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26 February 1981

... FBIS 40TH YEAR 1941-81 ...

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 3/81)

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

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CONTENTS

INTELLECTUAL KROLL ELABORATES ON MOTIVATIONS OF CURRENT POLISH 'REVOLUTION'

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French No 12 Winter 1980-81 pp 537-544

[Article by Marcin Krol: "Poland: A Different Revolution"; French translation from the Polish by Ewa Berard]

[Text] Given the events in Poland, we offer our readers an analysis by a young Polish intellectual: Marcin Krol. Born in 1943, he is a historian. His graduate thesis was on the political views of the Jacobins. He has published a book (with W. Karpinsky): "Political Profiles of the Polish 19th Century" (Warsaw, 1977). A lecturer on research at the Polish Academy of Sciences until 1978, he is now not regularly employed. He belongs to the category of those whom certain Westerners call "dissidents" but whom it would be more appropriate to call simply free men. It is an immense consolation to know they are so numerous and so lucid in Poland today.

COMMENTAIRE

The events of the past three months have taken us all by surprise--except, of course, those for whom each day that dawns is but an opportunity to predict "extraordinary happenings," enabling them to clarion facile a posteriori "I told you so's." Why were we thus surprised? Why could we not have foreseen them? And why have we continued to be mistaken at each step of the last 3 months? Why have we been unable to grasp what was actually happening? For, no one among the intellectuals[1] believed for one single moment that independent unions could ever be formed. Wherefrom, then, did this new freedom arise--a relative freedom, of course, but a freedom of action nonetheless? What obstacles did it have to confront? How can we benefit from it today, or rather, how can we learn to make use of it?

1. Except possibly Jacek Kuron, whose ideas are not necessarily shared by all the comrades of the Workers Defense Committee (KOR). A discussion of this opposite viewpoint, however, is beyond the scope of this essay; it warrants a separate article.

An Unforeseeable Revolution

It all stumbled into being. Today, of course, we are in a position to recognize several of its determining factors: the [Catholic] Church and the pope's visit, the opposition groups, which had been active over the past 4 years, the serious economic situation, the price rises--the price rises that were actually the immediate cause of the strikes. Had there not been this measure, it is possible that the strikes and the political and social upsets that followed it might never have taken place. Had there not been the lies and the shabby tactics of the government representatives who were sent to the coastal region during the early days of the strikes, the strikers and their comrades would probably have settled for the wage increases and some minor pinpoint concessions by the authorities, such as, for example, authorization to erect a monument to the memory of the victims of 1970. The events of August would therefore not have been unavoidable; and, what is more, they were not even consistent with the logic of social development. The sociologists who, totally taken aback, recognize today that their surveys had never revealed the existence of such a potential for revolt among the workers should not feel too guilty. Their findings were "correct"; it is the events that were not.

History knows of no revolt born of weariness and mistrust alone. Weariness and mistrust, even occasional anxiety and an awareness of the adversary's weakness, cannot in themselves explain a revolutionary explosion, not even as restrained and conscientiously controlled a one as in Poland's case. In no way can these be but secondary causes, and the authorities could easily have avoided such an explosion if they had only been capable of a more rapid and more effective reaction.

During the latter half of the 1960's, a system of government was formed, based on corruption. Such a system may be condemned from the juridical or moral standpoints; the fact remains nonetheless that political systems based on corruption have not been rare historically. They have endured for decades at a time and have operated no less effectively than the others. Gierek's regime was relatively benevolent and let people live (the people, that is, who gave and those who took). A system based on corruption is, by definition, a lax one. And corruption and an aberrant propaganda have bestowed upon the system--and the party--the indispensable aura of an isolated realm unto itself. Within that universe, the government and those who carry out its orders have felt secure, have felt warm and snug, and the only thing that concerned them was to remain there. They thus preferred to ignore the alarm signals that reached them from outside their world, from a reality that refused to disappear. They made believe they perceived neither the grave economic situation nor the emergence of independent influences. To allow these phenomena to enter their field of vision would be to place themselves in the position of having to react, to take decisions; and this, they felt, not without reason, involved major risks.

Their fears turned out to have been well founded, for, in the end, it was a decision, a decree, that finally triggered the crisis. Actually, there had been people within the governing elite itself who had, for clearly different reasons, criticized the system of corruption. In early 1980, some extremely mild reforms were outlined. But the framework of the system remained unchanged and its feeble effort could have done none other than set off the debacle.

It is useless to seek the causes of the crisis either in the pressures the workers and our society as a whole had for some time been bringing to bear on the government, or in the measures decreed by the latter, no matter how unpopular and harsh they may have been. The causes of the crisis were many; taken separately, however, none of them was determinant, and, taken as a whole, they could have led to another solution. In any case, as regards the period that preceded the crisis, it is more exact to speak of the weakness of the government than of the forcefulness of society.

A Moral Revolution...

The causes of the crisis must therefore be sought in the psychological factor. The strikes were, for the workers, less a protest against a weak, discredited and inert government than the explosion of their spontaneous, genuine, sincere feelings, the opportunity they rose to the occasion to seize, to feel, even were it to be only for the space of a few days, like men: united, capable of exercising their will and of acting accordingly. Basically, the workers struck for their inner selves, to prove to themselves that it was possible to tear themselves away from the cogwheels of an absurd and corrupt system. There was no social "revolution," and much less a political "revolution"; there was a moral "revolution," an existential one. Its object was to prove that we still exist, that we have not yet lost our essential human qualities, and that we are still capable of friendship, of genuineness, of kindness.

...Misunderstood By the Intellectuals

Is it surprising then that these unprecedented strikes were not understood by the intellectuals--at least, at their inception? We, the intellectuals, plunged into a search for their economic causes. Then, when it became clear that the wages issue was not sufficient to explain the behavior of the coastal region workers, we evoked with relish their political and civic motivations. The fact is, however, that it would have sufficed to read the famous list of the 21 points, where the most disparate demands paralleled each other, to understand that the workers were setting as much, if not even greater, store on the act of demanding as on their concrete demands. Thereafter, for the strikers, confronted by the government's representatives, winning--that is, obtaining the signing of the agreement and its implementation--became a matter of honor. This, however, in no way derogates the premise that the origin of all their demands, including the most important one--the creation of independent unions--was less social than existential in nature. The workers were fed up with being "represented" by the official unions. It was to these, above all, that the workers wanted to prove the fact of their existence and that the distorted existence handed down to them by the official system was not the only possible one.

The intellectuals, for by far the most part, experienced no similar need. I want in no way here to idealize the workers, attributing to them a special need for identity, nor to put down the intellectuals. The latter, by reason of their profession itself, have simply adjusted better to the system in place. This

adjustment, which was inevitable, made them forget the existence of absolute values; or, more exactly, they lost the intellectual link binding them to those values--for, in Poland, one can always count on the survival of moral reactions, if only thanks to the national tradition. It was thus neither absolute values nor social values that governed the behavior of the intellectuals, but rather situational values. Everything had become ambiguous and relative. Concepts no longer had any meaning of their own; a book, an article, a comment had no value other than the impact they might have on the current situation. Thus, one and the same article could produce many different reactions, while its social value and, with all the more reason, its absolute value were passed over in silence and, at best, treated as secondary. The example of the Experience and Future (DIP) group[2] is highly characteristic in this regard. This group was held in differing esteems--from good to bad--depending on its situational value, this in turn being dependent upon the judgements made of its efforts to create intermediate links between the two adversaries: the government and the intelligentsia. It is also to be supposed that for the group itself it was situational value that counted above all others.

The initial approach to the strikes by the intellectuals was based precisely on situational values. The appeal for solidarity set in motion among the intellectuals collected 234 signatures. It was an eminent and unitary display by the intelligentsia. A success! Yet, we intellectuals continued to doubt that the workers could succeed in obtaining independent unions. The arguments we advanced in this regard were many. Political arguments: The government could not possibly agree to this or that demand. Theoretical arguments: The system of parallel unions could never work in Poland. Practical arguments: The creation of new unions would run into innumerable difficulties. The fact was simply overlooked that the workers' motivations stemmed from another dominant: the existential one. Our arguments, therefore, assuming they were even heard, could not have convinced them.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki,[3] in a distinction that has gained celebrity, postulated two types of realism: the realism of the coastal region workers and that of the Warsaw intelligentsia. How is this distinction to be interpreted?

The realism of the workers was nurtured by despair; that of the intelligentsia, by fear. The realism of the workers was nurtured by pride; that of the intelligentsia, by the hope of a compromise. I am not advancing a value judgement. These two different attitudes had different motivations: existential motivations in the case of the workers; circumstantial ones in that of the intelligentsia. The two groups moreover had different interests at stake: The intelligentsia had much to lose if the Gierek regime fell; the workers, for their part, nothing. The

2. (Editor's note): A group devoted to critical comment, which brought together Catholic intellectuals and former Party cadres.

3. (Editor's note): Editor-in-chief of the Catholic magazine WIEZ (The Link), and member of a group of experts who worked together with the Gdansk Inter-factory Strike Committee (MKS) in August.

intelligentsia devoted its time to speculating on just how far the government coul go in making concessions; the workers devoted theirs to formulating their demands.

What explanation can there be for this force and genuineness of feeling among the workers? For this sudden existential thrust among the workers and its virtually total absence among the intellectuals? The reasons are many; I will cite only two. The first is negative: Most Polish intellectuals had little by little become reconciled to their existence in the universe of circumstantial values. To preserve their identity in that universe of compromise, these intellectuals plunged feverishly into research on the engulfment of art and creative thought by ideology and politics. The interest they centered on Stalinism, fascism, Orwell, Milosz and, generally speaking, on all demystifying writings was a seeking for immunization against an enmeshing mechanism they were coming to know more and more. The thinking that guided their researches was negatively oriented: It pointed to what had to be done to avoid the trap, to avoid becoming enmeshed or enmeshing the others in it. The concrete cases of enmeshment serving as examples clearly offered little or nothing of artistic or intellectual worth. We learned, therefore, thanks to these researches, to recognize the bad and the dangerous and to guard ourselves against them; but we scarcely learned to recognize the good and the beautiful and showed little interest in the processes leading to them. The result of this was that what we were learning from our demystification quests was more often than not alienating us from the world of social problems and plunging us into Hermetism, into pure thought, into aestheticism, into art for the sake of art. This is not to say that what we learned were worthless or detrimental to creative thought or to art. On the contrary. But I do believe that such "splendid isolation" could but atrophy our need for social involvement. Each intellectual, taken separately, found himself or herself enriched, but all together, as a social force, they were weakened by it.

The Role of the Church and of Religion

The second reason lies in the roles fulfilled by the Church and by religion in the Poland of today. A clear distinction must be drawn between the role of the Church, with its institutions and its tradition, and that of religion. The Church in Poland--need it be recalled?--represents a force. An organizing force, but also and above all, a spiritual force. This force of the Church rests on the patriotic-religious syndrome, a syndrome we can all recognize whether it manifests itself in our societal and political life or in its symbolic form. The Church is the only true ally of all those who, no matter how slightly, reject power politics. Polish intellectuals have very well understood this function, above all during the 1970's, and have used it to full advantage, more often than not with the tacit or open consent of the Church itself.

On the other hand, the social function of religion, of the practice of religion, and of the emotions of the world of the sacred is to constitute the only system that can be used as an infallible reference in a universe of generalized mistrust. Religion is the sole source of genuine emotion and reflective thought. It is

clear, therefore, that the roles of the Church and of religion are widely different. To invoke the impact of the pope's visit as a factor that bore decisively on the air of calm and dignity that characterized the coastal region strikes is to adduce the role of religion and not that of the Church. Even though the authority of the Polish Church was strengthened by the election of the pope and by his visit, these had no direct effect upon the strikes. And although the faith was fortified by them, they also had no direct effect on events. On the other hand, what did play a capital role was the consolidation of religion as a system of reference and as a fountainhead of authentic emotion and reflection (and not exclusively religious but also patriotic ones, for example). Somewhat schematically speaking, we might say that what counted for the workers was religion as a system of reference, whereas what counted for the intellectuals was the Church as a force. We might add that this perception of the distinct roles of the Church and religion has been growing increasingly sharper recently, in proportion as certain decisions by the Church's hierarchy have been exhausting the confidence that had been placed in the authentic and "noncircumstantial" character of its leadership.

To remain within the terms of reference we have adopted, we will call the realism of the workers an existential realism, and that of the intellectuals a circumstantial one. This is not to say (above all, taking into account the threat of Soviet intervention that is ever present in the minds of all Poles) that the realism of the workers is devoid of moderation and level-headedness. Moderation and level-headedness have, since August, become intrinsic characteristics of the Poles. This is an unforeseen evolution, although, already during the pope's visit, the Poles had shown evidence of these characteristics. How was such an evolution possible in a society that had not really had an opportunity to radicalize its political experience and develop its own political culture?

Polish Maturity

The level-headedness or, as it is obligingly termed, the maturity of the Polish society never ceases to astonish the entire world, beginning with the Poles themselves. Everything comes about as if the Poles had decided to abandon their romantic image and their traditional role as idealists given to light-horse-cavalry charges against tanks, to play another role in which they are seen as merchants in bourgeois dress calculating down to the last penny the largess of their gestures. The Poles have indeed switched roles.[4] Coming as it does on the heels of the romantic pathos, the comedy of middle class manners obviously borders on the profoundly boresome. Thus it is that, contrary to all expectations, student meetings for the creation of new university associations are down-to-earth and moderate, hence boring. Students and intellectuals, as well as workers and all the new labor union leaders, are taking stock of reality. They are fully aware of what they can do and, above all, of what they cannot do. They all respect very scrupulously the point of agreement at which the steadfast character of our system of our alliances is confirmed.

4. (Editor's note): The French term [emploi] was used in the original [Polish] text.

The farther removed one is from the decision centers and from the major strike centers, the more this scrupulous respect takes on magical forms. This accounts in particular for the evocation of "antisocialist forces" inside Poland and of "hostile forces that interfere in our internal affairs" abroad, in the West. The frequent questions on the links that bind the new unions to the KOR, as well as the not less frequently voiced mistrust as regards Western journalists, have their origin in this particular variant of level-headedness and moderation. The often heard expression "The coastal region strikes are a Polish internal affair" had no other function in the beginning than that of a protective screen. Today, it approaches a certain xenophobia and an idealization of Polish characteristics. It finds expression, in turn, through, among other things, the indifference of the new unions toward the experience of the Western labor union movement. This attitude is easily understood: It attests the level-headedness of the workers, who must take into account the views of the magic world of their interlocutor, in this case the Party, behind which looms the shadow of the Soviet Union.

The Poles owe this level-headedness, this maturity, to a historic experience extending from the Warsaw uprising in 1944 to 1976. These characteristics are being nurtured, as I have already said, as much by the desperation of the Poles as by their faith in a compromise. Their level-headedness will harden as and to the extent that the independent unions harden. It must not be forgotten, however, that this level-headedness is not that of the democratic nations, which have behind them a long tradition of free public life. If the Poles have opted for level-headedness and moderation, it is because no other choice is open to them and because only this line of conduct offers them promise of a beneficial improvement in the political situation. Should such improvement not be quickly forthcoming, this level-headedness and moderation will again give way to desperation and indifference, in short, to political idealism.

Level-headedness and moderation mean first and foremost, today, forgoing the exercising of influence in domains specifically reserved to the government, to exercise it fully within new associations and new labor unions. This entent may be stated in very simple terms: Leave us free to act within our domain and we allow you carte blanche, leaving you in peace.

The realism involved consists of not voicing demands that, in the general view, could put to question the very bases of the regime and that, as such, would be totally unacceptable to the communist powers. The question involved, then, is not whether this or that agreement /will [in italics]/ but rather whether it /can [in italics]/ be respected--in other words, whether the new relationships among the social forces can evolve along the lines being envisioned by all those who are talking in terms of entente, of compromise and of the social contract.

The Future of the Polish Revolution

There can be no doubt that the authorities will try to confine the union movement to the strictly social problem area. They will surely adopt the same approach to the new university associations and the newly formed or restructured researchers' and artists ' associations. To the extent it can, the government will limit the

freedom granted to these associations to socioprofessional matters. Should this new freedom be accompanied by measures reducing the extent of censorship, it will appear to everyone in the beginning, and not without reason, to be a substantial victory. What may satisfy a scientific association, however, will shortly fail to satisfy a labor union; the more so, I repeat, since the motivations behind the events of August were existential, not social, the fact notwithstanding that it was the unions themselves who, guided by their realism, agreed to limit their domaine of intervention to specific and isolated social and economic problems. Demands concerning censorship and access by the Church to the media did indeed come up during the August negotiations, but as incidentals; and the government could easily reject them in the future as issues not within the province of the unions.

If, after having passed the organizational stage, the workers movement does not expand its field of intervention, it stands, regardless of the movement's inherent force, to lose its thrust and its power of attraction. The stage at which the workers movement, played out, will then no longer be able to influence the government will signal the death knell of the initiatives of the intelligentsia--initiatives that will have behind them no independent social force whatever. Unfortunately, we know very well that the new unions cannot, and moreover have no desire to, exercise influence in the affairs of state. What then should we be doing?

The future of the changes now taking place in Poland is linked to the extension of the union movement to the nonoccupational social categories: local and regional communities. In other terms, the future of these changes demands that the process of formation of authentic citizens, the concretization of authentic concepts of societal life, be extended to the entire population, and that the population learn to conduct itself as a society and no longer as a group of persons subjected to the sole power of the state. The extension of these changes must of course take place gradually, but an absence of progress in that direction would be a bad sign. Similarly, a continuing lack of understanding of the essence of the "revolution" in progress would also be disquiting. It must become clear that the "revolution" that is currently under way no longer consists of wresting from the governing power some new little niche of the space over which it has reigned entirely unto itself, but it is precisely an existential "revolution"--that is, a process of revival of things, of institutions, of problems in a new, independent, self-managed light. For, the hypothesis cannot be excluded that following the death of the intellectual associations, the unions would in turn find themselves reduced by the dynamic of the system to wresting concessions, one by one, and to conducting purely circumstantial actions, subjected to the hazards of internal strife among factions within the party. True, such a state of things would still be preferable--need it be pointed out?--to the situation that existed prior to the August events; but it is also nonetheless true that it would seal the doom of the existential, absolute, noncircumstantial motivations.

All of this adds light to the source from which the strikers draw their realism, their maturity and their dignity. The man whose actions are inspired by existential motivations aspires first of all to affirm his existence and, only after he has done so does he think of consolidating it. He is drawn neither toward

revolutionary destruction--for, his purpose is to create, not to destroy--nor toward compromises within the existing framework of relationships--for, this threatens his newly regained identity. Thus, the obliteration of his existential motivation, of his yearning for identity and a free will, would mean the end of his realism, of that very realism we admire so much today. In a society that has neither a democratic tradition nor a political culture of its own, the disappearance of realism would create a void that nothing could fill in its place.

The Question of the Program

Independence, self-reliance, self-management: these are the demands most frequently heard today. These are merely formal demands (and not only because their realization would require juridical changes); they are in a certain sense empty demands. They all reflect the same aim: to free the unions, the universities, the publishing houses and the movie industry from state control. The analogy ends there. The publishing houses will continue to publish books--they will publish more of them, faster, and better ones. But as for the unions, the intellectual associations and the university organizations, their undertakings and objectives are far from being definable with such precision. True, they have concrete missions: the defense of their interests and of their members; but, as we have seen, this horizon is viewed too narrowly. Hence, our ever-present concern: the question of a program.

Be it in student meetings or in workers meetings, we hear repeated discussion of the need for a program of action, a union program or an association one. It would seem that what is involved is a set of objectives that would, at one and the same time, be more general than the defense of special interests and more concrete than the defense of human rights. Actually, what is needed is to discuss not a set of objectives but a set of concepts, at one and the same time apolitical and more concrete than those of truth, justice and generosity. We stress that this need for a program extends beyond the level of the missions that are the province of the unions and of the university associations; it is equally evident that the ambitions and inherent potentials of those same unions and associations, for their part, also extend beyond the level of their provinces. We might add that the publishing houses and movie producers, to stay within the example I have just cited, should be free to decide for themselves what is to be their agreed upon cultural policy and to make their own choices of concepts and values.

The independence of the unions and associations is not to be confined solely to their independence of decision; it must also mean a creative competitiveness as much in regard to practical action as in regard to spiritual action. The formulation of programs must be worked out through debates that address concepts, values and world views, more so than through confrontations between ideologies or political views that would moreover be difficult to debate publicly. Now, concepts, values and world views are precisely the field of the intellectual elite. It must be recognized, however, that over the last few years, even though we know the causes, the elite have not been equal to the demands of their tasks. With the dawn of a certain freedom in August has come the appearance, on the scene, of the post-revisionist attitudes, the moralizing attitudes, inherited from the independent socialist tradition, generous but intellectually sterile, and of attitudes

in support of the social doctrine of the Church or rather of what remains of it. None of these attitudes--for, they cannot be termed systems of views and much less, conceptual doctrines--is capable of inspiring the programs of the new institutions and organizations. A sound pluralism of concepts, or, at the very least, of opinions, can materialize only on the express condition that the independence of these new initiatives and the authenticity of societal behavior, spontaneous but nonetheless diversified, be preserved. In practice, this means upholding the broadest possible decentralization.

I can already anticipate the comments: Our strength lies in unity and in negotiation with the governing powers. This has been clearly understood by the intellectuals, who for years now have declined to debate concepts and have opted for closing ranks in their quarrel with the governing powers. But what they have thus gained as a community, they have often lost as individuals. Only certain ones among them, at the price of efforts beyond measure, have succeeded in preserving their individual views and in structuring them independently, without allowing themselves to become buried in intellectual and ideological polemics.

We have already mentioned above the sterilizing effect of the interest that has--justifiably, moreover--surrounded the "captive thinking" phenomena. But the intellectual attitude that consists of limiting itself--in the name of the principle that "our strength lies in our unity" and of the struggle, fully justified though the latter may be, for the social freedoms and for intellectual freedom--to expressing itself in half-terms and through allusions: this attitude is certainly no more enriching. For the intellectuals, now, at the height of the social explosion, to raise the problem of freedom of thought is not only highly commendable but, even more so, indispensable. But for the entire intellectual potential to find itself mobilized, throughout the many years the struggle for freedom must needs last, for the purpose of stigmatizing, ridiculing, denouncing, simply leaves little or no room for the cultivation and flowering of independent and creative thought.

Can we then use to advantage the new freedom that has been won by the workers? Yes, provided we fulfill two conditions: First, we must extend the changes now in progress to all of society. Secondly, we must stimulate the rebirth of intellectual life. It is intellectual life that must provide the thrust that will enable the new attitudes, the new views, and the new ideological options to concretize. It is intellectual life that must provide the fountainhead from which the new social groups and movements must draw the conceptual inspiration and the program that are so cruelly lacking to them today.

The Instituting of Freedom

"He who seeks in freedom something other than freedom itself is born to serve," wrote Alexis de Tocqueville. Freedom is a value unto itself, and the aspiration to freedom is an alienable value. "Do not ask me to analyze that sublime drop;

it must be tasted. It finds its own way into those great hearts that God has prepared to receive it; it fills them, it swells them. It can never be understood by those mediocre beings who have never felt it."[5]

The "revolution" that has just occurred in Poland has no precedent either in Poland's past nor in universal history. The differences are clear. Never before has existential motivation and the aspiration to freedom for its own sake manifested themselves in such pure forms. If there is a precedent, it is that of the American Revolution. It also was less a revolution than an expression of aspiration to freedom, an existential manifestation. To admit this comparison, slightly exaggerated though it may be -- to accept that the Polish "revolution" was neither a revolt of the poor against the rich, nor a revolt of the oppressed against their oppressors, nor a revolt of the masses against tyranny, but rather a constructive act assertive of freedom -- is to recognize at one and the same time that the "revolution" -- because it is exactly that and that alone -- is but a beginning, but a point of departure, for the undertaking to institute freedom, an incomparably more difficult undertaking, and one that must be accomplished under conditions that are totally different from those that existed in the America of the 18th century. This point of departure nevertheless offers a unique opportunity, an extremely rare one in all history: that of undertaking an authentic, democratic and constructive action. For, the affirmation of freedom in an existential act has nothing in common with the destructive negativity that characterizes most social revolts and constitutes their original sin. It is devoid of hatred, of envy, of terror--those eternal companions of revolutionary ecstasy. Are we capable of seizing this opportunity? It seems almost impossible -- the more so since, now, the future no longer depends solely upon Polish society as a whole or on the workers but, above all, on the intellectuals and on their ability to become--very belatedly, it is true--the fathers of our revolution and of our democracy. Almost impossible... Almost.

[End of article; editorial quotation from Karl Marx follows]:

"Russia must avoid having a common interest with any other nation; but every other nation, considered separately, must be persuaded to have common interests with Russia, and with no other power whatever." -- Karl Marx: "Russia and Europe" ([French] translation by B. Hepner, Gallimard, Paris, 1954, p 122).

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5. Alexis de Tocqueville: "L'Ancien regime et la revolution" [The Former Regime and the Revolution], Gallimard, 1952, p 277.

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POLAND

'L'EXPRESS' REPORT ON SOLIDARITY LEGALIZATION NOTED

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 15 Nov 80 pp 127-129

[Article by L'EXPRESS special correspondent in Warsaw Emile Guikovaty: "Poland: A Special Day"]

[Text] Monday 10 November 1980. Lech Walesa has won one round: the Supreme Court gives "solidarnosc" (Solidarity) the stamp of legality. Cardinal Wyszynski distributes copies of his book and 35 Western journalists are expelled. Emile Guikovaty experienced that Monday first-hand, a day which only the future will be able to judge.

Monday 10 November was not an ordinary day. It was a day of victory, but nobody was crowing over it. It was a day of tears of joy, of sad and happy smiles, a day of anxious faces. "Solidarnosc" (Solidarity), the name of the new Polish trade unions, had won and won big, but at 6 in the evening, before a packed roomful of journalists and under the television spotlights, Lech Walesa, the hero of Gdansk, his moustache all awry and dressed in his Sunday suit, let his weariness show through for a moment: "This evening," he said "I would like to forget about the whole world."

Everything had begun very early in the morning at the offices of the Club of Catholic Intellectuals (KIK) on Kopernik Street. The place must have seen its heyday 50 years ago--the walls were covered in exotic-type wood--but more difficult times had made it run down. All the members of the National Committee of "Solidarnosc" were present. The ones who have achieved national fame were familiar: Walesa, who led Gdansk to the resounding victory of the 31 August agreements; Kazimiers Switon, founder of the Committee of the first free trade union in the powerful industrial center of Katowice; Jaroslaw Sienkiewicz, the representative of the Silesia miners; Karol Modzelewski, the historian who became the leader of the workers of Wroclaw; Zbigniew Bujak, a leader from the Mazowsze region of Warsaw; and Stanislaw Zawada, the "Solidarnosc" chairman at the giant Nowa Huta steel works (Krakow).

At 0845 a militant handed his comrades the tickets to gain them entry to the room set aside for the Supreme Court at the Warsaw Palace of Justice. As a court of final appeal, three magistrates were to decide on the legal action instituted by "Solidarnosc." Walesa and his friends maintain that they were cheated in the court of original jurisdiction. The judges of the Warsaw court would only register the statutes proposed by "Solidarnosc" on one condition, an excessively harsh one: they had to refer to the governing role of the party, the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR).

"That is out of the question," the workers had replied. "Our trade union must be free and independent." In order to bring it before the Supreme Court, "Solidarnosc's" lawyers, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, a well known Catholic jurist, and Jan Olszewski, who has specialized in defending dissidents, laid the basis for a compromise. Rumor had it that personal contacts with party leaders had been made behind the scenes and that some form of agreement would be reached. However, witnesses had been able to catch sight of the members of the Political Bureau of the PZPR leaving the party headquarters in downtown Warsaw the day before. Measures had evidently been taken in case the general strike announcement sent out by "Solidarnosc" for the 12th were to take effect.

It was getting on towards 0900. The "Solidarnosc" leaders, numbering around 100, disappeared into two dusty and wobbly buses rented for the occasion. "Is morale high?" I asked Stanislaw Zawada whom I had met in Krakow. Zawada, who is 40 years old with reddish blond hair and a large drooping moustache, answered with an uneasy smile and the hand gesture which means "so-so."

The two buses went through a major portion of Warsaw before they arrived at the Supreme Court in Ogrodowa Street. It was exactly 0900. In front of the entrance to the court about a hundred people were already waiting. The small crowd was growing constantly in spite of intense cold. The room chosen for the hearing was too small to accommodate the public. So we would not know anything before the trade unionists came out. A vague feeling of dread gripped the onlookers. It was no time for illusions. If the Supreme Court were to rule against "Solidarnosc" and if the strike were triggered, the country's fate would hang in the balance.

Twenty policemen and policewomen in gang-style black jackets were keeping order with the help of "Solidarnosc" militants who were wearing an armband of white and red, the Polish colors. A worker had come with his daughter who had blond braids. Perched on his shoulders, she was waving a little Polish flag. A very elegant gentleman was also there, dressed in a white sheepskin overcoat fur-side out. He held a pretty little black poodle at the end of a leash. Nobody dared ask him why he was attending this event.

At 1030 several journalists gave up their guard duty. They had been summoned to the police station on Krucza Street, the visa and passport office. They expected to be expelled. On the previous day the attitude of the Polish authorities had shown a hardening. Several special correspondents had been intercepted at the airport even before they entered the country and in spite of their visas being in order. Others had been picked up in Gdansk and Krakow and "asked" to return to Warsaw. Among those summoned to Krucza Street were 2 Frenchmen, 6 Britishers, Germans, Americans, Italians, and Danes, 30 or 35 in all. The first one to go into the fateful office was Eric Bourne, the correspondent for the Boston CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR who had been responsible for covering East Europe for 35 years, a rosy-cheeked man in his sixties. When he came out he provided confirmation: it was expulsion. The funniest part of it was that Bourne's visa was expiring anyway that same day. And it is true about Dessa Trevisan, the London TIMES special correspondent, that she too was expelled, although she had returned to Belgrade two days earlier. A triumph for socialist bureaucracy.

This special correspondent for L'EXPRESS found himself in the office with the one from the London OBSERVER. This was how the dialogue with the official went:

"How is it you are picking us out from among 300 foreign press correspondents?"

"It is a lottery," the policeman joked.

"But why expulsion?"

"You are not being expelled. We are simply asking you to leave Poland as quickly as possible."

"Do you have specific grounds?"

"We don't have enough meat to feed all of yo[illegible]"

In short, it was clearly a big joke and a stamp in the passport. The journalists had to leave Poland within 24 hours. The fact that 11 November marked the exact beginning of the Madrid conference on the Helsinki accords, which promise the free movement of people and ideas, did not seem to bother the Polish authorities unduly. When their formalities were done, the journalists went back to their post in front of the Supreme Court. The waiting went on and more and more people came. Finally at 1300 the door opened. The crowd rushed forward. I was surrounded by Poles all of whom were taller than I by a head or two. I caught a glimpse of a bunch of flowers stirring in the cold grey air. A voice made itself heard but the megaphone was defective. People more or less gathered that it was victory, that the Supreme Court had overturned the decision of the Warsaw court. People cried: "Bravo! Bravo!" Then came their departure amid cheers: the two buses slowly moved forward, and standing up against one of the doors was a woman with her face covered in tears.

Then underway for the bishop's palace. The victors were to be received by Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, the primate of Poland, who had cut his stay in Rome a week short. Again we waited in front of a metal gate, this time on Miodowa Street in the area around the old city. It was learned that the three Supreme Court judges were divided at first but finally brought Chairman Witold Formanski around to the judgement that the Warsaw court had gone beyond what is specified in the constitution in its desire to modify the "Solidarnosc" statutes in the way the government wanted. The court had accepted the compromise proposed by the new unions. They were to be registered along with their statutes. An annex was to refer to the Gdansk agreements which committed the workers' committees of the shipyards "to recognize that the PZPR plays a governing role in the State" and "not to oppose the existing system of international alliances" which Poland has.

In spite of the legal victory carried off by "Solidarnosc," this point created a certain ambiguity which television was to make the most of that same night.

For the moment there was a euphoria of success. It was 1430 when Walesa and his companions went into the receiving rooms of the bishop's palace. Walesa spoke first. He thanked the cardinal for the efforts he made as an unofficial mediator between the government and the "insurgents." The old primate answered him, recalling that as a chaplain before the war he had participated in the struggles of the Christian trade unions. And it is true that before his imprisonment from 1953 to 1956 made him the symbol of a persecuted Church Wyszynski had the reputation of being a priest with views close to the working class. He stated his support for "Solidarnosc's" activity but he emphasized that Poland's economy was entering a period of very grave crisis. The winter was threatening to be harsh. The situation needed to be set right and the country needed to be saved. Order and discipline were more necessary than ever.

The Pictures of the Lady of Czestochowa

The Cardinal offered Walesa a new edition of the Gospel. He told him, "This is the best book on communism I know of." He handed every member of the National Committee a copy of his latest work which is devoted to the cult of Our Lady. During this time a priest went up to the metal gate. He entrusted the militants in charge with packets of pictures of the Lady of Czestochowa, the patron saint of Poland, which bore the primate's insignia. The militants distributed them to passersby. They stopped buses and gave the pictures to passengers and drivers who made the sign of a "V" with their hand. It was an atmosphere of exhilaration.

At 1630 the government spokesman received the press at the prime minister's palace. He confirmed the terms of the Supreme Court's decision. In conversations civil servants assert that the step taken to expel journalists is on record. Then came the return to the bishop's palace and patriotic and religious singing. It was close to 1700 when Walesa and his little band left the Primate's residence. The two buses went towards the suburbs. "Solidarnosc" was to hold a press conference in a room put at its disposal by the Nowotko factory, a factory making engines and motors. After another hour's wait the trade union leaders finally faced the journalists. Walesa was weary but relaxed. There were jokes and puns. One Polish journalist asked the leader of Gdansk if he really thought, as he had said, that Poland could "catch up with and overtake Japan." Unruffled, he made the assertion again. "Poland," he explained, "has sizable reserves of raw materials and good productive land. So why not?" The Polish journalist did not seem convinced and no more did those around him. But Walesa turned then to more immediate considerations: "We are now entering into the second phase which is to organize and consolidate our movement. The most difficult part is still to be done. We are 10 million strong, and everyone has to be put in groups in enterprises, and regions have to be set up."

Then came a new departure. The free trade union of the Mazowsze region was sponsoring a gala affair at the Grand Theater. People holding tickets had to fight to get in because less fortunate ones were congregating in front of the doors. At the top of the stage was a big "Solidarnosc" sign under a Polish flag. The young actor Andrzej Seweryn read Adam Mickiewicz's famous poem "To the Brothers of Muscovy" which celebrates the activity of Russian and Polish revolutionaries in the 19th century. Verses by Czeslaw Milosz, the recent Nobel laureate for literature and a Polish emigre in the United States, were cheered. The actress Krystyna Janda, the heroine of the "Man of Marble" and of "Without Anesthesia," two of Andrzej Wajda's latest films, sang a song dedicated to her country. After the actor Jan Pietrzak gave a comic monologue about the government's shortcomings which delighted the audience, he planted himself in front of the microphone and came out with a song he had composed: "In order for Poland to become truly Polish." The audience took up the refrain all together.

But what about tomorrow? At NOWE DROGI magazine the theorist Ludwik Krasucki explained to me that the Party does not fear "Solidarnosc," that we are talking about a movement of common people which the Party can very easily work with. He said, "'Solidarnosc' brings us the inspiration we have been in need of to get back in contact with the masses and revive our recruitment and to struggle against corruption and domination by bureaucratic officialdom." In short, the Party is ready to play it that way. A large number of "Solidarnosc's" militants are Party

members. At Nowa Huta, Zawada and his assistant Mieczyslaw Gil stated that they were quite aware of that fact. "Relations with the Party will be complicated," they said. "We are not kidding ourselves. We will be forcing the Party to change." Is this a sign: As of Monday evening the Gdansk Party Committee, whose meeting was chaired by its first secretary, Tadeusz Fiszbach, is calling for a purge of the PZPR Central Committee which, in the view of grass roots militants, is incapable of successfully leading Poland's resurgence.

Time will tell. But this 10 November was certainly a memorable day.

Photo Captions:
1. Lech Walesa announcing the victory of the Solidarity trade union, at the Grand Theater of Warsaw on 10 November.

2. Warsaw, 10 November: Cardinal Wyszynski passes on to Walesa the Pope's blessing.

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POLAND

'L'EXPRESS' VIEWS ELIMINATION OF 'GIEREK CLIQUE' AS HYPOCRITICAL

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 11 Oct 80 p 155

[Article by E.G.: "Poland: Hypocrite Time--The Party is Not Going to Win Over the Poles by Eliminating the Gierek Clique"]

[Text] At the moment the Polish press is full of surprising pieces of news. One of the most recent ones is that Maciej Szczepanski, former head of the radio-television network, was accused of having acquired two airplanes, a helicopter, a yacht, and two sumptuous villas, one in Athens and one in Nairobi, all thanks to his job. This is enough to make the average Western president-director general green with envy.

Szczepanski was working under cover with the committee for the administration of state enterprise. He was not the only one to come under suspicion in the Warsaw uproar which is going all out to justify the title of the Chinese revolutionary song: "Socialism Is Good." In fact his case is a good illustration of the score-settling atmosphere which seemingly will prevail from now on within the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR, the name of the communist party in Poland.)

In the middle of the Great Terror of the 1930's Stalin had ordered the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and had wiped out most of its leaders. Nowadays the men in the Kremlin must be wondering what is to become of this same communist party--a party which is clearly cut off from any contact with the population and which is unable to channel or control the activity of the independent trade unions; a party which is tearing itself to pieces and denouncing itself before the mischievous eyes of every Pole.

Last week's plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the PZPR certainly did not tell the Poles anything new. For 20 years they have been hearing the same old refrain: the economy is in terrible shape, and the party has made mistakes but it is going to rectify them. It is ages since anyone, from Warsaw to Krakow and from Katowice to Gdansk, paid any attention to these great surges of self-criticism. Many think like Tadeusz Grabski, a member of the party secretariat, who is indignant about the "hypocrisy" of some of his comrades who are "offering now to make reforms when they have had the chance to carry them out for a long time."

"Hypocrites" will pay dearly for being exposed: six of them have been dismissed from their duties on the Central Committee and two others sent up for trial for "Misuse of public property." Edward Gierek, who was replaced in his job as first secretary by Stanislaw Kania, is already completely isolated within the group of higher authorities, and undoubtedly he too is all set to experience the effects of the purge.

The elimination of the Gierek clique goes hand in hand with Gen Mieczyslaw Moczar's return to center stage, the party organ of the PZPR having showered him with praise this week. The personality of this fellow Moczar is quite difficult to define: he opposed both Gomulka during the 1960's and Gierek 10 years later. Some see in him a fierce anti-Semite, and others a "nationalist," but a nationalist who has never offended the Soviets. Gierek got him out of the way in 1971 and this former minister of internal affairs was named head of the Supreme Chamber of Control, not a very glamorous job, but it allowed him to put together files on his comrades which he seems to be making good use of now. Szcepanski is the first one to be finding out.

Urgent Matter

In actual fact the PZPR still seems to be fairly divided and Gen Moczar's files might be used to serve the purposes of only certain people. Apart from that, and what is more serious for the government, there is the activity of the new independent trade unions in the Solidarity group. This group is still attempting to acquire legal status which the Warsaw courts stubbornly persist in refusing to give, their objections highlighting what an obstacle the ossified system presents. How can unions be authorized which make no reference to the governing party? How can they be allowed to join forces all over the country when the Gdansk agreements did not envisage anything of the kind? In short, how can something be legalized which communist law declares to be illegal?

But the matter is an urgent one and calls for decisions. The Solidarity group and its leader, Lech Walesa, not content to have organized an impressive 1-hour strike the other week in spite of the authorities, are talking now about creating a free press. They are even getting ready to receive printing equipment which would be sent from Brussels by the World Federation of Free Trade Unions. An observer says, "Walesa and his friends are not challenging the regime. They are putting its back up against the wall."

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