JPRS L/9564

23 February 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 10/81)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9

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CONTENTS

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UK-FRG Relations Strained Over EEC Fishing Policy
(Michael Hornsby; THE TIMES, 13 Feb 81) 1

BELGIUM

Poll Shows Eyskens's Popularity on Increase
(POURQUOI PAS?, 11 Dec 80) 3

FRANCE

Airborne Rapid Deployment Force Tested
(Pierre Mace; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Dec 80) 8

Several Limits on Defense Establishment Viewed
(Roger Chevalier, Pierre Dabezies; PARADOXES, Apr-May 80). 13

Defense Policy Guidelines Formulated After Colloquium
(PARADOXES, Apr-May 80) 31

Briefs
Transport Aircraft Readied 35

ITALY

Figures on Labor Market Situation for 1980
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 7 Jan 81) 36

SPAIN

Suarez' Fall, Socialist Takeover Predicted
(Jose Manuel Arija; CAMBIO 16, 5 Jan 81) 43

UNITED KINGDOM

'TIMES' Journalist Discusses West's View of Detente
(Arrigo Levi; THE TIMES, 12 Feb 81) 47

COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UK-FRG RELATIONS STRAINED OVER EEC FISHING POLICY

LD131433 London THE TIMES in English 13 Feb 81 p 7

[Dispatch by Michael Hornsby: "Germans Infuriated by British Stance on EEC Fishing Policy"]

[Text] Brussels, 12 Feb--The collapse in the early hours of this morning of the umpteenth attempt by EEC minister of agriculture to agree on a common fisheries policy has seriously strained Britain's relations with West Germany.

Mr Peter Walker, infuriated his West German counterpart, Herr Josef Ertl, by refusing to approve an agreement with Canada that would allow EEC boats to fish off Labrador in return for tariff reductions on Canadian sea food exports to the community.

The agreement poses problems in that most of the Canadian fish would be sold on the already depressed British market, but Mr Walker's main reason for withholding approval was to retain a bargaining counter in the dispute over the EEC's internal fisheries regime.

Under the agreement some 14,500 tonnes of fish, mainly cod, could be caught by EEC boats in Canadian waters, West German trawlermen, who get the bulk of this catch, are angry and frustrated at being denied such a valuable haul.

The Germans say that unless their fishermen can get into Canadian waters by the beginning of March at the latest the agreement's value will be much reduced because after that date icebergs make fishing dangerous.

Herr Ertl is convinced that the British are now maintaining their veto on the Canadian agreement out of sheer malice. He accused Mr Walker of "ungentlemanly conduct" and said he was an "even more unpleasant" negotiator than Mr John Silkin, the previous agriculture minister and noted anti-marketeer.

The Germans were not the only ones to be irritated by Mr Walker's performance. When talks broke down last December, most of the blame was aimed at France--but there was a lot more sympathy for the French point of view last night.

In the eyes of the Germans and the French at least, there was a clear link between last May's agreement on Britain's EEC budget refund and an early solution to the fisheries dispute and it was being openly suggested yesterday that Britain had reneged on its part of the bargain.

The atmosphere is bound to be much more difficult when agriculture ministers meet again on March 9 and 10. There is a danger that the whole dispute will become caught up in the annual negotiations on farm prices. With the French presidential elections only a month away, Mr Daniel Hoeffel, the French fisheries minister, will find it even harder to offer concessions.

The one glimmer of light is that the minister of agriculture, for the first time this week, started to look at ways of satisfying Mr Walker's most contentious demand--that access of continental fishing vessels to British coastal waters should be physically controlled.

The gap between Britain and France, the two main protagonists, on the rules that should govern fishing within 12 miles of the British coast has narrowed. The French can probably accept that this zone should be reserved essentially for British boats provided the French can maintain a reasonable level of traditional fishing there.

But much more difficult is the British demand for a ban on boats more than 80 feet long in areas beyond 12 miles off the north of Scotland and in the Irish Sea. The French say that beyond 12 miles the rules of free access must be guaranteed. The Dutch-sponsored compromise--a system of licensing--misfired mainly through lack of detailed preparation.

CSO: 3120

COUNTRY SECTION BELGIUM

POLL SHOWS EYSKENS'S POPULARITY ON INCREASE

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 11 Dec 80 pp 11-12

[Article: "The Political Barometer: Mark Eyskens's Irresistible Rise: The Belgians Have Confidence in their Prime Minister"]

[Text] The "PP?[POURQUOIS PAS?]-Marketing Unit Political Barometer" this time reveals an interesting rise in temperature: the popularity rating of Mark Eyskens, who has been finance minister for a short time, suddenly becomes feverish in November. And not by a little! Rated seventh in September with 27 points, he is now second, propelled forward by a jump of some 12 points! In short, this is the irresistible rise of Gaston's offspring, who has indisputably become a national personality. For the "Eyskens effect" is seen not only in Flanders (+12), but also in Brussels (+14) and even in Wallonia (+10). And this while a Karel Van Miert, for example, remains above all a very Flemish personality, his score being low in Brussels and almost nothing in Wallonia. Other increases are also pointed out by this new "PP?-Marketing Unit" barometer: the PSC [Christian Social Party] Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb and the Socialist Guy Spitaels, both men receiving 4 points nationally. Among the new heads put to the test, only Herman de Croo, on the liberal side, clearly breaks through, thus becoming the Number Two man in the PVV [Party of Freedom and Progress], ahead of Herman Vanderpoorten.

The new justice minister, Philippe Moureaux (10 points), is of course rising, but is still not pulling into first place among the "20" in our national ranking. The same is true for Freddy Willockx (secretary of State (SP [for Public Service] in the PTT [expansion unknown]), also with 10 points, and Jean-Pierre Grafe, chairman of the CEPIC [Political Center of Christian Independents and Cadres]-PSC, who only gets 9 points.

This month "PP?" and "Marketing Unit" also tested the confidence the Belgians have in their prime minister. To the question, "Do you have confidence in Wilfried Martens to solve the problems currently being raised in Belgium?", the 1,087 persons questioned responded as follows:

--have every confidence.....12 percent
--have some confidence.....36 percent
--have not very much confidence.....16 percent
--have no confidence.....20 percent
--have no opinion.....16 percent

The proportion of the positive (48 percent) and the negative (36 percent) ratings is assuredly a good result for Wilfried Martens, since one Belgian in two has at least some confidence in him. On the other hand, it will be noted that one Belgian in five has no confidence at all in him.

WALLONIA

		September	November	Difference
1.	Andre Cools	39	39	SQ [status quo]
2.	Paul Vanden Boeynants	38	39	+ 1
3.	Wilfried Martens	37	38	+ 1
4.	Antoinette Spaak	38	38	SQ
5.	Willy Claes	36	35	- 1
6.	Edmond Leburton	36	35	- 1
7.	Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb	32	35	+ 3
8.	Jean Gol	32	32	SQ
9.	Guy Spitaels	27	30	+ 3
10.	Mark Eyskens	20	30	+ 10
11.	Leo Tindemans	30	28	- 2
12.	Guy Mathot	28	28	SQ
13.	Henri Mordant	28	28	SQ
14.	Henri Simonet	27	28	+ 1
15.	Jean-Pierre Grafe	-	20	-

As always, no personality really stands out from the crowd in Wallonia. Outside of the obvious jump by Mark Eyskens, who was recently advanced by his statements on the "necessary sacrifices," the increase for C.-F. Nothomb and Guy Spitaels (+ 3 for both) will be noted. Also noteworthy is Edmond Leburton's decline nationally (- 2) as well as in Wallonia (- 1).

BRUSSELS

		September	November	Difference
1.	Paul Vanden Boeynants	44	47	+ 3
2.	Antoinette Spaak	47	47	SQ
3.	Wilfried Martens	43	47	+ 4
4.	Mark Eyskens	32	46	+14
5.	Henri Simonet	38	41	+ 3
6.	Willy Declercq	41	41	SQ
7.	Willy Claes	41	40	- 1
8.	Guy Spitaels	28	34	+ 6
9.	Jean Gol	32	32	SQ
10.	Leo Tindemans	34	32	- 2
11.	Edmond Leburton	30	27	- 3
12.	Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb	21	27	+ 6
13.	Andre Cools	24	27	+ 3
14.	Karel Van Miert	21	23	+ 2
15.	Henri Mordant	18	21	+ 3

Here too, the same increases are to be found for Eyskens, Spitaels and Nothomb. At a more specifically Brussels level, Vanden Boeynants and Simonet (both + 3) consolidate their positions as regional leaders, Antoinette Spaak being stable.

FLANDERS

		September	November	Difference
1.	Wilfried Martens	47	49	+ 2
2.	Karel Van Miert	46	49	+ 3
3.	Leo Tindemans	48	45	- 3
4.	Mark Eyskens	31	43	+ 12
5.	Willy Claes	42	41	- 1
6.	Willy Declercq	38	41	+ 3
7.	Hugo Schiltz	25	29	+ 4
8.	Paul Vanden Boeynants	25	27	+ 2
9.	Jos Chabert	22	26	+ 4
10.	Henri Simonet	22	24	+ 2
11.	Guy Spitaels	20	24	+ 4
12.	Herman De Croo	-	23	-
13.	Henri Vanderpoorten	18	18	SQ
14.	Gaston Geens	14	18	+ 4
15.	Freddy Willockx	-	18	-

Noteworthy here is the settling down of Leo Tindemans, who loses three points in his own region and two points nationally. Enough to make the great man of Edegem make a face, this maniac for popularity polls. This is because in Mark Eyskens Leo Tindemans obviously finds himself with one more rival on his hands. A dangerous rival: might not Mark Eyskens be that "third man" who tomorrow, within the CVP [Social Christian Party], might separate the "enemy brothers," Wilfried Martens and Leo Tindemans?

The goal of the "PP?-Marketing Unit" political barometer is to determine the popularity of those who are leading us. The question asked of the persons who were interrogated being, "For each of the following political personalities, please tell me whether you wish to see him play an important role in the next few months?". The inquiry was carried out from 24 to 28 November 1980 by Marketing Unit, a company specializing in market studies and opinion polls, with a sampling of 1,087 Belgians age 18 and over, according to quotas as to sex, age, habitat and socio-professional class. The results were weighed in terms of the importance of the three regions of the country.

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CSO: 3100

COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE

AIRBORNE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE TESTED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Dec 80 pp 30-32

[Article by Commander Pierre Mace]

[Text] Commander Pierre Mace graduated in 1965 from Ecole de l'Air and volunteered for Transport. Assinged to the 2/63 Bigorre, he acquired all his N 2501 qualifications there, before becoming a CIET instructor, then a brigade leader in Salon. He later commanded the Transall-equipped 3/61 Poitou squadron. He has logged 4500 flight hours and is presently head of the General Studies Division at the COTAM General Staff.

The code word Fregate designates the latest airborne operation (OAP) which, as part of the FAE (Foreign Action Force) training, made it possible to test reaction capabilities for the 11th Parachute Division (DP) and for certain units which can be activated along with this force, particularly the TAM tactical squadrons.

Concept

Monday Morning

The Army General Staff, responsible for defining the general lines of the maneuver, set its theme: tactical situation, goals and terms of the action contemplated. The decision was made, in this case, to carry out an airborne operation in order to take control of an airport on which, in a second phase, combat materiel would be unloaded.

Personnel and materiel means (ground and air) were defined. the COTAM component included Transalls and N 2501's.

Transport squadrons were alerted through TAM operations center.

The designated tactical squadrons formed the crews. Technicians busied themselves around the aircraft to solve last-minute problems.

The gathering of units began with little delay and it was possible before 1500 hours to line up the entire operation in Toulouse which was selected as the operation's starting base.

Monday Noon

A liaison plane brought to Toulouse the Transport Group Commander (CGT) named for the occasion, who would provide technical support to the OAP commander within an inter-army general staff established for the purpose and in charge of mounting the operation.

Adapted to the scope of the maneuver, this general staff included among others:

The OAP commander (generally, a superior officer of the 11th DP);

The CGT (chosen by COTAM for his aeronautics and military experience);

An officer of BOMAP (Airborne Mobile Operational Base), a unit of the 11th DP in charge of technical problems in air delivery;

An officer of PCAM (Mobile Air Command Post), permanent arm of the Tactical Air Force for the 11th DP, responsible for fire support;

The commander of the airborne troops.

The first problems to be settled were of a tactical nature:

Choice of intervention mode: mass drop of troops and materiel or scattered drops? Assault landing?

Related aspects of this choice were also important:

In either of the scenarios chosen, pursuit flights would probably come into play (neutralization of intervention zone, protection of transport planes especially during critical jump stage);

Preparation of above cited zone (beacons, radio contact);

Use of a PC (Command Post) plane.

Next came technical matters:

Number of aircraft available, and intent to maximize their capability, made it mandatory to strictly apportion loads (men and materiel). In addition there were constraints linked to the aircraft's characteristics: limit on transportable weight (load distribution, performance in case of engine breakdown), load volume, maximum number of parachutists per plane, resistance of terrain where landings must take place.

This distribution accomplished, a strict timetable then had to be established, which, counting backwards from the H hour scheduled for drop or assault landing, would integrate flight time, runway time, and time needed for TAP (airborne troops) boarding and equipping.

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Last came a definition of communications networks and preparation for eventual replacement and diversion actions.

Monday Afternoon

All aircraft had reached Toulouse.

At this point the head of the transport force still had an enormous task, specifically aeronautic, to carry out:

Define transport plane maneuver: navigation procedures, drop or landing procedures, separation of the various plane formations (each with distinct performances and missions) in time and space, gathering of all aircraft, emergency procedures in case of breakdowns, use of flight communications;

Liaison with CFT (transport formation commanders), that is, the leaders of the various airborne waves; calculation of actual plane performances as a function of current parameters, minimum amounts of fuel required.

All these factors enabled him to establish an order of operations for each formation. The crews then had to chart their itineraries and fine-tune their navigation.

Monday Evening

General Crew Briefing, very highly rated at COTAM. Prepared at the blackboard by the CGT, it made it possible to review all the details of the written order, to refine them, and to solve various problems which inevitably arise.

Crews and craft were ready for takeoff to their action zone.

Execution

Because of the development of the (fictitious) situation adopted as the framework of the maneuver, the Army General Staff had decided to set 0630 hours on Tuesday as the drop hour for the first parachutists.

Tuesday 0400 Hours

The huge BOMAP field in Toulouse was all astir: crews putting final touches to the preparation of their mission, navigation technicians checking cargo holds and jump gear, trucks on the move for plane loading, parachutists at inspection drill, runway couriers shuttling back and forth, and heavy tank trucks full of aviation fuel.

The operation commander issued his final orders, during a last meeting under the wings, before boarding with his general staff the Transall PC from which he would be able to act on all data concerning the OAP, and communicate with the transport forces, fire support tactical planes, and ground troops.

Tuesday 0440 Hours

All parachutists aboard; the engines were beginning to turn.

Tuesday 0500 Hours

Takeoff of first N 2501, followed by the other craft, which left from Toulouse in less than 20 minutes.

Meteorological conditions enabled the planes to rejoin their objective, somewhere in Poitou, using sight navigation at very low altitude. Prized above all for its utter discretion, this navigation procedure, the most conventional imaginable, naturally requires adequate visibility. If the overcast becomes too great, ruling out the use of sight navigation, sequential navigation is used, which only Transall can perform, and which allows low altitude penetration under all meteorological conditions, night and day. This procedure consists in following the determined course by illuminating the ground periodically with on-board radar (in sequences), and by comparing radar images and the "prediction" photographs which are available to the crew, and which provide a radar image of the area over which the flight is taking place. At the same time, autonomous navigation means are used: calculator and Doppler radar, whose signals are highly limited, again for the sake of discretion. The plane's position being thus determined, it is possible to establish the minimum flight altitude compatible with the surrounding relief features.

In any case the vulnerability of the transport planes and the ever-present surprise element, made it mandatory to use separate itineraries. The aircraft regrouped at a given gathering point, just a few minutes before the drop.

The precision required for this rendez-vous (15 seconds between planes) and the safety of the flights were obtained through a strict distribution of tasks among the crews: control of flight elements, sky monitoring, maintenance of flight path and observance of timetable.

At the same time the constant concern for discretion placed extreme limitations on radio exchanges during flight.

Tuesday 0620 Hours

The leader of the first formation arrived at the regrouping point. A glance to the right and left: his wingmates were on time.

Tuesday 0627 Hours

The formation began its bailing operation, now the most delicate phase of the flight, during which the transport planes at reduced speeds were particularly vulnerable. Fortunately the fighter planes were there to offer them protection.

Tuesday 0630 Hours

"Go." Within a few minutes, over three different jump zones, nearly 800 parachutists were going to be dropped from the COTAM aircraft.

As soon as the last parachutists had jumped, a new dip to ground level took place before the return to Toulouse where the craft would be serviced. In particular, heavy equipment was loaded aboard the Transalls for transporting in a second round.

Tuesday 0815 Hours

The parachutists had completed the first part of their mission and seized their initial objective, a rough terrain where the second wave of Transalls would be able to land.

Tuesday 2300 Hours

OAP Fregate was nearly complete. The parachutists had been dropped on schedule at the designated spots. They received, right on schedule, the heavy equipment and vehicles they needed for continuing their maneuver.

Once again the COTAM-TAP joint group proved its operational effectiveness. This exercise had shown that both groups are capable of conceiving and preparing within short periods of time, a maneuver requiring perfect coordination among the various units involved.

This also gave us, the transport forces, an occasion to check on the quality of our outfits and the appropriateness of our teaching methods.

In any case it was only a wargame, but with practical tasks which are very good illustrations of the conceivable utilization of our FAE.

11,023
CSO: 3100

SEVERAL LIMITS ON DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT VIEWED

Paris PARADOXES in French Apr-May 80 pp 69-89

[Article by Roger Chevalier and Pierre Dabezies: "Technical, Industrial and Financial Capabilities for Defense"]

[Text] The issue of our country's technical, industrial and financial capabilities for defense inevitably leads to an examination of our industry from a technical, commercial and financial standpoint, including a certain number of derivative problems which may involve exportation, cooperation, civilian repercussions, employment, subcontracting and, in general, relations with industry as a whole.

For example, the aerospace industry, which probably represents the main component of our weapons industry, is actually an entity working in symbiosis between the military and civilian sectors on one hand and between airframes, engines and equipment on the other.

In general, the commercial success of the weapons industry has proved that France possessed not only technical capability, but capabilities in the areas of mass production, marketing and after-sales services as well.

The U.S. Department of Defense itself attests to this, as illustrated in particular by sales of helicopters and maritime observation aircraft to that country. The case is the same with regard to CFM 56 engines for KC 135 tankers and the Roland license.

With regard to arms, those contributing to nuclear weaponry, i.e., those which are directly linked to the policy of deterrence, must be examined separately, since this is a purely national activity without trade limitations related to exportation and often associated compensation or cooperation. We will therefore begin by examining our capabilities in this area directly linked to the policy of deterrence and then move on to conventional weapons.

I. Policy of Deterrence

1.1. Current Means of Deterrence

As everyone knows, the policy of deterrence is based on the fact that response to a nuclear attack would inflict such damage that a potential enemy would not take

the risk. In view of the lack of accuracy of available missiles (2-3 km) within the required range, the force required to destroy targets used to be figured in megatons. It was therefore difficult to strike only military targets: for that matter, it appeared that destruction of major centers was also a means of deterrence.

From this standpoint, as we know, the materiel introduced in France was:

A--Mirage IV aircraft and associated AN.22 nuclear bombs.

B--S2 and S3 ballistic missiles, distributed in the silos of the Albion Plateau in two groups of nine stationary silos.

The S3, whose range, accuracy, force and penetration are better than the S2, retains the latter's first stage and uses a second, higher-performance stage with a reentry system which includes: a nuclear warhead made more resistant to the explosive effects of other missiles; a system of "penetration aids" to complicate the detection and trajectory measurement job of enemy defenses.

Ground systems (silos ...) have been improved and simplified. The principal results have been an increase in reliability and availability, as well as the reduction of maintenance costs.

C--M1, M2, M20 ballistic missiles and their M4 successor.

The M4 has a markedly longer range than the M20, first because it has three stages instead of two and secondly as a result of technological innovations incorporated into these stages: improved powder and use of flexible tubing. Launching will be carried out from the same submarines and same tubes as the M20, but if only because of the missile's larger diameter, a recasting of the tubes is necessary. After these operations, for the intermediate term there is no foreseeable significant improvement in the case of MSBS [sea-to-surface strategic ballistic] missiles. Emphasis should be placed on submarine protection.

The M4, scheduled to go into service in 1985, is a multiple-warhead missile which will be on a par with the American Minuteman III.

It should be noted that if this level was able to be reached with far fewer test launchings than the United States has to its credit, it is because we focused our efforts on a certain few lines of development and involving almost only the "strategic" aspect. As a result, various problems were not considered, such as those concerning ground penetration against underground targets or those raised by specific-use weapons such as land or naval mines.

The M4 effort required a renewal of operations and credits following a period characterized by a certain degree of sluggishness after the thermonuclear goal had been achieved. Actually, optimum use of the resources in place could enable France to enlarge its arsenal and simultaneously have available seven types of weapons with an average life of 15 years. Similarly, from the financial standpoint, the low percentage of expenditures by the AEC's [Atomic Energy Commission] Military Applications Directorate [DAM] demonstrates that production volume could be greatly increased at the cost of a low increase in expenditures, especially since in the future

the cost of nuclear materials should decline and their availability should increase: in this respect, there is no major difficulty either for the supply of plutonium, extracted in the Marcoule reprocessing plant, or for highly enriched uranium produced by Pierrelatte, or for light materials used in certain high-performance nuclear weapon formulas, including lithium and tritium in particular.

The PAECHT [expansion unknown] report on military planning states: "An increase in nuclear production would not be very expensive in comparison to conventional weapons production. Up to the present time, our series have been very limited and production cost has been approximately 10 percent of the DAM budget. Thus it would be possible to have more weapons without proportionately increasing expenditures."

This report also contains the following figures:

1. AEC defense subsidy in comparison to defense budget:

1969:	9.1%	1978:	5.2%
1974:	6.6%	1979:	5.1%
1977:	5.5%	1980:	5.3%

2. Military Applications Directorate (DAM-AEC) credits compared with defense payment credits:

1969:	5.8%	1978:	3.3%
1974:	4.8%	1979:	3.4%
1977:	3.6%	1980:	3.5%

1.2. How Deterrence Must Proceed

The accuracy of American and Soviet guidance systems has improved considerably in recent years and it is known that the payload falls within 300 to 400 meters of the target using these systems. At the same time, the miniaturization of payloads makes it possible to use multiple payloads, which is exactly what the M4 will be using from now on, with its six nuclear warheads destined to be placed on staggered ballistic trajectories. The consequences of these improvements may be decisive: the force of the payload can be reduced for a given mission; damage can be limited to a target of reduced size and to its immediate surroundings; it is thus possible to aim at military installations while limiting environmental damage.

At the same time, our own deterrent force is becoming more vulnerable. For it to remain credible, therefore, it must be made as invulnerable as possible. That requires efforts in three areas:

A. Improvement of Multiple-Payload MSBS Missiles as Main Means of Deterrence

Since this system is the least vulnerable to enemy attack, action must be taken:

1. To toughen the payload. This involves technically reaching the stage where an enemy antiballistic missile cannot destroy more than one of our attacking warheads (or more than one object in the case of a stream of nuclear warheads and decoys).

The term "toughening" covers an extremely large area. "Toughening" a nuclear weapon consists of assuring its survival at a certain distance from a nuclear explosion

caused by an antiballistic defense system weapon. For example, it is known that the energy released by a high-altitude nuclear explosion (i.e., beyond 50 to 100 km) is almost totally in the form of X-rays and emission of neutrons.

In the fissile environment of a nuclear payload, neutrons can start reactions capable of disturbing the explosion's planned development. Moreover, their effect on fissile materials may cause the internal release of significant amounts of energy.

X-rays absorbed at a very shallow depth by nuclear warhead materials create a deposit of energy at that very shallow depth, thus producing a true shock wave which, propagating in the structures, may cause very significant damage, by impulse distortion in particular.

Gamma radiation, X-rays and neutrons produce temporary or permanent defects which may be harmful to the proper operation of equipment, particularly electronic equipment.

In brief, the purpose of toughening is to guard against these and other, even more complex effects (electrons, electromagnetic impulses, etc.).

2. To protect submarines. Despite some advancements in submarine detection, the vulnerability of these vessels, whether missile-launching or attack submarines, is still very slight. Progress must still be made, however, with regard to hulls and hatch systems to make it possible for them to resist deeper submersion.

Without doubt, the most real danger is that of the submarine being spotted by infrared satellites at the time of launchings.

Finally, the importance of the protection which may be provided by nuclear attack submarines must be emphasized. In comparison to the Soviets and Americans, who have between 50 and 100, and the British, who have built about a dozen, the lag of France, which is just beginning, is notorious.

B. Improvement of SSBS [surface-to-surface strategic ballistic missile] System to Reduce its Vulnerability

To create a "casus belli," should the case arise, it seems necessary that part of the deterrent force should be on national soil.

The S3 system in stationary silos fulfills this function, but will become more vulnerable because of the improved accuracy of enemy missiles (SS20 in particular).

In an initial approximation, the probability of a warhead falling an "effective" distance from an underground target varies according to a Gaussian law. In practice, with the figures cited, this probability is increased by 10 or more. That means that whereas several hundred warheads used to be needed to neutralize the Albion Plateau, a few dozen, i.e., a small fraction of enemy strength, may be sufficient.

Toughening underground installations can definitely improve the situation, but could not substantially change the foregoing conclusion.

One solution, therefore, is the construction of movable missiles, corresponding to the SX missile project, with the missiles mounted on vehicles. The entire unit would move between the shelters of a network so that its exact position would not be known and the chances of escaping an attack would be increased. (This proposal, which is not without objections and problems, calls for realistic, detailed studies.)

C. Introduction of Observation Resources to Prevent Surprise.

Our technical, if not our financial capabilities may cause us to consider building three types of satellites: communications, observation and navigation. In view of our strategy, the use of a navigation satellite, capable of enabling submarines to establish their positions exactly, does not seem essential, however. On the other hand, with regard to telecommunications satellites, which we have decided to use, our country must have--besides a civilian observation satellite, SPOT--a military observation satellite, SAMRO (Military Optical Reconnaissance Satellite).

A navigation satellite, however, would be necessary in the event that France should decide to use cruise missiles.

The total cost, including launchers, for four satellites launched successively, and with a life of 3 years each, would be approximately F 5 billion (under 1980 economic conditions).

Detection resources of enemy ballistic missiles--This detection must be by radar. The fundamental problem is the application of the information thus obtained, since the warning period in Europe is only a few minutes.

Detection resources of submarines--Until now, antisubmarine devices have enjoyed total impunity in their operations. We must expect to see submarines attacking such devices in the near future.

There must be an effort to make substantial progress in the area of airborne magnetic detectors and their effective radius should be increased by a factor of 10 so that it reaches a few kilometers.

With regard to acoustic resources used by surface vessels, they must also be improved and these vessels must have the ability to lure and confuse submarine detection.

The importance of stationary passive monitoring systems in particular and of sonar submerged at great depths should be noted.

Finally, there seems to be no place for the "cruise missile" in such an array. Its slow response time makes it a poor antiforce weapon. It is also an anticity weapon which is inferior to the ballistic missile, insofar as it is a question of attacking a country that has made a definite civil defense effort and has rapid dispersion possibilities (slight automobile traffic in particular). Its advantage is in forcing the enemy to provide significant defenses to detect and stop it, its effectiveness resting first on the saturation of that defense. To assure the latter, it would therefore be necessary to build a very large force, perhaps beyond our means, whose dissemination on our soil would also not be without drawbacks.

Finally, the cost of this system would be very high. The development and production of 100 vehicles, each carrying two missiles with a kiloton payload, would already cost 6 billion 1980 francs (yet nothing indicates that this would be adequate!).

1.3. Cost of a Deterrent Policy

The following diagram summarizes in a very simplified manner--excluding payloads and submarines themselves--the amount and staggering of actual or estimated expenditures to assure the creation of the two land and sea components of the French deterrent force and its operation from 1970 to about 2000.

With all costs based on 1980 francs, this diagram suggests that for the items considered, i.e., essentially the launchers plus the infrastructure of the SSBS system alone, the creation and development of both systems cost approximately F 1.5 billion annually; keeping them in operating condition costs F 200 million per system per year.

It is also known that a nuclear submarine is valued at more than F 2 billion. This figure rises to about F 4 billion if we include the cost of missiles and payloads.

Annual Expenditures: Billions of 1980 Francs

II. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Tactical nuclear missiles, with a shorter range and less force than ballistic missiles, can play several roles, mainly: a limited deterrent role, but one which can be reinforced by appropriate protection of payloads; an intermediate-level role in the response to an attack, a level making it possible to demonstrate determination without, however, immediately reaching the level of maximum destruction.

Several systems exist or are proposed:

1. Tactical Air Force. This includes Mirage III and Jaguar aircraft, each capable of launching the AN.52 atomic bomb with a force of approximately 20 kilotons.

2. The Pluton tactical missile with a 120-km range, delivering missiles with a force of 10 to 20 kilotons. This system is organized into five nuclear artillery regiments, each comprising three batteries of two launching ramps, or a total of 30 ramps mounted on AMX 30 chassis. Each regiment includes about 1,000 men with 300 vehicles. Like the other tactical missiles, the Pluton represents another rung in the ladder of deterrence.

3. A Pluton successor (Hades) is being considered, with the same type of payload. Its range will be determined by considerations which are actually political. The 250-km range is acceptable if the units are deployed in the FRG--which does not appear advisable--or if, accepting the possibility of firing at Germany, we attempt instead to spread them out, for better protection, over national territory. On the other hand, if we intend to fire eastward over the FRG from units deployed in France, the range must be between 400 and 500 km. It is true that this latter hypothesis does not seem sound in view of the deterrent strategy which we have adopted.

4. A Mirage 2000-ASMP system in which the ASMP (medium-range air-to-surface missile) equipped with a kiloton payload is launched from aircraft at a distance of 100 km from the target at very low altitude.

5. Practical naval air force. Now being organized, it includes Super Etendard aircraft equipped with the AN.52 nuclear weapon and ready to take off from the aircraft carrier "Clemenceau"--already converted for that purpose--and the aircraft carrier "Foch," in the process of being converted.

The operational life of these various projects will extend at least until the year 2000.

A sixth tactical system is recommended by some, at the prompting of the "father of the neutron bomb," Sam Cohen, and the Livermore and Los Alamos "schools." It is the multiple ANT [Tactical Nuclear Weapon] proposed by Col (CR [expansion unknown]) Marc Geneste. Comprising 2,000 to 3,000 low-energy weapons (several kilotons or even subkilotons) which are not very vulnerable to a preventive attack in view of their number and mobility, it would permit a barrage of fire capable of constituting a real deterrent at a time when, from fear of all-out escalation, the strategic deterrent is presumed to lose its credibility.

This concept could be reinforced--and reinforced in the minds of its promoters--by using the "neutron bomb," whose greater antipersonnel effects, on the other hand, imply a reduction of related damage and risks incurred for underground armed troops.

If the Atomic Energy Commission seems prepared to build multiple ANTs and appears close to mastering the techniques for stronger radiation weapons, the question of cost and the question of strategic choice remain. For the time being, this system is not part of our deterrent mechanism. It is also difficult to see how it could fail to become part of a comprehensive apparatus, which would ultimately be NATO.

III. Conventional Weapons

3.1. Industrial Problems

1. Except for immediate recourse to the nuclear deterrent force and even in the event of using tactical nuclear force, conventional weapons constitute an essential aspect of the defense system. They play a complementary role, indeed even a principal role in a limited conflict, particularly outside Europe.

In this regard, we must make a distinction which has no equivalent for nuclear forces which are considered from a strictly national standpoint: the distinction between industrial independence and independence of armed forces. It is conceivable that all weapons needed for our defense could be developed and produced by national industry. This would be the hardest course, although the supply of raw materials would remain a limitation. But the greatest obstacle to be overcome would be the considerable amount of credits required. In practice, for the national budget, it would not be possible to maintain the entire array of weapons.

2. It is useful to recall how the problem was handled during the last 30 years.

Right after World War II, French ground, air and naval forces were rearmed with the aid of transfers of purchases of American and British war materiel. Up to the end of the fifties, the contribution of the United States and, to a lesser degree, of Great Britain, was decisive. However, since the beginning of this decade French weapon industries began to design and produce prototypes which were capable, if not of competing with the best foreign materiel, of at least attaining the performance of the somewhat less advanced materiel which those foreign countries were willing to sell to France.

Ten years later, toward the middle of the 60-70s, not only did materiel designed and built in France replace foreign weapons in our units, but abroad, on foreign markets, French weapons production began to compete with that of industries as powerful as the American or British industries. By the end of the decade, France was becoming an important exporter of arms, soon overtaking Great Britain and behind only the United States and Soviet Russia.

3. Today, with the increasing complexity of weapons systems, higher research and development costs, keener international competition than before, the future status of the French arms industry may be a source of some anxiety.

On the positive side--if we can call it that--the international market is not "saturated" and is even tending to grow. The acquisition of sovereignty by new nations, the Soviet Union's actions and the uneasiness which they cause, unequally distributed energy resources which must be protected and supply routes which must be kept open are creating vast needs.

Another positive factor is that France is solidly established in a large number of countries. Its technology is valued there. Only rarely does it place political conditions on the sale of its arms and does not speculate about the purchase of its arms to influence the governments of consumer countries.

Finally, on the whole, French technology is of high quality. It is recognized as such by competitive foreign industries which must often make their governments exert pressure to prevail.

The negative side of the situation, however, must not be overlooked: first of all, there is the lag of certain nonvital but nevertheless important sectors.

There is also the small amount of credits in France for studies and research and scientific instruments. This inferiority has been particularly obvious for 5 years.

Above all, there is the presence of very active competition since the end of the Vietnam war and the development of other countries' arms industries.

Finally, there is the relatively small size of the domestic market: limited numbers of orders are sufficient to satisfy our needs alone. Thus exportation has become urgent. For example, more than 75 percent of combat aircraft production and about 70 percent of tactical missiles production are destined for foreign customers. Without these exports, the industry could exist only with total government subsidy and in the manner of an arsenal. Moreover, costs would be prohibitive and research reduced to the sector of national programs alone.

4. Four solutions may be considered and are effectively being used: producing our conventional weapons ourselves when this is vital or economically advantageous, as we do in the case of our nuclear weapons, since we hardly run up against any technical limitations. Otherwise, producing our materiel through European cooperation. More rarely, for this has more drawbacks, turning to Atlantic cooperation. In exceptional cases, purchasing.

5. The strictly national solution has been applied successfully in the recent past, but it may become more difficult. Thus after the Mirage III (400 for France, 1,000 exports) and the Mirage F1 (150 for France, 450 exports at present) comes the Mirage 2000: its exports may well be less spectacular than those of its predecessors, since there is the competition of the Tornado in addition to that of the Americans. With regard to sea-to-sea missiles, the career of the Exocet family (MM.38, MM.40, AM.39) has been brilliant: more than 1,200 missiles sold. But it is certain that the English and the Germans, who have been our largest customers, are no longer ready to purchase the next generation from us as a matter of course. Or rather, if we build this materiel ourselves, they may well build competitive materiel, with or without American cooperation.

In the case of both examples mentioned, the economic situation is markedly more unfavorable than that which we have known. In no way does this mean that the national solution is impossible, but that its cost price for our defense will be considerably higher. The problem must therefore be considered in the general context of the national budget. With regard to this examination, a positive reply has been given for the Mirage 2000 in particular. A reply will have to be made in the case of future sea-to-sea missiles.

It is conceivable that the future very-short-range surface-to-air missile (SATCP), with its modest cost and a sizable foreign market, must also be produced as materiel. But this type of solution may well be limited.

6. Cooperation makes it possible to divide research and development costs and to reduce unit costs as a result of the quantity produced. For example, bilateral cooperation means a saving of 30 to 40 percent in comparison to a strictly national solution. Moreover, cooperation between European partners has advantages, in particular that of linking partners of the same level and resulting in a single production line.

Difficulties in this regard cannot be overlooked, however, and first off, the meaning of cooperation in the area of military materiel must be clearly defined. Cooperation must be understood as development by the general staff of nations cooperating in the same arms program, with technical and operating specifications, time limits, prices and maintenance conditions necessarily suitable to the participants. It must also be understood as agreement concerning the division of research and development operations, the share assigned to each cooperating partner and the conditions under which each partner's efforts will be coordinated to achieve production of prototypes. An understanding is therefore necessary in regard to production, maintenance, repairs and also sales of cooperatively produced materiel to third nations wishing to purchase it.

Various types of objectives--military, industrial, political--are thus interwoven and their compatibility is not obvious. Superimposition of the specifications required by each national army may well be harmful. Consider the Transall, simultaneously obliged to satisfy the FRG, with purely continental concerns, and France, with overseas aims. The Jaguar, designed primarily as a training and light support aircraft, has become--at the request of the British--a ground-attack aircraft taking off with twice the weight initially planned. As for the Alpha Jet, transformed into a fighter aircraft at the request of the Germans, it actually has two different models.

Whatever the case, with regard to arms, one of the essential concerns must be to preserve the national ability to produce complete weapons systems. From this standpoint, for simplicity and efficiency of industrial operation, the best system is undoubtedly the division of programs between countries and manufacturers so that each program is specifically assigned, with a balance between all programs. This is what has been done in the case of helicopters. It turns out that this is not easy to do, however, if only because of the small number of programs and their unequal importance. Moreover, the various governments involved want to have control over the development of the programs. But there is a solution for combining government requirements and the absolutely necessary interdependence of manufacturers: the established organization must include a single supervisory agency representing governments and a single coordinating agency representing manufacturers. A good example is the BPFA (Office of French-German Programs) and Euromissile (GIE: Economic Interest Group, 50% AEROSPATIALE [National Industrial Aerospace Company] and 50% MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm]). It is clear that it is still a laborious job to define and achieve joint goals which do not sacrifice individual goals. Product variations must be accepted. But within the scope of this solution, it has been possible to maintain the national ability to produce complete weapons systems thanks to a careful industrial policy (and one which is difficult to carry out, for the essential subunits and assembly supervision are obviously the most exacting tasks).

Cooperation between European partners has actually had a certain degree of success, as illustrated by the following examples.

A--The exportation of products manufactured jointly by AEROSPATIALE and MBB and marketed by the Euromissile GIE (Milan and Hot antitank missiles and Roland surface-to-air missile) has produced results which have made it possible to amortize part of the investment and to finance studies for future generations. The self-financing rate permitted by these results is approximately 50 percent, thus providing a substantial improvement of our defenses. It was also possible to sell the Roland license to the United States, because it involved a jointly manufactured product.

B--The trio of Gazelle, Puma and Lynx helicopters has been divided between Westland and AEROSPATIALE as follows: Gazelle and Puma: prime contractor, AEROSPATIALE, and subcontracting to Westland; Lynx: prime contractor, Westland, and subcontracting to AEROSPATIALE.

This arrangement has worked very well on the industrial level and less well commercially (although with 800 Gazelles and 642 Pumas sold). It will be noted in this regard that since the Germans were not a party to the agreement, our helicopters were in competition with the German BP 105. For that matter, a significant fraction of our exports is linked to cooperation. In any event, foreign orders have reached considerable levels in recent years: 10 billion in 1977; 12 billion in 1978; 18 billion in 1979.

Here again, this involves a fundamental contribution to our defense and to our economy as well. Thus, even if it is an exceptional year, it may be noted that in 1971 military aerospace sales represented more than one-third of our petroleum purchases.

In fact, under the present circumstances, a significant part of our financial capability, and consequently our industrial capability, depends on exports. Reducing this facet of our operations would require a budget subsidy to offset the lack of revenue and would also deprive us of competition which serves to stimulate and control our competitiveness.

7. Atlantic (or Franco-American) cooperation can only be cooperation limited in each instance to some materiel which both nations consider preferable to exchange because it is in both their interests. It has the drawback of systematically leading to two production lines, since we want to have one in Europe and it is a practice for the Americans to have one in their own country. It may have the advantage of providing us with technological achievements in certain cases, but the Americans are very cautious in this respect, if only because of our competition with them.

The Roland agreement and the General Electric-SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine Design and Production Company] agreement on the CFM 56 engine are two examples of this cooperation.

8. Purchasing--by possibly accepting compensatory subcontracting--is an acceptable solution when the materiel is not vital to the nation's security and when this solution proves best economically. This was the case of the KC 135 tankers. This would probably be the case if France decided to have long-range surface-to-air missiles, since their development costs are very high and purchasing would definitely be much more economical.

3.3. Trends in Conventional Weaponry

A--Fighter Aircraft

We know that with the exception of the Mirage IV strategic bomber, after the Mirage III series today's fighter aircraft mainly includes: the Mirage F1 interceptor, now equipped with Super 530 air-to-air missiles in conjunction with Cyrano IV radar, capable of attacking enemy aircraft at high altitudes and high speed; the tactical-support single-seater Jaguar, a product of French-British cooperation, in turn simultaneously equipped with air-to-surface missiles, antiradar missiles and air-to-air missiles; the Mirage 2000, equipped with the M53, whose production has just started, is on the verge of succeeding the Mirage F1. The Super 530 missile will be adapted for it, coupled for low-altitude missions with Doppler radar, now in production. As for the Mirage 4000, developed for the present at the prompting of its builder, it could one day compete with aircraft of the F.14 and F.15 type on foreign markets.

B--Transport Aircraft

With the exception of about 100 Nord-Atlas (Nord 2.500), 25 years old and flying at 315 km/hour for a distance of 1,100 km with a 5-ton load, needs are currently met by the Transall.

The Air Force, equipped with 50 aircraft from a first batch, has ordered 25 more planes which will be delivered between 1981 and 1984.

To the extent that a future transport plane would appear necessary, industrial reasoning would be to use the experience acquired with the Transall and to build it with European cooperation.

Studies are currently underway in France to characterize this aircraft, but are only in their initial stages. It may be said, however, that strategic (10,000 km) and tactical (2,000 km) strikes are among the characterization factors considered.

The 10,000-km mission is definitely alluring, but the penalties involved in comparison to the Transall-type mission (4,000 km) must be considered: four-engine instead of twin-engine, at least 50 percent more weight, longer takoff distances, higher development and production costs, as well as maintenance costs (at least double). The amount of the investment, which is about F 3-3.5 billion for a medium-range transport plane, approaches F 5 billion for a long-range transport aircraft. On the material level, there is no technical limitation on production of a wide-radius-of-action aircraft.

C--Tactical Missiles

France has acquired experience and an enviable clientele in this area, as evidenced by the following production examples: antitank missiles: following the first-generation SS11s and SS12s, the Milan (90,000 missiles ordered) and Hot (30,000 ordered) missiles through French-German cooperation; sea-to-sea missiles: Exocet family: MM.38, MM.40 and AM.39 (1,200 ordered), to which must be added the Otomat and Kormoran, through cooperation; surface-to-air missiles: Crotale and French-German Roland; air-to-air missiles: R.530, Super 530 and R.550.

For the future, it seems reasonable to continue along the same main lines and for the same reasons.

Antitank missiles, an essential component of conventional weaponry, would be produced through cooperation; the third generation is currently under study from this standpoint. Desired advancements concern their use under all conditions (nighttime, bad weather), penetration of payload and total missile autonomy from the time of firing thanks to appropriate homing guidance ("fire and forget").

With regard to sea-to-sea missiles, paralleling the development of existing national programs, a study is underway on a future supersonic missile with ramjet engine (current missiles are subsonic) and longer range, capable of reaching 200 km. A very-short-range surface-to-air missile (SATCP) is also under study and could be produced on the national level. A decision is expected in 1980.

The area of the long-range surface-to-air missile is difficult to penetrate, since it is tightly controlled by the United States and its cost is very high.

There is no European project at the present time and if ne[illegible]d, it would have to be purchased from the United States or produced under license (which was done in the case of the Hawk and which is being considered for the Patriot).

With regard to air-to-surface missiles, the development of the AS 30 homing missile with laser guidance is being completed. The AS 30 (4,000 were produced in a former radio-controlled version) is suited to ground-environment attack. For the battlefield, it is possible to consider a Roland derivative or to accept the Maverick offered by the Americans, but which seems somewhat heavy.

The cost of tactical missiles can obviously vary according to the programs and length of series.

For example, the development and industrialization costs of such a program are between 0.5 and 2 billion 1980 francs, depending on its degree of sophistication.

It is advantageous to note, however, that if the price of a tank is between F 4 and 8 billion, the price of a missile is 100 times less on the whole, when a direct hit reaches percentages thus far unknown.

D--Helicopters

Our helicopter production is among the best and in particular we are on a par with the large American firms. This is due, among other factors, to the advantage of offering a full range, even if it is limited upward to helicopters of approximately 8 tons. The position occupied is well reflected by several examples taken from a total of more than 5,000 helicopters (both civilian and military, as the two areas are closely interwoven in this case) sold to 100 different countries: the Alouette III, 1,400 sold; 800 orders have been received for the Gazelle, produced in cooperation with Westland (Great Britain), which can be equipped with six Hot missiles; the Puma, army tactical transport helicopter (600 ordered), produced jointly with Westland.

A new generation has just been developed and is being put into service. It includes: the Dauphin, one version of which, the SA 366 G, has been ordered by the U.S. Coast Guard for maritime observation; the Super Puma--a highly improved version of the Puma, capable of greater autonomy--which the Army and Navy are thinking of ordering.

E--Armored Vehicles

The modern tank is characterized by its protection, mobility and firepower: protection reinforced by maneuverability and acceleration, but especially partial substitution of composite materials and fibers for steel; greater mobility with mobile firing and night vision of battlefield; firepower, with 120-mm caliber, using more and more armor-piercing shells of high kinetic energy and high-direct-hit probability up to 2,000 meters.

The future French-West German tank, whose construction has just been planned, will apparently be along these lines. If the studies prove positive, 5,000 units could be produced for a joint investment of F 40 billion. The tank will weigh about 40 tons and will be equipped with one main 120-mm turret. This turret would be stabilized, thus making it possible to fire while moving, and would include light-intensifiers for night combat and laser telemetry. This tank would be capable of crossing streams and impervious to atomic, chemical and bacteriological attack.

Just as we may wonder whether aircraft has reached its final generations, we may also wonder whether this production will not actually be the armored vehicle's swan song. Its very concept may well be challenged, in any case its profile and its weaponry. Average cost today: F 5.5 million; projected 1990 cost: F 10 million (in 1980 francs).

F--Ships

With the exception of nuclear-powered missile-launching submarines, the French Navy, now 300,000 tons strong, is bound to decline critically between 1984 and 1988 for lack of having carried out the "plan bleu" planned several years ago to offset the obsolescence of equipment partly dating back to World War II. An aggravating circumstance: the transfer of new exclusive maritime zones, due to changes in Law of the Sea, has conferred on us responsibilities which would require larger naval forces.

The Navy estimates that it needs three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers which would handle short- or vertical-takeoff aircraft. These ships would weigh less than the "Foch" or "Clemenceau" conventional-powered aircraft carriers now in service (20,000 vs. 36,000 tons).

The fleet would also include antiaircraft corvettes to offset the gradual disappearance of squadron escorts equipped with Tartar antiaircraft missiles. These corvettes would be accompanied, particularly in the Mediterranean, by antisubmarine corvettes, several of which are now under construction. Attack submarines, a half-dozen of which are planned for the immediate future, helicopter-carrying aircraft and about 40 maritime patrol aircraft of the Breguet Atlantic type, but with improved equipment and antisubmarine and antisurface weapons, would complete the group.

Here again, with the generalization of third-generation missiles, we may wonder what will become of maritime operations and conventional ships. "Hydropters" are now under study, as well as surface vessels with bilge keels and flexible skirts.

IV. Effects

The weapons sector in general and the aerospace sector in particular undeniably have a considerable stimulative effect on industry as a whole. Not that they create techniques which would not be developed without them, but they speed up their appearance and application by utilizing them before the others. And the most economically valuable are soon adopted by other industries. A typical example is the miniaturization of electronic calculators, which was due to space vehicle and missile guidance requirements and whose expansion was almost instantaneous.

This is because, more than ever, technological advancement is a strategic target in itself. The ideal situation, in order not to be surprised--here again--is to cover all paths of development of new technologies. That results in research supported by military budgets, support which is absolutely necessary to maintain defense potential. In fact, economic studies show that even in the United States, in view of the amortization cycle of expenditures and limited growth rates, this level of activity could not be self-supported by private companies. It has been possible to speak of "forced rhythm."

Conversely, all of this military research and development activity, which precedes civilian activity in a way, affects the civilian aerospace sector first and then industrial operations in general. This ranges from basic scientific results to civilian versions of military aircraft to many types of equipment, including the calculators mentioned above.

Some of the most significant examples are listed below.

Space Operations. The first national launcher, the Diamant, was directly derived from the development programs for what was to become the SSBS and MSBS. Even today, the ability to produce launchers and satellites is closely tied to the ability to produce ballistic missiles and even if the propulsion has changed, success in this area is a significant gage of the credibility of our deterrent force: anyone who masters the technique of putting a satellite into orbit with accuracy can likewise place a warhead on target.

Civilian aviation obviously benefits from the work carried out for military aviation: scientific and applied research; equipment and systems; civilian versions of military aircraft; testing and possibly production methods.

Among the most important specific examples: fibers and composite materials and inertial navigation systems, which are today part of the equipment of new civilian aircraft.

Another kind of effect, just as important, is financial support provided by military programs for civilian programs (this is true of airplanes but includes helicopters as well). In all American companies, significant sums derived from the profitable results of military programs are allocated for self-financing of civilian programs.

The same is true in the case of AEROSPATIALE, where a large part of self-financing comes from the profits on military programs (profits obtained mainly from exportation, it is true, and which therefore cannot be considered a direct effect of the national defense effort).

Conversely, and this is what results from the symbiosis of civilian and military activities, with the common body of basic research the military benefits from the efforts of civilian aeronautics. Mainly in two areas: rationalization and reduction of costs: the civilian sector's most stringent financial requirements result in advancements from which military production automatically benefits. Cost analysis and "design to cost" were first introduced into industry for transport aircraft. The civlian sector's own innovations: greater life expectancy, reliability, safety and simplification of maintenance are areas in which these innovations are most striking. In France, production of the automatic testing system for ATEC [expansion unknown] equipment, developed by AEROSPATIALE for the Concorde and subsequently applied to Mirage aircraft, is a typical example.

Finally, it may be noted that civilian aviation's share of the aerospace industry's sales has risen. Approximately: at the world level, from 12.5 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 1976; in France, from 20 percent in 1960 to 26 percent in 1978.

Civilian Helicopters. Historically, because of their cost, helicopters were first used as military vehicles, from which civilian versions were then derived. This was the case in France for the Gazelle and Puma. It must be noted that the opposite has occurred in the recent past in France in the case of the Dauphin and Ecureuil. This change is a result of the development of civilian helicopter applications and the upheaval in the distribution of clientele in recent years.

In the case of AEROSPATIALE, the development has been the following (percentages for total number of aircraft):

	civilian	military
1976	23	77
1977	71	29
1978	57	43
1979	89	11

The most recent trends are intended to characterize from the outset stages capable of different versions. This is the case of the Super Puma, whose first version was civilian but whose military version was conceived from the outset.

With regard to technology, it may be noted that plastics were first introduced into hubs and blades for military helicopters. Among other reasons, the risk of rupture from the impact of a shell is much smaller with plastic components.

Related industries, and especially the materials industries, benefit from the work carried out for the aerospace industry. The spread of using light alloys, special steels and composites are past and present examples. The use of titanium, which has spread more slowly than expected but whose prospects are still good, could be the next example. Mastery of these technologies is an important factor for the competitiveness and independence of all our industry.

Conversely, the independence of our weapons industry requires a minimum level of related industries and as stated above, the contribution of military credits is essential for maintaining this level. This is one of the sectors in which the independence of our defense and our industrial policy are closely linked. It is uncertain whether coordination of goals through planning could be improved.

In any event, a certain number of areas can be mentioned in which the effort must at least be maintained and in certain cases reinforced.

With regard to materials, we depend on American suppliers for products such as some of the most advanced fireproof fibers or alloys.

Among components, we can cite monolithic components (thin-film circuits) and certain hydraulic components.

In the case of equipment, infrared optical and optoelectronic systems deserve special mention. We may also add millimeter-wave detection and synthetic antennas (antennas with fixed parts, where the movement of a mobile antenna is replaced by an appropriate combination of signals produced by a separate computer).

It should be noted that for many new types of equipment in which mechanical parts are replaced by electronic components, and for optimizing guidance methods as well, it is important to make an effort in the area of software.

In other cases, we are in a good position, but it is essential for us to stay in first place. For example, this is the case with propulsion: powder propellants and ramjets for missiles, small turbines for helicopters.

In general, even while depending on foreign suppliers for some basic components, today we have no striking technological inferiority, but such inferiority may appear in several years and render our materiel noncompetitive on the battlefield as well as commercially. With the present effort, we are tending to lose ground rather than to gain any. A financial supplement, which by the way is small in comparison to our defense expenditures as a whole (several thousandths), is undoubtedly essential to preserve the future. An effort in this direction has been made in the 1980 budget.

An examination of the effects of the weapons industry could not be completed without mentioning the impact on employment and training. Quantitatively, the weapons industry employs nearly 300,000 persons, or 4.5 percent of the gainfully employed population working in industry. Qualitatively, it is a high-technical-level industry which makes a very significant contribution to the advancement of the national industrial structure through its orders for high-quality equipment and the highly skilled personnel whom it trains. Contrary to what has sometimes been claimed, the weapons industry does not unduly enlist valuable personnel; it supplies them.

Roger Chevalier--Born in Marseille on 3 May 1922, a former Ecole Polytechnique student and general aeronautical engineer, he is one of the leading French specialists in tactical missiles and ballistic and space systems. The general technical director (1970) and subsequently a member of the board of directors of the National Industrial Aerospace Company--SNIAS (1974)--Roger Chevalier has been its associate general director since 1976. He is an officer of the Legion of Honor and a commander of the National Order of Merit.

Pierre Dabezies--Born in Casablanca on 9 February 1925, he first pursued a military career: Coetquidan Military Inter-Services School, naval paratroop officer, French and American war schools, colonel (CR). A professor of public law and political science, since 1967 Pierre Dabezies has pursued a university career. A professor at the University of Paris I and the Institute for Political Studies, he also directs the Sorbonne's Center for Defense Policy Studies. The author of numerous works, including "La Guerre Revolutionnaire" [The Revolutionary War], he is an officer of the Legion of Honor.

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DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES FORMULATED AFTER COLLOQUIUM

Paris PARADOXES in French Apr-May 80 pp 171-174

[Text] 1. The security and defense of France constitute an essential obligation in a world in which no international order based on peace and respect for international law has been established and does not appear likely to be established in future years.

France is a member of the Atlantic Alliance, whose main power is by far the United States. France participates in European cooperation and has concluded with the Soviet Union agreements intended to give shape to a policy of detente and understanding. This diplomatic action, linked to necessary security requirements, does not in any way release France from its defense duties. Much to the contrary. For a certain time, some people were able to pretend that this was a stable world in which national defense--a principle more than a necessity--was secondary. But in view of events, unrest, force being extended now and again in unusual ways, the trend toward a certain multipolarity ... no French diplomacy is credible without a constant effort to achieve suitable and modern defense. The Yom Kippur War, the oil crisis, the multiplicity of local conflicts and the invasion of Afghanistan have shown those who were still doubtful the extent to which international order is constantly being challenged. No one can foresee the extremes to which the causes of world instability may lead. This is why France is obliged to make the continual adaptation and modernization of its defenses one of our highest national requirements.

2. French defense can only have a national character. American strategy considers European and French security only from the standpoint of U.S. security interests. The political and strategic goals of the leading European powers are not the same as our own. Finally, any defense relies on civic fellowship and patriotic sentiment, without which any plan is devoid of effectiveness. Public mindedness and patriotism are dependent on the nation.

Therefore, France cannot assign responsibility for its security and defense to any government or to any foreign command. It must reinforce in the heart of its children the will to accept a responsibility which belongs only to them.

In this regard, our nuclear arsenal plays a dual role: as a military tool, through deterrence it guarantees our community's protection in the event of danger; as a political tool, it frees us from protection or guardianship which would take away our freedom on the pretext of assuring it.

It is not a question of "neutralism": our alliances are still determinate. But in view of our geographic position and our interests, it is a question of France remaining master of its choices and its destiny regardless of what happens.

3. Deterrence is at the core of our defense system. We cannot endorse a strategy of flexible or gradual response which, in an effort to defer, avoid or ward off all-out escalation, results in a revival of the concept of "battle," from which Europe and our country--whether free or not--would ultimately perish.

Our necessary invulnerability is primarily based on submarine weaponry, since missile-launching submarines, by their very nature, represent the deterrent weapon par excellence. For our country, their optimum number appears to be about 10, with the understanding that nuclear-powered attack submarines must also be built to protect them.

In addition to this oceanic force, our strategy must be based on air forces or movable missiles suited to our urban and geographic environment, even missiles in silos, provided that the latter are protected by being buried very deep.

A complement to this invulnerability effort is necessary. It includes short-range atomic forces, for which accuracy is essential; traditional armored forces representing an indispensable barrier and initial defense capability, significant both militarily and politically; protection of sensitive ground, air and coastal points by the three armed services; finally, civilian protection against radioactive fallout.

4. All deterrent forces must be subject to constant modernization, which simultaneously involves destructive capacity, range, guidance, resistance and accuracy.

In this regard, some choices are essential, which must be motivated by two types of considerations. On one hand, considering our limited resources, the essentials must not be sacrificed by taking on an excessive financial burden, as in the case of weapons which--regardless of their value--have a secondary nature in comparison to the primary requirements. On the other hand, these choices must remain within the scope of our deterrent strategy, without leading us to copy arsenals and strategies which go beyond our problem.

In this respect, three stumbling blocks are to be avoided. The technical stumbling block: our capabilities should be put in the service of a strategy that is also subject to our policy, and not the other way around. The traditionalist stumbling block: we must guard against the waste and distortions which sometimes result from the preferences, aspirations and rivalries of weapons or armed forces. Finally, it happens that militarily attractive substitutions are used by some people as alibis for political aims contrary to our independence but who dare not speak their name.

This is the way in which military service presently imposes an excessive burden on the armed forces, for volunteers and professionals represent the bulk of the personnel required for deterrent forces and field forces. The law on national service must allow the armed forces to reduce, in proportion to these requirements, their draft quotas by making it possible for the young men called to be assigned to other tasks.

In brief, choices and priorities are the key words in a system which must be improved and not challenged by applying to it criteria which are not in keeping with the aims and requirements of a national defense effort based on deterrence.

5. The defense of overseas territories and departments, and more generally--in view of the agreements linking us to certain countries and situations which may possibly arise--our distant field capabilities, requires traditional units, some stationary and others capable of being quickly engaged.

With regard to overseas territories and departments, stationary units must be rather large and have sufficiently modern materiel to be able to act independently of any reinforcements. As for special field forces, the main emphasis--when stopover authorizations are risky--is to be placed on making long-radius-of-action means of transport available to them, which they presently lack.

As the converse of deterrent forces, possible cooperation with foreign units may be considered in this regard, but in any event France must have its own means of communication (telecommunication) and command.

6. In general, our industrial capability is equal to our defense resources; the derivative effects of our military effort are also such that it can proceed unhampered. To keep abreast of the most advanced developments, however, our research and development policy should be continued and reinforced, for without it we would be left behind very quickly.

In reality, the dual problem of our independence and the choices to be made arises once again.

If we are able to do everything, we do not necessarily have to do everything alone--except in the case of nuclear weapons, which must be national--for financial reasons as well as for other reasons involving, for example, the diversification or scope of our exports. For our possible cooperation with other nations, therefore, guidelines and limitations must be established so that they do not jeopardize either our autonomy or our effectiveness on the pretext of serving our interests in the short term.

Limited cooperation in terms of the number of partners, with a single prime contractor and avoiding the superimposition of national specifications capable of destroying the advantages which may be expected from such operations. Cooperation which, as it proceeds, also does not cause us to forfeit our capabilities and does not lead us to become totally dependent one day on foreign industry and planning departments.

With regard to choices, it must never be forgotten that sophistication is not an end in itself. Our undertaking must remain strictly within the scope of the established strategy.

Our overall defense effort must be maintained, of course, even stepped up if possible, with a reversal of the trend--justified by a legitimate concern for improving the status of personnel--to increase operating credits at the expense of Title V credits. In any case, the fact remains that the budget package will still be too modest for rushing into secondary programs.

7. Technical development, the source of changes in the ratio of the two superpowers' forces and strategy, gives rise to interpretations which--far from being totally unbiased--cause some people to question either deterrence in general, and our deterrent system in particular, or even the national character of our defense.

This trend should be countered by reaffirming our concern for independence, in which connection the preceding conclusions make it possible to state that for France it represents a requirement which it can meet. If this policy implies the possibility of remaining neutral in a conflict which would not be our own, it is not synonymous with neutrality, and much to the contrary, it adds value to our alliances. Our determination to remain ourselves and to provide for our own protection is the gage of a country at once aware of its responsibilities to itself and of its solidarity with its neighbors and allies.

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BRIEFS

TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT READIED--Heavy transport aircraft are being readied to carry reinforcements to the CAR [if needed]. [Text] [Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 17 Jan 81 p 5]

CSO: 3100

COUNTRY SECTION ITALY

FIGURES ON LABOR MARKET SITUATION FOR 1980

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 7 Jan 81 p 5

[Article: "Employment Outlook in Italy Still Bright"]

[Text] 1) Employment Expansion Still Holding

The positive cycle of the labor market which started in 1977 does not seem to have lost its momentum. Even though the results of last October's labor force quarterly survey are not yet available, no change is expected in the trend which in July's survey showed an increase in employment of 299,000 workers compared with the same month of last year--accounted for by an increase of 252,000 and 153,000 workers, respectively, in the tertiary and industrial sectors, and a decrease of 104,000 [as published] workers in the agricultural sector.

Averaging the findings of the first three studies of 1980, the number of workers employed indicates an increase of 314,000 workers over and above the 97,000 of 1978 and the 218,000 of 1979.

The implications of other indicators are unclear. As far as the Wage Supplement Fund is concerned, there was a strong decline in the hours of compensation granted in the first quarter of the year (-45.2 percent); little change in the second quarter (-5 percent); an increase in October (+83.2 percent). Even the results of the ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute] monthly employment survey of large industry are inconsistent: during the first 9 months of the year, employment in this sector declined 0.5 percent but the number of hours worked was up 3.2 percent.

The many unfavorable signals from large industry (decline in employment, greater recourse to Wage Supplement Fund, etc.), do not seem, at least for now, to have any repercussions on other sectors which are still enjoying a satisfactory level of activity.

2) Unskilled Labor Market: First Difficulties?

Some comforting findings on the status of the unskilled labor market resulted from the Center for Business Statistics monthly survey of advertisements in the employment section of 18 major daily newspapers.

Table 1 shows, as usual, the level of demand for work and the level of advertised positions, as well as the number of persons advertising their availability as a

proportion of the number of advertised positions. This last figure is the thermometer of the market's state of health; it rises when the increase in demand is greater than the supply of available jobs, and vice versa. In recent developments the index rose in 1978 compared with 1977, but it was already beginning to decrease in the second half of the year, so that in 1979 the level of advertised demand was considerably smaller than the level of advertised openings. This decline in the index continued during 1980. As far as demand was concerned, it declined 11.7 percent in the first semester but increased 8.4 percent in the quarter from July to September and 5.4 percent in the 2-month period from October to November. The rise in demand may be a sign of increasing difficulties in job hunting. Advertised jobs increased strongly during the first semester (+39.6 percent); the expansion held on through the next quarter (+20.7 percent), but fell drastically in the last 2-month period (-0.8 percent).

Changes in the index of positions wanted as a proportion of advertised openings are even more striking: a decline of 37.1 percent in the first semester was followed by a further decline of 13.2 percent in the summer quarter and by an increase of 5.6 percent in the 2-month period from October to November.

All in all, the strong positive dynamic which prevailed until the first half of 1980 clearly lost momentum during the last months: an obvious symptom that recession is affecting also the labor market.

3) Skilled Labor Market Losing Ground

The monthly survey undertaken by the center, with the support of Unioncamere and Isfol on skilled labor job openings, taking into account the number and size of advertisements in the 18 daily newspapers and the characteristics of each (number of positions, location, occupation, type of degree, age, foreign languages spoken, etc.) reveals new, interesting findings through October. To reiterate, the survey concerns approximately 100,000 annual job offers; it involves a very particular sector of the labor market--top management, administrators and technicians, and midlevel management, plus highly skilled factory-workers--which, due to its nature, is highly sensitive to the general state of the economy. The hiring of highly skilled personnel often becomes for the firm a true investment.

As per Table 2, advertised jobs for qualified personnel strongly declined: the number of advertised openings increased 11.3 percent during the first quarter (compared with the same period of the previous year); it declined 1.9 percent in the second and 13.2 percent in the third quarter. After a strong decline in July and August and no change in September, it increased slightly in October (+4.9 percent). If instead of the number of openings, one takes under consideration help-wanted space purchased, the impression is less negative: +11.2 percent in the first quarter, +3.4 percent in the second, -2.1 percent in the third and +5.2 percent in October.

During the second half of the year the situation for the skilled labor market noticeably worsened; such worsening could be a dangerous symptom forewarning a similar trend which could affect the entire labor market.

Furthermore, if one takes into account the location where jobs were being offered, in the first 10 months of the year there was an increase of 6.9 percent in the north and 13.4 percent in the center and a decline of 2.1 percent in the south in addition to a decline of 4.2 percent for other unspecified Italian locations. In very strong decline were position offerings in foreign locations--particularly in OPEC countries (-60 percent)--which fell by one-third due to serious political and financial difficulties sustained by certain sectors of foreign labor markets (large plants, etc.).

4) Job Offers from Industry Fall Sharply

A very troublesome aspect of the present skilled-market crisis lies in the strong decline of job offers from industry. During 1979 in comparison with 1978, there was a fairly sizable expansion in the chemical and housing sectors--but a moderate contraction in the food, "other manufacturing," and mechanical industries, and a very strong one in the textile sector.

During the first 10 months of 1980, on the other hand, all sectors of industry registered a very strong decline (Table 3). The tertiary sector, which had not performed brilliantly in 1979, fares much better; compared with the first 10 months of 1979, the decline in advertised jobs for skilled labor within the wholesale and retail trade industries was matched by an expansion within credit and services as well as the miscellaneous category "other."

The relative depression in the skilled labor market within the industrial sector, which worsened during the last months, is a troublesome problem, as we mentioned, and it emphasizes the precarious nature of the industrial sector's present crisis.

5) University Graduates: Economists, Chemists and Engineers on Top

The skilled labor market survey also appears useful for monitoring the effectiveness of the higher education system in relation to the economic system. Table 4 shows the number of graduates by degree in 1979 and the demand for graduates derived from the skilled-labor-market survey. The relation between supply and demand of new graduates during that year provides a rough indication of the market value of the various university degrees.

In spite of its limitations, the comparison sheds light on some very interesting aspects of this analysis. The number of advertised openings in relation to university graduates is much higher for scientific degrees (168 per 1,000) than for non-scientific degrees (98 per 1,000). Among the former, the highest relation of offers to graduates is in chemistry degrees (540 per 1,000), followed by engineering (365) and by "other fields" (343). Well below average are the other degrees, particularly in the natural sciences--biology and geology (44 per 1,000), mathematics and physics (37) and medicine (12). Within the scientific group, graduates in economics are by far the most sought after (774 per 1,000); the index is low for law (50) and lowest for political science (4).

Obviously, the probability that a graduate will find work is not only dependent on the relation between the supply and demand of graduates, but also on the opportunities available for self-employment, and within government (whose openings only exceptionally appear in daily newspapers).



1) Quarterly Index of Unskilled Labor Job Applicants and Openings

—— 2) Applicants
---- 3) Openings
···· 4) Applicants per 100 Openings

Table 1 - Index of Unskilled Labor Supply and Demand Based on Advertisements in Major Daily Newspapers (1969 = 100)

Year & Month	Job Applicants	Job Openings	Applicants per 100 Openings
1977	128.3	87.5	68.0
1978	131.9	71.2	80.7
1979	105.3	82.0	55.1
1979 January	109.4	74.1	64.3
February	150.2	84.0	77.9
March	137.0	78.0	76.5
April	103.9	83.4	54.3
May	136.5	87.1	68.9
June	74.6	84.7	38.4
July	44.0	54.0	35.5
August	22.5	34.6	31.6
September	140.2	119.7	51.1
October	138.4	90.1	66.9
November	133.1	102.7	56.4
December	74.4	81.6	39.7
1980 January	100.7	108.3	40.5
February	138.4	114.3	52.8
March	120.0	129.4	40.4
April	95.8	105.6	39.5
May	98.2	120.3	35.6
June	75.5	108.1	30.4
July	40.4	64.6	28.4
August	25.6	41.6	26.8
September	158.1	145.3	47.4
October	155.7	102.0	66.5
November	130.5	89.3	63.7

Table 2 - Index of Skilled Labor Openings Advertised in Major Daily Newspapers (1978 = 100)

Year & Month		Number of Job Openings	Space Purchased
1978		100.0	100.0
1979		101.8	114.6
1979	January	101.5	117.8
	February	98.5	124.5
	March	99.2	124.0
	April	93.0	111.7
	May	107.8	121.4
	June	138.1	154.8
	July	103.7	82.0
	August	41.7	28.4
	September	143.8	159.5
	October	102.7	130.9
	November	112.8	132.3
	December	81.8	89.3
1980	January	108.2	125.5
	February	112.3	149.8
	March	113.7	132.2
	April	102.3	122.6
	May	114.2	141.5
	June	111.6	137.0
	July	59.8	64.7
	August	26.0	23.2
	September	140.6	176.4
	October	109.0	138.7

Table 3 - Skilled Labor Openings by Economic Activity of the Requesting Firm

Activity	First 10 months 1979	First 10 months 1980	% change between the first 10 months of 1980 & the first 10 months of 1979
Food and tobacco industries	3,121	2,762	- 11.5
Textile industries	2,781	2,787	+ 0.2
Metal and mechanical industries	13,005	11,912	- 8.4
Chemical industries	6,611	6,241	- 5.6
Other manufacturing industries	6,345	5,965	- 6.0
Construction industries	9,217	5,989	- 35.0
Wholesale and retail trade	5,197	4,312	- 17.0
Credit and insurance	2,736	3,347	+ 22.7
Services	6,915	8,125	+ 17.5
Others	18,012	22,745	+ 26.3
TOTAL	74,325	74,185	- 0.2

Source: Center for Business Statistics, Isfol, Unioncamere

Table 4 - New Graduates and Advertised Openings for Graduates, 1979, by Type of Degree

Degrees	1979 graduates (1)	Job openings for graduates (2)	Openings for graduates per 1,000 new graduates (2):(1) x 100=(3)
Medicine and surgery	14,792	177	12
Agriculture and veterinary medicine	1,738	188	108
Chemistry and industrial chemistry	752	406	540
Pharmacy	2,203	263	119
Engineering	11,389	4,159	365
Mathematics and physics	2,945	108	37
Natural, biological, geological sciences	5,323	236	44
Other scientific fields	5,801	1,991	343
Total scientific degrees	44,043	7,528	168
Economics and business, statistical sciences	3,481	2,695	774
Law	7,233	363	50
Political science	2,696	12	4
Other nonscientific degrees	19,134	129	67
Total nonscientific degrees	32,544	3,199	98
Unspecified degree	-	3,894	-
TOTAL DEGREES	77,487	14,611	189

Source: Center for Business Statistics, Isfol, Unioncamere

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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN

SUAREZ' FALL, SOCIALIST TAKEOVER PREDICTED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 5 Jan 81 pp 18, 19, 20, 22

[Article by Jose Manuel Arija]

[Excerpts] Will Adolfo Suarez survive as president of the government throughout 1981? The prospect is unlikely. This year is starting out dragging behind the problems which already existed 12 months ago. Only the autonomy question appears to be comparatively less tense. But the economic crisis, unemployment and terrorism continue to accompany the president of the government like a shadow, as they have since he was elected to the post.

All the opposition political parties are already predicting that Adolfo Suarez only has enough steam for a few months. They consider it very unlikely that he will last the whole year, and, with true skepticism they doubt that he will hold out until the next general elections. Suarez' stability at the head of the government thus becomes the most important unknown factor in politics for 1981. It will be a real challenge, and Suarez will regard it as such, so that it would not be rash to think that if the current president of the government manages to survive 1981 he will keep his mandate until the 1983 elections.

If terrorism and unemployment continue to the same degree, with the government as weak as before, there will be no need for a crystal ball to predict a new charge of the light socialist brigade in coming months. Whether the offensive will be carried out with the lances of censure or with the gloved fist of the coalition government will depend on the circumstances: internal tensions of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Party], importance of the moment, etc.

But moving on from suppositions to foreseen events, 1981 is going to be the year of political congresses. And what congresses await us! The respective "critical sectors" of each party have been warming up their motors for months, and putting their respective governing bodies on the alert.

First, in chronological order, will be the congress of the Catalonian communists of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], followed by that of the UCD, and later those of the PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia], EE [Basque Left] and PCE [Spanish Communist Party], all planned to come before summer; in September there will be that of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Party].

The centrist and socialist congresses will have a factor in common: the battle of their respective oppositions to obtain representation in their governing bodies for the different internal factions. The "apparatchiks" want their executive boards to be homogeneous, and therefore elected by the majority system. Their "critics," on the contrary, want everyone to be represented at the top, and for this they must be elected by the proportional system.

The former argue in defense of their thesis that a party is effective and responsible when it is directed by a team sharing the same tactics and without rifts; the latter reply that there is true democracy in a party when all its components feel that they are represented by those who lead them.

If the UCD opposition manages to bring in proportional representation at the end of January, the example would act as a spur, and would smooth the way for the socialist critics. On the contrary, if the majority position should prevail in the elections for the executive board of the UCD, it would reinforce the same thesis supported by the present leadership of the PSOE.

With some variations, a similar problem exists in the communist ranks, which could put an end to the Leninist practice of democratic centralism. The charge of factionalism has already been brought up in the PSUC, with the appearance of a pro-Soviet movement which defends the invasion of Afghanistan, and which could create serious problems among the Catalonian communists.

In the PCE the confrontation takes another form, and is caused by the internal democratization of the party. For the most open sector of the Eurocommunists, the way their organization can be changed is by the retirement of their old leaders and the statutory reform which governs the composition of the various executive committees.

The communist picture becomes still more complicated when one realizes that the Workers Commissions [CCOO] will also hold its congress. The CCOO has been postponing the date of its congress for a year--in violation of its own statutes--so as to avoid internal tensions. Now the closeness of the dates of the party congress and the trade union congress could raise new factors of disagreement.

But the elections of 1981 do not end here. This is the year when the autonomous parliaments of Andalusia and Galicia are due to be elected. The importance of these elections will lie in the fact that the opposition parties could carry off the victory in these parliaments. If this should happen, the isolation of the central government would increase if it found itself with a "periphery" completely dominated by other political forces.

Nor will 1981 be an easy year in the municipal area. If the political parties, in their coming congresses, are going to devote special attention to drawing up plans with a view to the 1983 general elections and to preparing differing strategies, the same thing could occur in the municipalities.

Now that the first part of the mandate has been carried out, where the municipal governments devoted a large part of their efforts to establishing themselves, to finding out about problems and clearing up their economies, the second stage will probably be to take the offensive.

The socialists, who dominate the principal cities of the country, have already decided to give priority to their municipal policy. At least, this was the agreement at the last meeting of the executive committee of the PSOE in 1980. Urban infrastructure, health and social policies--schools, housing, hospitals, etc.--are the crash objectives which have been established, and here tensions could arise with the respective ministries.

As for the sociolabor field, unemployment will continue to increase throughout the whole year, according to all predictions. What is going to happen to the hundreds of thousands of unemployed whose unemployment insurance will expire? A bleak prospect, with latent possibilities of explosiveness, for which there is no solution at the moment. The same situation will force the employers to continue the series of shutdowns of their companies.

With this specter of unemployment, it does not seem to be in the cards that 1981 would be full of strikes and conflicts. The trade unions will prefer to devote their activity to the preservation of jobs. The UGT [General Union of Workers] will renew the Framework Bargaining Agreement (AMI), emphasizing the maintenance of purchasing power, productivity and union rights. The CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] will try to have the employers comply with the lower part of the new wage scale that is being negotiated, and to avoid what happened in 1980, where the socialist union obtained an average increase at the upper ceiling.

For their part, the CCOO, having already abandoned the topic of mobilizations, will try to recover the ground lost in joint negotiations. They will have no other recourse than to join the AMI, either signing the agreements in parallel from outside, or looking for a discreet opening which would allow them to quietly join the AMI, which up until yesterday they condemned.

The renewal of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the United States, the process of admitting our country into the Common Market, the development of Spanish relations with the Maghreb area, and the subject of whether or not to join NATO will be the most important international policy questions during 1981.

The continued existence of American bases in Spain will not be questioned either by the government or by the socialist opposition, who in this way will delay our country joining NATO. As for the contents of the Friendship Treaty, negotiations will be more difficult, because tougher Spanish demands are anticipated, such as compensation for the cities where the bases are located.

In 1981 we will still be outraged and saddened by criminal terrorism. There are few who doubt this. The goal seems to be at least to lower the level of violence. For the first time, the police are beginning to get information about the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] terrorists, and they have a serious and meticulous plan, with a staff which thinks, plans and carries out the struggle against the ETA, something which did not happen until Juan Roson arrived at the Ministry of Defense.

The loss of popular support for terrorist violence in the Basque Country, and the creation of the autonomous Basque police are two important cards to be played this year.

To sum up, 1981 presents a picture full of difficulties and complexities, as we have outlined here.

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CSO: 3110

COUNTRY SECTION UNITED KINGDOM

'TIMES' JOURNALIST DISCUSSES WEST'S VIEW OF DETENTE

LD121345 London THE TIMES in English 12 Feb 81 p 8

[Article by Arrigo Levi: "West Stands Form to Prevent Cold War"]

[Text] Three Western leaders have recently offered their thoughts on the future of East-West relations and world peace. President Reagan in his first news conference and in his talk with American editors; President Giscard d'Estaing in his ample Entretien televise; Herr Helmut Schmidt in his Bundestag speech; and the French president and West German chancellor again in their Paris communique, have told what, in their view, should come "after detente."

Sharing a wish to prevent a new cold war, the three leaders have told what the conditions are for the resurrection of an improved detente, although the word "detente" is out of favour and new labels are suggested.

Comparisons are hateful, but I shall award first prize in this leaders' competition to President Giscard d'Estaing for an extraordinary performance covering the whole picture of international relations, while second place ought to go to Herr Schmidt.

President Reagan's views and world philosophy seem to be much less elaborate, while other European leaders, who have kept silent, cannot complain if President Giscard d'Estaing and Herr Schmidt have once more taken the leadership of Europe. In any case, their Paris communique represents the European majority view.

What is more important is that President Reagan's occasionally rough thoughts and the two European statesmen's refined analyses appear to be much nearer than might have seemed possible.

President Reagan starts from a somewhat simplified view of past detente; "a one-way street the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims." We know that Europeans attribute a more positive value to the detente process, which, in their view, has powerfully contributed to the present political cries of the Soviet system.

But it now turns out that President Giscard d'Estaing's reservations about old detente are quite similar to President Reagan's. What detente meant, according to the French president, was peaceful coexistence between East and West "living together without making war," but also "a change in the positions of influence in the world, which has largely taken place in favour of the Soviet Union." The two presidents are equally determined to put an end to such one-sided detente.