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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

THESIS ON 'MONETARY REPRESSION OF AFRICA' EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan 81 pp 65-67

[Review by Jehan Duhamel of the book "Monnaie, servitude et liberte. La repression monetaire de l'Afrique" [Money, Servitude and Freedom. The Monetary Repression of Africa], by Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi. Preface by Mohamed T. Diawara. One volume 15.5 x 22.5, Editions J. A., Paris, 286 pp]

[Text] Recently, in July 1980, the Editions J. A. published the work by Prof Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi "Monnaie, servitude et liberte" [Money, Servitude and Freedom ], with a preface by Mohamed Diawara, former minister of the plan of the Ivory Coast and president of the Dakar Club. The title of the work is somewhat aggressive and the subtitle is even more so: "The Monetary Repression of Africa." The author is a professor of economics at the Abijan University. Previously he was professor at the University of Yaounde. He graduated in 1964 from the University of Clermont-Ferrand and the school of application of the INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] in Paris.

We asked Mr Jehan Duhamel, former director of the BCEAO [Central Bank of Western African States] in Dakar (1961-1965), director of studies of the Banque de France (1965-1970), and general director of the BIAO in Paris (1971-1975).to comment on this work and evaluate the ideas it supports.

"Money, Servitude and Freedom." Such is the title of a work which a brilliant African university professor, Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi, has just published. In a sharp style he describes the role of money as the bearer of progress and, therefore, of emancipation, but also, inversely, as a generator of liens and, therefore, of bondage. The tone of the work, however, is provided by the subtitle, which in fact could have been the main title of the book: "The Monetary Repression of Africa."

I. Professor Pouemi's Theses

In general, the thesis is clear: the economic and social development of the African continent has been artificially restrained by a monetary policy systematically oriented toward the continent's impoverishment.

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In the period of colonization it was logical, if not legitimate, for money to be managed with a view to the total implementation of the colonial pact whose purpose was to exploit overseas territories to serve, in the best possible manner, the interests of the colonizer, who was looking for both a source of inexpensive raw materials and an outlet for its industry.

Conversely to what might have been expected, the acquisition of independence by the African states hardly changed the situation. It barely involved modifications, more theoretical than real, in the structures of the monetary and financial apparatus, the modalities of the creation of a monetary system, and the management of foreign currency reserves.

A. Self-Repression Techniques

As far as the former French empire is concerned, the old mother country remained the center of the real decisions and, through its virtually absolute control over the granting of credits and the orientation of savings, to exert a delayed imperialism which safeguarded the essential features of its economic interest. With a few nuances the same occurred in the other former colonial systems whose monetary and credit structures, even though differently conceived in colonial times, kept and continued to keep the African economies in a state of skillfully organized dependence and exploitation.

To stick to the French example, which is the main topic of the author's study, and which he considers particularly illustrative, the delegation of powers granted the local monetary organs in the area of credits were manifested to the extent to which they remained locked within a very strict joint system controlled by a group of French technical advisors who were remarkably vigilant. After all:

The guarantee given by France concerning the franc of the African financial community (the CFA franc) has remained illusory, for it represents an operations account which the French authorities have always been very careful to maintain positive;

The fixed rate of exchange between the CFA and the French franc deprives the monetary policy of the different countries within the zone of all independence, for it forbids them to adapt the parity of their currency to the development of their economies.

Within the context of political independence, such a situation of monetary and, consequently, economic subordination could be maintained only with the agreement, one would be almost tempted to say the complicity, of the African leadership. The latter have been led to accept it either as a result of blindness or fear of change. Furthermore, while the monetary order controlled by the former colonial power hindered development by measuring out the indispensable loans required to meet the initiatives of entrepreneurs, artisans and peasants, it was also such to benefit a small African elite, politicians and officials and other administrators of state-owned companies.

Obviously, the countries which demanded total monetary independence--Guinea, Mali and Mauritania--had no reason to be pleased with the economic consequences of their emancipation. The reason was that their experiments were too isolated to be viable by themselves.

Such are, according to Professor Pouemi, the main characteristics of what he describes as African monetary and, therefore, economic self-repression.

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#### B. International Monetary Repression

Added to the self-repressive methods applied with the agreement of African political leaders is a worldwide system of external repression supported by the sum total of industrialized countries, who are concerned with the durable preservation of their privileges. In effect, this is one of the dominant orientations in the international monetary order which keeps the African economies in a state of dependence directly prejudicial to their expansion.

The world monetary order, developed at the end of the last war, was, in fact, structured on the basis of three main mechanisms which, originally, were as follows:

The existence of a ruling currency, the American dollar, which was asked virtually to play the role of single currency imposed upon everyone in economic and financial exchanges on a global scale:

The fixed ratio of exchange between the dollar and all other currencies. This deprived the members of the system, the African countries especially, of the possibility to have recourse to deliberate variations in the exchange rate in order to pursue an autonomous economic policy;

The International Monetary Fund, which, in fact, gave quite useful loans to member countries but which tied its aid to extremely constraining conditions as to the way their economic policy was oriented. Proceeding on the basis of very conservative and rather rigid views, the stipulations of the fund mostly conflicted with the pursuit of social progress activities in the developing countries.

Naturally, the world monetary system was greatly changed after the convertibility of the dollar was abandoned in 1971. However, this did not improve the situation of the Third World. The orderly repressive system was followed by the disorderly repressive situation. There is no longer an international currency. Henceforth reciprocal monetary relations are covered by the principle of floating exchange rates. A generalized inflationary situation has spread among the industrial countries and the level of interest rates demanded of borrowers has become unbearable.

The Third World countries are the principal victims of this state of things. They become the unwilling importers of inflation, which they did not create, as a result of which their balance of payments worsens, thus lowering the living standard of their populations.

Noting the repressive effects of the global monetary disorder with which the industrialized countries alone manage to cope, Professor Pouemi unhesitatingly concludes that this disorder is deliberately maintained for the sake of keeping the developing countries in a position inferiority and dependence which could have been avoided with the help of the initial results of their recent industrialization.

#### II. Comments Called For by Such a Sharp Thesis

Such was the stern analysis of an African professor, an analysis which Mohamed Diawara, president of the Dakar Club, labeled as "scouring." The preface provided by Mohamed Diawara was as vigorous as it was brilliant.

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What makes this thesis even more seductive is that it is talentedly written. The author displays an excellent knowledge of monetary mechanisms and their ties with economic life and a remarkable facility in describing them clearly to the non-initiated readers, which, in itself, is a tour de force. This makes even more regrettable the fact that the author has assumed a systematically critical and virulent stand which deprives his work of a great deal of its force of persuasion. Unwittingly, the famous expression comes to mind that, "anything excessive becomes unconvincing."

A. On the Subject of Some Particular Views

Without listing all the arguments--numerous though they might be--with which Professor Pouemi's ideas could be challenged, several among them are worth expanding:

To maintain that the value of a currency is independent of the amount and type of foreign currency reserves means to ignore the fact that a country cannot live permanently in a deficit situation. It may be true that the systematic and steady accumulation of foreign currency may prove to be useless and to the detriment of the living standard; it is no less true that trade imbalances and services must be compensated for through the movement of capital, i.e., by resorting to foreign indebtedness which, in turn, makes a receiving country dependent on the lenders; furthermore, should the situation with foreign exchange reserves become too negative, lenders become scarce;

To note that the system of floating exchange rates is "impure" because of measures taken to limit the exchange fluctuations and to assume, conversely, that it should be "pure," i.e., based on properly free fluctuations, means to forget that the factors influencing the variation of exchange rates are not all of them economic and that the uncontrolled intervention of speculative operations might lead to erratic excesses whose consequences would be catastrophic to the economies of the affected countries;

To consider the mechanisms operating in the franc zone have contributed to the member countries nothing but economic subordination is not as overstated as it would be to deny the advantages which this system has brought to the French economy. The claim that operational accounts are so conceived as never to be losing is inexact. Actually, even though, generally speaking, they have not been losing over a long period of time, with the exception of Mali, which has always been in the red, the situation has been turned around: starting with 1980 operations in the UMOA zone have been steadily losing; this means that, in accordance with concluded agreements, France has supplied these countries with the foreign exchange they required to see them through a difficult period.

Furthermore, the fact that the African countries within the franc zone have a currency which is practically interchangeable with the French franc is, unquestionably, a factor in attracting foreign private investments which find security in this type of monetary system.

B. On the Concept of the Work

Notes on specific points are relatively secondary compared with two far more basic criticisms triggered by Professor Pouemi's theses.

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1. The basic argument of the work is that the currency or, rather, the creation of currency is the almost exclusive key to economic expansion and that by setting limits to the growth of internal credit, agencies such as the Common Central Bank, the Franc Zone or the International Monetary Fund are engaged in a systematic and entirely illegitimate action of blocking the development of the Third World. In particular, the author claims that the thus imposed enterprise self-financing is a heresy, for it is nothing but a factor of price increases and that private savings, even though they largely consist of cash, should be used to a far greater extent in financing industrialization and agricultural progress.

This means putting money on a rather high pedestal, for even though money is a means for attaining progress, it is merely one of the development factors. It also means to forget that entrepreneurs are always ready to ask for loans but are frequently insufficiently concerned with making sure that their project will generate sufficient repayment funds. It means emphasizing the adverse effects of an excessive monetary supply, for the granting of loans has never been the absolute guarantee that there will be an increasing output which would back the money thus inserted within the economic circuit. It also means neglecting the fact that a very slim line separates money and savings always ready to be converted into money.

Above all, it means denying the fact that an investment, whatever its nature, cannot be based on cash alone. It is essentially based on a certain economic, social or even political environment. So far, the biggest obstacle to development in Africa has been a sum total of insufficiencies in the various areas of transportation, telecommunications, energy supplies, industrial infrastructures and, perhaps even more so, shortages of artisans and of vocationally trained personnel. The injection of currency, naturally, contributes to the remedy of this situation. However, it must be gradual and organized in a way which would avoid distortions; progress in the various areas must be achieved on a parallel basis. Otherwise a substantial risk of dislocation would exist.

2. According to Professor Pouemi the generalized inflation and consequent global monetary disorder are the manifestation of the opposition of the industrial world to the legitimate aspirations of the Third World. The author offers a pertinent analysis of this confrontation between two major types of civilization which seems, indeed, to be the basis for a generalized increase in costs and prices and which is gradually leading the industrialized countries to withdraw behind a protectionist system adverse to the development of Third World countries.

Here again, however, the author engages in an impassioned and excessive presentation of the facts, a presentation which does not sufficiently take realities into consideration. He actually insinuates that the Western world is deliberately using inflation as the ultimate means of defense in opposing the claims of the poor countries. This amounts to ascribing to the Western world both a great deal of perseverance in its malice and of cohesion in the protection of its interests. Could anyone fail to see, conversely, that the industrialized countries themselves are the first victims of inflation and of the monetary chaos which disturb their own economies and lead to the under-utilization of their own manpower?

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The origin of the crises which periodically shake up various civilizations may be found in the will of the least favored social classes to demand an improvement of their living conditions and even an equal distribution of wealth. For a long time this phenomenon existed only within the national borders where disparities were closer to home and more evident. In recent decades there has been a trend toward extending it to the rest of the world. The development of information media brought to light the unequal living standards among different nations. Such inequalities were worsened by the impact of a demographic expansion which varied substantially from one continent to another. Under these circumstances the claims of the poor nations called for a substantial increase in raw material prices and for a more equitable redistribution of industrial activities.

The world's leaders--politicians or heads of enterprises--have become aware of the fact that a transfer of wealth and activities to the benefit of the Third World is inevitable. Such a transfer can be achieved only by taxing the haves. The easiest way to do this is the painless one, i.e., when a flourishing economy is taxed and, therefore, when such taxation is manifested in no more than a slight slowdown of the internal growth rate. It is infinitely more difficult to tax an economy in a state of crisis, for this makes such a taxation more evident. Added to this is the fact that the Western nations have democratic political systems, i.e., systems which are relatively unequipped to impose sacrifices upon their populations. They are reduced to efforts to influence minds through the mass media, i.e., to operate through extensive and gradual actions.

As long as a way to rebalance the distribution of wealth, acceptable to the majority, has not been found, disagreement between the feeling of impatience of the deprived and the conservatism of the richer nations will be manifested by an inflation which will be more or less poorly controlled. Such is the nature of the phenomenon which took place in France in recent decades and such is the process which is developing on a world scale ever since the sudden unilateral increase in the cost of energy products.

### III. The Chances of an African Monetary Zone

In the face of this entire disorder which he dissected with impassioned strictness, Professor Pouemi did not fail to try to suggest a solution. In a few pages, the volume of which could seem too small compared with the very long critical analysis which accounts for the substance of his book, he suggests that Africa set up its own monetary zone which would encompass all underdeveloped countries on the continent but would be totally independent of the other monetary systems in the world. Such a union would draw its own strength from its internal cohesion and economic dynamism within the recovered independence of its own power of the generation of money and the adjustment of the exchange rates. The management of reserves and the granting of credits would be controlled by a joint central bank whose governor and management would be largely independent of national political powers.

Such suggestions seem rather unrealistic.

It would be hard to imagine African governments, so different from each other in terms of historical and linguistic traditions or ideologies, to become deliberately involved in a process of monetary and, consequently, economic rapprochement which would imply the loss of a substantial percentage of their sovereignty.

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It would be hard to imagine that the new monetary union--assuming that it has been organized and is functioning smoothly--could formulate a purely African line of behavior, totally independent of the other global monetary systems. Such a new association could not allow itself to transgress on a durable basis the traditional rules of monetary generation, any more than the existing monetary unions, by plunging into an excessively generous loan-granting policy.

Finally, could we agree with professor Pouemi that a monetary union would be sufficient to bring about an economic union? The old question of determining which one should precede the other has long remained unanswered. It is clear, nevertheless, that an economic or monetary union would be viable only if it rallies peoples who have imperative reasons to unite both because they complement each other and because they share a joint vision of development and, even more so, of human society. One could only wish that such were to become the case of the countries in the African continent.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FRANCOPHONE MOVEMENT SEEN AT CROSSROADS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 pp 348-349

[Report: "Francophone Movement Questioned; Failure or Growing Pains"]

[Text] We know that a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of francophone countries was to take place last December in Dakar. At the last moment, however, it had to be postponed sine die because of differences existing between France and Canada on Quebec's representation. The purpose of the meeting was to consider a project which had been conceived and passionately supported by President Leopold Sedar Senghor. It dealt with the basic francophone community. As Olivier Stirn, secretary of state for foreign affairs, pointed out in Dakar on 15 January, it is a plan which France hopes to implement one day and to which it gives its continuing support. After the postponement of the Dakar meeting, which, we would like to hope, will be no more than a transient incident, we asked a specialist in francophone affairs to give us an interpretation of this matter.

The ministers of foreign affairs of francophone countries did not meet in Dakar, as President Senghor had planned, to promote the idea of the organization of an organic francophone community. Since, meanwhile, the Senegalese chief of state had proclaimed his withdrawal from national political life, one may ask if the postponement of the meeting was not equivalent to aborting the idea itself.

The reason which motivates the francophone countries to organize is their desire to combine their affinities and cultural complements and to apply them in an effort to establish a zone of solidarity and co-prosperity. Unquestionably, this is an ambitious undertaking which is justified by the current international situation, which is characterized by unequal development, the steady weakening of the poorest countries, and the risks which this state of things entails in terms of maintaining the peace. It is legitimate for groups based on the use of the same language of international communications and a background of reciprocal understanding and shared values, to be concerned with the study of the reasons for the situation and of possible remedies.

Project Started in 1965

The project has been described as the francophone version of the Commonwealth; the history of the latter is both long and noted by happenstances which prevented

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neither its development nor its activities. Conceived in 1839, organized in 1931, and considerably expanded after World War II, the withdrawal of Pakistan, Ireland and South Africa notwithstanding, and completed, in the course of time, through the addition of subsidiary agencies such as the Foundation (1966), it was finally in 1971 that the Commonwealth adopted a declaration according to which its partners acknowledged the fact that the application of common principles could have a worldwide beneficial influence.

The francophone project was initiated in 1965 by Presidents Bourguiba and Senghor. The latter deserves credit for having formulated it to his peers, in Kigali, in 1979, and in Nice, in 1980, at the meeting of heads of French and African states. The implementation schedule called for a consultation to be held by the ministers of foreign affairs at the end of 1980. Construing as a failure the fact that a casual incident prevented the holding of this meeting would be the equivalent of having little faith in the fact that such an undertaking is of sufficient interest to remedy the situation in the very near future.

What was it, in fact, that happened? A difference became apparent concerning the nature of the problems which were to be discussed in the course of the high level francophone meetings. On the basis of Senghor's analysis of global relations, it is a question, first of all, of going beyond the "cultural scorn" shown by the industrialized countries of the underdeveloped countries, and of reestablishing the balance of all spiritual contributions to the human community; this implies reciprocal respect and acknowledgment, as well as training, transfer of technology, and combination of intellectual and financial means leading to harmonious development. There is also the further possibility of adopting joint platforms in the areas of economics, basic human rights, and changes in the development of aggressive militarization policies.

It was precisely the ministers, meeting in Dakar, who were to define their own targets and formulate their priorities. However, this question was shunted as a result of the current Canadian viewpoint. Involved with its provinces in a discussion on Canada's constitutional future, the federal government in Ottawa reserved for itself the right to represent Canada at the Dakar meeting, considering this to be the outline of an international agency in which, from the strict legal viewpoint, it would be the sole legitimate representative. In this case, Quebec would have been reduced to a representation on a level which it deemed unacceptable. As of that point the French government pressed for a postponement of the meeting, for it considered that such a francophone predominately cultural meeting was the most important and the most permanent feature of its policy according to which Quebecers must be represented in francophone bodies.

Was the desire for solidarity expressed by the members of the francophone group to gain the upper hand over circumstantial considerations? There were three features favoring an affirmative answer: the existence of already institutionalized ties, the number and diversity of countries interested in a cohesive francophone group, and the nature of the problems they had to discuss.

Like the Commonwealth, the francophone group is so structured as to enable its members to think, engage in research and exchange of ideas and cooperation in all

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areas of activity. Ministers of education and of youth and sports have been meeting regularly since, respectively, 1960 and 1969; they have even set up in Dakar a permanent secretariat in charge of organizing their conferences. Other heads of technical departments have followed their example (the ministers of scientific research and justice), or about to do so (agriculture, culture, etc.).

The francophone unification movement is triggering an intense and dynamic confrontation of ideas among parliamentarians, journalists, jurists, university members, economists, historians, physicians, artists, engineers, etc.

The ACCT Rostrum and Place of Gathering

However, the institutionalization of relations among francophone countries achieved its best progress with the establishment of the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency (ACCT). Established in Niamey, in 1970, by 22 countries, currently it lists 34 members spread over all continents. Its special aspect is that it offers an outlet for expression and a place where countries who are entirely or partially French-speaking, countries where the French language is in daily use without having an official status, or provincial governments such as that of Quebec and New Brunswick, may gather. The agency, operating on a budget of 70 billion francs, implements training, exchange, and production of cultural goods programs; it has a special development fund for specific activities related to the enhancement of the human and economic potential of its members.

A study of the geographic breakdown of the francophone group will show that the 34 members of the ACCT includes countries having a great variety of systems: Western capitalist countries such as France, Belgium and Canada; Commonwealth members such as Mauritius, the Seychelles, Vanuatu and Canada; socialist countries such as Vietnam, Laos and Benin; and countries within the Arab-Islamic sphere, such as Tunisia, Lebanon and the Comoro Islands. In all these countries, specifically those within the African bloc, the French language may be a common denominator but is not necessarily the language spoken by the entire population. This proves that internal linguistic cleavages are not an obstacle to affiliation with the francophone group; this argument, which applies to countries where other cultural languages exist and are developing, equally applied to francophone minorities within countries whose national language is different. For this reason, the francophone community feels the existence of a bond with the Acadians of the Canadian maritime provinces, the Franco-Americans in New England and Louisiana, the Val-dotans and the "French-speaking people" of Kampuchea.

All these groups are following with interest the development of the francophone idea which, in a way, represents a chance for their ethnic survival. It is likely that, should this idea convert into reality, other countries would not ignore the advantages offered by a spontaneous regrouping which would offer them a security in transcending systems and circumstances. It would be difficult in this respect to imagine a community so rich in terms of its diversity where Morocco would not be represented, as well as Algeria which could challenge Quebec for the position of the second largest French-speaking community in the world in terms of the number of people who use the French language in their work, educational activities or culture.

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The attractiveness of an organic community would obviously apply in the choice of topics it could discuss. Comparing, once again, this situation with the Commonwealth, let us recall that the latter is not exclusively an economic or monetary association or a military alliance. We find in the Commonwealth as many political differences as there are in the ACCT. What remains, essentially, is the usage of a common language and the awareness and practical work of public institutions based on similar cultural foundations. Discussions among English-speaking partners, at the highest level, may cover a large number of subjects. However, where as efforts are being made to resolve the major problems of today, no specific policy is formulated, for the target is "to reach the highest possible level of understanding rather than even the lowest level of agreement." Unquestionably, this is also the wish of the promoters of the francophone community. A dialogue which has been initiated by the concern for reaching an equal level of cultural development and knowledge it would be natural for its consequences to lead to more specific economic and political realities.

Belgium offers as much as Canada grounds for a debate on the future of its French-speaking population. Need we recall the fact that the Flemings in Belgium have concluded a linguistic union agreement with the Netherlands, based on their cultural similarity. Who could say that this agreement is merely intellectual and is not translated by the wish for a greater mutual understanding on other levels and for purposes which would benefit the interests of both parties?

After the conference of ministers of foreign affairs was adjourned, several countries, France among them, expressed the wish that this project be resumed soon. Obviously, the French-speaking community does not have an agency on the highest level as that of the Commonwealth with its conference of heads of governments. It would be desirable for such an agency to be organized and for individual problems to be surmounted for the sake of attaining a level of co-prosperity and solidarity among voluntarily and fully participating countries; by its vocation this level may be intellectual but it would also be economic by necessity and, finally, political by conviction, and would be able to meet the challenge of the current international order.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CEPGL-EEC COOPERATION REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 383

[Text] The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) have a specialized energy agency known as the EGL or, in other words, the Organization of the CEPGL for Energy of the Great Lakes Countries. The agency's seat is in Bujumbura, in the Republic of Burundi.

Let us recall that on 15 July 1970 the ambassadors of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire (the three members of the community) signed in Brussels an agreement protocol according to which the three countries were to cooperate in the area of energy. The first step in the implementation of this agreement was taken on 20 August 1974 in Kinshasa with the signing of a convention creating the Nonprofit Association for the Electrification of the Great Lakes Region. This marked the theoretical birth of the EGL. On 15 January 1977 the EGL General Assembly represented by ministers (Rwanda-Burundi) and a state commissioner (Zaire), who were in charge of energy problems, met in Bujumbura to name the members of the management committee. This represented the physical birth of the EGL. The committee consists of a director general and two directors, respectively appointed by Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi.

With a view to establishing functional relations between the EGL and the CEPGL, the 10 September 1978 second ordinary session of the conference of heads of states, held in Gisenyi (Rwanda) decided to make the EGL part of the CEPGL. The manner in which this integration was to be accomplished was formulated at the third ordinary session of the conference of heads of states, held in Lubumbashi (Zaire), on 9 December 1979.

It was thus that the EGL became a specialized agency of the CEPGL. It enjoys administrative, technical and financial autonomy. The integrated EGL was renamed, as we mentioned at the beginning of this note. It deals with energy in all its aspects.

The EGL work program covers the entire energy sector of the community: wood, peat, coal, hydroelectric, solar, wind and geothermal energy, natural gas, methane gas and hydrocarbons, and the interconnection and coordination of energy use policies.

The first project undertaken by the EGL is the development of a second hydroelectric power plant on the Ruzizi River, known as "Ruzizi II Project." The main purpose of this project, the study of which has been completed, will be to insure reliable electric power supplies between 1985 and 1990. This will make it possible

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for the CEPGL members to prepare for the expansion of their programs for energy-generating equipment. Its implementation will involve the building of a dam and a hydroelectric power plant at the Kitimba site. It will generate about 40 megawatts and will have an annual output of 140 million kilowatt hours of electric power.

The EGL will neither manage nor implement plans but will be in charge of their study. It is, above all, a study bureau whose role, therefore, is conceptual.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GUINEAN-CAMEROONIAN TREATY--From 17 to 21 February, President Ahmed Sekou Toure made an official visit to Cameroon on invitation of President Ahmadou Ahidjo. According to their joint communique: "They decided to conclude a friendship and cooperation treaty and to set up commercial and cultural agreements." [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Mar 81 p 620]

EEC AID FOR OMVS--Thanks to a new very important financial effort on the part of the EEC, over 80 percent of the financing of the OMVS (Organization for the Development of the Senegal River) project may soon have adequate financing. As the result of the visit by Robert N'daw, Mali's minister of industrial development and current president of the OMVS Council of Ministers and Mokhtar Ould Haiba, OMVS high commissioner (see MTM of 16 January 1981, p 133) to Brussels, on 22 January, 30 million ecus were pledged as regional cooperation (in addition to 15 million ecus granted as the fourth FED regional cooperation project for the access route to the Manantali Dam). Other funds, totaling 30 million ecus will be added to the project on the basis of the national programs of the three interested countries: Mali (13.4 million), Senegal (10.3 million) and Mauritania (6.3 million). Eighty percent of the total financing has thus been reached. The figure could become even higher thanks to the additional financing of Saudia Arabia totaling \$50 million (about 38 million ecus). The OMVS, which is making plans for a meeting of lenders in the near future, in order definitively to secure the financing for the different aspects of the project, could thus consider the opening of negotiations with low bidders for the Diama Dam and call for bids for the Manantali Dam. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 367] 5157

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ANGOLA

COOPERATION WITH FRANCE REVIEWED, IMPROVEMENT HOPES EXPRESSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 446

[Text] The situation in southern Africa received prominent mention during Jean Francois-Poncet's visit to Angola last month. On this occasion, France and Angola noted that they shared the same concerns regarding the Namibian problem (cf. MTM, No. 1837, 23 January, p 208). The French parliamentary delegation, which arrived shortly afterward (cf. MTM, No. 1839, 6 February, p 329), also proved to be sensitive to this question, while it was also able to observe the Angolan people's commitment to national construction and to building a society that answers their aspirations.

Even though its heart was in the socialist camp, the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] decided from the start, in 1956, long before becoming the ruling party, to maintain relations with /all/ [in italics] countries. After independence, those relations were easier to establish with the Eastern countries that had helped Angola in its struggle against the colonial power than with most of the Western countries which ostracized the new state to the extent that, in 1976 for example, it was refused subscriptions to western newspapers.

Over the years, relations improved, particularly with France. They are now "bright and sunny," satisfactory to both sides. Angola, in its quest for development, is after the technology that suits it best. It can get it either from the East or the West, except that the infrastructure it inherited from Portugal came from the West and cannot just be discarded.

It was inevitable--political goodwill being evident on both sides--that Angola and France should move toward better relations "in their mutual attachment to respect for the independence and respective political choices of the two states"; the establishment of diplomatic missions in Luanda and Paris and the visits of Jean Francois-Poncet and the French delegation to Angola were concrete manifestations of that positive evolution.

In terms of economic relations, one sees growth in French-Angolan trade, facilitated by the signing of important bank agreements; those purchasing credits are going to enable the Angolans to proceed to major investments in several sectors (oil, agro-industry, mining).

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In 1980, Angola subscribed for Fr 949,226,000 in contracts with France, and all indications are that, in 1981, the trend will become even stronger. In the oil sector, the two oil groups, Total and Elf-Aquitaine, will begin "offshore" prospecting after the installation phase, according to previous agreements, to determine if the Angolan coast holds the reserves of black gold about which there has been so much talk. The other most important contracts have been with Renault-Industrie, Peugeot, Titan, Creusot-Loire, Schaeffer, Bas-Rhone Languedoc, Alsthom-Atlantique, Potain-Poclain, Dumez, SNIAS, Degremont, and Sulzer. To balance the trade, Angola will sell France oil, cement, minerals, and even coffee.

The two countries want to see their relations expand to new domains. The joint statement published following Jean Francois-Poncet's visit emphasized the prospects for cooperation in the sectors of energy, construction, transport, fishing and ancillary activities, the textile industry, etc. A general framework agreement for cultural, scientific, and technical cooperation may be contemplated. It was decided to discuss the subject, and missions will be exchanged to develop such an agreement.

In political terms, Angola thinks that France could, and should, play an important role in solving the problems of southern Africa for many reasons: because France has direct relations with South Africa; because it is a part of the Five contact group (with Great Britain, the FRG, Canada, and the United States), which is committed to helping the South African Government move forward on the Namibian question; because it has interests both in South Africa and in Namibia, and because if it wants to preserve its present interests in Namibia, it must work to insure that future relations with the future independent Namibian state are on a promising path.

Mr de Almeida has worked hard to strengthen Franco-Angolan ties and to communicate what Angola has wanted to say to France. He has let it be known that he will probably soon be leaving his embassy in Paris and returning to Luanda (where a ministerial portfolio will be entrusted to him). We do not doubt that his successor will continue the tradition of resolute courtesy he established during his stay in the French capital.

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BURUNDI

BRIEFS

COTTON CROP -- At a cost of 38.5 million Burundi francs the Burundi Government has just bought out the Ruzizi cotton gin. From now on, it will be in the hands of COJERCO (Committee for Managing the Cotton Reserves Fund). Therefore, the State intends to control all textile activities, following a decree of 1 February 1979, deciding to purchase the Ruzizi gin. COJERCO wants to restart Burundi's cotton production by expanding planted areas in order to obtain greater profit. In 1979-80 6,400 hectares of cotton were planted and the yield was 6,600 tons/hectare. This fiscal year was balanced with a deficit of 4 million Burundi francs for COJERCO. From now on this organization intends to market part of the cotton crop in the premises, thanks to the needs of COTEBUL (Textile Works of Bujumbura). The first delivery to this gin was 500 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 321] 9626

CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH CUBA -- The Republic of Burundi and the Republic of Cuba have signed an agreement for cultural exchange for the 1981-82 period, on 27 January in Bujumbura. According to this document, the two countries will study the possibility of cooperation and exchange of theatrical groups between the Cubartist agency and the Burundi Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 322] 9626

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA -- Pierre-Desire Engo, Cameroon's Vice-Minister for Economy and Planning, and Kim Pak-son, Vice-Minister for Foreign Marketing for People's Democratic Republic of Korea, signed a commercial agreement on 16 January in Yaounde supporting a merchandise exchange, catalogued on two lists, A and B. The two parties agree that this merchandise will be paid in negotiable currency, that certain merchandise categories will be exempt from customs and that their transit will be facilitated. Fairs and exhibits will be organized and a mixed commission will be set up. This commission will meet alternately in Yaounde and Pyongyang. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 256] 9626

SWISS COOPERATION -- Switzerland will grant Cameroon a credit mix of 20 million Swiss francs (2.5 billion CFA francs) and a donation of 2 million Swiss francs for development projects. According to the agreement signed 21 January in Bern by Cameroon's Vice-Minister of Economy, Pierre-Desire Engo, half this credit will be financed by the Helvetic Confederation for a term of 20 years, without interest. The remainder will be granted by a consortium of Swiss banks at conditions close to those of the market. The donation will finance projects approved by Swiss experts. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 256] 9626

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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

JAPANESE AID--Japan has put at the disposal of the Comoro Islands an amount equivalent to 7 million French francs or 350 million Comoro francs for the purchasing of rescue boats. The agreement was initialed on 6 February, in Moroni, by Hiko Furusawa, Japanese ambassador to the Comoro Islands, with embassy in Antananarivo, and Ali Mroudjae, Comoro's minister of foreign affairs and cooperation. Both Mroudjae and Furusawa emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 387] 5157

AIR AGREEMENT WITH MAURITIUS--On 6 February Mauritius and the Comoros signed in Port-Louis an agreement on flights between the two countries. The agreement was signed by Dr B. Ghurburrun, minister of health and interim minister of communications and Dr Mtara Maecha, Comoros minister of transportation, tourism, posts and telecommunications. It stipulates that Air Mauritius airplanes will be allowed to land in the Comoros while Air Comoros airplanes will be allowed to land in Mauritius. Currently flights between the two countries are handled by Air Tanzania. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 387] 5157

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ETHIOPIA

ATTACK REPORTEDLY PLANNED TO CRUSH ERITREAN RESISTANCE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Mar 81 p 44

[Text] Strongly armed with new Soviet materiel, 30,000 men will soon launch an attack on the last bastion of the Eritrean liberation movements: Nakfa, 240 kms north of Asmara, defended by some 2,000 guerrilla troops. Conceived by the Soviet military advisors to the Derg (the junta governing Ethiopia since 1974), this attack should reportedly achieve the submission of all Eritrean cities.

This achievement has taken the Derg nearly 5 years. In 1976 the Eritrean liberation movements were in control of all major centers with the exception of Asmara. Two years later, another war would benefit the Ethiopian Government: the Ogaden war opposing it to Somalia, for which it received massive assistance from the Soviets, and especially the Cubans with a 15,000-man expeditionary corps. Somalia experienced a serious defeat and the Cubans stayed on. The Derg could therefore turn toward the northern front in Eritrea. One by one, the strongholds of the secession were recaptured. Only Nakfa remained: it was ruthlessly defended and hundreds of Ethiopian soldiers were killed there in 1979. Two years later, the Derg is reaping its revenge: by razing Nakfa, it will deal a mortal blow to Eritrean secession.

However, this does not signify the end of the Eritrean revolt. Some 30,000 guerrillas could continue to harass the Ethiopian troops. However, one condition should first be met: the Eritrean liberation movements, now embroiled in dissension, should settle their differences and coordinate their struggle. This is today's wager.

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GABON

MIXED COMMISSION WITH FRANCE REACHES PARTIAL AGREEMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 380

[Text] The mixed France-Gabonese commission which convened on 5 and 6 February in Libreville for the first time (MTM 6 February 1981 p 316), reached an agreement on cultural, scientific and technical points.

On the other hand it was not possible to come to terms on economic and financial matters. Another meeting will take place in the next trimester to re-examine the projects which remained in abeyance.

Martin Bongo, minister of foreign affairs, headed the Gabonese delegation, while the French delegation was headed by Robert Galley, minister of cooperation.

On the subject of technical cooperation France announced its decision to increase by 10 percent its annual contribution to the expenses of the French technical personnel in Gabon. This is in the framework of a "Gabonization" policy which would make Gabon responsible for a part of the expenses. The French contribution will rise from Fr 69.5 million to Fr 76.5 million. In addition France has added a lump sum of Fr 2 million destined for the equipment to be used for completing housing for overseas personnel.

In the field of scientific research, France wishes to offer its help in training Gabonese research workers.

According to French sources both delegations came to an agreement to develop the production of raw material (uranium and manganese) and other investment projects in the field of energy, rural development, telecommunications and small and medium-sized businesses.

The deterioration of French commercial balance with Gabon was brought up by the French delegation. According to some important Gabonese, the poor results recorded by France in recent years are due to the "drop in competitiveness in some French products such as the competition of Japanese cars."

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In considering the results of this first meeting of the Franco-Gabonese mixed commission, it should be noted that the absence of an agreement in the economic and financial field is balanced by the signing of a cultural accord which renews scientific cooperation between the two partners, which had considerably decreased in recent years. Also the agreement of 21 January 1978 on the movement of people, which had not been applied up to the present time, could take effect quite rapidly in view of the continuing negotiations between both parties.

It should also be noted that in the economic field France will examine with great interest some Gabonese projects, such as those relating to SOGAFERRO's [Gabonese Ferroalloys Company], need for electric energy (for the production of ferro-manganese near Franceville), mine prospecting, village hydraulics, and the establishment of a new airport in Libreville. Also of note is the fact that FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) will grant financial aid for the exploitation of the Libreville-Moyabi wireless beams. As regards PME (small and medium size businesses), PROPARCO, a branch of CCCE (Central Fund for economic Cooperation) could intervene in Gabon and COFACE (French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade) could study the financing of the equipment for this sector. FAC will probably continue its aid for food and fruit-bearing projects in Franceville, while CCCE will concern itself with hevea culture near Mitzic, a project for which a meeting of the financial backers is expected in Libreville next March.

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GHANA

BRIEFS

FOREIGN AID--According to Dr George Benneh, the Ghanaian minister of finance and economic planning, the new civilian administration of President Limann, has already received in 15 months of rule about 1 billion cedis in foreign aid in the form of loans and grants. He estimated that by September 1983 such assistance could amount to about 10 billion cedis. The minister made this known through his vice-minister Dr E. L. Nyakoteh during the 13th annual general assembly of the Institute of Ghanaian Engineers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Feb 81 p 489] 9735

COOPERATION WITH ITALY STUDIED--In the course of the discussion held in February in Accra between leaders of the Ghanaian Chamber of Commerce and the Italian-African Chamber of Commerce of Milan, the two consular assemblies decided to cooperate more closely to further Italian-Ghanaian exchanges and to encourage interest in Ghana among Italian investors. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Feb 81 p 489] 9735

FLIGHTS TO ROME CURTAILED--Italian aviation authorities decided unilaterally to reduce the number of weekly flights of Ghana Airways from Accra to Rome from two to one because the company has put a DC-10 into service on its European flights. Ghanaian authorities consider this measure an infringement of the accords concluded between the two countries. The latter propose to refer the dispute to international arbitration. It will be recalled that when the Italian company Alitalia decided, in 1976, to replace its DC-8 with a DC-10 on the route, it did not inform Ghana, which did not hold it strictly to account. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Feb 81 p 489] 9735

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

TOURE'S WARNING ON CURRENCY--The Economy: Warning From President Sekou Toure. President Ahmed Sekou Toure severely criticized the "futile hoarding" of Guinean currency, called the syli, by private Guinean businessmen, and threatened to "propose that the hoarded bills be no longer of equal value to those deposited in the bank." In a speech at the closing session of the capital's regional revolutionary council, Sekou Toure asserted that the banks are being more liberal on withdrawals. As a result, he continued, the hoarding constitutes "aggression against the Guinean economy." Sekou Toure said bluntly to businessmen, carriers, and the holders of big fortunes: "If the government must one day issue new bills, I would be among those who would propose that bills outside the banks not have the same value as those bills that, because of confidence in the regime, have been deposited in the bank. We are giving," he added, "a very brief reprieve to bad Guineans. If they do not move quickly, they will be sorry." The Guinean chief of state also stated that private Guinean diamond mining operators--there are already 100,000, he said, only 2 months after the opening of the Kerouane mine--were engaging in fraudulent traffic in stones, and the mine would be closed if such traffic were not stopped. Sekou Toure also deplored the fact that his country, which he said has more tractors than most other African countries as well as very fertile and well-watered land, must get international food assistance in order to "make ends meet." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 426] 9516

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IVORY COAST

LONG-AWAITED CABINET RESHUFFLE EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Feb 81 pp 28-29

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] After the election marathon from July to December that wrought far-reaching changes at top levels of the single party, the PDCI (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, whose leader is the chief of state), the National Assembly and among mayors of the major cities, the new political edifice could be crowned only by a government shakeup.

Enigmatic Phrases

Awaited with hope mingled with concern by some and dreaded by others, President Houphouet-Boigny's decision did not come until 2 February. Even so, it was precipitated, some say, by the accidental death of the minister of state charged with public health and population, Jean-Baptiste Mockey, on the Grand Bassam-Abidjan road on 20 January. A prominent figure on the Ivorian political scene, Mockey, who until October 1980 had cherished the dream of succeeding his eternal rival Philippe Yace as secretary general of the party, left a vacuum in the political arena.

Nevertheless, the ministerial shakeup of 2 February was not as thorough as anticipated. Following the Seventh Congress of the PDCI (29 September to 1 October 1980 in Abidjan), speculation had run its course. Had the chief of state not slipped a few enigmatic phrases and loaded words into his general report on policy and orientation and waved a veritable sword of Damocles over the heads of the ministers? Suddenly, most of them began to lose sleep, convinced that the shakeup would turn out to be a clean sweep.

In the end, nothing of the sort was true. Except for National Defense and Interior, the main ministerial posts did not change hands. Defense falls to a newcomer, Konan Jean Banny. About 50, his hair peppered with grey framing a massive head planted on a bull-like neck, the president of the Order of the Bar of the Ivory Coast had actually occupied the post until his arrest at the time of the famous 1963 "conspiracy." Sentenced to death, freed and granted amnesty, Jean Banny was elected deputy in 1975 and was triumphantly reelected in November 1980 from Yamoussoukro, his native city.

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Since the Seventh Congress, this authoritarian and eloquent man, steeped in classical culture, has become one of the top three leaders of the party. During the legislative election campaign, the entire political world in Abidjan expected to see him run for the National Assembly perch, creating serious difficulties for Henri Konan Bedie. But in the end, Banny good-heartedly abstained on behalf of the former minister of economy, who therefore had no trouble succeeding Philippe Yace. He lost nothing because in so doing, he goes back to Defense, where he succeeds Mbahia Ble Kouadio, holder of the post for 17 years without interruption and somewhat weakened by the serious surgical operation he underwent last year.

Strong Man

The Ministry of Interior goes to Konan Koffi Leon, prefect of Bouake, outwardly a simple, unaffected man. About 40 and of average height, he has a relaxed, friendly air. When we told him, on 12 October 1980, the day of the presidential elections, of the rumors about his future appointment as minister of interior, Koffi Leon was content to smile and comment evasively and mysteriously: "I am fine where I am."

The new minister of interior, who was very successful, it is said, at heading the departments of Aaloa and Bouake, is considered a strong man. The Ivory Coast needed such a man, it is added in top government circles, where no one has forgotten the ease with which on 7 December 1980, on the occasion of festivities marking the 20th anniversary of independence, an unknown person had no difficulty throwing a bomb at the car of President Houphouet-Boigny.

Barons and Young Wolves

Accused of laxity, the minister of interior therefore traded his portfolio for that of minister of state to the president of the republic. Alexis Thierry Lebbe, along with Mathieu Ekra and Auguste Denise, would henceforth form the trio of immovable barons who, as state ministers, would provide the president with the advice and ideas stemming from their experience in office. The faithful companions of Felix Houphouet-Boigny for some 30 years, they do not need to see or hear their master to know what he likes or detests. At the slightest move or look, they can anticipate his daily thoughts.

This is not the case of the young ministers and state secretaries who are making a resounding entry into government. In the furrow opened up by the Seventh Congress, some dozen young wolves will now serve their apprenticeship in the affairs of state, either in the full ministries, as in the case of Amoakon Thiemele, Balla Keita, Kouessi Apete, Eugene Niagne Lasme, Christian Lohourignon Zagote and Duon Sadia, respectively ministers of commerce, scientific research, posts and telecommunications, construction and city planning, water and forest resources and tourism, or in posts of secretary of state where they will have to second known figures. This is the case with two former leaders of the MEECI (Movement of Students and Pupils of the Ivory Coast), Gilles Laubhouet, promoted to the post of secretary of agriculture, and Bernard Ehui, who, beaten in the recent legislative elections, was named to the same office under the minister of planning and industry.

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Curiously enough, ministers who as rumor would have it would be shuffled around, either because they had been in their posts for over 10 years, as in the case of Paul Akoto Yao in National Education, or because they quarreled with personnel in their ministry, as in the case of Amadou Thiam in Information, have remained where they were. This is also true of the technocrats, whose retention constitutes both a guarantee of competence and a proof of the stability of the governing team. This is the case with Laurent Dona Fologo in Youth, Abdoulaye Kone in Economy and Finance, Ange Barry Battesti in Technical Education, Denis Bra Kanon in Agriculture, Lamine Fadiga in the Navy and Simeon Ake in Foreign Affairs.

At a time when the Ivory Coast is engaged in difficult international negotiations aimed at obtaining fairer prices for its agricultural products (coffee and cacao), it was in fact indispensable that those who had followed those issues should remain in place. The same concern undoubtedly dictated the transfer of Maurice Seri Gnoleba from Commerce to Planning and Industry, where that great administrative official will be able to give free rein to his knowledge of figures and graphs.

As for the eight ministers who are leaving the government, they are assured of having somewhere to go. Between the National Assembly (of which three are already members), the Economic Council, the embassies and the chairmanship of a board, they will have too many possibilities to choose from. At any rate, with no exceptions, rare indeed is the comrade that Houphouet abandons without resources and without a life preserver on the banks of the Ebrie Lagoon.

Constitutional Vacuum

And yet, the democratic edifice which the chief of state intends to set up is not complete. After the different elections, the leadership of the mass organizations affiliated with the party still has to be elected. This is the case of the General Union of Ivory Coast Workers (single union), whose secretary general, Ade Mensah, was beaten in Yopougon, a low-income suburb of Abidjan, in the November legislative elections.

Above all, the vice president of the republic, who would replace the chief of state in case of his death or if he were unable to perform the duties of his office, has yet to be named. "There is no hurry," President Houphouet-Boigny told us. But there is, for the remaining constitutional vacuum could well turn the Ivorian democracy into an unfinished work, or at least a building without a cornerstone.

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IVORY COAST

HOUPOUET-BOIGNY SAYS RESPONSIBILITY MUST GO TO YOUNGER GENERATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Feb 81 pp 26-30

[Interview with President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, in Yamoussoukro, by Sennen Andriamirado; date not given]

[Excerpts] Houphouet does not often go to the presidential office. To the local headquarters in Abidjan and even to his Cocody residence, Felix Houphouet-Boigny prefers his "village" of Yamoussoukro, 250 km from the capital, whence he handles affairs of state by telephone. At times, he summons his aides, ministers, high officials or those obscure members of the presidential entourage whose names are scarcely known and who jealously protect the "Old Man's" retreat.

[Question] You have been criticized for preferring to retain the French, even in positions of authority.

[Answer] I have been criticized by the young people, but they did not know that I was working in their interest. I preferred to train the young. Now they are in posts of responsibility because it was not fair, after they were trained, to make them cool their heels in the anterooms of responsibility.

[Question] But they were still excluded from political power.

[Answer] That is precisely the 1980 phase. Students, the competent, these young people have headed all our departments, including our unfortunate companies. But they were unknown to the public. They were not in Parliament.

In 20 years, the Ivory Coast has changed. We have the masses of its generation (laughter). My own is between 60 and 75, the mass of those who fought for independence. The one born 15 years before independence was not represented in Parliament and on the Economic and Social Council. Now then, there must be no break in the chain of generations. It is now that the young people must take over.

[Question] Therefore, the democratization decided upon in 1980 is a turning point in favor of a generation.

[Answer] It is not a turning point; it is a phase. It is not a revolution; it is an evolution. Those born in the 1940's did not know forced labor. They tell us: "We would not have accepted that. We would have fought." But they did not live through it. It is that generation gap that I tried to avoid.

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[Question] At that point, was there any risk of upheavals in the Ivory Coast?

[Answer] You must hold out your hand to young people or else they will shove you aside. That is why I told my comrades: "We must not break the chain of generations that is sacred with us. You must leave to those who come after you much more than you received from your predecessors."

That is what the young people expected of them. The time had therefore come to move from one generation to another, and the time had come to proceed to a free vote by the people. Our generation is leaving democracy to the new generation.

[Question] Otherwise, what would have happened?

[Answer] There would have been an explosion. What happened to De Gaulle in May 1968 impressed me a great deal. At that time, the young people of France who had not known the German occupation knew about De Gaulle only what their parents or elders told them. The ministers were 50 or 60 years old and the members of Parliament the same age. The young people lived on hope; the old in the past. There was a break in the chain of generations. De Gaulle's aides did not do their duty. They should have told him how impatient the young people were.

[Question] Is that impatience of the young people the same throughout Africa? More precisely, are all the African leaders doomed to follow your path, democratization, or else be swept aside?

[Answer] Youth is universal; its impatience also. Today in Africa, the risks of explosion are greater than ever. Poverty is a good breeding ground for such upheavals. And what do we see? Economic crisis, poverty, a future without hope.

[Question] What African event struck you the most in 1980?

[Answer] It was not an event; it was a general situation: the economic crisis and its corollary, poverty. For us Africans, it is a catastrophe. The prices of our products are lower than ever. We live off of our coffee, our cacao. And have you seen the pitiful price they want to pay us for it?

[Question] Yes, those are your European or American friends. What is Giscard doing to help you?

[Answer] What do you want Giscard or Helmut Schmidt to do against the big French or German capitalist firms? It is not the German or French government that buys our products; it is those companies.

[Question] But have you Ivorians not suffered certain failures because you were deceived? In the case of sugar, for example?

[Answer] I was deceived, that is true.

[Question] By whom? By your European partners or your own aides?

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[Answer] My aides trusted their European advisers who did not play the game. Why? The French do not know sugar cane. They know sugar beets. The Cameroonians were more circumspect than we were.

On the advice of the World Bank, they went to Egypt, which was already producing 1 million tons of sugar cane. In 3 months, the Egyptian experts proved that out of the 21 billion CFA francs on the invoice of the European promoters, there was an overbilling of nearly 5 billion. They oversaw the work and the Cameroonians had a plant that cost 16.6 billion with a 50,000-ton capacity. It puts out sugar at 100 CFA francs a kilogram.

We did not have that luck. From 21 billion CFA francs, the evaluation of our proposals climbed to 35 billion and our sugar costs 250 CFA francs a kilogram to produce. On only three sugar complexes, we found an overbilling of 34 billion. It was too late. We could only reduce our projects from ten to six complexes.

[Question] You are very concerned by the economy? Are there not disturbing political subjects in Africa?

[Answer] I am concerned by the widespread poverty I see, and poverty helps destabilization.

[Question] Are you not concerned over the matter of the Sahara?

[Answer] The Sahara is an affair between Morocco and Algeria. When those two countries come to an agreement, there will no longer be any issue of the Sahara.

[Question] Why were you not a member of the Committee of the Wise Men of the OAU on the Sahara?

[Answer] The time will come. At the present time, the Ivory Coast does not want to be both a judge and a party to the dispute. Do you know the position of the Ivory Coast? We are neutral. It is our current minister of foreign affairs (Simeon Ake, then Ivorian ambassador to the United Nations) who headed the UN investigation into the Sahara. But they will call on the Ivory Coast when they are ready for discussions.

[Question] Will "destabilization," as you call it, now served by what you also call "poverty," spread?

[Answer] Destabilization is not anything new. Do you know why Idi Amin pulled off his coup d'etat in 1971? It was not he who did it, but the British. He did not even know what he wanted. Likewise, in Ghana, when the military ousted Nkrumah, they came to see me. I asked them why they staged their coup. They replied: "Things were no longer going well." That is all! I also asked them what they were going to do. They did not know. People abroad knew instead!

[Question] And yet, destabilization does not only come from the outside. In Iran, the Shah fell because of the revolution.

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[Answer] I was the last chief of state received by the Shah of Iran, and I noticed then that there was nothing much for the people. In Iran, the land belongs to the leaders and the leaders were all religious figures, the ayatollahs and the others. The Shah had the courage to launch the green revolution, the redistribution of land.

The imams felt the danger. They put aside their mutual grievances and united. With respect to them, the Shah's aides had not done their duty; they had not warned him. When I went there, they introduced me to a group of "peasants," but that was not what they were. We farmers recognize one another. The Shah's priority was industrialization although in his country, scarcely 25 percent of the people had any schooling.

[Question] There was also another problem: human rights.

[Answer] The Westerners, especially since Jimmy Carter, can make no judgment except on the basis of human rights! I once received representatives from the Human Rights League. I told them: "You have come to the wrong place; go somewhere else. Here in the Ivory Coast, we have gone beyond human rights."

[Question] Is there a universal notion of human rights?

[Answer] The first right of man is the right to life. We respect human life. Corpses have no rights. Because here in the Ivory Coast we do not kill, we are above human rights. We are ahead.

[Question] Is information a human right?

[Answer] Yes (hesitation). Yes. Objective information. Every morning, I read the newspapers and I realize that the same event is interpreted differently depending on the ideology. You can make no sense out of it. Where is the information in that case?

[Question] You have said that Bokassa's model was Napoleon. And what about your own? First of all, what African statesman has impressed you the most?

[Answer] (Without hesitation.) Kwame Nkrumah. He was a great nationalist. We were friends from the time of our very first meeting in Paris in 1947. And we remained so. We were friends when his country gained independence in 1957. His first trip abroad was to the Ivory Coast.

[Question] And you issued your famous challenge to him!

[Answer] (Shocked.) That is not true! They have twisted history. I never made any such challenge! He came to my country as a friend. In Africa, one does not receive a friend and then challenge him (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1043). I told him: "Your country is independent. You must prove that a black country headed by a black can succeed. We will be behind you. We shall urge you on to succeed."

We were friends, I tell you. He loved Africa. It was the Padmores who deceived him, making him engage in subversion in neighboring countries. Otherwise, I loved Nkrumah. Even his party was modeled after ours.

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[Question] But you did not have the same idea of Africa unity?

[Answer] He went much further than I. He wanted Pan-Africanism, an Africa united from Bizerte to the Cape, with a single government, a single assembly. It was a utopia! But if he made errors, he made them in good faith. He was poorly guided. He undertook extravagant expenditures for nothing.

[Question] And what non-African statesman would be your model?

[Answer] George Washington. He was a man who fought for his country's independence. Then he withdrew voluntarily to enjoy, as an observer, the results and successes of his fight. He gave his land to the American Government. He was content with his residence at Mount Vernon.

I wanted to retire also to enjoy, like Washington, the results of my action. Unfortunately, the situation is not good and it would be giving up to leave now.

[Question] At any rate, you are not a man to retire.

[Answer] I believe that I could have been. I could have had an active, not passive, retirement. They would have come to ask my advice and would have kept me up on the events of my country, the world. But I cannot.

[Question] Senghor is leaving (the interview took place before his departure).

[Answer] He did not even speak to me about it. I deplore the fact. He is a friend, even if we have some misunderstandings. That is human, after all. What could happen in Senegal cannot be a matter of indifference to the Ivory Coast. But he is leaving (a sigh and a smile). The heart has its reasons when the head does not.

[Question] And you will leave one day. What have you done to prepare for your succession?

[Answer] Do you think that Lenin had planned that Stalin would succeed him? That Stalin himself thought of Khrushchev? For myself, I trust men. I am rebuilding a team and it is from that team that the person who will take my place will come.

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IVORY COAST

BACKGROUND OF NEW ABIDJAN MAYOR

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Jan 81 p 43

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "The Young Wolf"]

[Text] The battle of Abidjan has not yet taken place. It was to pit the young wolf Emmanuel Dioulo against the old fox of Ivorian politics, Arsene Usher Assouan, for the conquest of the office of mayor of the capital. But on 4 January 1981, the sole candidate, Emmanuel Dioulo, was elected by 55 out of the 60 municipal council members (six representatives from each of the ten communes). Usher preferred to remain in the background.

Once more, as was the case at the time of the election of Henri Konan Bedie to the office of president of the National Assembly (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1044), no final duel pitted the old against the modern candidates. Once again, one of the old hands, Assouan, preferred to yield the way to a newcomer -- as Philippe Yace had done for Bedie -- rather than to start a battle of leaders.

This was undoubtedly because once again, the only conductor of Ivorian political life intervened at the last moment to prevent the battle: Felix Houphouet-Boigny, whose immediate and avowed objective is to have the younger generation relieve the old guard.

Mission Accomplished

At the age of 44, Emmanuel Dioulo, "Manu" to his close friends, divorced and the father of five children, takes over the office of mayor of Greater Abidjan, succeeding Antoine Kanga, an old traveling companion of Houphouet, mayor for 20 years but who did not even run in the municipal elections of 30 November 1980 (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1040). This new first citizen of a metropolis of 1.4 million inhabitants joined with Henri Konan Bedie in leading the onslaught of the young in the political arena.

The "easy contact," "obsessed with his work," Emmanuel Dioulo completed his studies, at the beginning of independence, at the IHEOM (Overseas Institute of Higher Learning), formerly the French National Overseas School (ENFOM), where African administrative officials were trained in Paris.

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In 1962, Emmanuel Dioulo went home to become subprefect of Bouna, in the north. Six years later, assigned to the southwest, he was given the district of San Pedro and in 1969, having leaped over all the steps, he became chairman of the board of the Southwest Region Development Authority (ARSO). Under the direct authority of President Houphouet-Boigny, he wrought miracles (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1043), to such an extent that ARSO would be the only company dissolved at the end of 1980 because its mission had been "concluded and definitely accomplished."

"Return of the Ebrie"

But Dioulo was haunted by his return to Abidjan. An Ebrie, the ethnic group of the founders of what would become the capital, he is the son of Antonin Dioulo who, at the end of the 1940's, led, reigning over Abidjan, the Progressive Party, then a rival of the RDA (African Democratic Rally) of Houphouet-Boigny until it merged with it. "Manu" had accumulated chairmanships of companies, banks, and so on.

But it was not enough for him to be a businessman. In 1978, he decided to embody the "return of the Ebrie" at the head of Abidjan. A "legitimate but too ambitious" aim, his adversaries would say, watching the young wolf become, in July 1980, the secretary general of the subsection of the party in Plateau (business district in Abidjan), then deputy on 9 November. Henceforth, he will also be Mr Mayor.

The secret of this dizzying rise? According to Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Emmanuel Dioulo was shrewd enough to "build an effective entourage." It remains to be seen whether the effectiveness of the businessman will serve the politician, for the entourage will no longer be the same. The team of experts could be succeeded by a mass of courtisans, the parasites who worshipped (and sometimes deceived) Manu during his election campaign.

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MALAWI

FINANCIAL AID FOR ETHANOL PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 439

[Report: "SFI Assistance in Ethanol Production"]

[Text] The SFI (International Financial Company), a branch of the World Bank, will lend financial assistance to a \$8.7 million project on the production of ethanol fuel from molasses. This will meet up to 10 percent of Malawi's fuel requirements. The project will be implemented by a new company, the Ethanol Company, Ltd., which will use the byproducts of molasses produced by the Dwangwa Sugar Corporation Ltd., in the production of some 4.9 million liters of ethanol (alcohol anhydride) which will be mixed with gasoline.

The promoter of the Ethanol Company is the Oil Company of Malawi (1978) Ltd. (Oilcom), the main distributor of petroleum products in the country. Jager and Associates, a research company with experience in ethanol installations, will be its technical partner. Oilcom will contribute a capital of \$844,000; Jager's contribution will total \$281,000. The other stockholders include the Investment and Development Bank of Malawi Ltd. (Indebank), with \$638,000; Dwanga Sugar, \$263,000; SFI, \$263,000; and the German Development Company (DEG), \$525,000. Indebank will also grant a loan of \$1,862,000; the SFI will lend \$1.7 million, while the DEG will lend \$500,000. Suppliers' credit totaling \$1.9 million will cover the financing plan.

Malawi does not produce petroleum domestically and has been severely affected by petroleum price increases. Furthermore, like all countries with no access to the sea, it suffers from irregular supplies. The produced ethanol will ease this dependence on imported fuel and will save the country about \$1.7 million per year in foreign exchange. The facilities will be built in the vicinity of the Dwanga Sugar Refinery, on the western bank of Lake Malawi. In addition to the molasses, the plant will use the excess steam and electricity produced by the sugar refinery.

The startup is scheduled for the end of 1981. By 1984 19,500 tons of molasses should be processed annually. This is the second SFI project in the production of substitute energy based on biomass. Previously, the SFI contributed to the development of a Brazilian plan for the production of alcohol from manioc roots.

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MALAWI

BRIEFS

INTERNATIONAL AID LISTED -- During the last few months, Malawi has benefited from the following aid: Multilateral Aid-CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation) has granted a loan of 3 million Malawi kwachas to implement a coffee development project. Bilateral Aid--Great Britain has granted Malawi an aid of 11,700,000 kwachas as a donation to finance the acquisition of various goods and services of British origin. As for Canada, an ACIDI (Canadian International Development Agency) mission has come to Malawi to study new possibilities of cooperation between the two countries. Among other projects mentioned were the extension of the Lilongwe-Mdrinji Railroad line up to Chipata; the construction of a new dairy in Lilongwe; and the furnishing of 500 head of cattle, 250 of which will be delivered starting in 1981. The Netherlands offered Malawi medical equipment worth 3,100,000 kwachas. India, through IDBI (Industrial Development Bank of India) has proposed to the Malawi government a line of consumer credit in the amount of 5,000,000 kwachas. This sun will be used to finance various development projects. Japan has granted a loan of 1,500,000 kwachas to the Malawi government to finance the construction of Lilongwe's International Airport, predicted for the end of 1981. This extension completes the loan of 18,000,000 kwachas initially granted by Japan to build the airport which was converted to a donation by the end of 1971. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 321] 9626

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MALI

ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION OVER 5 YEARS SAID TO PREVENT CRISIS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Feb 81 p 485

[Article: passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Mali has just taken the step before which it has hesitated for more than 10 years: it is liberalizing its economy. The grain trade is henceforth open to private businessmen. Following the congress of the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM), the sole party, held from 10-12 February, 20 of the 30 existing state companies are going to disappear, says AFP [Agence France Presse]. We recall also that Gen Moussa Traore, president of the republic, stated on 31 January that his country wanted to adhere once again to the West African Monetary Union (UMOA).

The most important of these decisions is the liberalization of trade. Up to now, state companies, notably the /Malian Agricultural Products Office (OPAM),/ have handled trade in local products. The poor functioning of these companies and the low prices which they paid for commodities led products to move to neighboring countries and led especially to a major internal black market charging prices often double the official prices.

By liberalizing, the Malian state will, by contrast, have to deal with substantial businessmen, who are taxable. Prices should stabilize by themselves in accordance with the law of supply and demand at a level in between the present official prices and the parallel price. The black market should disappear, thereby enhancing wages to some extent. In a word, Mali is thus heading toward a true wage-price policy. However, OPAM is not going to disappear. It will limit its activities to supplying the armed forces, hospitals, and the administrative apparatus. The /Malian Import Export Company (SOMIEX)/ will confine itself to the activities described in its name, leaving internal commerce to the private sector. State companies that are either profitable or that provide a public service, such as /Air Mali,/ will be retained, and French assistance has been obtained to improve their profitability (see the conclusions of the joint French-Malian cooperation commission, in MTM on 13 February, p 369).

These measures should facilitate Mali's return to the fold of the UMOA. Because of Mali's poor economic situation, the monetary union, composed of Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Benin, and Togo, refused to readmit Mali's return in 1968 to the Franc zone, which it had left in 1962.

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According to financial sources, Mali's return to the UMOA must be in stages to make possible a 100 percent revaluation of the Malian franc (1 MF = 0.01 Fr) and above all a deficit reduction. According to official figures, deficits are estimated in 1980 at 6.8 billion Malian francs on balance of payments; 52.8 billion on balance of trade (FOB); and 107.1 billion on gross external reserves. The external debt was 185 billion in 1979, and more than 90 percent of the 1981 budget will be dedicated to operating expenses.

The changes that Mali decides on will not be implemented without social problems. This is why the changes will be stretched out over the 5 years of the 1981-1985 development plan. Thus, the state companies slated for elimination will get rid of their personnel through retirement or transfer to the private or the mixed enterprises which, it is anticipated, will replace them. Resistance could also come from quarters that profit from the black market and from elements that are politically nostalgic for a statist economy. The Malian regime seems to be aware of this, but without the present measures, it would be swept into economic crisis.

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MALI

BRIEFS

DEPUTIES' FRUGALITY--Mali's deputies decided on 13 February to give up their compensation. The deputies thereby show their solidarity with the members of the central executive bureau of the Democratic Union of Malian People (UDPM) who also decided to renounce their compensation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEANS in French 20 Feb 81 p 426] 9516

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NIGERIA

## BRIEFS

SHELL NIGERIA DENIAL -- Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria has denied information from foreign sources according to which Shell would have delivered Nigerian crude to South Africa. In an official statement published 21 January in Lagos, the company director, Mr Holmes, declared that "not a single drop of Shell's Nigerian oil has reached South Africa, directly or indirectly". Let us not forget that it was following accusations of oil delivery to South Africa that British Petroleum, operating in Nigeria, was nationalized in 1979 by the military government of Gal Obasanjo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 254] 9626

OIL PRODUCTION INCREASE -- Nigerian oil production has again exceeded 2 million barrels/day last November with exactly 2,061,896 barrels. The production increase was already felt in October (1,875,200 barrels) compared to September, which reached the lowest level for 1980 (MTM 16 Jan 81 p 140). The figure for last November was 88,620 barrels/day less when compared to November 1979, which is quite normal considering the current Nigerian oil policy, even if September's drop is not. On the other hand, in regards to refining, production increased considerably last November, compared to November 1979 and this due to the new Kaduna refinery (October, 1980). This production has in fact, gone from 78,074 barrels/day to 187,817 barrels/day. It could have exceeded even that if the three refineries had been in operation, if not at full capacity (together: 360,000 barrels/day) at least satisfactorily. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 254] 9626

AGREEMENT WITH EAST GERMANY -- Last month in Lagos, East German and Nigerian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Oskar Fisher and Prof Ishaya Audu have signed a new long-term commercial agreement between the two countries. According to this agreement's terms the GDR will furnish electrical, construction, transportation, printing equipment, etc., in exchange for cocoa, agricultural products, cattle feed, minerals, oil, etc. Prof Audu has estimated that this new agreement will open a new era in bilateral relations. He has made public that another agreement has also been concluded, concerning air traffic. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 314] 9626

DAM CONSTRUCTION -- The Cormix Division of the Joseph Crosfield and Sons, Ltd. company from Warrington, has received a large order for its plasticizing product, known by the name of "Cormix P 4" for the Riber Oyan dam project. This product,

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suitable for tropical countries, is currently used in the Middle East. It is mixed with cement to delay very fast drying and assures a greater life span and increased strength. Dam construction works estimated at 35 million pounds were launched in June 1979 and are only half finished, whereas they should normally have been finished by the middle of this year. Although a dirt dam, it needs large amounts of cement, ranging up to 90,000 cubic meters. That's why the "Cormix P 4" product has been ordered. About 50 tons have already been delivered since January. It should be mentioned that the project, located in Ikega, about 5 km from Lagos has been contracted out by the Ogun Oshun River Basin Development Authority to the George Wimpey and Company Ltd. (Nigeria). The consulting engineers are Tahal Consultants Ltd. (Nigeria) from Ibadan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 314] 9626

COOPERATION WITH THAILAND--Nigerian Minister of Agriculture Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau talked with the ambassador to Lagos from Thailand, Suthep Sarilak, on 12 February about possible cooperation in the field of rice growing. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Mar 81 p 619]

PETROLEUM PROSPECTING--According to the NEW NIGERIAN, citing an official of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNRC), the Nigerian national company is continuing its petroleum prospecting and will probably do some drilling in the Lake Chad area soon. It should be recalled that the BUSINESS TIMES of 4 November stressed that the prospecting of that company, which intended to go into production, was so far carried out exclusively by foreign companies which are its majority stockholders. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Mar 81 p 618]

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SOMALIA

BRIEFS

PRC MIG DELIVERIES--China has reportedly delivered to Somalia part of the 20 MiG-19 that it had agreed to provide. On the other hand, the U.S. has promised this country 42 million dollars for the purchase of defensive weapons. However, Mogadishu reportedly needs offensive arms to initiate once again the war against Ethiopia.  
[Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Mar 81 p 53]

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TOGO

EXTENSION GRANTED ON FOREIGN DEBT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Feb 81 p 488

[Article: passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] On 20 February Tete Tevi Benissan, the Togolese minister for finance and the economy, led a delegation from his country to Paris to meet with Togo's creditors in hopes of rescheduling the country's external debt.

The creditor country participants to the negotiations were the FRG, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland. Also participating in the meeting were observers from Canada, the IMF, the /International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),/ the secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (CNUCED), the European Economic Community (CEE), the OCDE [OECD], and the /Central Bank of the West African States [BCEAO]./

"The representatives of the participating countries, cognizant of the recovery efforts undertaken by the government of Togo, note with satisfaction the government's economic and financial plan, which has the support of the /International Monetary Fund (FMI),/ and deem it opportune to make a positive contribution to redressing Togo's external payments," it was emphasized at the French ministry of the economy.

Thus the representatives of the participating countries agreed to reschedule those payments of the Togolese debt which are due from 1 January 1981 to 31 December 1982. The Togolese Government, will repay them over a period of 9 years, including a grace period of 4 years.

According to the BCEAO's most recent published statistics, at the end of 1978 Togo's external debt--debts of the state and debts guaranteed by the state, including the debt of the /Cement Company of West Africa (CIMA0)/--came to CFAF 66,645.5, with 40,721.5 million not yet levied at that time, including CFAF 15,808.8 million to international institutions; 14,126.9 million to foreign governments' 26,715 million to banks and other financial establishments; and 9,994.8 million from credit purveyors.

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TOGO

## BRIEFS

PRODUCTION, EXPORT STATISTICS--The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) devoted one of its recent economic statistics bulletins to Togo. The 1979-1980 agricultural season produced 14,788 tons of cacao (up 2,186 tons from the previous season); 10,841 tons of coffee (up 4,612 tons); 15,550 tons of cottonseed (up 2,876 tons); 5,018 tons of karite nuts (up 3,801 tons); and 11,692 tons of palmetto (up 5,934 tons). At the beginning of the season, the price paid to the producer was raised (CFAF per kg) from 200 to 220 for cacao, from 180 to 200 for coffee, and from 31 to 41 for karite. The value of the harvest was CFAF 3.3 billion in cacao (up 0.7 billion), 2 billion in coffee (up 1 billion), 0.9 billion in cotton (up 0.2 billion), 0.2 billion in Karite, and 0.6 billion in palmetto. Phosphate exports from the Togolese Phosphates Office amounted to 3 million tons with a value of CFAF 2.3 billion at an average sale price of CFAF 7,643 per ton. From 1962, when exploitation began, to the end of 1979, exports have produced a total 29.3 million tons CFAF 177.6 billion in income, at an average selling price of CFAF 6,059 per ton. The budget for the 1980 fiscal year (January-December) was fixed at CFAF 67.2 billion in revenue and expenditures (up 2.4 billion over the previous one); it includes 8.1 billion in revenues from the Togolese Phosphates Office and the Togolese Agricultural Products Office, and, in terms of outlays, 15 billion in debt service and 7.4 billion in equipment purchases (down 5.2 billion). The International Monetary Fund announced on 20 February that it is granting Togo a stand-by credit of as much as 47.5 million in Special Drawing Rights (DTS), or \$57.9 million. This 2-year credit is intended to finance the Togolese economic plan for 1981-1982 aimed at reducing deficits in the balance of payments budget. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Feb 81 p 488] 9735

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UGANDA

## INDUSTRIAL CROPS RENEWAL STUDIED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 261

[Article: "Towards a Renewal of Industrial Crops and Industries in General"]

[Text] The Ugandan Government has decided to renew agricultural industrial crops neglected during Idi Amin Dada's regime and is currently studying the findings of a report made by a British company on the subject. The economy has been in such chaos that the task will be difficult and will require a lot of time and effort (MTM 12 Oct 79 p 2775). From 1971, the date of Idi Amin's taking power, until 1979, the date of his overthrow, all industrial crops, especially coffee and cotton, which assured the main sources of cash for the country, have suffered a sharp decline (MTM 20-27 Jul 79, pp 2055 and 2115). Discouraged by administrative neglect, unprofitable yields, lack of means of transportation and fuel, many farmers during this period reverted to produce farming and, when they didn't they generally preferred to smuggle their industrial crops to neighboring countries or they found buyers who offered them a better price. Therefore, it is estimated that one-third of the coffee crop left Uganda illegally. On the other hand, the government will be engaged in renewing all other industrial sectors as all administrations have done after Idi Amin's fall. Appeals to foreign investors should--if the regime stabilizes--increase business proposals in future months. The substantial Canadian contract to exploit cobalt has already been cited as an example (MTM 2 Jan 81 p 37). Other technicians have already been employed in restoring the sugar industry. Dr Obote's government, in any case, is repeating reconciliation gestures internally as well as abroad. The recent Kampala Summit has shown this at least to neighboring countries and the choice of an Ugandan of Asian origin for diplomatic representation in London marks Uganda's evident interest in renewing better relations with the old colonial power (MTM 23 Jan 81 p 202). UP to now the European Community has been very generous with assistance of \$108 million mainly for agriculture. The World Bank brought assistance in the form of food and emergency aid, totaling \$30.5 million within the frame of its World Food Program. But, even with this support, it is estimated that 3 to 5 years will be needed in order for Uganda to reach its 1970 level in raw material exports. Taking into account current directions, about \$1 billion will enter State's coffers each year.

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UGANDA

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC MEASURES -- After his election as Chief of State last 11 December Dr Milton Obote seems to have allowed Uganda to recapture its calm atmosphere and the start of economic recovery is beginning to be felt. After lifting curfews in Kampala on 16 January (MTM 23 Jan p 202) the number of soldiers walking the streets has been reduced in the capital, as well as in other large cities. Many control barricades have been removed. Regarding the economy, officials have decided to decrease food prices in Kampala, by one-half, to fight against a flourishing black market, the "magendo". A special force has been formed in the police department to carry out this fight successfully. On 22 January an official source said that more than 1,700 people had been arrested and 1,000 of them were released 1 hour later. The objective of this special force, commanded by lieutenant colonel Omaria has, is to put an end to the smuggling and black market operations between now and the end of March. This measure has caused discontent among the merchants and officials would do well to not aggravate this situation. On the other hand, the East African Summit held in the capital of Uganda and the resumption of railroad service between Uganda and Kenya are considered immediate positive results over the past few weeks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 261] 9626

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION--In the fourth quarter of 1980 petroleum production in the maritime zone in Zaire reached 1,853,545 barrels, or a daily average of 20,147 barrels as against 13,149 barrels in the third quarter of 1980. The total output for 1980 has been assessed at 6.5 million barrels or an average of 17,808 barrels daily as against, respectively, 7.6 million barrels annually and 20,860 barrels daily in 1979. The output appears to be continuing its increase in 1981. At the beginning of January it averaging 21,159 barrels daily, 400 barrels of which from the Mwambe structure. The anticipated normal output for 1981 is assessed at some 21,800 barrels daily or 1,090,000 tons for the entire year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 436] 5157

BRAZIL PROJECTS--The projects for a variety of Brazilian undertakings in Zaire have been considered as a result of contacts between business circles of Brazil and Zaire established at the fourth Brazil Export 80 Fair in Sao Paulo. They involve the opening in Kinshasa of a branch of the Bank of the State of Sao Paulo, investments in manioc or sugar cane plantations (specifically with a view to the production of fuel alcohol), the construction of hotels and a hospital, the processing of tropical fruits, imports of automobiles and canned beef products, and various commercial representations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 436] 5157

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