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Translation

NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S. POLICY

By

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ANNOTATION

The book is devoted to a study of a most urgent problem of contemporary international relations--the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and U.S. policy in this sphere. The monograph examines various aspects of the problem--the evolution of Washington's approach to nonproliferation, the attitude toward the corresponding treaty, the imperialist rivalry of the United States and the West European countries and relations with the developing states on nuclear power issues. The book analyzes the contradictory nature of U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere and in the approach to the USSR's proposals aimed at strengthening the practice of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

INTRODUCTION

The relevance of the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is not in doubt. It is occasioned by the urgency of the struggle against the threat of nuclear war. L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee Report to the 25th party congress: "...the adoption of further effective measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons on our planet remains a most important problem. The USSR is ready to cooperate in its solution with other states."[1]

In the Soviet Union's foreign policy activity the problem of nonproliferation invariably occupies a central place among questions of nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The USSR was an initiator of the conclusion of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which at the present time has been signed and ratified by more than 100 countries.

The importance of the conclusion of the treaty and the need to strengthen it have been confirmed repeatedly. The Soviet-British joint declaration on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons issued at the time of the British prime minister's visit

to the Soviet Union in February 1974 emphasized the task of "as large a number of states as possible subscribing to the treaty."[2] Nonproliferation issues were discussed at top-level Soviet-French talks in 1977 and 1979. The adopted Program of the Further Development of Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and France in Favor of Detente and Peace said that, guided by an endeavor to avoid an increase in the nuclear threat, the countries recognize the urgent "need for further efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons."[3]

At the time of the signing of the SALT II Treaty Between the USSR and the United States in June 1979 the problem of nonproliferation was carefully examined by the delegations of the two countries. The Soviet-American communique, which was signed by the heads of government, observed that the USSR and the United States "advocate a further strengthening of the practice of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons."[4]

Nonproliferation issues have been and are being examined on the USSR's initiative not only at the level of bilateral contacts but also in a number of international organizations, primarily the United Nations.

Paramount significance is attached to this problem in the Soviet proposals "Practical Ways To Halt the Arms Race," which were submitted in 1978 for examination by the UN General Assembly Special Disarmament Session. At the UN General Assembly 33d Session the USSR presented the initiative of the conclusion of an international convention on strengthening security guarantees of nonnuclear states and on agreement being reached on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they do not currently exist. These proposals will be at the center of the attention of the second conference of countries party to the Nonproliferation Treaty planned for 1980. The USSR's course toward disarmament--the limitation and gradual reduction of existing arsenals of nuclear weapons, right down to their total liquidation--is geared to the creation of a political climate in international relations which would facilitate the solution of the problem of preventing the spread of these weapons.

The importance of this problem from the viewpoint of the strengthening of international security is perfectly understandable. Indeed, if in the process of the creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons states which do not currently possess them were to be involved, the threat of nuclear war would increase immeasurably. It is not difficult to imagine to what the development of events could lead if there were to be nuclear weapons also in the arsenals of the parties to a conflict. An increase in the number of nuclear states could also make extraordinarily more complicated questions of nuclear disarmament, which are in all their acuteness part of the agenda of the foreign policy activity of the majority of countries in the 1980's. All this dictates the vitally important need for the creation of appropriate international conditions which would reliably avert the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Processes appreciably complicating and thereby imparting even greater urgency to this problem were further developed in the 1970's. The number of countries materially capable of creating nuclear weapons continues to increase in line with the unfolding of the scientific-technical revolution and the broadening of interstate cooperation, in the sphere of nuclear technology included. In the estimation of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 1975 there were 15 such

"near-nuclear" or "threshold" states, but at the start of the 1980's their number may have exceeded 20. American specialists believe that by the year 2000 the number of states with the technical potential for the development and creation of nuclear weapons could have risen to 40.

The 1970's were a period of the intensive development of nuclear power engineering. The growing need for energy, the increased prices for conventional types of fuel and the creation of highly economic and safe types of nuclear power reactors condition the attractiveness and economic advantages of the further development of nuclear power stations. However, a byproduct--plutonium (a fissionable material which, with the appropriate reprocessing, is suitable for the creation of nuclear weapons)--is separated off in the process of the operation of conventional nuclear power installations. Even now many countries are obtaining from the nuclear power stations plutonium in quantities sufficient for the production of their own atomic bombs. In the estimation of experts, by 1990 a quantity of plutonium will have been obtained in the developing countries alone sufficient for the manufacture of 3,000 atomic bombs annually, each with a yield equal to that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

How, then, to advance along the path of the development of nuclear power engineering and at the same time reduce the risk of its use for military purposes? This question has acquired political importance at the current stage.

In the situation of an increase in countries' technical capabilities in the nuclear sphere the hypothetical probability of the extension of the "nuclear club" could become a reality in the very near future. How many nuclear states are there in the modern world? It is quite difficult to answer this question accurately. Formally there were five nuclear states at the time of the signing of Nonproliferation Treaty--the United States, the USSR, Britain, France and the PRC. In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device, categorizing it as an explosion for peaceful purposes. In 1978 then Prime Minister M. Desai solemnly declared at the UN General Assembly Special Disarmament Session that India would not produce or acquire nuclear weapons, even if other countries embarked on this path. In 1973, at the time of the Near East conflict, Israel, in the opinion of American experts, was close to using the nuclear weapons at its disposal in military operations. In 1977 South Africa was on the point of testing nuclear weapons, which was foiled following intensive diplomatic efforts by the USSR, the United States, Britain and France. A whole number of "threshold" countries which do not yet subscribe to the Nonproliferation Treaty such as Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan and others are also very close to actual possession of nuclear weapons. Thus there are signs of an increase in the number of potential nuclear states, which at times do not even conceal their intentions on this score.

At the same time in the new historical situation, when the relaxation of international tension is becoming a factor of the consolidation of international security, real conditions exist for a lessening of the nuclear threat and the danger of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The realization of these possibilities and success in closing up channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons which exist and which could emerge in the future will depend to a considerable extent on the policy of the Western powers, primarily the United States.

The United States was the world's first country to create and use atomic weapons. The policy of confrontation with the socialist world in the cold war period led to a nuclear arms race in the United States itself and among its allies--Britain and France. The from a "position-of-strength" policy and the aggressive preparations of the Western countries were accompanied by extensive use of the nuclear threat. The USSR was forced to find a suitable means of neutralizing it--creating its own nuclear weapons. However, as the United States' original strategic superiority disappeared and relations between the United States and the USSR in the military sphere came to be characterized by strategic parity, American ruling circles began to recognize the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war. Simultaneously the possibility of an increase in the number of nuclear powers, which emerged back in the 1960's, came to be regarded as a factor destabilizing the strategic relations of the United States and the USSR and increasing the threat of nuclear war. As a result in the mid-1960's the United States attempted to pursue a more active policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. While far from consistent, this policy nevertheless played a definite part in the formulation of the principles of the practice of nonproliferation--the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

In the mid-1979's, when the threat of proliferation had thrown the latest challenge at international security, the United States was forced to pay greater attention to this problem. The administration of President J. Carter declared the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons a priority task of the United States. At the current stage U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere is evolving in an acute struggle among the ruling circles over questions connected with nuclear weapons and with the relaxation of tension between East and West. The continuing threat of the spread of nuclear weapons is prompting an intensive quest by American scholars and politicians both for ways of refining nonproliferation practice and for new conceptual approaches to this problem. Where does the specific danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons lie, is there a solution to the proliferation problem at all, what practical steps should the United States take to reduce to nil the risk of the use of nuclear power for military purposes and to reduce the significance which is still attached to nuclear weapons in international relations as a whole and to their military policy in particular, what significance is attached to a relaxation of tension and disarmament for reducing the danger of an increase in the number of nuclear states? These and a number of other attendant questions are at the center of the attention of the debate in the United States surrounding nonproliferation problems. It obviously cannot fail to have an impact on Washington's foreign policy in this sphere.

The main purpose of this book is to determine the significance attached to the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the system of the United States' foreign policy priorities and to reveal its impact on the evolution of American foreign policy. At the same time the study is devoted to a purely concrete and practical task--an analysis of current U.S. policy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Without belittling the significance of the investigation of international subject matter in the historical retrospective, it would appear advisable to concentrate the main attention on how the United States views this problem, what practical recommendations exist in American political thought for its solution and how they are influencing Washington's concrete political course.

The success of the struggle against the spread of nuclear weapons will depend on how constructively the cooperation of countries of the world proceeds in this sphere

and on how far the solution of questions of political and military detente progresses. For this reason one of the book's tasks is an analysis of the United States' approach to relations with its principal allies--the West European countries and Japan--the developing countries and also with the Soviet Union.

An objective reality of the modern world is that the United States and the USSR, as the two strongest nuclear powers, bear the main responsibility for averting the threat of nuclear war. It is perfectly understandable that the relaxation of tension and the positive evolution of Soviet-American relations could facilitate the accomplishment of this mission. The creation of an international climate which would contribute to the solution of nonproliferation issues will depend to a considerable extent on Soviet-American relations. An analysis of American approaches to the USSR's initiatives in the field of nuclear disarmament, the limitation of and reduction in nuclear arsenals and the complete and general banning of tests and limitation of the geography of the deployment of nuclear weapons and the nonuse of force as a whole and nuclear weapons in particular in international relations appear to be of importance in this connection. An analysis of the sources of the obstacles which the present administration is placing or could place in the way of a solution of these problems also appears to be of no less importance.

Of course, the book examines these questions only to the extent that they are directly related to the tasks of the struggle against the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, there is no doubt that this threat is prompting the need for essential amendments to be made to U.S. military policy and a reevaluation of the significance of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy. Such a reexamination could lead to an extension of the sphere of interaction of the United States and the USSR in various questions of the strengthening of international security, including a halt to the nuclear arms race. Revelation of spheres of possible interaction of the USSR and the United States with respect to the nonproliferation problem and an analysis of the factors which, under certain circumstances, could have a positive impact on their relations and curb the negative consequences of the influence of reactionary forces on Washington's policy on this issue are an organic component of this study. The success of the policy of the relaxation of tension will depend to a considerable extent on how far Soviet-American relations develop. In any event, despite all the toughness which the present administration is attempting to demonstrate, the USSR's position with respect to questions of nonproliferation, disarmament and detente remains the basis for dialog.

L.I. Brezhnev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, emphasized once again in his speech to the electorate on 22 February 1980 the Soviet Union's adherence to a policy of detente and disarmament: "We counterpose to the 'doctrine' of war hysteria and a feverish arms race the doctrine of consistent struggle for peace and security in this world. We are faithful to the Peace Program put forward by the 24th and 25th congresses of our party. For this reason now, in the 1980's, as before, in the 1970's, we advocate the strengthening and not the destruction of detente. A reduction in and not a swelling of armaments. And rapprochement and mutual understanding between peoples and not artificial estrangement and hostility."[5]

U.S. policy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons at the current stage is as yet insufficiently studied in Soviet literature. This is explained by the fact that this problem has acquired extraordinary urgency for the United States

in the most recent years. At the same time, in attempting to investigate American policy in this sphere the author has relied on the availability in Soviet science of works which have analyzed both general and concrete questions of the foreign policy of the United States and its approach to various problems of nuclear disarmament and also monographs which illustrate international relations as a whole and the USSR's foreign policy.[6]

The book was written on the basis of the use of a broad range of American and West European sources and literature--government documents, congressional hearings, the speeches of politicians and scientists, monographs and articles published in foreign periodicals. The material studied has to do mainly with the latter half of the 1970's.

Chapter 1. Evolution of the United States' Approach to Nonproliferation Issues

The threatening consequences of nuclear weapons have long been discussed at all levels of American society--in government and public organizations and by professional diplomats, politicians, businessmen, scientists and religious figures. Hearings are held in the U.S. Congress devoted, in the congressmen's estimation, to the most acute problem that has been encountered by the American nation and all mankind. The mass information organs, from popular through narrowly specialized publications, comprehensively illustrate this question. The leading scientific research centers engaged in the elaboration of the long-term foreign policy prospects are uniting their efforts in a quest for its solution. Stressing the urgency of the problem, the editorial office of the authoritative BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS journal has symbolically moved the hands of a clock on the cover closer to Doomsday--nuclear catastrophe.

Alongside questions of relations with West Europe and Japan and the developing countries and the West's relations with the East and nuclear arms control problems in the system of foreign policy priorities officially proclaimed by the J. Carter administration there also stands the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide. Judging by how contemporary American society as a whole has a hostile attitude toward a further increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons and by the significance which is attached to this question, the impression could be formed that nonproliferation policy has always been at the center of Washington's attention and that we largely have to thank for this the consistent aspirations of all postwar administrations to this goal. This conclusion, incidentally, may also be encountered frequently in the works of American scholars such as J. McBride and G. Quester, for example, which claim that Washington has always opposed proliferation. An Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report stressed right out: "The policy of any U.S. administration since the end of WWII has been to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons."[7]

However, this conclusion is in serious contradiction with the actual state of affairs and glosses over the indisputable fact that the United States' postwar policy was largely the cause of the spread of nuclear weapons, contributing to the emergence of the difficulties with which the United States has been confronted at the current stage. An examination of the evolution of the United States' approach to the nonproliferation problem inevitably leads to this conclusion.

In the historical retrospective the very idea of nonproliferation was born simultaneously with the creation of the atomic bomb in the United States. The possibility of the use of atomic energy for military purposes by other countries was obvious to the ruling circles of the leading Western countries right from the outset. Back in November 1945 the heads of the three countries which had actively collaborated within the framework of the Manhattan Project--the United States, Britain and Canada--emphasized in a joint declaration: "The production of atomic energy for military purposes is based to a considerable extent on the same methods and transforming processes inherent in the use of atomic energy in industrial interests."[8] How to guarantee that atomic energy would not be used for military purposes? This question was discussed at the first UN sessions. In accordance with a proposal of the USSR, the United States and Britain, a resolution was adopted at the General Assembly First Session in January 1946 on the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, which consisted of the representatives of all 11 Security Council members and the representative of Canada.

At this time the solution of nonproliferation problems largely depended primarily on the United States inasmuch as precisely it had a monopoly of atomic weapons. However, the prescription drawn up by Washington failed to correspond to the correct diagnosis since it was prescribed for other countries, leaving the privileged position of the United States inviolate. American ruling circles did not take account of the fact that the policy of a monopoly in atomic armaments could undermine a system of measures geared to the use of the atom for peaceful purposes only. The short-term political advantages derived from Washington's atomic status prevented it from evaluating correctly both the genesis of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and its long-term negative consequences for American interests. As a result the fate of the American initiatives which Washington presented in 1946 in the nonproliferation sphere also proved predetermined.

The terms of the United States' participation in international cooperation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes were set out in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, which was prepared by a special consultative committee under the auspices of Secretary of State J. Byrnes. The principal propositions of the report also constituted the basis of the so-called "Baruch Plan," which was submitted on 16 March 1946 for examination by the UN Atomic Energy Commission.

The "Baruch Plan" proposed the creation of an international body for the development of atomic energy formally within the UN framework, but actually subordinated neither to the General Assembly nor the Security Council. This suprastate organization was to have taken charge of the fuel-producing reactors and plants. It was assumed that mines and nuclear materials would have to be transferred to its ownership and that it would be given exclusive rights in all spheres of the use of atomic energy. Essentially the planned organization was a world industrial monopoly determining its own laws and rules for atomic power engineering in all countries.

Realization of the plan envisaged the establishment of certain stages of control of atomic energy. Whereas the uranium mines were controlled at the first stage, only at the final stage was control of the production of atomic weapons proposed. The time of the transition from one stage to another was not clearly defined, although the stages had been calculated such as to observe American interests. The

Acheson-Lilienthal report pointed out that "during the transitional period all the atomic enterprises will, as before, be at the disposal of the United States...so that in the event of any failure in implementation of the plan during the transitional period the United States would retain the predominant position in respect of atomic weapons."[9] Formally the plan proposed that at its final stage, following the establishment of an effective system of international control, the United States was to have transferred to the disposal of the international body the existing atomic bombs and the plants for their production in operation. However, to judge by the statements of representatives of the administration at that time, Washington intended deciding this question unilaterally "in the light of all the factors of the international situation" and proceeding from U.S. security considerations.

At the same time as discussion of this proposal was under way in the United Nations American ruling circles did not consider themselves bound in respect of the stockpiling and refinement of the arsenal of atomic weapons. D. Acheson, who replaced J. Byrnes as U.S. secretary of state, emphasized that "the plan does not require that the United States cease the production of weapons either in connection with the putting forward of the plan or with the start of the activity of the international body."[10] Such an interpretation of a plan aimed at establishing international control over atomic energy testified that the U.S. initiative was geared to preserving the monopoly of atomic weapons and at the same time preventing other countries from having at their disposal what the United States had. This became particularly apparent after the Soviet Union had submitted for examination by the UN Atomic Energy Commission on 19 June 1946 the draft international convention "Banning the Production and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction." The draft convention proposed the nonemployment of atomic weapons under any circumstances, the banning of their production and storage and the destruction of all stockpiles of finished and incomplete atomic weapon products. At that time precisely such an approach could have effectively solved the question of the future of atomic weapons, putting them beyond the framework of international law, which would have led to their proliferation having been halted in embryo. However, this proposal proved unacceptable to the United States since the latter believed that it would be deprived of the advantages ensuing from the monopoly possession of atomic weapons.

The negative reaction to the USSR's proposal was a logical consequence of the United States' approach which had taken shape at that time to the use of atomic weapons as the main diplomatic instrument in relations with other countries and as the main component of the from a "position-of-strength" policy. In this context the "Baruch Plan" concerning the future control of atomic energy appeared no more than a diplomatic screen concealing the true intentions of American ruling circles and the calculations of achieving a postwar peace settlement on their terms with the help of the atomic bomb.

Contemporary American historians studying this period--H. Alperovitz, H. Feis, D. Horowitz and others--are increasingly often reaching the conclusion that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki opened the way for U.S. ruling circles to the use of atomic diplomacy and that the use of the bomb was not so much a military act of WW II as a deliberate act of the cold war against the USSR which the United States was about to conduct and win, using the atom bomb, in J. Byrnes' words, as a "big stick" in relations with opponents of its policy.[11] The U.S. position at the Potsdam Conference and at sessions of UN bodies testified that implementation of this policy had begun.

On 9 August 1945, in an address to the American people, President H. Truman stressed the United States' endeavor to maintain the monopoly of the new weapons: "The atom bomb is too dangerous for it to be made use of by anyone who wishes.... We must be the custodians of this new weapon."[12] The classification of the production of atomic weapons technology as top secret was accompanied by government circulars on the need to continue tests for the purpose of their refinement and stockpiling. The next experimental atomic bomb was exploded on Bikini Atoll on 1 July 1946 in the atmosphere of a wide-ranging propaganda campaign aimed at intimidating other states with the power of the new weapon.

The American approach to nonproliferation, which amounted on the one hand to preserving atomic weapons on a legimitate basis as an effective military and political means in its arsenal and, on the other, to prohibiting their acquisition by the countries of the world, whether allies or adversaries, was based on an evaluation of the advantage of their possession in international relations and at the same time on calculations that the United States would be afforded a considerable length of time for political use of the advantages of the monopoly before other states would be capable of their independent production. Precisely this latter consideration was frequently pointed out by Gen L. Groves, leader of the Manhattan Project, who believed that the technological gap between the United States and other countries would require of the latter considerable effort and time before they could catch up with the United States. Despite the existence of opposing viewpoints among American scientists, a commission chaired by Secretary of War H. Stimson concluded in 1945 that it would take the Soviet Union roughly 10 years to create an atom bomb.[13] The underestimation of other countries' possibilities combined with an unconcealed endeavor to maintain the monopoly of atomic weapons predetermined Washington's policy in the cold war period in the nonproliferation sphere, which was identical to a policy of maintaining American atomic monopoly at any price.

What was transparently implied in the "Baruch Plan" was clearly set forth in the law on atomic energy, known as the McMahon Act, which was adopted in July 1946. The new law provided for the transfer of powers in the development of atomic energy in the United States to a commission of the same name (Atomic Energy Commission), established government ownership of all stocks of fissionable material and nuclear equipment on American territory and dropped a "veil of secrecy" over the use of atomic energy for military and peaceful purposes. It required that the administration cease cooperation in the nuclear sphere with all other countries, including the allies--Britain and Canada--who had participated in conjunction with the United States in the development of atomic weapons during WWII. Congress gave the "green light" to U.S. policy aimed at monopolizing the nuclear arms race and its use as a basic political means in the international arena.

The McMahon Act drew a demarcation line for the future between the United States and the nonnuclear countries in questions of atomic energy which the "Baruch Plan," according to the official assertions of American representatives in the United Nations, was, on the countrary, to have eliminated.

Could the "Baruch Plan" have been acceptable to the countries of the world given this approach to nonproliferation questions? U.S. President D. Eisenhower declared in 1960: "In 1946 we had an opportunity of insuring the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. This opportunity was let slip when the Soviet

Union turned down an all-embracing plan of placing atomic energy under international control put forward by the United States."[14] Since that time many American experts in the field of nonproliferation problems have been unable to dispense in their works with a mention of the fact that if the USSR had accepted the "Baruch Plan," the problem would have been solved and the situation in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be different. However, recently a number of specialists and historians in the United States has reached the conclusion that the plan was "doomed to fail" in advance primarily because Washington "did not intend to link the problem of control of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes with the problem of nuclear disarmament," preferring to retain for itself unilateral advantages in the military sphere. W. Bader, former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, emphasizes in this connection: "As long as the United States maintained a monopoly of atomic weapons and intended to use them in this circumstance or the other, the Soviet Union had no real choice other than to reject the proposal, which could have impeded its efforts to create an atomic counterweight to America's existing advantage."[15]

The United States' policy of the monopoly ownership of atomic weapons was not only obvious and unacceptable to the USSR; although it had supported the "Baruch Plan" at the official level in the United Nations, Britain, America's closest cold war ally, embarked on the independent creation of atomic weapons in January 1946. Following the breaking off of Anglo-American cooperation in this field as a result of passage of the McMahon Act, according to the well-known historian M. Gowing, London stepped up work in this direction. British ruling circles were unwilling to reconcile themselves to an American monopoly and did not trust Washington. Defending the decision to create an atomic bomb, then Prime Minister C. Attlee, a Laborite, emphasized: "We must maintain our position vis-a-vis the Americans. We cannot allow ourselves to be completely in their hands, the less so in that their position is not always clear."[16] Similar considerations were also characteristic of France's ruling circles, who at that time had only just begun preparatory work on implementation of an atomic program.

The natural consequence of the United States' approach to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons set out in the "Baruch Plan" was the deadlock which came about in its discussion in the United Nations and the disbandment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1948. The buildup of nuclear potential and the use of atomic diplomacy by the United States were the main reasons for the further spread of atomic weapons in the 1940's and 1950's. The Soviet Union tested an atomic weapon in 1949, putting an end to the United States' monopoly, and Britain joined the ranks of the "atomic club" in 1952. The first round of struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons connected with the "Baruch Plan" ended in total failure because U.S. policy in the sphere of nonproliferation amounted to perpetuation of the discrimination against other countries by way of the preservation of its monopoly of superweapons and their use for diplomatic purposes in relations both with adversaries and with allies. Strictly speaking, the term "nonproliferation " is hardly apt for a description of U.S. policy inasmuch as it amounted in practice to the stockpiling and refinement of its own nuclear potential, that is, to its further proliferation to the detriment and at the expense of the interests of other countries.

U.S. ruling circles evaluated the USSR's 1949 atomic test as an end to their monopoly of the ownership of superweapons and removed the nonproliferation problem from

the agenda for a certain time. The news that its ally, Britain, was preparing to test an atomic weapon independently was even received with satisfaction in Washington for at the height of the cold war this was regarded as a contribution to the military efforts of the Western countries. Obsession with the idea of "containing communism" prompted the United States' endeavor to make effective use of atomic superiority and to continue its buildup and refinement. The race in atomic weapons led to the creation of even more powerful weapons--thermonuclear. The United States' atomic potential overstrode national boundaries and settled on the territory of other countries, on military bases girding the socialist countries. It was in precisely this period that various military-strategic doctrines of its use, primarily the "massive retaliation" doctrine, were in full bloom. At the peak of the cold war a policy of nonproliferation was inconceivable in the context of Washington's strategic preparations and the policy of confrontation with the socialist countries.

In the first half of the 1950's the looming threat of atomic war and the Soviet Union's repeated attempts to attract the people's attention to this problem elicited the unprecedented sweep of the movement of public forces of countries of the world for a halt to the nuclear arms race. In this situation Washington was compelled in order to neutralize the arguments of the supporters of disarmament to present an initiative aimed at channeling the development of atomic energy into peaceful purposes.

In 1953 President D. Eisenhower put forward a proposal for other countries' extensive use of the peaceful atom. The "Atoms for Peace" program had been thought up to create the illusion of a reduction in the use of atomic energy for military purposes. The program's main postulate—the more the atom is used for peaceful purposes, the less it will be used for military purposes---had, as subsequent events showed, no relation to nuclear disarmament. As the American professor R. Barnett rightly observed, "the 'Atoms for Peace' plan was not a disarmament plan."[17] However, the underlying political motives of the program--an endeavor to lessen opposition to the United States' nuclear arms race--contributed to the development of secondary phenomena--the extensive proliferation of nuclear technology and the corresponding information, which in the future could have been used for military purposes.

Other factors also had an impact on the formation of the United States' approach to international cooperation in the sphere of atomic energy. First, the United States' growing need for supplies of uranium ore from abroad for the refinement of nuclear weapons. Then Secretary of State J.F. Dulles emphasized in a speech to the Joint Atomic Energy Commission that the provisions of the 1946 McMahon Act banning cooperation in the nuclear sphere even with allied countries were hindering the receipt of "indispensable" strategic raw material. Second, the development of research in the atomic sphere by other countries (at a time when Britain had built its first scientific research reactor in 1947, France in 1948 and the United States only in 1950). Accentuating attention to this aspect, Dulles emphasized that the United States no longer had it in its power "to halt the flow of pertinent information" and that if it were to attempt this, such a policy would lead to a diminution in American influence on countries of the world. The idea can be traced in his pronouncements that via cooperation with allied countries the United States would be able to exercise certain control over the development of atomic research.[18] Third, the endeavor of U.S. monopoly circles to occupy the dominant position in world nuclear technology markets and to derive financial benefits here earlier than their potential competitors.

New legislation in the atomic energy sphere enacted in 1954 was the basis for the development of cooperation with the allied countries in spheres not directly related to problems of the United States' "national security."

The bilateral agreements concluded with other countries contained clauses on rights of control and inspection and also on the other countries' commitments to use the information, materials and equipment obtained solely for peaceful purposes (as of 1957 the control functions were performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA). Each agreement drawn up by the American Atomic Energy Commission required the approval of the President, who had to determine "whether or not it represented an unjustified risk in respect of the defense and security" of the United States, and the support of the congressional Joint Atomic Energy Commission.

At the same time questions of control in the new program took a back seat behind the extensive development of atomic energy internationally. As M. Willrich and T. Taylor rightly observed, "'Atoms for Peace'...signaled a radical shuffling of priorities...prior to 1953 international control figured in first place, and the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes second; now development is in first, and control and inspection in second."[19]

The negative consequences of these changes, which made their presence felt much later, were the logical consequence of a policy as a result of which not only the secrets of the production of atomic weapons but also the necessary technology proved accessible to other countries. As colorfully expressed by the American scientist A. Kramish, "the nuclear genie was handed to other nations on a plutonium platter."[20] In the historical retrospective the problems of control over the proliferation of nuclear technology which the United States encountered head-on in the 1970's emerged largely as a result of its policy in the 1950's. It is not fortuitous that a number of American experts now make a critical evaluation of D. Eisenhower's proposal. D. Rosenbaum, an employee of the Atomic Energy Commission, declared in 1975: "The sorry truth is that we opened a Pandora's box..., and it may be that the 'Atoms for Peace' program was the most stupid idea of our time."[21]

Whatever the case, implementation of the "Atoms for Peace" program contributed to an increase in the nonnuclear countries' material-technical potential for the creation of nuclear weapons, which was a principal factor compelling Washington in the mid-1960's to adopt a serious approach to the need for the formulation of international measures preventing the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

However, in the 1950's the program of the peaceful use of the atom went hand in hand with the nuclear arms race in the United States. Under the conditions of the cold war the military atomic programs of America's allies frequently received Washington's direct political assistance and material-technical aid. A consequence of this was the resumption of the nuclear partnership with Britain following the enactment in 1958 of far-reaching amendments to the McMahon Act.

What was the reason for President D. Eisenhower's decision to seek Congress's revision of the McMahon Act and to abandon to a certain extent the foreign policy course toward the preservation of hegemony in nuclear questions initiated under Truman? After all, the development of the West European countries' national nuclear programs

promised unfavorable consequences for the United States in the long-term. The spread of nuclear weapons could lead to the gradual loss of America's overwhelming military superiority in NATO, to the allies being on a par with the American "nuclear giant" and, as a result, to the inevitable weakening of the United States' influence in West Europe. But considerations connected with the interests of the so-called "national security" of the United States itself and the need to heed the nuclear claims of the allies, which were leading to a crisis in NATO, had an impact on the adoption of this decision by the U.S. Administration.

A secret report of a group of Pentagon and State Department experts on the consequences of the launching of an artificial satellite in the Soviet Union stated that in a military-strategic respect the United States was in a dangerously disadvantageous position compared with the USSR. A new view of the NATO allies' national nuclear programs began to spread rapidly among the American ruling circles. In the State of the Union address on 8 January 1980 President Eisenhower emphasized the need for the United States' cooperation with all its allies in the hope of "surmounting" as quickly as possible "the technological gap with Russia which has come about as a result of the launch of a satellite."[22] This trend toward a broadening of cooperation with the allies came to predominate in the military-strategic thinking of the then U.S. Administration. In practice Washington was thinking not of the problem of proliferation but of the restoration of military superiority over the Soviet Union, even at the cost of encouraging and stimulating the national nuclear programs of its allies. In this situation the priority task, American strategists believed, amounted to the more flexible use and deployment of existing nuclear weapons on the territory of the NATO countries and also the enlistment, in Eisenhower's words, of the "energy and talents of the allies" in the development of nuclear weapons. For this reason when, in March 1958, the Soviet Union unilaterally halted the testing of nuclear weapons and opened the way to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the United States did not follow its example. The refusal was dictated not only by considerations connected with America's nuclear program but also with the interests of the nuclear programs of the European allies, primarily Britain, which had not then fully completed a series of its own nuclear weapon tests, and, in part, of France, which had only just embarked on implementation of its own program. "As a whole, the American position in this period was determined," Bader wrote, "by the priority of our own testing program, defense of the interests of Great Britain...and, ultimately, the plans for sharing nuclear knowledge and nuclear weapons with our allies to nullify the advantages of the Soviet Union which had come about with the launch of the satellite."[23]

At the same time under the conditions of the new global correlation of military forces and the development of the "crisis of trust" in NATO a trend toward the West European countries' military independence of the United States began to be displayed. That is why the idea of "nuclear autonomy," which had been engendered in Paris, and the attempts of certain West European NATO members to obtain access to the control of American nuclear weapons were phenomena of which America's ruling circles had to take account. Although Washington's endeavor to retain monopoly rights to the use of nuclear weapons remained the main foreign policy line, it nevertheless came to be combined with attempts to neutralize the threat of further exacerbation of contradictions concerning nuclear problems in relations with the allies and simultaneously to take advantage of their "nuclear ambitions" in the interests of strategic preparations against the USSR. There was no unanimous opinion among U.S. ruling circles in this period on the granting of nuclear weapons to the NATO allies. The Eisenhower administration's official position in this connection, which was set out by J. Dulles

on 17 April 1958, amounted to the following: "there is no necessity in peacetime for the United States to turn over nuclear weapons in their entirety or the nuclear components thereof to the national control of the NATO allies."[24] However, prominent figures of the Republican Party, who believed that resistance to the West European countries' joining the "nuclear club" would be a source of further contradictions, did not agree with this viewpoint and, like N. Rockefeller, called for nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles to be handed over to the NATO allies. A certain section of America's ruling circles believed that the United States' so-called "national security" interests required cooperation with its allies in the nuclear field in one form or another. However, the U.S. Administration's first attempts to combine to a certain extent the interests of the United States and its allies and to institute cooperation in nuclear questions within the framework of the Atlantic alliance by way of enacting amendments to the McMahon Act led to the emergence merely of a "special nuclear relationship" with Great Britain, which emphasized the discrimination in the Atlantic alliance and strengthened the disagreements among the allies.

When, in January 1958, the President asked Congress to revise the 1946 Atomic Energy Act for extending cooperation in the sphere of nuclear weapons with the allies, he was undoubtedly aware that this proposal would encounter strong opposition in Congress, which had adopted a far more conservative position in its approach to atomic problems than the White House. This opposition came to light during discussion of the amendments to the 1946 Act. The congressional Atomic Energy Commission firmly opposed "providing access to additional countries in the sphere of nuclear weapons production." The vague wording of the amendments to the effect that American nuclear information would be available only to countries which had achieved "significant progress in the development of nuclear weapons" elicited a counter question in Congress as to which countries might be included in this category. The Atomic Energy Commission replied unequivocally to this question: "Only Great Gritain meets the set standards."[25] Indeed, following Congress's passage of the amendments, it turned out that Great Britain was the sole NATO country which fell within their terms of reference. "Despite the fact that President Eisenhower had emphasized multiplicity in his appeal for cooperation with friendly countries," W. Bader wrote, "the purpose of the legislation was merely to include Great Britain, and only Great Britain, in a 'special nuclear partnership' with the United States."[26]

As distinct from Great Britain, France, which as of this time had yet to carry out a single nuclear weapon test and thus, according to the enacted amendments to the McMahon Act, had not achieved "significant progress in the production of nuclear weapons," found itself outside of the initiated nuclear partnership of the two principal NATO allies. Despite Paris's persistent attempts to obtain assistance from Washington in carrying out its nuclear program, its request for the granting of nuclear information was regularly turned down by the U.S. Administration. In July 1958, when, at the time of Dulles's talks with the French Government in Paris, the secretary of State made it understood that France could not count on a privileged position analogous to that of Britain, the French Government officially confirmed its intention to continue its national nuclear program independently.

Undoubtedly, it was not only the technological gap between Britain and France which predetermined the latter's exclusion from nuclear partnership with the United States. Political motives were also at the bottom of this. Following the 1956 Suez crisis, which caused a sharp exacerbation of Anglo-American contradictions, relations

between Britain and the United States were gradually restored and became even closer, whereas relations between France and the United States continued to deteriorate. The mutual understanding on which the "special relationship" between Washington and London was built was lacking in the diplomatic sphere between Paris and Washington. As a consequence of this, "the Americans trusted the British more than the French.... The United States is not," British experts wrote, "at this time about to snare its atomic secrets with a country which might use them in circumstances not approved by it."[27] De Gaulle's attempts to create a "triple directorate" in NATO and thereby secure for France a privileged position akin to that occupied by Great Britain did not encounter a favorable response in America's ruling circles and led merely to a further exacerbation of American-French relations and a deepening of the crisis in the Atlantic alliance. The subsequent withdrawal of France's Air Force and part of the Mediterranean fleet from NATO's military organization was accompanied by a demand for the removal of American nuclear bombers from French territory. As a result of the exacerbation of American-French relations there followed a further strengthening of relations between Washington and London, which predetermined the joint coordination of the use of nuclear forces and was the basis for the sale of long-range Polaris missiles to Britain in 1962.[28]

Formally the amendments to the 1958 McMahon Act did not, as it were, contribute to so-called "horizontal" proliferation, that is, an increase in the number of nuclear countries (Britain had already tested both atomic and hydrogen bombs). But the formula in accordance with which Britain could obtain technological assistance in an improvement of its nuclear forces undoubtedly reinforced the endeavor of other countries to achieve a status in the nuclear sphere similar to that of Britain's in order to achieve privileged cooperation with the United States. In this period the United States still adhered to a selective policy, distinguishing its closest and special partners and also countries allied with it from other states. This selectiveness was prompted by attempts to use the proliferation of nuclear weapons to regulate not only the correlation of forces in the nuclear sphere between West and East but also mutual relations within NATO. The passing of the 1958 amendments objectively put Washington in the difficult position where any allied country which had created independent nuclear weapons could on legitimate grounds turn to the United States for technological assistance. This was fraught with serious consequences for U.S. policy in the future.

However, even at this stage Washington was rendering real assistance to so-called "vertical proliferation," that is, a buildup of existing nuclear armaments, having taken charge of the development of Britain's nuclear forces. Thus the "special nuclear relationship," which was codified in American legislation, was a most important step of the United States along the path of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Despite congressional opposition to the further direct proliferation of nuclear weapons among the NATO allies, Washington took a number of steps to increase their role and participation in the use of American weapons deployed on the European continent. As of 1947, when two bomber squadrons armed with atom bombs were stationed at bases in Britain, American troops in Europe acquired atomic and hydrogen weapons as new delivery systems were created. The tactical nuclear weapon in the form of the short-range Sergeant, Pershing and Honest John missiles were part of the armament of the American forces in the FRG. The intermediate-range Jupiter and

Thor missiles were deployed on the territory of Britain, Italy and Turkey in 1958. The stockpiling of nuclear weapons on the territories of the European countries was accompanied by the instruction of the military personnel of the nonnuclear NATO countries in the handling of these weapons and the granting to them of the corresponding information and, ultimately, the possibility of the joint operational use of the weapons (given retention of the presidential veto). These measures stimulated the NATO allies' nuclear ambitions. Far-reaching plans came to be drawn up in Washington for sharing nuclear responsibility in the North Atlantic alliance.

In 1959 the American general L. Norstad, supreme NATO commander in chief, proposed handing over part of the nuclear weapon stockpiles directly to NATO control and making the bloc a "fourth nuclear power" where the Atlantic partners might cooperate on equal terms in the operational use of these weapons. In December 1960 this proposal was officially submitted to a NATO Council session in Paris by U.S. Secretary of State C. Herter. The endeavor to preserve the maximum flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons, including the policy of sharing nuclear responsibility with the NATO allies, was prompted largely by the D. Eisenhower administration's negative approach to nonproliferation problems, which at this time were being discussed in the United Nations.

At the UN General Assembly 12th Session in 1957 the USSR had in a memorandum on partial measures in the disarmament sphere raised the question of states possessing nuclear weapons undertaking not to pass these weapons on to other states. In 1958 Ireland submitted to the First Committee a draft resolution on the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons which implied a need for a renunciation of their transfer to other nonnuclear countries. The resolution was adopted with the support of the socialist countries, while the United States and its allies abstained, fearing that such measures could have a negative effect on the plans for the use of tactical atomic weapons in Europe and cooperation in the nuclear sphere within the NATO framework. A similar scene was also observed in 1960 in the voting on a resolution of Ireland's which called for countries to "refrain from handing over not only control over nuclear weapons to any country not possessing them" but also the "information essential for their production." The resolution was approved by the General Assembly, but the United States and a number of its allies abstained, as before, thereby testifying to their disapproval of the outlined limitations on their policy with respect to the spread of nuclear weapons.

The policy of broadening cooperation in the nuclear sphere with the NATO allies which was set during the D. Eisenhower administration actually contributed to the further spread of nuclear weapons, which ultimately could not have failed to have contradicted the interests of the United States with its long-term aspiration to maintain control of the solution of questions on which the problems of war and peace depended.

At the start of the 1960's, at the time of the J. Kennedy administration's assumption of office, the threat of a further increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons was so real that the problem of nonproliferation gradually came to occupy a principal place in the system of the United States' foreign policy priorities, forcing the ruling circles to take a new look at their nuclear policy.

In the 1960's, when it transpired that the so-called "missile gap" had proved to be no more than a fiction employed by the Pentagon to stimulate the nuclear arms

race, the mutual relations of the United States and the USSR at the strategic level developed in the direction of the establishment of nuclear parity or equivalence, when each side had acquired the capacity for, in the words of then Defense Secretary R. McNamara, each other's "assured destruction in the event of the onset of a military conflict." In this situation the nuclear forces of the NATO allies lost their military significance from the viewpoint of the interests of the United States' "security" since they could no longer influence the outcome of a possible confrontation between the United States and the USSR. At the same time the attitude toward them of America's ruling circles was increasingly determined by fears that at the will of the West European allies the United States might be dragged into a nuclear conflict in Europe without even wishing this. "We do not believe in national forces of containment...," President J. Kennedy set out the American position in NATO's nuclear questions at a 17 May 1972 press conference, "and inasmuch as one country after another would embark on the development of its own means of containment, I believe that we would become involved in an increasingly dangerous situation."[29]

The adoption of the "flexible response" doctrine presupposed that the West European NATO members would mainly represent the conventional forces (the "sword") and the United States nuclear weapons (the "shield"). This led to a raising of the "nuclear threshold" and reduced the automatic nature of the United States' nuclear forces' involvement in military operations on the European continent characteristic of the "massive retaliation" strategy. At the same time the allies' nuclear ambitions were publicly assailed by representatives of the administration, particularly Defense Secretary R. McNamara, on the grounds that they contradicted the concepts of centralized nuclear strategy which retained for the United States the right to decide the question of activating NATO's strategic forces. Whereas for the D. Eisenhower administration the main task in long-term military planning had amounted to assisting the nuclear programs of the West European countries, a possible "sharing of nuclear secrets" and an increase in their direct participation in the use of nuclear weapons provided for in the "Norstad Plan," under the J. Kennedy administration the main attention was transferred to an endeavor to put the lid as far as possible on the development of the allies' independent nuclear forces. However, this policy encountered serious resistance from the NATO allies, which, endeavoring to increase their independence of the United States, were attempting to enhance their nuclear role. Thus Britain, despite serious failures in its rocket-building program, did not intend to wind up its nuclear potential. In 1960 France tested an atomic weapon and declared its resolve to create full-fledged independent "deterrent forces." The FRG also aspired to possession of nuclear weapons.

The plan for the creation of multilateral nuclear forces (MNF), which emerged following the December 1962 Nassau meeting of the heads of government of the United States and Britain, was designed to reconcile the irreconcilable. On the one hand the main purpose of the MNF was preservation of the United States' dominant position in the sphere of the use of nuclear weapons and the establishment of certain control over the nuclear potential of Britain and France. On the other, this plan presupposed the development of cooperation in the sphere of the use of the nuclear weapons of the United States and its NATO allies and a certain enhancement in the West European countries' role in decision-making in the military-strategic sphere, that is, a certain infringement of U.S. positions for the sake of neutralizing Atlantic contradictions.

A bitter struggle developed within U.S. ruling circles on the question of implementation of the MNF. A group of political figures from the State Department and the Pentagon such as M. Bundy, R. Bowie and Gen L. Norstad insisted on continuation of the policy of partnership in respect of the West European countries in the nuclear weapons sphere, even at the expense of the United States' renunciation of the right to veto the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Opponents of the MNF believed that the "sharing of nuclear responsibility" was too high a price for preservation of the Atlantic partnership for in contributing to a further growth of the nuclear forces of Britain and France and facilitating access to nuclear weapons to the FRG the United States would lose control over the solution of questions of war and peace. As discussion of the MNF plan continued, the following alternatives confronting the United States gradually crystallized: continue the policy of nuclear partnership with the allies, transferring part of its nuclear forces to their control and their possession or give preference to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, adopting a policy of limiting the number of countries possessing them.

For President J. Kennedy the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons was a nightmare, and he emphasized repeatedly that the United States must effectively "use the time remaining to prevent the spread and persuade other countries not to test or possess or produce, transfer or acquire such weapons."[30]

Even then a number of American experts had come to realize that the numerous negative consequences of proliferation would inevitably lead to reduced security throughout the world and to the increased probability of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict into which the United States could also be dragged. The 1962 Caribbean crisis showed as obviously as can be the urgent need for the joint efforts of the United States and the USSR in averting the nuclear danger. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty was the prolog to an agreement on controlling and limiting the nuclear arms race under the conditions of nuclear equivalence between the USSR and the United States. U.S. Administration representatives' characterization of the further spread of nuclear weapons as a "threat to the national security of the United States," the testing of an atomic device in 1974 in the PRC and the increase in the material-technical possibilities of a number of countries in the creation of nuclear weapons conditioned the evolution of Washington's constructive approach to the discussion in the United Nations of nonproliferation problems, which had occupied a central place in the work of this international organization by the mid-1960's.

Initially the American UN delegation attempted in its nonproliferation proposals to leave loopholes for the possible transfer of nuclear weapons to military blocs and various military formations of the MNF type. They did say, it is true, that nuclear weapons should not be handed over to the national control of states which did not possess them. But the sphere of nuclear cooperation with the allies remained unaffected by the limitations. Such proposals of the United States elicited sharp criticism in the United Nations on the part of the socialist and developing countries. The UN General Assembly decree of 25 November 1965 appealed that a nonproliferation treaty contain no loopholes which could allow the direct or indirect spread of nuclear weapons in any form. A resolution was passed on 4 November 1966 which called for an end to actions making it difficult to come to an agreement on nonproliferation.[31]

Under the influence of the world community voices began to ring out increasingly often in the United States in support of the speediest conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty. W. Foster, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, emphasized that the United States must choose--either to continue "nuclear mergers" of the MNF type or embark on the creation of a nonproliferation process. In his opinion, it was desirable to give preference to relations with the USSR and the immediate conclusion of an appropriate treaty.[32] This viewpoint was supported by G. Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a number of political figures and scientists such as J. Wiesner, C. Kaysen, R. Gilpatrick, H. Stassen and others. An influential group of supporters of nonproliferation was formed in the U.S. Congress--R. Kennedy, J. Pastore, J. Anderson, A. Cooper and others--who believed that the plans for nuclear cooperation with the NATO allies would be contrary to the achievement of the long-term goal of U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere. Sen R. Clark warned: "As long as we are toying with the idea of creating MNF and as long as we are flirting with West Germany, offering to grant it the right to stand closer to the nuclear trigger, the Soviet Union will not, in all probability, wish to conclude a treaty which would prohibit the further spread of nuclear weapons."[33] In May 1966 the Senate adopted a resolution calling on the U.S. President to seek the speediest conclusion of a treaty in this sphere. The resolution pushed the L. Johnson administration toward a more constructive approach to negotiations with the USSR. In February 1967 the United States was compelled to abandon the clauses in the American draft of the treaty which could have left open the possibility of the creation of MNF and to proceed to coordinate it with the USSR's draft.

By this time the MNF plan also was virtually doomed. From the very outset France had openly refused to participate in it, Britain had put forward alternative plans, which only muddled things and created insurmountable obstacles for the United States, and only the FRG continued to stubbornly cling to them, which testified to its aspiration to gain access to nuclear weapons.

The contradictions with the allies, the dubious benefits of the sharing of "nuclear control" in the MNF, which impeded nonproliferation policy, and the position of the USSR and the other socialist countries were the reasons for Washington gradually growing cool toward this plan. For this reason when R. McNamara presented the proposal of forming a Nuclear Planning Committee in NATO, many political observers evaluated this step as a retreat from the idea of the handing over of control and the nuclear weapons themselves contemplated in the MNF plan. Although discussion of it continued, seemingly by force of inertia, the center of gravity in Washington's policy had nevertheless shifted from "nuclear partnership" with the allies to Soviet-American cooperation in the nonproliferation sphere.

Following constructive negotiations between the United States and the USSR, a draft Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was ultimately formulated which was opened for signing on 1 July 1968 simultaneously in Moscow, Washington and London. On the very first day the treaty was signed by 58 countries, including the nuclear states of the United States, the USSR and Britain, and the process of its ratification by the three nuclear powers was completed on 5 March 1970, and the treaty came into effect.

Thus an examination of the evolution of the United States' approach to nonproliferation issues shows that American policy in this sphere was determined only in the

1960's. The buildup of the nuclear arsenal in the United States itself, direct assistance in the development of Britain's nuclear potential and the policy of nuclear cooperation with the allies within the NATO framework were factors which contributed to both the "vertical" and horizontal" spread of nuclear weapons. This policy could not have failed to have led to the appearance of nuclear weapons not only among the United States' adversaries but also among its closest allies. However certain American scholars may attempt to claim that the United States was always a supporter of nonproliferation, postwar history testifies convincingly that it was precisely Washington which was to blame for the spread of nuclear weapons. At the height of the cold war American ruling circles were unwilling to understand that the race in nuclear weapons in the United States and their nonproliferation among other countries were mutually exclusive goals of Washington's policy.

Realistic American political figures' correct evaluation of the consequences of the further spread of nuclear weapons as a threat to the interests of the security not only of the United States but of the whole world prompted the gradual movement of the nonproliferation problem to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960's. This afforded an opportunity, given close cooperation with the USSR, for the creation of a nonproliferation mode consolidated in an appropriate international treaty. The latter became the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The United States' ruling circles' high evaluation of the treaty's significance for American interests was unable to long gloss over the fact that its conclusion was not the crown of a policy but, rather, only a point of departure for the more successful prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Although in the period of the first R. Nixon administration at the threshold of the 1970's the acuteness of the nonproliferation problem had abated to a certain extent owing to the fact that Washington believed that the treaty would solve if not all, then the majority of problems, the further increase in the nonnuclear countries' possibilities in the use of the atom for military purposes nevertheless compelled the United States to take a new look at this problem. Since the mid-1970's Washington has been attempting to find the appropriate political course for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Questions of the spread of the technological possibilities of nonnuclear countries for nuclear weapons production connected in one way or another with the rapid development of peaceful atomic power engineering have emerged at the center of the attention of American political figures and scientists.

Chapter 5. The Policy and Material Potential of the "Near-Nuclear" Countries in the Evaluation of American Experts

American scholars' numerous studies devoted to nonproliferation issues pay very close attention to an analysis of the approach of the "threshold" countries to the problem of the possession of nuclear weapons. What factors might influence decision-making in this sphere, what material basis exists for proceeding toward the path of the creation of nuclear weapons, at what pace might the process of their proliferation develop--these questions are constantly being discussed by American political scientists in an evaluation of the political intentions of the "near-nuclear" countries.

There are a number of reasons why the ruling circles of this state or the other might endeavor to acquire nuclear weapons. However, what for some plays a decisive part in making a decision in favor of taking the path of nuclear armament exerts a directly opposite influence on others. Each country has its own considerations and special circumstances in which this decision is made. At the same time it is possible to roughly pick out three types of motive which in one way or another influence the political leaders of the "threshold" countries to make a decision to embark or not to embark on the path of nuclear armament--military, political and economic considerations.

Considerations connected with questions of security, the majority of American experts believes, traditionally play the predominant part. Military strength is considered the main instrument of insuring security. The incorporation therein, as a component, of nuclear weapons is directly connected with expectations of advantages in the military sphere in relations with opposed states, which in the past amounted to the following;

achieving military superiority over a real or potential enemy (the creation of atomic weapons in the United States in WWII, for example, was connected with the need for the military destruction of the Germany-Japan axis powers);

obtaining strategic predominance in military relations with other countries (the stockpiling of America's nuclear arsenal has been subordinated to this task since the war);

achieving effective means of neutralizing the nuclear threat on the part of a state possessing nuclear weapons (putting an end to the United States' nuclear monopoly, for example); and

achieving a greater degree of independence in the military-political sphere of one's bloc allies (the nuclear programs of Britain and France).

Such are the principal motives for taking the path of the possession of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of Western experts, the logic of the arguments connected with military interests which led to the emergence of the present nuclear powers could also be extrapolated in this combination of the other to other countries' approach to the solution of the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons.[34]

However, a decision to acquire nuclear weapons by one country might also prompt a reciprocal reaction to their spread in this region or the other since neighboring states would attempt to nullify these military advantages. W. Epstein, special assistant to the UN secretary general for disarmament, emphasizes the metamorphosis in certain countries' approach to nuclear issues following such acts by neighbor states. Thus India, which throughout the 1950's and the start of the 1960's was an active supporter of nonproliferation, was forced, following the PRC's nuclear explosion, to look to its security in the atmosphere of continuing tension in relations with Beijing. In turn, in the ruling circles of its neighbor, Pakistan, there has been an increased aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time it is not difficult to realize that in the future Pakistan's nuclear ambitions could lead to a growth of feeling in favor of the acquisition of nuclear weapons in other states, particularly Bangladesh and Iran.[35]

For this reason it should not be forgotten also that short-term "advantages" in the military sphere acquired with the aid of nuclear weapons could in the long term prove to be a complication in a given country's relations with its neighbors for the simple reason that the latter will attempt to do everything possible to start their own nuclear programs. However, as T. Greenwood, a research scholar at MIT, correctly emphasizes, farsightedness is not always characteristic of this decision or the other in the military sphere. "Temporary military advantages accruing from the position of the first and sole country in a given region to possess nuclear weapons glosses over the long-term problems ensuing from the position of being only one of several nuclear countries."[36] Out of considerations connected with security questions a number of "near-nuclear" countries is still not a subscriber to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and, furthermore, their approach and policy are largely adjusted by the attitude toward the treaty of opposed neighboring states.

American scholars emphasize that a definite part in the question of whether to have or not to have nuclear weapons is also played by political considerations and expectation that with their help it will be possible to enhance prestige and status in the world. The nonnuclear countries often draw attention to the fact that in the modern world states possessing nuclear weapons still have greater political weight in international relations. They regularly participate in the majority of international fora, where their views invariably attract greater attention than those of nonnuclear states. France and, particularly, Britain could hardly retain their special international positions in today's world under the conditions of the economic superiority of the FRG and Japan without nuclear weapons. Yet they continue to be categorized as great powers. Undoubtedly, it is not only the possession of nuclear weapons which has secured these countries' present-day positions, but in the eyes of certain nonnuclear countries this possession is, as before, associated with higher status in the world.

The political calculations of the "threshold" countries may be reduced to the following:

first, attempting to achieve a status in the world similar to the position of the nuclear powers and thereby secure for themselves the right to attend all international fora where present-day global problems are decided;

second, increasing political prestige in this region or the other. Nuclear weapons are still regarded by certain states as a symbol of technological progress and could, in line with economic development, be an integral attribute in the political ambitions of regional "power centers";

third, strengthening their independence and resisting political pressure on the part of such nuclear powers as the United States and the PRC. This consideration is present in the majority of "threshold" countries in crisis regions of the world;

fourth, attempting to do away with inequality in the economic, political and military relations between the capitalist countries and their former colonies. The developing countries' clashes with the capitalist states over political-economic questions, which grew more frequent in the 1970's, are also reflected in one way or another in the attempts to redistribute military strength; and

fifth, utilizing nuclear weapons as an instrument of political pressure on opposing states. This calculation is primarily typical of the ruling circles of Israel and South Africa.

However, it should be mentioned that the real political minuses which ensue from the possession of nuclear weapons could at first sight prove imperceptible against this background of theoretical "pluses." Fears that the majority of nuclear and nonnuclear states which subscribe to the treaty will revise in a negative manner their attitude toward a country which takes the path of nuclear armament are playing an increasingly big role in political calculations. It is perfectly natural that a country which has the technical capability of creating nuclear weapons, but which deliberately refrains from such a step could derive far greater benefits from the pursuit of a nonproliferation policy than otherwise. A number of industrially developed nonnuclear states like Canada, Sweden and Australia, for example, are increasing their political weight in the international arena in precisely this way.

American scholars believe that economic factors may largely operate in parallel with political considerations in this sphere. Despite the truism that the nuclear arms race is a heavy burden on the economy, views still exist justifying the possession of nuclear weapons economically. The viewpoint that the technical knowledge acquired in the creation of a nuclear device could play a decisive part in the intensive development of the peaceful atomic industry still finds supporters. But this connection is not at all obligatory in practice, as the experience of Sweden and Canada, for example, shows. Nevertheless, economic dividends connected with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and with the achievement of a high technological level in the nuclear sphere, which, it is hoped, will bridge the gap economically between the developed and developing capitalist countries, could be present in these calculations. In developing nuclear power certain "threshold" countries believe that it will be able to reduce the expenditure and time needed to create nuclear weapons if such may be required in the future. It is not fortuitous that countries situated in crisis regions have, as a rule, a relatively high level of development of peaceful nuclear programs.

According to D. Gompert, research assistant of the Council for Foreign Relations (New York), an incentive to the creation of nuclear weapons could also be the endeavor of countries liberated from colonial dependence to rid themselves of the political tutelage and economic exploitation of the capitalist countries and to use this weapon in the future or the threat to create such as a lever of pressure in the reorganization of economic and political relations with the capitalist countries on fair terms and also as a means of defending their economic independence against the former metropolis.[37]

The factors adduced above in this combination or the other could have an impact on the evolution of the "threshold states'" approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. Doubtless, nor can we underestimate here factors of a military, political and economic nature, which are working increasingly strongly against the "nuclear option" at the current stage. Importance is attached to a precise determination of the correlation of "for" and "against" and the ascertainment of the main motives for them for the achievement of the greater efficiency of nonproliferation policy in respect of the "threshold" countries.

Western specialists are paying great attention to nine "threshold" countries which in terms of technological potential and political intentions could under the impact of this combination or the other of the factors adduced above at a certain time openly or secretly take the path of use of the atom for military purposes. These are South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Iran, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Taiwan and South Korea.

When, in August 1977, a TASS statement was issued to the effect that South Africa was close to completing work on the creation of nuclear weapons and that direct preparations for the testing of such were underway at a firing range in the Kalahari Desert, initially, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, "this news was not taken seriously in the West."[38] Furthermore, there were foreign policy observers who assessed it as a "simple propaganda maneuver" of the USSR aimed at torpedoing Anglo-American plans for settling racial problems and increasing its influence in southern Africa at the expense of the interests of the Western countries. But the intensive diplomatic campaign aimed at averting the test in preparation which followed the USSR's warning forced even skeptical observers to adopt a sober approach to an evaluation of the real threat of the racist regime's possession of nuclear weapons.

Following the timely warning signal on the part of the USSR, Washington, London, Paris and Bonn were forced to undertake a vigorous probe of Pretoria's intentions. The South African authorities angrily officially rejected the accusation leveled at it, but this only increased fears in the West that South Africa was ready to test a nuclear weapon. Satellite photographs of facilities installed in the Kalahari obtained at the Carter administration's urgent request left no doubt as to Pretoria's true intentions. These photographs were passed on to London, Paris and Bonn, and the latter immediately issued statements concerning the serious consequences for South Africa in the event of it testing a nuclear weapon. The threat of universal condemnation of the action in preparation forced Pretoria's ruling circles to back down. As President Carter reported at a press conference on 23 August 1977, South Africa had promised that "neither now or in the future will it conduct the test of a nuclear weapon."[39]

Summing up the results of the August events, foreign policy observers in the West unanimously observed that only the USSR's timely warning signal and the diplomatic efforts of all the countries concerned prevented the implementation of South Africa's plans in respect of nuclear tests. As the WASHINGTON POST wrote, "without outside pressure, South Africa would possibly have moved to explode a bomb within a few weeks, if we assume that it has the explosives and that it had resolved to proceed at full speed."[40]

How could it have happened that South Africa had come that close to creating a nuclear weapon and how is the high technological level of its nuclear program to be explained? A concise history of South Africa's cooperation with Western countries provides an exhaustive answer to these questions.

Immediately after WWII, the United States and Britain, attracted by the large reserves of uranium ore necessary for the development of their nuclear potentials (South Africa has the capitalist world's third largest reserves), rendered effective assistance in the formation of Pretoria's uranium industry: 27 mines with 17 extracting plants built with the direct participation of Anglo-American firms were

incorporated in the uranium business. South Africa's proceeds from exports of uranium ore predominantly to the United States and Britain amounted to approximately $2 billion. As ascertained during congressional hearings in 1977, South Africa's uranium monopolies occupy a leading place in a secret uranium cartel, cooperating closely with the corresponding monopolies of the United States, Australia and France in the division of sales markets and the regulation of prices for this strategic raw material.

At the start of the 1960's the United States sold South Africa the first atomic reactor, which, with the participation of American specialists, was commissioned in the township of Pelindab near Pretoria. This reactor, which came to be called Safari I, became the basis of South Africa's nuclear program. The enriched uranium necessary for its operation, which may be used for the manufacture of an atomic bomb, was regularly supplied by the United States. It was precisely the imports of enriched uranium from the United States which played a significant part in the development of the nuclear program since at that time there were no other alternative sources of supplies thereof. A large number of the 120 physicists sent to Western countries were trained in laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission in Oak Ridge. When South Africa embarked on the installation of an experimental facility for uranium enrichment at the start of the 1970's, the American Foxborough Corporation sold South Africa two computers which it sorely needed. An agreement was reached between Washington and Pretoria on long-term supplies of slightly enriched uranium as fuel for the nuclear power stations being installed in South Africa.[41]

Cooperation with the FRG came to be developed intensively in the 1960's. Counting on receiving its share of uranium resources (40 percent of uranium consumed in the FRG is currently exported from South Africa), Bonn readily agreed to contacts between the two countries' atomic scientists and encouraged the exchange of scientific information. The closest informal relations were established between the specialists of Pelindab and the atomic center in Karlsruhe. South Africa maintained contacts with 15 of the FRG's scientific research centers, including the Max Planck Nuclear Physics Institute.[42]

Easy access to scientific research work in the sphere of nuclear physics being conducted in the FRG could not have failed to have contributed to the development in South Africa of a "new, unique process" of uranium enrichment, as a leader of South Africa's atomic program proudly declared at the start of the 1970's. True, the secret of South Africa's success was revealed by the West German physicist E. Becker, who heads the work in this field and who, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, declared bluntly and indignantly that "the South Africans had appropriated West German technology illegally."

According to the magazine DER SPIEGEL, the West German STEAG firm had been rendering South Africa assistance since 1974 in the construction of an experimental installation for uranium enrichment in Walindab. As a result by the mid-1980's, when a commercial uranium enrichment plant will begin operation, South Africa will not only be "totally independent of foreign sources of supply" but will also become a major exporter of strategic raw material suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.[43]

France's monopolies have also contributed to the development of South Africa's atomic program. In the summer of 1976 in most bitter competition with General Electric and West German and Dutch firms a French consortium headed by "Framat" concluded an agreement with South Africa on the supply of two 1,000-megawatt nuclear power stations. The deal was closed for a sum of $1 billion. In accordance with the contract, the spent fuel is sent to France for reprocessing (the stripped plutonium may be used for the further development of French nuclear potential here). Nuclear power stations provide 10 percent of total electric power consumed by South Africa. Considering that South Africa experiences no acute need for additional energy sources for peaceful purposes, the nuclear power stations will mainly provide energy for the uranium enrichment plant (enrichment techniques require great energy expenditure).

A report appeared in the French press in 1977 that the corporation for the production of nuclear fuel, COJEMA, had concluded a contract with South Africa on long-term supplies to it of natural uranium and, furthermore, that COJEMA had agreed to grant South Africa as an advance an interest-free loan of $105 million for further development of the uranium industry.

A concise enumeration of the principal stages of South Africa's cooperation with Western countries shows convincingly that without active assistance on the part of the monopolies and scientific research centers and without equipment supplies and the exchange of scientific information South Africa would hardly have achieved on its own what specialists term "a high level of atomic development," which has brought it as close as can be to the creation of its own nuclear weapons. This was frankly acknowledged at the start of 1977 by Dr [Rouks], head of South Africa's atomic research: "We may attribute our present successes to a considerable extent to the instruction and assistance so readily granted by the United States in the early years of our nuclear program, when certain Western powers joined efforts to introduce our scientists and engineers to atomic science."[44] Such moving compliments to the West seem nothing more than malicious mockery of the myopic and suicidal policy of leading capitalist countries in relation to Pretoria.

If we now attempt to give an answer to the question of what factors contributed to the cooperation of countries of the capitalist world with South Africa, it first needs to be said that South Africa's current nuclear potential is a poisonous seed of the cold war which germinated in the 1970's. It was precisely at the height of it, when the United States and Britain were leading the nuclear arms race, that the need for a strategic raw material--uranium--led to the conception of the uranium industry in South Africa. A parallel course of switching South Africa in to the West's military-strategic system for fighting the "communist threat" was expressed in large-scale supplies of arms--missiles, aircraft, warships, radar systems and so forth--on the part of the United States' NATO allies. Following the embargo in the 1970's on direct supplies of arms by Britain and France, Pretoria has continued to receive them in accordance with purchased licenses via third countries. As a result South Africa already possesses modern nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, particularly the British Buccaneer aircraft and the French Mirages. Immutable stereotypes of the mentality of the times of the cold war are perceived even now, as before, in the West's military-strategic plans, in which South Africa is constantly assigned a leading role in the so-called "defense" of the "free world's" sea communications at the Cape of Good Hope at the junction of the Indian and

Atlantic oceans. Such an approach to South Africa's military-strategic significance in the world balance of forces was also prompted by the fact that the capitalist countries' ruling circles essentially closed their eyes to the rapid development of South Africa's nuclear program and failed to react properly to the numerous early warnings of authoritative experts and organizations.

The London Institute of Strategic Studies long since placed South Africa first on a list of 14 states which could provide themselves with nuclear weapons in the very near future. As far as the American press is concerned, the WASHINGTON POST reported in February 1977 that South Africa needed "at the most, from 2 to 4 years to produce an atomic bomb" and that this time could be shortened to just "a few months" if Pretoria were to undertake a crash program.[45] Incidentally, even South Africa's ruling circles repeatedly gave transparent hints in the past that Pretoria was capable, if necessary, of creating its own atomic bomb. Thus then Prime Minister Vorster proudly declared in 1976 that "South Africa can enrich uranium and has the possibility" of creating nuclear weapons.

Pretoria's course toward the creation of its own nuclear potential was determined by the constant refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Despite the obvious signs and realistic forecasts, ruling circles of the Western countries were nevertheless unable, prior to the USSR's warning signal, to take preventive steps in respect of South Africa. The main reason for this inactivity can be explained by the traditional obsession with preserving the West's strategic positions and continuing the policy of military rivalry with the East, which prevents priority being given in good time to new problems.

In the development of its nuclear program South Africa has taken advantage not only of the tension between West and East but also the bitter interimperialist struggle in the modern nuclear technology and materials markets between the United States and the West European countries. France's deal with South Africa, which the United States simultaneously wished to conclude, was put together in this atmosphere. Pretoria is even now continuing to play its trump card--uranium raw material in exchange for the technology it needs for development of the atomic program--in the interimperialist competition of the Western countries.

Following the events of August 1977, there has been an ongoing debate in the American press about whether South Africa is continuing the course toward nuclear armament. On the whole, the majority of observers agree that Pretoria's promises not to test a nuclear weapon are a sufficient guarantee that this will not occur. True, there still exists the viewpoint, largely inspired by Pretoria's statement concerning the peaceful nature of the atomic program, that South Africa does not need nuclear weapons for they are of no military-strategic value--"Pretoria has sufficiently strong conventional armed forces, no one is posing a threat to it from outside, and the use of nuclear weapons to suppress racial disturbances within the country would be catastrophic for the interests of the whites." But such reasoning does not withstand criticism. As T. Greenwood rightly observed, "in deciding the question of whether to be or not to be a nuclear country the dominant role is performed increasingly not by military but political calculations."[46] From Pretoria's viewpoint, the possession of nuclear weapons or the capability of their immediate production is a principle lever of diplomatic pressure not only on the policy of

African states but also on the policy of leading capitalist countries, including the United States. In the racist regime's calculations it is precisely nuclear weapons which would afford an opportunity of decisively influencing development of the international situation in southern Africa.

At the same time Western observers note that having given up nuclear testing in the face of serious economic sanctions and political isolation South Africa could nevertheless continue the course toward nuclear arms, without demonstrative explosions, and employ the threat of the immediate acquisition of these weapons. Accentuating attention on the new tactics of the "near-nuclear" states, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR emphasized in this connection: "Like Israel, South Africa has understood that politically it is very convenient to retain the right to keep a 'bomb in the basement'."[47]

Thus it is logical to assume that Pretoria's threat of acquiring nuclear weapons has only been indefinitely postponed. This conclusion is also corroborated by continuing statements of members of the racist regime's government. Thus even after South Africa's official promises, on 30 August 1977 Finance Minister Hörwood provocatively declared: "It is time we told Carter and anyone else that if at some time we suddenly decide to use our nuclear potential differently, we will do this very quietly and will consider only our own assessments here."

What consequences could South Africa's possession of nuclear weapons entail? There is no doubt that this event would signal the start of a nuclear arms race on the African continent in which sooner or later other countries would become involved. Faced with a real nuclear threat or diplomatic blackmail, the African countries might turn for assistance to other countries (for example, members of the British Commonwealth to Britain and the former French colonies to France, confronting the latter with the need to participate in the "nuclear restraint" of South Africa). "Making South Africa a nuclear power," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR wrote, "would only lead to the great powers increasing military support to Africa and, possibly, compel some of them to extend the nuclear shield to the black countries."[48] Such a step by Pretoria would strike a palpable blow at the idea of making Africa a zone free of nuclear weapons and would contribute to the kindling of international tension in this area of the world.

This would have even more serious consequences for struggle against the further spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. A nuclear South Africa would not only be an example for the ruling circles of countries which have yet to renounce the intention of acquiring their own nuclear weapons but also a principal supplier of the necessary technology and materials for their manufacture. The WASHINGTON POST emphasized in this connection: "The campaign to prevent the world's armament with nuclear weapons...would suffer a serious setback and its future would be uncertain, particularly when it is considered that South Africa possesses rich natural uranium deposits. If it could process and enrich sufficient uranium to manufacture its own bomb, it could be a potential exporter of uranium suitable for weapons production to other countries also."[49]

Reports appear regularly in the Western countries' press that South Africa is even now performing a noticeable role in the spread of the nuclear danger, having established close bilateral relations with a number of "near-nuclear" countries. Thus, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, an agreement has long been in effect between South

Africa and Israel in accordance with which Pretoria has committed itself, in exchange for nuclear technology and information, to "guaranteed supplies of uranium" needed for the development of Tel Aviv's nuclear potential. The BOSTON GLOBE reported the existence of contacts in the nuclear sphere between South Africa and South Korea and South Africa and Taiwan.

The threatening consequences urgently confront the leaders of the West, primarily the United States, with the question of the need to take urgent steps to cut short the South African racists' hankering after the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to make adjustments to foreign policy corresponding to the interests of the struggle against proliferation.

First, the West's leading powers are in a position to put immediate pressure on South Africa for the latter to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and put its nuclear program under international control, and not only those areas of it which are being implemented with the direct participation of other countries. The West, which maintains close economic and political relations with South Africa, has in its arsenal sufficient levers for influencing it, from a halt to supplies of enriched uranium and cancellation of the order for nuclear power stations through the imposition of a total economic embargo and Pretoria's political isolation.

Throughout the period 1978-1980 the United States sounded out at government level South Africa's positions on the question of the latter signing the Nonproliferation Treaty. In the event of the treaty being signed South Africa would undertake in principle to agree to IAEA control of its nuclear program. For its part, Washington, as "compensation," would continue supplying South Africa with enriched uranium.

Washington categorizes this potential "deal" as evidence of the United States' farsighted policy in southern Africa, while the South African press regards it as a big win for Pretoria. The point being that the manifold forms of South Africa's nuclear cooperation with the United States and other Western countries would enable it to save tens of millions of dollars on its nuclear research program. Simultaneously the broadening of official channels of communications with the Western countries would contribute to a deceleration of the process of Pretoria's isolation in the international arena. Assessing the agreement with South Africa which was in preparation, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE emphasized in September 1978 the dubiousness of the fact that it would provide for stricter control over its nuclear capacity. It is rather, according to the journal, an indication of the strengthening of relations between the "custodian of the interests of the West" and the "white authorities" at a time when the struggle in southern Africa is assuming extensive proportions.[50]

Second, the Western countries' ruling circles could have adopted a more constructive approach to a study of the idea of making Africa a zone free of nuclear weapons. But short-term strategic calculations of the leaders of the Western states, which are constructed from standpoints of the cold war times, still prevent an understanding of the fact that their long-term interests will be in jeopardy in the event of the spread of nuclear weapons.[51]

Third, the fact of the coincidence of South Africa's preparations for testing a nuclear weapon with the accelerated development of new nuclear missile systems in the United States--neutron bombs, cruise missiles--indicates that the further race

in nuclear arms is continuing to stimulate the process of their acquisition by other countries. In 1977 Pretoria calculated that the wave of protests against the United States' neutron bomb would deaden the resonance of its tests and facilitate its entry onto the path of nuclear armaments.

All this leads to the conclusion that the Pentagon's course toward obtaining unilateral strategic advantages and an endeavor to lead the nuclear arms race could have a directly opposite, negative result for the long-term interests of the Western countries' "security" since they are complicating the struggle against the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide.[52]

The threat of the further spread of nuclear weapons in the world urgently dictates the need for the Western countries to abandon the foreign policy approach of the times of the cold war, when all changes in the world were viewed through the prism of bilateral West-East confrontation. Only a policy of relaxation of tension and cooperation on key issues of world politics can guarantee the successful solution of the acute new problems, including the problems of nonproliferation, confronting mankind.

We have to agree with the opinion of the WASHINGTON POST, which valued highly the interaction of countries of East and West in frustrating the nuclear tests in South Africa in August 1977 and expressed the hope that this interaction would be continued: "If such cooperation could be strengthened and extended...the events of these last few weeks...could serve as a historic precedent."[53] Indeed, removal of the nuclear threat at the Cape of Good Hope would be an important contribution to the consolidation of peace worldwide.

As in the case with South Africa, Western countries have played the main part in building up Tel Aviv's nuclear potential.

Israel has a comparatively small nuclear program, which at the present time includes two scientific research reactors: one was built in 1959 with the assistance of the United States, the other in 1960 with the assistance of France near Dimona. Whereas the first reactor is controlled by the IAEA, the second operates without any control in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy. When, at the start of the 1960's, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered nuclear facilities in Dimona and President J. Kennedy demanded explanations from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the latter replied that it was a "textile factory." All U.S. attempts at the highest level to inspect this reactor throughout the 1970's were fruitless since they encountered a categorical refusal in Tel Aviv (a group of members of Congress visiting Israel was refused in 1976). It is precisely this reactor which produces the plutonium which Israel is using for military purposes.

Economically Israel has no burning need to develop nuclear power stations and greeted Washington's 1974 proposal to sell it a nuclear power station unenthusiastically. Although talks are currently continuing on nuclear power station supplies, it is nevertheless believed that Tel Aviv will not accept the terms of the sale formulated by the J. Carter administration, which provide for the establishment of IAEA control over the country's entire nuclear activity.

In the SIPRI's estimation, Israel has a small installation for extracting plutonium from spent fuel and is working on the creation of uranium enrichment equipment. The Dimona reactor annually produces 40 kilos of plutonium, which is sufficient for the production of four atomic bombs.[54] Israel does not have uranium ore reserves, and this objectively prompts the endeavor to obtain it from various sources and in various ways.

The ["Plambet"] affair concerning the sale of 200 tons of American uranium ore, which was shipped to the Euratom countries in 1968, but which did not reach its destination, became a scandal in 1977. An investigation conducted by the appropriate authorities of the United States and the West European countries contains the conclusion that the missing cargo of uranium ore was stolen and sent to Israel, in all probablity with the direct connivance of Z. Shapiro, then president of the American Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, who is known for his ties to representatives of Israel's atomic industry. Despite its compromising nature for the United States, this conclusion is shared by the majority of Western specialists, who well recall the theft of PT boats from the French port of Cherbourg in 1973.[55]

Currently the main supplier of uranium raw material to Israel is South Africa, which receives from Tel Aviv highly developed nuclear technology in exchange. Cooperation in the nuclear sphere continues with France and the United States.

Does Israel have atomic weapons? This question is now being debated increasingly in the Western press, particularly following an article which appeared in TIME magazine on 12 April 1976 whose authors concluded that Tel Aviv possessed nuclear weapons and was close to using them during the 1973 Near East conflict.[56] Officially Tel Aviv holds to the version expressed by Prime Minister L. Eshkol in 1964: "Israel does not have atomic weapons and will not be the first country in this area to acquire them." However, with time, a certain ambiguity has been observed in statements on this score. The same L. Eshkol emphasized in 1968 that Israel possessed the secret of the production of nuclear weapons, but was still far from the possibility of producing them.[57] In 1974 Israeli President E. Katzir (himself a nuclear engineer) gave the following ambiguous answer to a question from American journalists as to whether Tel Aviv possessed nuclear weapons: "Why should this concern you? Let others worry about it." In sum, Tel Aviv's official line amounts to an official denial of the presence of atomic weapons and indirect confirmation of the capacity to produce them. This tactic affords Israel an opportunity to make flexible use of its nuclear potential as political and military blackmail in respect of the Arab countries, at the same time "not exasperating" the United States in its policy of nonproliferation and not openly challenging world public opinion.

In the CIA's estimation, Israel has in fact already created nuclear weapons. This viewpoint is reinforced by the following facts: first, Tel Aviv has accumulated large stocks of plutonium and uranium, partially with the help of secret operations; second, its efforts in the sphere of the development of techniques of uranium enrichment and plutonium conversion are of an ambiguous nature; and, third, great attention is being paid to the creation of its own nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It is believed in the West that Israel will not endeavor to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities by way of the open testing of nuclear weapons, the less so in that there is currently no need for this technically. However, indications of a refinement of the nuclear weapons and the further development of atomic potential could

be manifested obliquely in subsequent decisions on the development of its own nuclear missile systems, particularly in an increase in the range and accuracy of the Jericho missiles, and also in decisions on the acquisitionof American missiles for its own air force.[58]

The existence of the obvious technical capacity for creating nuclear weapons also conditions Tel Aviv's negative attitude toward the Nonproliferation Treaty. While the Arab countries undertook in principle to maintain their nonnuclear status, having signed the corresponding treaty, Israel declined to do this. It is for this very reason that a number of Arab countries has not ratified the treaty. Even at the present stage Israel continues to adopt a negative attitude toward the question of being a party to the treaty. The main reason for this position is that subscribing to the treaty would, in the ruling cirles' calculations, reduce the significance of the "psychological means of restraint" which the nuclear potential represents and would deprive Israel of a "valuable trump card" in political negotiations in the Near East.

Another factor determining Israel's position is the fact that subscribing to the treaty would signify official renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons, as a result of which it would be far more difficult for the United States to reconcile itself to a subsequent decision on the production of nuclear weapons if some new circumstances, in the opinion of Israel's leaders, required this.

As a whole, the general opinion among politicians in the West is that Israel is technically and materially capable of producing atomic weapons and delivering them to the target and that, considering the ambiguous statements of its leaders and the negative attitude on the question of subscribing to the Nonproliferation Treaty, it cannot be ruled out that, under certain conditions, the country could make a "decisive" choice in favor of nuclear weapons. This situation continues to engender suspicion in the Near East countries in respect of Tel Aviv's nuclear intentions and could be the detonator of a chain reaction of proliferation in this crisis area of the world.

Pakistan does not subscribe to the Nonproliferation Treaty and has not signed the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Pakistan's attitude toward nonproliferation is largely determined by its traditional rivalry with India. Back at the end of the 1960's the future head of state, A. Bhutto, emphasized that in the event India acquired nuclear weapons, the Pakistani people would "eat grass," but do everything possible to catch up with it.

Information was prevalent in UN circles in 1979 that Pakistan was preparing in the verynear future to test its own nuclear device.[59]

By the start of the 1980's Pakistan had only one nuclear reactor, which had been supplied by Canada. In 1976 Pakistan signed an agreement with France on the purchase of a plant for the conversion of spent fuel, which caused acute contradictions between the United States and France and the United States and Pakistan. The acquisition of equipment for breeding is unjustified economically and merely testifies to Islamabad's true intentions. As the newspaper LE MONDE emphasized, "it is hard to imagine why Pakistan, which has just one nuclear power station...can be in economic need of a nuclear fuel reprocessing installation which could only be justified by a big nuclear program based on the construction of breeder reactors."[60]

Following certain changes in France's export policy at the end of the 1970's, steps were taken to modify the original agreement to reduce the risk of the accumulation of plutonium in Pakistan. A report appeared in the Western press in August 1978 that the Franco-Pakistani agreement might be canceled owing to France's unwillingness to supply dangerous equipment and a refusal to compromise on these issues on the part of Pakistan. The journal NUCLEAR NEWS reported simultaneously that the possible annulment of the deal was caused by a PRC proposal to supply analogous equipment.[61] American political scientists believe that Beijing's endeavor to create a new military-political geometry in South Asia could prompt the PRC's more active assistance in the nuclear sphere to its allies, including Pakistan.

Initially the United States, for its part, put considerable pressure on Pakistan for the latter to cancel the deal. In 1977 Washington imposed as a repressive measure an embargo on supplies of modern American arms to Pakistan, particularly 110 A-7 aircraft. In 1979 the United States made the decision to discontinue economic assistance to the tune of $40 million for the current fiscal year and $45 million for the following year in response to Pakistan's attempts to clandestinely create a uranium enrichment plant.

However, at the start of 1980 Washington all but abandoned the policy of restraining Pakistan's "nuclear ambitions" when it proposed massive supplies of modern arms to Islamabad for the purpose of incorporating it in the Pentagon's aggressive preparations in Asia. The American press evaluated the arms supplies as "silent encouragement" of the aspirations of Pakistan's ruling circles' to acquire nuclear weapons.

Argentina has not subscribed to the Nonproliferation Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty. It has signed the Tlatelolco Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, but has not ratified it. Argentina is considered a country with a comparatively high level of development of the atomic industry. It has considerable reserves of natural uranium, and, given the absence of other sources of energy, attaches importance to the development of nuclear power stations. A 320-megawatt nuclear reactor supplied by the FRG has been operating in the country since 1974. A second will come on stream at the start of the 1980's. The installation of factories for the production of uranium fuel is continuing. Argentina possesses its own low-capacity nuclear fuel reprocessing installation, which enables it to recover and store plutonium. By 1983 the average annual plutonium product will constitute 340 kilos.[62] A large industrial plant for converting spent fuel is being installed simultaneously with France's assistance. In addition, there are six scientific research reactors in Argentina, one of which is the biggest in Latin America. As a whole, Argentina has sufficient economic resources and trained personnel for carrying out a nuclear arms program.

A distinctive feature of Argentina's policy in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is emphasis on the need to preserve independence in the nuclear sphere. For example, its nuclear reactors operate on natural uranium. It opted for such a path specially in order not to export [sic] enriched uranium from other countries, particularly the United States, and thus not be dependent on them. In 1974 Argentina signed an agreement on an exchange of nuclear information with India.

Argentina consistently pursues a policy of keeping its hands free in the nuclear sphere. Its reasons for not signing the Nonproliferation Treaty amount, as a whole, to the fact that it could impede its economic development (the reference being, in particular, to the article on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes). The country's leaders have emphasized repeatedly that Argentina has the right to the independent use of explosions, which, as they put it, "are most promising from the economic viewpoint." At the same time SIPRI experts believe that economically Argentina "would stand to gain far more from joining the ranks of those who have subscribed to the treaty, which provides for supplies of nuclear fuel and technological assistance in the nuclear sphere."[63] They draw attention to the fact that not signing the treaty is not a direct indication that Argentina intends to create nuclear weapons. But such a decision could be influenced by the position on these issues of its traditional rival in Latin America--Brazil. As emphasized in a CIA document on the spread of nuclear weapons carried in the press in 1978, political considerations concerning prestige in Latin America could largely prompt Argentina's decision on taking the path of nuclear armament.[64]

Neither has Brazil joined the Nonproliferation Treaty. Although it has signed the Tlatelolco Treaty, it has nevertheless repeatedly stressed its right to independently conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which is contrary to the articles of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Until recently Brazil was behind Argentina in the level of development of the atomic industry. Its first industrial 500-megawatt nuclear reactor, supplied by the United States, was commissioned in 1977. But the situation changed following the signing in 1975 of a 15-year agreement with the FRG on the sale of nuclear equipment to the tune $5 billion. In accordance with the agreement, the FRG obtained guaranteed access to natural uranium and thorium reserves. In turn, Brazil acquired 8 industrial reactors operating on enriched uranium, a plant for the production of uranium fuel and a plant for uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, which insured the complete nuclear fuel cycle. And this essentially affords an opportunity for proceeding to the creation of nuclear weapons, if such a decision were to be made.

Following the signing of the agreement with the FRG, Brazil's foreign minister declared that the country had acquired new technological and political status in the world arena as a result. Brazil's leaders have repeatedly made it understood that they consider nuclear might and international positions inseparably interconnected. Will Brazil follow along the path of use of the atomic program for military purposes? A decision on this question will largely depend, as a number of experts emphasizes, on the course opted for by its neighbor--Argentina. The ruling circles' endeavor to enhance the country's international status and a certain apprehension as regards Argentina's intentions are, it is believed, strong factors which could lead in the future to a policy of nuclear armament.

In addition to agreements with the FRG, France and the United States in the atomic energy sphere, Brazil has similar agreements with Britain, India and Israel. Brazil's objections to the Nonproliferation Treaty are largely similar to those of Argentina, and experts emphasize that its position on joining the treaty will largely depend on the evolution of the approach of this neighboring country.

The Arab Republic of Egypt has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, but has not ratified it. The reason why Eygpt continues to hold off from the treaty basically

amounts to the fact that the state opposed to it--Israel--is also not party to the treaty and that its policy has all the indications of the accelerated development of the nuclear potential. Furthermore, Egypt believes that the security guarantees to the nonnuclear countries contained in the UN Security Council resolution are insufficiently dependable and that they should be of the precise form of commitments of the nuclear states to regard the threat or use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear subscriber-countries as perfectly adequate grounds for the collective prevention of nuclear aggression or retaliatory measures against the aggressor.

Egypt is far behind Israel in a technological respect. It has only one small and inefficient scientific research reactor. During a tour of Near East countries in 1974 U.S. President R. Nixon proposed selling Egypt and, simultaneoulsy, Israel 600-megawatt industrial nuclear reactors. This proposal aroused strong opposition both in the United States itself and in other countries as an act contrary to the spirit of the Nonproliferation Treaty, particularly since the sale proposal was not made dependent on a precise system of control of the equipment. Critics also emphasized that the sale proposal failed to take account of the fact that the introduction of nuclear technology in crisis areas of the world could lead to its use in the future for military purposes also.

According to press reports, talks on the sale of the reactors are almost complete, and, according to the plan, in the event of the sale, the nuclear power stations will be commissioned by the mid-1980's.

It needs to be pointed out that Tel Aviv's position on nuclear issues is the principal factor determining Egypt's policy. As the majority of American specialists believes, the country will hardly ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty until Israel takes similar steps in this direction. An increase in Israel's nuclear potential could prompt Egypt, given the absence of an adequate technological base of it own, to purchase nuclear devices from other countries with the help of the rich oil-producing Arab countries and also to strive to extend cooperation in the nuclear sphere with the leading West European countries.[65]

Right up to the ouster of the monarchy in Iran in January 1979 Tehran's policy of building up its technical potential in the nuclear sphere was a cause for unconcealed anxiety even among American experts. Although the country had signed and ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, the great-power ambitions of the monarchist ruling clique nevertheless made a change in the approach to the question of the possesion of nuclear weapons a definite possibility. In September 1975 the former shah of Iran declared in an interview with the NEW YORK TIMES that, given certain changes in international relations, Tehran might reexamine its position on this issue: "If 20-30 ludicrously small countries were to attempt to create nuclear weapons, in this case I would be forced to reexamine our policy."[66]

The monarchist regime's endeavor to occupy the dominant position militarily in the Persian Gulf and make the country the world's fifth strongest state by the start of the 21st century could have prompted the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the military arsenal if only as a symbol of future political status.

Of course, proceeding along this path could have prompted similar steps on the part of a number of Arab countries situated in the Persian Gulf zone and also the

negative reaction of the states bordering it. The monarchist ruling clique would have been forced to take serious account of these consequences before making the decision to create its own nuclear weapons. At the same time the large-scale program of the development of Tehran's atomic energy, which was hardly justified from an economic viewpoint, testified that the monarchy intended to preserve its freedom of choice in this question.

According to preliminary plans, nuclear power station capacity in Iran was to have constituted 34,000 megawatts by 1995. Iran would have had to have purchased 25 nuclear power stations to achieve this figure. Only one scientific research reactor was operating by the start of the 1980's. But the number of completed deals and the shah's government's negotiations on new purchases indicated that the country's technical potential in the nuclear sphere would increase sharply. In 1974 Iran concluded an agreement with the FRG and France on the purchase of nuclear power stations which were to have been commissioned in the mid-1980's. To obtain access to enriched uranium Iran granted a loan of $1 billion to France's atomic agency and secured for itself 10 percent of the stock of the new CORDIF uranium enrichment consortium. In parallel with the development of relations with the West European countries Tehran also maintained course toward the acquisition of nuclear power stations from the United States.

Agreement was reached between the United States and Iran in the latter half of the 1970's on the supply of eight nuclear reactors to the tune of $7 billion. In the negotiations with the United States, France and the FRG on new purchases the monarchical government repeatedly attempted to obtain equipment for uranium enrichment and spent fuel conversion. This testified that Iran aspired to the achievement of independence in the enrichment and breeding sphere, which would have afforded it uncontrolled possibilities in the event of a decision to proceed to the creation of nuclear weapons.

The reexamination of the country's foreign policy following the overthrow of the monarchy led to a certain reevaluaiton by Tehran of the plans for the large-scale development of the atomic industry. After the new Iranian Government canceled a number of arms purchases which the shah had concluded with the United States and West European countries, the implementation of deals in the atomic industry sphere was also questioned.

In this situation certain American specialists believe that although the idea itself of the creation of a strong technological potential in the nuclear sphere in the long term could remain within Tehran's sights, the complex problems of the country's socioeconomic reorganization will, in all probability, play the paramount part in the system of the country's political priorities.

South Korea and Taiwan have subscribed to the Nonproliferation Treaty; but, American experts believe, factors brought about by their strategic vulnerability and the traditional confrontation with the PRC could have a strong impact on the decision to take the path of nuclear armament. In 1976 Taiwan built a laboratory device for the breeding of nuclear fuel on which, according to reports of SIPRI specialists, work came to a halt at the end of the same year under pressure from the United States.

South Korea has two scientific research reactors and is creating two nuclear power stations, and a reactor is also on order from Canada. In 1976 Seoul declared its intention to purchase a conversion plant from France, but these plans were canceled under pressure from the United States.

In the opinion of the well-known American commentator J. Anderson, the CIA has sufficient information to the effect that, despite Seoul's official assurances that it will not produce a nuclear device, the South Korean regime "possesses the necessary knowledge and resources for its manufacture."[67] South Korea and Taiwan, which are situated in a crisis area of the world, require closer attention in the sphere of the threat of proliferation, all the more so in that an endeavor to acquire nuclear weapons can be clearly traced in their policy. Thus a CIA report pointed out directly that "Taiwan's current policy is most probably leading to the creation of nuclear weapons."[68] As is believed in the West, these states' decision on the question of whether to take the path of nuclear armament or not will largely depend on the evolution of the international situation in this region and on their relations in the military sphere with the United States.

It has to be noted that in addition to the above-mentioned countries, which the majority of American experts categorizes as the main candidates for the "nuclear club," there is a further number of countries which hint from time to time of their aspiration to the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons, but which as yet lack the technical potential. Thus when the United States cut off military assistance to Turkey at the time of the Greek-Turkish conflict connected with the Cyprus problem, certain of its leaders also began to talk of the desirability of the acquisition of such weapons. Rumors circulate regularly in the Western press that Libya has requested that the PRC and France sell it atomic weapons (it was announced in 1976 that France had supplied Libya with a 600-megawatt scientific research reactor). The Yugoslav press also discusses the possibilities of the creation of nuclear weapons from time to time.[69]

To this it should be added that a number of industrially developed countries has long had the technical potential for the independent creation of nuclear weapons, but for certain considerations prefers not to take this path. These include the FRG, Japan, Italy, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Netherlands and others. Experts' attention is drawn to the positions on nonproliferation issues of the first two states for the success of the struggle against the spread of nuclear weapons could largely depend on their position.

Currently the FRG and Japan are full-fledged parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty, but it was ratified in these countries in an atmosphere of acute internal political struggle after an interval of 5 years since it was signed. In accordance with the 1954 Paris Accords, the FRG had undertaken not to create nuclear weapons on its territory, but this undertaking did not rule out, however, the possibility of their purchase or creation on the territory of other countries. At the time of the signing of the treaty the FRG's ruling circles insisted on obtaining commitments from the United states that the treaty would not prevent the possibility of the creation of European nuclear forces (ENF). L. Dunn and H. Kahn, research fellows of the Hudson Institute, observe that, by all indications, the FRG is in its export policy in the nuclear sphere pursuing a long-term course toward the spread of nuclear weapons in the world, endeavoring to weaken the positions of the existing nuclear

powers and, as a consequence, lift the taboo on its own nuclear weapons in the future.[70] Thanks to the FRG's high technological level, a very insignificant length of time would be needed to embark on this path. Nevertheless, the majority of experts agrees on the little likelihood of such a step since it is perfectly clear that such a turnabout would elicit sharp opposition on the part of the socialist countries and the states allied with the FRG. In the CIA's estimation, "only the total collapse of the existing security structures (which is of little probability in the immediate future) in Europe accompanied by an increase in military tension in the world might prompt the FRG to take this path. Even a limited proliferation among other countries would hardly have a serious effect on the approach to this problem."[71] The FRG's ruling circles currently prefer to derive the increasing economic benefits from the position of a nonnuclear power, profiting from the United States' "nuclear umbrella."

Japan's position is largely similar to the FRG's approach. Provisions of Japan's Constitution prevent to a certain extent independent provision with nuclear weapons, although repeated attempts have been made to revise the constitutional barriers under the pressure of a number of military and political groupings. Emphasizing the high level of development of the country's atomic industry, former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger stressed in an interview with the ASAHI EVENING NEWS in July 1978 that "there are no technical means preventing Japan creating nuclear weapons." But the sharp opposition to such a step both inside the country and abroad is the cause of the Japanese ruling circles' restraint and caution on this matter. A number of military specialists believes that acquiring its own nuclear weapons would prove "a disastrous step" for Japan's strategic position as an island state.

It has to be noted that there is no uniform opinion among American experts in an evaluation of Japan's future policy. True, the majority of them, including high CIA and State Department officials, believes that, given the absence of abrupt changes in the balance of forces in the Far East, Japan is unlikely to take the path of nuclear armament. However, representatives of the Defense Department (particularly the navy) believe that to achieve its long-term goals in the developing Asian countries and to create a favorable alinement of forces in the plane of economic and political interests Japan's leaders could begin to seriously reexamine the possibility of the creation of nuclear weapons. In their estimation, such a decision could be made at the start of the 1980's and rapidly in the event of the further spread of nuclear weapons in the world, which could lead to a lessening of the traditional domestic opposition and the disappearance of the "atomic allergy." At the same time experts agree that Japan's future course in nuclear issues will be conditioned to a considerable extent by the development of the situation in Asia and the evolution of its military relations with the United States.[72]

In order to become a nuclear country in the full sense of the word it is not enough to have tested nuclear devices or to have secretly fabricated them; it is also necessary to have dependable delivery vehicles. And here the majority of specialists emphasizes that, owing to imperialist trade rivalry in conventional modern types of armament, a situation has evolved wherein a number of "threshold" countries, while not yet testing nuclear weapons, already has at its disposal vehicles for their guaranteed delivery to the target (table 1). For example, the Skyhawk A-4, Starfighter F-104, Phantom F-4, Mirage V, Canberra and Buccaneer have a capacity of 4.5, 2, 7, 4, 3 and 6 tons respectively. The range of the Skyhawk, Canberra and

Buccaneer is up to 6,000 kilometers; that of the Phantom, Starfighter and Mirage up to 3,000 kilometers.

Table 1. Nuclear Weapon Delivery Vehicles in the Arsenals of Certain "Threshold" Countries

Country	Vehicle potentially capable of delivering nuclear weapons
Argentina	Skyhawk A-4, Canberra, Mirage III-E
Egypt	Phantom V
Brazil	Mirage III-EB
Israel	Phantom II, Skyhawk A-4, Mirage IIIs and the Jericho missile
Iran	Phantom IV, V
Pakistan	Canberra, Mirage V, Mirage III-E
Taiwan	Starfighter F-104
FRG	Starfighter F-104, Phantom II and Honest John, Pershing I and Sergeant missiles
South Korea	Phantom V and Honest John missile
South Africa	Canberra, Buccaneer, Mirage F-1, Mirage III-E
Japan	Phantom II, Starfighter F-104

Table compiled on the basis of data of "Military Balance 1979-1980," London, 1979.

The ground-to-ground missiles such as the Israeli Jericho (range of 1,000 kilometers) and the American Pershing 1 (720 kilometers), Lance (139 kilometers), Sergeant (135 kilometers) and Honest John (40 kilometers) also have the necessary specifications for delivering nuclear weapons. If necessary, these missiles, which are used for studying the atmosphere, can be adapted for other purposes.

Considering the scale of the trade in modern and refined weapons, the majority of states will encounter no serious difficulties in acquiring the above nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Specialists also draw attention to the fact that aircraft of civil aviation like the Boeing 707 could also be used, with certain slight modifications, as a delivery vehicle for "crude" atom bombs.
Thus the majority of "near-nuclear" countries possesses nuclear weapon delivery vehicles capable of striking targets in states which border them.

As experience testifies, the development and maintenance at a modern level of even "modest" nuclear forces is an extraordinarily costly business. For example, expenditure on the creation of the nuclear forces of Britain and France has amounted to more than $10 billion. However, whereas previously countries began their military nuclear programs almost from scratch, now progress in the peaceful use of atomic energy has created the conditions for programs of the fabrication of nuclear devices with a sharply reduced degree of corresponding expenditure. In the SIPRI's estimation, India's expenditure on conducting a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes in 1974 amounted to approximately $500,000, mainly because this explosion was a byproduct of a wide-ranging program of the peaceful use of atomic energy. Cost is no longer a significant obstacle on the path of the creation of atomic bombs on the basis of plutonium. In F. Barnaby's estimation, for many small countries an atom bomb with a yield of 20 kilotons could be the weapon for striking strategic

targets in neighboring states. Considering the relatively low cost of various delivery systems and their availability on the world market, "modest" nuclear forces based on the independent creation of nuclear devices would cost several hundred million dollars, which would correspond to the cost of a modern cruiser.[73]

More modern nuclear forces could cost more, but not so much as to be beyond the means of a number of countries whose military budgets are growing constantly. Thus E. Lefever, a research assistant of the Brookings Institution, believes that the cost of creating "moderate nuclear forces" (120-kiloton atom bombs, 30-50 nuclear weapon carrier bombers and 50 ground-to-ground guided missiles with a range of 1,500 miles) would amount in 1978 prices over a decade to $3.5 billion.[74]

Thus the availability of delivery vehicles and the high level of development of nuclear technology theoretically bring about the existence of the "physical" potential for the creation of "deterrent forces" by a number of "threshold" countries.

It must be noted that the American experts' forecasts concerning the rate of proliferation has proved extraordinarily overstated in the past and, consequently, unrealistic. Immediately following the testing of a nuclear weapon in the United States, scientists who worked within the Manhatten Project framework were predicting the rapid proliferation of atomic weapons in the absence of the strict international control of atomic energy. The physicist H. Uri believed that half a dozen countries would join the "nuclear club" within 5 years. Another atomic scientist--[I. Lendzhmuir]--believed that in the wake of the United States nuclear weapons would be acquired by the states which participated in joint work with the United States, namely Canada and Britain, and then by states opposed to the United States.

The second wave of alarmed forecasts came at the end of the 1950's and the start of the 1960's, when the consequences of the "Atoms for Peace" program--an increase in countries' technical capabilities in the nuclear sphere--made themselves keenly felt. Official representatives of the D. Eisenhower administration predicted that not only Canada and Sweden but also the FRG would possess nuclear weapons at the start of the 1960's. The American Academy of Sciences and the National Planning Association emphasized in a joint study in 1960 that, given the absence of international control, there would be 10 nuclear states in the world in 5 years. The well-known atomic physicist K. Snow declared in 1960, speaking of the prevailing opinion among his colleagues, that all physicists "know that more than a dozen countries will need possibly only 6 years to acquire nuclear weapons."[75] In the mid-1960's Lord Chalfont, then a British foreign minister, believed that by the mid-1970's the number of nuclear countries would have risen to 10 or 12.[76] But these forecasts have not been corroborated. Compared with the early anxious predictions the real increase in the number of countries which have tested nuclear weapons has occurred comparatively slowly. Following the testing of an atomic weapon by the third state --Britain--in 1952, the three subsequent countries conducted tests at intervals of 8, 4 and 10 years over a 22-year period.

Such forecasts proved groundless largely because they were based on false premises. It was believed, for example, that achievement of the technical capacity for the production of nuclear weapons would also automatically entail a political decision, that is, that the latter would play a part derived from the technical potential.

But it gradually became clear that it is precisely political considerations in the question of whether to have or not to have nuclear weapons which play the decisive part and that factors exist impeding embarkation on the path of nuclear armament. Past forecasts took account neither of the degree of risk to a country's position in the world ensuing from a decision to possess nuclear weapons nor the degree of benefit in the event of refraining from such a step.

To take the temporal aspect, it might appear at first sight that with the passage of time the proliferation process abates and could finally be reduced to nothing. Thus in the first decade of the atomic age (1945-1955) three countries tested nuclear devices, in the second (1955-1965) two, in the third (1965-1975) one and in the fourth possibly not one. But this manner of reasoning does not take account of the fact that the nonconducting of tests is accompanied by radical quantitative and qualitative changes in the technical potential of many states. As pointed out above, the existing programs of the use of atomic energy in a number of countries could shorten the path which has to be traveled by this country or the other if its ruling circles decide to provide themselves with nuclear weapons. The distance which they would have to cover technically could now be covered far more quickly and with less expenditure of effort than hitherto. As the American expert A. Wohlstetter believes, under the conditions of the proliferation of nuclear technology "many states need only a small push" to finally complete the path which will lead them to the mastery of the technical capacity for the creation of nuclear weapons.[77]

It is not surprising that the third wave of anxious forecasts concerning proliferation began in the mid-1970's. The forecast of W. Epstein, special assistant to the UN secretary general for disarmament, contains the conclusion that by the 1980's some 17 states will have the capacity for producing nuclear weapons and approximately 40 by 1995.[78] Incidentally, it is not only the experts but also officials (like, for example, J. Nye, then assistant U.S. secretary of state for nonproliferation) who are inclined to believe that the number of "near-nuclear" states could be 40 by the year 2000.[79]

Of course, these forecasts, which were compiled on the basis of an estimation of the proliferation only of technical potential, without regard for other factors, do not afford an opportunity of determining the real number of states which could take the path of the possession of nuclear weapons, even less in that entirely specific political conditions exist for each state. However, there is no doubt that in the current situation the "nuclear club" could rapidly and easily expand if a number of "near-nuclear" states takes a political decision in this sphere. Thus D. Gompert of the Council for Foreign Relations does not rule out the possibility that by 1990 "the nuclear community could consist of 10 'manifest' nuclear powers, 5 'probables' and 10 'threshold' states, which would be in a position to manufacture a nuclear weapon within several weeks." He also believes that more than 100 countries will most likely not follow the path of the acquisition of their own weapons owing to the lack of a serious threat on the part of other states and also owing to technological backwardness.

Certain American specialists assume that with the increase in the number of nuclear powers the significance of this weapon as a symbol of international prestige will be devalued and that this will lead at some point in time to diminished motivations to acquire it. While acknowledging the logic of such arguments, Gompert inclines to

a more pessimistic conclusion: "As long as such prestige symbols as skyscrapers, national airlines, a national steel-casting industry and a national atomic engineering program exist, it could happen that in the future there will most likely remain in the world only a few states which will lack the capacity for creating nuclear weapons."[80] But the rate of proliferation will depend increasingly less on technical capabilities and more on the evolution of international relations and factors which have an impact on the problems of the security of this "threshold" country or the other. It could increase given the development of tension in relations between East and West (North and South) and in the relations of the developing countries among themselves. And, on the contrary, decline if the policy of a relaxation of tension predominates in relations between countries.

In the current situation, when the task of nonproliferation has assumed world significance and been made a part of the foreign policy priorities of the majority of states both of the West and the East, an important part is played by consideration of the further increase in the technical potential of the "threshold" countries and the policy aimed at neutralizing the factors which could bring about its use for military purposes.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev stated in a message to the participants in the 21st IAEA General Conference: "We cannot close our eyes to the fact that there are still forces in the world which would like to get their hands on nuclear weapons in order to threaten the peoples with these weapons. For this reason the task of placing a reliable barrier on the path of the spread of nuclear weapons and averting the danger of a nuclear war is now more acute than every."[81]

Under conditions where there is a real possibility of an increase in the nuclear states an analysis of the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons for international relations acquires special significance.

Chapter 7. Conflict of Approaches to the Formulation of a Long-Term Strategy in the Nonproliferation Sphere

While displaying a comparative community of interests in an evaluation of the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons American scientists express, as a rule, the most diverse and frequently directly opposite viewpoints when the question of possible measures to reinforce the nonproliferation process arises. An analysis of American political thinking in this direction provides an opportunity of portraying the complex picture of struggle around these problems.

Disagreements begin with the estimation of the practical possibility of preventing proliferation. A group of scientists continues to exist in the United States which regards the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world as an inevitable process since, they believe, it is impossible to imagine that the "threshold" countries will renounce the temptation to dispose of nuclear weapons. The supporters of this viewpoint are skeptical concerning the possibility of the formulation of effective nonproliferation measures. Thus W. Griffith, a professor at MIT, claims that the arguments and measures against proliferation are "a nonproliferation theology which, crudely speaking, is equivalent to King Canute's commands to the sea to remain still. It is clear that proliferation is proceeding, and some people are

attempting to slow it down, while others have no great hopes of success. All this is like the eternal struggle against sin."[82] In a word, since it is no longer possible to restore "nonnuclear virginity" in the world, so also the formulation of the question of resistance to the pressure of the supporters of the possession of nuclear weapons, as also the pursuit of a practical policy against their proliferation, is, he believes, fruitless.

The particular danger of this concept is that it could serve as theoretical justification for a further arms race and be the point of departure for the active encouragement of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is not fortuitous that this concept has supporters among the disciples of a "from-a-position-of-strength" policy, the advocates of the hard line of the confrontation of the two social systems and also the initiators of the nuclear equipment of the countries of the "Atlantic world." The same Prof Griffith urges, for example, the creation of "new centers of nuclear might," particularly the creation of joint West European nuclear forces.[83]

Such fatalism brought about by the hopelessness of the struggle against proliferation could ultimately indeed prove fatal for the world community. It fails to take account of the fact that the scale of the danger to mankind depends on the extent of proliferation and on how many and which countries take the path of the creation of nuclear weapons. "For the preservation of world peace it is far from a matter of indifference whether there are 8 or 20 nuclear states in 10 years time. Which states acquire them is equally significant,"[84] A. Pierre, research assistant of the Council for Foreign Relations correctly asserts. For this reason it is essential to distinguish the problem of a total and irrevocable halt to proliferation from the problem of its limitation and control.

Many American scientists emphasize that from the very start of the atomic age few people believed that further proliferation could be halted inasmuch as nuclear weapons were regarded as an important diplomatic and military set of tools for the achievement of foreign policy goals. It was believed that as long as this significance was retained nuclear weapons would not be swept into the background of world politics and that the task of a complete halt to proliferation would be unrealistic as distinct from the problem of limitation and control, which in this situation is, they believe, the sole acceptable and possible goal.

The policy of control and limitation stipulates that considerable political and technical obstacles should be placed in the way of proliferation, that slowing down its pace will provide time for the limitation of existing arsenals of nuclear weapons, that the negative consequences of proliferation will be reduced to a minimum and largely neutralized and that ceilings will ultimately be placed on the further development of the very process of proliferation. It is precisely this formulation of the tasks, this group of experts believes, which could be a guarantee of effective policy in this sphere, which is counterposed to the pessimism and fatalism of the supporters of the inevitability of proliferation concepts.

At the same time we cannot agree with the proposition which is often put forward by American scientists that if yet another country takes the path of nuclear armament, this will create a "nuclear domino" effect, that is, produce a chain reaction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[85]

Indeed, embarkation on the nuclear path by this country or the other will have negative consequences for the cause of nonproliferation. But the factors which prompted a given country toward the nuclear path might not have an analogous impact on another country. Diversity in the evaluation of the significance of nuclear weapons for the interests of this state or the other represents the predominant characteristic of the state of affairs in this sphere of international relations and presupposes the need for the formulation of a differentiated approach for each individual instance and a careful consideration of the singularities of this country or the other. Those, on the other hand, who believe that if one further country reinforces the "nuclear club" this will signify the failure of nonproliferation strategy as a whole largely ignore the concrete realities and peculiarities of the very process as such. Despite all the attractiveness of the aspiration to a complete halt to proliferation, the maximalist "all or nothing" strategy could prove doomed to failure in the long term insofar as it largely suffers from the same fatalism characteristic of the representatives of the viewpoint of the inevitability and unavailing nature of the struggle against proliferation--such is the opinion of certain American experts.

A number of American experts believes that the problem of proliferation has already reached the stage where the question is not that of the need to prevent proliferation but of measures and methods of adapting to the consequences which it might bring about. Starting from a futurological analysis of the evolution of the situation in the world over the next 10-20 years, they insistently recommend that technical assistance be rendered countries which will take the path of the creation of nuclear weapons in instruction in the "rules and laws" of nuclear strategy to reduce the likelihood of chance incidents in this sphere.[86]

However, it should be acknowledged that such assistance could only stimulate "threshold" countries to take the path of open nuclear armament and legalize the proliferation process. However useful and valuable the futurological conclusions may be, these scientists' recommendations are frequently of no positive significance for the practical solution of the problem and are, furthermore, fraught with obvious negative consequences. In short, they could more likely bring closer the consequences which they are attempting to avert.

It has to be noted that the predominant belief among U.S. political scientists is that the proliferation process is susceptible to management and control. According to their concepts, it is primarily necessary for the achievement of effectiveness in the solution of the problem to do away with "abstract horror" in the face of the consequences of proliferation and to concentrate attention on concrete actions in this sphere. However, this community of view on the question of the manageability of the proliferation process exists simultaneously with a broad diversity of approaches to the formulation of practical recommendations for U.S. foreign policy. The classification of these approaches is extraordinarily complicated, which is caused primarily by the complexity of the nonproliferation problem itself. The proposed recommendations depend on how the proliferation process is understood, on its place in the system of foreign policy priorities and also on who is making them and what forces they represent in the United States. It would appear expedient for a correct orientation in this wave of opinions and recommendations to dwell briefly on a determination of the genesis of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The difference in the approaches of American scientists to averting the spread of nuclear weapons is often determined by the qualification of the very process of proliferation upon discovery of the reasons for it. One viewpoint amounts to the fact that it is a purely "technical" problem for the creation of nuclear weapons depends on the presence or absence of technical potential. Proceeding from this, recommendations are made concerning the need for the main accent in nonproliferation strategy to be put on limiting the use for industrial purposes of the particularly dangerous components of atomic engineering and fissionable material. In a word, the less of the latter at other countries' disposal, the less the likelihood of proliferation. A large group of American experts believes that it is difficult to justify the further development of atomic power engineering, considering its manifold negative consequences. Control over the use of nuclear technology and materials is, in their opinion, simply an analgesic incapable of removing the "disease" itself. Radical surgical measures are needed, these experts believe, which could place definite ceilings on the development of atomic power engineering in the immediate future.

The opposite viewpoint amounts to the fact that proliferation is a purely "political" problem not connected with questions of the development of atomic power engineering. Political and military considerations dictating the decision to acquire nuclear weapons--this is the main cause of proliferation, and by no means the presence of technical potential. The supporters of this viewpoint believe that the creation of technical barriers in the way of proliferation are doomed to fail. The main attention, they believe, should be paid to political influence on the position of this state or the other, that is, neutralization of the very causes of proliferation.

It should be observed that each of the two approaches in question has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, few people doubt that if this country or the other possesses the material capability of providing itself with nuclear weapons, this facilitates a decision being made to create such. Furthermore, political influence for the purpose of preventing such a step might in this case prove insufficiently effective. A scenario in which a majority of countries, including a number of reactionary regimes, possesses the technology and materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons appears sufficiently intimidating to underestimate or altogether ignore the problem of limitation and control in the use of particularly dangerous technology and materials.

On the other hand, the inadequacy of such an approach is no less evident since it identifies the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons with that of the proliferation of nuclear technology. Acquired capacity for the creation of nuclear potential is far from synonymous with its practical use. If material capacity were the main driving force of proliferation, it would be logical to assume that over 20 countries possessing the necessary technology would already have nuclear weapons, these including Canada, Japan, the FRG, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and others. It has to be noted here that a nostalgia is sensed in the views of the supporters of the so-called "technical" approach for the times of the "bipolar world," when the United States could disregard the political parameters of the nonproliferation problem inasmuch as the technology and knowledge in the sphere of nuclear weapons were accessible to only two-three countries.

In the contemporary politically "multipolar world" with the extensive proliferation of the appropriate technology and knowledge such an approach could fail to pass the test in a confrontation with reality. The well-known experts in the nuclear physics sphere, T. Taylor and H. Feiveson, believe that in atomic engineering "no magical measures will be able to convert a basically political problem into a technical one.... In the long term it will be impossible to seriously inhibit proliferation as long as nuclear weapons are regarded as of political benefit only to those who possess them."[87]

The purely "technical approach" to the problem of nonproliferation is very convenient to those who advocate the need to continue the nuclear arms race within the United States itself and the policy of confrontation with the USSR. Military experts and representatives of the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex are inclined to view this problem in isolation from the United States' practical policy in the nuclear sphere, closing their eyes to the close connection between the policy of nuclear armament and the problem of nonproliferation. As a rule, the supporters of this direction support the Nonproliferation Treaty and pay lipservice to the urgent need to cap the spread of nuclear weapons. However, they attempt to reduce the entire policy in this sphere to measures for controlling other countries' use of nuclear installations and materials. Their inconsistency becomes obvious when the question arises concerning the need for an adjustment of American military policy and the formulation of concrete proposals to limit the arms race lest the American nuclear arsenal serve as motivation for other countries' creation of their own nuclear weapons.

The representatives of this approach display a double standard towards other countries and themselves, declaring that the interests of U.S. security take precedence over all considerations connected with nonproliferation and asserting that it is necessary to continue to refine America's nuclear potential and achieve superiority over the USSR.[88]

It is perfectly obvious that the blinders of "bipolar" thinking prevent the representatives of this direction from objectively and soberly evaluating the extent of the threat of proliferation to the security of the United States itself. Characterizing their views, Prof G. Rutgens emphasizes: "If we look at the annual reports of the secretary of defense on the United States' military needs, it is hardly possible to find even half a page devoted to the problem of nonproliferation. There will be hundreds of pages on what we 'need to respond to an operation of the Soviet Union' and so forth. ...There is hardly a place dealing with what is going on in the rest of the world."[89]

Such an approach stimulates proliferation, and sooner or later this "concern" for security is directly damaging to it. According to G. Frank, professor of psychology at Johns Hopkins University, the underlying psychological cause of this phenomenon is obvious--"an inability to quickly change the way of thinking and behaving to adapt to an abruptly changed situation."[90]

Indeed, nonproliferation considerations recede into the background when the question arises of building up NATO's armament with intermediate-range missiles and "of the nuclear reinforcement" of the Atlantic alliance to create an "additional counterweight" to the socialist community countries. In calling for the United

States to support the idea of the creation of European nuclear forces on the basis of the nuclear forces of Britain and France a number of American experts holds to the belief that the nonproliferation problem does not, as it were, apply to the Atlantic region and that the main threat of proliferation emanates exclusively from the developing countries.[91] Political circles connected in one way or another with the military-industrial complex and supporters of the active use of "nuclear pressure" in implementation of the United States' foreign policy aline themselves with this direction. Senators H. Jackson, S. Nunn and B. Goldwater, Yale professor E. Rostow, Gen A. Haig, former supreme commander of NATO, Gen M. Taylor and so forth may be put in this category.

While acknowledging the greater conceptual depth and theoretical substantiation of the second ("political") approach as distinct from the first ("technical") inasmuch as its orientation is to a greater extent toward disclosure of the causes of proliferation we cannot at the same time fail to emphasize its sometimes practical inadequacy, which ensues from an underestimation of the part played by nuclear technology and materials in the proliferation process. Correct theoretical conclusions as to the origin of the problem are sometimes combined, however strange it may seem, with a disregard for urgent questions connected with the spread of dangerous technology, and they could, furthermore, be a serious argument in favor of its further, even more widespread proliferation. It is not fortuitous that the supporters of this second approach include representatives of "atomic business," who support the unrestricted development and proliferation of nuclear technology and materials on the pretext that the problem of nonproliferation is of a purely political nature.

Since the time of the adoption of the "Atoms for Peace" program large influential groups economically connected with atomic power engineering have formed in the United States, as also, incidentally, in other capitalist countries, in the corresponding sectors of industry and scientific research and government establishments. These groups have an interest in the further use of atomic energy even to the detriment of such an important problem as the nonproliferation of nuclear devices. Furthermore, when the question arises of the need to limit the trade in dangerous technology or to halt its further development to prevent proliferation, these groups are inclined to qualify such measures as "antinuclear" measures aimed against atomic power engineering. Indeed, they are inclined to regard the very process of proliferation as largely inevitable for in this case uncontrolled trade and the high profits connected with it acquire the necessary theoretical basis.[92]

A composite approach which synthesizes the positive recommendations of the first two has emerged and is rapidly evolving in the confrontations of these two extreme viewpoints. Its supporters believe that the solution of the nonproliferation problem lies not in setting technical measures against political ones but in their organic combination. The presence of nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment and spent fuel conversion plants and plutonium and uranium reserves could undoubtedly be the material basis of the creation of nuclear weapons. International control and also certain restrictions in the sphere of technology are intended to narrow the possibility of the use of this basis for nonpeaceful purposes. While simultaneously taking account of the fact that nuclear proliferation, as I. Smart emphasizes, "despite the technical form, was never anything other than a political problem brought about not by the capability of states but by their will" the main accent

in long-term strategy should be shifted to reducing the influence of military and political factors on international relations which could still push this country or the other toward the possession of nuclear weapons.[93]

Thus a strategy combining technical and political measures may be successful only in the event of the deep-lying causes of proliferation being neutralized, that is, a reorganization of international relations being effected wherein nuclear weapons gradually become costly ballast for those who have them and a useless and dangerous business for those intending to have them. SIPRI experts emphasize: "Without repudiating the need for further changes in the sphere of control and corresponding restrictions in commercial exports, there is an urgent need to shift the main accent onto questions connected with national security and political prestige and the fundamental causes of nuclear proliferation. The best method of slowing down nuclear proliferation amounts to the nuclear states showing by their practical actions that they wish for and aspire to a lessening of the political and military role of nuclear weapons...implementing practicable measures in the nuclear disarmament sphere."[94]

Having determined the general joint subordination of the "technical" and "political" approaches to the solution of the problems of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, it is advisable to examine the concrete recommendations of the American scientists representing these approaches.

Two directions exist in approaches to the formulation of measures to reduce the risk of the use of atomic engineering for military purposes. The first unites the scientists who are supporters of the so-called "technical denial" policy. The essence of this policy amounts to minimizing, where possible, the international exchange of potentially dangerous equipment such as, for example, uranium enrichment and spent fuel conversion plants. As a result, the supporters of such measures believe, it would be possible to create high technological barriers, difficult to surmount economically, separating the peaceful use of the atom from the military use. An embargo on trade in this equipment on the world market and a halt to the further industrial assimilation of spent fuel conversion processes are proposed as practical steps.

Arguing their position, the supporters of this approach emphasize that under conditions where enterprises for converting spent fuel function under the conditions of the national control of this country or the other, the possibility arises of the use of plutonium for purposes other than intended. Having the appropriate training in the sphere of the design, testing and production of the "nonnuclear" components of nuclear weapons, any country could in theory create a nuclear arsenal in a very short time after having acquired plutonium. While acknowledging that there also exists another way to acquire plutonium--construction of a small secret installation for breeding--the supporters of this approach emphasize that this way could be very risky politically inasmuch as there exists a high probability of detection of this secret operation.

Plans for the creation of breeder reactors operating on plutonium should also be reexamined, they believe, in parallel with the deferment of the proliferation of industrial installations for converting spent fuel. These recommendations are based on the postulate that under the conditions of the further development of the

so-called "plutonium economy," where plutonium becomes an indispensable and main element of the nuclear fuel cycle, the technical barriers on the path of the creation of nuclear weapons diminish and the time needed for a reorientation from the peaceful use of the atom to military use is reduced considerably.

The authors of the study "Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices," which collates these recommendations, believe that the question of "the technological capabilities and possibilities for the creation of nuclear weapons in the long run appears more important than the present intentions of this state or the other."[95] The logic of their arguments is not without certain justification. Indeed, the current approach of a number of states to the problem of nonproliferation could in theory change in favor of the creation of nuclear weapons, whereas the necessary technology would always be at their service in the event of the existence of "plutonium installations."

This approach envisages the necessity of dependable supplies of nuclear fuel and reactors to the importer-countries as compensation for the latter's renunciation of the acquisition of dangerous technology on condition that the latter undertake to place under international control all atomic engineering facilities installed with the assistance of other countries or independently and also the return to the exporter-country of used fuel containing plutonium. The American experts which adhere to this approach believe that the supplier-countries should employ as a lever of influence the recipient-country's dependence on the export of equipment and fuel. They believe that a halt to cooperation in the sphere of atomic engineering with all the ensuing negative consequences would be the retaliation to which this country or the other could be subjected in the event of it taking the path of the creation of its own installations for uranium enrichment and spent fuel conversion.

Various proposals for the achievement of the close coordination of the policy of the exporter-countries and even for the division of spheres of influence in the nuclear technology markets in order to reduce the negative effect of the competition of the main suppliers[96] are also part of this direction.

But the main weakness of the "technological denial" policy is, its critics believe, that such a formulation of the question is to a certain extent belated and therefore insufficiently effective. The critics of this approach base their objections on the fact that the breeding of spent fuel in other countries, particularly the West European countries, has already become economically profitable in its development. Investments in breeder technology are caused by an endeavor to obtain the corresponding dividends from their industrial assimilation. Under conditions where the power engineering situation in this country or the other differs from that of America the recommendations for slowing down the further development of these sectors of atomic power engineering are difficult to implement. Conversion installations and breeders represent for many countries a way to achieve independence of the United States in the sphere of uranium fuel supplies.

They believe that even if joint steps come to be taken with the West European countries and Japan on restricting access to the market of dangerous technology, it should not be expected that a number of "threshold" countries will cast off their efforts to create analogous equipment. Rather, on the contrary, this could intensify

their independent activity in this direction. This is indicated by historical experience even. Thus when, in 1944, the United States closed off to Canada access to plutonium breeding research, it began its own program and was successful in this sphere of nuclear technology. Analogously, despite the United States' endeavor to keep secret from other countries uranium enrichment techniques, the West European countries developed enrichment methods independently. Thus the "technological denial" policy could be doomed to failure in the long run.

At the same time the coordination of the exporter-countries could be assessed as evidence of the cartelization of the "nuclear business" and as attempts to preserve the "technological hegemony" of the industrially developed capitalist countries and lead to the further estrangement of the developing countries from the industrially developed states of the West. Furthermore, restrictions on supplies of nuclear technology contradict to a certain extent article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which envisages the development of broad exchange in this sphere among those party to it. This could be used as a pretext for violations of the treaty by other parties to it. Prof G. Palfrey, former adviser to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, warns of the possible consequences of such a policy: "...the result could be a political explosion and increased polarization between the developed and developing countries. This could seriously undermine the support which the third world continues to lend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."[97] Is the exacerbation of relations withthe allied and developing countries "an acceptable political price to be paid to slow down proliferation for only a few years"? This is the question being asked by the critics of this approach.[98]

A second direction could be characterized as "regulated exchange." Its supporters believe that it is necessary to authorize the transfer of any technology and materials on condition of the observance of strict international control and the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the exporter-country and the importer-country which contain the latter's commitment not to use the technology, materials and equipment for other than peaceful purposes and not to transfer them to a third country without the exporter's consent. The basis of this approach is the conviction that the combination of political commitments with control measures will be an effective barrier on the path of the "military" use of atomic engineering. Account is taken here of the fact that certain countries could, if required, create nuclear installations without the help of others.

The supporters of this approach observe that it corresponds to a greater extent to article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty and conforms to the aspiration of the nonnuclear countries to derive the maximum benefits from the peaceful use of the atom as a kind of compensation for renunciation of the path of the creation of nuclear weapons. At the same time it presupposes the achievement of the greater effectiveness of averting proliferation at a far lower price. As American scientists, particularly T. Greenwood, believes, the supplier-countries could take advantage of the endeavor of certain countries to purchase "dangerous" technology and not create their own to establish a dependable system of control over this type of equipment and obtain additional political commitments which they would not have in the event of the creation of national enterprises with their own forces.[99]

Whereas for the countries which subscribe to the treaty such "regulated exchange" would signify an extension of commitments already assumed, for the countries which

are not party to it it could represent one of the few means in the gradual establishment of control over their entire nuclear power engineering and in obtaining commitments not to use it for military purposes. Insofar as the political commitments of this government or the other are of great significance for an evaluation of their intentions, their violation could lead to the undermining of their prestige and positions in the world. Furthermore, the international commitments would also be an obstacle in domestic political debates in the event of certain forces attempting to adopt a decision to produce nuclear weapons.

The "regulated exchange" policy, a number of American experts believes, seems more effective than the "technological denial" policy since it presupposes as an indispensable preliminary condition obtaining additional political commitments and the extension of the sphere of international control over the atomic activity of all states.

As a whole, American scientists' quest for a solution of the problem of reducing the danger of the use of nuclear technology and materials for military purposes is aimed at finding this combination or other of elements of all the enumerated directions which takes account of the specific peculiarities of this country or the other.

At the same time specialists agree that competition in the trade in nuclear equipment and materials makes this problem extraordinarily complex and increases the possibility of proliferation. S. Baker warns that "the nuclear suppliers' economic rivalry with one another could soon lead to a situation in the world in which 20 or more countries would be several months or so away from the creation of nuclear forces."[100] For this very reason the question of the trade in and transfer of technology is not so much a commercial as political question directly related to security. The recommendations of the majority of American scientists on the need for the achievement of international agreement with respect to the expediency of supplies of particularly dangerous elements of nuclear equipment are based on precisely this conclusion. Certain experts, particularly S. Ebinger, research assistant at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, warn here of the negative consequences of unilateral acts and the need to solve problems of the elaboration of technical measures to reduce the risk of the problems of the elaboration of technical measures to reduce the risk of the use of technology for military purposes by way of the cooperation of all parties concerned, both exporters and also importers of nuclear technology and materials.[101]

At the same time a number of American scientists believes that neither attempts to limit supplies of particularly dangerous technology and materials nor the elaboration of effective measures for subsequent control over them can halt the process of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. "A country which has made a decision... to create nuclear weapons," M. Guhin emphasizes, "can acquire them with time, when its resources permit." But the majority of American scientists agrees that the policy and measures aimed at "winning time" are perfectly justified since "the prospect of becoming a nuclear power could prove less attractive and more risky if a greater interval of time separates the decision to produce from the actual production of nuclear weapons."[102]

Under the conditions of the relative accessibility of nuclear technology and materials the center of gravity of the struggle against proliferation is gradually shifting from the technical to the political sphere. As a result long-term efforts in this sphere, certain American scientists believe, should be geared to diminishing and ultimately nullifying the effect of the political and military factors in contemporary international relations which could still prompt countries' aspiration to the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons for considerations of security, political prestige or economic benefit.[103]

A number of American experts believes that a principal task in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is to prompt the "near-nuclear" countries to renounce the aspiration to acquire their own atomic arsenal inasmuch as this possession will not ultimately be of economic, political or military benefit to them. At the same time it not only will not strengthen but, on the contrary, will weaken their "national security."[104] As arguments supporting these assertions the experts cite, as a rule, examples connected with the United States' nuclear policy.

They recall that since the war the United States has spent colossal amounts on maintaining and refining its nuclear forces, while the military expenditure of other Western countries has been considerably more moderate, which has enabled them to allocate additional capital for economic development. The endeavor of certain American strategists to "wear out the USSR" with the constant intensification of the arms race has proven in practice to be the wearing out of the United States itself and its closest partner--Great Britain.

As a result such nonnuclear countries as Japan and the FRG, which have far surpassed the United States in a number of indicators, have become the United States' strong economic competitors. As far as Britain is concerned, this country has switched from the level of a "great world power," in the estimation of its leaders, to the category of a "secondary" power. Specialists emphasize that a principal cause of such changes in the correlation of forces in the Western world is the difference in levels of military spending. For example, from 1945 through 1970 the United States spent more than $1.3 trillion on military purposes, the lion's share going on nuclear armaments. Japan, however, in the same period spent $10 billion on the same purposes, that is, approximately 1 percent of U.S. expenditure.[105] Thus while the United States was perfecting its military forces, its Western allies were allocating additional capital for economic development. However, if the nuclear race inflicted more than perceptible losses on the United States, which has tremendous economic strength, it can be imagined what damage would be caused the economy of the developing countries if they were to attempt to take the same ruinous path.

In the foreign policy plane possession of nuclear weapons has not averted serious U.S. failures in the international arena. The attempts to use them as a means of political blackmail or pressure have not produced the desired results either in relations with the socialist states or with the developing countries or with the principal Western allies. The latter, worried by the potential danger of being dragged into a nuclear incident, have repeatedly endeavored to dissociate themselves from Washington's policy in periods of international crises. This was manifested particularly in the period of the war in Indochina and during the 1973 Near East crisis. The example of the American draft "Atlantic Charter" (1973)

showed that the United States' allies are by no means about to pay for their "nuclear protection" with concessions either in the sphere of the economy or in the political field.[106]

Disillusionment with nuclear weapons as a basic instrument for conducting foreign policy has been reflected in the works of many serious American political scientists --H. Morganthau, S. Hoffmann, R. Still and others. Former Secretary of State H. Kissinger emphasized in his book "American Foreign Policy" that at the contemporary stage a country's nuclear might cannot be directly transformed into political influence in the international arena.[107]

Critics of the United States' nuclear policy also point out that the development of strategic atomic armaments not only has not contributed to the strengthening of America's "national security" but has rather, on the contrary, undermined it. Whereas previously American military strategists could in their plans regard U.S. territory as virtually invulnerable, with the development of nuclear delivery vehicles "the threat of being completely wiped out in the event of the outbreak of a world thermonuclear conflict"[108] has hung over America. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara wrote on this score in his book "The Essence of Security": "A country may reach a stage where, while purchasing ever increasing military equipment, it no longer strengthens its security; we have reached this stage."[109] To the question of what is leading to a weakening of U.S. "national security" serious American research scholars, particularly H. York, are compelled to acknowledge-- the acquisition and refinement of nuclear weapons systems, primarily by the United States itself.[110]

Countries which attempt to provide themselves with their own nuclear weapons to insure their "security" could find themselves in an analogous situation. As F. Ikle emphasizes, in this event there would take effect "the iron law of proliferation: if one country makes the decision to create nuclear weapons, its potential adversary will attempt to do the same."[111]

Thus the historical experience of the United States testifies sufficiently convincingly that the possession of nuclear weapons not only has not yielded American national interests the dividends of an economic, political and military nature on which Washington counted in the postwar period but has been a factor which has led to a diminution in the United States' role in international relations at the start of the 1980's. It is not fortuitous that a realization of such negative political consequences prompted the resolve of the ruling cirlces of a number of industrially developed countries like Canada, Japan and Sweden not to go the route of nuclear armament.

However, for the effective solution of nonproliferation problems it is not enough to create merely a system of argumentation against the acquisition of nuclear weapons --these measures must be accompanied by essential adjustments to the nuclear powers' foreign and military policies.

It is perfectly obvious that a weakening of the motivations for other countries' to acquire their own nuclear weapons can be achieved only as a result of a diminution in the political and military significance of nuclear weapons. This goal can be achieved only by way of concrete and real changes in the approach to nuclear weapons on the part of thepowers which possess them, primarily the United States.

In attempting to determine the sources of proliferation many scientists come to the conclusion of the direct interconnection between the race involving nuclear arms and their proliferation. Thus, H. Morgenthau, head of the school of "political realism," emphasizes: "As long as the present nuclear powers continue to compete with one another in building up nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as the main instrument of their national policy, it will hardly be possible to keep other countries from following their path. Nuclear proliferation is only the spatial extension of the nuclear arms race. The former may only be averted by a halt to the latter."[112]

Taking this conclusion as a basis, a number of American scholars--G. Rutgens, C. Yost and R. Betts--believes that a fundamental reappraisal of American foreign policy priorities is essential owing to the threat of proliferation for it is precisely this, they are profoundly convinced, which in the future may prove the main danger for the United States and the world community as a whole. To the extent that proliferation threatens U.S. security, they believe, "policy in this sphere must be nothing other than a subordinate component of policy in the sphere of national security."[113] And whence the conclusion that measures to diminish the significance of nuclear weapons, the limitation and reduction of arsenals, no first use and no use of them against nonnuclear countries, the creation of nuclear-free zones, that is, everything which at first sight weakens, in the opinion of the American military, U.S. security essentially strengthens it since it diminishes for other countries the motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, that is, impedes their proliferation. It is precisely such a "nonstandard" view of the interests of national security which is the sole effective one under the conditions of the reality of the threat of proliferation.

At the same time the representatives of this direction observe that the United States is still far from concrete and consistent accomplishment of the tasks of a diminution in the role of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy. Sober-minded American research scholars express concern that the United States is continuing in foreign policy strategy to stress nuclear might, seeing force or the threat of force as a most important instrument of its policy. Many specialists, scientists, political figures and representatives of public circles emphasize that attempting under the new historical conditions to shape political policy with the old methods and means is fraught with the most serious consequences for the security of the whole world community. Unfortunately, S. Lens observes, the United States evidently sometimes forgets that by its personal example it is "wittingly or unwittingly" contributing to the spread of the nuclear danger worldwide.[114]

They note particularly the fact that the United States, while paying lipservice to preventing the outbreak of a nuclear conflict, is not supporting this policy with practical steps, declaring its readiness to be the first to employ nuclear weapons and use them in so-called "limited conflicts."[115]

The propaganda of every conceivable doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons considerably harms the cause of the creation of a new international climate free of fear of the atomic threat and, particularly, the cause of disarmament. Prof G. Rutgens warns with alarm in this connection that official statements "whose purpose is to make nuclear weapons an effective instrument of foreign policy are inevitably increasing incentives in the third world countries to the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons."[116]

American scientists emphasize that a principal factor stimulating proliferation is the nuclear arms race. Despite the fact that the United States currently has a nuclear potential 12 times greater than required to destroy the whole world, the Pentagon is continuing to increase appropriations for strategic nuclear forces.[117]

The "excess" nuclear might of the United States is dangerous, a number of American experts believes, in that it is constantly expanding the spheres of application, embracing new areas of influence and setting new goals. It is doing appreciable damage to the political and strategic "balance of forces," giving rise to negative propaganda consequences, for this "excess" nuclear might is regarded as a direct challenge to the United States' political opponents and at the same time an open appeal to the allies to continue to build up their own nuclear potential.

In this connection a number of American experts, particularly W. Epstein, G. Rutgens, L. Bloomfield and H. York, declares that the nuclear race is directly contrary to official U.S. policy aimed at achieving control over proliferation. It is impossible, they believe, to demand of countries which do not have nuclear weapons that they renounce acquisition thereof infinitely if serious progress is not achieved in the sphere of the limitation and reduction of existing arsenals of nuclear armaments. The correctness of this conclusion was corroborated once again by the sharp debate on problems of the nuclear arms race at the 1975 Geneva conference of the parties to the treaty.

The supporters of decisive measures for fighting the proliferation of nuclear weapons evaluate positively, as a whole, the American-Soviet agreements that have been reached in the sphere of strategic arms limitation. While welcoming their results they insistently recommend that the administration strive for implementation of the SALT agreements and prevent delay in further American-Soviet talks on limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals, which is only to the benefit of states endeavoring to acquire their own nuclear weapons.[118] Professors G. Kistiakowsky and S. Drell believe that the lack of significant progress in the nuclear disarmament sphere could be a convenient pretext for a decision by any country, irrespective of whether it is party to the Nonproliferation Treaty or not, to go the route of the creation of nuclear weapons.[119]

It is precisely in the face of such a threat that prominent scientists and political figures are giving preference to questions of nuclear disarmament over other of the United States' foreign policy goals. Sen A. Cranston warned during congressional hearings: "Regardless of the fact that big differences exist in viewpoints between Moscow and Washington on problems of trade, human rights and diplomacy, regardless of the fact that detente will not provide magical solutions to the real differences in national interests andregardless of the fact that the United States wishes to improve its relations with the PRC, we must not and cannot allow the talks on limiting nuclear weapons to slow down and become deadlocked."[120]

Thus in formulating their recommendations on the question of nonproliferation a number of American scientists and political figures is coming to the conclusion that U.S. policy can only produce effective results if the United States itself follow the path of nuclear disarmament and strive for a diminution in the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its foreign and military policies.

In a broader plane the United States' foreign policy course in the world arena should, they believe, be geared to removing existing and preventing new centers of tension and solving disputed problems not with force but at the negotiating table and on paths of the development of relaxation of tension processes. Ultimately it is precisely the relaxation of tension which is the main factor which will contribute to other states' restraint in the question of whether or not to acquire their own nuclear weapons, that is, in the solution of the problems of their nonproliferation.[121]

However, the recommendations of the supporters of disarmament are encountering the strong opposition of the disciples of a "from-a-position-of-strength" policy. Many scholars and political figures like [V. Khan], research fellow of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic Studies, Prof M. [Khog] and former Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger are giving advice with respect to a solution of nonproliferation questions from cold war positions. They are persistently forcing off on others the idea that the bigger the arsenal of the United States' nuclear weapons, the less the likelihood that the nonnuclear countries will wish to take the path of nuclear armaments. In a word, the United States' nuclear weapons are allegedly capable of performing the functions of "deterrence" and "restraint" in the sphere of their proliferation.[122] The main attention here is given to propaganda of the proposition that the United States' nuclear commitments to its bloc allies are a guarantee against proliferation and that it is necessary to strive to increase their dependability and extend them to other countries. A further buildup of nuclear forces, use of which should not be restrained by either legal or geographical limitations, is, they believe, an indispensable condition of the Untied States' military commitments to its allies. Measures leading, on the other hand, to a diminution in the effectiveness of the nuclear forces could lead to an undermining of the military commitments and, as a consequence, increase the incentives for certain allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Thus the policy of extending the United States' military commitments abroad based on nuclear might is viewed by this group of scholars and political figures as an effective way of solving the nonproliferation problem.

Yet it is clear even to many of these that this approach has its limits under the conditions of the continuing crisis of the bloc structures (the collapse of SEATO and CENTO, for example, and contradictions within the NATO ranks).

First, the United States' assumption of military commitments in respect of one country could be assessed by a state opposed to it as a "hostile act," which would only push this country toward the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

Second, at the current stage even the security guarantor-countries view with ever increasing distaste the possibility of an extension of the military commitments on account of the fear of being dragged into a conflict by their new ally. The promotion of the "Nixon doctrine" at the start of the 1970's testified to an endeavor to revise the goals and forms of U.S. global involvement in order to prevent a repetition of the humiliating defeats of the time of the war in Indochina. In the light of the opposition within the United States to the new commitments even their supporters have been forced to acknowledge at times that "the policy in the sphere of nonproliferation which basically provided for an extension of America's commitments to insure security is doomed to fail, at least in the immediate future."[123]

Third, extending commitments to insure security to new countries in only possible given the latter's readiness to cede their political independence to a certain extent and grant Washington levers for influencing their policy. However, the prospect of diminished independence will hardly find a response even in countries which formally have allied relations with the United States, let alone nonalined countries.

As a whole, the present situation in the sphere of the United States' military commitments abroad is such, the majority of American scholars believes, that the problem could amount more to attempts to somehow maintain their "dependability," which is gradually declining in the eyes of the allies, but by no means to their extension to new countries. Moreover, in the estimation of certain specialists, maintaining even the existing military commitments in respect of countries situated in crisis areas such as South Korea and Taiwan could be fraught with serious consequences for the security of the United States itself.

However, that which the United States is not in a position to do, certain American experts believe, could be performed by the USSR, which is rapidly developing bilateral political relations with a number of countries, which in the long term could exert a braking influence on their aspiration to acquire their own nuclear weapons, that is, a prescription which is dubious from the viewpoint of the possibilities and interests of the United States is proposed to the Soviet Union with assurances that the extension of global involvement would be met withunderstanding to a certain extent in the United States.[124] Of course, on the one hand these recommendations take account of the growth of the USSR's international influence and the consistency of the Soviet position on nonproliferation issues, which is, undoubtedly, a positive aspect, but, on the other, they completely ignore the fact that the USSR has always been opposed to bloc policy as a basis of international relations. As a whole, they imply shifting the burden of the prevention of proliferation onto other countries.

Whereas at the current stage the possibility of the implementation of a bloc approach to the solution of nonproliferation questions is frequently evaluated pessimistically, its supporters continue to put their hopes in these measures for the long term in the event of frustration of the policy of relaxation of tension. Thus T. Greenwood emphasizes: "If a trend were to develop in practice toward the greater confrontation of the superpowers, the result could be a trend toward the existence of strong alliances and toward the extension of the spheres of their activity to other regions which previously were outside or in the neighborhood of areas of East-West confrontation."[125] Such a development of events, a number of American scholars believes, would lead to the world's even greater polarization and its division into opposed blocs whose leaders would be able to keep their allies from embarking on the path of independent nuclear armament by way of consolidating their military commitments.

The recommendations concerning a reanimation of bloc policy involve a nostalgia for cold war times. Their supporters entirely disregard the fact that the "bipolarity" in international relations of the 1940's-1950's has sunk into the past and that the development and emergence of new independent "political poles" remains the prevailing trend.

Even if in the short term bloc policy is capable of producing some limited results in nonproliferation policy, in the long term its effectiveness is a matter of

doubt and skepticism to many American scholars. Their critical evaluations are based on historical experience, which testifies that a bloc structure (NATO, say) prompts others to create their own weapons to increase the possibility of influencing U.S. policy (Britain, for example) and dissociate themselves from a danger emanating from one-sided dependence on the United States (France, for example) or to obtain access to the use of American nuclear weapons (the FRG, for example).

The fact that Britain tested its own nuclear device in 1952, when there was absolutely no question of the dependability of America's commitments to NATO and to another bloc member--France--in 1960, prior to its withdrawal from NATO's military structure; that the FRG at the start of the 1960's was longing for nuclear weapons, endeavoring to participate in the MNF--all this indicates that blocs and America's military commitments within their framework not only do not curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons but rather, on the contrary, encourage it. This conclusion is supported by the fact that among the "threshold" countries which frequently do not conceal their nuclear ambitions are America's allies--Israel, South Korea and Taiwan.

A number of American research scholars, particularly R. Still and J. Gara, are of the opinion that the United States overestimates the extent of its influence on its bloc allies aimed at keeping them away from a course toward independent nuclear armament: "Whether we continue to carry out our commitments to NATO or not, we will hardly be able to control the behavior of the FRG and Japan like before."[126] In this connection it has to be noted that all the United States' attempts to prevent its ally--the FRG--from selling nuclear installations to Brazil failed completely. Certain experts suspect that the cooperation of one of the United States' principal NATO allies--the FRG--with other countries in the nuclear sphere such as South Africa and Brazil is being undertaken in order "not to waste time in the event it becomes necessary for it to have nuclear weapons."[127]

The above recommendations are being accompanied by advice which is to be heard increasingly often for the more effective use of supplies of conventional arms, which could lead to a "nonnuclear" solution of the security problems of this country or the other. Behind this approach is the simple calculation that any state which is provided with modern-type conventional arms would have greater confidence in its capacity for resisting a potential aggressor and that there would be less temptation for it to acquire nuclear weapons. Supplies of modern arms, which the United States alone undertakes to the tune of over $10 billion, have come to be regarded as a kind of lever of influence on the evolution of nonnuclear countries' political course in the nonproliferation sphere.

At the insistence of Sen S. Symington an amendment was made to the Military Assistance Act in 1976 banning the sale of modern arms to a country which intended to create independently or with the help of other countries spent fuel conversion and uranium enrichment plants in circumvention of international control by the IAEA. At that time this measure was directed primarily against Pakistan, which had concluded such a contract with France, but was in the long term aimed at putting pressure on other countries also.

Evaluating the significance of such measures, a number of American experts draws attention to their dubious effectiveness for nonproliferation. First, they

emphasize, the "threshold" countries importing American arms could, to obtain more military equipment, blackmail the United States with the threat of taking the path of the possession of nuclear weapons (like South Korea, for example). Second, the supplies of conventional arms include modern missile installations and strategic aviation which could be used as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, which would "whet the appetite" of military and political leaders and increase the temptation to acquire nuclear weapons. Third, an increase in supplies to one state could push other states toward a decision to provide themselves with their own nuclear weapons in order to balance the inequality that has come about, in their opinion, in conventional forces in a given region.[128]

As a whole, critics agree that supplies of conventional arms could lead to increased political and military tension in the relations between states of one region or another, while their use on the battlefield, considering the destructive power of modern armaments, is fraught with consequences which are hardly balanced by problematic benefits in the nonproliferation sphere. At the current stage, when the problem of limiting the trade in modern arms is on the agenda, the above prescription could largely be evaluated as an attempt to justify its continuation with the plausible excuse of insuring the interests of states' security to keep them from going the route of nuclear armament.

Thus it should be emphasized that the question of reducing the incentives for other countries of the world to acquire nuclear weapons is being solved in the United States in an atmosphere of acute struggle between the supporters and opponents of nuclear disarmament and the relaxation of tension as a whole.

Questions connected with a quest for a solution of nonproliferation problems are inevitably leading American scientists to the conclusion that the United States must clearly determine its principal allies in the achievement of this goal. The alinement of forces in the modern world points to the need for broader and more constructive cooperation. It is perfectly natural that the opinion exists among American scientists that the solution of these problems in the long term is impossible without the USSR's assistance. They emphasize in this connection that the parallel concern of the United States and the USSR for preventing proliferation is just as obvious as for liquidation of the threat of nuclear war and that the USSR has always been more responsible than the United States and the West European countries in questions of the proliferation of nuclear technology. It played a positive part at the London conference of exporter-countries and has always advocated universalization of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Foiling the nuclear weapon tests in South Africa in August 1977, which was the result of the initiative of the Soviet Union, was the first joint action of countries of East and West in the practical prevention of proliferation, and this could be a working model of American-Soviet relations in the future. A. Pierre is firmly convinced: "The United States and the Soviet Union must coordinate their foreign policies in relation to unstable regions and 'threshold' countries to prevent their taking the path of nuclear weapons."[129] M. Mandelbaum believes that "the United States and the USSR could with joint efforts provide guarantees of the security of the majority of members of the world community and solve the questions connected with nuclear technology." However, many experts have been forced to state with regret that "the political barriers on the path of their close cooperation are still very high."[130]

At the same time attempts are very frequently made to portray the organization of such cooperation as "superpower" policy and something like a condominium of the USSR and the United States against third countries aimed at perpetuating their predominance in the nuclear sphere over the nonnuclear states. This argument is without foundation inasmuch as the goal being pursued by the Soviet Union, at least, is not only a strengthening of the nonproliferation process but also the liquidation of all existing nuclear arsenals. It is essential here to also take account of the fact that policy in the nonproliferation sphere is global and that more than 100 states concerned to strengthen their security by way of renouncing possession of nuclear weapons participate therein. Soviet-American relations could become the central and, at the same time, an organic element of this strategy, and the world's nonnuclear countries would hardly object, but would welcome it rather if the solution of the basic problems in this sphere were to be assumed by the United States and the USSR in cooperation with other members of the world community.

Appeals to rise above bloc obsession and for a broadening of the United States' practical possibilities in the sphere of nonproliferation strategy with the aid of cooperation with the USSR have become the leitmotiv of the recommendations of many supporters of nonproliferation in the United States who have repeatedly recommended that the administration seek closer and more constructive relations with the USSR, not allowing ideological differences to prevent the successful solution of the problem which will decide whether mankind enters the 21st century safely or not.[131]

However, this approach is not to the liking of the disciples of a "from-a-position-of-strength" policy and a course toward confrontation with the USSR, who for the sake of achieving short-term advantages are ready to forgo the long-term interests of world security as a whole and U.S. security in particular. Supporting the nuclear arms race and recommending a tough bloc policy against the socialist and developing countries, they are thereby actually encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Realizing that proliferation represents the main danger to the United States in the long term, sober-minded politicians propose far-reaching measures aimed at a halt to the nuclear arms race and at a relaxation of tension. The supporters of confrontation with the USSR, on the other hand, sometimes deliberately belittling the significance of the problem of nonproliferation, are attemtping to get off with palliative solutions, adhering to a continuation of "power politics" based on the United States' nuclear might.

The degree of effectiveness of U.S. strategy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will depend to a considerable extent precisely on the outcome of the clash of these trends and approaches.

Chapter 8. The Problem of Guarantees of the Security of Nonnuclear States

In the complex of measures to reinforce the nonproliferation process a particular place is occupied by questions of guarantees of the security of the nonnuclear countries which have renounced the acquistion of nuclear weapons and do not have such on their territory. The majority of international affairs specialists agrees that a country which has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty has voluntarily deprived

itself of the possibility of resorting to nuclear weapons in the event of a confrontation with states which possess nuclear weapons. For this very reason it has a right to demand of all nuclear states as compensation for renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons commitments that the latter not use nuclear weapons against it. Only given this solution of the questions of the security of the nonnuclear states is it possible to strengthen the nonproliferation process. However, as long as there are no security guarantees established by international agreements the nonnuclear countries will continue to fear the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them, and their perception of weakness in the military sphere compared with the nuclear states could be a motivation for acquiring their own weapons. The need for a further consolidation of the nonproliferation process makes pressing and urgent the implementation of the proposal "Conclusion of an International Convention on Strengthening the Nonnuclear States' Security Guarantees," which was presented by the USSR in 1978 at the UN General Assembly 33d Session.

This initiative of the USSR in the United Nations has a history which it might be expedient to briefly illustrate.

Back in 1966 the Soviet Union had advocated banning by treaty the use of nuclear weapons against states undertaking to observe nonnuclear status. A message of A.N. Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the Disarmament Committee of 1 February 1966 emphasized: "The Soviet Union's presentation to the committee of a draft Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is imbued with a single aspiration--to close off all paths of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.... To facilitate agreement on the conclusion of the treaty the Soviet Government declares its readiness to incorporate in the draft of the treaty an article banning the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states which are party to the treaty which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory."[132]

At that time this USSR proposal was broadly supported in the majority of countries and corresponded entirely to the nonalined states' aspirations to make the use of nuclear weapons illegal. As is known, with the support of the socialist countries and nonalined states the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1961 which said that the use of nuclear weapons would contradict "the letter, spirit and aims of the United Nations" and that any state using nuclear weapons should be regarded as "violating the UN Charter" and perpetrating "a crime against humanity and civilization." However, despite the fact that the USSR's 1966 proposal was an organic consequence of this UN resolution, the Western powers at that time opposed it, although a number of nonalined countries like India, Pakistan, Nigeria and others evaluated the significance of this initiative highly. As American research scholars themselves admit, the United States' opposition to commitments on the nonuse of nuclear weapons was at that time caused by the fact that America's ruling circles assigned nuclear weapons a principal place in the realization of military and political plans in the world arena.[133]

As distinct from the American approach to the question of the nonuse of nuclear weapons, "the USSR's approach to this problem," R. Ulman, former NSC employee and professor at Princeton, emphasized, "has been characterized from the very start of the atomic age by open hostility to nuclear weapons and has amounted to the fact that they should be banned and existing stockpiles liquidated."[134] In view of the disagreements with the Western powers which participated in the formulation of the

Nonproliferation Treaty, the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw its proposal. At that time the main attention was paid to adopting guarantees to the nonnuclear countries of another kind--an understanding on assistance to countries which were the victims of nuclear aggression.

In June 1968 the governments of the USSR, the United States and Britain issued special statements. They dealt with the three powers' intention to seek immediate Security Council action to secure in accordance with the UN Charter support for a state not possessing nuclear weapons which was the victim of aggression or the subject of the threat of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons. Security Council Resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 contained approval of the corresponding statements of the three nuclear powers and their promises to assist a victim of aggression.

The three powers' statements and the Security Council resolution laid the foundation for providing security guarantees for the nonnuclear states which had signed the Nonproliferation Treaty and countries which promised not to create nuclear weapons. At that time they were evaluated positively by the majority of countries.

However, just over 10 years after the adoption of the Security Council resolution there has been a change in a number of countries' attitude toward its significance, despite the fact that the 1968 statements of the three nuclear powers remain fully in effect. As the American statesmen who participated in the formulation of these commitments themselves, particularly A. Fisher, former deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, acknowledge, after the PRC became a permanent UN Security Council member, the 1968 resolution's effectiveness diminished on account of the possibility of a PRC veto of the collective actions of the nuclear states which had undertaken to assist a country which fell victim to nuclear aggression.[135]

In this situation a return to the USSR's 1966 proposals was an urgent necessity for strengthening the security of the nonnuclear countries. The UN General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1972 on the nonnuse of force in international relations and on banning forever the use of nuclear weapons was a kind of prolog to a new discussion of the problem of the nonuse of nuclear weapons.

At the 1975 Geneva Nonproliferation Treaty review conference a number of states, including not only the nonalined countries but also America's allies--Australia, Japan and New Zealand--presented a proposal on strengthening the security guarantees for the treaty's nonnuclear states by way of the adoption of a commitment on the nonuse of nuclear weapons against them. The proposal which had been put forward was not examined constructively at that time mainly owing to the opposition of the West's nuclear powers. As W. Epstein, assistant to the UN secretary general for disarmament, emphasized, "the United States' negative approach was not surprising since it had always opposed any commitments on the nonuse or no first use of nuclear weapons."[136]

At the current stage the military interference of the United States in the Persian Gulf and of the NATO countries, including nuclear countries, in the internal affairs of African states, China's aggressive intrigues in Southeast Asia, the expansionist policy of the "near-nuclear" states of Israel and South Africa--all this is occurring with regard for the possibility of also putting, should an opportunity arise,

nuclear pressure on this nonnuclear country or the other. It is not surprising that the task of neutralizing such threats has become a principal foreign policy concern of the majority of countries.

The nonnuclear countries' concern for a strengthening of guarantees of their security is also increasing in view of the fact that the race in nuclear arms, stockpiles of which have already reached a quantity entirely sufficient to destroy every living thing on earth many times over, is continuing. By their refusal to participate in the race in these weapons the nonnuclear states are making a definite contribution to nonproliferation and thereby to an easing of the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. They have a right on these grounds to expect firm guarantees that nuclear weapons will never be used against them.

Proposals concerning a strengthening of the guarantees to the nonnuclear states were also put forward by a number of countries at the UN General Assembly Special Disarmament Session. Considering such proposals entirely justified, on 26 May 1978 the Soviet Union issued a statement which emphasized unequivocally that it would never use nuclear weapons against states which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have such on their territory. The special session's final document contains a proposition on the need for persistent efforts to be made for the conclusion of effective agreements aimed at preventing the use of nuclear weapons against countries which do not have such weapons. Certain delegates of nonnuclear countries emphasized at this session that security guarantees would be best legalized in the form of a multilateral treaty.

The new Soviet proposal submitted at the General Assembly 33d Session represents the further development and concretization of the USSR's position set forth in May 1978. Not confining itself merely to a solemn statement concerning the nonuse of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union confirmed its resolve to conclude special agreements on this score with any nonnuclear country. The USSR believes that the conclusion of an international convention in which states possessing nuclear weapons ready to give the appropriate guarantees on the one hand and countries undertaking to preserve their nuclear-free status and prevent the deployment of weapons on their territory on the other would participate would contribute to accomplishment of the task of strengthening security guarantees.

The conclusion of such an agreement would impart to the security guarantees for the nonnuclear countries universal backing in international law, and the participation of other nuclear states therein would undoubtedly increase its effectiveness. It is perfectly obvious that the nonnuclear states would derive considerable benefits of a military and political nature and they would only be required to observe nuclear-free status here.

What is the textual content of the convention?

The preamble of the draft convention presented by the USSR explains discursively and specifically the purposes of and the need for its conclusion. In particular, it emphasizes that its adoption would contribute to a lessening and, ultimately, the removal of the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, a halt to the nuclear arms race, more effective measures in the area of nuclear disarmament and, particularly,

the prevention of the extensive proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time it draws attention to the fact that this document ensues organically from corresponding earlier UN resolutions and documents like Security Council Resolution 255 of 19 June 1968, Resolution 2936 of the 27th UN General Assembly of 29 November 1972 and documents of the 30 June 1978 UN Special Disarmament Session, corresponds to the nonnuclear states' endeavors to keep their territory free of nuclear weapons and their requests for security to be provided against the threat of their use and represents an important means of strengthening peace and general security and also the nonproliferation process.

Article I of the draft convention stipulates that the participant-states possessing nuclear weapons will undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten their use in relation to the nonnuclear states party to this convention, which will renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and not allow them on their territory or elsewhere--on land, at sea, in the air and in space.

Article II says that the above-mentioned undertaking extends not only to the territories of the nonnuclear states which have signed the convention but also to the armed forces and facilities under their jurisdiction and control wherever they may be.

Article III regulates the procedure of consultations among the participant-states in the event of this violation or the other of the commitments assumed on the part of both nuclear and nonnuclear states.

Article IV determines its effective period and the right to withdraw from it. It stipulates, in particular, that agreement will be permanent. In exercise of its state sovereignty each of its participants here has the right to withdraw from the convention if it decides that exceptional circumstances connected with its content would threaten its higher interests. It would give all parties to the convention and the UN Security Council 3 months' notice of this withdrawal. This notification must contain a statement of the exceptional circumstances threatening its higher interests.

Article V deals with amendments to the text of the document. In particular, taking into account the possibility of the emergence of concrete wants or the need for certain changes, any state has the right to propose amendments, which take effect for the states which consent to them following their adoption by a majority of the participant-states. Subsequently for each remaining participant-state the amendment takes effect on the day that it presents a document on its adoption. This provides for a certain flexibility of the operation of the convention and a consideration of singularities in the interests of different states.

Articles VI and VII of the convention determine the rules of its ratification and the procedure of its validation. They emphasize that each state which has not signed the convention prior to it taking effect may subscribe to it at any time.

Such is the content of the main articles of the draft International Convention on Strengthening Security Guarantees for the Nonnuclear States[137] presented by the Soviet Union.

If we were to attempt to briefly describe the positive significance of this convention for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, we would have to highlight the following. First, the nonnuclear countries which signed it would have confirmed once again their intention of not taking the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. The failure to sign it on the part of a number of "threshold" countries and treaty nonsubscribers would summon a negative reaction in the world community and testify to these countries' true intentions. Second, there would be an increase in military benefits to the nonnuclear countries in the event of their renunciation of the acquisition or creation of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, however, taking the path of their creation, a state would forfeit the security guarantees on the part of the nuclear powers extended to it hitherto, which would sharply weaken its security as a whole. Third, limitation of the scale and forms of the threat of the possible use of nuclear weapons would lead to the further devaluation of the significance of nuclear weapons as a means of conducting military operations and exerting political pressure legitimized on an international law basis. Fourth, an alternative path of strengthening security would be opened to the nonnuclear countries distinct from participation in bloc structures, which, without affording dependable guarantees from the military viewpoint, threaten their interests on account of the participation of this country or the other in conjunction with an allied nuclear power in conducting strategic preparations providing for their territory to be made over for the deployment of nuclear weapons. Fifth, there would be a diminution in the risk and threat of the outbreak of nuclear war as a whole.

In a word, adoption of the convention would be an effective measure in the sphere of strengthening international security and averting the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet initiative stirred great interest in the assembly. Even in the course of general debate at the time of its discussion representatives of the socialist states, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Argentina, Pakistan, Finland and other countries expressed many interesting and concrete considerations apropos the draft convention. They expressed the prevailing opinion that the conclusion of the convention would contribute to reducing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict and to limiting the sphere of the possible use of nuclear weapons with regard for the interests of the security of the nonnuclear states. The nuclear powers' adoption of commitments on concerted guarantees enshrined in international agreements would be an effective solution of the problem of protecting the nonnuclear states from the use of nuclear weapons against them.

Discussion of the Soviet proposal on the conclusion of the International Convention on Strengthening the Security Guarantees of the Nonnuclear States also continued in the UN General Assembly First Committee. The course of the debate, in which the representatives of more than 50 countries participated, showed that the overwhelming majority of members of the international community regards the Soviet initiative as a timely and important step.

On 14 December 1978 at its plenary session the UN General Assembly 33d Session approved by the overwhelming majority of 137 for and 2 against (the PRC and Albania) the USSR's proposal and called on the Disarmament Committee in Geneva for the speediest elaboration of a draft of this document.

What is the position of the Western powers on this question and, primarily, the attitude of the United States to this problem? In order to understand the sources

of Washington's official position it is advisable to dwell on a brief analysis of American political scientists' different viewpoints on the problem of security guarantees for the nonnuclear countries.

The assertion may be encountered frequently in American political literature that the nuclear states' commitments concerning the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries will hardly exert any noticeable influence on braking the incentives of the latter's approach to the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons since military considerations in their favor ensue primarily from an evaluation of the threats to security on the part of neighboring states in this region or the other and not from fear of an attack by the nuclear states. "The governments (of nonnuclear countries—V.D.) are usually more worried about the behavior of neighboring states and not remote nuclear powers. And when they do sense a threat on the part of nuclear states, they are more afraid of an attack with the use of conventional forces and not atomic weapons," T. Greenwood, research assistant at MIT claims.[138] Analyzing the military factors influencing the "threshold" countries' choice in favor of nuclear weapons, L. Dunn, research assistant at the Hudson Institute, similarly believes that "the decisive role in this question is performed by considerations of restraining a potentially nuclear regional opponent or strengthening their own influence in this region."[139] In a word, deciding the question of whether to acquire nuclear weapons or not does not depend directly on the restrictions imposed on the nuclear powers' military strategy in the sphere of their use.

But this proposition does not withstand criticism in the historical retrospective. A real threat of the United States' use of nuclear weapons in military operations against nonnuclear countries has arisen repeatedly throughout the postwar period.

The question of the use of atomic weapons on the battlefield was discussed at the highest level in political and military circles at the initiative of Gen. D. MacArthur, U.S. commander in chief in the Far East, in 1950, at the time of the aggression in Korea. At that time even the United States' closest cold war partners such as Britain were forced to vigorously intervene to prevent America's ruling circles taking such a catastrophic decision. A similar situation was also observed in 1954 during the Indochina crisis.

In the 1960's, during the war in Indochina, a number of U.S. military personalities called for the use of these weapons in Vietnam, citing U.S. Army Field Service Regulation #35, which points out that the use of nuclear weapons by the air force, navy and ground forces cannot be regarded as a violation of international law or the international convention limiting their use. According to the newspaper THE TIMES, in 1968 President L. Johnson was subjected to strong pressure from certain Pentagon figures, who were insisting that tactical atomic weapons be used to assist the American garrison besieged in Khe Sanh. In February of the same year the Pentagon sent to Vietnam a group of nuclear specialists to study the problems of the use of atomic weapons at the scene of combat operations. Western observers stressed repeatedly that more than 5,000 nuclear weapon units were concentrated in the Southeast Asia region for this purpose.[140] The U.S. military circles' intentions which had become known caused considerable anxiety in the West at that time. Then British Prime Minister H. Wilson declared that the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina would be insane and could lead to an escalation of the conflict and the outbreak of world war.

In 1973, at the time of the Near East conflict, the United States, having put its armed forces on the alert, made understood its resolve to use all r ans, including atomic weapons, in the event of a possible escalation of the military conflict in the Near East. As is known, this evoked a negative reaction from the West European countries (with the exception of Portugal), whose leaders, confronted with such a threat, almost unanimously dissociated themselves from their ally, barring the use of their territory for such actions.

Throughout the postwar period in all conflicts and crisis situations in which on the one hand Western countries possessing nuclear weapons and, on the other, nonnuclear countries have participated the factor of the possibility of their use in military operations or to exert diplomatic influence has constantly been present in the calculations and fears of the opposed parties. Whereas the former have endeavored to use nuclear weapons for blackmail purposes as an effective means of atomic diplomacy, the latter have been forced to seek the possibility of neutralizing such threats.

There were many examples of "atomic diplomacy" in the 1970's. Thus in 1971, at the time of the Indo-Pakistan conflict, Washington, having sent the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" into the Indian Ocean to the Indian coast, unequivocally attempted to put pressure on Delhi with the threat of the intervention of its armed forces, including nuclear forces, in the affairs of the Hindustan peninsula. It is not fortuitous that certain experts believe that the threat of the use of military force in 1971 on the part of the United States was one of the reasons prompting India to explode a nuclear device in 1974.

In 1980, at the time of the Iranian-American crisis, Washington sent to the Indian Ocean an armada of warships with a variety of nuclear weapons systems.

As a whole, it was precisely a number of countries' nonpossession of nuclear weapons which was regarded by Washington as a condition conducive to the use against them of "atomic"and "power" diplomacy with impunity. According to a paper of the Brookings Institution, in the period 1946 through 1975 American forces were deployed in support of political aims on 215 occasions. The United States threatened the use of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly on 19 occasions.[141]

Pentagon leaders and military theorists do not exclude the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons not only against nuclear but also against nonnuclear countries. Particular anxiety, among American scientists included, was caused by a statement in 1975 by then U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger, who, with the DPRK in mind, declared that under certain circumstances the United States would be prepared to be the first to use nuclear weapons in so-called "limited conflicts." This statement caused legitimate alarm in the DPRK, which qualified it bluntly as nuclear blackmail against a nonnuclear country.

At that time a number of American political scientists was forced to acknowledge that the threat of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states and the promotion of military-strategic concepts of waging "limited nuclear wars" were contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons. "In threatening nuclear weapons for the purpose of the so-called defense of South Korea American officials would like to preserve an inexpensive method (compared with Vietnam) of intimidating a nonnuclear country, in this case North Korea, by the prospect of its nuclear devastation. Such diplomacy

undoubtedly undermines the strategy of nonproliferation to the extent that it assumes that only a nuclear country may feel secure against unilateral blackmail.... Use of the nuclear threat to influence the behavior of nonnuclear countries is not only incompatible with the purposes of nonproliferation but also justifies as going without saying the discrimination ensuing from the existence of nuclear and nonnuclear countries," R. Falk, a professor at Princeton, emphasizes.[142] It is obvious to many experts that on the pretext of insuring their security from real and not hypothetical threats on the part of a nuclear power--the United States--certain countries could be compelled to give serious thought to the possibility of creating their own nuclear weapons.

Specialists in the nonproliferation and disarmament sphere have repeatedly drawn attention to the manifest contradiction between official Washington's endeavor to maintain the maximum effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a means of conducting military operations and an instrument of diplomacy and official policy aimed against the spread of nuclear weapons. Addressing the U.S. Congress, A. Fisher, former deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, drew attention precisely to the inconsistency of U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere: "We are attempting to motivate peoples to subscribe to and support the Nonproliferation Treaty, but at the same time we insist that any form of restraint in questions of the nuclear bombing of these people...does not apply to the foreign policy of the United States."[143]

It is not fortuitous that perceptions of open and concealed threats on the part of the West's nuclear powers in diplomatic practice prompted the nonnuclear countries' prolonged struggle for the adoption of commitments on the nonuse of nuclear weapons. These include not only nonalined states but also U.S. allies. Fears of finding themselves one-on-one in confrontations with a nuclear power and not having a chance (owing to commitments assumed not to acquire nuclear weapons) to show effective resistance are the cause of a certain reluctance on the part of a number of "threshold" countries to subscribe to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Incidentally, similar considerations connected with questions of security are also being expressed by countries which subscribe to the treaty which have renounced nuclear weapons and have not obtained adequate guarantees that they will not be used against them. W. Epstein emphasizes: "Problems of extending security guarantees are of interest to all nonnuclear countries and not only third world states. Concern for questions of security is a principal reason why certain near-nuclear and potentially nuclear countries have not subscribed to the Nonproliferation Treaty."[144]

A number of disarmament specialists (R. Falk, R. Ulman, W. Epstein, A. Myrdal, R. Tacker and others) believes that the adoption of commitments on the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries which are party to the treaty would lead to a situation where the participating country would be in a safer situation than a state refraining from subscribing to it. Precisely such an action would be a motivation not to acquire nuclear weapons for security considerations, that is, a factor strengthening the nonproliferation process. Otherwise--given the absence of limitations on the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries--discrimination against the nonnuclear countries on the part of the nuclear powers threatening to undermine the nonproliferation process will be revealed in all its poignancy.

Princeton University professor R. Tacker believes that the problem of the nonuse of nuclear weapons is directly related to the creation of an effective system of their nonproliferation for the following reasons. First, because this is an effective means of providing the nonnuclear states with security guarantees against nuclear blackmail on the part of powers which possess such weapons. Second, the adoption of this principle would lead to a considerable diminution in the significance of nuclear weapons for a country's international position. In this event the nuclear states would not be able to regard nuclear weapons as a legitimate means of conducting military operations, and they could in the future essentially be made illegal together with toxic gases and biological means of warfare. This, in turn, could lessen the motivation to their creation by nonnuclear states which might still regard these weapons as a means to achieve great-power status. Third, a commitment not to use them would lead to a real strengthening of the moral-political positions of the nuclear powers as the initiators of nonproliferation for otherwise it would be a case of their requiring of other states that they not acquire what they themselves consider important from the political and military viewpoints. Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons "would legitimize their role as advocates of other states' nonpossession of nuclear weapons."[145]

As a whole, such a policy would be of positive significance in averting a nuclear war since it would lessen the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons and prevent the development of the "nuclear reflex" as a response to all military operations employing conventional means.

Another Princeton professor--R. Falk--goes even further in his conclusions and recommendations, believing that it is difficult to halt the nuclear arms race without limiting their use. He wrote in the journal FOREIGN POLICY: "At the current stage the creation of new weapons systems such as the Trident represents nothing other than a resumption of the military's endeavors to maintain freedom of maneuver in the strategy of the first use of nuclear weapons. It would therefore be advisable to present an initiative on the nonuse of nuclear weapons for a halt to the nuclear arms race. At the initial stage this declaration could refer to the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries and subsequently to the total renunciation of their use as the said means of conducting military operations except for instances of self-defense." Falk believes that steps in this direction could ultimately contribute to the emergence of agreement among countries of the world community concerning the fact that the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity.[146]

Discussing various circumstances in these matters, a number of American scholars emphasizes that in the plane of averting proliferation the concept of the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries is the most effective. The other commitment on not being the first to use nuclear weapons largely applies to relations between nuclear powers. In this connection, they believe, it would be advisable to examine the corresponding 1976 initiative of the Warsaw Pact in a regional aspect --in Europe--which could contribute to reducing the risk of the "nuclear opposition" of the blocs. However, globally, this approach, it is claimed by a number of American research scholars, might not procure the obvious advantages for nonproliferation which ensue from the first commitment. As R. Garvin, former science and technology adviser to presidents L. Johnson and R. Nixon, believes, given commitments on

the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states, a country deciding to take the path of the creation of its own weapons would jeopardize its own security, having forfeited guarantees on the part of the nuclear states, and given commitments on not being the first to use nuclear weapons, its decision would not be reflected in a weakening of its security. It would be necessary to embark later on realization of the no-first-use concept and mainly in the context of relations between nuclear powers.[147]

Specialists' attention is also drawn to the question of the form in which the security guarantees will be given--in official statements or international accords.

The overwhelming majority of American scholars, even those who doubt the effectiveness of such measures against proliferation, agree that solemn promises not enshrined in the form of international treaties will hardly be taken seriously by other countries and will have no marked influence on their approach to nuclear weapons. The same T. Greenwood emphasizes: "The threat of the use of nuclear weapons will inevitably exist as long as the weapons themselves exist. The fears of the nonnuclear states will hardly be quieted by a declaration of abstention, however solemn it may be. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons will inevitably exist as long as the weapons themselves exist. The fears of the nonnuclear states will hardly be quieted by a declaration of abstention, however solemn it may be. The threat is the same before and after the declaration."[148]

R. Garvin believes that "the conclusion of a formal international agreement on nonuse would contribute more to the nonnuclear states' confidence" in respect of guarantees of their security than unilateral declarations. In this case an international treaty on the nonuse of this weapon with simultaneous real adjustments to the nuclear powers' military strategy would be an effective instrument of the prevention of proliferation.[149]

An argument frequently put forward against the idea of the nonuse of nuclear weapons is that such a step on the part of the United States could bring about a crisis of the West's alliances, having undermined trust in America's military guarantees in various multilateral and bilateral blocs. "The assumption of commitments not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries should be viewed with caution. There is danger that such commitments could undermine the cohesion of the alliances," such military experts as P. Doty, M. Nacht and others warn.[150] Extreme opposition to the idea of the nonuse of nuclear weapons is expressed by the Pentagon, whose representatives are always stressing that limitations on the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of so-called "restraint" and "deterrence" will lead to a change in the strategic situation in East-West relations not in favor of the United States and will increase the risk of the outbreak of conflicts with the use of conventional arms. In their opinion, in this case the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in West Europe and South Korea would be shorn of military-political significance, which could allegedly bring about a "dangerous" military imbalance and the threat of conflict. Precisely from considerations of bloc interests a number of experts warns that the United States should not unconditionally renounce the use of nuclear weapons and that "if it has to choose between preserving the durable structures of the alliances and a commitment on the nonuse of nuclear weapons, the first path is preferable."[151]

However, there is a group of scholars in the United States which believes that in the situation of "nuclear parity" between the United States and the USSR continuing reliance in military strategy on tactical nuclear weapons and a readiness to use them are fraught with the danger of any conflict developing into a nuclear conflict threatening all mankind with catastrophe. For example, analyzing the military-political situation in Europe, B. Russett, professor of Yale University, believes that whereas freedom of maneuver in the use of nuclear weapons to insure the so-called "defense" of West Europe made some sense in the 1940!s, when the United States possessed superiority in the nuclear sphere and its allies were experiencing a shortage of conventional forces and when a high degree of tension existed on the European continent, in the new situation, given nuclear parity and equivalence in the conventional forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, there is no sense in clinging to the preservation of freedom in nuclear questions. "To reduce the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war threatening the total destruction of West Euorpe it would be expedient to declare firmly and unilaterally even no first use of nuclear weapons,"[152] B. Russett declares.

Considering the potential danger of a limited conflict in this region or the other developing into a global conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, Adm G. La Rocque, B. Russett, D. Record and others urgently recommend a start on the gradual reduction of the United States' nuclear presence in its allied countries and the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from them. At the same time as a step conducive to this long-term goal R. Garvin emphasizes the need for the pursuit of a policy of the nonuse of nuclear weapons, which would "contribute to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of other states, which corresponds to the recommendations concerning the reduced dependence of the United States and its allies on tactical nuclear weapons."[153]

In a debate in which military arguments against nonuse are losing their significance owing to the obvious nature of the increased risk of nuclear war the opponents of this measure continue to emphasize persistently that the preservation of the bloc structures and the United States' unconditional readiness to use nuclear weapons are a dependable guarantee against proliferation and that a policy of the nonuse of nuclear weapons leading to the undermining of the United States' "nuclear commitments" to the allies would promote the latter's decision to take the path of independent nuclear armament, that is, further proliferation. "If the dependability of NATO continues to diminish," L. Dunn, research assistant of the Hudson Institute, declares, analyzing the consequences for West Europe of a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, "independent West German nuclear forces may appear by the end of the 1980's and start of the 1990's."[154] The consequences of such a development of events would lead to the increased aspiration of other West European countries to provide themselves with their own nuclear weapons and the undermining of the entire nonproliferation system.

A number of American experts believes that a policy of nonuse in Southeast Asia also could have similar consequences. In particular, reviewing the situation on the Korean peninsula, T. Greenwood believes: "Inasmuch as America's tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in South Korea, to that extent a declaration on their nonuse could be seen as a reluctance to abide by its military commitments." Such a conclusion would push Seoul toward starting on its own nuclear arms program. South Korea could be followed by Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia and others.[155]

But the proposition of the positive significance of military alliances for the cause of nonproliferation does not withstand criticism. As emphasized in a previous chapter, historical experience testifies that bloc policy encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons rather than restrains it. In 1978 a report of the House International Relations Committee which the press acquired contained facts testifying that despite the United States' military commitments to South Korea, Seoul embarked at the start of the 1970's, unknown to its ally, on the development of programs of the creation of its own nuclear weapons. It is with good reason that American scholars caution the United States against overestimating its influence on its bloc allies and capacity for keeping them away from a course toward independent nuclear armament, believing that this solution of nonproliferation questions cannot be dependable and effective over the long term.

Nevertheless, the opinion still prevails among America's political scientists that a policy of the unconditional renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons could lead to the erosion of the bloc structures and that in its approach to the nonproliferation problem the United States should be concerned to preserve the military alliances which it heads. Thus T. Greenwood cautions: "The United States should accompany possible declarations on the nonuse of nuclear weapons with vigorous assurances of its continued commitments in respect not only of South Korea but also the states whose confidence in American guarantees could be undermined--Taiwan, Japan, Australia and the West European countries."[156] One perceives as the basis of this approach the aspiration of America's military and politicians and the supporters of a tough U.S. foreign policy course in the world arena to preserve, as before, nuclear weapons as a principal instrument of the "from-a-position-of-strength" policy.

Thus to sum up the debate in the United States on the problem of the nonuse of nuclear weapons, we may conclude the following. On the one hand the United States cannot fail to take account of the fact that the task of averting the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons requires immediate limitations on their use against nonnuclear countries in order to reduce the latter's motivations to acquire them. On the other hand, the adoption of unconditional commitments in respect of the nonuse of nuclear weapons is being impeded by Washington's endeavor to preserve the effectiveness of these weapons as a military and diplomatic means and the gravitation toward bloc policy.

This ambiguity was also distinctly reflected in official U.S. policy, when, in 1978, the problem of the nonuse of nuclear weapons was the subject of international discussion and the USSR presented the initiative of the conclusion of the corresponding convention.

The positive reaction of the nonnuclear states to the Soviet declaration that the USSR would never use nuclear weapons against states which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not have such on their territory largely compelled the United States also to take a step in this direction: on 12 June 1978 Secretary of State C. Vance read out a statement from the President which said that "the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear country which has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or which has given some similar internationally binding undertaking not to acquire nuclear explosives. An attack

on the United States, its territory or its armed forces or its allies by states which are allied to some nuclear state or linked with some nuclear state in carrying out or developing this attack will constitute an exception."

U.S. officials specified that this statement in no way affects Washington's readiness to use nuclear weapons for the purpose of the so-called "defense" of the United States' allies in Europe and Asia. Evaluating the White House statement, American experts emphasized that this promise will hardly have a significant practical influence on U.S. policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. According to the NEW YORK TIMES, the main purpose of the statement was "an attempt to allay the concern of the developing countries, which are expressing dissatisfaction that attempts are being made to force them to renounce the development of nuclear weapons unilaterally."[157]

When, however, an INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE correspondent requested specific clarification of what practical limitations this promise imposes on the United States, the official State Department representative declared with unconcealed irony: "Whereas prior to the adoption of the commitments, in the event of some subject of Ruritania (the name of a fictitious kingdom from the romantic novel "The Prisoner of Zenda" by A. Hope--V.D.) hitting a GI, the United States had a right to respond to this attack with the use of nuclear weapons against this state, but now, following the promises, it does not have this right."[158]

Such an interpretation, which essentially amounts to a ridiculously minimal limitation of the use of nuclear weapons, is perfectly logical, considering the reservations which Washington made in parallel. At the same time diplomatic observers emphasized that unilateral official promises, at however high a level they may be made and however solemnly they may be enunciated, will hardly contribute to the nonnuclear states' confidence in their security until they are enshrined multilaterally in an accord in international law.

The Soviet Union's proposal formulates precisely its high-minded position on the prevention under any circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons by a power possessing such weapons against a state which does not have such and does not allow another country to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory. According to the American position, however, the United States could employ nuclear weapons on the pretext that this was being done for self-defense.[159]

Whereas for the Soviet Union its declaration at the UN General Assembly Special Disarmament Session was a point of departure for subsequent measures in the sphere of limiting the use of nuclear weapons, in particular, the proposal on the conclusion of a legal agreement, for the United States similar promises appeared the limit beyond which they were not prepared to go.

The endeavor of America's ruling circles to preserve as much freedom of maneuver as possible in the use of nuclear weapons became particularly apparent following submittal for examination by the General Assembly session of the Soviet proposal on the conclusion of a convention on strengthening security guarantees for the nonnuclear states. During discussion of this draft in the UN First Committee Washington's position was sharply criticized by the nonnuclear states, who asked the perfectly legitimate questions why American statements on nonuse were accompanied

by reservations and why they did not welcome the concept of an official treaty commitment. The nonnuclear states were completely dissatisfied with the demagogic explanations given by the American delegate, who declared that since "nuclear weapons represent an element of the agreements in respect of security which have up to now helped us insure peace and preserve the lives of all of us here in this hall... such a promise cannot be applied to the nonnuclear states unconditionally." For the latter it is precisely the threat of the use of nuclear weapons which is the principal factor making their security unreliable, and references to the United States' bloc allied commitments in no way diminish their concern.

The significance of the Soviet proposal for the interests of the nonnuclear states' security was so obvious that the American representative did not dare cast doubt on the idea of the conclusion of the convention, referring merely to the impossibility of its realization at this stage, in view of the considerable divergence in the approaches of the five nuclear powers to the question of the nonuse of nuclear weapons (Britain supported the U.S. position, and France and the PRC merely declared that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons). Considering the negative reaction to the position of the United States, its representative was forced to emphasize that the United States was ready to continue discussion of questions of security guarantees.

Throughout 1979 and 1980 the Disarmament Committee in Geneva examined the possibility of the formulation of an international agreement on security guarantees for the nonnuclear states. However, because of the resistance of the United States and Western countries, this effective measure for curbing the spread of nuclear weapons has yet to become a reality.

A fear can be traced in the American approach to the USSR's initiative that this limitation or the other in the use of nuclear weapons will lead to an undermining of bloc policy and to the reduced effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a military and diplomatic means, in a word, to a further loss of the possibility of acting "from a position of strength," to which Washington is so accustomed. HOwever, the acute problems confronting the countries of the world and the urgent need to curb the race in nuclear arms, prevent their proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear war demand a radical reexamination of the United States' foreign policy course and an end to ambiguity in the approach to problems of nuclear disarmament. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States to combine a policy of building up the nuclear arsenal and preserving freedom of maneuver in the use thereof with the tasks of averting a nuclear war. In the modern world a situation has evolved wherein it is essential to make a clear and firm choice in favor of the strengthening of world security and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Otherwise the threat and danger of nuclear war will not diminish but grow.

Chapter 11. U.S. Policy at the Start of the 1980's: Results and Prospects

The President's 1980 State of the Union address once again demonstratively emphasized that the administration was fully resolved "to insure American leadership in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, which could...threaten the security of the United States."[160] With what foreign policy activity luggage in this sphere does the Washington administration enter the 1980's? What were America's ruling circles seeking more--"leadership" or real success in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons?

Taking account of the mood in the country, as presidential candidate, J. Carter endeavored to devote more attention to the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, criticizing the Republican administration for its inability to adopt effective measures to neutralize this threat. In his repeated stump speeches he stressed the need for this issue to figure highly in the system of the United States' foreign policy priorities and promised to take the appropriate steps in this direction. Describing the long-term goal of U.S. foreign policy, J. Carter asserted at that time: "The spread of nuclear weapons in the world represents the biggest waste and the greatest danger. Our final goal must be to eliminate the nuclear potential of all countries."[161]

Initially such statements might have given rise to the hope that the United States would attempt to find a comprehensive approach to the solution of the problems of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into consideration its "technical" and "political" parameters. However, the administration's very first steps showed that the central place in U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere continued to be occupied by questions connected not with a diminution of the factor of nuclear weapons in international relations but with the use of atomic power engineering. What are the results of American policy in this sphere?

When, in April 1977, the basic propositions of a program to reduce the risk of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes were put forward and, in March 1978, a law was passed on increased control over exports of nuclear technology and materials, the administration was fully optimistic concerning the success of its initiatives. First, Washington was counting on the fact that, having abandoned for an indefinite period the industrial breeding of spent fuel and halted the creation of breeder reactors, it would set a "good example" to other countries. Second, the United States hoped to persuade them to follow this "good example" at the diplomatic level. Third, where persuasion was of no avail, the United States proposed using as an instrument of pressure a new law providing for the curtailment of fuel supplies for nuclear power stations if other countries failed to observe the criteria in the approach to the development of atomic engineering prescribed by the United States.

However, by the start of the 1980's this optimism of the U.S. ruling circles had changed to despondency: the opposition of the majority of countries of the capitalist world to the American initiatives was obvious.

The philosophy of the Carter administration's approach to nonproliferation issues differed sharply from the views and concepts of previous administrations. Whereas at the time of the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty the basis of policy was that all states should enjoy the benefits of the peaceful atom equally, having undertaken here not to acquire nuclear weapons, now, in "blacklisting" the process of the breeding of spent fuel Washington made it understood that the nonnuclear countries should also renounce such technology, irrespective of whether it is profitable to them economically or not and whether it is under IAFA control or not. The formal logic of such a philosophy might appear convincing to the United States, if the potential scale of the spread of plutonium in the world is taken into consideration, but whether it will prove acceptable to the nonnuclear countries economically and politically is the question on whose solution the fate of the new initiatives depends.

When, in the 1960's, talks were being held concerning the Nonproliferation Treaty, many nonnuclear countries justifiably suspected that the United States might attempt to take advantage of it to preserve its dominant positions in the sphere of nuclear technical knowledge on the pretext of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Much effort was required at that time to persuade the majority of countries to sign the treaty even given the presence of article IV. When the text of the treaty was officially submitted to the United Nations in May 1968, A. Goldberg, at that time U.S. representative in this organization, attempted to remove these doubts, declaring: "There is no reason to fear that this treaty will impose any restrictions on the possibility of states which do not have nuclear weapons developing their potential in the sphere of nuclear science and technology."[162] The current abrupt turnabout proved manifestly contrary to this position and article IV. Essentially Washington openly questioned the confidence in the commitments of the treaty's nonnuclear countries not to acquire nuclear weapons and expressed doubt concerning the dependability of the guarantees of control on the part of the IAEA. A research body of the U.S. Congress, which in 1979 prepared a report on the consequences of U.S. policy in relations with West Europe, was forced to acknowledge that if Washington had presented such initiatives at the time the Nonproliferation Treaty was being drawn up, the latter would hardly have been signed either by the industrially developed or the developing countries.[163]

It is not surprising that the American initiatives evoked a sharply negative reaction in the majority of countries of the capitalist world. Indignation at the unilateral changes in the principles of international policy in the sphere of the use of atomic energy extended to both the developing and the industrially developed capitalist countries.

The former viewed this step as a continuation of economic discrimination and went as far as to charge that the new technological policy was nothing other than a hangover of colonialism. "As in the good old days of colonialism, when assimilation of the Bible was accompanied by the sword, so now also the assertion of American views on nonproliferation is, it seems, a forerunner of atomic colonialism,"[164] a scientist from India caustically observes. The majority of developing countries believes that fear as regards the spread of nuclear weapons is being used by the United States for attempts to deprive them of the benefits of the comprehensive use of atomic energy. Washington's new export policy has been described as undermining the entire concept of North-South cooperation, which envisages the broadest possible exchange of progressive technology. The policy of "technological denial" in the atomic engineering sphere was viewed negatively at the 1979 Havana conference of heads of government of nonalined countries.

The West European countries and Japan viewed the United States' actions as an endeavor to neutralize the strengthening of the positions of its main competitors in the world nuclear technology markets, particularly in the sphere of the industrial assimilation of reprocessing and the creation of breeder reactors. France, Britain, the FRG and Japan have not concealed their intention of continuing the development of the "plutonium economy," which, they believe, is irreplaceable in catering for energy requirements at a time of an acute fuel shortage.

According to preliminary plans for the industrial assimilation of reprocessing, in the 1980's Britain intends to obtain a quantity of approximately 2,000 tons of spent

fuel from Japan and approximately the same quantity from the West European countries; and France approximately 6,000 tons from Japan, the FRG, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Australia. Roughly 50 tons of plutonium will be obtained as a result of reprocessing, and the profits will run to over $3 billion. The FRG and Japan have not abandoned the intention of becoming a part of this business, having begun the creation of analogous installations. What position should the U.S. Administration opt for in respect of the industrially developed countries: supply them with enriched uranium, which would soon be reprocessed, and thereby create precedents for the developing countries or adhere firmly to the principles set out in the new law--this was the dilemma which immediately confronted Washington. Reflecting on the fate and consequences of the U.S. initiatives, American scholars emphasize precisely this deadlock situation. M. Brennar, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, warns: "The new strategy in the nonproliferation sphere will lead to an inevitable dilemma: on the one hand, it will hardly be successful without the support of the allies, but, on the other, excessive pressure on them could end in its complete failure."[165]

There was sharp opposition to the White House strategy in the United States also. Even in the first year of office of the Democratic administration the Westinghouse and General Electric nuclear giants suffered considerable losses as a result of the increased competition for orders for reactors on the part of the French and West German monopolies. According to IAEA data, 12 power reactors costing approximately $1 billion each were ordered worldwide in 1977. The United States did not obtain a single foreign order, and its share of the world market was zero. Only in 1978 were American companies able to obtain two orders from South Korea.

The American firms' concern is caused not only by the financial losses but also by the fact that ultimately their main competitors will get even further ahead of the United States in the development of new areas of atomic engineering and will practically monopolize the services to other countries in the sphere of spent fuel conversion. This prospect, a number of American experts believes, could simultaneously nullify the possibility of achieving the goals set by the administration in the program to prevent proliferation. A report prepared for Sen J. Biden (Democrat, Delaware) pointed directly to the need for a reexamination of the original postulates of the government programs in view of the fact that the United States' unilateral measures are insufficiently effective: "The restrictions that have been introduced in respect of American nuclear materials and equipment are so strict that countries not possessing a nuclear potential could turn to other states and thereby circumvent all or almost all the American restrictions."[166]

Washington's strategy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of dangerous technology was built on the premise that countries using atomic energy for peaceful purposes would readily accept increased dependence on the United States in the sphere of supplies both of nuclear reactors and the necessary fuel. In order to stimulate a renunciation of the creation of dangerous technology--enrichment and conversion plants--Washington even undertook to make "timely, guaranteed and profitable supplies of fuel." The idea of setting up an international fuel bank which could grant the necessary uranium to the countries which for some reason were unable to obtain it along bilateral relations channels was aimed at achieving this goal. In October 1977 the U.S. President declared the United States' readiness to contribute to such a fuel reserve and, together with other countries, to study the question of its institutionalization.

However, a number of American experts, particularly M. Brennar, emphasize that the promises sounded good in words, but when it came to practical deals, the complex procedure of the issuing of licenses for exports of nuclear materials provided for by the new law caused doubts among the importer-countries as to the dependability of these supplies.[167] The idea of the creation of a fuel bank remained unrealized at the start of the 1980's. Considering the further aspiration of the majority of countries to political independence of the United States, it can hardly be expected that such economic dependence would be acceptable to them over the long term. The threat of a halt to supplies of nuclear fuel from the United States would bring about other countries' attempts to creat national enterprises for the manufacture of fuel for nuclear power stations.

In addition, Washington failed to consider the fact that the energy situation in other countries sometimes differs sharply from the situation in the United States, which can permit itself to get by with traditional types of energy sources, in the main. As nuclear technology expert E. Wood correctly observes, "for other countries, which regard breeder reactors as the only hope of securing for themselves their own energy sources, the arguments of the United States are simply irrelevant, and fuel conversion for them is the sole possible way to obtain plutonium for the breeders."[168] It is not fortuitous that a number of experts agrees that concrete U.S. strategy aimed at a renunciation of the introduction of installations for spent fuel conversion and the slowing down of the development of breeder reactors could lead to the directly opposite results.

The British political scientist I. Smart concludes that the aspiration to independence of the United States will contribute to other countries' adopting decisions to proceed to the creation of their own installations for fuel enrichment and breeding following the example of West Europe: "There is obviously a risk that the policy being pursued by Carter could sooner or later stimulate an increase in rather than a limitation of enrichment and breeder installations."[169] This viewpointis also shared by the organ of America's business circles--the magazine FORTUNE--which, summing up the results of the Democratic administration's policy in the nonproliferation sphere, concludes that "the policy and tactics approved by the United States are actually contributing to precisely the development which they were intended to halt."[170]

The organ of the Council for Foreign Relations, which is influential in the United States--the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS--sharply criticized U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere. Throughout 1979 it regularly carried articles of prominent experts in international relations such as M. Bundy and S. Hoffmann who called on the administration, before it was too late, to change its policy and abandon the "punitive" clauses of the legislation. In the opinion of Harvard professor S. Hoffmann, it would be advisable in the interests of the United States "to partially retreat from the ambitious goals proclaimed in 1977." But he, like others, was forced to acknowledge that doing this is not so simple now because of the law, guided by which Congress could "block the majority of future pragmatic decisions aimed at a search for compromise."[171] M. Bundy, former adviser to presidents J. Kennedy and L. Johnson, expressed serious concern, believing that if "the United States continues to insist on being right, a new coalition could be formed uniting the suppliers and consumers of nuclear technology and materials with freer standards and differing

from American estimations of dangers and benefits."[172] In a word, the United States' hegemonist policy could in the practical plane lead to the further proliferation in the world of dangerous technology and diminished control over it on the part of the IAEA, that is, to reverse results.

This threat and the clear opposition of the majority of countries forced the U.S. Administration to agree to certain compromises and an easing of its policy. In 1978-1980 Washington was forced to give its consent to the shipment to West Europe and Japan of spent fuel for reprocessing and the inauguration of the first stage of a conversion plant in Tokai-Mura (Japan). But such a modus vivendi with the industrially developed capitalist states would inevitably entail a further adjustment to policy in respect of other countries for otherwise there would be obvious discrimination against the latter. Despite a certain easing of U.S. policy, there is no doubt that the general conclusion is that all this can only postpone "head-on confrontations" until the transition period envisaged by the new law is over.

Why is it that a principal U.S. initiative in the international arena in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear arms--the 7 April 1977 J. Carter program and the law on increasing control over exports of nuclear technology and materials--have encountered such strong opposition and their fate appears in a somber light?

The majority of experts believes that a fundamental miscalculation of the administration was that the United States attempted to operate by proceeding merely from its own interests, ignoring the requirements of other countries, and that, in imposing its goals, failed to reckon with the fact that other countries have a right to beliefs and views different from those of the United States. A number of prominent Western political scientists such as S. Hoffmann, M. Bunday, K. [Kayzer], director of the Cologne (FRG) International Relations Institute, I. Smart (Britain) and others conclude that the sources of such foreign policy miscalculations lie in U.S. ruling circles' underestimation of the realities of the modern world and a hypertrophied overestimation of their own capacity for continuing to lead it, as before. The approach to a solution of nonproliferation problems was conceived in the spirit of traditional U.S. omnipotence without regard for the fact that in contemporary international relations its role has diminished considerably.

The sharp contradictions between the United States and other countries of the capitalist world on questions of the nonproliferation of nuclear technology and materials testify that it is impossible in contemporary international relations to find a satisfactory solution of urgent problems outside of the framework of broad international cooperation. Unilateral initiatives by the United States, whatever their intentions, can hardly be successful if they fail to take account of the vitally important interests of other countries. Furthermore, an approach oriented toward unilateral American interests could harm policy in the nonproliferation sphere.

Justifying the pursuit of the United States' aggressive course, representatives of the U.S. Administration often adduce the argument that as a result of this approach "we have managed to force other countries to recognize that the problem of preventing further proliferation is of paramount importance and merits the most serious steps being taken."[173]

However, sober-minded experts in the United States and other capitalist countries approach an evaluation of the results of the administration's policy differently. Thus the Japanese scientist R. Imai emphasizes: "The United States is no longer capable of foisting its own version of the truth on the world...in this plane U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere has evidently done more harm than good."[174]

Washington's endeavor to unilaterally set limits on the development of atomic engineering and to use its positions in the nuclear sphere as an instrument of pressure on sovereign states has led to even the positive results in the business of nonproliferation achieved within the framework of international cooperation going virtually unremarked.[175] In order to compensate to some extent for the unfavorable impression created by its unilateral approach Washington was forced to agree to certain steps in the further refinement of the process of control and inspection on the part of the IAEA. Granting a special subsidy of $10 million for training a staff of specialists and creating instruments for the technical detection of violations, the United States declared that it would insist on all countries obtaining American materials or benefiting from American services agreeing to the extension of control and inspection measures to all the nuclear facilities on their territory.

The introduction of maximum precautionary measures, the need for which the USSR has long insisted on, might make it possible to close a loophole in the international system for using materials and technology not as intended. Simultaneously, thanks to this, the inequality of the countries which, having signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, have already adopted a legal commitment on placing all nuclear facilities under international control, as distinct from the countries which are not party to the treaty, could be removed. Having passed the corresponding act, the United States may now require the extension of precautionary measures to the entire nuclear activity of these states. Such an approach would force other supplier-countries also to adopt analogous measures in respect of the importer-countries. All this would strengthen the nonproliferation process.

The U.S. legislation also contains a provision concerning the need for the importer-countries to adopt measures for the physical protection of the reactors and corresponding materials which must be sufficiently reliable to prevent the risk of their theft.

The possibility of sanctions on the part of the United States in the event of nonobservance of control measures or the use of fissionable material for military purposes, if implemented selectively, could contribute to insuring that the "nuclear option" of this country or the other prove a costly undertaking since this would have to be paid for with a halt to economically important cooperation in the atomic engineering sphere. It is precisely this consideration which may now play a significant part in some country or the other's decision on whether to take the path of the creation of nuclear weapons or not.

At the same time the administration has expressed readiness to take certain steps to enhance the privileged status of the countries which subscribe to the Nonproliferation Treaty compared with nonsubscribers in the use of atomic power. At the UN General Assembly Special Disarmament Session in June 1978 the American representative A. Young confirmed the U.S. intention to strive for the creation under IAEA auspices of a fund to assist countries party to the treaty to develop atomic engineering. For its part, Washington undertook to allocate $5 million for these countries' purchases of enriched uranium to help them perform the necessary scientific

research. In addition, the American representative emphasized the United States' intention to finance through the Export-Import Bank nuclear programs which conform to conditions leading to a lessening of the danger of the use of atomic power for military purposes.

The supplier-countries maintained unity, agreeing on the announcement of a moratorium on supplies of potentially dangerous materials and technology, and promulgated the general principles determining their export policy. A fundamentally new dialog was conducted on an international level on an evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle, and it marked the first step on the way to the formulation of a common approach of consumers and suppliers of nuclear technology and materials to the use of atomic power for peaceful purposes.

The fact that by the efforts of the socialist community countries the problem of nonproliferation has come to occupy a central place in the activity of the United Nations, as a result of which the majority of countries of the world community had a sharply negative reaction to South Africa's preparations for testing a nuclear weapon, is also logical. Thus where Washington has thought less about "leadership" and where the policy of confrontation has yielded to the idea of cooperation, U.S. policy has not impeded the achievement of certain positive results.

Is U.S. strategy adequate for the challenge of the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons at the start of the 1980's? This is the question which unavoidably confronts American experts in summarizing the results of U.S. policy. The majority of them responds to this question negatively. This viewpoint is justified primarily by the fact that Washington's strategy is oriented mainly toward the creation of "technical barriers" on the path of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and hardly touches on the political aspect of the issue, namely, neutralization of the main motivations to proliferation, which, as an indispensable preliminary condition, should presuppose a cardinal reorganization of international relations on the path of an extension of the processes of the relaxation of tension and a devaluation of the role and significance still attached to nuclear weapons. Whatever is made of America's proposals concerning a limitation of the spread of dangerous technology and materials and a strengthening of international control over the use of atomic power for peaceful purposes, this strategy will hardly change countries' attitude toward nuclear weapons--this is the leitmotiv of the critical remarks leveled at the Carter administration.[176] This is particularly topical today, when Washington has set course toward stimulating the nuclear arms race and when it has openly announced an aspiration to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Does the United States understand this? To judge from individual statements of certain officials, this aspect of policy was initially within the sights of the administration. For example, J. Nye, adviser to the President on nonproliferation, acknowledged in an interview with the newspaper INTER DEPENDENT: "in the long term the problem cannot be reduced merely to technical parameters, and a refusal to make available dangerous technology cannot be an adequate policy in the nonproliferation sphere." As if justifying post factum the "punitive measures" against plutonium breeding, he emphasized that the United States never believed that if it prevented breeding, this would avert the spread of nuclear weapons. In his opinion, the accentuation of this issue was prompted merely by the fact that it "brooked no

delay since it was essential to maintain the existing distance between the use of nuclear power for peaceful and military purposes and postpone the time when 40-50 countries might possess the technical potential for producing nuclear weapons."[177]

But the policy of creating additional "technical barriers" and "gaining time" can only appear justified in the event of this time being used primarily to weaken the nonnuclear countries' motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, which still exist in contemporary international relations, and to curb the nuclear arms race, taking into consideration here the fact that technical knowledge cannot be eradicated and that technical capacity can hardly be limited for long.

In a situation where factors stimulating proliferation continue to operate and where ruling circles of the United States themselves are attempting to considerably increase their arsenal, regarding it as the basis of its increased influence on other countries, the threat of states' transition from the ranks of "near-nuclear" to nuclear will remain and increase even. It will become increasingly difficult to neutralize this threat with some "technical barriers," and only a political impact will be able to exert a braking influence on their "nuclear option." The effectiveness of this impact could be conditioned by the extent of the devaluation of the military and political significance of nuclear weapons in international relations and will depend on how far the nuclear powers progress along the path of the limitation and reduction of their arsenals of nuclear weapons, the adoption of commitments on their nonuse, limitation of the geography of their deployment and so forth.

This conclusion could hardly be a discovery for the administration. Even as presidential candidate in 1976, J. Carter emphasized that the effectiveness of nonproliferation policy would depend on progress in the nuclear disarmament sphere: "I believe we do not have sufficient right to ask others to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons infinitely if we do not demonstrate significant progress in the control, subsequent reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals."[178] Among the President's promises upon taking office figured the task of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the world political arena in order that prestige considerations connected with these weapons not perform a role prompting their acquisition. The complex of questions which then required, the President believed, immediate solution included the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals, the complete banning of nuclear weapons tests, the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear forces from a number of crisis regions, the creation of nuclear-free zones, the adoption of commitments on the nonuse of nuclear weapons and the abandonment of military doctrines which assert that nuclear weapons perform a useful "restraining" role. As a whole, in the approach to the solution of international problems, administration representatives initially repeatedly gave the assurance that the United States would carefully avoid a policy which created the impression that nuclear weapons lent it exceptionally high prestige or a strong position in international affairs.[179]

The solution of questions of nuclear disarmament presupposed as an indispensable condition continuation of the policy of relaxation of tension in relations with the USSR and a course toward extending mutual understanding and cooperation on problems of world politics.

But such a foreign policy perspective evoked bitter resistance from supporters of the "from-a-position-of-strength" policy and opponents of a relaxation of tension. As a result the majority of the President's 1976 election promises were "shelved." The administration signed the SALT II Treaty, but, taking the position of the right-wing forces, proceeding from electoral considerations, postponed its ratification and signed the protocol to the first treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, but has dragged out its ratification. Taking into consideration the popularity of the Soviet declaration, it was forced to declare the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries, but with such reservations as make this declaration questionable, and to begin talks on a total ban on nuclear weapons tests, but subsequently adopted a position which actually prevented agreement being reached.

Moreover, Washington not only abandoned plans to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas but also set course toward the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missile systems in West Europe, disrupting the existing nuclear equivalence in Europe. The White House adopted the decision to create a new generation of nuclear missile forces--the MX, Trident II and cruise missiles--in order to attempt to achieve with them military superiority globally.

In the eyes of the nonnuclear countries this military policy of Washington's by no means testifies to progress along the path of a reduction in the significance of nuclear weapons in the world arena, that is, along the path of neutralization of the main long-term factors which are the basis of proliferation. It is not fortuitous that a number of Western experts is convinced that at the second conference reviewing the effect of the Nonproliferation Treaty and party countries' fulfillment of their commitments the nonnuclear countries will express their dissatisfaction with the results of nuclear disarmament and will raise the question of the need for the United States' fulfillment of commitments in accordance with article VI of the treaty, pointing out that otherwise the nonproliferation process will be unstable and unreliable.

The J. Carter administration's transition to a policy of hard-line power confrontation with the Soviet Union undermining world security will unavoidably do serious damage to the solution of questions of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Even in the estimation of Western experts the United States has departed from the policy of "restraining" the nuclear ambitions of Pakistan, counting with its assistance on strengthening its strategic positions in South Asia. Such a myopic approach is fraught with negative consequences for nonproliferation as a whole since it could be reflected in the nuclear policy of other "threshold" countries which Washington regards as outposts of its influence in the world. These and other countries which are not party to the treaty could take advantage of the tension in international relations to embark on the path of nuclear armament without fearing joint actions on the part of the states concerned.

Sober-minded American scholars and political scientists have repeatedly opposed such a U.S. policy, believing that it could only contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, Prof G. Kistiakowsky cautioned: "Without Soviet-American cooperation...the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide will undoubtedly accelerate."[180] However, as events at the start of the 1980's have shown, Washington is ready for the sake of short-term and dubious benefits to forgo the long-term interests of international security.

Farsighted experts agree that to achieve effectiveness in the nonproliferation sphere the United States must rid itself of the one-sided orientation toward the creation of "technical barriers" on the path of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and shift the accent to the political side of the issue--a surgical removal of the "nuclear cancer" continuing to destroy the fabric of international relations. They emphasize that the situation in this sphere could have been more favorable if the United States had brought the debate on nuclear disarmament to the same pitch of acuteness as the discussion of technical issues concerning the proliferation of plutonium-reprocessing installations and breeder reactors, supporting it with consistent concrete actions on its part, and if with its actions aimed at exacerbating Soviet-American relations the United States had not impeded the solution of this question. Only a policy of relaxation of tension can guarantee the success of the strategy of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Otherwise the policy being pursued by Washington will only lead to the appearance of a world in which there will be several dozen nuclear states. The alternative is obvious: either relaxation of tension and nuclear disarmament or the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Evaluating the results of world politics in the nonproliferation sphere, Western experts frequently point to the fact that prior to the 1980's there had not been a single nuclear weapon test by any nonnuclear country. Indeed, a positive phenomenon, but the reason for it was not the actions of the United States but to a considerable extent the consistent position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which is shared and supported by the broad peace-loving community. At the same time by the start of the 1980's, given the further increase in the technical potential of countries and the lack of significant progress along the path of military detente, an optimistic view of the current situation could be likened to seeing only the tip of the iceberg, and international security in the long term simply may not withstand a collision with it. A sense of uncertainty is characteristic of realistic circles in the United States. Just prior to his retirement, J. Nye declared: "I believe that it would be no surprise if there were to be yet another nuclear explosion in the world at the end of the 20th century."[181]

Despite this pessimistic forecast, there is no doubt that the likelihood of the further spread of nuclear weapons would diminish considerably if the United States and other nuclear countries were to make an appreciable contribution to the relaxation of tension and nuclear disarmament, which the USSR has long been calling on them to do.

Conclusion

An analysis of American concepts and policy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons testifies that this problem has objectively occupied a most important place in the system of the United States' foreign policy priorities, irrespective of the concrete acts of this administration or the other.

This has been brought about by the fact that the threatening consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide and the real possibility of such a process put on the agenda the task of the formulation of a foreign policy course for the successful solution of this problem. A study of different approaches to nonproliferation issues makes it possible to determine policy parameters in this sphere in the medium term and the long term.

In the strategy aimed against the spread of nuclear weapons an important part continues to be played by problems of reinforcing the nonproliferation process provided for by the corresponding treaty: the further extension of the body of countries subscribing to it; making the treaty more universal; refining and increasing the effectiveness of the system of IAEA guarantees; placing all nuclear activity in all nonnuclear countries under international control; establishment of the strictest control over the operation of the most dangerous elements of the nuclear fuel cycle connected with the production of fissionable material suitable for the creation of nuclear weapons; insuring the physical protection of peaceful nuclear facilities; and a halt to interimperialist rivalry in exports of nuclear technology and materials. All these measures are aimed at preventing the peaceful use of the atom and atomic engineering itself becoming a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Without belittling the significance of the problems connected with the peaceful use and further development of atomic engineering, it has to be emphasized that under the conditions of the growth of material possibilities in the nuclear sphere the center of gravity of nonproliferation strategy shifts from the technical to the political sphere. As a result the main efforts in the long term should be geared to reducing and, ultimately, nullifying the effect of the political and military factors in contemporary international relations which could still prompt countries' aspiration to the creation of their own nuclear weapons. It is a question of policy connected with the nuclear arms race.

The quest for a solution of nonproliferation problems by American scientists and political figures points to the need for considerable adjustments to be made to U.S. policy, the general and main result of which should be a diminution in the political and military significance of nuclear weapons in the system of international relations. The direct interconnection between nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation dictates the task of a cardinal reassessment of traditional U.S. approaches to safeguarding the interests of so-called "national security." If Washington's policy, which is based on the might of nuclear weapons, is pushing other countries toward acquiring these weapons, this means it is a threat to the security of the United States itself. This conclusion is becoming the leitmotiv of the recommendations of the supporters of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The proposed measures in nonproliferation policy include a halt to the quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race, a reduction in existing arsenals of weapons, a complete ban on nuclear tests, limitation of the use of nuclear weapons, realization of the ideas of the creation of nuclear-free zones and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from overseas bases.

However, the search for the optimum course in the sphere of nonproliferation is encountering the bitter resistance of the military-industrial complex and the supporters of the nuclear arms race and the "from-a-position-of-strength" policy. The approach of these forces to such problems as nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation is characterized by aggressiveness of thought and, sometimes, an unwillingness to understand that the presecriptions of the cold war are unsuitable for the solution of contemporary problems of world security and that nonproliferation issues demand a fundamentally different attitude than in the past. The endeavor to continue the political confrontation with the USSR and to retain the lead in the nuclear arms race reflects the inability of America's ruling circles to adapt to the rapidly changing world and find the correct answers to the challenges with which it is presenting the United States.

The successful solution of the task of nonproliferation presupposes as an indispensable condition continuation of the policy of relaxation of tension and the achievement of mutual understanding and cooperation between all states. The cold war created the baneful environment in international relations in which the proliferation process, which has extended to five states, began. It was precisely at that time that nuclear weapons found a "legitimate" place in world politics and acquired open and secret admirers in a number of nonnuclear countries.

The relaxation of tension made it possible to take the first steps on the path of eradicating nuclear weapons from international relations. A number of important American-Soviet SALT agreements was signed in the 1970's. Questions of the complete banning of nuclear tests and the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states are at the examination stage. Relaxation of tension has afforded an opportunity for countries with different social systems to coordinate efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and the consolidation of international security. The close interaction achieved in the period of detente made it possible to foil South Africa's preparations for testing a nuclear weapon in 1977 and demonstrated the broad possibilities of the constructive cooperation of countries of West and East in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. At the current stage of international relations, when the question of a halt to the race in nuclear arms and their further nonproliferation is as acute as can be, there is no adequate alternative to the relaxation of tension. The cooperation of countries in consolidating international security is the arterial path toward removal of the threat of nuclear war.

The USSR's numerous initiatives and proposals in the sphere of a halt to the arms race and disarmament are contributing to the creation of an international climate conducive to the solution of questions of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to their gradual exclusion from international relations. These include proposals on the further limitation of and reduction in nuclear armaments, a total ban on tests of nuclear weapons, a halt to their production in any form, the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers to study questions of nuclear disarmament, no first use of nuclear weapons in relations between countries which have signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the strengthening of nuclear guarantees for the nonnuclear countries and the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states which do not have such at the present time and support for the creation of nuclear-free zones and "peace zones" in different regions. A constructive approach to these initiatives on the part of the United States and other nuclear powers could promote to a considerable extent countries' efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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