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# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 11/81)



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INTERNATIONAL

AZERI ACADEMY JOURNAL ON SOVIET-IRANIAN POLITICAL, CULTURAL RELATIONS

Soviet-Iranian Relations: 1962--1975

Baku IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK AZERPAYDZHANSKOY SSR: SERIYA ISTORII, FILOSOFII I PRAVA in Russian No 3, 1980 pp 29-36

[Article by G. D. Alibeyli: "Soviet-Iranian Relations: 1962--1975"]

[Text] The beginning of the 1960's was marked by the entrance of Soviet-Iranian relations onto a new phase, characterized by a normalization and development of intergovernmental relations and a deepening of technical and economic ties.

Iran's turn in the direction of developing relations with the USSR was preceded by its own economic and political causes. The failure of the attempt to extricate the country from its difficult economic situation by means of the policy of the so-called "stabilization of the economy;"\* the difficulties encountered by the ruling circles in promulgating the agrarian reform laws of 1960 and 1962, and Iran's dependence on the imperialist countries in a political and economic regard constituted the principal causes of the currency-financial crisis in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

The country's progressive public figures and Iran's realistically minded political leaders came to understand that the problems encountered on the path of socio-political and economic development of the country were basically the result of Iran's participation in the military-political plans of world imperialism. Under the circumstances of the acute currency-financial crisis there was an intensification of the movement to conduct an independent foreign-policy course, based on the principles of neutrality, a restoration of the traditional trade and economic ties with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp. Under the pressure of these factors the Iranian ruling circles were compelled to re-examine, to a certain extent, the principles of Iran's foreign economic policy, its one-sided orientation toward the Western countries, and to enter upon the path of technical and economic cooperation with the countries of the socialist world.

The change which took place in Iran's foreign policy course was also strongly influenced by the major scientific and technical achievements of the socialist countries, primarily those of the USSR, the undisputed growth of the Soviet Union's authority in the international arena, and the upsurge of the national liberation movement in the countries of Asia and Africa.

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As far back as the early 1960's the Soviet government, in meeting the desires of the Iranian side, agreed to receive an Iranian governmental delegation in Moscow and to examine with it questions of normalizing Iranian-Soviet relations, which had been broken off in the preceding years. Moreover, the hope was expressed that ways would be found to improve relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. However, in connection with the elections to the Iranian parliament, this trip did not take place.

Despite the opposition of imperialist diplomacy and that of reactionary circles within Iran itself, definite shifts were outlined in Iranian-Soviet relations.

On 15 September 1962 an exchange of notes took place in Tehran between the ambassador of the USSR and Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs [3, 305]. In its note the government of Iran gave assurances to the government of the USSR that it would not allow any foreign state to have the possibility of setting up rocket bases on Iran's territory [4, 364--365; 5]. In its answering note the USSR stated that the government of the USSR received with satisfaction the information contained in the note of the government of Iran [6].

The exchange of notes between the USSR and Iran, as well as Iran's refusal to make its own territory available for the stationing of foreign rocket bases, facilitated the strengthening of the foundations of mutually advantageous relations between the two countries, and it corresponded to the interests of the peoples of both countries, along with preserving peace and security in the region of the Near and Middle East as a whole.

Based on the normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations, definite shifts took place in Iran's foreign policy toward restoring and developing trade and economic ties with the countries of the socialist camp, primarily with the Soviet Union. The negotiations which were conducted on regularizing a number of questions concerning transit and border matters served as a confirmation of this. Thus, in October 1962 there was an exchange of ratified documents with regard to transit problems, and on 20 December of that same year the parties exchanged ratified documents with respect to the treaty on the regime of the Soviet-Iranian border and on the procedure for adjusting border conflict and incidents,\*\* subsequently these played a great role in expanding economic ties between the two countries and in settling all transit and border questions.

The restoration of normal relations with the Soviet Union allowed Iran to utilize the financial and technical aid of the USSR and other socialist countries in order to solve the problems of its economic development. In characterizing the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to the developing countries, the newspaper AZER-BAYDZHAN wrote as follows: "It is impossible to say that the mighty Soviet state desires to see a weak, poor country as its neighbor. On the contrary, the relations of the above-mentioned power with all countries, in particular, with the countries adjacent to it, such as Afghanistan, demonstrate that the Soviet Union is carrying out a policy whereby its neighboring countries can achieve economic development as soon as possible and within brief periods of time can become advanced industrial and agricultural countries" [7].

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During the period which elapsed after World War II the imperialists and their supporters within Iran itself strove by all possible means to worsen the mutual relations between the two neighboring countries, utilizing in this matter financial and technical "aid" to Iran and mythical "threats from the north." In this business imperialist diplomacy after the coup d'etat in August 1953 did not encounter any sort of serious obstacles. Iran's ruling circles, proceeding from their own narrow class interests, threw the doors of their country wide open to monopolistic capital to the detriment of mutually advantageous Soviet-Iranian trade and economic relations, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was striving and is still striving to establish truly good-neighborly relations with Iran, based on the following Leninist principles of foreign policy: equality, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other; this is the general line of the USSR's policy with regard to all countries, including Iran.

As far back as 1962 the newspaper SAPAHR declared that "when our economy was in danger, when the Soviet Union with its great scientific achievements and defense of the cause of peaceful coexistence without any sort of self-seeking purposes or to disseminate its own ideology, stretches forth the hand of friendship and is offering to us during this period of economic crisis aid without any conditions, it would be correct if our leaders for the sake of maintaining our independence and prestige would grasp this hand and save Iran from its crisis" [8].

As a result of the strivings by both sides to establish mutually advantageous trade and economic relations, on 27 July 1963 an Agreement was signed on economic and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran [9, 676--681], which played a positive role in the subsequent development of economic ties between the two countries.

In accordance with this agreement the Soviet Union took part in the construction of the hydro complex on the Araks River. Following the successful construction of the "Araks" complex Iran acquired the possibility of developing as much as 40,000 hectares of new lands and providing for the needs of the population of the northern regions with regard to electric power produced by the electric power station constructed on the Araks. The development of the new lands facilitated the development of the economy of Iranian Azerbaijan, since these lands produced approximately 30,000 tons of grain and 25,000 tons of cotton annually [10, 350]. In this regard the newspaper AZERBAJDZHAN wrote that "if dams are built on the Araks River, then in the future the Mugan Steppe will be transformed into a fertile region, and this will have a favorable effect on the lives of the Azerbaijanian population" [11].

The joint Soviet-Iranian construction of the "Araks" hydro complex also had great political reverberations in Iran. At the ceremony of commissioning this dam Iran's Minister of Water Resources and Electric Power declared that "we have only heard the expression 'peaceful coexistence,' but today we have fully understood its meaning.... With strength, knowledge, and ability our peoples have tamed the wild Araks and can now reap fruits to improve our own lives. What our peoples have achieved as a result of effective cooperation is the beginning of our future projects" [12]. And the organ of Iran's official circles, the newspaper ETTELA'AT emphasized that the "dam on the Araks River is an outstanding symbol of Soviet-Iranian cooperation" [13].

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In 1974 a new agreement was concluded between the two countries, providing for the construction of a second hydro-power complex on the Araks River in the region of Khodaaferin [14]. Plans were made to build two electric power plants with a capacity of 200,000 kW. The putting into operation of this complex made it possible to develop as much as 100,000 hectares of new lands [15]. This plan provided for the construction of a man-made reservoir with a volume capacity of about 2 billion cubic meters of water [16, 20].

A new affirmation of good-neighborly relations was the official visit by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev, to Iran, which took place on 16--23 November 1963. In Iran great importance was attached to L. I. Brezhnev's visit. "The visit of L. I. Brezhnev to our country facilitates the strengthening of good-neighborly relations between our countries" [17], wrote the newspaper KEYHAN. And PAYGAM-E EMRUZ asserted that this visit would open up a new page in Iranian-Soviet relations [18].

Two years later the Soviet government, in proceeding to meet the desires of the Iranian side, agreed to render financial and technical assistance to Iran in creating a number of enterprises in heavy industry [19, 272].

In the light of this spirit of agreement a number of meetings and negotiations were held during the course of 1965 between the appropriate organizations of the Soviet Union and Iran; these ended with the signing of a new agreement on economic cooperation between the two countries, dated 13 January 1966 [20, 161--165].

In accordance with this agreement the Soviet Union took upon itself the obligation to render aid to Iran in building a metallurgical plant in the Isfahan region, in the construction of a main gas pipeline in the Save-Astar section (with a length of 495 km), and in the construction of a machine-building plant in Arak with a productivity of 30,000 mechanical units per year. In order to build these projects, the Soviet Union granted Iran credits amounting to 260 million rubles.

The importance of this agreement for Iran consisted in the fact that it was directed at creating heavy industrial enterprises of great national economic significance for Iran [21, 31].

In the technical and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran the foremost place is rightfully occupied by the construction of a metallurgical combine in Isfahan Province. [see 22, 77--122; 23; 24; 25; 26].

The contract for building this plant was concluded on conditions which were very advantageous for Iran. In accordance with the agreement the planning work was carried out by the Soviet side. The Soviet Union also supplied the comprehensive technical equipment, the metal structural components, the electrical apparatus, the wiring products, and the basic building materials [27, 970--975]. In accordance with the plan the first stage of the plant had a specified capacity of approximately 600,000 tons of steel per year.\*\*\*

Despite the opposition of international, monopolistic capital and that of its agents within Iran, the construction of the first stage of this plant was completed successfully. The cooperation of the two countries in building this plant, as acknowledged by the Iranian side, became a model for the peaceful coexistence

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of countries with differing sociopolitical systems [30]. On the basis of this major industrial complex plans were outlined to develop other sectors of heavy industry as well [31, 59--70].

In accordance with the agreement of 13 January 1966 the Soviet Union rendered financial and technical aid to the construction and development of a machine-building plant in Arak, designed to turn out materials-handling equipment, steam boilers, equipment for sugar and cement plants, mine rail-cars, metallurgical structural components of various types, power-transmission line poles, facilities for storing petroleum products and water, agricultural machinery, and spare parts for it.

Another important project of Soviet-Iranian cooperation is the Iranian main gas pipeline on the Sava-Astara section (495 km) and the branch to Tehran (115 km), along with supplying equipment and machinery for the compressor stations, located along the entire length (1100 km) of the gas pipeline [21, 22--27].

The construction of this gas pipeline is of great economic advantage for Iran. This gas pipeline supplies previously unused natural gas from the petroleum-bearing regions of the country to the Soviet Union, while it also provides for the gas needs of the major Iranian cities, including the large industrial complexes [32, 7]. The gas deliveries to the Soviet Union serve to amortize the credits granted to Iran by the Soviet Union for financing the construction of a number of industrial enterprises.\*\*\*\*. On the whole for a 15-year period, i. e., beginning in 1970, it was planned to supply the Soviet Union with as much as 140 billion cubic meters of Iranian natural gas. In 1974 the USSR received 9.1 billion cubic meters of gas, and by the middle of 1975--about 33 billion cubic meters [34, 17].

A new step on the path of cooperation between the two countries in the field of the gas industry was the signing of an agreement in 1975 in accordance with which Iranian natural gas was to be transported to the countries of Western Europe across the territory of the USSR [35; 36, 129; 37]. The privileged conditions of Soviet credit are highly thought of among Iran's business circles. "The Soviet government is not taking money from us," wrote the newspaper KAYHAN, "it is accepting goods to balance its accounts.... The interest rate for the credit extended amounts to 2.5 percent a year, and this is the lowest percent possible."

In addition to the enterprises listed above, the Soviet Union has rendered financial and technical aid in the construction of a thermal electric power station in Tabriz, planning and surveying operations for the Mugan Irrigation Canal, seismic exploratory operations for petroleum and gas in the Iranian territorial waters of the Caspian Sea, bottom-deepening [dredging] operations in the ports of Enzali and Noushehr, planning and testing operations on a refrigeration plant in Tehran with a capacity of 10,000 tons, with the possibility of expanding to 16,000 tons, and on developing a technical and economic report on building a new port on the shore of the Caspian Sea.

The USSR has rendered considerable aid to Iran so that the latter may carry out its plans for economic development. During the period of the Third Five-Year Plan (1963--1967) the Soviet Union rendered assistance in building grain elevators which are of great importance to the national economy. Twenty-two grain elevators were built with a total capacity of 300,000 tons, and the capacities of existing elevators were expanded to 57,000 tons [38, 23; 39]. Iran was granted credits in



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order to carry out these projects. And the amortization of these credits was accomplished by the Iranian side by deliveries to the USSR of traditional export commodities.

In 1967 Iran was visited by a Soviet governmental delegation. During the meetings which were held there took place a broad exchange of opinions with regard to problems of Soviet-Iranian economic ties and ways to expand such ties. In accord with the wishes of both sides a decision was adopted to develop economic cooperation between the two countries also during the period of operation of the Fourth Five-Year Plan for the development of Iran's economy (1968--1972) [40, 20]. At the desire of the Iranian side during the period of the Fourth Five-Year Plan Soviet specialists rendered aid in the field of improving the irrigation system, building dams, prospecting for and exploiting mines, metallurgy, the construction and equipping of ports, supplying equipment and machinery for building and operating roads. For the purpose of making operational decisions on the questions of Soviet-Iranian economic cooperation, a Permanent Soviet-Iranian Commission was created in June 1968 [41, 204; 42].

The Soviet Union also rendered aid to Iran in the creation of non-ferrous metallurgy. In accordance with a protocol signed on 22 July 1967 and an agreement concluded in June 1968 the appropriate Soviet organizations took part in building a lead-and-zinc plant, conducting geological prospecting operations, equipping appropriate mines, and building an enriching mill for this plant.

Soviet-Iranian technical and economic cooperation developed successfully from year to year, and this made it feasible to supply it on a long-term basis. In order to achieve these goals, a treaty was signed in October 1972 between the Soviet Union and Iran for a 15-year period (45); this opened up broad possibilities for cooperation between the two countries in the matter of building new industrial and agricultural complexes in Iran [43; 44; 46, 263]. In accordance with this treaty cooperation between the two countries developed in the areas of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the petroleum, gas, and chemical industries, machine-building, agriculture, irrigation and fishing, the planning and construction of electric power plants, conducting geological prospecting operations, and training Iranian technical personnel [47, 199]. In exchange for supplying complete sets of equipment and machinery for the projects under construction with the aid of the Soviet Union and for rendering technical services, the USSR has received the traditional Iranian export items [48, 50].

In carrying out the provisions of the 15-year treaty the Soviet Union and Iran signed a protocol on the construction of two cement plants with a productivity of 1600 and 3000 tons a day [49, 54]; these are of great importance in the matter of providing an uninterrupted supply of building materials to projects under construction.

In all, some 150 various national economic projects have been built in Iran with the aid of Soviet organizations; these are of great importance for its socioeconomic development [50].

For Iran's industrial development providing technical personnel for facilities in operation or under construction is of extremely great importance. At the same time the situation in this matter has been exacerbated by the fact that the process of the "brain drain" from Iran for socioeconomic and political motives has become an acute social problem. Hence, the training of Iranian technical

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personnel came to occupy an important place in the country's domestic policy.

Cooperation between the two countries in the business of training Iranian technical personnel has been carried out by the following three methods: organization of vocational-technical centers in Iran, by means of the so-called production-brigade training, and the recruitment of Iranians for the purpose of on-the-job training at industrial enterprises of the Soviet Union. Prior to 1970 four educational centers were organized in Iran, and by 1975 approximately 7,200 persons had been trained there.

Production-brigade training has been the most mass method of training technical personnel. Up to 1975 this method was employed to train about 30,000 skilled workers. Prior to 1974 some 1300 persons were trained at metallurgical and machine-building enterprises of the Soviet Union [51, 12; 38, 22].

And, on the whole, with the aid of Soviet specialists, working in various industrial enterprises and agricultural projects of Iran, about 100,000 skilled Iranian workers and technicians have been trained [50].

In summing up the results of the development of Soviet-Iranian technical and economic relations, one can reach the conclusion that they have developed on an equitable and mutually advantageous basis, have not been accompanied by any sort of conditions of a political or military nature, while they have facilitated the strengthening of Iran's positions in trade and economic questions with the developed capitalist countries. Soviet technical and economic aid to Iran has been aimed basically at industrializing the country and, for the most part, at creating heavy industrial enterprises. It has facilitated the expansion of the state sector, created real possibilities for solving important socioeconomic problems, including solving the question of employment for working people,\*\*\*\*\* and it has placed limits on the sphere of penetration by international monopoly capital into the country's economy.

The victory of the anti-monarchist, anti-imperialist revolution in Iran has potentially created still broader possibilities for fruitful cooperation between the USSR and Iran.

In speaking to the voters of the Baumanskiy Rayon of the city of Moscow, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared as follows: "...we wish success and prosperity for the new, revolutionary Iran, and we hope that the good-neighborly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Iran under the new conditions will receive fruitful development on the firm basis of mutual respect, good will, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs" [53].

FOOTNOTES

\* The policy of "stabilizing the economy" was a complex of measures providing for the improvement of Iran's financial position by means of attracting foreign capital into the country's economic development [1,1--5; 2,1--10].

1. MADZHALLE-YE BANK-E MARKAZI-YE IRAN, 1340, No 4.

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2. MADZHALLE-YE BANK-E MARKAZI-YE IRAN, 1341, No 13.
3. Doctor B. Pazargad, "Kronolozhi-ye tarikh-e Iran," Tehran (Other publication data not indicated).
4. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1962. Sb. dokumentov" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1962: Collected Documents], Moscow, 1963.
5. IZVESTIYA, 16 September 1962.
6. PRAVDA, 16 September, 1962.
- \*\* This treaty was signed as far back as 14 May 1957 and ratified by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 26 November 1957, and in Iran's Senate and Majlis on 19 June 1958.
7. AZERBAYDZHAN, 1 August 1962.
8. SAPAHR, 14 August 1962.
9. For text see: VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 5 August 1965, No 3.
10. Ye. A. Orlov, "Soviet-Iranian Relations in the Present Stage," in the book: "Kolonial'naya politika i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noye dvizheniye" [Colonial Policy and the National Liberation Movement], Kishinev, 1965.
11. AZERBAYDZHAN, 7 March, 1963.
12. SEDA-YE MARDOM, 21 July 1970.
13. ETTELA'AT, 30 June 1970.
15. ZHURNAL DE TEHRAN, 1 April 1974.
16. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, No 2, 1974.
17. KAYHAN, 27 November, 1963.
18. PAYGAN EMRUZ, 16 November 1963.
19. "Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1964--1965. Sb. dokumentov" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1964--1965: Collected Documents], Moscow, 1966.
20. For text see: "Madzhmue-ye moakhedat-e dzhanebe-ye motabare dolat-e shakhen-shaki-ye Iran," Vol 1, Tehran.
21. MADZHALLE-YE BURS, 1346, No 51.
22. TAKHGIGAT-E EGTESADI, 1348, No 19--20.
23. "Tarikh-e sakhteman-e karakhane-ye zob-e akhan dar Iran," 1349.

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24. Ali Zahedi, "Sanaye-ye Iran bad az dzhang," Tehran, 1342.
25. SALNAME-YE "DONYA", 1340, No 3.
26. TEHRAN EKONOMIST, 1341, No 466--470.
27. MADZHALLE-YE BANK-E MARKAZI-YE IRAN, 1344, No 44.
- \*\*\* On 16 March 1973 there occurred the official opening of the first stage of the metallurgical plant. Taking part in this ceremony was the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, A. N. Kosygin. In March 1973 an agreement was signed providing for an expansion of the plant to a capacity of 4 million tons of steel per year [28; 29].
28. IZVESTIYA, 18 March 1973.
29. ETTELA'AT, 17 March 1973.
30. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 17 March 1971.
31. MADZHALLE-YE BANK-E MARKAZI-YE IRAN, 1345, No 61.
32. KHANDANIHA, 1970, No 15.
- \*\*\*\* The Soviet Union granted Iran credits amounting to 260 million rubles for a term of 12 years at an annual interest rate of 2.5 percent. These credits were amortized by Iran by supplying natural gas to the Soviet Union, as well as the traditional Iranian export items. The credits being received by Iran from the countries of Western Europe and the United States are being amortized by currency with an annual interest rate computed, on an average, at 5.5 percent; this is one of the methods used to plunder Iran. Thus, cooperation with the Soviet Union is very advantageous for Iran; it facilitates the creation of a national Iranian heavy industry and the development of its foreign trade [33, 53].
33. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1967, No 1.
34. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1975, No 6.
35. MARDOM, 1354, No 149.
36. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1975, No 9.
37. TINES [THE TIMES ?], 10 July 1975.
38. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1974, No 2.
39. In accordance with a contract concluded in 1975, Soviet specialists are taking part in the construction of eight more grain elevators in Iran.
40. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1970, No 1.

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41. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1967. Sb. dokumentov" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1967: Collected Documents], Moscow, 1968.
  42. ETTELA'AT, 30 July 1967.
  43. ETTELA'AT, 11 October 1972.
  44. PRAVDA, 13 July 1972.
  45. The necessity of concluding such an agreement was noted even as far back as the high-level Soviet-Iranian meeting in October 1968 [46, 263].
  46. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1968. Sb. dokumentov," Moscow, 1969.
  47. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1972. Sb. dokumentov," Moscow, 1973.
  48. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1973, No 2.
  49. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1974, No 5.
  50. PRAVDA, 13 March 1979.
  51. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1973, No 4.
  52. ETTELA'AT, 17 March 1973.
- \*\*\*\*\* Suffice it to say that during the construction of the Isfahan Metallurgical Plant and its ancillary facilities some 60,000 workers and engineering personnel were employed [52].
53. PRAVDA. 3 March 1979.

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Soviet-Iranian Cultural Ties: 1960--1980

Baku IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK AZERBAJDZHANSKOY SSR: SERIYA ISTORII, FILOSOFII I PRAVA in Russian No 3, 1980 pp 38-46

[Article by R. Shurkyurova: "Soviet-Iranian Cultural Ties during the 1960's and 1970's"]

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[Text] The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, directed at strengthening peace and international cooperation, at aiding the developing countries, has won deserved recognition on the part of progressive public opinion throughout the world.

As long ago as a year before the October Revolution V. I. Lenin, in formulating the principles of the policy of the future socialist state with regard to the oppressed peoples, wrote as follows: "We are applying all our efforts to draw close to and merge with Mongolians, Persians, Indians, and Egyptians. We are attempting to render to these peoples, who are more backward and oppressed than we are, 'non-mercenary cultural aid,' in the splendid expression of the Polish Social-Democrats, i.e., to aid them in making the transition to using machinery, to lightening their labor, and to democracy...." [1, 120].

These humane Leninist principles constituted the moral foundation of the Soviet state's foreign-policy course, its developing technical, economic, and cultural cooperation with the countries of the non-Soviet East, including Iran.

The victory of the October Revolution in Russia, as well as the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ensured Iran the possibility of developing its own relations with other countries, including those with the major powers, on an equitable basis. From the first few days of its existence the Soviet state adopted the principle of equal rights in its relations with Iran, while at the same time rendering considerable aid and facilitating the strengthening of its sovereignty, along with the development of its productive forces and cultural life.

Cultural ties began to develop. They found their most notable reflection in the sphere of literature (translations of works by Russian pre-revolutionary and Soviet writers into Persian and translations of works by the Iranian classical writers and modern writers into Russian and the national languages of the Soviet republics), as well as organizations for art exhibits, motion pictures, and concert performances by Soviet masters.

Considerable assistance to the further development of Soviet-Iranian cultural ties was rendered by the creation in the autumn of 1943 on the initiative of Iran's progressive public opinion of the Iranian Society for Cultural Ties with the Soviet Union, which set as its goal the universal development of cultural ties between the two countries, acquaintance with the life of the Soviet peoples, and the strengthening of friendship and cooperation [2].

Nevertheless, it should be noted that cultural ties with Iran, as well as political relations, developed unevenly; this was linked with the intensification of reactionary, anti-Soviet tendencies in the foreign policy of the Iranian state in one phase or another. They became particularly bad during the 1950's, after the overthrow of Mossadegh's government and the establishment in the country of a police regime which relied on the United States.

However, the policy of unilateral orientation to the Western countries, and primarily to the United States, which led to a deepening of the economic, social, and domestic political crisis in Iran, made it necessary to revise this policy within the country's ruling circles, inasmuch as their positions and the position of the shah himself were being threatened. As a result the ruling circles of Iran were

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compelled to normalize relations with the USSR and other socialist countries; this was done in the early 1960's. Of great importance for laying down the path of Soviet-Iranian cooperation was the visit to Iran in November 1963 of the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev, which was greeted with great warmth by the Iranian people.

In evaluating the results of the years past, the Iranian press emphasized that the "friendship between the peoples of Iran and the Soviet Union is an historical necessity" [3]. It also emphasized the superiority of the Soviet system of education and science. Thus, the journal KHANDANIHA in its article "The Soviet Union in Attracting Foreign Students Has Won the Competition with the West" wrote as follows: "The Soviet Union is the first country to create a special university for teaching foreign students.... Now studying there are students from 80 of the world's countries, and the number of those desiring to go there is growing with each passing year.... The system of education in the USSR, according to the opinion of Western specialists, is much more serious and productive, and after studying the situation in the higher educational institutions of the Soviet Union, they recommend that its example be followed" [5, 7].

The shift which has been noted in the mutual relations between the two countries gave an impetus to the development of cultural ties, which were enriched by new tendencies. This corresponded fully to the interests of progressive Iranian public opinion which has always striven for cultural cooperation with the USSR. In August 1966 an agreement was signed in Tehran providing for cultural ties with the USSR for a period of three years with the right to subsequently extend it for the same time periods. As was stated in the preamble of this agreement, it was concluded "proceeding from the striving to strengthen and continue cooperation between both countries in the fields of education, science, culture, art, and sports for the purpose of implementing and becoming acquainted with the above-mentioned fields by means of friendly cooperation." This agreement provided for the "expansion of scholarly contacts between the scientists of both countries, exchanges in the field of education, the development of ties in the sphere of the theatrical arts, music, ballet, the exchange of dramatic and scientific films, the expansion of book exchange, and other types of cultural ties, including sports" [6, 123--124]. The fruitfulness of these ties led to the conclusion of Soviet-Iranian cultural agreements for a longer time period. Thus, in October 1972 a plan was signed for cultural exchanges between Iran and the USSR for a period of five years [4, 79]. And six years later, in June 1978, a Soviet-Iranian protocol was signed in Moscow concerning cooperation in the field of culture for the years 1978--1979, providing, in particular, for an increase in the exchange of cultural delegations.

What is new in the sphere of Soviet-Iranian cultural cooperation pertains primarily to the development of scholarly ties, which has found its chief reflection in the sphere of Iranian studies. The high level of development of such studies in the Soviet Union, its comprehensiveness, along with its broad grasp of the various aspects of the social and cultural life of the Iranian state beginning with its most ancient times have had to be recognized by the scholars and state figures of Iran.

Soviet-Iranian scholarly cooperation has been carried out through various channels and in diverse directions: in the form of contacts between the scholars of the two

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countries who are engaged in studying the languages, history, literature, economics, and art of the peoples of the Near and Middle East, cooperation in the study of the rich cultural heritage of the peoples of the USSR and Iran, working out the problems with regard to the various branches of knowledge, publication of works, translations, book exchange, exchanges of scholarly delegations, study trips, lectures, and so forth.

Iranian scholars were delegates at the 25th International Congress of Orientalists, which took place in Moscow in August 1960. This was the first Congress of Orientalists at which the Iranian Section had Persian as its working language. Soviet scholars--Academicians A. M. Mirzoyev, A. A. Alizade, A. S. Sumbatzade, Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. N. Bogolyubov, I. S. Braginskiy, Professors A. N. Boldyrev, M. S. Ivanov, and others participated in the work of the International Congress of Iranists, which was held in Iran in 1967. The Soviet scholars Academician G. B. Gafurov and Professor A. N. Boldyrev became members of the Standing Committee of the International Congress of Iranists. And since July 1974 Academician B. G. Gafurov has also been an honorary doctor of Tehran University. From the Iranian side the director of the Pahlavi Scholarly Library, Sh. Shafa\* was elected an honorary doctor of the MGU /Moscow State University/ imeni M. V. Lomonosov.

Many Soviet scholars have visited Iran on study trips. Iranian scholars who are interested in the development of scholarship and culture, as well as the state of Iranian studies in the USSR, have also been frequent guests in our country; the Institute of Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Academies of Sciences of the Union republics, universities, and libraries.

The famous Iranian mathematician and professor of Tehran University, Khashtrudi, upon his return in 1962 from a trip to the Soviet Union, emphasized that a great impression had been made on him by becoming acquainted with the achievements of Soviet scholars in the field of physical mathematics. He pointed out that the colossal achievements of Soviet science are guaranteed in the first place by the fine training received by scientific personnel and by the educational system [7].

The great interest toward the Soviet Union among wide circles of the Iranian public is testified to by the words of the prominent writer and scholarly doctor, Parviz Natel Khanlari, chairman of Iran's Cultural Fund. He visited the Soviet Union on an international symposium on modern Iranian poetry which was held in Dushanbe in January 1968. Doctor Khanlari also visited Moscow, Leningrad, and Tashkent. "I consider," said Khanlari, "that cooperation between Iranian and Soviet scholars is very useful; it must be developed in all possible ways" [8]. In the scholarly literary journal SOHAN ("The Word"), which is edited by Doctor Khanlari, his impressions of the trip to the USSR were published, as well as poems by Tajik poets.

In February 1971 the newspaper FARMAN in an article entitled "The Development of Cultural Cooperation between Iran and the USSR" wrote that scientific and cultural cooperation was growing broader with each passing year. Working particularly actively in this direction are the Pahlavi Library and the Research Center for Iranian Culture ("Bon'yade farhange Iran"). The article states that now not only are works by Soviet Iranian scholars being translated but scholarly research in this field is being coordinated between the Research Center on Iran, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, and the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences [9].



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A significant contribution to the scholarly exploitation of the treasury of Iranian poetry and prose was made by the Azerbaijanian scholar R. M. Aliyev. In Iran alone some 20 of his works have been published, including such major ones as the critical textual edition of Vol 1 of Firdausi's "Shah-name" (prepared with N. Osmanov), the critical textual edition with research and commentaries of "Sa'di-name" ("Bustan"), the critical textual edition with research and notes of the "Persian Divan" by Nasim, and many scholarly articles. In a foreword to the "Sa'di-name" ("Bustan") the prominent Iranian critic and literary scholar Faruzanfar notes that this scholar "has done a great deal for Iranian literature." In speaking specifically about R. M. Aliyev's critical textual editing of the "Sa'di-name" ("Bustan"), Faruzanfar emphasizes that "the reader will now be able to read this poetic collection in the form in which it existed at a time close to that of its author, with full confidence in the correctness of its vocabulary, phraseology, and contents, as well as being able to make judgements on the stylistics and method of thought of the great sheikh" /10/.

Another fruit of the scholarly cooperation between the Research Center for Iranian Culture and the USSR's scholarly institutions was the book "Khomay and Khomayun" by Khaju Kermani. The text of this epic poem, a landmark of the 14th century, prepared and researched from the oldest manuscripts from holdings in Iran, Britain, and the USSR by the Soviet Iranist K. S. Ayni, was also published in Tehran. K. S. Ayni's research received high praise both in Iran and in the USSR. The Iranian bibliographical journal RAKHNAMA-E KETAB included this book in its list of the year's best books, while the literary journals YAGMA and SOHAN called it a "model of textological labor." This research work was accorded a foreword by the general director of the Research Center for Iranian Culture, Doctor P. N. Khanlari /9/.

Another significant cultural event was the publication in 1971 of the academic edition of the remarkable narrative poem by a classical writer of Persian literature, the Second-Century poet Fakhrad-din Gorgani, "Vis and Ramin." The critical textual edition of this poem, based on all the extant manuscripts from holdings in the USSR, Iran, Britain, India, and Turkey, as well as the Ancient Georgian versions, was prepared by the Soviet Iranists M. A. Todua and K. S. Ayni under the direction of Academician G. V. Tsereteli.

The level of development of Iranian studies in the Soviet Union is further testified to by the fact that a Soviet bibliography on Iran numbers about 10,000 titles of monographs, collections of articles, and translations from Persian. Works by Soviet scholars occupy a prominent place in the development of worldwide Iranian studies.

Intensive and valuable research is being conducted by the Iranists of Soviet Azerbaijan. At the Institute of the Peoples of the Near and Middle East of the Azerbaijanian SSR Academy of Sciences, where the principal forces of the republic's Iranists are concentrated, comprehensive studies have been undertaken of the problems of the history, philology, economics, and social thought of Iran. Widely renowned are the works of Azerbaijanian Iranists, devoted to agrarian relations, questions of Iran's industrial development, the labor and trade-union movement, class formations, the formation of political parties, problems in the development of Persian literature and language, the dissemination of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in Iran, etc.

Literary ties underwent a remarkable development during the 1960's and 1970's. This pertains, first of all, to translations of belles lettres, which, to the greatest extent, facilitates mutual understanding between peoples.

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The Soviet publishing house "Progress," which is well known to Iranian readers, during the course of the 1960's and 1970's prepared translations and published editions of a number of works by Russian and Soviet writers in 30 languages, including Persian. Among them are works by I. Turgenev, A. Tolstoy, A. Chekhov, A. Pushkin, M. Sholokhov, and M. Gor'kiy. They also published collections of poems by Soviet poets, such as V. Mayakovskiy, M. Tursunzade, K. Kuliyeu, and others. Furthermore, the Soviet reader obtained the possibility of becoming acquainted not only with the creative work of the classical writers of Persian literature, but also with the works of present-day prose writers and poets of Iran, such as Sadek Khadayat, Said Nafisi, Shahriyar, and others, who are being published in Russian and many other languages of the peoples of the USSR. The works of Iranian writers have made it possible for the Soviet reader to deepen his own ideas about the daily lives, culture, and world view of the peoples of Iran.

In 1971 on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the establishment of Iranian-Soviet state relations, the governments of both countries decided to institute a literary prize named after the outstanding poet Abol Hasem Firdausi. This prize is awarded once every two years to citizens of the USSR and Iran for outstanding works in the fields of scholarship, literature, and art, which facilitate the strengthening of friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of these countries.

The first winners of the Firdausi Prize were as follows: the director of the Leningrad State Hermitage Museum, Academician B. Piotrovskiy--for his research studies in the field of the ancient culture of the peoples of Transcaucasia and Iran; the prorector of the Tashkent State University, Professor Sh. Shakhmukhammedov--for his meritorious service in popularizing Tajik and Persian literature, as well as for training specialists in this field; the chairman of the Council on Cultural Questions of the Palace Ministry of Iran, Honorary Doctor of the MGU imeni M. V. Lomonosov, and director of the Pahlavi Scholarly Library, Sh. Shafa--for his active work in collecting and popularizing the Iranian heritage in the field of literature and language; the prominent Persian writer and philologist, president of the Academy of Literature and Art of Iran, and publisher of the journal SOHAN, N. P. Khanlari--for his scholarly contribution in the field of Persian literature and language [11].

A prominent place in the cultural ties between Iran and the USSR is occupied by the exchange of motion pictures. Iranian screens have shown the best-known Soviet films, while the Soviet viewer has had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the films of the Iranian national cinematography. Iran was an active participant in the Moscow and Tashkent International Film Festivals. Various cities in the Soviet Union have on more than one occasion conducted Iranian Film Weeks, during which such motion pictures as the following have been shown: "Sunrise," "The Tiger of Mazandaran," "European Bride," "The Long Night," "The Eighth Day of the Week," and others; these have been warmly received by Soviet viewers.

At the 10th International Festival of Scientific and Educational Films, which was held in Iran in December 1973, Soviet films were awarded two gold medals and one silver medal. The winners of the festival were the Soviet films "Bird X," "The Structure of a Stem," "The Polarization of Light," and "I Want to Understand You" [12].

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In June 1975 the largest cities in Iran--Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and Abadan--with great success conducted a festival of Soviet films devoted to the 30th Anniversary of the Victory over German Fascism. Iranian viewers became acquainted with Soviet documentary and feature motion pictures about the Great Patriotic War, such as "Two Soldiers," "Ballad of a Soldier," "The Great Battle on the Volga," "900 Unforgettable Days," and others which produced an enormous impression. At the end of 1977 an International Festival for Children and Young People was held in Tehran. The highest award at the Tehran Festival was won by the film "The Wishing Tree," which was made by the Georgian director T. Abuladze.

Great popularity in Iran is enjoyed by Soviet performing artists, composers, and musicians. In January 1978 a successful tour was made by the Moscow State Symphony Orchestra under the direction of V. Dudarova. The Iranian press, in commenting on the performances by the Soviet musicians, emphasized their high degree of performing skills, the outstanding conducting talent of V. Dudarova, and the virtuoso performances of works by Russian and Soviet composers by the young pianist from Azerbaijan, F. Badalbeyli.

An enormous impression was produced in Iran by the USSR's art of ballet, which was demonstrated on the Iranian stage. The newspapers KAYHAN, JOURNAL DE TEHRAN, and AYANDEGAN wrote in their pages about the production of the ballet "Swan Lake" by Tchaikovsky, as staged by the well-known Georgian choreographer, V. Chabukiani, participating in which were soloists from the Theater of Opera and Ballet of the Georgian SSR, as well as Iranian performing artists. The newspapers gave high marks to the performances by the Georgian ballet artists in the two leading parts in the traditions of the "splendid school of Russian ballet, which is distinguished for its purity, lightness, and expressiveness of dance" [13].

In June 1979 the TEHRAN DZHORNEL published a long article on the Soviet ballet film "Spartacus," set to the music of A. Khachaturyan. Calling this film a pearl of Soviet cinematography, the author of the article remarked on the outstanding mastery of the performers V. Vasil'ev, N. Bessmertnova, M. Liyepa, and N. Timofeyeva, as well as the magnificent music by A. Khachaturyan and the choreography by Grigorovich. The showing of such films, noted the newspaper, facilitates the development of the Iranian national ballet [14]. Another Iranian newspaper, ETTELA'AT, wrote in its pages about the Soviet art of ballet and about the most famous productions of the Bol'shoy Theater: "Swan Lake," "Giselle," and "The Sleeping Beauty" [15].

Visits by A. Khachaturyan, Niyazi, F. Amirov, R. Barshay, M. Magomayev, R. Beybutov, G. Gasparyan, and others were events of enormous importance in the cultural life of Iran. Great popularity was enjoyed by the Soviet circus, the dance ensemble under the direction of I. Moiseyev, the symphony orchestra of the Moscow State Philharmonic under the direction of Yu. Temirkanov.

Exhibits have had great importance for the mutual understanding of the cultures of the peoples. Numerous monuments of Iranian culture and art have been preserved in the largest museums of the USSR--the State Hermitage in Leningrad, the State Museum of the Arts of the Peoples of the East in Moscow, as well as in the museums of Baku, Tashkent, Tbilisi, and other cities of the Soviet Union. Their exhibitions have been represented at the thematic exhibits of Iranian pure and applied arts,

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Persian manuscripts, and rugs, which have been held on more than one occasion in the Soviet Union.

In December 1963 an exhibit of Iranian miniatures was held in the State Museum of the Arts of the Peoples of the East; it was organized by the Administration of Fine Arts of Iran and the USSR Ministry of Culture. This exhibit, which numbered about 200 works from the collections of Iranian museums, opened up for Soviet people one of the splendid pages of Iranian pictorial art.

Both countries have held more than one photo exhibit; these exhibitions have told the story, in particular, of the achievements in the field of culture in Iran and the USSR. In May 1974 the capital of Iran conducted an exhibit entitled "The USSR --The Country and Its People in Photographs." During the same year an exhibit devoted to Iran was organized in the Polytechnical Museum in Moscow. These exhibits invariably attracted a great deal of attention from the people attending them.

Great scholarly interest was evoked by the Second Conference on the Art and Archeology of Iran which was held in October 1973 in Moscow at the State Museum of the Arts of the Peoples of the East with the participation of scholars from Oriental studies institutions from throughout the country--Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Tbilisi, Tashkent, and other cities of the Soviet Union, and the large exhibit which was organized in conjunction with it of Iranian painting of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, consisting of items preserved in the State Museum of the Arts of the Peoples of the East, the Hermitage, and the Museum of Georgian Arts.

Cultural ties in certain other fields, including sports, were also developed during the 1960's and 1970's.

A broad exchange of cultural delegations took place, including some at a high level. Thus, the Soviet Union was visited by the following persons: the minister of culture and the arts, the minister of science and higher education, the minister of enlightenment, the director of the center for scholarly documentation, the director of sports societies, and a number of other highly placed persons. Iran, in turn, has been visited by Soviet scholars, writers, and cultural figures. In the field of the press Iran has been visited by journalists and correspondents from the central newspapers and journals, while the Soviet Union has been visited by the leading editors and publishers of ETTALA'AT, KAYHAN, PAYGAM EMRUZ, TEHRANA MOSAVVAR, KHANDANIHA, and others [4, 79--80].

The indubitable importance of the Soviet-Iranian cultural contacts which developed during the 1960's and 1970's consisted primarily in the fact that they made it possible for the Iranian public to become acquainted with the level of cultural development of the peoples of the USSR, including its Eastern peoples, with the level of scholarly research in the USSR with regard to Iran, to receive direct scholarly aid from Soviet scholars in working on the landmarks of Iranian culture, and to get a look at the masterpieces of the art of Soviet masters who have made a notable mark in the development of Iran's cultural life. These contacts have permitted various circles of the Soviet public to become more closely acquainted with many spheres of the very rich Iranian culture--the literary landmarks and masterpieces of Iranian art--and to establish direct cooperation with Iranian scholars and other cultural figures; this, in turn, has enriched our ideas about Iran and stimulated the development of Iranian studies in the USSR.

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The 1978--1979 anti-monarchist, anti-imperialist revolution in Iran, after overthrowing the shah's regime, proclaimed with the lips of the people the striving to create and develop an independent society. The Soviet state, true to its Leninist principles of foreign policy, declared its readiness to develop the broadest possible ties with revolutionary Iran. Shortly after the victory of the Iranian revolution, on 2 March 1979 in his speech in a meeting with the voters of the Baumanskiy Electoral District in the city of Moscow, the leader of our party and state, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, said as follows: "We wish success and prosperity to the new revolutionary Iran, and we hope that relations of good-neighborliness between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Iran will develop fruitfully under the new conditions on a firm basis of mutual respect, goodwill, and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other" [16].

Despite the complexity of the internal political situation in Iran, which undoubtedly has affected Iranian-Soviet relations, including those in the field of culture, it is gratifying to note that sharply defined tendencies have begun to appear in Iran toward a further recognition of the merits of Soviet scholarship on the level of studying the history and culture of their country, as well as Soviet literature. A specific manifestation of this was, for example, the translation of the section on the history of Iran during the first half of the 19th century (author N. A. Kuznetsova) from the book "Outline of Modern Iranian History" (Moscow, 1978), as carried out by the Tehran publishing house "Neshr-e beynolmelyali," R. A. Seidov's book "The Iranian Bourgeoisie in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries" (Moscow, 1974), O. S. Melikov's book "The Establishment of Reza-Shah's Dictatorship in Iran" (Moscow, 1960); this last-named work shows the path to power taken by the first Pahlavi monarch, following the methods of despotism in the country's complicated internal political circumstances of that time.

In April 1980 the press released the news of the publication by the Tehran publishing house "SolKh" of selected works by the Azerbaijanian poet Nabi Khazri in Azerbaijanian and Persian. In the introduction by the translator of this collection, the well-known Iranian poet Mohammed Ali Mahmid, awarded high marks to the level of literature and culture of Soviet Azerbaijan [17].

The further strengthening and development of cultural contacts between the two countries will bring undoubted aid to the peoples of Iran and those of the USSR.

## FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism," in PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30.
2. For the development of Soviet-Iranian ties prior to the 1960's see: D. Valiyev, "Sovetsko-iranskiye kul'turnyye svyazi" [Soviet-Iranian Cultural Ties], Tashkent, 1965.
3. NEDA-E IRAN-E NOVIN, 4 July 1965. Cited in [4, 76].
4. N. S. Tikhonov, "Desyat' let plodotvornogo sotrudnichestva (spets. vypusk)" [Ten Years of Fruitful Cooperation (Special Edition)], Izd. TSNION pri AN Azerb. SSR, Baku, 1974.

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5. KHANDANIHA, 1345 (1966), No 61.
  6. For text see: VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSR, 20 March 1968, No 12.
  - \* After the Revolution of February 1979 in Iran many institutions of the former shah's regime were abolished, and their officials were replaced correspondingly. A reorganization was also carried out in the system of higher educational institutions and in the press.
  7. IZVESTIYA, 22 November 1962.
  8. IZVESTIYA, 16 January 1968.
  9. FARMAN, 30 February 1971.
  10. "Sa'di-name ya Bustan," Entesharat-e ibn-Sina. Tehran, 1347 (1968).
  11. IZVESTIYA, 15 January 1974.
  12. VYSHKA, 26 December 1973.
  13. KAYHAN, JOURNAL DE TEHRAN, AYANDEGAN, 2 February 1972.
  14. TEHRAN DZHORNAL, 4 June 1978.
  15. ETTELA'AT, 14 June 1978.
  16. PRAVDA, 3 March 1979.
  17. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 17 June 1980.
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REGIONAL

SULTANGALIYEVISM ATTACKED BY TATAR AUTHORS

Kazan' TATARSKAYA ASSR: REAL'NOST' I BURZHUAZNYYE MIFY in Russian 1977 (signed to press 14 Jun 77) pp 123-138

Chapter 6 from the book "The Tatarskaya ASSR: Reality and Bourgeois Myths", Tatarskoye knizhnoye izdatel'stvo

Text Sultangaliyevism and Its Bourgeois Defenders

The establishment of Soviet power enabled the Tatar workers to proceed to solve numerous and difficult problems of building the nation. The main ways of solving them were outlined by the Program of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and the resolutions on the national problem, which were passed by the 10th and 12th party congresses. Whereas the elimination of the legal inequality of nations was the first step of the socialist revolution, the abolition of their de facto (economic and cultural) inequality should have become its next step. In the end the goal of the party was to help the workers of the non-Russian nations and nationalities to catch up with the advanced nations, to eliminate the vestiges of the former national discord and to unite in one harmonious multinational family.

The attainment of this goal did not suit the Tatar bourgeoisie, just as the bourgeoisie of the other nations of Russia. Therefore the Tatar bourgeoisie interpreted the formation of Soviet autonomy in a nationalistic spirit--as the creation of a state system, which was not connected by any bonds with the Russian Federation and was not dependent on it. The nationalist bourgeoisie perceived the declaration of the Tatarskaya ASSR as an act of the separation of the Tatar people from the Russian people, as a unique "partition." Former State Duma member K. Khasanov let out the cherished thoughts of the Tatar bourgeoisie when he said: "We, the Tatar nation, for several centuries vegetated at the Russian Court. This day (the day of the declaration of the Tatarskaya ASSR--M. A. and S. B.) we achieved partition" (113, p 36).

The goal of the bourgeoisie was to set the Tatar people against other peoples and to kindle national enmity and hatred in the name of maintaining class domination over "their own" workers. Sultangaliyevism was precisely an expression of the organized protest of the nationalist bourgeoisie against the policy of the Communist Party (113, p 7).

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Bourgeois authors have exerted considerable effort in trying to prove that Sultan-galiyevism reflected the view not of the bourgeoisie, but of the broad masses. At the same time "Sovietologists" and Tatar nationalist emigres are not sparing in their compliments for M. Sultan-Galiyev, calling him a "revolutionary," "national communist" and even a "genuine Marxist." Thus, A. Bennigsen and C. Quelquejay extol Sultan-Galiyev, interpreting his views as the application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the colonial East and himself as a revolutionary who ostensibly set as a goal "to direct the October Revolution toward Asia" (178, p 323).

As a result the question of the social roots of Sultangaliyevism is veiled, while the problem of its ideological sources is solved in an obviously idealized light.

It is impossible to understand the essence of Sultangaliyevism without taking into account the spiritual relationship between it and the views of the Tatar nationalist bourgeoisie. The ideas of Sultan-Galiyev were in many ways in keeping with the conceptions of the ideologists of the Tatar bourgeoisie.

First, there is the "theory" of the "united multitude." Like other Pan-Islamists, Sultan-Galiyev believed that the Tatar bourgeois nation prior to the October Revolution had not undergone or had hardly undergone social differentiation. In his opinion, the increased class differentiation among Tatars began only in 1918. Thereby Sultan-Galiyev ignored the fact of the existence among Tatars of a proletariat and a bourgeoisie and of the class struggle between them.

Second, there is the recognition of the special "cultural mission of the Tatars" with respect to the other peoples of the East, the need for the constant orientation of the Turkic peoples toward Kazan' as the spiritual and cultural center of Islam. The aspiration of Sultan-Galiyev to make the eastern peoples of Russia dependent on the Tatar bourgeois nation was concealed behind the formulation about a "cultural mission."

Third, there is the recognition of the positive role of the Islamic religion and the Islamic clergy in the life of the Tatar workers. Thus, with respect to Shari'ah laws Sultan-Galiyev wrote that ostensibly among them there are "very many which are of a quite positive nature." As to the fanatic reactionary Tatar clergy, as Sultan-Galiyev claims, it had disappeared before the February Revolution, while "a new clergy, which promoted the weakening of the religious fanaticism of the Tatars, appeared in its place" (!) (117, pp 24, 29, 36-37).

Fourth, there is the rejection of the idea of the class cooperation of the workers of various nations. Nothing whatsoever remained of it after the fact of a class differentiation among Tatars was repudiated, a special role in the East was ascribed to them and the importance of Islam as a common ideology for the Turkic people was emphasized in every possible way.

Thus, the conceptions of Sultan-Galiyev were thoroughly permeated with Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. In order to conceal their essence, Sultan-Galiev attempted to disguise his nationalist arguments by means of Marxist phraseology.

This, of course, is not an accident: in 1917, when Sultan-Galiyev became associated with the Bolshevik Party, he already had behind him experience in cooperating



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with the Moslem bourgeoisie in the spreading of nationalist ideas. By this activity of his, in his own words, he earned the gratitude of prominent Pan-Islamists and Pan-Turkists.

Consequently, it is necessary to seek the ideological sources of Sultangaliyevism in bourgeois nationalism. Having joined the Communist Party, Sultan-Galiyev "changed color" only on the outside. He did not become a Marxist. He was described very accurately by the prominent figure of our party S. Ordzhonikidze, who in 1923 pointed out: "...The participation of one Moslem intellectual or another in the struggle against the reaction... still does not prove anything. This does not mean that one is a communist. It means only that one is our fellow traveler" (113, p 71).

The rating of Sultan-Galiyev as a fellow traveler of the party denotes the temporary, tactical nature of his participation in the revolution. The views of this nationalist reflected the vacillations of the class which was between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that is, the petty bourgeoisie. Therefore Sultangaliyevism, like the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, was characterized by all its negative traits: a metaphysical, one-sided approach to the assessment of phenomena of social life, the failure to understand the guiding role of the proletariat in society, inconsistency, "evasiveness and influence with respect to socialist ideology (32, p 374), nationalism. The treatment of questions of the socio-economic and political development of the eastern peoples from the point of view of this ideology meant not "the application of Marxism-Leninism" to the national problem, as bourgeois falsifiers claim, but its right-wing opportunist revision. Objectively Sultangaliyevism played into the hands of the bourgeoisie.

Citing the articles of Sultan-Galiyev, which were published in October-November 1919, American "Sovietologist" R. Pipes attempts to force upon the readers the idea that "the ideology of Sultan-Galiyev was not at variance with the Bolshevik strategy of 1919-1920...." But it is enough to compare the views of Sultan-Galiyev with Lenin's theses on the fundamental questions of the national liberation struggle for the incompatibility of his ideological stand with the general line of the party to become immediately clear.

V. I. Lenin, in regarding the October Revolution in Russia as the first act of the commenced world socialist revolution, pointed out that it would not be able to triumph, having only struck the "front" of imperialism, that is, the mother countries, it should also strike its "rear," that is, the colonies. The collapse of world imperialism will occur as a result of the combination of socialist revolutions in the countries of the West with the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples of the East. V. I. Lenin expressed a high opinion of the anti-imperialist movement of the colonial peoples. In his report at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East (November 1919) he noted that these peoples "have to play a great role in the revolutionary struggle, in the revolutionary movement...." At the same time V. I. Lenin did not forget for one moment that in the end the fate of world imperialism would be decided not in the colonies, but in the mother countries, that is, where its main positions are. Therefore, V. I. Lenin said, "only the proletariat of all the advanced countries of the world can finally triumph..." (7, pp 328, 330).

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The conception of Sultan-Galiyev was based on completely opposite conclusions. It was based on the fact that ostensibly the national liberation movement of the peoples of the East would strike the final blow to world imperialism. According to Sultan-Galiyev, the victory of the national democratic revolutions and the abolition of the colonial system would lead to the automatic collapse of international imperialism. "Deprived of the East and cut off from India, Afghanistan, Persia and its other Asian and African colonies," he declared, "West European imperialism should go into decline and die a natural death" (117, p 38). Taking this conception as his basis, Sultan-Galiyev called upon revolutionaries to direct their main attention not to the West, but to the East, where the fate of international imperialism was ostensibly being decided.... When reading these arguments of Sultan-Galiyev, it seems that you are dealing with a contemporary Maoist exponent, who is prophesying that "the center of the revolutionary storms has moved to the East," that henceforth "the wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West" and so forth.

Lenin's conception of the world revolutionary process is based, as is known, on the recognition of the need for a stable alliance of the international proletariat with the oppressed peoples of the East, who are peasants for the most part, as the most important condition of the success of their struggle against imperialism. In this alliance the leading role should belong to the proletariat as the main, leading force of the anti-imperialist camp. Only the proletariat is capable of uniting the various currents of the revolutionary movement, of pointing out to them clear objectives of the struggle and of leading them into a decisive assault on capitalism.

Sultan-Galiyev set the national liberation movement against the struggle of the international working class. He in fact struck out Lenin's brilliant idea about the need for an alliance of the oppressed peoples with the international proletariat by his thesis that since nearly all the classes of colonial society are oppressed by capitalism, they all ostensibly "have the right to be called proletarians." Having thus replaced the Marxist interpretation of the term "proletariat" with the petty bourgeois interpretation, Sultan-Galiyev thereby cleared the way for the conclusion about the needlessness of the proletarian leadership of the national liberation movement. This is so obvious to any reader who is in any way acquainted with Marxism-Leninism that even the revisionist (R. Garodi) was compelled to call Sultan-Galiyev's thesis "nationalistic," "alien to the fundamental principles of Marxist analysis" (182, p 88).

The negative attitude of Sultan-Galiyev toward the idea of the proletarian leadership of the national liberation movement was based on his deep lack of faith in the revolutionary abilities of the international working class. Without understanding the revolutionary essence of its strategy and tactics in the national liberation movement, Sultan-Galiyev accused the international and Russian proletariat of "one-sidedness," "impotence" and their failure to fulfill "the promise to support the revolutionary aspirations of the East." He completely ignored the assistance and support which was given by Soviet Russia to the struggling countries of the East--Turkey, Afghanistan, China, India and so on. Lenin's idea that, having broken the chain of imperialism at one link and having split the world into two systems, the October Socialist Revolution thereby gave enormous assistance to the structure of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation, was fundamentally alien to Sultan-Galiyev.

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To counterbalance Lenin's conception Sultan-Galiyev advanced the idea of turning over the leadership of the national liberation movement to the more developed eastern peoples of Soviet Russia (for example, the Tatars), who, as peoples close in language and culture, should lead them. Thus, Sultan-Galiyev replaced the class principle of the leadership of the national liberation movement by the national principle.

As a result of this substitution the distinct class outlook of the development of national democratic movements was lost. Under these conditions the national bourgeoisie, the revolutionary nature of which was transitory, while the opposition of its interests to the interests of the proletariat was permanent, was able to make its way to the leadership under the cover of outwardly "revolutionary" slogans.

Even the briefest survey of Sultan-Galiyev's main conceptions on the questions of the national liberation movement reveal their petty bourgeois, anti-Leninist nature. These conceptions were at variance with the party program, which was adopted at the eighth congress in 1919 and indicated that in the area of national relations "the policy of the convergence of the proletarians and semiproletarians of different nationalities for the joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and bourgeoisie is regarded as of paramount importance" (56, p 45).

But the matter was not limited only to the "theoretical exercises" of Sultan-Galiyev, which in itself already upset the ideological unity of the ranks of the party. His anti-Leninist views fed his nationalist political line. It was a policy of opposing the movement of peoples for the creation of their own national state system to the general party policy of building socialism. Taking refuge in socialist phraseology, the Sultangaliyevists persistently pursued a policy of separating the non-Russian peoples from the Russian proletariat. For these purposes they used extensively the slogan of creating a united state system of the peoples of the Volga River region and the Urals and initially linked the realization of their plans with the creation of a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic.

Sultan-Galiyev and his sympathizers, proceeding from their hegemonic plans, did not want to hear anything about the formation of a separate Bashkir autonomy. The conclusion by the Soviet Government of an agreement with the Bashkir nationalist government on the creation of a Soviet autonomy evoked a negative reaction among the Sultangaliyevists. On 27 February 1919, soon after the Bashkir troops, who prior to this had fought in the camp of the Whites, went over to the side of the Red Army, Sultan-Galiyev in a direct-line telephone conversation said to A.-Z. Validov, the leader of the Bashkir nationalists: "You were in too much of a hurry, you uselessly went over to the side of the Bolsheviks and thereby ruined the matter..." (159, p 71). By "the matter" Sultan-Galiyev meant the idea of creating a united Tatar-Bashkir state.

Sultan-Galiyev attempted "to rectify the situation" at the Second Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, again dragging out the slogan of the formation of a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic. But this venture of his failed.

Then Sultan-Galiyev attempted to achieve his goals in a roundabout way, through the inclusion in the Tatar autonomy being created of territories with a Tatar-Bashkir population, which were not a part of the Bashkirskaya ASSR. He set forth his

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plans in a letter dated 21 February 1920 to the well-known nationalist G. Baimbetov, stating that henceforth "there is only one... chance to create a Tatar-Bashkir Republic: ...to declare the remaining area the Tatar Republic, to consolidate it, and then to merge with Bashkiria" (94, p 94).

However, the creation of a Tatar-Bashkir Republic was not the ultimate goal of Sultan-Galiyev--he regarded it only as an intermediate stage on the road to the creation of a Turanian Republic, which should have included the Volga River region, the Urals, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. This idea was borrowed in full by Sultan-Galiyev from militant Pan-Turkists like Rashid-kazy Ibragimov, who back in 1905 wrote about the need to unite the peoples of the Middle and Lower Volga River region, the Urals and Siberia in a Pan-Turkic state.

After the failure to create a Tatar-Bashkir Republic, Sultan-Galiyev advanced the slogan of forming a "Volga-Kama Federation," which should have included the Tatars, Chuvash, Mari and Udmurts. This federation was conceived by him as a state ensuring the hegemony of the Tatars over the small nationalities of the region. But this attempt of the Sultangaliyevists also failed owing to the reluctance of the peoples of the Volga River and Urals regions to create such a federation. Sultan-Galiyev admitted that "the Chuvash and Mari were wary of this idea and did not especially aspire to a union with the Tatars."

The foreign defenders of the Sultangaliyevists also justify their attempt to create a separate "Moslem Communist Party," citing, in particular, their desire ostensibly "to leave free the hands" of the Tatar revolutionaries for leading the socialist revolution in the East. As the first step in this direction the Sultangaliyevists were prepared to use the sections of communists of the eastern peoples, which had been set up in the party in the interests of taking into account the national peculiarities of local party work. The national-deviationists sought the recognition of the federative principle of interrelations between the party and these sections, having as a goal in the end to detach them from the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and to form them into an independent party. The Sultangaliyevists and their sympathizers were obsessed with the idea of uniting the communist organizations in the eastern republics in a "Colonial International," which was separate from Comintern and was opposed to it. Such separatism in organizational matters inevitably led to the separation of the arisen communist movement in the East from the international communist movement and only played into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Therefore the Second Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, having supported the retention of national sections in the party, at the same time indicated the need for their subordination to local party organizations. This was the only correct solution, which was dictated by the interests of uniting the communists of all nationalities of the country into a unified Communist Party.

Reluctant to recognize the objective laws of the failure of the nationalist plans of the Sultangaliyevists for building a state and a party, bourgeois authors cite other reasons to substantiate their anti-Soviet ideas. Thus, Bennigsen and Quelquejay see the main cause of the defeat of Sultan-Galiyev in the fact that all his proposals "came up against the insurmountable opposition of Stalin" (178, p 371). In this way the "Sovietologists" wish to achieve two goals at once: first, to prove the purely "chance" nature of the failure of the nationalist conceptions of

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Sultan-Galiyev; second, to play on the criticism of the personality cult of Stalin by the 20th CPSU Congress.

Bourgeois ideologists ignore the basic fact that the nationalist policy of the Sultangaliyevists went against the national policy of the entire party. Not only Stalin, who held the position of People's Commissar of Nationalities, but also the highest party organs, its Central Committee and V. I. Lenin personally gave a negative characterization to the plans of Sultan-Galiyev. Thus, the plan to create a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic was rejected in the end by V. I. Lenin, who during a discussion with the representatives of the Central Bureau of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, which was held on 22 March 1920, gave, in the words of Chairman of the Tatarskaya ASSR Council of People's Commissars S. G. Said-Galiyev, "a splendid lesson in how one of the just liberated nationalities, which is comparatively stronger, should not assume the role of a benefactor with respect to a less stronger nationality, and especially should not act contrary to its wishes" (51, p 339).

In exactly the same way the "Sovietologists" interpret the defeat of the Sultangaliyevists in the matter of creating a "Moslem Communist Party" as a result of the interference of Stalin. Meanwhile it is well known that the organizational principles of the building and activity of the Communist Party were developed by V. I. Lenin, who stood up for them in the fierce struggle against the Bundists, Mensheviks and other opportunists. Back on the eve of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party V. I. Lenin emphasized the duty of the Russian Social Democrats "not to create separately operating organizations, each in its own direction, not to lessen the force of the onslaught by splitting into numerous independent political parties, not to spread estrangement and isolation..." (21, p 122). Stalin in his speech at the First Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, having noted the need to retain the international principle of building our party, said: "Such is the opinion of the party, which the party Central Committee instructed me to report" (138, p 90).

Meanwhile the Sultangaliyevists wanted at all costs to defend their anti-Leninist conceptions without reckoning with the majority of the party. The tactics of their leader at the Second Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East consisted, by Sultan-Galiyev's own admission, in the following: to force through, in defiance of the party Central Committee, the question of establishing a Tatar-Bashkir Republic or, in case of defeat, to declare the formation of the "Eastern Communist Party." In both instances the Sultangaliyevists intended to impose their collective point of view on the party.

The "Sovietologists" strive to reduce the danger of the nationalist activity of Sultan-Galiyev, asserting that he was not really an enemy of the party, but only "a representative of the intraparty opposition." This is nothing other than an attempt to legitimize factional activity in the Communist Party. Not by chance do Bennigsen and Quelquejay attack the resolution "On the Unity of the Party," which was adopted by the 10th congress on the suggestion of V. I. Lenin and which ordered all groups to be disbanded and a stricter watch to be kept over not allowing factional actions. The bourgeois ideologists accuse the 10th congress of the fact that it "opened the way to a monolithic party." Hence it is only one step to the justification of the counterrevolutionary activity of Sultan-Galiyev: since after

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the congress for him "legal opposition was impossible, only illegal activity remained for him" (178, p 365). It turns out that the party itself prompted Sultan-Galiyev to antiparty and anti-Soviet activity (?!).

The "Sovietologists" and renegades try to justify the activity of Sultan-Galiyev by interpreting it as a natural reaction to great power chauvinism. But these attempts are not original. Such an "argument" was advanced by his supporters back in the 1920's, and at that time it was severely criticized by our party. The Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) with responsible party workers of the national republics and oblasts, which was held in 1923, noted that whereas at the initial stage the nationalist activity of Sultan-Galiyev to some extent could have been regarded as a reaction against Great Russian chauvinism, such an approach was completely unsuitable for explaining his activity at subsequent stages. In the resolution of the conference it was stated: "The antiparty and objectively counterrevolutionary tasks set by Sultan-Galiyev and the very logic of anti-party work led Sultan-Galiyev to a traitorous search for an alliance with clearly counterrevolutionary forces which are aimed at overthrowing the Soviet system..." (56, p 487).

The clear-cut political appraisal of Sultangaliyevism as a counterrevolutionary trend, which was given by the party, does not suit the "Sovietologists." They would like at any cost to moderate this appraisal or to cast doubt upon it. A. Bennigsen, for example, acts this way by including the resolution of the Fourth Central Committee Conference "On the Case of Sultan-Galiyev" in the category of "detective literature" (177, p 653).

Bennigsen, of course, knows about the secret contacts of Sultan-Galiyev with Turkish and Persian bourgeois figures and about his attempt to make contact with the leaders of the Turkestan basmachi. Thus, in a letter to Persian bourgeois political figure Tadzhi Bakshi, Sultan-Galiyev wrote about his intention to unite the Moslem communists and the bourgeois leaders of the East in order to oppose them to Comintern and the Soviet Government (95, p 28). In another secret letter addressed to Bashkir bourgeois nationalist A. Adigamov, he gave the assignment to establish contact with basmachi leader A.-Z. Validov. These secret letters are convincing evidence that "Sultan-Galiyev had gone over from the camp of the communists to the camp of the basmachi" (47, p 303).

The Tatar national-deviationists, just like Bennigsen, at one time attempted to express doubt about the authenticity of the anti-Soviet documents which exposed their leader. But this attempt of theirs ended in complete failure. At the Fourth Central Committee Conference Stalin fittingly rebuked the national-deviationists, stating that the conducted investigation had proven the authenticity of the letters of Sultan-Galiyev. Moreover, in Stalin's words, "Sultan-Galiyev himself acknowledged their authenticity, moreover he let more be known about his offenses than is stated in the documents, thoroughly acknowledged his guilt..." (47, p 305). Why, then, did Bennigsen have to raise a question which was clarified long ago? Apparently, only in order to express his liking for the anti-Soviet nationalist who was exposed by the party.

In their monograph Bennigsen and Quelquejay claim that Sultan-Galiyev, by maintaining contacts with the opponents of the Soviet regime, ostensibly "no longer had in

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mind the creation of a truly counterrevolutionary organization, but simply a 'front of the discontent'" (175, p 168). As "proof" the French "Sovietologists" cite the statement of Firdevs, Yenbayev, Mukhtarov and so on, that is, the very national-deviationists who supported Sultan-Galiyev in every possible way. The facts attest that the so-called front of the discontent was the nucleus of the formed counter-revolutionary organization.

The Tatar nationalists played a leading role in this organization. They set the tone in the work, instructed sympathizers, set specific tasks for them and made arrangements on concerted actions. Sultan-Galiyev constantly informed the Bashkir, Turkestan, Crimean and other nationalists and gave them recommendations on what policy to pursue. In December 1922 he organized in Moscow an illegal conference of a number of delegates of the 10th All-Russian Congress of Soviets from the eastern republics, at which the question of joint actions at the congress was agreed upon. In fulfilling the decision of this conference, several delegates came forth with nationalist demands at the meeting of the party faction of the 10th All-Russian Congress. The nationalists also carried out similar preparation for organized action before the 12th party congress, which discussed the national question.

While the party headed by V. I. Lenin acted as the organizer of the unification movement of the Soviet peoples, the Sultangaliyevists acted in counterbalance to its policy. They interpreted the party policy of creating a multinational Soviet socialist state as the aspiration of the "Pan-Russians" to reestablish "an actually united, indivisible Russia." The bourgeois nationalists supported the partition of the RSFSR and the formation of a separate federation of republics of the Turkic peoples. In the end it was a question of isolating the Turkic peoples from the other peoples of the USSR and, as Sultan-Galiyev stated, of surrounding "Great Russia" with independent (that is, bourgeois) states which had been separated from it. Ali Akysh, who dreams that along with "Ural-Volga states" "Siberian states" in the east, a "Great Turkestan" in the southeast, a "Caucasian Federation" in the south and a "Great Ukraine" in the west would appear on the map of the Soviet Union, today praises precisely this ideal of Sultan-Galiyev (171, 26).

The plans of the Sultangaliyevists played into the hands of both the internal and the foreign enemies of the Soviet state, for they were designed for the elimination of the USSR as the base of the building of socialism and a reliable bulwark of the international communist and workers movement. Therefore the party acted quite justly in removing Sultan-Galiyev for his criminal actions from the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and expelling him from the ranks of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).

All the subsequent activity of Sultan-Galiyev attests that the conclusions of the Fourth Central Committee Conference correctly reflected the counterrevolutionary orientation of Sultangaliyevism. After being expelled from the party he did not cease the struggle against the Soviet Government. The Sultangaliyevist center directed underground organizations in Kazan', the Crimea and Astrakhan', conducted hostile anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, studied the political sentiments of the population and recruited new members. Under the conditions where the party was waging a fierce struggle against the Trotskiy-Zinov'yev and Bukharin oppositions, the Sultangaliyevists agreed to a merge with antiparty elements. At the same time they strengthened ties with foreign countries. The Sultangaliyevists were linked

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through Crimean nationalists with the ruling circles of landowning Poland, and through the Central Asian basmachi and White emigre G. Iskhaki with the British General Staff. Using their official position, the sympathizers of Sultan-Galiyev turned over to the capitalist powers secret documents and decrees of the party Central Committee and the Soviet Government. All this was done in the hope of an attack in the next few years of international imperialism on the USSR and its partition in the future into separate states. For Sultan-Galiyev the question of the collapse of the Soviet Government had been decided in advance. In 1928 he stated that "now one does not have to speak of the coming collapse of the Soviet Government, rather it is necessary to speak about how it will fall...."

The hostile activity of the Sultangaliyevists was properly appraised by the party. In the resolution of the Bureau of the Tatarskaya Oblast Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), which was adopted on 26 September 1929, it was qualified with every reason as "a part of the common bourgeois front," which "is performing under the conditions of the national republics work on undermining the fraternal alliance between the workers of the previously oppressed nationalities and the revolutionary proletariat in order to guarantee the victory of the reaction and the counterrevolution" (113, p 43).

The "Sovietologists" pass over in complete silence the fact that Sultangaliyevism as a political trend never had a mass base, for it was alien and hostile to the interests of the workers. Even some politically immature elements, which initially stood behind the platform of the Sultangaliyevists, gradually abandoned it and began to follow the party. Characterizing this process, PRAVDA in the issue from 4 November 1929 wrote: "...The evolution of Sultangaliyevism in the direction of open counterrevolution took place at the same time as its isolation from the working masses.... Sultangaliyevism was transformed in 1929 into a narrow group of leaders of the right-wing nationalists and the reactionary nationalist intelligentsia."

The measures of the Central Committee, which were aimed at overcoming bourgeois nationalism and cliquishness in the Tatar Party Organization, found extensive support among the working masses. At gatherings and meetings the workers, peasants, Red Army men and employees said that they completely supported the policy of the Communist Party. Thus, the meeting of the party aktiv of Verkhne-Gorodskoy Rayon of Kazan' in a resolution of 22 November 1929 noted with complete satisfaction the timeliness of the exposure by the oblast party committee of Sultangaliyevism as a display of the militant bourgeois nationalism of the counterrevolution. The meeting of the instructors and students of the Tatar Department of the Artemovo Party School in the Donbass, which was held on 1 November 1929, qualified the attempts of the Sultangaliyevists to spread their ideology among the masses of workers and peasants at a trend which ran counter to the national policy of the party and was aimed at the realization of the plans of the White emigration. The workers of the Galaktionovskiy Factory in Kazan' in a resolution adopted in December 1929 emphasized that the workers and the bulk of the peasants had closed ranks even more closely around the implementation of the slogans of the party and the Soviet Government. The workers of the city and the countryside angrily condemned Sultangaliyevism as an obstacle in the way of the building of socialism in the USSR and demanded of the party that it henceforth properly repulse all manifestations of

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nationalism and "cut the root from under" the shoots of cliquishness.\* Such was the impartial sentence passed on Sultangaliyevism by history itself. It was equivalent to the acknowledgement of its political death.

The 15th Oblast Conference, which was held in June 1930, in the resolution on the report of the oblast committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) appraised in the following manner the importance of the activity of the party organization on overcoming nationalism and chauvinism: "The ideological and organizational rout of counterrevolutionary Sultangaliyevism, the gains in the struggle against the vestiges of great power chauvinism and local nationalism, the increase of the activeness of the entire party organization in the practical implementation of the Leninist national policy and the overall economical and cultural growth of the TR (that is, the Tatar Republic--M. A. and S. B.) on the basis of the strengthening of the socialist sector of the economy are creating favorable conditions for the more rapid overcoming of the economic and cultural backwardness of the working Tatars and national minorities" (66, pp 399-400).

The complete exposure and rout of Sultangaliyevism promoted the closing of the party ranks on the principles of proletarian internationalism and the strengthening of the ties of party organizations with the masses and provided the conditions for the elimination of the vestiges of national enmity and the building of new, socialist social relations.

\* See the issue of the newspaper KZYL TATARSTAN for October-December 1929.

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