrate the tremendous harm done by the arms race to each country of the world individually, and to the entire world community as a whole. They reveal the depth and scope of Soviet political initiatives aimed at bridling the arms race, at disarmament.

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Foreword

It is sometimes said that the history of human society is the history of wars. If there is some element of truth to such an assertion, it would be no less valid to say that man has always dreamed of a time in which wars would leave his life forever. The biblical prophecy that a day will come when men will "beat their sabers into plowshares" was a reflection of this dream.

Today this is no longer simply an allegorical image, sculptured in bronze by the Soviet sculptor Ye. V. Vuchetich and standing before the United Nations building in New York.

Since the time that the creator of the world's first socialist state, V. I. Lenin, named disarmament the ideal of socialism, the task of implementing man's age-old dream of reforging death-dealing weapons into the implements of peaceful labor became a matter of practical policy of the Soviet state and, later on, of other socialist countries as well.

Being the greatest pragmatist, V. I. Lenin, in distinction from bourgeois pacifists who are satisfied with simply talking nostalgically about peace, perpetually emphasized that only real disarmament efforts can narrow down the material-technical base of warfare, and that only total disarmament is a real guarantee of peace, and the most dependable means of eradicating wars in general. Having a perfect understanding of history and being able to predict its development in many ways, V. I. Lenin warned back in 1915--30 years before the first atomic bomb was exploded--that war based on the latest mighty achievements of science and technology "may lead, and will invariably lead, to destruction of the conditions themselves of human society's existence."*

Lenin's warning is all the more valid today, and it is no coincidence that many of L. I. Brezhnev's speeches have it as one of their obvious themes. "Peace cannot be strong," he said in one of them, "until we put an end to the arms race we are now engaged in, to inflation of military budgets, and to creation of increasingly more terrifying mass destruction weapons. It has now come to the point where if the weapons now stockpiled were to be launched, mankind would be completely annihilated."**

Owing to the efforts of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces, certain results were achieved in the effort to restrain the arms race in the 1960's and 1970's. Had this not been so, there could be no doubt that the world situation would have been worse today, and the danger of war would have been greater.

But at the same time it is entirely obvious that the rate of progress and the scale of agreement on limitation of arms are still behind the rate and scale of the arms race. Moreover at the turn of the present decade the most aggressive circles of the USA and other imperialist powers assumed a course, in collaboration with Chinese

*Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 396.

**Brezhnev, L. I., "O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva. Rechi i stat'i" [On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978, p 597.

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hegemonists, toward further intensification of the arms race, in their desire to disturb the presently evolved military balance in the world in their favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to the detriment of international detente and the security of nations.

But this has not discouraged the proponents of peace and disarmament. Rather than weakening, they are increasing their efforts to preserve and deepen detente, to bridle the arms race, and to achieve a turning point toward real disarmament. And they look at the future with optimism because, as A. A. Gromyko noted, "now that the idea of disarmament has captured the imaginations of the masses, it is playing an increasingly greater role as a material force in world policy."*

The collection offered here describes what has been done to limit arms and achieve disarmament, why more has not been achieved yet, and what specifically is being done in this direction today.

Problems and Prospects of Limiting Strategic Arms

Strategic arms limitation holds a special place in the effort to halt the arms race, reduce the military danger, and preserve international peace. This problem has essentially become the key direction in Soviet-American relations. Being the two mightiest powers of modern times, the USSR and the USA must not permit the strategic arms they possess to grow in quantity in the course of an uncontrollable arms race, since this would increase the danger of nuclear war and undermine the prospects of consolidating peace and security.

Implementation of existing strategic arms limitation treaties and achievement of new ones may open new possibilities not only for halting the growth of nuclear missile arsenals and insuring their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation, but also for successively traveling the road of their significant reduction, having in mind full cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and liquidation of their stockpiles in the end.

The Soviet Union's consistent struggle to bridle the arms race is based upon a meticulous analysis of the balance of power in the world, and on a full consideration of the military-strategic situation, the trends and prospects of its development, and the material-technical factors of armed forces development. In this struggle, the USSR bases itself on the need for both respecting the interests of the security of each state individually, and consolidation of international peace and security in general.

The process of limiting strategic arms began in November 1969 with initiation of Soviet-American negotiations alternately in Helsinki and Vienna. Their chief result was the signing, on 26 May 1972 during a Soviet-American summit conference in Moscow, of the permanent Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, and the five-year Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the

* "Sovremennaya diplomatiya burzhuaznykh gosudarstv" [Modern Diplomacy of Bourgeois States], Foreword, by A. A. Gromyko, Moscow, 1980, p 15.

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Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms.¹ Somewhat earlier, on 30 September 1971, the permanent Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War was signed between the USSR and the USA; it can rightfully be interpreted as part of the general complex of SALT-ONE agreements.

By signing the ABM limitation treaty, the USSR and the USA pledged to deploy not more than two ABM complexes on the territory of either of the sides. The treaty established the principle of the national technical means of verification in accordance with the universally recognized rules of international law. The sides pledged not to interfere with national technical means of verification, and not to employ intentional camouflage measures that would hinder verification. A joint Soviet-American Permanent Consultative Commission was created to promote achievement of the aims and satisfaction of the provisions of the treaty.

The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms "froze" the number of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers possessed by the sides at those levels which were in existence as of 1 July 1972, and it set the limit on launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's).

These agreements were significant in that for the first time there was consent on concrete measures that would in fact restrain the growth of the quantity of offensive arms. Also of importance is the fact that the USSR and the USA agreed to interpret the signed SALT-ONE treaties only as the first step in efforts to further limit strategic arms. In a joint communique dated 30 May 1972, both sides emphasized that they "intended to continue active negotiations to limit strategic offensive arms, and conduct them in the spirit of good will, respect of the legal interests of one another, and compliance with the principle of equal security."²

The SALT-ONE documents signed in Moscow were met with great satisfaction on the part of the broad world public. But at the same time the enemies of disarmament and detente, both within the USA and in NATO, attempted to block enactment of the strategic arms limitation treaty.

A major struggle began between the treaty's proponents and opponents in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. In compliance with the USA's constitutional procedure, at the end of September 1972 the Senate approved ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antibalistic Missile Systems, while the Senate and House of Representatives confirmed the Interim Agreement. On 29 September 1972 the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and Interim Agreement were approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and on 3 October 1972 USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers exchanged certificates attesting to the treaty's ratification and adoption of the Interim Agreement at a White House ceremony. The treaty and agreement became law.

For the first time, the Soviet-American SALT-ONE documents spelled out the solutions to highly complex problems in national and international security, ones which appeared insoluble just 5-10 years previously. Together with the important document "Fundamental Principles of Mutual Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America," these agreements on limiting strategic arms were an important step helping to weaken the threat of nuclear war and restrain the arms race.

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In November 1972 the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Phase Two (SALT-TWO) began in Geneva. The Soviet side consistently led the talks toward agreement, and it submitted concrete proposals on new measures that would effectively limit strategic arms, promote stabilization of the military-strategic situation in mutual relations between the USSR and the USA, and strengthen the cause of peace and international security.

In June 1973, during a Soviet-American summit conference in Washington, a document spelling out the fundamental principles of negotiations for further limitation of strategic offensive arms was signed. It emphasized that the sides would follow the principles of equal security, and with the recognition that attempts to obtain unilateral advantages would be incompatible with reinforcement of peaceful relations between both states. The document asserted the need for introducing limitations affecting not only quantitative indicators but also qualitative improvements in strategic offensive arms. The sides confirmed the premise that the limits on strategic offensive arms must be subjected to verification by national technical resources.

The next step advancing the cause of limiting strategic arms was the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems, which foresaw reducing the number of ABM deployment areas for each of the sides from the two permitted by the treaty to one.

As far as negotiations on a treaty to limit strategic offensive arms were concerned, they went on at a time of acute struggle between the proponents of the SALT treaty and reactionary militant circles in the USA which had formerly attempted to block enactment of the SALT-ONE treaty and were now making an effort to force SALT-TWO into a stalemate. Thus the talks proceeded irregularly, and periods of prolonged stagnation were observed. In his memoirs, former President R. Nixon admitted for example that in summer 1974 the Pentagon blocked the signing of the treaty by submitting the knowingly unacceptable demand of unilateral concessions on the part of the USSR.³

A certain shift occurred in SALT-TWO during a working conference between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G. Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974. The intention of the sides to sign a new long-term agreement to limit strategic offensive arms effective until 31 December 1985 was confirmed. It was proposed that this agreement, based on the principle of equality and identical security of the sides, would include, besides the appropriate provisions of the Interim Agreement, the following limitations:

"a) Both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities of strategic weapon delivery systems;

"b) both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's)."⁴

Thus a ceiling for the total number of strategic weapon delivery systems was set, to include strategic bombers, which were not included in the previous agreement. Achievement of agreement to introduce a maximum limit upon strategic arms would doubtlessly have been a major step forward in the effort to limit the most destructive types of weapons.

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A fundamentally new element in the Vladivostok agreement was establishment of maximum levels for ICBM's and SLBM's outfitted with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. For this purpose the Soviet Union insisted during the strategic arms limitation talks that the production and deployment of missiles with independently targetable reentry vehicles be prohibited, thus averting an arms race in this area. The importance of the Soviet proposal for real limitation of the strategic arms race can be seen at least from the fact that in the last 10 years the number of nuclear warheads in the USA increased by about 1,000 units per year, while the number of delivery systems remained almost constant.⁵ Therefore although it was not a radical solution, practical implementation of an agreement concerning the numbers of MIRVed missiles would have set a certain limit on the unrestrained race in this area.

In order to achieve practical implementation of the decisions made in Vladivostok, at the beginning of 1975 the work of the Soviet and American delegations was resumed in Geneva with the job of preparing the texts of the appropriate documents on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement. Fundamental problems associated with limiting strategic offensive arms were discussed in a meeting between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G. Ford during the time of the Helsinki Conference in August 1975. Negotiations conducted in 1975-1976 between L. I. Brezhnev, A. A. Gromyko, and H. Kissinger had important significance to progress in strategic arms limitations.

Throughout the entire time of SALT-TWO, the Soviet Union persistently followed the line of achieving the greatest possible limitations of strategic arms. In the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev noted: "Attaching extremely important significance to this entire problem, we have persistently asked, and more than once, the United States not to close the matter with just limiting the existing forms of strategic weapons. We felt it possible to go further. Specifically, we suggested reaching agreement to prohibit creation of new, even more-destructive armament systems, particularly the new Trident class submarines with ballistic missiles and the new B-1 strategic bombers in the USA, and similar systems in the USSR. Unfortunately these proposals were not accepted by the American side."⁶

Following J. Carter's election to the U.S. presidency in fall 1976, the Soviet-American SALT-TWO negotiations drew to a halt, and in some areas there was even a digression from the approach agreed upon previously. Such was the case, for example, in March 1977, when the American delegation came to Moscow with an openly unilateral proposal which could in no way serve as the basis for a mutually acceptable solution. It is now becoming clear that the American administration, the U.S. Congress, and the American delegation in Geneva contained influential individuals who worked not to complete the effort of preparing the draft treaty, but essentially to block it. Many months of purposeful, meticulous work were required to return the negotiations to the mainstream of the Vladivostok agreement, and implement the directive of the 25th CPSU Congress--to prepare a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on limiting and reducing strategic arms.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter met in Vienna on 15-18 June 1979. On 18 June they signed the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on

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Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation, the protocol to this treaty, and the Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms.

As is stated in a document of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Minister on the results of the Vienna Conference, "agreement on these issues became possible as a result of the long and hard work of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, and L. I. Brezhnev's personal contribution to preparing and conducting the conferences, to consolidating universal peace, to bridling the arms race, and to developing mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social structures."⁷

Full implementation of the documents signed in Vienna would have opened up new possibilities not only for halting the build-up of strategic offensive arms and achieving their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation, but also for achieving a real reduction in these arms for the first time.

As far as the basic content of the SALT-TWO agreement is concerned, in distinction from the Interim Agreement, which dealt only with two types of strategic offensive arms (ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers), the new agreement foresaw maximum levels for the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASM's). The treaty establishes equal maximum limits for the nuclear weapon delivery systems of both sides; it foresees, as a start in the reduction process, reduction of existing nuclear arms; the treaty imposes, with the purposes of reducing the threat of the qualitative arms race, significant limitations on modernizing strategic offensive systems and on creating new systems.

The aggregate levels set by the treaty cannot exceed 2,400 units initially, and later on they will have to be reduced to 2,250 units. The established sublevels of 1,320 units for the launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's outfitted with independently targetable reentry vehicles and heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles having a range greater than 600 km, and the sublevels of 1,200 units for the launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles and 820 units for the launchers of ICBM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles had the objective of providing the fullest possible guarantee of a balance in strategic forces, without providing unilateral advantages to one side or the other.

Also serving the same purposes are limitations on the number of reentry vehicles that may be installed in ICBM's and SLBM's and on the number of cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km that could be carried by heavy bombers. Prohibition of the creation of new types of ICBM's (not counting one new type of light ICBM's) should limit the race in deployment of new, more-powerful types of ICBM's.

Permitting modernization of strategic arms within certain bounds, the treaty simultaneously prohibits rebuilding launchers for light ICBM's into launchers for heavy missiles, and creating ICBM's with a launch or cold launch weight greater than that of heavy ICBM's possessed by each of the sides.

Prohibition of a number of new types of strategic offensive arms, foreseen by the treaty, is a serious step in restraining the arms race. Article IX foresees, for

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example, prohibition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 km for launchers on floating platforms that are not submarines; prohibition of resources for the launching of nuclear weapons or all other forms of mass destruction weapons into near-earth orbit, to include fractional orbital bombardment systems; prohibition of mobile launchers for heavy ICBM's, and so on.

Establishment of the sublimit of 1,320 units and simultaneous limitation of the number of cruise missiles with which a bomber may be supplied is equivalent in principle to establishment of a limit on the aggregate number of aircraft-carried cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km. Installing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles on cruise missiles is prohibited concurrently.

The protocol to the treaty, which will remain in force until 31 December 1981, sets the number of additional limits on cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km, mainly prohibition of the deployment of sea- and land-based cruise missiles and prohibition of the testing of such missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The protocol also prohibits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, as well as flight tests of ICBM's with such launchers, and equally so, the flight testing of ASM's or deployment of such missiles.

The mutual pledge not to circumvent the provisions of the treaty through any other state or states, or by any other means, has independent and, moreover, extremely important significance. This closes a dangerous loophole of possible erosion or weakening of the set limits and provides a strong guarantee of their stability and effectiveness.

The practice of notification concerning the launchings of ICBM's beyond the limits of national territory was introduced by the previously signed Soviet-American Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War dated 30 September 1971 and the Agreement to Prevent Incidents on the High Seas and in the Airspace Above Them dated 25 May 1972. The SALT-TWO treaty foresees a general and farther-reaching pledge on this account, foreseeing prompt notification as to the performance of all planned test launchings of ICBM's, with the exception of just single ICBM launchings planned within the limits of national territory. This pledge is an important measure aimed at increasing the trust between the sides.

The fundamental principle of Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks is the principle of equality and identical security. The new treaty was structured mainly on the basis of this principle, and it expresses a just balance between the interests of the USSR and the USA. It is the result of many years of effort. Each provision of the treaty and of other documents associated with it was carefully thought out, and no deviations from the achieved agreement can be considered permissible. At the Vienna talks L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that "any attempts at shaking this intricate edifice, which was erected with such great difficulty, to change any details in it, or to tilt it in one's favor would be an unpromising effort. The entire structure might collapse--with serious and even dangerous consequences to our relations and to the situation in the world as a whole."⁸

Formation of the principle of equality and identical security began long prior to the opening of Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation as a result of Soviet disarmament initiatives in the early 1960's. Thus the text of the Joint

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Declaration of the Governments of the USSR and the USA on Prearranged Principles for Negotiations on Disarmament, which were approved by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 1961 contains the following provision: "All measures of universal and total disarmament must be balanced such that in no phase of enactment of a treaty would one state or a group of states be able to receive a military advantage, and that security would be guaranteed equally to all."⁹ Later this principle was embodied in the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement, and it was documented in the Fundamental Principles of Mutual Relationships Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America dated 29 May 1972, which confirmed the impermissibility of attempts "to obtain unilateral advantages, directly or indirectly, at the expense of the other side";¹⁰ it is also documented in the Fundamental Principles of Negotiations on Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms dated 21 June 1973.

The preamble of the new treaty and the Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms, signed in Vienna by L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, devote a special place to this principle. Section One of the Joint Declaration states in particular: "The sides will continue to negotiate, in compliance with the principle of equality and identical security, on measures to further limit and reduce the quantities of strategic arms, and to further limit them in qualitative respects."¹¹

In terms of limiting strategic arms, the principle of equality and identical security is essentially an expression of the recognition by both sides that parity is needed in their strategic arms, and that a balance in strategic nuclear missile power must be maintained, be it peculiar and, at times, dynamic. The principle of equality and identical security, the sole possible foundation for agreement on strategic arms limitation, is organically associated with the very nature of modern weapons and the objectively existing balance of strategic forces between the USSR and the USA.

During the Vienna talks in June 1979 between L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, each side declared that it did not aspire and would not aspire to military supremacy, inasmuch as this might lead only to dangerous instability, generating a higher level of arms and not promoting the security of either side.¹²

Discussing provisions worked out in the course of the strategic arms limitation talks and making up the basis of Soviet-American interaction in this area, we should note the important significance of combining quantitative and qualitative limitations. In this case the role of qualitative limitations grows significantly when equal maximum levels of strategic arms are established for the sides, and especially when these limits are reduced. The need for combining quantitative and qualitative limitations is dictated by the principle of equality and identical security, inasmuch as when quantitative limitations exist, it becomes even more important, than in their absence, to establish qualitative limitations that would exclude the possibility either side might have for shooting ahead through improvements in armament and obtaining unilateral advantages, even if the quantitative limits remain the same. In other words there is a constant possibility of so-called "technological breakthrough"---creation of new forms of weapons which, when placed in the hands of one of the parties to the strategic arms limitation talks, could provide the latter a unilateral advantage.

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The provision of combining quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms was documented in the SALT documents as one of the fundamental principles of the negotiations.¹³

In addition to establishing quantitative limits, in order to reduce the threat posed by the qualitative arms race the SALT-TWO treaty imposes significant limitations on modernizing existing strategic offensive systems and creating new systems. These limitations pertain, in particular, to the launch and cold launch weight of missiles, the number of reentry vehicles per MIRV missile, and other parameters.

One important factor of the viability of SALT agreements is organizing verification of compliance by the sides. In application to SALT, the principle of verification effectiveness assumes the form of national technical means of verification. Article XII of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems dated 26 May 1972 and Article V of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms state that "each of the sides uses the national technical means at their disposal in such a way as to comply with the universally recognized principles of international law." This same principle, which had now demonstrated its viability, was also included in Article XV of the SALT-TWO Treaty.¹⁴

The SALT-TWO agreements signed in Vienna in June 1979 are typified not only by the fact that they establish a system of mutually associated and balanced limitations on strategic offensive arms, but also in that they clearly define the future tasks associated with strategic arms limitations. These tasks are spelled out both in the text of the treaty itself and in a special document--Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms.¹⁵ Discussing this aspect of the Vienna agreement, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko noted the following at a press conference on 25 June 1979: "...the present treaty creates a bridge leading to the next treaty.... It is our intention to not stop with what has been achieved, to go farther, to spare no efforts in order to achieve a further reduction of nuclear missiles."¹⁶

Here specifically are the goals set in the joint declaration cited above: Meaningful and significant reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms; qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, to include limitations on the creation of new types of such arms and on modernization of existing arms; limitation of strategic offensive arms that destabilize the strategic balance to the greatest degree; measures to reduce and avert the danger of a surprise attack; resolution of issues contained within the protocol to the treaty--that is, concerning mobile ICBM launchers, sea- and land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km, and on on.

As is spelled out in Article XIV of the SALT-TWO Treaty, active negotiations on strategic arms limitation were to be resumed immediately after the SALT-TWO Treaty entered into force. Thus the next step is to ratify the SALT-TWO Treaty, which would open the road for progress toward SALT-THREE.

However, in the time since the signing of SALT-TWO, serious obstacles have arisen to limitation of strategic arms, and new difficulties have arisen due to the inconsistency and hypocrisy of the policy of the USA and its allies, which are in

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turn associated with negative trends in the growth of military expenditures and intensification of the arms race, trends which arose and developed back before the signing of SALT-TWO.

Throughout the entire time President J. Carter has been occupying the White House, Washington has continued to encourage further growth in military preparations. The USA's five-year military program calls for further expansion and qualitative improvement of the arsenal of strategic arms. Production of cruise missiles began in 1980. Efforts are under way to create the new mobile MX ballistic missile, which is to be deployed in the latter part of the 1980's, and the new Trident submarine system is being developed and introduced. Conventional armed forces are beginning to experience their largest growth in the postwar history of the USA. The ruling circles of the United States, resurrecting the infamous policy of dealing "from a position of strength", have assumed the road of directly subverting the efforts toward detente. To please business interests, U.S. Congress and the administration tabled ratification of the SALT-TWO Treaty indefinitely.

At the same time the leaders of the USA continue to proclaim that the SALT-TWO Treaty is still on the agenda of the U.S. Senate, and that the administration intends to see to its ratification in the future.

U.S. Secretary of State E. Muskie said the following in a speech on 7 May 1980 to the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs: "I believe that signing the agreement for balanced arms limitation would strengthen our security. The SALT-TWO Treaty cannot be interpreted as our gift to our rivals. By limiting the threat hanging over us, it satisfies our own interests."

U.S. Presidential National Security Advisor Z. Brzezinski follows the same line. Speaking for example on 11 October 1979 in Savannah (Georgia), he declared that the SALT-TWO Treaty strengthens the security of the USA, reduces the threat of war, and provides the basis for reducing nuclear arms, and that this treaty has vitally important significance to the future of the USA as a national entity.

Thus despite all of the zig-zags in practical policy, the ruling circles of the USA admit that limitation of strategic arms is in keeping with the fundamental national interests of the USA. Public opinion surveys show that most Americans are in favor of limiting or completely prohibiting strategic offensive arms. According to a survey conducted by NEWSWEEK in February 1980, 60 percent of the Americans have this opinion.

In turn the Soviet Union, true to its consistent policy of peaceful coexistence and reducing the risk of the outbreak of war, will do everything it must to keep intact all of the positive things that have been achieved so far in limiting strategic arms and restraining the arms race in general. The 1980's can and must become a time of significant movement forward toward real disarmament, including in relation to strategic arms. The SALT-TWO agreement creates the necessary prerequisites for this. Whether or not the favorable prerequisites are satisfied will naturally depend not only on the Soviet Union but also primarily on the United States. Progressive mankind hopes that the proponents of halting the uncontrollable arms race and achieving new agreement, on the basis of SALT-TWO, on further measures to limit and reduce strategic arms will prevail in the USA.

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FOOTNOTES

1. "Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy, zaklyuchennykh SSSR i inostrannymi gosudarstvami" [Collection of Existing Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions Signed Between the USSR and Foreign States] (referred to hereinafter as "Collection of the Existing Treaties..."), Issue XXVIII, Moscow, 1974, pp 31-32.
2. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov. 1972" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. Collection of Documents. 1972], Moscow, 1973, p 79.
3. See PRAVDA, 24 June 1979.
4. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov. 1974" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. Collection of Documents. 1974], Moscow, 1975, pp 171-172.
5. "Department of Defense Annual Report," Wash., 1980, p 77.
6. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 23.
7. PRAVDA, 22 June 1979.
8. PRAVDA, 18 June 1979.
9. "Mezhdunarodnoye pravo v dokumentakh" [International Law in Documents], Moscow, 1969, p 385.
10. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collection of Documents], Moscow, 1977, p 121.
11. PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
12. Ibid.
13. See "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov," p 127; PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
14. See "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov," pp 115, 119; PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
15. See PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
16. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.

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GROUND FORCES

NEW BOOK RECOUNTS WW II EXPERIENCE OF INFANTRY DIVISION

Kiev ROZHDENNAYA NA ZEMLYAKH ZAPOROZHSEKIKH in Russian 1980 (signed to press 14 Feb 80) title page, pp 2, 5-7

[Title page, annotation and foreword from book "Born on Zaporozh'ye Lands", by Guards Maj Gen (ret) A. I. Oleynikov, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literaturny Ukrainy, 115,000 copies, 178 pages]

[Text]

A. I. Oleynikov
Guards Major General (ret)

BORN ON ZAPOROZH'YE LANDS
(Second Supplemental Edition)

Signed to press: 14 Feb 80
Copies: 115,000
Pages: 178

Kiev
Political Literature of the Ukraine
Publishing House
1980

This book traces the combat experience of the 226th (later the 95th Guards) Infantry Division from the date of its formation in July 1941 in Zaporozhskaya Oblast up until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The division participated in the defense of Poltava, Khar'kov and Stalingrad, in the battle of the Kursk Salient (Prokhorovka region), in the liberation of Poltava, Kremenchug and Kirovograd, in the assault crossings of the Dnepr, Yuzhnyy Bug and Dnestr Rivers, in the liberation of Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in battles on German territory. It was awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, and received the designation "Poltavskaya." The author has concentrated his attention on the heroism of the division's fighting men, and on the patriotism and proletarian internationalism of Soviet people in the struggle against fascism.

Literary annotation by M. M. Gilelakh.

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Author's Foreword

On 22 June 1941, fascist Germany suddenly attacked the Soviet Union without a declaration of war. The peaceful labor of Soviet people was interrupted. The Soviet nation engaged mankind's most wicked enemy, German fascism, in mortal combat. A new period ensued in the life of the Soviet state and the Communist Party--the period of the Great Patriotic War.¹

On the fields of battle Soviet fighting men, inspired by communist ideals, showed their immeasurable superiority over the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who had become a tool in the hands of the Nazis, straining to achieve world domination.

But it is precisely this obvious truth that many authors of war memoirs published in the west are reluctant to admit. Hitler's former military leaders and participants in the "Eastern Campaign" accuse Hitler in the first place of all the failures, having declined to take into consideration the opinion of his highly experienced generals, as well as the "impassable Russian roads," "devastating climate," "poor supply system," etc.

The question automatically arises--could the pedantic members of the German general staff fail to take into account the road conditions or the capacity for troop supply? Of course not. Today it is universally known that the attack on the USSR was thoroughly planned and prepared by the military command of Hitler's army. But this plan began to fall apart from the minute that the first Wehrmacht subunits crossed the Soviet border. Triumphal reports of successes by Hitler's troops flew to Berlin, but in actuality events were not at all taking shape as the German staff envisaged. Soviet border guards and Red Army troops were standing up along the enemy path, able to counter his numerical and technical superiority with an invincible stubbornness, an unbending will to attain victory. By their courage and heroism they showed once again that "victory in any war depends in the final analysis on the courage of the masses who are shedding their blood on the field of battle. A conviction as to the justness of a war, consciousness of the necessity to sacrifice one's life for the good of his brothers enhances the courage of the soldiers and induces them to bear unprecedented difficulties."²

Those who would advocate revising the results of the war all paint the same picture of the "Wehrmacht's valor." It goes without saying that many German army units [soyedineniye] were not ill-prepared for waging predatory wars. But how often were they smashed by Soviet regiments and divisions formed in the heat of battle out of reserve soldiers and officers--units that acquired their military experience during the course of the battle!

The 226th Infantry (later the 95th Guards) Division was just such a unit. It had to wage battles with the "Death Head" SS Tank Division--not without reputation--and with such units as the "Viking," "Reich," "Mighty Germany," and "The Fuhrer's Bodyguard," but not once did its fighting men leave the battlefield in defeat.

In July 1941 the newly-formed division consisted only of about 200 regular soldiers. But with the passage of a little time, men of entirely peaceful professions became masters of the military art, because in every one of them dwelt a high consciousness of patriotic duty.

1. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p 476.

2. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 41, p 121.

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In 1945, after the liberation of Prague, streamers gleamed on the colors of the 95th Guards Poltavskaya Infantry Division--the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov (Second Degree), and the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy. Such was the Motherland's evaluation of the courage of her sons.

This book recounts the trials that befell them, relates how these soldiers and officers perfected their combat skills in savage battles.

My own recollections are not the book's sole foundation.

I became commander of the 95th Division back during the course of the offensive battles, and stayed with it from the village of Zybkoie in Kirovogradskaya Oblast until Prague. But to discourse on this period alone would be to sidestep the beginning of its combat journey--an aspect of no small interest, to be sure.

I decided to relate the most significant events, including those which took place prior to my arrival in the division. Letters and memoirs of veterans of the 95th proved invaluable in this regard--from G. Ye. Dzhig, P. V. Boyko, P. P. Biletskiy, P. A. Podsiarin, F. M. Zayarnyy, S. N. Yerzhikovskiy, I. P. Zima, V. P. Poviychuk, P. V. Mitrofanov, N. D. Sebezhko, G. A. Kobernik, S. G. Kobernika, F. P. Bazekin, M. M. Rokhlinaya, Ye. V. Meshkovaya, A. A. Tyutyayevaya, S. V. Andreyev, V. P. Arnatov, M. N. Golubev, V. A. Kudelich, B. A. Zbarzh, and from many other officers and soldiers to whom I express my sincere gratitude.

This work uses excerpts from books by Soviet military leaders, documents of various types and materials from the archives. Views of foreign authors are cited.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

BOOK DISCUSSES ROLE, TASKS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Moscow GRAZHDANSKAYA OBORONA in Russian 1979 (signed to press 17 Sep 79) title page, pp 2, 3-4, 5-6, 174-176

[Title page, annotation, table of contents, foreword and chapter I from book "Civil Defense", edited by N. P. Olovyanishnikov, Izdatel'stvo "Vysshaya Shkola", 330,000 copies, 176 pages]

[Text]

CIVIL DEFENSE

Ed.: N. P. Olovyanishnikov

A Textbook for Students of Specialized Secondary-Level Educational
Educational Institutions Authorized by the USSR Ministry of Higher
and Secondary-Level Specialized Education

Second Edition, revised

Signed to press: 17 Sep 79

Copies: 330, 000

Pages: 176

Moscow "Vysshaya Shkola" 1979

This textbook examines the means and methods of defense against weapons of mass destruction, and deals with organization for civil defense administration and communications, the conduct of reconnaissance, rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery measures in the centers of damage.

It is intended for students of specialized secondary-level educational institutions.

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Foreword

Significant, positive changes in the development of international relations have been brought about as a result of the wise and purposeful activities of the Lenin Central Committee of the CPSU, the CC Politburo, and the CC CPSU General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, directed towards consolidating the peace and security of nations.

At the same time, the forces of imperialism and reaction are striving to hamper détente. They are embarking on a new stage in the arms race and expanding the production of weapons of mass destruction.

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Under these conditions the CPSU and the Soviet government are taking the necessary measures to insure that our country is safe from any surprises. They are maintaining the country's defensive capacity at the required level, and strengthening our armed forces and civil defense in every possible way.

Through thorough preparation of the population and the national economy, civil defense must achieve a maximum reduction in the destructive effect of modern weapons, and in case of an enemy attack, must conduct rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery measures at the damage centers.

One of the most important tasks of civil defense is training the population in protecting themselves from the weapons of mass destruction. Students are undergoing such training in educational institutions.

In secondary-level specialized educational institutions, civil defense is an integral part of students' initial military training.

The major tasks of this training comprise the following: conducting a close study of the destructive properties of the modern weapons employed by the armies of the imperialist nations, and studying methods of protection from these weapons; training students in the practical use of means of protection, teaching them how to equip the simplest shelters, conduct personal decontamination and disinfection and use instruments in radiac and chemical defense reconnaissance; acquainting students with the basics in conducting rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery measures, with methods of conducting reconnaissance, and also with the peculiarities of conducting civil defense measures at sites of that sector of the national economy for which the specialists are being trained.

This textbook was written in accordance with the program of initial military training, and covers subject areas in both the program's general section (Chapters I-IV; para. 20-22, Chap. VII; para. 25-27 and 29, Chap. VIII) as well as the "Individual Section Training" (Chapters V, VI; para 23 and 24, Chap. VII; para 28, Chap. VIII; Chapters IX-XIV).

Chapter I. Role and Tasks of Civil Defense

Civil defense (CD) is part of the system of national defensive measures conducted in time of peace and war for protection of the population and the national economy from weapons of mass destruction and other means of enemy attack, and also for the conduct of rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery measures in the damage centers and zones of contamination.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government attach a great deal of significance to civil defense and are constantly concerned with strengthening it. The improvement and development of civil defense is a nationwide matter and the duty of each citizen of the USSR.

The role of civil defense is determined by the nature of the complex and varied tasks it will have to accomplish during a nuclear missile war. These tasks may be divided conditionally into three groups.

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The first group comprises tasks related to providing protection for the population against the weapons of mass destruction: advance preparation of protective structures; providing the population with means of individual protection; training the population in methods and means of defense; organizing the notification process for threat of enemy attack; organizing and conducting population dispersal and evaluation.

The second group includes tasks related to enhancing the stability of operation in national economy projects during wartime and under conditions of enemy attack.

The third group comprises tasks related to eliminating the aftereffects of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction--the organization and conduct of rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery measures in the damage centers.

Satisfactory accomplishment of these tasks depends to a great degree on the preparedness of command personnel and non-military formations, as well as on the preparedness of the entire population for defense against the weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, one of the fundamental tasks of civil defense in peacetime is universal, mandatory training of the population in the methods and means of protection.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

BOOK DISCUSSES SOCIALIST PATRIOTISM, INTERNATIONALISM

Moscow PATRIOTIZM I INTERNATSIONALIZM V DEYSTVII in Russian 1979 (signed to press 21 May 79) title page, pp 2, 3-4, 119

[Title page, annotation, table of contents and introduction from book "Patriotism and Internationalism in Action", by V. I. Nechipurenko, Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF USSR, 40,000 copies, 119 pages]

[Text]

V. I. Nechipurenko

PATRIOTISM AND INTERKATIONALISM IN ACTION

Signed to press: 21 May 79
Copies: 40,000
Pages: 119

Moscow
Order of the "Mark of Esteem"
DOSAAF USSR Publishing House
1979

Professor V. I. Nechipurenko, doctor of historical sciences, discusses the nature of socialist patriotism and internationalism, and covers in detail the means of educating youth in the glorious traditions of the Soviet people and its armed forces.

This book is intended for DOSAAF propagandists and a wide circle of readers.

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Introduction

We live in an era of radical social changes. The postures of socialism continue to consolidate and expand. Victories in the national liberation movement are opening up new horizons for countries that have won their independence. The class struggle of the workers against the oppression of monopolies, against exploiting orders is mounting. The revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist movement is assuming greater and greater proportions. All of this taken together, the 25th CPSU Congress stressed, signifies development of the worldwide revolutionary process.

In the vanguard of builders of the new world, of fighters for socialism and national liberation stand communist and workers' parties. Leading the historical, creative work of hundreds of millions of people, they are being guided by Marxism-Leninism, and are carrying on high the banner of revolutionary worker solidarity. Proletarian internationalism permeates the entire substance of the theory and practice of scientific communism. It is the inexhaustible source of strength and cohesion for the revolutionary liberation movement, the pledge of its victories.

Proletarian internationalism has acquired a special significance in our time. On the one hand this has come about through growth in the potential of the basic revolutionary forces, which, in rallying together, are capable of handing imperialism a decisive defeat. On the other hand, this rallying together is necessitated by the tactics of our class enemy, who is intensely coordinating his anti-communist activities on an international scale, striving to split communist ranks apart and attempting to pit various detachments of the workers' national liberation movement against each other.

As the 25th CPSU Congress pointed out, a movement of the problems of internationalism to the fore of ideological conflict in the international arena has been brought about by the peculiarities of the current period. It is precisely at this time that the question of the fate of mankind, the future of civilization, has arisen with special acuteness. Internationalism and the brotherhood of nations have become the solid expression and criterion for the moral development of mankind, one of the deciding factors in social progress.

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The enemies of communism, right and "left" revisionists and Maoists, are distorting in every conceivable way the essence of proletarianism, and are attempting to pit it against patriotism. They engage in profiteering on peoples' national feelings, implant and cultivate chauvinistic attitudes. In this regard, nationalists of every stripe are lining up more and more frequently in "marxist" clothing. Adopting certain views of Marx, Engels and Lenin and nondiscerningly interpreting them, they attempt to emasculate socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism by extracting their Marxist-Leninist class essence. This demands a high degree of political vigilance on the part of Soviet people--an intense, uncompromising struggle against inimical ideology, a strong rebuff to nationalistic views and dispositions alien to our society.

Pointing out the necessity for a strict, class-oriented, concrete and historical approach to the definition of internationalism and patriotism, V. I. Lenin noted that it is not he who vows and swears to be an internationalist that is one, but rather he who really wages a struggle in the internationalist manner. "Internationalism in fact," Vladimir Il'ich stressed, "is one and only one thing--selfless work in developing the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own country, supporting (with propaganda and one's sympathies, as well as materially) /that very same struggle/, that very same line, and /only that line/, in /all/ countries without exception." [in boldface] According to Lenin, patriotism blends integrally with revolutionary internationalism--for the struggle of the workers in pursuit of their national interests is at the same time the struggle to realize the international interests of the proletariat.

V. I. Lenin thoroughly revealed the inseparability of national and international tasks in the struggle for liberation, of national and international responsibility of the participants in this struggle. He thoroughly revealed the dialectical unity of patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The correctness of Leninist ideas has been confirmed by the entire course of historical development, by the great achievements of true socialism, of the international workers' movement and the national liberation movement.

"In the distant October of 1917, workers and peasants of Russia emerged as one against the old world, the world of greediness, indignity and violence," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech "The Great October and Progress for Mankind." "They built socialism in a country surrounded by the hostile forces of imperialism. They built it, and they defended it. Today we are not alone. Our country has become part of a large family of socialist states. So could we--Soviet communists and all the Soviet people--be anything more tightly knit in the world that surrounds us than this socialist family? To see it flourish, to promote our general welfare, we are doing everything in our power!"

These words vividly express the essence of the new socialist patriotism and internationalism that permeate the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet state, and that characterize the vital orientation of the Soviet man, who unites within himself boundless devotion to the Motherland, readiness, the will and ability to build communism, defend the peaceful labor of his own people and the peoples of the fraternal countries of the socialist community as well.

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This book will deal with the essence and specific character of patriotism and internationalism, their interrelationship, their role in the upbringing of the new man, in the building and defense of communist society. It is intended for DOSAAF propagandists and a wider circle of readers.

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