

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9548

13 February 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 6/81)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9548

13 February 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 6/81)

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Saddam Husayn Compared to Nasir, Extolled (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 26 Dec 80-1 Jan 81).....	1
--	---

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

Muhammad Haykal Discusses At-Ta'If Summit (Muhammad Haykal; THE SUNDAY TIMES, 1 Feb 81).....	10
---	----

IRAN

Bani-Sadr Attacks Opponents (James Dalgleish; REUTERS, 1 Feb 81).....	12
--	----

Country Reportedly Obtaining Arms Secretly (Peter Deeley, Peter Durisch; THE OBSERVER, 25 Jan 81).....	14
---	----

Oil Contracts With USSR, Spain, India Signed (Terry Povey; FINANCIAL TIMES, 13 Jan 81).....	16
--	----

Briefs Reza Sends Message to Women	17
---------------------------------------	----

MAURITANIA

Economy Minister Discusses Economic Policy Decision (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 Nov 80).....	18
--	----

IDA Grants Loan for Gorgol Irrigation Project (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 Nov 80).....	19
--	----

Briefs	
Irrigation Loans	20
Customs Tariffs	20
Hodh Echargui Economic Development	20
Application of Islamic Law	20

- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sonimex Price Increases	20
MOROCCO	
Article Analyzes Pluralism Tolerated Under Monarchy (Hamid Barrada; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Dec 80).....	22
WESTERN SAHARA	
Paris Magazine Interviews POLISARIO Chief (Mohamed Abdelaziz Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81).	28
Libya Possibly Behind POLISARIO Ship Boarding (Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Dec 80).....	31
Briefs	
Diplomatic Relations With Costa Rica	33

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SADDAM HUSAYN COMPARED TO NASIR, EXTOLLED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 26 Dec 80-1 Jan 81 pp 16-19

Article: "With the Fall of the 'Arab Solidarity' Slogan, the Dilemma of the eighties: The Arabs Need Another Nasir"7

Text/ There is a phenomenon in Arab political life which inspires amazement. In the midst of the tension the Arab nation is going through, in the depths of the disputes fragmenting the Arabs, and in view of the narrowness of the popular base on which most regimes stand, we ought to have awakened day after day to Communiqué No One declaring a military coup in one capital after another.

This has not happened. In fact, it has not happened for a relatively long time. The Arabs today are venturing onto the eighties mostly with regimes which began life by the seventies and managed to exist 10 years or more, in spite of all the disturbances which have characterized this period in Arab relations and in the context of relations between the regimes and their citizens.

Perhaps the improbability of change in Arab capitals may be ascribed to a group of psychological and political reasons.

Today there is an almost general aversion to mounting an adventure to reach power. The spirit of bloody violent adventure which marked our political life in the fifties and sixties has quieted down or disappeared. More precisely, it has fled behind the fear of even thinking about adventure or embarking on it, on the one hand; on the other, a deep feeling has grown among opposition forces, be they civilian or military, that rule in this complicated, disturbed world is no longer a matter of pomp or circumstance but is a burden, a heavy burden by which the people sitting in the seats of power today are oppressed, and does not merit an adventure which will not assure attainment of it.

This psychological reason which impedes the spirit of adventure is supported by the dominance of a state of relative contentment among forces, groups or classes which possess the capability to make change.

For example, the military class has been encased in privileges of salary, rank and benefits and has been drowned in the comfort of civilian life, with everything which psychological and social stability requires in the way of early marriages, cars, comfortable homes, and some acquisition of luxuries which the broad public of the citizenry cannot get its hands on.

This is as far as the psychological conditions which helped regimes in the seventies neutralize the forces competent to constitute a real danger to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

them are concerned. As for the political reasons, the discussion of those is a lengthy one.

All the regimes born on the threshold of the seventies, except for a few -- most prominently those of Iraq and South Yemen -- were military in origin. They transferred their intense infatuation with discipline, their exceptional concern for their security and their zeal to surround themselves with all means of prevention and early and distant warning from the barracks to the palace of government.

Col al-Qadhafi dismantled everything in his jamahiriya except for his security agencies. Field Marshal Ja'far Muhammad Numayri sheltered a supporting military strike force which was able to save his regime and rid him personally of bondage to the hatching of coups who once thought that they had become part and parcel of the regime, if not closer.

What happened in Syria was something exceeding all imagining. A change occurred in the organic foundation of the armed forces through reliance on a specific factional fabric whose cancerous cells extended to all service arms, in the form of officers described as officers who belonged to a religious sect that harbored feelings of persecution vis-a-vis other sects and went back to dark periods in the history of the religious quarrels of Islam.

In order to negate the possibilities of any change in the regime, and out of a concern to maintain the dominance of religious factionalism, even if changes occurred in personnel, a religious militia by name of the Defense Companies was established within the armed forces. These companies have their benefits, powers, security agencies and independent leaders and have trained the scions of the sect in urban combat, not just to strike out at any military plot but also to deter any civilian mutiny or popular movement.

This organic change in the structure of the army explains why the religious regime has remained in power, supported by military power. This armed religious organization, surrounding the capital and main towns like an amband under the command of the brother of the head of the regime, explains why President Hafiz al-Asad has remained at the head of his regime for 10 years although he "enjoys the support of only 2 or 3 percent of the citizens," in the words of President al-Sadat -- quoting a statement President al-Asad made in a warm moment of frank talk between the two in the past.

Likewise, these regimes -- except for those of Iraq and South Yemen -- share another characteristic: they are the property of a military officer or leader who holds all authority and power in his hands and on whose face are focused all the lights of media propaganda. He is the "leader of the cavalcade" in Syria, the "devout president" in Egypt, and "our brother the colonel who set off this great revolution" in Libya.

A Personal Leadership with Limited Aspirations

These personal leaders, by virtue of their scant popular support, have restricted their ambitions to monopolizing power within the limits of the country

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

they rule and control; as a consequence, they are local regional leaders who do not have national aspirations going beyond the borders, and refuse to let any winds blow across the borders bringing in nationalist or unificationist influences.

President Numayri, at the funeral procession for Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, cried as no grief-stricken man ever cried. Nonetheless, the Sudanese leader rejected all Nasir's unificationist ideas when he was offered membership in the federation of the republics of Egypt, Syria and Libya, in spite of his delight.

President al-Sadat relinquished a broad mass legacy which Nasir had bequeathed to him throughout the length and breadth of the Arab nation and forced himself into Egyptian introversion, ignoring the fact that Egypt, even before its Arabization or Islamization, reached the peak of its power and the apex of its brilliance by extending its influence and effectiveness to the environment around it and that it lost even its national independence when it drew back and isolated itself in its shell.

It is strange that the Albanian policeman Muhammad 'Ali realized the value of Egypt's opening to the Arabs; one day he almost brought down the Ottoman Empire and disrupted the international balance. The Upper Egyptian Nasir of the Bani Murr also absorbed this, and he governed Arab emotions and embodied their aspirations for 18 years. This fact has been lost on al-Sadat; during his tenure, Egypt has lost its Arab influence and effectiveness, handing its independent national will over to the American-Israeli alliance and its thought and culture over to old people, thinkers from the thirties and forties like Tawfiq al-Hakim, Louis 'Awad and al-Husayn Fawzi, in order to strike out at the Arab spirit within itself and to glorify the "civilized relationship" between Egyptian man and Zionist man.

The strangest thing is that after all this al-Sadat was anxious to make Egypt the leader of the Arabs by virtue of numerical majority, out of his belief — and many Egyptians are the prisoners of this illusory belief as well — that Nasir's Arab leadership was based on the law of quantity — Egypt's numerical quantity.

Yes, quantity was an effective element in the Arabs' acceptance of Nasir's leadership. However, this accounting majority became surplus marginal and zero when al-Sadat severed Egypt's leadership from the ambitions, interests and hopes of the Arabs; al-Sadat today feels the cold shivers of isolation, although he puts a total of 40 million Egyptians in his pocket.

Perhaps one might say that our brother Mu-ammr's military affiliation and the individual nature of his rule have not prevented him from having unificationist ambitions which he has in practice expressed through the attempts he made with al-Sadat's Egypt, Bourguiba's Tunisia, Numayri's Sudan and al-Asad's Syria.

That might be true to a large extent. The man does have his unificationist ambitions. However, these ambitions are intensely interwoven with his cloudy or obscure system of thinking, have become lost in his intense fluctuating psychological moods, and have been uprooted through the proliferation of his

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

objectives, which sometimes swim north with the current of the sea and at other times drift south with the sands of the Sahara.

That has all hastened the collapse of the rulers' and regime's trust for the Libyan president. There then occurred "the third theory" which he formulated, with the obvious ideas of a pupil in primary school, to entice Arab public opinion, to review the soundness of his political, ideological and intellectual deductions and to offer himself as a model off the shallowness of thinking and vision at the apex of Arab political leadership.

al-Qadhdhafi's unificationist experiments have become more of a threat to the lofty national goal of unity than the secessionism, regionalism and domestic orientation of the non-unificationist, anti-Arabhood leaders. Unity is a holy national hope, from whose content the reverential quality of sanctity which surrounds it may not be absent, by subjecting it to capricious experiments which are based on personal interests and political axes that bring misery on the Arab masses after a few weeks or months.

The repetition of the misfortune of the experiment and the melodrama of the wretched spectacle of secession which follows the heat of the entree and the beginning abruptly and without preliminaries turn the serious unificationist scenario into a comedy enticing the masses looking on from the Gulf to the Atlantic to jeer whenever they watch a unificationist scene. How could that be if the writer of the scenario is President al-Qadhdhafi himself?

The masses of the union in 1958 carried Nasir's automobile from Shukri al-Quwwati's house to the guest mansion where he stayed when he came to Damascus to inaugurate the union state. Nowadays the doors of Damascus are flung wide open to al-Qadhdhafi to visit whenever he likes. But where is the enthusiasm of the masses? Where is the passionate desire to bear the leaders' retinues on heads and shoulders?

Affiliation with Arabhood is not just a symbolic quality contained in the body of the name of a regional state, a semantic repetition in press and radio comments and statements by leaders and ministers, an application to join the Arab League or an official acknowledgement which is entered down like the presentation of a reprimand in the heart of ledgers.

Affiliation with Arabhood is an absolute faith in the existence of a single nation, not numerous peoples. This faith plainly and of necessity negates affiliation to a country, state or entity whose borders were drawn up in the past by colonial fingers and interests.

This deep faith in affiliation with the greater nation and the broader homeland is what organically and spontaneously prompted half the Lebanese to ally themselves with their Palestinian brothers in the Lebanese war. While this war cost the Lebanese and the Palestinians more than 100,000 victims, it baptised the Arabhood of Lebanon by blood.

This deep belief in Arabhood is what has prevented a single Lebanese national leader from standing up and rebuking the Arabs for the fact that little Lebanon,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

whose population does not exceed 3 million, paid this high price in blood and lives over 3 years, while al-Sadat does not let an opportunity pass before the microphone without rebuking the Arabs for the fact that Egypt, which numbers 40 million, has paid 100,000 victims over 30 years in confronting the Zionist enemy.

Reasons for the Weak Feeling of National Affiliation in Egypt

The weak feeling of national affiliation is what prompts al-Sadat to boast unabashedly to the Arabs and chastise them over what Egypt has done for their sake, as if the Egyptian army consisted of mercenary troops who fought by proxy and deputization for the Arabs, not for the defense of the Arabhood of Egypt and Palestine.

Out of fairness to al-Sadat, he does not bear the whole responsibility for the weak feeling of national affiliation among the Egyptians. The long withdrawal, by virtue of the circumstances of backwardness and decline, during the era of the Mamelukes, the Ottomans and Western colonialism, kept Egypt estranged from its consciousness of its affiliation with its motherland until Nasir came and awakened this consciousness, though he was not given the opportunity to deepen it, implant it and validate it by education. Sharing in this responsibility was a broad generation of nationalist intellectuals and thinkers who did not take the opportunity of Nasir's rule to invade the Egyptian universities and centers of thought with their nationalist thinking.

Thus it was very simple for al-Sadat to bring Egypt out of the front line trench under the slogan of holding the Arabs to blame for damaging it. It was easy for him to make a reconciliation with Israel and normalize relations with it without fearing a savage domestic wrath. In fact, this all took place within the framework of alienating Egypt from the Arabs, setting it apart from them and raising it above them.

In any event al-Sadat's regime is not the only regime in the seventies which was overwhelmed by narrow regional local spirit and was ultimately brought to striking out at the man most entrusted with the strategy of "Arab solidarity" on which the Arab League was founded in 1945 as a feeble, pale expression of the unity of national interests.

There are regimes which have been forced into vacillation by circumstances on the right and the left, making it impossible for them to adhere even to this frail thread of Arab solidarity. President Numayri, who began as a Nasirite leftist in 1969, and ended up, as a result of coup attempts against him, as a regional rightist, could not put the Sudan in a position of solidarity, if only of a surface nature, with the Arabs against the Camp David peace with Israel because he was prey to difficult domestic circumstances which made him the prisoner of his Western relations.

The rejection of the principle of "Arab solidarity" by the regime in South Yemen is founded on the fact that it has gone beyond the Arab premises on which the national front, firmly linked to the Arab nationalists' movement, was based to its acquired Marxist beliefs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The success the Marxist regime there has obtained in emphasizing the centralism of the state has not broadened into a wide popular base on which the regime could move. The blatant failure to establish such a base has compelled it to agree to rally under the umbrella of Soviet protection, with all its exorbitant taxes from the acceptance of its influence, its experts, and its naval and air bases, to acceptance of its schemes to strengthen its hegemony over the outlets and entrances to Arab water and Arab shipping and oil routes.

Perhaps British policy makers now realize the extent of their stupidity and shortsightedness in handing the keys to power in South Yemen over to the National Front toward the end of the sixties, in order to offend Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, whose forces dominated North Yemen. They handed South Yemen out the window of Nasirism so that it would fall through the window of an enemy who was greater and more dangerous to the West.

Search for an Alternative

The narrow domestic popular base of the regimes of the seventies has caused them to seek a foreign alternative on which to rely and through which to exercise their Arab role, instead of choosing the alternative of their Arab affiliation and extending bridges to transform the fragile format of "Arab solidarity" to an advanced form of practical coordination or unity.

Syria's alliance with the Soviet Union, expressed by the treaty of friendship and cooperation which al-Asad signed with Brezhnev last October, may increase Syria's defense capability, but it in fact and reality is an alternative foreign outlet and a safety valve for the domestic isolation the regime is experiencing.

The lack of parity in the circumstances of the two contracting parties makes the independence of Syria -- which was always the crux of the delicate Arab political balance -- a pawn to the calculations and interests of a major country like the Soviet Union in its struggle with the United States and the West in the Middle East and the Arab region, just as al-Sadat's alliance with Washington has made Egypt the pawn of the calculations and interests of a major country like the United States in its struggle with the Soviet Union to preserve its dominance over the Arab region.

The Amman summit conference consecrated, or almost consecrated, the collapse of the slogan of "Arab solidarity" which has been the basis of official dealings among Arab countries up to now. This relationship of solidarity did not satisfy Arab nationalists yearning for former relationships of unity, but the collapse of the slogan in this poor stage of modern Arab history has signalled the degree of deterioration in understanding to which Arab relations have declined and has opened the way for Arab countries to disengage themselves from a minimum of national relations in order that they may be distributed between the two international camps competing in the region.

Thus al-Sadat's alignment with the American camp, and the rallying of Syria, South Yemen and perhaps Libya under Soviet hegemony, has for the first time in their modern history faced the Arab countries with the danger of a hot or armed confrontation with one another.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This statement is not a form of exaggeration, or provocation of panic in Arab public opinion. Rather, it is an actual fact, embodied in the mobilization of 50,000 Syrian troops and 1,200 tanks along Jordan's borders during the Arab summit conference with Damascus boycotted and embodied in the return of tension to the Egyptian-Libyan borders, the outbreak of skirmishes and mobilization on the Libyan-Tunisian borders, Libya's intervention in Chad, the Iraqi-Iranian war, and the continued Lebanese dilemma, as forms of heated indirect confrontations among Arabs.

Thus the opportunity remains fully present for the shedding of Arab blood in an Arab-Arab war at any moment. If the calculations of Syria or Jordanian field commanders who stand facing one another on both sides of the border go wrong, they may perhaps open another bleeding wound in the Arab heart.

The Arab region is rapidly turning into a map of the international partitions which the conditions of the Soviet-American struggle brought to the fore after World War Two. Just as there are two Koreas, two Chinas, two Germanys and two Europes, we are now experiencing the first signs of the emergence of American Arab countries and Soviet Arab countries.

Perhaps there no longer is any urgency prompting the United States to unleash the Israeli monster to snap at the Arab body or discipline one regime or another from time to time. Hot or cold Arab struggles will guarantee that the Arabs are diverted from their direct enemy. Likewise, there is no urgency prompting the Soviets to engage in the risk of setting off the fire of a third world war of uncertain results by directly approaching the water and oil of the Gulf; it is enough for Moscow to move its Arab pawns to fiery acts whenever it wants a local war or disturbances in the area.

It is the Arab regimes of the seventies who bear the responsibility for this unfortunate situation before history — they who by virtue of their domestic circumstances agreed to internationalize Arab disputes, dissension and struggles on a broad scale. We are now preparing to enter a stage of total Arab rift which it will not be possible to mend by the traditional methods of reconciliation and laxity which for example Saudi diplomacy has pursued.

Nasir and the Arab Summit Format

In the light of the tragic circumstances which the Arab nation is going through, the Arabs have lost Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and the distinctive national role he played. Nasir was not above the level of Arab disputes — rather, he became enmeshed in them, and perhaps tried to increase their intensity. In addition, he was defeated in three wars. However, in view of what he represented as the president of Egypt, the biggest Arab country, the direct influence and effect he had on the Arab state as a result of his popular magic and his mass relations, and the penetrating power of personality he possessed, he was always able to get the Arabs united during the times of danger.

Nasir overcame his personal and political price and hemorrhaging wounds in Yemen and Syria to call for the first Arab summit meeting in 1965. This high-level format for joint Arab action proved its great success in eliminating many disputes and lessening many difficulties and obstacles. Indeed, it managed to establish, after his departure, a minimum Arab political and military solidarity

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and mutual agreement on the basic cause, the cause of Palestine and the confrontation with Israel.

It is enough, for 'Abd-al-Nasir to be held in esteem in the eyes of the Arabs, that he breathed his last at the peak of the superb effort he exerted at the Arab summit level to stop the Jordanian-Palestinian war in 1970.

Where, however, is the regime and the political leadership that may be qualified to perform Nasir's role?

A review of current Arab circumstances does not inspire optimism about the possibility of producing a rapid alternative to Nasir.

President al-Sadat, by squandering Nasir's mass legacy, by relinquishing his national path and by making peace with Israel without authorization or agreement from the Arabs, has permanently forfeited his credentials to perform this role, and has snatched Egypt away from the possibility of bringing a leadership to the fore which is able to bear this national burden.

Saudi leadership, by virtue of its traditional political status and its alternating Arab position and Islamic position, does not want to transcend the framework of the role it had drawn up for itself as an immediate, practical intermediary for resolving sudden Arab complications without getting down into their roots or getting lost in their labyrinths.

President al-Qadhafi has removed himself, by force, determination and design, from the framework of the Arab conception of a personality which is able to play Nasir's role. This observation also applies to his "unificationist" partner, President Hafic al-Asad, who made an encouraging start with the seventies, reached his peak in the October war, then gradually drew back and regressed, to become the prisoner of his regime with all its complexes, weight, burdens and tumors.

This rapid review also makes it necessary that we pause before the Iraqi regime, not because AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI sympathizes with it but by virtue of the potential it actually possesses for playing Egypt's Nasirite role.

This statement may not please those persons who are tangling with this regime on the Arab stage and who, out of jealousy or vexation with it, hasten to reject its worthiness and fitness to perform this role.

However, this immediate objection does not conceal the deductions of an unbiased observer who has been following the current Iraqi regime since it came to power in 1968.

Perhaps the first and most conspicuous of these deductions is that the Iraqi regime has in practice proved its national commitment by affirming the independent nature of its political path and its anxiety not to fall into the pits of alignment with international camps, at a time when people making political decisions in other regimes are surrendering their will, one after the other, to the major international powers and are mortgaging their independent identities to Washington or Moscow.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Whatever may be the objections of those opposed to and making mischief over the Iraqi regime's style of dealing with events, they cannot deny its achievements, starting with the liberation of its oil and the rescue of the Syrian front from real catastrophe in the October war and ending with the reassertion of a minimum Arab will to resist the Camp David platform.

For the first time in the modern history of Iraq, a young man has made his way to power through the ranks of his party in order to give his small country a strong firm leadership, political stability, and economic and developmental prosperity, to qualify it to stand on the eastern wing of the great nation and defend the Arabhood of the Gulf which is being threatened by the Persian peoples who are once again dressed in the garb of religion.

Of the regimes born on the threshold of the seventies, the Iraqi regime today seems the most stable, the most self confident, and the most qualified to play a unifying national role. The personality of its president bears much resemblance to and congruence with Nasir's personality; nonetheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that the challenges facing this regime are greater and tougher than those facing the other Arab regimes because it has placed itself in the position of full national responsibility.

Perhaps this is Saddam Husayn's fate. His success in facing these challenges will in the practical sense prepare him in the eyes of his nation to assume a role similar to that of Nasir in the fifties and sixties.

The romantic nostalgia which will drive the Arabs in the eighties to seek an alternative leader in the form of the departed commander shows the extent of the error on which are based the convictions and analyses of "revolutionaries" and "progressives" who considered Nasir an intermediate, tentative stage between retention of the old and revolution against it, which must be followed by a more progressive, revolutionary stage.

What has actually happened is that the stage which followed Nasir was "more tentative and black," contrary to every "scientific interpretation" which says that history is proceeding along a political line progressing toward the better. There is no doubt that the "revolutionaries" who see what al-Sadat and others are doing on the Arab stage have come to regret their vexation with Nasir and their constant expression that he was a transitional or intermediary stage which would inevitably be followed by the stage of total revolution.

The hoped-for radical revolution has not happened, and it is probable that it will not happen at all in the bloody scenario which was sketched out by theories which give history a "scientific" interpretation. Today, 10 years after Nasir's departure, the Arabs are yearning for leaders in his image and not in the image of Lenin, Castro or Guevara.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

11887
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

MUHAMMAD HAYKAL DISCUSSES AT-TA'IF SUMMIT

LD021431 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 1 Feb 81 p 10

[Article by Muhammad Haykal: "Finesse and Forcefulness Stamp Saudi Summit"]

[Text] The most expensive summit meeting in history came to its glittering end last week in At-Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, with the leaders of 42 Islamic countries reaching some agreement on how best they might face the future.

Among the decisions taken was the one to put the question of Arab Jerusalem at the top of the Middle East agenda. It was also decided that nothing could be done about the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, and that requests for cash from various groups of Afghan rebels should be scrutinised with care if not scepticism.

The very sacredness of At-Ta'if--it is close to Mecca--was of enormous importance to Saudi Arabia, whose considerable prestige and resources were thrown into the affair. The Saudis were at pains to demonstrate to all Muslims that the holy places, especially Mecca, which had been attacked and occupied 18 months ago, were safe in its custody. And they wanted to prove to others, particularly the Reagan administration, Saudi Arabia's importance as Islam's representative.

Saudi Arabia was also seeking to reassure itself about its friendships throughout the world and its influence, not because it was a nation of rich resources and rich men but because of its capacity to inspire.

Such a role carries problems, however. Once you inspire clear-cut decisions on, say, Palestine and Jerusalem, it means you cannot accept even the semblance of a compromise. (It is no coincidence that the summit was named "Conference on Jerusalem and Palestine"). And that, in turn, means running the risk of difficulties with some traditional friends: that is, the United States.

The nightmarish aspect of the summit was most apparent in its security arrangements. After all, some of the 42 delegations were under vows to liquidate each other.

Another task was to prevent the accidental confrontation of enemies without causing offence. The Saudis achieved this with an impressive mixture of finesse and forcefulness.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The summit security system, including equipment, cost \$150 million. This concentration on the hardware of law and order was in marked contrast with Saudi Arabia's attempt to redefine "jihad"--an important word and issue in Islam. Jihad, or holy war, means total mobilisation against the enemy to the extent that, during jihad, no man is allowed to sleep. Many people feel that, in attempting to give the word a more symbolic meaning, the Saudis may simply be compensating for lack of action.

Whether this is valid criticism or not, the Saudis' interpretation has a direct bearing on the future of Arab Jerusalem.

Efforts to negotiate an end to the Gulf War stumbled badly. The Iraqi leader, Saddam Husayn, rejected the idea that Algeria should play a role in this. In his view, no Arab could be neutral.

He was somewhat more sympathetic to the notion of the Palestine Liberation Organisations' taking a hand in the mediation process.

Some of the poorer Islamic nations' hopes for financial assistance were not met. Before the summit opened, there had been talk about a total sum which was put as high as \$20,000 million. The sum actually approved was \$3,000 million.

An indication of this new mood of caution emerged from the discussion of Afghanistan. Pakistan's General Ziaul Haq spoke frequently on what should be done about the Afghan resistance movements. He felt the resistance fighters talked more than they fought and he contended that if help were to be given to Afghan refugees, it should be channelled through the Pakistan Government.

The summit leaders agreed, though the Gulf states are setting up a special fund for anti-communist movements.

There were other important developments at the summit. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman formed a new block in which action on such matters as internal security, purchase of armaments, border disputes and differences arising from the nationality of different tribes will be co-ordinated.

To avoid the war-imperilled Hormuz Straits, the Gulf states are now thinking of constructing an additional oil outlet through Oman to the Indian Ocean.

As for the Arab League, it has gone into limbo. Now that the emphasis has moved to the Islamic arena, where inter-Arab conflicts can be handled on a different level, league members are unable to agree even on a date for their next meeting.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981

CS0: 4820

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

BANI-SADR ATTACKS OPPONENTS

JN011230 London REUTER in English 1212 GMT 1 Feb 81

[Report by James Dalgleish]

[Text] Tehran, 1 Feb (REUTER)--President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr has launched what seems to be a thinly-veiled attack on his political opponents in a speech reported today by the official PARS News Agency.

In an apparent reference to his hardline fundamentalist opponents, who are led by members of the Islamic Republican Party, Mr Bani-Sadr has quoted as calling on Iranians to resist "bullies and tyrants" with all their power and unity.

"If you want to have an independent and free country, if you do not want to be ruled by those who want to bring back the dark days of the past through lies, trickery, calumny, libel, prison and torture, then do not fear anything," the president told his audience in the southeastern town of Jiroft yesterday.

Speaking on the eve of the second anniversary of the return from exile of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, Mr Bani-Sadr also said: "I will resist tendencies towards oppression, towards [words indistinct] towards prison and towards [words indistinct].

Last November he alleged that torture was being used in Iran but he did not specify by whom. His charge led to the appointment of a commission of investigation but no report has yet been published.

PARS issued its account of Mr Bani-Sadr's speech in English and it was reported in the English-language TEHRAN TIMES. But, except for a brief story in one moderate paper, the address was not quoted in any Persian-language daily.

State radio last night quoted President Bani-Sadr as saying at Jiroft that Iran knew, when it opposed Iraq in the Gulf war, that it would not get U.S. arms which it had already paid for. This was a reference to recent remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig on the subject.

But the radio did not make any mention of the president's speech as reported by PARS.

The agency quoted him as saying: "Iran is not the former country which could be kept in an atmosphere of suspicion."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

He said most Iranians opposed oppression and the solution of problems by force.

"What could frighten people who did not fear the shah's regime?" he asked.

PARS also reported Mr Bani-Sadr as saying he would not submit to "internal enemies of the revolution."

"If we give the oppressors any more chances, they will intensify their pressure and cruelties and we will be involved in greater problems before the war ends," the president said.

COPYRIGHT: REUTER, 1981

CSO: 4920

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

COUNTRY REPORTEDLY OBTAINING ARMS SECRETLY

LD261647 London THE OBSERVER in English 25 Jan 81 p 5

[Peter Deeley and Peter Durisch "exclusive" report: "Iran Spends Millions In Secret Arms Deals"]

[Excerpt] Iran, desperate for arms in its war with Iraq, is trying to obtain supplies secretly by using friendly countries as a conduit.

Two weeks ago, a North African country approached Sam Cummings, the world's largest private arms dealer, with a request to buy spares for British and American military equipment.

Mr Cummings said last week at his Manchester warehouse: "They told us that the spares were for Iran but we told them we could not supply them. The North Africans offered to provide the paperwork to make it appear the hardware was going to them."

Sources in the arms industry tell us that Iran has agreed deals for \$100 million (41.6 million pounds) worth of arms in the past fortnight.

Taiwan is said to be a big supplier. The same informant told us that the Iranians had already obtained American made spares manufactured under licence in Italy.

Hamburg, he said, was being used as a trans-shipment point. Other sources in the industry indicate that Iran has also got military supplies from North Korea, Algeria and Austria. Iraq, it is being said, is obtaining its equipment through middlemen in Berne, Switzerland.

We saw a telex message last week asking for one million rounds of 20mm ammunition for Iran's F4 Phantom jets and a similar quantity for its F5 Tiger aircraft.

Few countries would presently grant an export licence for arms to go to either side in the conflict. Consequently, current deals being done in the West will probably involve a bogus destination for the arms in order to obtain an export licence.

South Africa is also getting large supplies of military hardware from politically "hostile" countries where governments are prepared to turn a blind eye to international sanctions. For commercial expediency, these nations are using third countries--sometimes without their knowledge or agreement--as fronts for the trade.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Portugal carries on a flourishing tradewith South Africa, selling huge amounts of ammunition to the military, although these deals do not show up in any government-produced statistics.

The Portuguese Government's figures of arms exports for 1979, for instance, show sales worth 2,300,800 pounds to Gabon; but the African government has denied it received anything. In the first half of 1980, Portugal claimed it had sold 900 tonnes of ammunition to Thailand, but Thailand, too, has denied all knowledge of such purchases.

Over the same period, the Portuguese Government's statistics show that more than 1,250,000 pounds worth of arms went to Pakistan. The Pakistan Embassy in Lisbon says no arms were purchased, pointing out that the Pakistan armaments industry produces every type of weapon Portugal could offer.

It has come to light that the ammunition allegedly destined for Thailand was loaded onto ships of a Danish line. The same shipping line has been linked in Copenhagen with the shipment of 12,600 unarmed grenades from Montreal to Durban.

A shipbroker who chartered the vessel has been convicted in Denmark of violating the United Nations embargo on arms exports to South Africa. He is appealing against the court findings.

Danish police have completed an investigation into the movements of vessels belonging to four shipowners suspected of carrying arms or ammunition to South Africa in the past 3 years.

In two cases, ships have been identified where a bogus destination was used in port, but en route the ship changed course.

Where South Africa has been the true recipient, the Danish national flag has been taken down and South African military ships have come out to escort them into harbour.

During our investigations into misuse of documents essential to the arms export trade, a Portuguese arms dealer told us of an instance where his government had issued an end-user certificate--which details who the arms are going to--for military supplies. The hardware was delivered to a Portuguese airfield. "One night, planes came in and took away everything to South Africa," the dealer said.

In Spain, at least two cases are known where prominent arms manufacturers were used as intermediaries in deals when tanks from India and Howitzer shells from Canada were sent to South Africa.

In West Germany an armaments manufacturer is under investigation for having allegedly supplied war materials to Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Argentina, all banned by Bonn from receiving arms exports because they are "areas of tension."

The company claims all exports were carried out with government approval. The arms found their way to their real destinations by circuitous routes: 1,000 machine guns for Saudi Arabia went via Italy; arms for South Africa went through Paraguay; and Argentina got its supplies through Spain.

COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd [1981]

CSO: 4920

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

OIL CONTRACTS WITH USSR, SPAIN, INDIA SIGNED

LD131315 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 13 Jan 81 p 4

[Terry Povey dispatch: "Iran Signs Several Major Oil Contracts"]

[Text] Tehran--Iran has signed a number of major new oil contracts--including one with the Soviet Union--in the clearest indication yet that the country is returning to the world oil market.

The contract with the Soviet Union is for 40,000 barrels a day. It represents payments for hard currency debts built up since Iran stopped gas supplies to the Soviet Union early last year after a disagreement over prices.

The other major contracts include 150,000 b/d with Petronor of Spain and the renewal of India's 100,000 b/d contract for this year.

Since the start of the Gulf war 15 weeks ago no official figures for Iran's oil exports have been available, although oil industry specialists in Tehran yesterday estimated current exports of crude to be 700,000 b/d.

They are sceptical of reports from Washington that exports had already surpassed the Iranian target of 900,000 b/d for the first quarter of this year.

Iran has yet to announce its contract price for the current quarter, although this is expected to be made public later this week. A rise of 10 percent is expected, taking Iranian light crude up to \$38.91 and heavy to \$37.81.

Iran is selling oil on the spot market at these prices at the Lavan Island terminal in the lower end of the Gulf. A surcharge of 86 cents per barrel to cover transport costs from Kharg Island to Lavan is added to this.

Iran is using its small tankers to ferry oil to the safety of Lavan. However, as VLCCs can only load at Kharg, a number of countries have taken the decision that a single VLCC road is less of a risk than several trips using smaller tankers, and are therefore loading at Kharg.

Iran could have sold more oil but several customers did not seek to renew 9 month contracts due to renewal just before the war. Brazil and Sweden are two examples of this.

COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd [1981]

CSO: 4920

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

BRIEFS

REZA SENDS MESSAGE TO WOMEN--Cairo, 7 Jan (REUTER)--The 20-year-old self-proclaimed Shah Reza of Iran today sought the aid of Iranian women in overthrowing the Islamic government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni. In a message to Iran, his first since coming of age last October, the son of the late Shah Mohammed Pahlavi contrasted "the chains of slavery imposed on women by fanatical reactionaries" with the equality guaranteed by his father's constitution. The shah's secretariat in Cairo's al-Qubba Palace released the message on the anniversary of Iranian Women's Emancipation Day. The message urged the women of Iran to "shake off their yokes, unmask the diabolical plots (of the reactionaries) and set an example of resistance to those people." The shah's family has been living in seclusion here since March last year. President Anwar al-Sadat has offered them permanent sanctuary. [Text] [JN080925 London REUTER in English 0918 GMT 8 Jan 81]

COPYRIGHT: REUTER; 1981

CSO: 4920

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

ECONOMY MINISTER DISCUSSES ECONOMIC POLICY DECISION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3088

[Text] Mauritanian Minister of Economy and Finance Ahmed Ould Zein recently indicated that "the economic policy decided upon by the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] and the government will follow two main lines: a line of austerity and a line of revival by index.

"This new revival is underway for we currently have an investment volume, either in the execution stage or on the point of it, of nearly 2 billion ouguiya. Here I am speaking of foreign resources allocated to the state. Thus I am not speaking of the investments made by the national companies, of which the most important (Guelb project, Gorgol project) are known and which will begin in the very near future. But as regards investment by the state or from accounts assigned to the state, the amount is on the order of these 2 billion ouguiya. These investments are at the takeoff point. You will certainly learn of it, but for us it is a particularly important takeoff in the revival of economic activity.

"I will add that the year 1981 will see the effective start of oil and sugar refineries for which start-up conditions are linked. As concerns the other projects, the perspective is reassuring and in fishing the current situation will soon be profoundly modified in a direction allowing much more activity in the coming months.

"Thus," the minister said in conclusion, "we have here steps allowing greater economic activity but also on a more solid basis, as it will not entail monetary financing or an increase in the public debt."

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980

8860
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

IDA GRANTS LOAN FOR GORGOL IRRIGATION PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3088

[Text] The International Development Association (IDA), a World Bank affiliate which grants funds on liberal terms, on 8 November announced a grant of 11.4 million SDR credit (\$15 million, about 660 million ouguiya) to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for financing an irrigation project at Gorgol.

This project, costing about \$93.2 million, is aimed at creating a focus of development in southeast Mauritania. Included are construction of a concrete dam at Fom El Gleita, a canal to carry water to the irrigation and drainage network, access roads, buildings, as well as technical assistance service, creation of production factors and agricultural equipment, and the building of 15 villages.

Project financing will also come from the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Saudi Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA), and the Redevelopment Bank (KfW) [Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau]. In addition, it will benefit from gifts from Libya, the European Development Fund (FED) and the Fund for Aid and Cooperation (FAC).

Production from the project is expected to reach 26,800 tons of cereals, which will permit the establishment of 4,640 families (28,000 persons) there and the creation of some 14,000 jobs.

The IDA credit is repayable in 50 years, with a 10-year deferment.

During the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 7 November, the Mauritanian minister of rural development presented a communication relative to the preparation and initialization of the Black Gorgol project. The council noted with satisfaction that project financing arrangements have been totally completed and took the measures necessary to initiate the project with the least delay.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980

8860
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

IRRIGATION LOANS--The World Bank on 6 November approved an AID credit of 11.4 million SDR (\$15 million) in order to finance an irrigation project in the south-east. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA) has just granted Mauritania a loan of \$10 million for the first irrigation network in the country. This project will allow close to 5,000 families to return to their homes in the Gorgol valley. These projects are part of an overall agricultural development plan that will decrease the country's dependence on imports. The authorities hope to reach an annual cereal yield of 26,000 tons. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2960] 8860

CUSTOMS TARIFFS--On 16 October the Council of Ministers of Mauritania approved a proposed statute to modify the schedule of duties and import and export taxes now in effect at customs. The statute aims at establishing a simpler fiscal policy and will be a first step toward harmonizing customs tariffs among CEAO [West African Economic Community] members. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2960] 8860

HODH ECHARGUI ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT--On 15 October at Nema, the economic development program for the Hodh Echargui region was set at 16 million ouguiya, of which the Mauritanian Government will contribute 13 million to rural development. The projects set up in the framework of this program will aim at preserving the livestock and at augmenting food production. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2960] 8860

APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC LAW--The application of Sharia (Islamic law) to the Mauritanian judicial system last month was "a first step toward the application of the precepts of Islam to all areas," Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla declared recently. Last month, for the first time in a considerable period, a man was executed and three others were flogged and had a hand cut off by virtue of the Sharia. In a speech broadcast for the Muslim festival of Id al-Kabir, the head of the Mauritanian state invited "all vital forces of the country to work side by side with the Military Committee for National Welfare to combat the perversions which have infiltrated our values during these past 2 decades and to return to our original customs and values." [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3025] 8860

SONIMEX PRICE INCREASES--On 31 October the Council of Ministers authorized the National Import-Export Company [SONIMEX] to increase prices on some of its products. Thus, loaf sugar has gone from 45 to 50 UM [Mauritanian ouguiya] per kilo,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

lump sugar from 35 to 40 UM per kilo; the price of cracked rice from 12 to 15 UM per kilo, whole rice up to 30 UM per kilo; all varieties of tea increased to 100 UM per kilo. For the past year, explained Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines Cissoko Mamadou, SONIMEX had been forced to sell at prices substantially below cost. Thus rice, which during January cost SONIMEX 18 UM per kilo, continued to be sold at 12 UM per kilo; loaf sugar sold at 45 UM per kilo, but cost 74.60 per kilo; lump sugar costing 64.70 per kilo was offered at only 35 UM per kilo. Only the sale of tea was producing a slight profit margin, but this amount was far from covering the deficit of hundreds of millions of ouguiya engendered at SONIMEX by selling other goods at a loss. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3025] 8860

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

ARTICLE ANALYZES PLURALISM TOLERATED UNDER MONARCHY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Dec 1980 pp 194-199

[Article by Hamid Barrada: "The Monarchy, the Left and the Rotation"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Morocco--Rare are the countries where the plural party system resists the rigors of postindependence regimes. Morocco is one of them. But what does not pluralism lead to a real change of team?

/"Far from me is the idea of claiming that the system was perfect. But when one speaks of Austria, I think one should emphasize the idea of a state in constant evolution, where nothing was fixed or once and for all defined. Where were we going? No one knew. But I who in my youth was a passionate adversary of the empire, now know that we destroyed something that could have become a shining example."
Manes Sperber./

In Morocco, why do the political "openings" to the left made by the government always come to a sudden end, and finally lead to nothing? Why do they come to seem like false windows and deceptive facades, if not boobytraps?

According to a broad spectrum of opinion, at home as well as abroad, the answer is simple, One word: trickery. Hassan II fools his world; he makes an art of confusing his opponents and they are wrong in having anything to do with it. The problem with that explanation is that it presupposes that the Moroccan left is the stupidest in the world, something which remains to be proved. The repeated failure of the "openings" poses a problem that concerns not only Moroccans. Since what is involved is in fact the viability and the credibility of democracy in a Third World country.

If men who challenge the government are hopelessly condemned to stagnate in the opposition, as in the prisons, and if as a result the political process stands revealed as a game of deception. Morocco would not constitute an original experiment worthy of interest, as far as institutions are concerned. The plural party system would remain "formal", mere colorful folklore, and in the end Morocco has nothing to envy, in the neighboring tyrannies. We would be dealing with a single party, /in fact/, camouflaged and underhanded. And there would even be reasons to credit the classic single party system with certain virtues--the same virtues a gangster has compared with a swindler: with a gangster at least you know where you stand.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A Lost Opportunity

A legitimate suspicion will continue at all events to hover over the Moroccan experiment as long as the /political/ motives of the left for not participating in the government remain undisclosed, when it can boast of representing forces at least as large as those of the governing parties. In other terms, should the failure of the "openings"--and hence the absence of any rotation--be imputed to the Cherifian monarchy /or to surmountable historical and political factors?/

Let us examine first the most recent "opening", during the summer of 1980, which went practically unnoticed. Hassan II announced the rehiring of some 3,000 national education and health officials who had been dismissed for over a year because of a strike. The persons concerned belong to the CDT (Democratic Confederation of Labor) close to the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces). Earlier, it had been suggested to them that they appeal for the king's clemency. They refused, considering that the sovereign, guardian of the constitution which recognizes the right to strike, has the grounds to intervene "spontaneously". Which he did.

That is not all. Soon the greater part* of the prisoners who were USFP members were pardoned. Then, came 20 August (commemoration of the exile of Mohamed V), when all political exiles (except two) were authorized to return to the country. In the speech he gave that day Hassan II announced two measures: rents for persons of modest means were lowered by one-third. (In parliament the opposition and sought without success, a rent freeze.)

Informal Talks

Second decision: representatives of the two political factions were invited to Ifrane to a colloquium on teaching problems. The "selection" system of the Education Ministry had provoked deep discontent, and the opening of the university session was likely to be stormy. At Ifrane, Professor Abderahim Bouabid finds he is asked to chair the committee charged with inquiring into the circumstances of the opening of the university season. The USFP leader declines: "I can only defend the positions of my party, which are contrary to those of the government." That need not matter; all the ministry's decisions, particularly the limitation of registrations in the faculties, were purely and simply cancelled. "Just imagine," Mr Guedira, king's counselor, said to us, "Giscard taking over the programs of Marchais or Mitterand."

At the end of the colloquium Hassan II explicitly declared that the same steps could be taken in other domains. On the fringe of the Ifrane colloquium Mr Driss Basri, the young minister of interior, and then Mr Guedira opened discussions with the leader of the left. These talks were kept "informal, exploratory." They could be taken up again tomorrow. But once again we have probably seen a missed opportunity. Why?

* Six persons to be exact, according to the USFP headquarters, were not freed. They were soon to be freed, depending on whether their cases were more serious than the others. Moreover, there remain, according to their comrades, 114 "Marxist-Leninist" political prisoners in Moroccan prisons.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In government circles there are men (not all, far from it), looking especially for reforms in the fields of health and the economy, who would approve the USFP's entry into the government, and regret that the party did not respond suitably to the palace gestures. Did not AL MOHARRIR, USFP daily, devote the major part of its "page one" to...the arrest of its cartoonist, Lemhadi, the very day the clemency measures were made public? The journalist had been questioned following a cartoon which seemed to be an offensive illustration of the royal speech. It was a mere coincidence since the offending material had been produced several days before. Moreover, the cartoonist was released. The only result of the "Lemandi affair" was that AL MOHARRIR's readers found the artist's talent suddenly dried up.

Rigid Attitude

The Ifrane decisions were also presented by the USFP paper with impolitic rejoicing. According to the left, it has "imposed" its views on the colloquium. That is not quite true, and at all events would only make the author of the initiative dig in his heels.

For themselves, the USFP explained that their reaction to the clemency measures had to be restrained: had not the government merely announced them in an official news agency dispatch, giving the list of about 15 exiles "among others"? One still wonders if the other royal decisions were not "timed to insure a peaceful resumption of trade union and university activities?"

And it can be added that, at all events, the "reopening" quickly turned into a "closing". The way parliament resolved the question of the entry into effect of a referendum adopted last May prolonging the legislature by 2 years is illustrative. Since the text did not say so, no one knew if it applied to the current chamber or would not be implemented until after the chamber's renewal, which, earlier, was to take place in 1981. The second possibility should have been accepted, in order to show consideration for the opposition (USFP and PPS) which had opposed the referendum and condemned the vote rigging.

However, a propos of the duration of the president of the chamber's mandate (3 years instead of 1), also provided for by the May constitutional amendment, the parliament decided on the immediate application of the terms of the referendum. Logically, the same interpretation should apply for the legislature. It turned out that the deputies of the majority urged, with the opposition, the later application of the referendum. Mr Ali Yata, leader of the PPS (Party for Progress and Socialism--communist), with good sense suggested recourse to the Supreme Court. An expeditious solution was preferred, and this was termed a "brutal act" by the opposition in the height of outrage. The USFP deputies do not hide the fact that they will leave parliament at the end of the "normal" term of their mandate (June 1981). All this does not help develop a compromise between the left and the palace.

To tell the truth, the king could always restore calm to people's minds if he really cared about collaboration with the left. It is significant that he did not directly intervene in the parliamentary moves: he always had the option of dissolving the chamber and bringing about early and relatively fair elections.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Stopgap Solutions

The fact remains that we are again far from the "opening" attempted in the summer. Obviously, psychological reasons are involved in this failure. The wounds of the sometimes bloody recent confrontations have not completely healed. Adversaries who become partners have the sensitivities of people flayed alive. Mutual and lasting suspicion transforms the simplest good will gesture into a doubtful act of trickery, if not disguised hostility. In our opinion, something more than psychology is involved. If suspicions are not abandoned it is because each side has not completely accepted the rules of democratic interaction. Everything happens as if democracy were considered a stopgap, a lesser evil or a necessary evil, at all events not as /the only form of government/. So much so that rotation, although the cornerstone of the democratic system, is not considered a normal objective. More precisely, it is not considered at all. When it is discussed either with the men in the government or with opposition leaders there is unfailingly a mocking, scoffing skepticism in the one group and a sad and resigned skepticism in the other. The multiparty system has entered into the habits of the kingdom, and happily it is part of the political panorama, but rotation, which is an inseparable part of the multiparty system, consubstantial as the philosophers would say, is seen as an incongruity, a naive, in fact unthinkable hypothesis.

The Opposition's Suspicions

It does not help matters that what both the opposition and the government agree on most is clearly the rejection or discouragement of rotation. There are precise causes for this situation, and while taboo, they are nonetheless pertinent and, we hope, stimulating and progressive. At all events, there is reason to believe that as long as the causes are not defined, clarified, and discussed, Moroccan democracy will remain wobbly, fragile, and uncertain.

As far as the opposition is concerned, in this case the USFP, it obviously is not completely converted to the idea of rotation. Posing as an alternative to the regime, having tried a little and dreamed a great deal about replacing it, Mehdi Ben Barka's party very naturally neglected to take the place due it in the monarchy. Wanting to be everything, it will come to nothing. Too much concerned about being the alternate, the USFP could not play the rotation role. It is true that it could plead extenuating--and exhausting--circumstances. The campaigns of repression, if not extermination, of which it was the victim almost since its birth 20 years ago, were not of the kind to inspire modestly democratic concerns among its active members. Until 1975 (the date it became the USFP) a rather large part of the UNFP was convinced that any political change could not be carried out without violent acts, and some of its members sometimes acted accordingly. The continued failure of this tendency, the isolation of its incorrigible inspirer, Mr Mohamed Basri, ended by persuading the entire movement to give up this simplistic and costly strategy.

Uncompleted Reconversion

The congress of January 1975 officially marked the turning of Professor Abderrahim Bouabid's party to legality. But it is noted that although this reconversion is reflected in the statutes, it is not yet anchored in the minds. This is shown by what happened at the 1978 congress: at the opening of the session on Friday 8 December, the first secretary made a courageous and clear speech in defense and explanation

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of social democracy in Morocco and at once it silenced the few young militants bringing in "revolutionary" slogans. But a little phrase in the political resolution intended as a condemnation of the "Makhzenian Monarchy," read in a stentorian voice at the congress closing, 3 days later was enough suddenly to wildly galvanize the minds. Members of the congress who had been dozing rose up to bring down the house with applause, chanting /"Mehdi and Omar/ (Ben Barka and Ben Jelloun, the party's two martyrs) /victory is inevitable!"/ It was Sunday night fever! An intellectual bitterly noted: /"One step forward, 20 years backward. Here we are back to the political climate of the 1960's and to the irresponsible and demagogic positions which have done such harm to the left."/

In reality the USFP has not finished its transformation and if it delays its resolute and systematic struggle for rotation it is because social democracy is practiced in the party as a strategy to be ashamed of. Perhaps no one dreams any more of a Great Night but it is difficult to accept the slow, prosaic work of social democracy. The immense majority of the USFP have learned through harsh experience that reformism is the only possible revolutionary program, but they submit without response to the intellectual terrorism of their adversaries.

Because of this attitude, which is the very opposite of political courage, and although Mohamed Basri's partisans can today be counted on the fingers of one hand, "Basrism" continues to wreak its havoc. And the result is that the formation of a leftist government (or a government with the left) seems a compromise bordering on betrayal more than an encouraging or at the very least normal prospect.

Presidential Regime?

So much for the opposition. But what prevents rotation on the government side? It goes without saying that when what for convenience is called the reign of Oufkir holds sway, there is no question of it. The left was the enemy to strike down. And if in such and such an action one was gentle with it or "kept in contact" with it, it was less to deal fairly with it than to discredit it or even to provide an escape hatch in case the effort to liquidate it went wrong and produced the opposite effect. It was a time of cruelty and deception.

The problem of rotation has only been (potentially) on the agenda since the monarchy, learning from its suicidal isolation after the putsch attempts in 1971 and 1972, opted for political liberalism or resigned itself to it. However, the obstacles that can be more or less easily identified (the ways of the Lord are inscrutable...) are such that the obvious democratization policy stops midway, and does not follow the democratic logic to its conclusion, which is rotation. There is sometimes the feeling that Hassan II is mistaken about the regime. Constitutional and parliamentary monarchy above the crowd and parties, sometimes assumes the air of an absolute presidential regime.

An Unorganized Right

One sees this clearly when the monarch descends into the arena and himself takes the initiative of having a referendum such as last May. The vote at the base could not help being distorted. Since, things being what they are, it is politically inconceivable that the voting results could be anything other than positive. How does one say no to a question posed by the commander to his believers, when his person, in the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

terms of the constitution, is "inviolable and sacred"? And if it happened that the barriers were overrun despite everything, how could one make public the results of such a vote? In fact, people found themselves facing an impossible situation after the second referendum of May (on the extension of the legislature). According to numerous, credible witnesses, a large majority apparently boycotted the polls or voted against the second constitutional revision (this was not the case for the first, bearing on the organization of the royal succession). And the minister of interior could not report it "without endangering the regime." Whence the famous 99.99 percent of the votes, serving as a reminder of Morocco's not so glorious membership in the Third World! The presidential aspects of the monarchy distort the democratic function and practically institutionalize vote rigging.

A second equally grave cause of rigging can be noted. After all, referendums are not held every day. It seems to us that the fundamental cause of electoral manipulations is the absence of an organized, independent right, able to depend on its own forces.

The Short-Lived "Parties of the King"

Let us be very clear: there are political parties situated to the right by virtue of their conservative responses--admitted or not--but their political audience remains limited and above all, as shown by all the kingdom's electoral experiments since independence, they cannot win against the left without the administration's massive and decisive assistance. It is no accident if on the eve of the elections one can see movements come forward, introducing themselves as the "king's party," which last only as long as roses, and parliaments, last in the kingdom. Such was the case of the FDIC in 1963, such will probably be the future--judging by the friction it is now experiencing--of the RNI [National Rally of Independents]. In Morocco the true party of the right is the Interior Ministry, regardless of the personality and the views of the incumbent.

This anomaly, if it is to be explained, even justified, by the vague subversive impulses of the left, has no further excuse. It is a disservice even to the regime. The monarchy has no interest in identifying itself with retrograde or parasitic social groups--who moreover, even if profiting shamelessly from the regime, are disloyal to it and are ready to drop it (as they did in 1971 and 1972) at the first alarm.

It remains true that it is the existence of the "king's parties," transitory and always the same, which constitutes the principal obstacle to rotation. Careful reading of royal declarations in recent times give us the impression that things could change in that regard. We had the opportunity in mid-October to interview Mr Ahmed Reda Guedira, counselor to the king, on the views of Hassan II on rotation. He replied to us in precise terms, authorizing us (once does not mean always) to cite him. "His Majesty expects to be kind of all Moroccans, without exception. He does not wish to be the prisoner of any political party, he does not prefer Mahjoubi Ahardane (chief of the Popular Movement) to Ali Yata (communist) nor M'Hamed Boucetta (Istiqlal) to Abderrahim Bouabib (USFP). In order to govern, he is quite free to have recourse to all."

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

9772
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WESTERN SAHARA

PARIS MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS POLISARIO CHIEF

LD061027 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81 pp 10-12

[Interview with Polisario Front Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz by Kamel Djaider: "We Are Determined..."--date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] What do you think of the pledge by the king of Morocco to make 1980 the year of peace?

[Answer] The king of Morocco rejects peace. It is rather the year of Ouarkiz, Akka, Ras al-Khanfra and other operations in which Hassan II sent thousands of Moroccan soldiers to a terrible and useless death in a lost war of aggression. The king of Morocco wished to delude his army and his people, who are growing impatient and refusing to die in this war, the burdens and sacrifices of which they bear.

If you remember, each time the Moroccan Army found itself totally unable to confront our Alps the king of Morocco and his military command tried by all means, including declarations of intention, to make believe that the end of the war was imminent. In the face of pressure from those of his allies most convinced of his defeat and from those members of the international community pressing him to put an end to his war of aggression, and also in view of the reverses suffered by his army on the battlefield and the economic and social disaster into which his country has been plunged, Hassan II's aim has always been to gain time and put off the day of reckoning. For example, soldiers taken prisoner by our forces who were officers in the Moroccan Army told us that at the end of 1978 the king and his military commanders spread the information in the army that the year 1979 would be the year of peace, and you know well what happened: the operations of Bir Enzahan, Smara, Lebouirate, Tan Tan and so forth during which the Moroccan Army suffered one setback after another and lost thousands of soldiers killed, wounded or taken prisoner.

At the end of 1978 and at the beginning of 1980, the economic, military, diplomatic and social situation for Morocco was such that Hassan II felt obliged to make peace in 1980. Much importance must not therefore be attached to such declarations when one knows that each opportunity to make peace offered to the king of Morocco by international organizations was simply rejected by him. Who is preventing him from starting negotiations as called for by the United Nations General Assembly? It is clear that this peace of which he speaks is only a maneuver aimed at

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

obstructing the decisions of international organizations and the aspirations of the Moroccan people and the army, who wish to benefit from the momentum which resulted from the Mauritanian-Saharan accord.

[Question] At one time there was talk of secret negotiations between the Polisario and Morocco? What is the position now?

[Answer] Since our objective is to live in peace with our neighbors, we did not hesitate for a moment when it came to replying positively to an invitation from his excellency President Mousa Traore of Mali to meet a Moroccan delegation to Bamako under his auspices.

[Question] What was the composition of this Moroccan delegation and why did the meeting not achieve anything?

[Answer] Under the auspices of President Traore, who personally exerted much effort within the OAU ad hoc committee aimed at the Mauritanian-Saharan negotiations reaching a successful conclusion, our delegations met a Moroccan delegation composed mainly of advisers to the king of Morocco, Guedira, Bensouda and Dlimi, and if this meeting failed, it was because Morocco showed itself to be intransigent and devoid of any political desire to find a solution.

[Question] Is the Polisario Front today preparing any particular strategy within the perspective of eventual negotiations with Morocco? In other words, is there a possibility of a settlement which will "save the king?"

[Answer] We are ready to negotiate with Morocco to find a peaceful solution to the conflict between the two countries. We are also ready to negotiate with Morocco in order that the two peoples, Moroccan and Saharan, might mobilize their efforts for the national construction of their respective countries, and not for war. The defense of the sovereignty of our country and the territorial integrity of the SDAR remain our basic aims, and if we do not achieve this by negotiation because of Moroccan intransigence we shall impose it by other means.

As for the second part of your question, I would remind you that our struggle is one for liberation which we waged for 7 years against the Spanish colonizers. Its objective is the liberation of our country; it aims neither to topple regimes nor to save them. If the regime of Ould Daddah fell, it was because he opposed the interests of the Mauritanian people and the legitimate aspirations of the Saharan people, who were obliged to defend them themselves, and if the king of Morocco wished to alienate his army after the attempted coups in 1971 and 1972 by launching it on a war of aggression against our country in order to save his throne, which was threatened internally, our people, who are defending themselves legitimately, are in no way responsible for the situation in which that king finds himself today. Having said that, the possibility of a settlement does exist. This involves a return to the legality defined by the international organizations; I would therefore remind you that the route has been marked out and requires that Morocco withdraw from our country and that the Polisario Front and Morocco begin negotiations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Situation in Morocco Can Only be Saved From Collapse By and End to This War

[Question] What is the meaning of the announcement that Hassan II is to visit Europe?

[Answer] It is not by traveling abroad, on whatever pretext, that Hassan will find the means of extricating his country from a disastrous situation at the military, economic and social levels. He does not now need arms or money for a lost war, but peace, for as you know Morocco is on its last legs. All the most important development projects have been abandoned because of the war; its foreign debts continue to increase; numerous firms and public concerns are bankrupt; unemployment is rife and the state cannot even pay the civil servants.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 AFRIQUE-ASIE

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WESTERN SAHARA

LIBYA POSSIBLY BEHIND POLISARIO SHIP BOARDING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 p 43

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani]

[Text] Once upon a time in Mauritania there was a retired policeman, Sid Ahmed Ould Aida, a scion of the emiral family of Adrar; one fine day he left his native Adrar for Nouadhibou, the Mauritanian fishing port. He bought a boat, which he called the "Toungad" from the name of a famous palm grove in Adrar. He also hired 20-odd sailors. Twelve of them (six Senegalese, four Mauritanians and two Spaniards) were aboard the Toungad in mid-October 1980 when it was attacked at sea by a Zodiac Mark V inflated raft armed with a machinegun and lighter weapons.

Funny Story

The crew were taken prisoner and the boat towed to a beach where, once it was ashore, it was riddled with bullets while the motor was taken out and tossed into the water. The guerrilla warriors of the POLISARIO Front who have been attacking watercraft along the Saharan Coasts since 1976 have never attacked with such anger.

They have furthermore been selective attacks. No Soviet boat or any boat carrying the flag of one of the Eastern European countries has been bothered any more than Japanese fishermen have been. The principal victims up to now have been the Portuguese and the Spaniards. In this hunting scene, only one South Korean boat for which the POLISARIO, in an unique example, asks a huge ransom.

Most of these incidents have made some noise in the press and have provoked some official reactions. Nothing of all of that, at least as far as we know, for the "Toungad" of Sid Ahmed Ould Aida. It is true that the affair seems to mix political strategy and tribal relations. An old quarrel between Reguibets of the north and the family of the Ould Aida of Adrar--Sid Ahmed had even criticized the Algiers agreement of 5 August 1979 so well that he then spent several days in prison.

For the disabling of his boat in mid-October, our policeman who became a fisherman addressed himself to the authorities of Nouadhibou, asking for Nouakchott to take steps to free his crew. Reply: he was wrong to accuse the POLISARIO Front.

It is true that at that moment no one was absolutely sure and that the empty packages of Algerian cigarettes found along the side of the wreck looked more like a provocation than a proof. And behold: 20 days later the sailors were set free,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

right in Zouerate. They declare and affirm that they were held by the POLISARIO Front in the northern part of Mauritania.

Sid Ahmed Ould Aida has made his accusation again and he has met members of the government: he wants an indemnity. Once again, without success. They even allow it to be understood that his boat was fishing illegally in Saharan waters. Which he gives the lie to with his last ounce of energy.

But this funny story was not finished. Many Mauritanian cadres have stated out loud: "There we were working in our own country..." There were also some eddies inside the DMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] where Captain Ahmed Ould Aida, cousin of Sid Ahmed and inspector of the National Guard, represents the population of Adrar....After many discussions, it was decided that expenses would be reimbursed by the SMAR [Mauritanian Company for Insurance and Reinsurance].

Not Discouraged

However, Sid Ahmed Ould Aida was advised not to go back to fishing again off Nouadhibou....The affair has not however discouraged other Mauritians from proceeding to that sector. A Mauritanian-Libyan Company has just been created...in Las Palmas, dependent on a Hispano-Libyan mother Company.

With this nuance it has almost received the blessing of the POLISARIO Front and it will not only engage in fishing, but also in transport between the Canaries and Nouadhibou. A new line of resupply independent...of Algeria.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

12,116
CSO: 5200

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH COSTA RICA—The government of Costa Rica has decided to recognize the Republic of Sahara and to open diplomatic relations. In a document signed by the two parties on 30 October, the two governments agreed to exchange ambassadors, it was announced in an official release, which went on to say that accreditation of the representatives would be effected after the two parties reached a mutual accord. [Paris MARCPES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3018] 8860

CSO: 4400

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY