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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 27 Mar 81, pp 834-35

[Article by Georges Meissonnier]

[Text] It seems proper to recall, as a preliminary remark, that to promote their economic development, the member countries of the West African Economic Community (CEAO: six countries: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal) signed a treaty which went into effect on 1 January 1974 and which provided for: establishment of a common custom tariff within a maximum period of 12 years; free circulation, exempt from any entry duties or taxes, of products coming from the member countries; setting up special preferential conditions applying to member countries' importing products from other member countries (regional cooperation tax, which went into effect on 1 January 1976).

At the same time, a Community Development Fund (FCD) was created, whose purpose was to compensate for the losses of customs revenues between member countries, and to finance studies and actions within the framework of the CAEO. Furthermore, the object of another fund, Fosidec, was to carry out studies and finance economic projects.

Secondly, the treaty signed on 28 May 1975 by the 16 countries of the Economic Community of the West African States (Cedeao, which includes besides the six CEAO countries, the following: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guine-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone and Togo) provides for the following:

- The elimination of customs duties between member countries, any other equivalent taxes and any quantitative commercial restrictions.
- The establishment of a common customs tariff after a period of 15 years starting from 28 May 1979, with the following schedule:
 - Zero to 2 years: retention of customs duties.
 - Two to 10 years: progressive elimination of customs duties between the states.

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--Ten to 15 years: adjustment of a common external tariff in the matter of customs duties.

--Finally, after 15 years: existence of an African common market applicable to the 16 member States.

--Discontinuing obstacles to the free circulation of persons, services and capital between member countries.

--Agreement on the economic, industrial, agricultural, monetary policies, and policies concerning the infrastructures, this harmony being marked by the creation of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development. The object of the latter will be to compensate for the losses of custom's revenues between member countries, to finance projects and provide guarantees for foreign investments.

II. To be eligible for the privileged conditions, Cedeao fixed some basic rules:

--Those relating to products: they concern the raw materials used and the added value.

--Those relating to the company: they concern the share of nationals in the companies, assets whereas this condition is not required in the CEAO treaty.

As regards the /basic rules relating to products/ [in boldface], one of the following four criteria should be satisfied:

--The products must be obtained entirely in the member countries (by products we mean minerals extracted from the ground, the marine subsoil, plant products, living animals, products of hunting and fishing, goods and products manufactured in the member countries from the above elements, and materials containing nothing imported from outside the member countries).

--The products containing community materials should have an added value representing at least 40 percent of the total cost of the materials used.

--The product should contain at least 60 percent of community raw materials.

--In the manufacturing process, the products should represent an added value of at least 35 percent.

On the other hand, and this is something fundamental, Article I of the decision A/DEC 15-5-80 dated 28 May 1980 in Lome, taken by the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Cedeao) specifies that the nationals' of the member countries may have up to the following percentages in the industrial companies whose products are eligible for the benefits of the preferential taxation deriving from their Community origin: 28 May 1981: 20 percent; 28 May 1983: 35 percent; 28 May 1989: 51 percent.

The list of companies which satisfy these conditions will be established and sent to the Executive Secretariat of Cedeao by the authorities in charge of

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industrial affairs in each state on the basis of a file presented by the enterprises concerned. This file would include the following information: identity of the industrial enterprise, legal regulations, name of the company, head office; nature of the activities; authorized capital and distribution of the latter; percentage held by the member country, percentage held by nationals of the member country, percentage held by nationals of other member countries, percentage held by foreigners.

Recourse to front companies is not advisable because, in any case, to determine the applicable rules with a view to defining the real percentage of participation by the nationals, one must consider at the source the effective holdings by nationals (private parties belonging to one or several member countries of the Cedeao and/or State participation, which may involve the State itself or public organizations). The economic criterion prevails therefore over the strictly legal criterion. As an example, if a company whose nationality, that is, whose head office is that of one of the member states of the Cedeao, wishes to have a 20 percent share, the capital distribution of this company would be examined. If it is a company with 51 percent share in African hands (private nationals or public organizations) and 49 percent foreign capital, an effective share of the nationals of 51 percent x 20 percent = 10.20 percent will be estimated for the industrial company wishing to benefit by the preferential system.

We cannot use therefore the system practiced in Morocco which made it possible to secure "moroccanization" through the intermediary of a Moroccan company without determining the national's real share.

Meanwhile, as regards the liberalization of exchanges, the Conference of the Heads of States of 28 May 1980 retained the principle of faster liberalization for the following countries: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal than for the other Cedeao countries. This liberalization concerns exclusively the native countries.

1. /System Applying to the Following Countries: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal/ [in boldface]. Three cases should be distinguished:

- a. The products of the community enterprises will be exempt from trade restrictions as soon as they are produced and will have free access to the Community market.
- b. The priority industrial products will benefit by expedited exemption from trade restrictions. They will be exempt over a period of 4 years at the following rates: 25 percent; 50 percent; 75 percent and 100 percent applicable on 28 May 1981; 28 May 1982; 28 May 1983 and 28 May 1984 respectively.
- c. The other products will be exempt from trade restrictions over a 6-year period at the following rates: 15 percent, 30 percent; 50 percent; 70 percent; 90 percent and 100 percent, applicable on 28 May 1981; 28 May 1982; 28 May 1983; 28 May 1984; 28 May 1985 and 28 May 1986.

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The definition of the community enterprise is being established. The list of priority industrial products is being drawn up.

2. /System Applying to the following Countries: Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Upper Volta, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra-Leone and Togo/ [in boldface]. The same three cases should be distinguished:

a. The products of the community enterprises, just as in formula 1, will be exempt from trade restrictions as soon as they are produced and will have free access to the Community market.

b. The priority industrial products will enjoy a fast easing of trade restrictions, but slower than in formula 1. These products will be exempt over a 6-year period at the following rates: 15 percent; 30 percent; 50 percent; 70 percent- 90 percent and 100 percent to apply on 28 May 1981; 28 May 1982, 28 May 1983, 28 May 1984; 28 May 1985 and 28 May 1986.

c. The other products will also be exempt from trade restrictions at a slower rate than in formula 1. They will be exempt over an 8-year period at the rates of 10; 20; 30; 45; 60; 75; 90 and 100 percent on 28 May 1981; 28 May 1982; 28 May 1983; 28 May 1984; 28 May 1985; 28 May 1986; 28 May 1987 and 28 May 1988 respectively.

III. Two important elements should be emphasized:

1. The A/DEC 16-5-80 decision has modified Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the protocol relating to the definition of the concept of products stemming from the member countries by considering that certain products (mixtures) may be considered as originating from the member countries under the conditions which the Council will specify on the basis of the Commission's recommendations. In this case, the part used in the mixtures which are proven to originate in the member countries will be taken into account.

2. To eliminate the non-tariff barriers, all the member countries (above formulae 1 and 2) will be treated in the same manner, the method of exemption being left to the judgement of the member countries, while the exemption will be accomplished at a faster rate than for the tariff barriers, and over a period of 4 years starting from May 1981 (Art. 2 of the decision A/18-5-1980 of 28 May 1980).

IV. At the present time, the most important problem from a practical viewpoint, and certainly the most urgent one, concerns the nationals' share in the companies whose head office is located in one of the 16 countries belonging to the Cedeao. The benefit from the 20 percent share on 30 May 1981 only concerns export companies in one of the Cedeao member countries. At the group level, an inventory should be made of the companies involved (export companies whose head office is located in one of the member countries of the Cedeao and which do not satisfy the condition of 20 percent participation). But this investigation should also exist at the level of each company taken individually, independently of the group to which they may or may not belong.

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In conclusion, it is apparent that the new rules of the Cedeao, as regards the share of the nationals in the companies, assets, assume considerable practical interest for industrial companies exporting within the Cedeao. Now, the criterion of the national's share appears to have been occasionally, if not forgotten, at least minimized in its consequences. Once again, the benefit attached to the participation of nationals seems to be more limited for non-industrial companies, but in all cases, all the export organizations which do not satisfy the legal conditions will not be eligible for the preferential tariff system and will therefore have to face competition from companies which are entitled to apply the share percentage fixed by the decision of 28 May 1980.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

BIDS FOR BUKAVU DAM--For the energy needs of Great Lake countries, EGL [Electrification of the Great Lakes Region] is issuing an invitation for preselection of companies to participate in the limited bidding which will subsequently be opened for construction of the Ruzizi II dam and hydroelectric power plant with a 40-MW [megawatt] capacity. This power plant will be located south of the city of Bukavu on the Ruzizi River, which at that point forms the border between Rwanda and Zaire. All operations and services are divided into six categories: No. 1--Civil engineering operations, excluding housing; No. 2--Supply and installation of hydromechanical equipment; No. 3--Supply and installation of turbines and auxiliary machinery; No. 4--Supply and installation of alternators and auxiliary equipment; No. 5--Supply and installation of electrical equipment; No. 6--Housing construction operations: 15 dwellings for staff personnel, including the various systems (sewerage, water, electricity, etc.). Completion periods are: 38 months for category no. 1; 32 months each for categories 2, 3, 4 and 5; 12 months for category no. 6. Construction operations for the Ruzizi II hydroelectric plant will be open for limited bidding among selected companies following the aforementioned preselection. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 848] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

ZAIRE-ANGOLA RAIL TRAFFIC--Zairian television announced on 11 March that rail traffic between Zaire and Angola will resume soon, but its frequency will depend on Angola. The Zairian National Railroad Company's representative in Kolwezi, Mr Rose Marin, stated in this connection that 30 cars of manganese and zinc (which were blocked at Kilunga) will promptly be using the Benguela railroad. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 793] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

CHADIAN REFUGEES IN NIGERIA--The UN High Commission for Refugees (HCR) granted emergency aid of \$1 million to Nigeria on 16 March for the approximately 12,000 Chadian refugees in the state of Bornu. The HCR aid supplements the aid program established by the Nigerian federal government, which already amounted to \$9 million in late February and which covers the refugees' short-term needs. It should be noted that besides the aid supplied to the Chadian refugees, Nigeria is also supplying aid to several hundred South African refugees, many of whom have received grants for continuing their studies in countries accepting them. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 842] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

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AHMAT ATTEMPTS TO GAIN SUPPORT--Mali and Niger abstained. Algeria voted against the draft resolution submitted by Acyl Ahmat at the conference of the foreign ministers from six Saharan states meeting in Algiers (February 17-19; see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1052). The chief of Chadian diplomacy asked his colleagues to support Qadhdhafi's action in Chad. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar p 21] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9719

ZAIRIAN ACTION AFFECTS ZAMBIA--Zambia lost all hope of improving its balance of payments when Zaire reduced by 20 percent, in January, the selling price of its cobalt, a metal of which it is the primary world producer. Cobalt represents 13 percent of Zambian income, the major part of which is covered by copper, always at a low price at the production level. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 p 21] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9719

SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA MOVES--Are secret negotiations taking place between Somalia and Ethiopia? There are rumors to this effect in the diplomatic circles of Geneva, where a number of contacts have reportedly taken place already. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 31]

SENEGAL, THE GAMBIA CONSIDERING CONFEDERATION--Dakar and Banjul are studying the constitutional structure which could lead Senegal and The Gambia to a certain type of confederation. [Jean-Louis Buchet, Afrique Confidentiel column] [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Mar 81 p 13] 6145

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ANGOLA

COMMENTS ON STRANGE BEHAVIOR OF FRENCH AMBASSADOR

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16-29 Mar 81 p 45

[Text] Will the French ambassador in Luanda remain at his post much longer? At any rate, the wish of Angolan official circles, as well as that of the international diplomatic community--including the Western one--in Luanda is that Jacques Foisier should be recalled to Paris as soon as possible, or, lacking that, should at least adopt a tone and behavior more compatible with his position.

Indeed, an increasing malaise seems to be developing in the Angolan capital with respect to the activities and the personal behavior of the French ambassador, whose attitude, generally condescending and arrogant and frequently hostile toward the policy of social and economic development conducted by the People's Republic of Angola, threatens to become a serious obstacle to the improvement of the French position in this country. This comes at precisely the time when, following the visit of French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet to Luanda and his meetings in Paris with his Angolan counterpart, economic and trade relations seem to be acquiring new impetus.

It is expected that the number of technicians and French residents--which today number about 200--would rise to 4,000 in the months to come, proof of the interest and increasing interests of France in Angolan economic life. However, do not Jacques Foisier's activities threaten to hinder the development of Franco-Angolan relations and to hamper those French businessmen who are increasingly viewing ties with Angola?

Various diplomatic incidents illustrate the strange behavior of the French ambassador. For instance, his colleagues noticed his absence at the reception offered by the Angolan government to the delegation of French parliamentarians--among whom all political tendencies were represented--which recently visited Angola. Moreover, they deplored his various interferences in the contacts the parliamentarians maintained with their Angolan counterparts. They were also struck by the fact that he lacked the most elementary courtesy in failing to invite a single Angolan to the reception he himself gave on the same occasion. They had already noted his very brief appearance at the public sessions of the last congress of the MPLA-Labor Party, while the entire diplomatic community had faithfully attended all the meetings.

More serious yet: Jacques Foisier's very colleagues at the French Embassy in Luanda privately resent his subjectivity in most of his diplomatic relations,

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which do not attempt in any way to mirror the political, economic and social conditions of the country. The tendentious and frankly hostile "exposes" he often presents to French diplomats, parliamentarians, businessmen and newsmen visiting Angola should also be mentioned. A French businessman was overheard telling one of his colleagues after a meeting with the ambassador in the latter's office: "It is strange...I was under the impression that the role of ambassadors was rather to work toward the improvement of relations between their countries and those to which they are accredited... This one..."

The Quai d'Orsay, which apparently is aware of the climate reigning in the French Embassy in Luanda, continues to turn a deaf ear to the situation. But didn't one of its former ambassadors to Luanda, Jean-Jacques Peyronnet, enjoy the respect and friendship of Angolan authorities, especially of President Neto, for his frank, direct and honest attitude? A victim of cancer, he had resigned before dying in Paris last December.

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ANGOLA

PROSPECTS FOR SIGNIFICANT 1985 OIL PRODUCTION INCREASE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1147

[Text] Production of oil in Angola should increase by 17 percent during 1981. But, according to Jorge Morais, minister of oil, this increase will not be very significant. Indeed, it will be much more important in 1982, placing Angola, with 10 million tons, in fifth place among African producers, behind Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Egypt.

So far, discoveries give reason to believe that in 1985 Angolan production will be more than 15 million tons annually, with a capacity for 20 million tons. In relation to exploration now under way, the discoveries in bloc 2 (on-shore, south of the Congo River) have induced those oil companies wishing to operate in Angola to offer their services: 17 of them are in line for bloc 1. The U.S. Cities Service Company should begin operations in bloc 9, south of the mouth of the Kwanza River.

A contract was signed with a new type of company, the capital of which comes from "neutral" countries (Canada, Sweden, Kuwait) and from the International Energy Development Company, whose objective is to foster oil exploration in developing countries.

The oil produced in the bay of the Kwanza is now beginning to bring in some profits because of the increase in the prices of crude oil. This is the oldest oil exploitation operation in Angola.

Jorge Morais recently stated that the recourse to U.S. companies has only commercial motives. "We accept these companies because they have huge financial and technological means, whose first beneficiary, after all, will be the Angolan state. We are fully aware of our strength as oil producers, and we do not come in as beggars at the time of negotiations."

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

AGREEMENTS WITH DENMARK, ITALY--Angola and Denmark signed an agreement on 6 April for a 60-million Danish kroner loan (about 44 million French francs) to be used in the development of the CIMANGOLA cement plant. It was also announced in Luanda that Italy has decided to grant a \$12 million loan for the implementation of economic programs. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1147]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

ELECTION SHOWS DACKO MUST CONSIDER NATIONALIST FEELINGS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 815

[Unsigned editorial: "The Central African Republic's Presidential Election--A Difficult Task After A Disputed Election"]

[Text] The announcement of the Central African Republic's presidential election results has disclosed a good many surprises. The first, and not the least, is the extremely narrow margin of the majority, 50.23 percent, which allowed David Dacko (Central African Democratic Union) to be declared president-elect after the first ballot. The second one is the result achieved by Ange Patasse (Central African People's Liberation Movement) who received 38.11 percent of the votes cast. However, Dacko outdistanced him by 90,288 votes out of a total of 744,688. The last surprise was the poor results the other candidates managed to get: Francois Pehoua (Independent), 5.33 percent, Henri Maidou (Republican Party of Progress), 3.23 percent; and Abel Goumba (Ubangi People's Patriotic Front), 1.42 percent.

Analysis of the voting reveals that Dacko derived his majority from the country's interior except for the Sara region in the northwest, Patasse's traditional stronghold. In fact Patasse had an edge of 5000 votes in Bangui, where he is very popular in the poor districts in the capital's outlying area and where he definitely has a good reputation among high school students, university students, teachers and civil servants.

The announcement of the results was awaited in a feverish atmosphere. Acts of looting victimizing French people occurred in the suburbs of Bangui, and in Bossangoa, the country's second largest city, and in the region controlled by Patasse, as well as in several localities all over the country. The chief of state had to announce a curfew throughout the country as of 16 March, and then a state of siege and the closing of the University of Bangui on 20 March.

As soon as Dacko's election to a 6-year term was announced, it raised sharp protests on behalf of his unsuccessful rivals. The turmoil calmed down fairly quickly because of the firmness shown by Dacko and the appeals for restraint made by Patasse; the latter does not want to risk seeing the legislative election which is constitutionally slated to take place during the month following the presidential election postponed because he feels convinced it will be favorable to him.

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The conditions in which the voting took place (voter lists had not been drawn up in alphabetical order, in Bangui more people voted than were registered, and it took the Supreme Court 4 days to announce the results: they were issued on 19 March, only a few hours before the time limit set by the Constitution expired) inevitably give rise to doubts about whether the balloting was carried out in a completely regular fashion. Dacko's opponents did not fail to condemn those conditions even though they too must have benefited somewhat from the sorry state of preparations for the election process. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the representatives of the opposition parties signed the Supreme Court's statement, which announced the election results, signing it jointly along with the representative of the winning party.

Dacko should also, since his return to power, receive credit for having come out in favor of the multiparty system and not having done anything to stand in the way of parties beginning to flourish. In fact, aside from the five parties which ran candidates, there exist the Central African People's Rally (RPC), chaired by Gen Sylvestre Bangui, former ambassador in Paris; the Central African National Union (UNCA), which along with the RPC supported President Dacko; and the Movement for Democracy and Independence (MDI), led by Francois Gueret.

More significant are the motivations of the voters. For the peasant masses who make up 80 percent of the population, Dacko is still the man who delivered them from the yoke of Emperor Bokassa, in spite of the fact that Dacko was acting as Bokassa's adviser up until just before Bokassa was deposed.

On the other hand, in the eyes of a good many of the capital's "intellectuals" (university students, teachers, civil servants), Dacko has not been able to shake off the label of being a candidate imposed by France which the circumstances of his return to power earned him. Therefore, President Dacko does not benefit from the kind of broad consensus which gives candidates designated by a single party the advantage. Within such single parties different political tendencies can find expression, except for single parties in countries governed in an authoritarian manner deriving inspiration from Marxist ideology, and the broad consensus gets translated into electoral results which reach near unanimity among the votes cast. In a sense, the upcoming legislative election will constitute the second ballot of the presidential election. Certain neighbors of the Central African Republic seem to fear that an example like the CAR situation may be contagious and will not make the task of those who govern any easier.

However, it seems that President Dacko, showing greater determination than was generally expected of him, has started to score points at the opposition's expense. In accordance with the state of seige, the Central African Armed Forces were reestablishing order in Bangui where about 2000 young militants from Patasse's party had been attempting ever since the election results were announced to get the government to step down. Confrontations left two dead and several dozen wounded. The call for a general strike on 23 March, first sounded by the opposition, was heeded by few people in Bangui. Calm was restored throughout the country as of the evening of 22 March. However, the University of Bangui remains closed.

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After having hesitated about what line to follow, the opposition leaders, certain of whom—Patasse and Goumba—have left Bangui and taken refuge in the country's interior, ended up choosing to stay within the law and decided not to contest the election's validity by other than legal means. Therefore, they are claiming responsibility for the restoration of order, but they are also asking President Dacko to postpone the legislative election for 6 months to allow them to prepare for it under conditions which will put them on an equal footing with the winning party's candidates.

President Dacko will have to rapidly make a decision and choose between strengthening his authority by strong-arm methods or via the collaboration promised by Patasse and offered to him by the opposition parties without any reservation if the appeal by the four unsuccessful candidates before the Supreme Court shows that the elections were fair.

Elements of the French operational force called the "Barracuda" were detached to Bangui to protect the security of the French Embassy and the Bangui Airport which was closed to traffic for several days, but there was no need for intervention on their part. However, they did carry out the evacuation from Bossangoa of French people who had been subjected to demonstrations of hostility. The opposition maintains that while the presence of French troops will have to be sorted out in the more general context of agreements with France, it is prepared to maintain a privileged status for French cooperation, while seeing to it that the country's independence is respected absolutely. For his part, President Dacko, who says there is nothing in the friendship shown him by France for him to be ashamed of, will himself also definitely have to take into account nationalist aspirations, particularly of young people, teachers, high school students, and university students, aspirations which for the time being the opposition has been able to monopolize for its own advantage.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

ELECTIONS SEEN AS POSITIVE EXPERIMENT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 pp 18-20

[Article by Francois Soudan "The Heirs Bury the Empire"]

[Text] There were, of course, some irregularities. In spite of everything the Central African Republic experienced a great positive first with the presidential election of March 15... provided that the democratic experience is followed up.

Democracy exists. David Dacko has encountered it. In several polling places in the working-class suburbs of Bangui, with names like Kilometer Five, Fohu or Boy Rabe, the number of ballots polled on Sunday, March 15 by his main opponent, Ange Patasse, considerably exceeded the number of registered voters.

"If our adversary was able to cheat, this election was really free," those on the victor's side comment with a malicious smile. The victor? David Dacko, of course, elected president of the Central African Republic 18 months after the French parachutists of Operation Barracuda deposited him with their cases of ammunition on the airport runway in Bangui.

"It bothers me that I returned home in the baggage compartment of a Transall; I must acquire legitimacy," a David Dacko obsessed with his public image as a "parachuting president" seemed to repeat incessantly. Today this legitimacy is acquired, or rather, won, in the course of an electoral debate which the country had never before experienced, an open confrontation almost without precedent in central Africa.

It all started on December 8, 1980 with a "National Seminar of Reflection," organized in Bangui by Francois Pehoua, who was then David Dacko's dashing right-hand man. The opposition, having confronted the regime for several months and having often drawn excessively authoritarian responses, agreed to take part in this seminar. The opposition ranged from the Marxist-leaning left, that of the Ubangi People's Patriotic Front of Abel Goumba, to the Central African "Gaullist" Sylvestre Bangui, founder of a "Rally" patterned after Jacques Chirac's.

From this week of debates emerged an election timetable and a draft constitution signed by all nine political formations. Adopted by the huge majority of 900,000 Central Africans over the age of 18 on February 1 during a referendum,

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this draft became a reality. Liberal "in the French manner"--the advisers from Paris who surround David Dacko were not unfamiliar with its drafting--it provides for instituting a presidential-type republic and an unrestricted multiparty system. "Political parties or groups," as stipulated by Article 14 of the new constitution for example, "are formed and carry on their activity freely."

Thus the initial gong of this Central African democracy sounded on March 15 with the holding of the presidential election, after a pause for a campaign which was sometimes extremely vicious. After the withdrawals of Sylvestre Bangui and the teacher Tandalet Ozi Okito (founder of a phantom Socialist Party and nicknamed "the Central African Coluche" ever since he seriously proposed creating a national Hollywood on the banks of the Ubangi) five candidates remained in competition.

Abel Goumba, to start with, was the last one to deposit the legal guarantee of 5 million CFA Fr. Representative of the World Health Organization in Cotonou (Benin), in exile for 19 years, and leader of the oldest of the opposition parties, he is the only politician of caliber who never compromised with the Bokassa dictatorship. But honesty is not necessarily synonymous with popularity, as Abel Goumba would quickly perceive this.

He himself and his party are completely unknown outside the radicalized circles in the capital. Moreover, it was difficult to understand how this upright man, who posed the withdrawal of the French troops and the departure of David Dacko as conditions for his return to the Central African Republic in November 1979, had returned without his demands having been met. The result: a very weak score, far lower than he had hoped.

The second loser in the confrontation: Henri Maidou, Dacko's ex-vice president but, above all, Bokassa's former prime minister at the time of the massacres of the schoolchildren in April 1979--an image which sticks to him and makes him very unpopular with the youth of Bangui. His election emblem (a lion), his motto ("unity, liberty, progress"), and the constant reminder that he signed the request for military intervention against the emperor were not enough to draw any significant support for him.

His campaign was directed especially against the public image of David Dacko. (For example, as proof of the president's cowardice, he had had distributed several thousand copies of a tract reproducing the declaration of the transfer of powers from Dacko to Bokassa at the time of the coup d'etat of 31 December 1965.) Unsuccessful.

An independent candidate, high official at the headquarters of the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO in Yaounde), Francois Pehoua had little better success. Did he believe that David Dacko would leave the way clear for one who, a short while ago, was still presented as the president's heir apparent?

It seems that this brilliant technocrat, supported by certain Parisian business circles and close to the French minister for cooperation, was counting on a withdrawal in his favor by the former counselor to Bokassa (whom he himself had served briefly as minister of finance). At least that is what is being whispered in Bangui to explain his surprising candidacy. But Dacko "hung on" at the last minute, presumably on the advice of the Elysee, which was anxious

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about calm and stability in the CAR in this period before the French election. Too bad for Pehoua, who--with some justification--does not despair about the future: the election results put him in third place.

In fact, the main part of the debate took place between Ange Patasse and David Dacko. A complex figure with many twists and a vigorous orator--each of his speeches broadcast or televised during the campaign was followed with keen interest--Patasse ranks henceforth as the real leader of the Central African opposition.

In Bangui (20 percent of the national electorate), where the voting has been really "political" he is hot on David Dacko's heels. Elsewhere he is nothing to laugh at. Very popular with the intellectuals and the middle levels, much less so in rural circles, this former prime minister of Bokassa's (at the time of the coronation) has centered his campaign around two sensitive points: the presence of a French contingent (raised to 1500 men since the events in Chad) which he describes as "occupation troops"; and David Dacko's position as a businessman, a "stockholder in foreign companies operating in the Central African Republic."

The problem is that many Central Africans are very sensitive to the Libyan intervention in Chad and do not forgive Patasse for having momentarily taken refuge in Tripoli in 1979, also, his total honesty, "businesswise," has yet to be demonstrated. The fact remains that David Dacko will have to reckon with him in the future fragile coalitions after the elections--even if the sharing of tasks has already started with the cabinet reshuffle of November 1980, which saw six "Patassist" ministers enter the government.

Faced with this force of nature, the very placid Dacko has played to perfection his role of "president above the parties." His formation, the Central African Democratic Union, which has been established for a long time in the rural area where it took over from the MESAN [Movement for the Social Development of Black Africa], Bokassa's single party, has benefited from all the services of the state machinery, including, it seems, its financial advantages, which enabled it to hand out impressive supplies of election t-shirts bought in Paris and to use the 504 brand-new covered trucks shipped from France for the ministry of health for propaganda tours.

In addition to these few "unfortunate mistakes" was a big slip-up in the form of amnesia: In other words, aside from Abel Goumba, almost no one spoke of Bokassa and the role played by the candidates from 1966 to 1979--and for good reason in that except for the FPO leader, all of them have served the emperor from Berengo at one time or another. Consequently, no one wanted this file opened up. On this issue, at least, there has been a consensus--inglorious and somewhat shameful.

However, despite these inadequacies and pending the legislative elections which are to take place in April, it is difficult not to consider the experience which the Central African Republic has just gone through as positive--provided, of course, that it continues and that these elections are not a safety valve opened before the "restoration of order," and provided also that the leaders recognized

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by the ballot boxes become aware of the immense misery of the Central African people who, according to a recent United Nations report, are living in "a distressful state." A democracy is judged first of all by this yardstick.

David Dacko, who has shown an unsuspected firmness in this affair, seems resolute on democracy, despite pressures--discreet but real--from several of his neighbors who are anxious about a democratic contagion, which they fear. Dacko, who is said to be fascinated by Senghor and obsessed with the idea of atoning for his former humiliations and compromises, has even surprised his French "protectors," certain of whom believe that the Central African Republic is not yet ready for the multiparty system.

"He is an heir who wants to kill his father before going away," one of his French advisers says of David Dacko. Bokassa's second death is perhaps for tomorrow.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DATA ON ISRAELI GENERAL'S HOUSE ARREST

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 p 20

[Article by F. S. "From Suez to the Ubangi"]

[Text] He was the sole topic of conversation, apart from the presidential election: Shmu'el Gonen, about 50 years old, Israeli, a general and a diamond cutter, is at the center of an "affair" which has been agitating Bangui's little political world for a month.

There is something unreal about Gonen's trajectory. A general in the Israeli army at the time of the October 1973 war, commander-in-chief of the southern front, the Sinai front, and the Bar-Lev Line, this massive man, given to sudden fits of rage, was accused by his deputies of being mainly responsible for the defeat registered by his troops. He was then put in the reserve ranks.

He was linked momentarily with the Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio Somoza, before settling in Central Africa, where he trained Bokassa's imperial guard. In 1977, Bokassa rewarded him by authorizing him to create a diamond research company, Iligon. He obtained a license for prospecting in La Ngoere, between Berberati and Carnot, but no capital. That same year he founded another company, SICAMINES [Societe Industrielle Centrafricaine d'Exploitation Miniere], which tapped new money (South African?). But he forgot to dissolve Iligon.

September 1979 Bakassa falls, Gonen remains. In 1980, in disagreement with his main Israeli partner, he creates a third company, SOROMINES [expansion unknown], after terminating SICAMINES according to the rules. At this point the current minister for economic affairs, Mathieu Gbakpoma, intervenes. The law, he explains, requires everyone who creates a diamond company to pay the State 5 million CFA Fr per square kilometer. The fact of the matter is, Gonen paid for SOROMINES and SICAMINES, but not for Iligon. The minister demands it. Gonen recants: Iligon never existed anywhere but on paper! The minister immediately has him arrested and places him under house arrest. He is still there.

Why this relentlessness? One thing is certain: Gonen's mine is the best equipped and the most profitable in the country. It has a landing strip, a modern infrastructure. Does this lend weight to the rumors to the effect that Mathieu Gbakpoma himself and certain French interests reportedly have designs

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on this concession? To be quite truthful, anything is possible. Gonen may have misappropriated public funds; he may have been one of the organizers of the leaks concerning the relations between Giscard and Bokassa; and there may be a desire to silence him. In any case, there is something to keep the gossip going in the sidewalk interview broadcasts.

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CHAD

FRANCE ACCEPTS POSSIBLE COEXISTENCE WITH LIBYA IN CHAD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 820

[Unsigned article: "France and Chad: An Ambassador in N'Djamena?"]

[Text] How has Chad gotten into its present state? The question was asked recently by an article in LE MONDE which because of information drawn from reliable sources contrasts favorably with the customary nonsense written and uttered on this subject, and this question is not only of historical interest. Indeed, the question leads into the issue of French responsibility in the conflict which has bathed Chad in blood for the past 16 years, whether that responsibility is the result of simple friendship or of unfortunate choices made in 1910 at the time of the conquest of Wadai. For the Chadians themselves, the effectiveness of the structures they are going to have to put in place, in an Islamic Chad without any kind of political or administrative activity these days even at the lowest levels, will depend on how genuine and penetrating their analysis of things is.

However, it must be acknowledged that another more urgent question takes precedence over LE MONDE's: Where is Chad headed, and, in particular, what attitude can France have regarding Chad's new orientation?

The recent visit to Paris of Mr Naimbaye, the GUNT (National Union Transition Government) minister of agriculture, and the unofficial high level contacts he made there; the presence of second-rank Chadian politicians in France; the testimony of Chadian bureaucrats in Garoua, Bangui and Niamey waiting to see what will happen; the statements of Goukouni Weddeye himself; telephone calls made from Germany to his Parisian relations by Achl Ahmat, the minister of foreign affairs, who often goes there for health reasons; the small group of wounded Goukouni supporters being treated at the Percy de Clamart Hospital, who constitute a sounding board for all this activity—all of this bears witness to GUNT's desire to renew normal relations, to which an exchange of ambassadors would give concrete form. It would not be carrying this too far to connect it with the desire to provide for a counterbalance to the Libyan presence.

Two events cast a special light on how we will be able to respond to this expectation. First of all, there is the tour which Goukouni has just made for the first time in the southern part of Chad, by way of Bongor, Moundou and Sahr. This tour, by providing confirmation of the Chadians' determination to be united,

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is in fact a prelude to political and administrative reconstruction, the foundations of which, in the north, will be decisive for the future. It is not enough, in fact, just to express the desire for free elections. It is also necessary to provide organization and define a framework for them; in short, to figure out for what and for whom candidates will be running. The other event is the resumption of activity by Hisssein Habre, now based in Sudan, on the outskirts of Dar Guimr and Dar Tama, in the mountainous Kapka region where Doudmourah, the last sultan of Ndadai, gave French troops a hard time in days past.

At such a critical stage in the rebuilding of Chad, the presence in N'Djamena of a well-informed ambassador from France would make it possible to keep Paris informed, to prevent dangerous foreign influences from being the overriding ones in this rebuilding, and to finally support a gradual return to normal in areas deprived of road, air and mail links and of basic public services. On the other hand, in view of Hisssein Habre's getting back in the ring, not maintaining diplomatic representation would appear to be planning for an opportunity to overturn events. One may think what one likes about those events, but, after so much suffering has taken place, they are in tune with the obvious yearning for peace on the part of the majority of those taking part in this tragedy and, in any case, of all of its victims. Official French statements opposing Qadhafi's maneuvers in Chad lend credence to this interpretation of the lack of diplomatic relations because they seem to line the French up according to a simplistic political equation alongside Egypt and Sudan, which have been "pro-Habrist" up to now.

The question is figuring out whether it is more effective to deter the Libyans from settling in by providing Chad the cooperation it wants rather than by appearing to breathe life back into the civil war. Besides, what we are talking about is not effectiveness but emotional attachment. In spite of the ordeals of the last few years, we still have a solid fund of good will down there. Nobody knows what would become of that if a share of the responsibility for the resumption of hostilities were to be laid at our door.

It is true that the ambiguous stands of the Chadian leaders do not make it easy to normalize our relations with them and that before doing so we might want to obtain written guarantees with respect to the security of our diplomats. Unfortunately, ambiguity is not just a Chadian phenomenon. It is common among African governments, and there are many examples of criticisms aimed at certain French initiatives and publicly expressed by the same people who warmly approve of them in private. In Chad more than elsewhere this ambiguity is in keeping with the local character. Trying to clear it up would be an undertaking as vain as getting the Toubous to lead a sedentary way of life. It should be added that GUNT's members are afraid that this kind of guarantee might one day be used to justify an "anti-Libyan" military intervention. Even if they do not harbor this fear deep down, there are among them no lack of advisers to make that suggestion.

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In actual fact it is a simpler matter than that. Obviously one might feel that Chad's difficulties will be settled without us but in keeping with our interests and those of our allies, and that therefore our return to N'Djamena is not an urgent matter. This would be running a risk. Is that risk a lesser one than the one involved in recognizing a de facto state of affairs without having that mean approval of the basis of a regime? Besides, the attitude of de facto recognition is in keeping with a tradition of our foreign policy which we have constantly made plain. This will no doubt lead us to coexist with the Libyans in Chad. That is not such a dreadful prospect per se since we are already giving technical assistance to Libya inside its own borders. Although there may be some risk in this regard to the solidity of our African alliances (however, one does not see why our allies would not see the problem in the same terms we do), it does not seem to be any more awkward than the risk resulting from lying low which our adversaries could easily display as proof of our hostility to the GUNT.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

NORTH-SOUTH TENSION--Tensions increasingly keen between southerners and supporters of Goukouni Weddeye within the Chadian government. Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, vice president of GUNT [Transitional National Union Government], protested against the fact that instead of the Chadian flag, it is the flag of FROLINAT (Goukouni's political group) which floats over the public buildings in N'Djamena. The southerners are also said to have set April 10 as the deadline for the departure of several Libyan field officers which they requested of President Goukouni. The president, for his part, has been postponing for over a month a trip which he must make in the South. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 p 21] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9719

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CONGO

BRIEFS

CUBAN DESERTERS IN BRAZZAVILLE, POINTE NOIRE--Dozens of Cuban deserters--probably blacks--reportedly have been living for the past two years in the working-class suburbs of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, as well as in the Angolan and Mozambican muceques of Luanda and Maputo. They subsist from petty trafficking and trade secretly with surrounding villages. /Jean-Louis Buchet, Afrique Confidential column/ /Text/ /Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Mar 81 p 13/ 6145

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GHANA

NKRUMAHISTS CHARGE PNP MAINTAINS 'EXPLOITATIVE SYSTEM'

London NEW AFRICAN in English Apr 81 pp 35-36

[Article by Mark August Nyirenda]

[Text]

LEFT-WING elements of Ghana's ruling People's National Party (PNP) have accused the party's Right of "hijacking" Kwame Nkrumah's socialist policies in order to maintain their "capitalist and exploitative" system. The left alleges that the PNP hierarchy, contrary to public claims of wanting to bring about structural socialist changes, remains committed to capitalism and has only spiced its public statements with socialist jargon with hardly any changes.

This attack comes against the background of the simmering debate on the role of Nkrumah's socialist remedial plans and the search for a solution to Ghana's complex socio-economic problems.

Recent Lecture

The Left, which grouped itself into the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guard (KNRG) was particularly incensed by a recent lecture on the ideology issue given by Dr Aday Mensah, acting General Secretary of the PNP. Mensah talked about his party as well as the Convention People's Party (CPP) which was founded by the late Nkrumah.

He implied that the PNP was the natural heir of the CPP and even compared the PNP's commitment to restructuring Ghanaian society to socialism with the CPP. The Left is concerned that the PNP may have used its alleged alliance with the CPP to exploit public sentiment because it was under the CPP that Nkrumah, its founder, had campaigned to change the Ghanaian society in the early 1960s.

The KNRG has dismissed the PNP's attempt to portray itself as a party following Nkrumah's footsteps. It further charges the PNP leadership with confusing the people through this distorted and inaccurate claim. But to many, the PNP's "socialist policies" will, at best, amount to calculated and peripheral flirtation with the less radical aspects of Nkrumah's type of socialism. The PNP's claim, therefore, remains rhetorical.

There is also a growing feeling among many Ghanaians that the PNP-led government has found it expedient to be seen to embrace Nkrumaism because the association would lessen public criticism of its manifestly right-wing socio-economic policies.

In his lecture, Mensah castigated those who called for a socialist programme as being "ideological purists" who thought that Nkrumaism was a "sports jersey (that) they have designed (and) which can be donned by (other) people only with their approval". The PNP ideologue also implied that the Left had among its ranks personalities who had denounced Nkrumah during their various periods of political persecution, a claim that has since been hotly denied. The KNRG have noted, and not without irony at Mensah's claim, because it was in fact a group of PNP right wingers who bitterly opposed Nkrumah's socialist programme. Moreover these were the very men who obstructed Nkrumah's efforts to transform Ghana's economy along socialist lines.

The PNP has come under fire from another direction for its attempt to equate socialism and welfare state. Dr

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Mensah himself had alluded to the question during his lecture when he suggested that Ghana could do with either one of the two forms if the other could not be established. But the two systems are neither synonymous nor complimentary. The welfare state is basically a capitalist society in which, when capitalism develops a conscience and human face, tries to combat some of its own unacceptable features by taking palliative measures. The United Kingdom has such a society which has since come under severe criticism from the ruling Tory government now actively seeking to change it.

Experiment

The Left, meanwhile, has questioned Mensah's assertion that a socialist experiment in Ghana under Nkrumah between 1962 and 1966 had failed. Other students of history have similarly dismissed Mensah's claim as an "incompetent and ill-thought-out analysis" of the Nkrumah government. They point out that Nkrumah's plans were not truly implemented because they were thwarted by his overthrow from power in 1966, a coup achieved with support of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in concert with moves by European and western economic organs a year earlier when the world price of cocoa, Ghana's major export crop, was deliberately reduced. The price drop effected an economic squeeze by western industrialised countries and other imperialist powers which eventually succeeded in subverting Ghana's independence.

But the PNP leadership have not run out of excuses for not turning to socialism. And while some left-wing members have suggested that Ghana has remained committed to the capitalist system because its leaders fear incurring the wrath of their colonial masters in the West, the PNP leadership now argues that it would not be possible to restructure Ghanaian society because the constitution is against the creation of a socialist state. The PNP leadership evidently believes that the party's enemies would seek action to restrain it from the socialist course. However, Ghana's national constitution does provide for the

establishment of an egalitarian society in which "exploitation of man by man shall be prevented". Moreover it is this same constitution that President Hilla Limann solemnly vowed to uphold.

Mensah also referred to the contradiction which existed within the CPP during the Nkrumah rule and which the *Osagyefo* (a Ghanaian reference to Nkrumah meaning Redeemer) had tried to resolve. Mensah, in trying to highlight these contradictions, helped himself with generous, but conveniently chosen quotes, from Nkrumah's works to emphasize his analysis.

He quoted from *Dark Days in Ghana* while leaving out those passages of the same book which contradicted his findings. Nor did he bother that the book conclusively proved that Nkrumah had been stopped in his socialist reconstruction of Ghana only by the coup. Instead, Mensah used Nkrumah's admission that the CPP needed to be restructured as proof that the *Osagyefo* had intended to purge it of its radical elements.

Problems


Nkrumah's prescription for Ghana's political and economic problems is clearly stated in his later published books. In the circumstances, the PNP is trying to hide behind the constitution of Ghana's Third Republic while it continues along the path of neo-colonialism. The national constitution does not prevent the implementation of a positive ideological programme. There are many who have argued that a political party must always have a clear-cut programme. Students of this school of thought have further stressed that, contrary to common practice in African politics, parties and their programmes should not evolve around a personality. Rather, it should be the party that must organise the masses around a programme based on a people-orientated ideology.

Political theorists, in explaining the importance of a programme as it relates to an ideology, have said that while ideology maps out the general route to be taken by the party, the programme sets out the immediate targets and tasks. The struggle therefore is immutable since the programme is constantly changing until the ultimate goal of a socialist society is achieved.

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The controversy over the PNP's ideological dispute is not just academic. It has significant political and socio-economic overtones as these affect the country's problems. This has since assumed importance given that a growing number of people have become convinced that the PNP leadership have miscalculated Ghana's political mood. Many observers believe that this reflects the height of naivete on the part of those directing the nation's fortunes to assume that the country has not learnt from its troubled past ●



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GUINEA

BRIEFS

ADF WATER LOAN--The African Development Fund [ADF] recently awarded a loan of 1.5 million UCF (about 380.73 million CFA) to the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea for financing [a determination of] parameters, in preparation for a pre-investment study of water and electricity supplies. The loan is reimbursable over a period of 10 years and includes a 3-year grace period. The total cost of the study hors tax [translation unknown] is estimated at 1.9 million UCF, consisting of 1.5 million in hard currency and 0.4 million in local currency. The hard-currency costs will be completely covered by the loan. The local currency costs remain the responsibility of the Guinean Government. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] 9516

ADF RICE-GROWING LOAN--The African Development Fund [ADF] recently awarded a loan of 8 million UCF (about 2,030.58 million CFA Fr) to the Peoples Revolutionary Republic of Guinea for financing a rice-growing project in Siguiri. The loan is reimbursable over a period of 50 years with a 10-year grace period. The Siguiri region's rural development plan is aimed at food self-sufficiency and the economic and social development of a region that is still isolated despite its enormous economic and human potential. The primary aims pursued in the project are to increase and standardize the 6,820 hectares of rice production, to satisfy the food needs of the populace better, and to improve living conditions. The total cost of the project is estimated to be 27.84 million UCF. It includes 18.004 million UCF in hard-currency costs and 9.8 million in local currency. The project will be financed by the ADF, the International Fund for Agricultural Development [FAD], and the Guinean Government. The ADF loan will be used to finance a portion of the hard-currency costs, a portion amounting to 35 percent of the total cost of the project, which is to be carried out over a 5-year period. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9516

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

WFP EMERGENCY FOOD DONATION--The World Food Program [WFP] of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] is going to send Guinea-Bissau 5,000 tons of corn as emergency assistance to satisfy in part the needs of the drought-stricken population of the country. This gift, valued at \$1,152,000 when transport costs are figured in, was approved by Edouard Saouma, FAO director-general. A shorter rainy season than usual and the absence of rain at the critical time, as well as attacks by flocks of predatory birds, severely affected agricultural production in Guinea-Bissau this year, producing scarcity, according to an FAO communique of 12 March. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9516

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MADAGASCAR

RATSIRAKA'S SECRET: HOW TO STAY IN POWER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 pp 36-37

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Divide Your Friends; Win Back Your Enemies; Create a Political Police: You Will Be a Boss, My Son. How To Stay in Power"]

[Text] President Didier Ratsiraka won over a formidable ally when he rallied the old nationalist Monja Jaona to the support of his regime on 10 March. Arrested on 30 November 1980 (this was not known till January 1981), put under house arrest the very next day for an attempted uprising, the man heading MONIMA [National Movement for Madagascar Independence] party--Madagascar for the Malagasy--and who, for a long time now has been the incarnation of both a faction of the extreme Left, and an intransigent nationalism, thus regained his freedom and legality. It was not the first time, nor perhaps the last, either; for under every regime of the past 30 years Monja Jaona has experienced prison after rebellion.

Symbol of Resistance

In colonial times, he defied repression, even after the bloodbath of 1947-48, in which the first armed revolt of colonial peoples was drowned. Immediately after independence, under the regime of Philibert Tsiranana (1960-72), MONIMA crystallized into an increasingly tough subversive movement--culminating in the "bloody revolution" of April 1971, notorious for the massacre of thousands of unarmed partisans. Since then Monja--which is what all Malagasy call him--has stood out as the guilty conscience of those who, succeeding each other in power, have "retrieved" the popular revolution of May 1972. He tirelessly denounced the derailing of the train of democracy and socialism. He did so with impunity till the evening of 30 November 1980, when the two bosses of the constabulary and the police picked him up "to place him in safety, because there were people who sought to assassinate him"; but really because Monja Jaona was becoming a symbol of resistance to an increasingly less popular regime. However, this time, Monja came out of prison to join Didier Ratsiraka against "a resurgent Right" which, it has been announced officially, wanted to use his name in order to "overthrow the revolutionary power."

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Masterstroke

The union of the Left thus seems to have been rebuilt around Didier Ratsiraka, as in 1975, when the referendum of 21 December by a landslide vote adopted both the Charter of the Socialist Revolution and the new Constitution, and elected Didier Ratsiraka president of the republic. But the euphoria was not to endure.

"Johnny-come-lately" to the revolution, the new president consolidated his position, and achieved the masterstroke of dismantling all movements which opposite him could have led to any sort of alternative: the political parties (whether allies or adversaries), the armed forces divided into various compartmentalized, if not rival bodies. In March 1976, Didier Ratsiraka created his own party, Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA), whose "vanguard" role was challenged by MONIMA. But Ratsiraka was more than a party head. He was president of the republic, and, as such, presided over the "Front" (National Front for the Defense of the Revolution--FNDR), which regrouped all movements and parties which had supported the Charter of the Revolution. Even then, however, the fire of dissension was smouldering.

On the extreme Left, MONIMA and MFM [Militants for the Establishment of a Proletarian Regime] (a proletarian party which attracts particularly intellectuals and the second-class citizens of the big cities, very highly politicized) refused to sit together within the Front, and enjoined Didier Ratsiraka to choose between them. The president chose MONIMA. The leaders of MFM were put under house arrest shortly thereafter.

The formula paid off. Between March and June 1977, Didier Ratsiraka scored more points against his Front partners who contended the village and legislative elections. AREMA came out on top, relegating all the other parties to minor roles in the National Popular Assembly (ANP).

MONIMA accused AREMA of having rigged the elections by shamelessly making use of the services of the state, and demanded a purge of the government "stuffed with reactionaries and Right-wing opportunists salvaged from the ranks of the PSD"--Philibert Tsiranana's old Social Democratic Party, disbanded in 1972. Didier Ratsiraka nevertheless had grown in strength, he had appropriated the lion's share of the ANP and the village committees. There was no question of negotiating, still less of yielding to any kind of blackmail. Since under the Constitution only those movements which had been united in the Front could participate in politics, by mid-June 1977 MONIMA had slammed the door, effectively outlawing itself.

Monja Jaona paid no attention to that. He organized demonstrations and protest marches, and continued to publish tracts and communiques. Ratsiraka resorted to his tactics, convinced a "moderate" wing--in contrast to Monja's intransigence--to remain in the Front.

Schism and Cracks

Schism followed. MONIMA "hard-liners" followed Monja Jaona. A VSM-MONIMA (MONIMA Socialist Organization) rallied to Ratsiraka. From then on, the

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president who meanwhile had reconciled the extreme Left, the MFM rival of Monja's MONIMA--controlled everything, since he was not faced with any sufficiently strong or organized force. But, behind this facade of omnipotence, a new split was opening up, this time within Didier Ratsiraka's own party. Rivalries were gradually undermining AREMA.

Climate of Suspicion

Publicly--on the radio, at meetings--the president's trusted followers contradicted each other, and accused one another of sabotaging the revolution. Some, calling themselves the "AREMA of the Left," dubbed the others an "AREMA of the Right." In the front ranks of the former stood the president's wife, Celine Ratsiraka, as well as certain ministers commanding a flamboyant rhetoric, such as Georges Ruphin (Information), Bruno Rakotamovo (Equipment) or Simon Pierre (Rural Development and Agrarian Reform). On the other side, those noted for their economic realism, personified by the man second in command in the State, Lucien-Xavier Adrianarahinjaka, president of ANP; the dean of the "Front," Charles Ravoajanahary, or yet the minister of planning and finance, Rakotavao Razakaboana; and also, some say, various close collaborators of the president.

Anathemas were exchanged, as well as accusations. In each camp, secret weapons were being forged: files on the corruption of the adversaries, on the sudden dizzying leap to wealth of some member of the "AREMA of the Left," or bribery by one of "AREMA of the Right." Didier Ratsiraka did not take sides, but his Machiavellism soon became a balancing set.

Resentment grew as the president was blamed for not taking a stand. But, despite rumblings of discontent on both sides, no one raised a hand for permission to speak. Ratsiraka has kept his followers divided by an oath of unconditional loyalty to himself, exacted in 1975; as well as by the notorious "files" on each of them which he keeps up-to-date, by means of his intelligence service.

It is in this climate of suspicion at the top, that broods, at the base, anger. The economic crisis and the irresponsibility of those in charge--busy quarreling with each other--fostered the spread of poverty.

Police Apparatus

In 1979 the inhabitants of Fianarantsoa (south central) took to the streets. In 1980, it was the turn of Manakara (southeast), then of Toliary (south), at the instigation of Monja Jaona's MONIMA. At the beginning of 1981, the capital, Antananarivo--where the university has been on strike since the beginning of the academic year--was caught up in the same surfeit of violence, looting, demonstrations and merciless repression. There were 17 dead in February, not 6, as had been claimed; and there were 86 wounded, not 44; not to mention the arrests and abductions. The chairman of the educators' strike committee, Professor Randriamampandry, was picked up and then incarcerated no one knows where. Two other strike leaders were abducted right in town; the blood-stained car of one of them was found on 10 February.

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Physicians in the capital have demanded explanations. Early in March, the Council of Churches (Catholic and Reformed) issued an appeal to national officials, which was read in all churches. Among the armed forces, tracts were circulated inciting the officers to rebellion. There were no demonstrations in support of the regime. It was then generally believed that Didier Ratsiraka would fall from power.

But he did not fall; because he has no adversary, no organized movement of any kind, no challenging personality, and particularly because, even though he no longer has any political support, he controls a formidable police apparatus, whose strike-force is the sinister DGID (Directorate-General of Information and Documentation).

Absolute Legal Arm

This "political police" operates under the iron hand of Ratsiraka's brother-in-law, Colonel Bienaime Raveloson-Mahasampo, who is married to the sister of the president's wife. The DGID has complete power in Madagascar, with the mission of smoking out all "plotters" (false or real), traffickers in currency, those sabotaging the regime, mercenaries of imperialism and reaction." It strikes whom, when and where it wishes with a completely legal weapon--15 days' custody....

To sum up, the recipe of the political police works very well with a regime that keeps alive, to stay in power, an atmosphere of "permanent plot." The formula worked well for a certain Stalin, who inspired a certain Kim Il-song, Didier Ratsiraka's model.

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MALI

TRAORE'S 'RENEWAL' MOVE MAY GAIN HIM NEW ALLIES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 39

[Text] Two months after promising "fundamental changes," is Gen Moussa Traore going into action? At any rate, on 11 April he launched the campaign to achieve "the renewal of all grassroots organs of the party," as had been decided on 12 February at the extraordinary congress of the UDPM [Democratic Union of the Malian People]. A misunderstanding had cropped up at the time between President Traore--also the party's secretary general--and the members of the congress. The former affirmed that he had received a mandate "to proceed to the renewal of all components," including the BEC (Central Executive Bureau), while the congress had only requested of him the renewal of the "grassroots organs," that is, of local and regional sections, without attempting to change the national directorate. But by upsetting the base, Traore is actually gaining a weapon for the future: the new officials in charge of sections will demand in his stead the heads of certain BEC members who have become unpopular. In order to do so, Traore involuntarily acquired unexpected allies. In many districts, former officials from the US-RDA (Sudanese Union-RDA, Modibo Keita's party which was overthrown in 1968) have decided to present their candidacy to head the UDPM sections, the objective being to get hold of the new party internally, "since it is out of the question to overthrow Moussa Traore by a coup d'etat or through street demonstrations." They would also like to take President Traore at his word, after he declared in February that no longer would the UDPM "exclude anyone." This is one way of ending the ostracism directed against Modibo Keita's former companions.

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MALI

BRIEFS

AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE--Two credit agreements between France and Mali were signed on 30 March by Minister of Foreign Affairs Alioune Bondin Beye and Philippe Renard, director of the Malian branch of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation. The first agreement pertains to the financing of the study for a sugar project in Bankoumana, in the Bamako area, where production will amount to 30,000 to 50,000 tons. This agreement is for 500 million Malian francs, 170 million of which comes from the Fund for Aid and Cooperation, and the remaining 330 million from the Central Fund. Once implemented, this project will save Mali 6 to 7 billion Malian francs, now used to import sugar. The second agreement, for a total of 320 million Malian francs, to which are added a 330 million contribution by the FAC, will partially finance the opening of the Costes-Ongoiba canal. It must be noted that the Office du Niger is contributing 2.8 billion Malian francs to this project, as well as appreciable manpower. This second credit, reimbursable in 30 years, has been granted at an interest rate of 1.5 percent. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1129]

FRENCH WELL-DRILLING ASSISTANCE--The Paris Rotary Club has decided to give financial support to the Eau Vive firm to assist it in developing well-drilling operations in the Sahel, and particularly, in the early phases, in Mali, where one operation (Mali Aqua Viva) is already under way. This contribution of new capital should make it possible to drill 150 new wells between now and 1982 in the San region, 451 km east of Bamako, where 650 watering spots have already been created to make 30 liters of water available to each of 100,000 inhabitants every day. High officials responsible for the operation will be in charge of a technical caravan with instructions to begin drilling to depths from 20 to 100 meters. The wells will subsequently be equipped with a hand or foot pump that will be maintained by local technicians. Officials of the Paris "Rotary" said that this first involvement, which basically consists of supplying capital to an operation already in progress, could be followed by new initiatives. On the one hand, they are ready to extend "Operation Eau Vive" to other countries in the Sahel, particularly Senegal. On the other hand, they want to improve techniques and provide the wells with solar pumps, which at present are much more costly than manual pumps. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] 9516

URANIUM DISCOVERY--Mali's minister of industrial development and tourism, Robert Tieble N'Day, recently announced in Bamako that the Japanese company PNC had discovered uranium reserves in the northern part of the country, near Gao. Mr N'Day also said that in the wake of his recent trip to France, he was thinking of signing oil exploration permits for French and American companies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] 9516

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MOZAMBIQUE

PLANS DRAWN FOR PORT, RAILROAD EXPANSION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 801

[Excerpts] During talks held between officials of the commercial services section of the French embassy in Maputo with Mr Bhatt, national director for Mozambican ports and railroads, the following information about the planned infrastructure extension came out.

With regard to ports, various projects are under examination, including research concerning the viability of a coal terminal in the port of Maputo, which Soros Associates, a New York firm long associated with the ports and railroads directorate, has been asked to build.

The second study covers construction of a sulphur terminal (for transport to South Africa). Mozambique would like to begin work with the least possible delay; a request for bids will probably soon be issued, and in all probability only certain countries will be allowed to bid.

These special projects should not cause one to forget the overall plan for the development of the port of Maputo, which will be completed over a 20-year period in two stages, the first stage comprising the laying of piers and alignment of access routes to accommodate 100,000-ton ships, and the second stage comprising the designing of channels and, in accordance with the growth of the traffic, the possible construction of an offshore terminal at Ponta Dabela.

At Beira, the new port can currently receive, depending on the tides, ships with a maximum capacity of 25,000 tons. A pre-viability study of plans to deepen the routes of access to the port has been completed by the British company Bertlin and Partner. Completion of this project would enable the port to take ships of up to 40,000 to 70,000 tons capacity; completion would include two parts (deepening the access routes and constructing a deep-water pier); The Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries are interested in the project. The Netherlands has sent a team of technicians to the site. But divergent views between the Dutch consultants and the Mozambican authorities seem to have appeared. The latter apparently want a small-scale model of the port improvement works to be built in the Lisbon Engineering Laboratory, while the Dutch consultant believes such a model would not be useful.

The Netherlands is supposed to present a proposal at the end of April. Before then, Belgium will probably have presented its proposals. It is currently

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providing technical assistance for improving the efficiency of the port of Beira, and Mozambique expects to ask for the dispatch of Belgian technicians. Regarding railroads, Mozambican plans cover the purchase of equipment and the improvement of rail lines.

Mozambique needs 300 coal cars and has sent requests for them to Portugal, Brazil, and Zimbabwe, though up to now no response has been received. It also needs 150 ballast cars for the upkeep of the rail lines and has made requests to Romania, Zimbabwe, and Brazil, and should also have asked Portugal. In both cases, for both coal cars and ballast cars, Mozambique is asking for 100 percent financing, to be secured by the proceeds of port and transport taxes.

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NIGER

PRESIDENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY, EXTERNAL THREATS

LD161625 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Apr 81 pp 46-50

[Interview with Seyni Kountche, president of Niger by Siradiou Diallo: "I Have Learned a Great Deal in 7 Years"--date and place not given]

[Excerpt] JEUNE AFRIQUE: You recently arrested members of the former regime. Why?

Seyni Kountche: When Niger citizens compromise themselves with foreign powers we cannot sit back and do nothing.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you sure that the people who have been arrested are really linked with foreign powers and are not sometimes victims of confusion and the settlement of old scores?

Seyni Kountche: Never: Never, do you hear, never is an arrest made without proof being duly obtained.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: A citizen can usually cross his country's borders without being a foreign agent. Is this not especially true in a country in which the nomadic life is important?

Seyni Kountche: Of course we know that as well if not better than you do. But although the citizen has rights which we recognize and respect, the national community has rights too, especially the right to defend itself against foreign designs. In this connection any Niger citizen found guilty of treason toward his people will be severely punished. Moreover I do not see why you are trying to defend such people.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: I am not defending anybody, I am just trying to understand.

Seyni Kountche: There is nothing to understand. When Niger's security and independence, not to mention its integrity, are threatened we are forced to defend them. Therefore we will strike the enemy agents mercilessly.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you not afraid that by hitting out at an increasing number of Nigerois you are likely to tarnish your image as a statesman primarily concerned with development problems?

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Seyni Kountche: It is true that my image is judged chiefly on development. I would be worried if you had told me that you had noticed a change in my attitude in that sphere. I do not think there has been any change. But with regard to my firm line toward citizens who have compromised themselves with foreign countries...just look at Niger's geographical position and you will understand.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: This geographical position is well known. But are you not afraid of being carried away on the tide of repression and resistance which has weakened so many African regimes?

Seyni Kountche: You see, a politician has to be in control of events. He is carried away as you describe if he allows himself to be overtaken or led by events. I am not doing that.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: As far as repression is concerned, it is easier to know where and when to start than where and when to stop.

Seyni Kountche: Don't worry. You and the Nigerois know that I am not prone to injustice and abuse of power. I will not arrest anybody arbitrarily. Consequently this means that I know precisely where to start and where to stop.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Colonel al-Qadhdhafi seems to want to speak to some of your fellow citizens over your head; I am thinking of the Tuaregs. Does that worry you?

Seyni Kountche: Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has been caught up in a dangerous course which he no longer controls. It is a course which extends beyond Niger. The Tuareg problem also concerns Mali, Mauritania and Algeria. In other words al-Qadhdhafi has bitten off more than he can chew. For our part we will not tolerate this subversive action in our country.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Do you think that Niger's Tuaregs are sufficiently tied to the rest of the national community?

Seyni Kountche: In Niger they are perfectly aware of their membership of the national community. Especially since they enjoy medical care and state-financed supplies and equipment on an equal footing with the other ethnic groups.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless do they not tend to be on the fringes of society?

Seyni Kountche: Certainly not. All the ethnic groups are treated equally.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you not afraid that they will some day give into subversion?

Seyni Kountche: We have no fears. I will even say that if the Tuaregs had to choose a promised land one day it would certainly not be Libya. You must realize that the Arabs in general and the Libyans in particular have no more respect for the Tuaregs than they have for blacks. They regard them all as slaves.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless al-Qadhdhafi has the means and he is persistent.

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Seyni Kountche: He certainly has considerable means. But I am still convinced that the Nigerois will not allow themselves to be colonized by money. Whatever the discontent inside the country, people unite as soon as there is an outside danger. The experience of the Sawaba attacks in the sixties confirms that. Al-Qadhdhafi's hegemonist designs will simply contribute to the Niger people's unity. If there is a Libyan intervention we will fight with all our strength, with bows and arrows if need be.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: In what way are the Libyan designs a threat to Niger?

Seyni Kountche: There is not actually an imminent threat. We do not believe that al-Qadhdhafi could attack us openly. He can only indulge in subversion. Furthermore he would have to find a suitable medium--traitors--through which to act.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Why then are you speaking out against al-Qadhdhafi?

Seyni Kountche: Although there is no real threat, there is a real dispute which boils down to two points: First, we know that al-Qadhdhafi is recruiting Nigerois whom he is training to carry out subversive acts in our country; second, he has appointed a Mauritanian national who formerly lived in Niamey to organize and lead an artificial opposition. This Mauritanian (Liman Chaffi) is a well-known trader in Niamey where he still owes the Development Bank of the Republic of Niger a great deal of money. He was one of the main architects of the abortive putsch in March 1976. We found some of the weapons sent to the insurgents by al-Qadhdhafi in his house.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: When I asked you after the abortive putsch in March 1976 whether al-Qadhdhafi had inspired it, you said no.

Seyni Kountche: Of course I was well aware of the ins and outs of this affair. I was quick to assemble the evidence officially establishing al-Qadhdhafi's guilt. I simply discussed the matter with the late President Boumediene, avoiding any pointless polemics with al-Qadhdhafi and now wishing to be distracted from my development policies.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is there a danger of part of Niger's territory being occupied by Libya, a situation which would be like an extension of the famous Aouzou strip?

Seyni Kountche: There is no such threat at present. If al-Qadhdhafi were to indulge in such an adventure we would defend ourselves.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Some people have spoken of al-Qadhdhafi's army occupying the Tummo well on the Algerian-Libyan [as published] border.

Seyni Kountche: That is not true. Tummo is not occupied by the Libyans. That well is some 100 km from our furthest military post in the region. The nearest Libyan post is at a respectable distance from that watering hole.

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JEUNE AFRIQUE: You asked the Libyan Embassy staff to leave Niamey. Then the embassy was closed. Why?

Seyni Kountche: Because we do not accept any so-called people's bureau here. A minimum of courtesy is necessary in international relations.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: On what conditions could diplomatic relations between the two countries be reestablished?

Seyni Kountche: They have not been broken off. Relations have been frozen. They will be reopened when the two points I mentioned have been clarified. Meanwhile we feel no hatred toward the fraternal Libyan people, who are linked to us by geography, history, religion and culture.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How do you judge France's attitude in what is commonly known as the Chadian affair?

Seyni Kountche: France is big enough to know what it wants and what it is doing. It is not for me to judge its leaders' behavior.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: You give the impression of having moved much closer to Nigeria and Cameroon since the events in Chad.

Seyni Kountche: That is natural. We are in close consultation with those countries with a view to hastening the restoration of peace in Chad. We are making every effort to ensure the restoration of an atmosphere favorable to free elections under OAU auspices. Peace throughout the region depends on that.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: When does the Nigerois army plan to hand power back to the civilians?

Seyni Kountche: I do not know. First we must finish establishing the National Development Company. That structure will necessarily lead to something new.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What form will that innovation take?

Seyni Kountche: You are too curious. Wait and see.

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SENEGAL

MANY CHANGES NOTED SINCE DIOUF'S ACCESSION TO POWER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Mar 81 pp 10, 11, 12

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani]

[Text] The political climate is relaxing, and two months after the accession of Abdou Diouf to power many things have already changed.

Dakar, in mid March 1981, has come a long way from the atmosphere of febrile tension which marked the end of December 1980--the eve of President Leopold Sedar Senghor's departure. Today's political climate is clearly one of relaxation. The thaw is readily acknowledged by certain leaders of many opposition groups.

This "prospective" relaxation--as it is discreetly called by opposition members who reflect on the new realities--has left its mark on daily life. Despite severe criticism businessmen, French assistance personnel, and Syrian-Lebanese merchants seem less worried than in December. Yet, in the cafes on the Avenue Ponty, young intellectuals sell the latest taxaw of Sheik Anta Diop, entitled: "Democracy by Government in a Foreign Language is a Deception!" Revival of Wolof and other national languages is widespread.

Automobile traffic is still dense--despite an oil bill of some 50 billion CFA Fr in 1980, which will reach an estimated 62 billion in 1981. Building construction is thriving, to judge from the recent opening of a 20-story highrise and the imminent beginning of a few others by Senegalese developers. The same dynamism prevails in industry, with the opening on 11 March of the 17-billion CFA Fr Dakar-Marine complex, and of the 10-billion CFA Fr SEIB [expansion unknown] at Diourbel on 20 March. In early April the cornerstone will be laid for the most ambitious industrial project yet undertaken in the country, that of ICS [Chemical Industries of Senegal], whose cost is estimated at 63 billion CFA Fr.

With what money? Well, Senegal has never seemed so "credible," though the interest on the foreign debt reaches 37 billion CFA Fr for 1981. And not a

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week goes by without the daily LE SOLEIL announcing a "rain" of billions. Among the latest "fallouts"--and they are not the largest--are two Saudi Arabian loans on 5 March, totalling 10 billion, and two World Bank credits on 7 March, for a total of 5.4 billion. To launch a hydro-agricultural project in the Casamance, and to finance construction of the Dakar-Thies highway, President Abdou Diouf has brought back from the Islamic summit at Ta'if (25-28 January, JEUNE AFRIQUE Nos. 1048 and 1049) the additional funds totalling 85 percent of the 890 million dollars needed to finance the OMVS [Organization for Senegal River Development] project.

But what Ta'if and Mecca have meant to the Senegalese is above all the extraordinary image of their president emerging barefooted from the Kaaba. It was the first time a Senegalese had entered that inner sanctum, and there was great emotion throughout the country. The Abdou Diouf era has thus begun favorably, despite unemployment, inflation, and drought.

The new president has shown much character and personality, impressing on the state a style and dynamics all his own. Notwithstanding this, one still finds in a few ministries, governors' and prefects' offices, or state corporations, that official portraits of Senghor are still on the walls--and no Abdou Diouf.

It was the head of state who tactfully asked that such changes not be made in haste. But such is his new popularity that he could not prevent textile manufacturers from printing his portrait on tens of thousands of meters of cloth, which were quickly transformed, for his visit to the Sine Saloum at the end of February, into loincloths or boubous. This illustrates the popular success of the visit, during which Diouf revealed unexpected tribune-like qualities.

A peasant said to him in Wolof: "You are the Ndiol Macka (the giant of Mecca)." He replied: "There is but one Ndiol Macka. That is Mohammed, and he lies in Medina." Another exchange: "You are Abdou Siam (a quality Asian rice much esteemed here)." "Thank the Minister of Commerce instead. It is he who imported the rice."

Imported, but--says the opposition--for the most part distributed in the Sine Saloum shortly before the presidential visit: in the amount of 14,000 tons, says the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party], and for essentially electioneering purposes. Yet it was there, at Kaffrine, that Abdou Diouf on 26 February solemnly promised: "I shall assume my mandate until its expiration in 1983." He also promised that the next legislative and presidential elections will be "fair and impartial" and will "reflect the true will of the Senegalese people."

This refusal to move up the elections goes against the wishes of the President's friends as well as his opponents. It proves that the new President has character. If his political friends plead for early elections, it is because "the climate is very favorable." Abdou Diouf and his Socialist

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Party have every reason to believe they would win a very considerable majority. That is not at all certain for 1983. By this same means "Abdou" would rid himself of a defect imputed to him by the opposition: he is president by Senghor's will alone, and not by that of the people. Certain opposition papers call him "President 35" by allusion to the constitutional article which automatically made him head of state.

And yet, to wait until 1983 would enrich political life, since recognition of new parties is foreseen. The present constitution, be it recalled, recognizes but four main streams: the Socialist Party in power; the MRS [Senegalese Republican Movement] of Babacar Gueye, representing the right; the centrist PDS of Abdoulaye Wade; and the Marxist PAI [African Independence Party], of Mahjmout Diop. And of the legal parties only the PSD has won representation in the National Assembly, with 18 deputies out of 100 in the 1978 legislative elections. Other still forbidden currents, notably Sheik Anta Diop's RND [National Democratic Rally], which awaits legal recognition (Official Gazette No 1049), and former Council President Mamdou Dia's MSA [Socialist Self-Management Movement] consider that they could gain parliamentary representation. The ODP [Proletarian Democratic Organization], the clandestine PAI, the Democratic League, and many other extreme leftist coteries likewise aspire to recognition.

Since Senghor's departure all these parties, recognized or not, have been more or less tearing each other apart, and have lost their uniform hostility to the regime in power. Also at an end is the quarrel of the oldsters, which made Senghor the favored target of Sheik Anta Diop and Mamadou Dia.

It is precisely the latter who seem most interested in the will to democratic opening shown by Abdou Diouf and his Prime Minister Habib Thiam. But not without expressed reservations. The "three demands" of Sheik Anta Diop, as published in his paper TAXAW (a multiparty system, honest elections, a government of national union) gave rise to "legitimate anxieties" on the part of other opposition organs, particularly the Marxist semi-monthly JDB (Jaay Doole Bi). Mamadou Dia also made much of his demands, and his "contribution," which appeared in his monthly ANDRE SOPI, ends with words which have been much noticed: "Between Abdou Diouf and myself there is nothing at issue. There can be no rivalry between us. Was I not the first to urge him toward the podium, together with a few other young people of his generation? Our refusal of today could be replaced by active and total support if the new regime in power would put an end to equivocations and contradictions and take the path of national liberation and restoration of democracy. Such would be--if I may say so--our manner of helping Abdou Diouf. If he asked our advice"

That advice may have assumed concrete form during discreet meetings. Whence the moderation of reactions to the announced adherence to the 1983 date for elections, which allows time to amend the Constitution and to legalize the most representative trends.

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In this ambience a certain confusion has entered the ranks of the legal PAI. Its leader Mahjmout Diop had in a way won Senghor's preference. But Abdou Diouf's advisers, for their part, attribute to the clandestine PAI as much if not more truly representative character. Consequently there have been some attempts to help the two groups reconcile their differences and meld into a single PAI. Perhaps at the price of Mahjmout Diop's retirement.

In recent months many "small things" have moved in Senegal: the new orientations of national education, for example. And even as far as foreign policy, where we no longer quite find the "exclusive friendships" of Senghor. Perfectly lucid, the former president declared in his farewell address of 31 December 1980 that: "Abdou Diouf . . . has a stronger character than is thought. You will soon find out."

But a serious problem confronts Abdou Diouf: how to bring about profound changes while remaining faithful to Senghor? The latter, now in retirement, has admitted that priority no longer goes to cultural affairs, but that "economic and social matters demand all attention." And Diouf needs internal peace more than palaver in order to combat poverty, unemployment, inflation, and drought, which remain the country's plagues--behind the Dakar show window.

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SENEGAL

ACTIVITIES OF PDS LEADER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Mar 81 p 11

Article by A. D.: "91 Meetings in 15 Days"

Text Principal legal opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade has also changed since his resounding declarations of December, when he sought to bar Abdou Diouf from the presidency. Since then, his Senegalese Democratic Party has been shaken by divers currents, notably by the resignation of two deputies out of 18, and of three political bureau members, though that body does number 120.

Since then, Abdoulaye Wade has had as his major concern the reorganization of the PDS and the needed restoration of the confidence of its militants. Hence in the 15 days ending 1 March he covered some 3,200 km within Senegal, and held 91 meetings in Bakel, Matam, Podor, Dagana, and Saint Louis departments. Before that, he had organized rallies at Pikine, Thies, Kaffrine, and Kaolack. At Bakel the PDS reportedly gained the support of seven municipal councillors who resigned from the Socialist Party.

What is surprising is that the PDS organ LE DEMOCRATE has not appeared for seven months, while in Dakar there are swarms of other opposition papers, some of which in particular give expression to several marxist currents, including the pro-Albanian. "Lack of means," replies Fara Ndiaye, Wade's principal deputy, who categorically denies any notions of a quarrel or misunderstanding between himself and Wade. And yet, as spokesman for the group in Parliament, he has given the impression of boycotting the work of the Assembly for several months past. The reason given is that he was put in charge of several missions abroad by Secretary General Wade in order to enlighten several friendly parties which no longer understood PDS positions, and particularly the call for arbitration by the Army in December 1980.

Another major PDS concern is to convene the opposition round table, which has been announced several times but always put off owing to the reticence of certain parties. The PDS has finally adopted the tactics of bilateral contacts, and agreement is being reached on a document to be published in early April. The project is now circulating among the leaders of the PDS,

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FND, and the two PAIs. On the other hand, there is a total absence of all the movements which gravitate around Mamadou Dia and the rightist MRS of Boubacar Gueye.

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SENEGAL

LARGEST INDUSTRIAL PROJECT HAS INTERNATIONAL BACKING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 p 39

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani "Toward Industrial Adventure"]

[Text] Dakar-Marine, the oil refinery of the SEIB [expansion unknown], awaiting a large chemical complex and certain projects in the mineral field...

The largest industrial project ever carried out in this country will start in early April. In some 34 months, at an estimated cost of 63 billion CFA Fr, the Chemical Industries of Senegal (ICS) will produce sulfuric and phosphoric acid from the phosphates of Taiba. Another remarkable point is the firm commitment of several Third World countries to this ambitious operation. In addition to the IFC [International Finance Corporation] (a subsidiary of the World Bank), the Islamic Bank and the European Investment Bank will in fact handle the main part of the financing.

Also participating in the capital (21.3 billion CFA Fr) are India (20 percent), Ivory Coast (10 percent), and Nigeria (10 percent). Cameroon, for its part, has promised a 10 percent participation. India has undertaken to buy all the production surpluses that are not marketed in Senegal and West Africa.

Repair Shop

This ICS undertaking will follow two other industrial achievements which were inaugurated recently: namely, SEIB's oil refinery in Diourbel (which cost some 10 billion CFA Fr in investments) and Dakar-Marine (17 billion CFA Fr) (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1054). The latter installation places at the disposal of Dakar's industrial zone a floating dock, a new 1,200-ton traveling-gantry crane, a dry dock, a wharf, a ballasting and gassing station.

Dakar, located at the crossroads of the maritime routes from Africa, Europe, America and even from the Middle East and Asia, is also becoming an important repair shop for the big tankers that do not go through the Suez Canal. The main work was done with Scandinavian technicians and capital. In order to carry through the operation, the former French military arsenal, built 50 years ago, was ceded back to the Senegalese state in 1980. As luck would have it, the

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former general-manager of Dakar-Marine, Sheikh Hamidou Kane, who launched the work in 1976, is terminating in 1981 his assignment as minister for industrial development and craft trades. With this dossier closed, he is taking over that of the ICS.

The Water Problem

He is not dismayed by this. He is even thinking of other "sure" projects, e.g., mineral exploitation, namely, of iron in Kidougou [sic] in eastern Senegal, oil in Casamance, peat, or certain agro-industrial complexes, which are also in the air. Since this presupposes that the water problem is solved in the meantime, it is, consequently, the current priority; and the first work envisaged by the OMVS is going to start without delay. "It will soon be seen that Senegal is not as poor as is thought," Sheikh Hamidou Kane told us. That recalls the title of his famous book, published just 20 years ago, "Uncertain Adventure."

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

PALM OIL PRICES--A departmental decree of 2 February 1981 has set the maximum ex-factory sale price of palm oil at 2,221.40 zaires per ton throughout the Republic of Zaire. This price includes the amount of 50 zaires for the economic recovery fund. For the city of Kinshasa and other urban areas, the urban and regional governors will set retail and wholesale prices by adding a 10- to 12-percent profit margin, actual transportation charges and amortization charges to the ex-factory price. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 848] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

FERROSILICON PLANT--A Presidential Studies Service (SPE) mission visited Bas-Zaire in February to gather information about the possible installation of a ferrosilicon plant in that part of the country. The study conducted is financed jointly by the United States, Norway and UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization). As raw materials, the plant under consideration would use quartz, large amounts of which are found in Bas-Zaire, and timber from Mayumbe. Its installation would provide 500 new jobs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 848] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

MINING ACTIVITIES--The French Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office (BRGM) intends to develop its mining operations in Zaire. BRGM's director in Kinshasa, Mr Gerard Vincent, as quoted by AFP, acknowledges that involvement in mining activities is modest at the present time, but projects, some of which are sizable, are in preparation or on the verge of being launched. In Zaire, the BRGM is also implementing programs to provide the Zairian Government with technical assistance and to train personnel. The new mining projects include a copper and silver deposit discovered in the north of Shaba province by the Goma Mining Company, 80 percent of whose stock is held by the BRGM. A feasibility study is being conducted. In Kivu in the eastern part of the country, the Goma Mining Company is currently extracting 60 tons of cassiterite (tin) annually and annual production is scheduled to be increased to 100 tons over the next 2 years. The BRGM, which is the operator for the Zairian Department of Mines, is also planning to expand the operations of the Kania Mining Company (SOMIKA) in the north of Shaba province. Through its mining subsidiary, COFRAMINE, the BRGM controls 80 percent of SOMIKA stock. Outfitting operations have begun and production, which should start in the spring of 1982, could reach 750 tons annually. Another larger but longer-term project is also under study by Zairian and foreign mining experts: revival of the Tenke-Fungurume Mining Company (SMTF) in the south of Shaba province between Likasi and Kolwesi, where a copper and cobalt deposit is estimated at 50 million tons of high-grade ore. Exploitation

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of this deposit will depend on completion of the high-voltage line intended to supply electricity from Inga to Shaba sometime this year. The BRGM holds 34 percent of SMTF's stock. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 792] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

BUDGET CUTS--The Zairian Executive Council, which met in Kinshasa on 13 March under the chairmanship of Gen Mobutu Sese Seko, has made "deep cuts" in the 1981 budget, in particular reducing to a "strict minimum" the number of diplomats abroad while keeping all embassies open. The Executive Council also amended the budget of the Department of Education because of the "chaotic recruitment" of teachers in both the public and private sectors: President Mobutu has decided to halt "until further notice" the recruitment of teachers, who numbered more than 236,000 as of June 1980, while the 12,000 teachers not recognized by the government will be paid by those who recruited them. The Executive Council also decided to reduce auxiliary budgets and the expenses of diplomatic missions domestically and abroad. These reductions of expenses will be accompanied by an increase in revenues as a result of two draft ordinances-laws concerning certain tax and customs provisions. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 792] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

'JEANS' PLANT--A project for installing a textile plant to produce "100-percent cotton denim" fabric and clothing (Lois-brand pants and shirts of "jeans") has been submitted to Zairian officials by the president of the Spanish European Textiles and Clothing company, Mr Joaquim Saez Merion, who visited Kinshasa in February. This project would require an investment of about \$7 million. The plant could largely use Zairian cotton if production of the latter were adequate. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 793] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

IVORY TRADE BAN--Zaire has decided to ban, for 5 years, any unauthorized possession of ivory and any operation involving the purchase, sale or export of ivory throughout Zaire. This decision, which will become effective in April, was made on 13 March during a meeting of the Executive Council. The council also decided to set 31 March as the expiration date for any current permit for transferring ivory and to oblige any holder of a supply of ivory to declare its exact weight to authorities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 793] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915

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