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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 706



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS, FINANCIAL DISAPPOINTMENT OF SADCC

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3363

[Article: "Contacts Made at Maputo Conference Augur Well for the Future"]

[Excerpts] The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) did not produce those results expected by its member countries--Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--who had invited prospective aid donors to meet with them in the capital of Mozambique on 26-28 November.

Although this meeting was financially disappointing, the large number of foreign delegations present did make it a diplomatic success. In fact, 30 countries and 18 international agencies sent representatives to Maputo in response to invitations from Botswana which chaired the conference.

The conference's final communique revealed that initial pledges of financial assistance obtained from international lending agencies amounted to 650 million dollars over the next 5 years. The 97 transportation and communications projects submitted by the nine African countries amounted to nearly 2 billion dollars. But a certain number of governments and development agencies announced they intended to furnish additional funds in the near future.

It should be emphasized that the conference did not meet, after all, to establish an organization for waging war against the Republic of South Africa. Those SADCC countries bordering on the latter were more reluctant than the other SADCC countries to face the more or less dangerous effects open hostility to the Republic of South Africa could have on their economy. Hence they sought rather to show that they were a significantly powerful force and that Southern Africa was not limited just to the Republic of South Africa.

From this standpoint, the Maputo conference, as a vast public relations operation, was a success whose long-range consequences are still difficult to perceive.

Dialogue With Europe

Noteworthy, however, is the current strengthening of ties between the EEC and the Southern African "Nine," despite Mozambique's--the conference's host country--refusal to sign the Lome Convention.

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Because of this reluctance, Angola and Mozambique cannot benefit directly from moneys allocated to the EDF (European Development Fund) for the Southern African region as a whole: at least 100 million dollars under Lome 2, and actually probably more because Tanzania is not part of the southern region as defined by the EEC. Yet Angola and Mozambique will derive some indirect advantages from Lome 2 inasmuch as they are the natural outlets to the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean for the region's six landlocked countries.

Cheyssson pointed out that the EEC was participating, for example, in the initial phase of the reconstruction of Angola's Benguela railroad, the shortest route to the sea for Zaire's Shaba Province and Zambia's copperbelt. Under the terms of this participation, the EEC is to furnish rolling stock and maintenance services to Zaire and Zambia, members of the ACP community, to which the EEC is linked by the Lome agreements. Cheyssson told the AFP that this rolling stock obviously will not stop at the border.

The European commissioner also acknowledged that some difficulties did exist between the Federal Republic of Germany and Angola and Mozambique because of the special ties these two African countries have with the German Democratic Republic. Cheyssson called this a "bilateral" problem.

The AFP reported that despite the few reluctant feelings these difficulties may have aroused on both sides, European diplomatic circles still consider the dialog opened in Maputo between Europe and Southern Africa as "being a good model" for North-South relations.

A Positive Response From France

France was represented at the SADCC by Olivier Stirn, its secretary of state to the minister of foreign affairs. Stirn explained that Paris would respond in positive fashion to the appeal of the Southern African "Nine." The minister made no mention of any specific French financial assistance for the 97 projects submitted. These projects will be assigned to experts for detailed study. He did state, however, that the cost of programs initiated or planned by France in Southern Africa over the past 18 months totaled nearly 1 billion French francs.

It will be recalled that a series of financial protocols were recently signed or are being negotiated with Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation is also now authorized to finance operations in Angola and Mozambique.

The French secretary of state also noted the initiative taken by France jointly with Belgium, Canada, the United States, the FRG and the United Kingdom to establish a framework for "concerted action in behalf of development in Africa." In fact, an ad hoc committee met in Bonn early this year to discuss rail transportation in Southern Africa.

In concluding his remarks, Stirn said that France wanted to see this region of the globe "complete its liberation." He mentioned similarities between European and Africans in their collective approach to problems.

The French secretary of state was received on 26 November by President Samora Machel with whom he discussed Southern Africa's prospects. It may be recalled that Mozambique's foreign minister made an official visit to Paris a few months ago.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RESULTS OF SADCC MAPUTO CONFERENCE REVIEWED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81 p 31

[Article by Pierre Clary: "Objective 90"]

[Excerpt] The conference held in Maputo on 27 and 28 November was exceptionally well attended: indeed, the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) gathered a large spectrum of representatives from various countries and international organizations. This conference, which was prepared by the 9 countries of Southern Africa, was a result of the recommendations of the Lusaka conference, held last April. These countries were joined by Western countries, the EEC, Japan, India, Brazil, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, the Arab Bank for the Economic Development of Africa, the COMECON...

The SADCC is requesting the establishment of a regional center for research on soil conservation, since the only existing one is in South Africa. Within the next few months, Zimbabwe will organize a meeting to implement the regional program for food security. In the industrial field, a conference will be held in Dar es-Salam at the beginning of 1981 to review regional possibilities and to eventually favor trade agreements between the various countries; however, it seems certain as of now that the establishment of a free-trade zone will not be retained. Within the first 6 months of 1981, Angola will organize a technical conference on energy.

As for Zambia, it is scheduled to organize, also in 1981, a regional conference on financing problems, and an institute for the study of regional projects financing might be established as well; it is not likely that an institution such as a development bank may be chosen. Finally, regional training possibilities will be reviewed at a conference organized by Swaziland.

What were the immediate results of the Maputo conference? Of the 2 billion dollars representing the totality of the projects for the next 5 years, 650 million have been obtained. Another 400 million will be granted by the African Development Bank and 100 million will be provided by the EEC within the framework of the Lome II agreement; the OPEC special fund and the Scandinavian countries will also make a contribution.

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The discussions on financial pledges highlighted the reservations felt by certain countries. Thus, the EEC stipulates that its contribution should not finance investments in Mozambique and Angola since these two countries do not subscribe to the Lome agreement. Nevertheless, the infrastructures defined within a regional framework would mostly benefit the exchanges of landlocked countries which have signed this agreement. At present, this important basic issue has not been solved: it denotes, however, the true nature of the Lome agreement, which is not as disinterested as some have claimed.

Other Western countries, such as the United States, have not promised anything: doubtlessly, financial aid from these sources will only be granted if it is ascertained that setting up a regional economic force will not threaten their own investments in South Africa or this country's vital interests.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SUDAN HOSTS INTER-AFRICAN TRADE SYMPOSIUM

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Dec 80 pp 13, 14

[Text] *Fostering the development of intra-African trade, identifying its present inadequacies and recommending appropriate solutions were the themes of the recent Intra-African Trade symposium held in conjunction with the current Third All-Africa Fair. Organised in collaboration with the OAU, the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA), the International Trade Centre (ITC), Sudanexpo, and the Sudanese Ministry of Co-operation, Commerce and Supply and attended by more than 60 representatives of African nations, the symposium was given added importance by the active participation of African businessmen and bankers. Nagi Saleem Boulis was also in attendance and filed his report.*

AS HOST, Sudan was elected to chair the symposium, with Senegal occupying the position of vice-chairman and Kenya serving as rapporteur. Ahmed Salim, Sudanese State Minister of Co-operation, Commerce and Supply, welcomed the symposium participants and expressed the hope that the gathering would turn its attention to the task of implementing the Lagos Plan of Action (see *Sudanow*, June). His introductory speech was followed by the brief remarks of the Commissioner-General of the Third All-Africa Trade Fair and Director-General of Sudanexpo, Rtd. Brigadier Sayed Omer Mohamed Saeed.

Symposium discussions concentrated on the problems of development and the prospects for expanding intra-African trade. Particular attention was paid to the role of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organisations (AATPO), the work of which was described by Demeke Gewolde. Felix Moshia, representing the ECA, called for the expansion of intra-African

trade so as to reduce the importation from abroad of goods produced on the continent. Juan F. Laub, ITC advisor with ECA, emphasised the necessity of organising exports on the national level, placing particular stress on the creation in every African nation of a specialised corporation designed to promote export trade. Hashim el Berir, chairman of the Sudanese Exporters Union, spoke about the work of his organisation and Abdel Rahim Mohamed Abdel Rahim of the Ministry of Cooperation, Commerce and Supply discussed the government's perspective on the problems of developing Sudan's export sector.

Considerable attention was devoted to the uses of trade fairs as a stimulus to export growth and to the issue of spreading trade-related information throughout the continent. Mr Mustafa, deputy director of Sudanexpo, informed the audience of the preparations for the Third All-Africa Fair and stressed the value of both general and specialised fairs. He was followed by R.H.C. Hammad, ITC Trade Fair Advisor in Sudan, who called for an evaluation of the impact of the fair on the commercial deals that are concluded between businessmen in attendance. Farid H. Nawas, ITC representative in Sudan, propagated the new, non-traditional African exports and urged that they be fostered as a means of earning the hard currencies that the continent so badly needs. He emphasised the necessity of establishing joint-export marketing groups for these new products. Abdel Gadir Mansour, from Sudan Commercial Bank, spoke about the financial difficulties entailed in intra-African trade, stressing the importance of seeking practical solutions so as to promote Africa's prospects. Candida David, ITC Trade

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Information advisor in Sudan, informed the audience about the conditions and requisites for establishing successful trade information and documentation centres.

Recommendations were made in six areas of concern to the symposium participants.

Firstly, that OAU and ECA should immediately initiate the necessary machinery aimed at establishing a union of African International Trade Fairs, which should be responsible for programming, coordinating and ensuring the efficient organisation of national, sub-regional and All-African Trade Fairs.

Secondly, that the OAU and ECA, in cooperation with ITC and other specialized agencies, should immediately carry out the necessary studies aimed at establishing selected, specialized annual All-Africa Trade Fairs in product areas where Africa's supply position is healthy.

Thirdly, the participants recognised major deficiencies with regard to competitiveness of African exportable products both at the intra-African trade level and outside the continent.

a) Individual countries should immediately request the services of ECA, to collaborate with ITC and other specialized agencies in undertaking detailed studies of selected national products with high intra-African trade potential so as to recommend policy measures necessary for increasing the intra-African trade of such products.

b) Specific commodities in which Africa does not seem to have supply or competition problems are still not substantially traded among African countries relative to the effective demand and the available market in the region. ECA, in collaboration with ITC and other specialized agencies, should immediately undertake necessary studies to determine the strategies which African exporters and importers should pursue in order to maximise intra-African trade in these vital commodities.

c) ECA, in collaboration with ITC and other specialized agencies, should immediately undertake studies aimed at determining the feasibility of utilizing airfreight facilities for an increased number of commodities in intra-African trade.

d) The OAU and ECA should speed up negotiations on payment arrangements for the expansion of the intra-

African trade, as well as increasing assistance to export credit-guarantee schemes.

e) The long term solution to the clearing and payments problem should be the establishment of an intra-African Trade Bank. The short-term solution to this problem should be the establishment of bilateral reciprocal accounts between African countries.

f) Efforts to create institutions to collect and disseminate trade information for African countries should be redoubled. In particular, the Regional Trade Information studies, which ECA has reportedly been contemplating, should be speeded up and assistance should be provided to individual African countries in order to enable them to build up national trade information machineries which would be capable of utilizing regional and global information facilities. Participants undertook to make such requests to the international organisations for the necessary assistance.

Fourthly, participants emphasised that they are fully aware of the various conventional obstacles which hamper the expansion of intra-African trade, such as transport and communications, supply constraints, institutional frameworks for trade, and inadequate export-infrastructure facilities. However, the critical aspects to which the symposium felt that it should address itself were those which are capable of immediate improvement. To rectify the difficulties the participants decided as follows:

a) Each applicant country should establish a focal export promotion institution with a strong legal basis and sound staffing for the purpose of fully exploiting the existing potential in intra-African trade.

b) The existing export promotion focal points in Africa, as well as those to be established, should forge a close cooperation among themselves including a periodic exchange of trade information.

Fifthly, the OAU secretariat should immediately call upon those member states that have not joined AATPO to do so as soon as possible.

Sixthly, participants felt the urgent need to conduct studies on border trade between African countries, since it forms an essential part of intra-African trade. These studies should stress documentation and record-keeping in order to make it easy to quantify the volume and value of this trade.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

JAPANESE TRADE WITH AFRICA DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 pp 3455-3458

[Text] In 1978 and 1979, Japan's foreign trade with the rest of the world showed the following characteristics:

The overall volume of trade increased 25.5 percent in current value from one year to the next.

The distribution of trade by continent is still clearly in favor of Asia.

The direction of the overall balance was modified: + 23-percent cover of imports by exports (in Japan's favor) in 1978; - 7 percent (against Japan) in 1979. This reversal in trend is of particular interest to a country whose commercial expansion is often considered excessive and unbalanced.

If one closely observes import and export trade, one will note that it is especially in Asia that Japan shows a deficit. This is understandable insofar as its purchases of hydrocarbons are mainly from Arab countries on the Gulf.

JAP-AF-A				
Répartition du commerce extérieur japonais par continents 1)				
(Milliards de yens)				
	1978		1979	
	Export	Import	Export	Import
Asie	7 640,5	8 470,8	8 709,4	12 944,9
Europe	3 799,8	2 054,7	4 318,7	2 694,1
Amérique du Nord	6 358,6	3 962,2	6 804,9	5 612,8
Amérique du Sud	693,8	455,8	783	727,5
Afrique	1 346,8	484,3	1 147,2	698,7
Océanie + divers (2)	716,5	1 319,8	768,3	1 667,4
Total	20 686,8	16 727,6	22 631,5	24 246,4

Key:

1. Distribution of Japanese Foreign Trade by Continent (in billions of yen)
2. South Sea Islands and others

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JAP-AP-8						
Quelques importants déséquilibres en valeur absolue (Pays pétroliers arabes exclus) 1)						
(Milliards de yens)						
	1978			1979		
	Export	Import	Balance pour Japon 2)	Export	Import	Balance pour Japon
États-Unis 3)	5 259	3 108,7	+ 2 150,3	5 772,8	4 458,9	+ 1 315,9
Corée du Sud 4)	1 266,2	540,5	+ 725,7	1 359,7	631,7	+ 628
Hong-Kong	645,9	103	+ 542,9	805,8	144,8	+ 660,8
Taiwan	750,4	385	+ 365,4	953,1	539,4	+ 413,7
RFA 5)	764,2	421,4	+ 342,8	933	563,6	+ 369,4
Liberia	354,7	38,7	+ 316	203,5	90,6	+ 112,9
Singapour	488,9	182,4	+ 306,5	587,8	325,5	+ 262,3
Panama	300,1	17,5	+ 282,6	196,4	37,4	+ 159
Pays-Bas 6)	336,2	67,4	+ 268,8	362,7	90,8	+ 271,9
URSS 7)	525,6	304,7	+ 220,9	536,3	419,1	+ 116,2
Nigeria	203,9	1,6	+ 202,3	178,9	9,3	+ 169,6
Grande-Bretagne 8)	490,6	290,2	+ 200,4	674,5	366,1	+ 308,4
Grèce	197,3	7,2	+ 190,1	164,9	16,2	+ 148,7
Indonésie	443,1	1 110,7	- 667,6	467,3	1 936,7	- 1 469,4
Australie	564,9	1 119,3	- 554,4	569,4	1 378,4	- 809
Canada 9)	395,4	673	- 277,6	379,5	696,7	- 517,2
Suisse	139,3	207,7	- 68,4	163,9	225,4	- 61,5
Italie	103	136,7	- 33,7	149,6	216,7	- 67,1
Ghana	8,6	22,1	- 13,5	7,5	24,6	- 17,1

Key:

1. Major Imbalances in Absolute Value (Arab Oil Countries Excluded) (in billions of yen)
2. Balance for Japan
3. United States
4. South Korea
5. Federal Republic of Germany
6. Netherlands
7. USSR
8. Great Britain
9. Switzerland

Percentages of cover (for Japan) by continent are as follows for 1978 and 1979:

	1978	1979
Asia	90.2	67.8
Europe	184.9	160.3
America	159.6	119.7
Africa	290	164.2
South Sea Islands	54.3	46.1

One can see a very substantial reduction in the rate of cover of imports by exports for the Asian continent, but also a very clear drop in Japanese commercial pressure throughout the world: - 24.6 percent in Europe, - 39.9 percent in America, - 125.8 percent in Africa and - 8.2 percent in the South Sea Islands.

Nevertheless, the pressure remains and gives rise to legitimate concern in some European or American nations, especially with respect to certain categories of goods (automobiles, optics, photography, cinema, radio and sound equipment, and so on).

The percentage distribution of Japanese imports and exports by continent in 1978 and 1979 was as follows:

	1978		1979	
	Import	Export	Import	Export
Asia	50.6	37.2	53	38.6
America	26.4	34.3	26.2	33.7
Europe	12.3	18.5	11.1	19.2
Africa	2.8	6.6	2.9	5.1
South Sea Islands	7.9	3.4	6.8	3.4

As previously stated, Asia's enormous predominance with respect to imports (50.6 percent of overall value in 1978; 53 percent in 1979) is essentially due to the fact that Japan makes almost all of its oil purchases from Middle Eastern nations. Consequently, among the first 15 suppliers, one finds: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. As one will see below, African oil suppliers play a relatively small role.

It is normal for Japan's trade to be very active with neighboring countries such as the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, or Korea. In Table JAP-AF-B [preceding page], one can see that with most of these countries, Japan is in the creditor's position and that the surplus of Japanese exports to South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Singapore, compared with purchases made in those countries, amounts to several hundred billion yen. It is true that the Japanese trade deficit vis-a-vis Indonesia alone was nearly 1,470,000,000,000 yen in 1979.

In Table JAP-AF-C [below], one can see the extraordinary position of the United States as a supplier, but especially as a customer of Japan. The following percentages for 1979 should make it clearer:

As a supplier: 18.4 percent of all Japan's imports. Turnover 1.68 times greater than that of Japan's second-ranking supplier, Saudi Arabia.

As a customer: 25.6 percent -- over one-fourth -- of Japan's total sales to other countries. Turnover 4.25 times greater than that of Japan's second-ranking customer, South Korea.

The vast majority of Japan's trade with Europe favors Tokyo, except with respect to Switzerland, Italy (see Table JAP-AF-B [preceding page], and sometimes Spain and Denmark. The deficit of Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain vis-a-vis Japan is still substantial.

Africa's participation in Japan's foreign trade is insignificant with regard to imports (2.8/2.9 percent) and very modest with respect to exports (6.6/5.1 percent). It is easy to see this in Table JAP-AF-C [below], for one will not find one African supplier or customer among Japan's top 20 trading partners in the world.

Table JAP-AF-C.

Principaux partenaires mondiaux du Japon en 1979
(Milliards de yens)

Pays fournisseurs		Pays clients	
1) États-Unis	4 456,8	1) États-Unis	5 772,7
2) Arabie saoudite	2 680,8	2) Corée du Sud	1 359,7
3) Indonésie	1 936,7	3) Taiwan	983,1
4) Australie	1 378,4	4) RFA	933
5) Iran	964,7	5) Arabie saoudite	840,7
6) Koweït	949,7	6) Hong-Kong	805,6
7) Canada	896,6	7) Chine populaire	803,8
8) Émirats arabes	799,2	8) Grande-Bretagne	674,4
9) Corée du Sud	731,6	9) Singapour	587,7
10) Chine populaire	647,7	10) Australie	589,4
11) RFA	563,5	11) URSS	535,3
12) Taiwan	539,4	12) Indonésie	487,3
13) URSS	419,1	13) Canada	379,5
14) Brunéi	414,5	14) Thaïlande	373,7
15) Irak	399,5	15) Pays-Bas	362,6
16) Grande-Bretagne	366,1	16) Irak	355,4
17) Sabah (Malaysia)	364,9	17) Philippines	353,1
18) Philippines	345,2	18) France	305,3
19) Singapour	325,5	19) Malaisie	285
20) Oman	282,8	20) Belgique	237,6


Key:

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. Japan's Main Trading Partners in 1979 (in billions of yen) | 11. Customers |
| 2. Suppliers | 12. United States |
| 3. United States | 13. South Korea |
| 4. Saudi Arabia | 14. Federal Republic of Germany |
| 5. United Arab Emirates | 15. Saudi Arabia |
| 6. South Korea | 16. People's Republic of China |
| 7. People's Republic of China | 17. Great Britain |
| 8. Federal Republic of Germany | 18. USSR |
| 9. USSR | 19. Netherlands |
| 10. Great Britain | |

South Africa, which leads Japan's African trading partners in imports and exports, is only 22d or 23d when compared with all countries in the world. Its sales to Japan are 16 times lower than those to the United States and its purchases are 27 times more modest. Actually, Japan's total purchases from the entire African continent were nearly comparable to those made by that country from the People's Republic of China, the tenth-ranking supplier to Japan, and 6.5 times lower than those made from the United States alone. Regarding exports, turnover for all of Africa is a little higher than that for Taiwan and five times less than the figure for the United States.

Japanese Imports From Africa

Table JAP-AF-E [below] provides the distribution of African imports by sections using the Brussels nomenclature. Outside of parcel post (00), which represents 11.3 percent of all traffic, the main Japanese purchases involved mineral products, including oil products (26.2 percent), common metals and manufactured products (20.43 percent) and unprocessed plant products (11.80 percent).



Key:

1. Japan's Foreign Trade in 1979 (in billions of yen)
2. Imports
3. South Sea Islands
4. Exports

Imports of mineral products are distributed as follows:

Chapter 26, metallic ores (iron, copper, manganese, lead, zinc, chrome): 82,615,900,000 yen. Suppliers: Swaziland: 956,796 tons; Mauritania, 195,792 tons; Liberia, 357,438 tons; Gabon, 124,064 tons; plus 16,832 tons going through the Congo; Zaire, 95,129 tons; Mozambique, 86,609 tons; Madagascar, 62,180 tons (chromite); Ghana, 30,746 tons; Nigeria, 146 tons, and so on.

Chapter 27, energy products (oil, coal): 73,762,300,000 yen. Suppliers: Libya, 19,111.3 million yen (441,651 cubic meters); Algeria, 12,038,700,000 yen (349,693 cubic meters); Angola, 11,837,000,000 yen (257,984 cubic meters); Nigeria, 5,490,000,000 yen (117,245 cubic meters); South Africa, 25,043,700,000 yen (2.4 million tons of coal and coke).

JAP-AP-D
Principaux partenaires africains du Japon en 1978
(Milliards de yens) 1)

Fournisseurs 2)		Clients 6)	
1) Afrique du Sud 3)	283,7	1) Afrique du Sud 7)	217,5
2) Libéria	90,6	2) Libéria	203,5
3) Zambie	64,2	3) Nigeria	178,9
4) Zaïre	26,4	4) Libye	119,7
5) Ghana	24,6	5) Égypte	86,3
6) Libye	22,8	6) Algérie	75,3
7) Égypte	20,4	7) Canaries 8)	30,9
8) Maroc 4)	16,3	8) Kenya	28,7
9) Côte d'Ivoire 5)	14,4	9) Côte d'Ivoire 9)	18,6
10) Angola	13,6	10) Soudan	16,4
11) Algérie	12,8	11) Tanzanie	15,7
12) Ouganda	11,3	12) Tunisie	15,5
13) Soudan	11,2	13) Ceuta/Mellilla	12,7
14) Nigeria	9,3	14) Madagascar	11,5
15) Cameroun	8,4	15) Éthiopie	11
16) Mozambique	8,2	16) Zambie	9
17) Madagascar	8,1	17) Cameroun	8,4
18) Namibie	6,9	18) Maroc 10)	8,1
19) Tanzanie	6,2	19) Ghana	7,5
20) Éthiopie	6,1	20) Angola	6,6

Key:

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| 1. Japan's Main African Partners in 1979 (in billions of yen) | 6. Customers |
| 2. Suppliers | 7. South Africa |
| 3. South Africa | 8. Canary Islands |
| 4. Morocco | 9. Ivory Coast |
| 5. Ivory Coast | 10. Morocco |

Chapter 25, nonmetallic, nonoil mineral products: 26,712,600,000 yen (phosphates, clays, asbestos, mica, porphyry, coloring earths). Suppliers: South Africa, 16,089,700,000 yen; Morocco, 8,279,600,000 yen; Senegal, 1,146,200,000 yen (74,566 tons of phosphates); Madagascar, 485,700,000 yen; Swaziland, 296,700,000 yen; Namibia, 145,400,000 yen; Kenya, 139,100,000 yen; Mozambique, 64,600,000 yen; Togo, 35,600,000 yen, and so on.


With regard to common metals, it is Chapter 74 (copper and manufactured products) that is easily in the lead, coming ahead of Chapter 73 (iron, reduced metal, steel) and Chapter 76 (aluminum).

Chapter 74: 84,586,700,000 yen. Suppliers: Zambia, 63,103,000,000 yen (158,889 tons); South Africa, 11,005,600,000 yen (27,936 tons); Namibia, 5,286,100,000 yen (11,203 tons); Zaire, 5,040,400,000 yen (12,848 tons); and so on.

Chapter 73: 27,813,700,000 yen. Suppliers: South Africa, 27,612,500,000 yen; Liberia, 181,500,000 yen.

Chapter 76: 18,292,900,000 yen. Suppliers: Ghana, 8,809,900,000 yen; Egypt, 4,515,700,000 yen; South Africa, 3,895,100,000 yen; Cameroon, 956,400,000 yen, and so on.

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Key:

1. Japan's Top-Ranking African Partners in 1979 (in billions of yen)
2. South Africa
3. Imports
4. Others
5. Morocco, Ivory Coast
6. Exports
7. Ivory Coast
8. Canary Islands
9. Others

Chapter 75 (nickel): 2,243,000,000 yen. Supplier: South Africa.

The unprocessed plant products (for food) most frequently purchased by Japan from Africa are coffee and spices (Chapter 9), unprocessed grain (Chapter 10) and oil-yielding seed (Chapter 12).

Chapter 9: 39,637,600,000 yen. Coffee suppliers: Uganda, 14,274 tons; Ivory Coast, 13,795 tons; Ethiopia, 6,683 tons; Tanzania, 4,144 tons; Cameroon, 2,636 tons; Angola, 2,337 tons; Madagascar, 2,024 tons; Rwanda, 1,514 tons; Burundi, 650 tons; Kenya, 313 tons; Mozambique, 241 tons; Lesotho, 98 tons, and so on.

Chapter 10: 32,256,300,000 yen. Suppliers: South Africa, 961,332 tons; Mozambique, 103,872 tons; Kenya, 65,950 tons.

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JAP-AF-E. Japan's African Imports Based on Brussels Nomenclature (V = billions of yen)

	V	%
00. Parcel post and undetermined items	79	11.31
01. Animals and animal products	30.6	4.38
02. Unprocessed plant products	82.5	11.80
04. Products from food industries	44.5	6.37
05. Mineral products (including oil)	183.1	26.20
06. Chemical products	16.4	2.35
09. Wood and manufactured items	11.4	1.63
11. Textiles and manufactured items	44.8	6.42
14. Gems and precious metals	44.8	6.42
15. Common metals and manufactured products	142.8	20.43
17. Transport equipment	10.4	1.49
Other sections, each representing less than 1 percent	8.4	1.20
	698.7	100.00

Chapter 12: 5,816,500,000 yen. Suppliers of peanuts, sesame seed, cottonseed and so on. Sudan: 11,882 tons; Mali, 10,462 tons; Togo, 5,525 tons; South Africa, 4,386 tons; Tanzania, 4,357 tons; Ivory Coast, 3,688 tons; Benin, 3,602 tons; Kenya, 2,466 tons; Mozambique, 2,303 tons; Nigeria, 2,070 tons; Upper Volta, 1,881 tons; Ethiopia, 816 tons, and so on.

Imports of animal products mainly included fresh fish (Chapter 3):

Chapter 3: 21,778,400,000 yen. Suppliers: Morocco, 9,780 tons; Senegal, 3,365 tons; Libya, 2,414 tons; South Africa, 2,346 tons; Madagascar, 1,791 tons; Mozambique, 1,564 tons; Mauritania, 1,020 tons; Canary Islands, 829 tons; Nigeria, 565 tons; Ghana, 456 tons; Namibia, 190 tons; Liberia, 181 tons; Cameroon, 171 tons; Sierra Leone, 43 tons, and so on.

Purchases of sugar for 24,616,800,000 yen (484,938 tons) were all made from South Africa.

One does not see substantial cacao purchases except from Ghana. Total purchases: 15,499,500,000 yen, including Ghana for 14,352,600,000 yen (16,480 tons); Ivory Coast, 990 tons; Cameroon, 410 tons; and Nigeria, 60 tons.

Japan bought 12,343,000,000 yen worth of inorganic chemical products (mainly phosphoric acid) from South Africa.

Wood (11,390,900,000 yen) comes from Cameroon: 51,973 tons; South Africa, 24,966 tons; the Ivory Coast, 13,394 tons; Gabon, 12,358 tons; the Congo, 10,127 tons; Liberia, 7,707 tons; Mozambique, 6,739 tons; Zaire, 2,901 tons; Ghana, 475 tons; Kenya, 465 tons, and so on.

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In the textile field, only three chapters include substantial imports:

Chapter 55, cotton: 34,856,700,000 yen. Suppliers: Egypt, 25,068 tons; Sudan, 16,853 tons; South Africa, 7,220 tons; Chad, 6,823 tons; Cameroon, 4,341 tons; Nigeria, 4,193 tons; Ivory Coast, 3,051 tons; Mali, 2,810 tons; Upper Volta, 2,098 tons; Central African Republic, 1,750 tons; Ethiopia, 999 tons.

Chapter 53, wool: 7,615,400,000 yen. Supplier: South Africa, 6,450 tons.

Chapter 57, fibers for sack-making, mainly sisal: 1,605,500,000 yen. Suppliers: Kenya, 6,290 tons; Tanzania, 5,145 tons.

Gems and precious metals (44,831,000,000 yen) are purchased by Japan from some 15 countries, mainly including South Africa, 43,281,400,000 yen; Ghana, 726,700,000 yen; Zaire, 360,700,000 yen; Zambia, 192,700,000 yen; Kenya, 102,500,000 yen, and so on.

Japanese Exports to Africa

Japan's highly varied exports to its 20 front-ranking African customers (94.1 percent of the total) are distributed as shown in Table JAP-AF-F [below]. One will note the considerable position occupied by the section of transport equipment, machinery and electrical or other equipment and of common metals and manufactured goods (81.94 percent of total Japanese exports in value).

JAP-AF-F. Japan's Exports to Its 20 Front-Ranking African Customers in 1979 (94.1 percent of total exports in value to Africa) Based on the Sections of the Brussels Nomenclature (V = billions of yen)

	V	%
04. Food industry products	18.6	1.73
06. Chemical products	17.5	1.62
07. Plastic and rubber materials	29.2	2.71
11. Textiles and manufactured items	48.8	4.52
15. Common metals and manufactured products	156	14.45
16. Electrical and other machinery and equipment	264.9	24.54
17. Transport equipment	463.7	42.95
18. Optical equipment, measuring and precision instruments	46.7	4.32
Other sections each representing less than 1 percent	34.1	3.16
	1,079	613.5
		100

Table JAP-AF-F shows the amount of purchases in value of the 20 countries concerned for the other chapters with the highest values, including (in billions of yen): Chapter 87, 238.1; Chapter 89, 211.3; Chapter 85, 154.6; Chapter 73, 143.7; Chapter 84, 110.4. 110,364 [sic]

South Africa alone bought over 82 billion yen worth of road transport equipment and Nigeria over 56 billion. Purchases of electrical equipment mainly include

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radios and television sets. The vast majority of all ships sold go to Liberia (194.7 out of 211.3 billion yen).

Other noteworthy chapters among exports are the following (over 5 billion yen), from 01 to 99:

Chapter 03, fresh fish: 5,949,900,000 yen (Canary Islands, 2,252,300,000 yen; South Africa, 2,034,200,000; Ghana, 1,480,100,000).

Chapter 16, canned meat or fish: 18,191,000,000 (Nigeria, 11,984,000,000; Egypt, 1,536,300,000; Libya, 1,527,000,000; Ghana, 1,019,500,000; South Africa, 777,800,000, and so on).

Chapter 29, organic chemical products: 5,138,200,000 yen (South Africa, 3,718,500,000; Nigeria, 500,700,000; Ivory Coast, 333,700,000).

Chapter 39, plastics: 9,409,400,000 yen (South Africa, 4,087,700,000; Nigeria, 3,094,100,000; Algeria, 564,000,000; Egypt, 465,400,000).

Chapter 40, rubber: 19,838,300,000 yen (Algeria, 5,125,200,000; Egypt, 3,964,400,000; South Africa, 3,228,100,000; Sudan, 1,796,700,000; Libya, 1,451,900,000).

Chapter 51, continuous synthetic textiles: 17,102,800,000 yen (South Africa, 8,040,900,000; Nigeria, 2,213,300,000; Sudan, 2,171,600,000; Egypt, 1,260,600,000).

Chapter 56, synthetic or artificial textiles, pieces: 17,904,400,000 yen (South Africa, 8,319,000,000; Nigeria, 3,033,100,000; Algeria, 2,363,100,000; Kenya, 1,056,900,000; Egypt, 1,005,300,000).

Chapter 82, tools, cutlery: 5,749,500,000 yen South Africa, 2.49 billion; Egypt, 1,025,700,000; Nigeria, 785,600,000; Libya, 620,800,000).

Chapter 86, railroad rolling stock: 14,313,200,000 (Egypt, 7,096,600,000; South Africa, 4,430,300,000; Zambia, 2,595,900,000).

Chapter 90, optics, measuring and precision instruments: 16,023,900,000 yen (South Africa, 6,480,400,000; Canary Islands, 1,754,100,000; Egypt, 1,605,500,000; Nigeria, 1,491,200,000; Libya, 864,200,000).

Chapter 91, clocks and watches: 7,708,900,000 yen (Canary Islands, 2,933,000,000; Egypt, 1,792,600,000; Ceuta and Melilla, 1,111,700,000; South Africa, 1,043,900,000).

Chapter 92, music and sound equipment: 22,941,500,000 yen (Libya, 12,822,700,000; South Africa, 3,957,000,000; Canary Islands, 1,641,800,000; Nigeria, 1,622,700,000; Egypt, 1,010,100,000).

[Table JAP-AF-G next page]

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JAP-AF-0

1 Classement des exportations du Japon vers l'Afrique en 1979 pour quelques chapitres remarquables (20 pays)
(Millions de yens)

	2	3	4	5	6
	Engins de transports routiers	Machines électriques	Machines non électriques	Fer, fonte acier et ouvrages	Engins de transport maritime ou fluvial
	Chap. 87	Chap. 85	Chap. 84	Chap. 73	Chap. 89
Leuta Mellilla.....	349,7	6 097,6	706,9	21,5	-
Canaries.....7	5 330,8	9 498,1	2 895,3	689,2	11,2
Maroc.....8	2 482	1 254,2	1 022,6	1 337	-
Algérie.....	2 041,6	5 938	22 879,8	26 471,8	3 970,3
Tunisie.....	624,3	396,4	463,9	6 124,6	7 232,8
Libye.....	35 506,0	49 801	3 956,1	10 512,3	21,5
Égypte.....	13 480,8	22 116,7	9 076,5	12 530,7	1 630,1
Soudan.....	2 064,3	1 265,4	3 106,4	3 024,5	-
Liberia.....	3 528,8	426,3	499,7	912,1	194 714,2
Côte d'Ivoire.....9	9 259,2	2 252,6	1 158,5	1 723,6	2
Ghana.....	588,2	1 447,7	832,8	854,7	488
Nigeria.....	56 276,3	25 401,6	21 644	39 655,3	2,3
Cameroun.....	5 494,8	442,5	536,9	930,1	-
Éthiopie.....	3 128,6	1 058,2	957	2 789,1	-
Kenya.....	6 707	2 104,6	3 274,4	11 245,1	-
Tanzanie.....	3 142,8	3 413,7	3 298,9	3 233,6	-
Angola.....	2 564,7	845,7	547,6	1 354,4	-
Zambie.....	2 286,1	955,2	722	1 037,6	-
Afrique du Sud.....10	82 258	17 162,7	32 240,3	18 876,4	5,5
Madagascar.....	973,7	2 905,5	544,4	2 410,1	3 268,2
Total.....	238 088,6	164 676,7	110 384	143 683,7	211 326,1

Key:

1. Classification of Certain Remarkable Categories of Japanese Exports to Africa in 1979 (20 countries) (in millions of yen)
2. Road transport equipment
3. Electrical equipment
4. Nonelectrical machinery
5. Iron, reduced metal, steel and manufactured items
6. Ocean or river transport equipment
7. Canary Islands
8. Morocco
9. Ivory Coast
10. South Africa

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONCERNED ABOUT LIBYAN ROLE IN CHAD

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp 24-28

[Article by Mohamed Selhami and Abdelaziz Barouhi--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] With the conquest of Chad, the Libyan leader thinks the hour has struck for him to realize a great dream, the United States of the Sahel, of which he would be the ruler.

Monday, 20 October. The Sebha air base (800 km south of Tripoli). Several hundred soldiers are trying to cram themselves into the big transport aircraft: two Ilyushin 76, three Antonovs (two of them borrowed from Syria), four Hercules C-130's. Also being loaded aboard are arms (machine-guns and artillery), munitions chests, light armored materiel (Brazilian Cascavels, British Ferret automatic machineguns).

Col Khalifa Mouftah is directing operations. Destination: Faya-Largeau, in Chad, 400 km from the border. /"Responding to the appeal of his brother and counterpart Goukouni Oueddei,"/ president of the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government), Mu'ammarr Zadhafi throws himself into the conquest of his neighbor to the south, a part of which, the Aouzou Strip (114,000 square kilometers) he has already been occupying for years. The prime objective: to finish off the "dissident" Hissein Habre, leader of the FAN (Northern Armed Forces). And then?

For several weeks the Libyan leader has had the green light from the Soviets for his military adventure. He is paying for the arms that Syria (which merged with the Jamahiriya on 1 September) buys from Moscow. In exchange for his support to the USSR's special partner in the Middle East, he has obtained carte blanche for his African schemes. And above all--an indispensable technical condition--the cover provided for the Chad offensive by the Soviet and East German advisers present in Libya.

Forty-eight hours before D-Day, Qadhafi calls together, in the presence of Soviet experts, his principal officers: Maj Abd-al-Salam Jallud, the leader's deputy; Gen Abu-Bakr Jabir Yunis, commander in chief of the armed forces; Lt Col Kharubi, head of the /Moukhabarat/ (secret services) and of the military branch of the Bureau of Arab Liaison; Col Muhammad (Lamgarif), inspector general of the forces;

Maj Khuwaylidi al-Hamidi, head of the "People's Resistance" (militia); Col Muhammad Barjati, commandant of the Cyrenaica military region; Lt Col Sayf Kaddaf Adam, head of the bureau for exportation of the revolution; Col Khalifah Muftah. Two members of the People's General Congress (Assembly) are also there.

The final details of "Operation Chad" are honed. Col Khalifah Muftah, age 40, trained in the USSR, has been named to lead the operation to "final victory." Before a map of the region he explains how the Libyan Army is going to be deployed. Nearly 4,000 men will be engaged (including 1,500 already stationed in the Aouzou Strip), all heading for Faya-Largeau. From there, 1,600 will disperse into northeast Chad; 400 will head for the Doubou base; the remainder (about 2,000 men) will descend even further south, toward Ndjamen, under the orders of Muhammad Brahim.

The road is open. The Jamahiriya cannot fail in Chad. And afterwards, why not Niger, then Mali... Qadhafi already has glimpses of the realization of his dream, that United States of the Sahel of which he would be the ruler (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 975). With the help of his over-equipped army, for which he is presently spending about \$4 billion per year. Forgotten now are the disappointments of the past! In truth, [this means only] the Ugandan expedition. For, despite the thundering pronouncements of their leader, the Libyans have never engaged their forces in the Middle East theater of operations.

In April 1979, shortly before the fall of Kampala, 2,000 men had been sent-- without being previously informed--to the rescue of Marshal Idi Amin Dada. Total defeat: 400 dead or wounded, 600 prisoners taken by the Tanzanians, who drove a hard bargain for their return. Among them, many non-Libyan Arabs, particularly Tunisians, trained in camps in the Jamahiriya and in Lebanon. They were "lacking in fighting spirit," it is said these days in Tripoli to explain the defeat. It is also true that they were far from their bases and on terrain with which they were completely unfamiliar.

In any case, the men participating in "Operation Chad" would be much more highly motivated. Three-fourths of them are Libyans, the others being Syrians, South Yemenis, and Palestinians (members of al-Sa'iqah, the pro-Syrian organization). "Revolutionaries" who have opted for Libyan nationality and been generously rewarded for it.

These shock troops apart, the Libyan army is still far from being equal to the ambitions and objectives of its leader. Overwhelmed by the last word in weaponry, the soldiers still have much to learn about handling these sophisticated arms. Nomads for the most part, often illiterate, the men in the ranks are not battle-hardened veterans. Ill-disciplined, fond of parading--carrying themselves jauntily with their Kalashnikovs slung across their backs--through the streets of Tripoli or Benghazi, they are barely able even to march in step.

One understands why the Libyan Army still needs experts and advisers from the "fraternal countries" of the socialist bloc (who are not for all that engaged in Chad) and foreign pilots (North Koreans, Syrians, South Yemenis...)

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But even so, the "1980 model" is visibly better organized than in past years. A result of the training provided by the foreign advisers. A result also of the growing militarization of the society. For Qadhdhafi has transformed his country into one huge barracks.

Up to this point, secondary and college students of course underwent periods of military training in order to serve in army transport and as "missiliers" [translation unknown] in case of need. From now on, they will receive their training in arms at school. Already, in Tripoli, primary schoolchildren are accoutered in combat dress and marching in step.

The factories too will be transformed to meet the requirements of the army. To tell the truth, Libyan workers already played a small enough part in production. Henceforth, they will report to their work-places in military dress and armed, and will be trained on-site.

But the finest success is the organization of the women into brigades. There are vast numbers of them in the armed forces, and they have the opportunity to achieve officer-grade status. The military academy has been opened up to them. One sees them in town, in their paramilitary uniforms, elegant, proud, and provocative. But woe to the "wolf." An over-enterprising young man found biting the dust in the middle of the street in Tripoli following an exhibition of judo. Qadhdhafi's revolutionary speeches have more impact on these women than on the men. And for good reason. For them the army acts as a means of emancipation. The barracks and authority (sometimes over the men) rather than confinement within the four walls of the family house and submission to relatives.

And after all, since commercial activities were banned (1979), the status of soldier has become a profitable one. Apart from the 3 months of intensive instruction at the start, one reports to the barracks just as another reports to the office. Unless one has guard duty, one goes home every evening when one's duties are accomplished. A young recruit's pay is 80 dinars (1,200 French francs) and is the owner of his own house. The soldier, like the officer, benefits from the concessionary pricing on all purchases in army stores (50 percent less expensive than prices in the city), on everything from furniture to electric gadgets, not to mention food products.

But this militarization cum social promotion is one thing, while war and its consequences are something else. For instance, there are these coffins which, since the Chad offensive started, have been deposited at dawn on the doorsteps of homes. When they are not put straight into the ground in the village cemetery.

The Libyans will not fail to react to this. But even so, it will not be eventual shifts in public opinion that will stop Qadhdhafi. Especially since, as of 24 November, barely a month after the unleashing of the Chad offensive, victory seemed at hand. After having forced their way along the Ndjamen-Ati-Abeche axis (see report from our special correspondent on page 28), the Libyans built a base at Douguia (60 km north of the capital). From there, they could support a final offensive against Habre's FAN, at the time when the FAT southerners of Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue were beginning to show their strength against Goukouni Oueddei's men entrenched at Farcha (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1037).

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Hissein Habre has good soldiers. But no airplanes or armored vehicles. The balance of forces is overwhelmingly in favor of Qadhdhafi and the GUNT. And the FAN gets no external support comparable to that received by Goukouni. Certainly, the Egyptians have been helping out for several months. But they do not like being committed so far beyond their borders. And will France, which had an understanding with Qadhdhafi on the sharing of influence in Chad (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1037), close its eyes indefinitely?

Many African countries, increasingly nervous, are pressing the French. Morocco, which is being pressed by Libya through the POLISARIO: Tunisia, threatened on its borders by some 10,000 men, two superbly equipped divisions (435 tanks; 10 battalions of infantry, one of commandos; 40 Mirage F-1 and Mirage 5 aircraft; Tupolev-22 bombers; some 20 helicopters): both are denouncing Libyan expansionism.

Egypt, on which are targeted the Scud-B missiles, is doing the same. Mali and Niger, with limited defensive capabilities, potential victims of Qadhdhafi's Sahara scheme--Qadhdhafi maintains opposition commandos in Libya--take refuge in discretion. Only Senegal, which has had (in its own "ayayollah", Ahmed Khalifa Nyasse) a foretaste of Qadhdhafian subversion, has spoken out strongly through its president, Leopold Sedar Senghor. But other countries have let Paris know that the "Libyan invasion" was threatening the equilibrium of the region. On 24 November, the Quai d'Orsay stated that "the arrival of sizeable armed elements from the outside gives a new dimension" to the civil war. More than a month after the start of Libya's massive intervention, that is certainly an understatement!

In fact, without breaking its tacit accord with Tripoli, the government in Paris must have given assurances to its friends in the region. In particular to those most directly threatened (Niger and Mali): Qadhdhafi will not go further than Chad.

France up to now was conceivable betting on a Libyan defeat after the elimination of Hissein Habre. For Qadhdhafi's troops would have a hard time as an occupation army exposed to the hostility of a majority of Chadians and to a guerrilla movement on its own ground. But most Africans think the devil has been too much indulged. Thanks to them, there is movement toward creation of a new inter-African force under the banners of the United Nations. Under these conditions, the Soviets would have no entry. And Qadhdhafi would be left with no choice but to withdraw.

This is how "Operation Chad" could end. But the Qadhdhafi "threat" remains, and his expansionist, revolutionary, and pan-Islamic ambitions. By throwing his army into the conquest of Chad, he proved that nothing would stop him. Except, perhaps, an "Operation Libya" mounted by some of his adversaries.

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CHADIAN NATIONAL FEELING AGAINST LIBYA ARISING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 28

[Article by Christian Grain--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] After Faya-Largeau, Dalait, Oum Chalouba and Biltine, Abeche has become the basic objective of Qadhdhafi's cohorts. This traditional and religious town in the east, 100 km from the Sudanese frontier, is in reality the real arsenal of the FAN [Northern Armed Forces]. This is where Hissein Habre's men store the arms they capture from the enemy. It is through this point that the munitions bought on the international market--whether in Sudan, Egypt, or in one or two other countries that are willing to serve as intermediaries--are channeled. So it is from this point that the goods needed in Ndjamena set out on their 750-km journey over roads and trails.

Since 5 November, the Abeche-Ati-Jdjamena trail has been bombarded daily by the 22 Libyan Tupolevs. Hissein Habre told me several days ago: "If the FAN disappeared, the shock waves would be felt throughout Sahelian and central Africa. Nothing will stop Libya. The French, who are looking at the short term, are deceiving themselves thinking they are duping Libya. You cannot outfox Qadhdhafi."/

And Hissein Habre continues to fight. As a guerrilla. He fears he will lose Abeche and be strangled in the capital. But he believes that if the Libyans bombed and took Abeche, it would probably turn against them and their allies. For Abeche is not his fiefdom. He went there in February 1979 and reorganized the town for the benefit of the population and particularly of the tradesmen. But most of the children of Abeche are fighting in the ranks of Goukouni Oueddei and Acyl Ahmat. If their town were taken by the Libyans and destroyed, they would certainly turn against their ally of today once he became the invader.

It remains that Qadhdhafi's new strategy--carrying the struggle to the interior, where he encounters the feeblest resistance--holds more dangers for the country as a whole than does the possible taking of Abeche: habituation to the Libyan presence on Chadian territory and on the borders of Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon.

Two months ago, a three-engine Tupolev-22 began dropping--2 or 3 times a week, from high altitude, and blindly--some bombs on Ndjamena.

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Today, Chinook helicopters of American design (but manufactured under license in Italy and equipped by the French firm Thomson CSF) as well as small propeller-driven aircraft resembling T-6's send salvos of rockets 4 or 5 times a day. Without their activities being coordinated with a real ground offensive.

One has even gotten accustomed to the three Tupolev-22's violating Cameroonian airspace every day in an east-west direction, between 1030 and 1200 hours, passing over Kousseri and Ndjamena to come back along the Jdjamena-Abeche trail.

And to the Libyan helicopter teams playing tourist in Bongor, in southern Chad, where they come to search out Colonel Kamougue's soldiers to bring them back up to Farcha, the rotation of DC-4's from the Libyan squadron no longer sufficing.

I have met several members of Goukouni's FAP who are still just as opposed to Hissein Habre, but manifestly shaken as to the justice of their fight. It is above all the southerners who are disturbed: their fear and their hatred of Hissein Habre are beginning to yield to their fear of having to learn Qadhdhafi's green Book by heart.

It certainly would seem that, in the face of Libyan ambitions, the birth of a Chadian national feeling might just be under way. But is it already too late?

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REVITALIZATION OF NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 pp 3326-3327

[Article by Jean-Claude Lucas: "Seventh Plenary Session of the Club of Dakar (Sousse, 24-26 November): A Contribution to the Revival of the North-South Dialogue"]

[Text] To cause social and economic antagonisms today which are so threatening to the ideal of squaring the "virtuous circle" of participatory development is certainly very difficult! Yet, however contradictory they may seem among themselves, the often stubbornly held positions taken by the protagonists of the crisis -- that is to say the industrialized nations, whether liberal or socialist, the oil producing countries, whether or not members of OPEC, the developing countries taken as an excessively undifferentiated whole -- would well and truly bring together the logical conditions for a dynamic breakthrough if they were to decide that they really want to "get out of it." It was precisely these conditions which the Club of Dakar, following the example of others, planned to reconcile by the end of its seventh plenary session which met from 24 to 26 November in Port El Kantaoui, near Sousse, with the resolute intention of showing how the fulfilment of the interests of each of the three components of the world community furthers the peace and dignity of its peoples. It was a matter then of making a contribution to the revival of the North-South dialogue which fortunately proceeds outside the narrow paths of official institutions in which it has already become fairly well bogged down.

But although, stepping back, the report on deficiencies and potentials becomes easier to draw up and virtually banal, although the analyses of the causes, taking into account elements of passion, brings out a nonetheless complex explanation of the crisis and enriches the theory of the exchanges of new concepts (interdependence, compensated balance, flow of factors, national preferences for structures...), the egotism and awkwardness of human groups put a brake, for the time being, on the implementation of international economic relations finally committed to justice, equality and "greater welfare," relations inspired by a real joint responsibility which people to a large degree, with an excess of paralyzing meanings, still perceive as being always quicker to give in to the seduction of deceptive myths.

This is the summary of the approach determined from the outset* and which, for lack of really original conclusive proposals, has opened the way toward study and thought perspectives which are encouraging. Rather than the somewhat vain and

* An approach introduced in the opening statements of Messrs Diawara, Moncef Bel Hadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for Civil Service and Administrative Reform, of Tunisia, and Alfred Sauvy, professor at the College of France.

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especially unnecessarily polished statements in diplomatic language which is far too cautious, what will be remembered of the activities of this last plenary session is that part -- maybe the best -- where the thoughts of the participants shared aloud were to be found, that part where they dare to go further and deeper, which nourishes the "tune of the times" with its ideas, in short that part which deserves more from the Club of Dakar than the excessive formality of the procedures and the scholasticism which one might have feared it would succumb to, a victim of the ambiguities and paradoxes of its formula or of its size, if not of its success.

Here then, distributed among the six families of adopted proposals, is an overview of the debates.

I. Investment of Surplus Capital

For the oil producing countries with a balance of payments surplus, the incitement to invest is largely a function of the guarantees of security and return likely to protect their financial assets, specifically from monetary erosion. Hence, the idea of an indexing of the value of capital. Such an arrangement would, in principle, be compensated by an agreement to moderate the development of the price of oil and, on the other hand, be accompanied, with regard to the borrowers, by conditions strictly adapted to their needs and capabilities.

Several ideas were brought forward during the debate, which would improve by being considered during possible exploratory studies at a later date. For example, the recommendation -- picked up from the Brandt Commission -- aimed at modifying the statutes of the World Bank in order to authorize it to agree to loans representing double its social capital. This measure alone would free an added capacity of 80 billion dollars. Moreover, the precedent created by the IMF of selling gold reserves at auction -- of which the first agreement, completely implemented, did not lead to a renewal -- could inspire countries which dispose of reserves to transform a part (10 percent, for example) at the current commercial market price, but it is not possible to make even an approximate evaluation of the effects of this system.

II. Increased Free Financial Transfers

In its general form, public aid no longer seems separate from energy problems, and it is unfortunate that during the sixties the industrialized countries missed the opportunity to earmark part of the oil returns they were enjoying at the time, for the developing countries. The worrisome case of Mauritania illustrates this remark: it is experiencing a shortage of drinking water because it can no longer distill sea water in the quantities it needs due to the prohibitive technical costs.

On this subject, the Club of Dakar pursued the thought it had started developing during its meeting in Abidjan in 1976. It involved moving towards basing aid on a tax on the order of a "world solidarity tax." Three possible bases for this assessment are being considered: a) an automatic contribution by the rich countries based on their national income; b) on the trade of energy products; c) on the trade of military materials.

The working hypothesis of the establishment of a preferential price for petroleum, granted by the exporting oil producing countries to the nonexporting oil producing countries, was abandoned because it raised numerous objections concerning

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difficulties of implementation. Its formulation in itself was already an obstacle to a preliminary study. All the same, this arrangement should not be completely ruled out from consideration. As a matter of fact, the examples of Venezuela and Mexico have been cited to back it up. These countries have committed themselves to supply 9 member countries of the Andean Community with 160,000 barrels of crude a day in return for the following payment agreement: 70 percent of the price is subject to a normal agreement and 30 percent to payment spread over 5 years. This 30 percent may be subject to long term (25 years) transformation according to normal loan conditions. This point undoubtedly feeds numerous controversies, particularly among those who see it as an additional incitement to the consumption of this non-renewable raw material, the management of which it would be desirable to organize: hydrocarbons are indispensable to the production of 23,800 products, and these products should be given priority in the use of hydrocarbons.

It is well known that public aid constitutes an imperfect and quantitatively insufficient instrument (overall, 0.34 percent of the affected GNP for the member countries of the OECD, as against a rate initially set at 1 percent). Furthermore, the aid resulting from bilateral cooperation between countries generally takes the form of a relationship of dependence, which erodes its effects, if it does not invalidate them. Finally, the critical situation of indebtedness of the developing countries -- the analysis of which shows an extreme diversity of structures -- requires a renegotiation which would not simply be an extension of credits over time, while the industrial countries of the OECD no longer dispose of surpluses which would allow them to respond to the financial needs of the developing countries, surpluses which are virtually all in the hands of the petroleum producing countries with positive balances of payment. This point touches on one of the aspects of the interdependence of situations which necessitate the definition of a financial and monetary economic order reconstructed on thoroughly modified bases.

This observation introduces one of the most urgent proposals to be implemented, specifically a just payment for raw materials for which it should be possible to guarantee export receipts in real terms. If the principle does not raise any controversy, the compensatory mechanisms -- assuming that the current conditions of price setting are maintained -- call for a reform going substantially beyond the usual stopgap measures. This approach leads to a program of local industrial development of the products, which is the only way to bring out the indispensable added value by which countries have a hold on their own future by controlling an endogenous and self-centered development. Hence, the action is directed towards the causes and not the results.

The following proposals are divided into these two groups of measures.

III. Strategic Development Options

Efforts must be made to increase agricultural production by giving the latter the priority role of satisfying food needs. This orientation cannot keep the developing countries from participating in the process of applied research in the new fields which constitute the technological stakes for the 1980's, such as agrobiological and nonconventional energy. Access to technology and the obstacles which slow down or virtually prohibit its transfer, constitute a particularly open theme for thought among the relevant parties.

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IV. Development of Horizontal Cooperation

In the case of Africa, regional integration in particular and cooperation at the level of technological research should draw on the achievements attained by the economic communities of Latin America (Andean Treaty) and of South-East Asia (Asean).

V. Less Developed Countries

In order to contribute its own ideas to the work of the United Nations Conference on less developed countries, to be held in Paris in September 1981, the Club of Dakar has set the objective of introducing "concrete proposals" on the subject as early as the first half of 1981. It would involve defining those means which would allow the most disadvantaged nations (the number of which is 30, 24 of which are African) to reach a minimum income level.

VI. Start of Global Negotiations

A suggestion was made to the effect that participation of the developing countries in decision making within the IMF, specifically in matters of allocations, should reflect a real democratization.

Final Comments

The Club of Dakar is changing its public image. The strategy of development, it is true, requires an understanding of the phenomena and the imagination to produce solutions comparable in their processes to Keynesian theory, according to which the general interest does not equal the sum of particular interests. In order to take action it will obviously be necessary to understand the direction of the developments which, in a scattered way, work in depth toward the emergence of new international economic relations which some people, perpetually behind the times, will always look upon as "the world turned upside down." By breaking through its regional framework, the Club of Dakar gives a symbolic scope to its gesture: Africa, which for a long time was kept behind developments, is indicating its desire to participate, through its potential weight, through its originality, in the development of the contemporary world.

By presenting, in the next few weeks, the six proposals which have just been adopted, to the secretary general of the United Nations, to the president of the World Bank and to the director general of the IMF, Mr Diawara, president of the Club of Dakar, will confirm the desire to reopen the North-South negotiations on the basis of far-reaching thoughts and not in the spirit of "everyone for himself," which alone leads to catastrophe. The Club of Dakar will have shown the way.

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REPORTAGE ON LOME I PROJECTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 5 Dec 80 pp 3328, 29

[Report from Brussels by a special correspondent: "Lome I and the Projects of Regional Cooperation"]

[Text] The Lome I Agreement reserved explicitly for regional cooperation an amount of approximately 10 percent of the credits, or 300 million European currency units (1 ECU = about 5.5 FFfr). What is the status of the use of these credits? As of 1 December 1980, the situation is the following: nearly 77 percent of the available credits have been allotted, or more than 230 million ECU's. Of this total, around a third have actually been spent.

Africa accounts for the largest part of the allotments, with more than 158 million. By large zones, the distribution for the projects is the following: West Africa, 80.8 million; East Africa, 40.9 million; Central Africa, 8.1 million; southern Africa, 25 million; to which is added 7.5 million for studies and 6.5 million for technical assistance and training. The Caribbean has received nearly 20 million and the Pacific countries 10 million. Finally, operations of general technical cooperation have absorbed more than 32 million: commercial promotion, budget of the "Center for Industrial Development," furnishing experts to the secretariat general of the ACP's [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries], etc.

Among the aid projects, the /transportation/ [in boldface] sector is predominant: more than 100 million ECU's, including 40 million allotted in eastern Africa, 26 million in West Africa, 8 million in central Africa, 18 million in southern Africa, more than 6 million in the Caribbean and more than 5 million in the Pacific. The number of projects is quite high, and mostly concern works of a very significant financial amount: 10 million ECU's for the Abidjan-Accra axis, 20 million for the Lusahunga-Bukumbe highway, more than 12 million for the Butare-Kayenza highway, 10 million for the Botswana-Zambia highway, etc.

The second sector is perhaps more surprising: it concerns /training institutions/ [in boldface] such as the "Veterinary Institute of Dakar" (4.5 million ECU's), the "University of the South Pacific" (3.2 million), for a total of nearly 28 million which concerns mostly West Africa and southern Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Next comes the domain of /large dams/ [in boldface] which with only two projects totals 20 million ECU's, in West Africa: "Senegal River Development Organization"

(OMVS) and "Mano River Union," not to mention the studies. Finally, the fourth sector in order of financial importance is that of **/industry/** [in boldface] which with the "Cimao" project [West African Cement Company] already accounts for 18 million ECU's, not counting the "Center for Industrial Development," etc.

These four sectors total nearly 200 million ECU's, or 87 percent of the allotments.

This distribution clearly shows the need, felt by the different States involved, to put regional integration in a priority position on an organized, modern network of lines of communication between them. It might perhaps be tempting to regret the absence, among the important sectors, of regional research (agricultural research, solar or wind energy, etc.), which should have made a better showing, but perhaps the 5th EDF [European Development Fund] will balance the 4th on this point.

The European Commission has just decided upon a special aid package of one million ECU's in favor of the following countries: Benin, Ghana, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Togo. This aid responds to the call directed to the EEC by the "International Office of Epizooties" (OIE) and by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the institution of an emergency program intended to combat cattle disease of which several outbreaks have recently reappeared in five countries of the region with danger of propagation. The total cost of this program is estimated at 5.142 million ECU's.

The Commission also decided upon a special aid package of 150 thousand ECU's in favor of the Central African Republic for the purchase of essential goods intended for the populations of the Northeast affected by the famine.

/Next Seminar at Lome on the Center for Industrial Development/ [in boldface] "The Center for Industrial Development" (ACP-EEC Agreement of Lome) is organizing on 9, 10 and 11 December 1980 at Lome, a seminar to attract the attention of the countries of West Africa on the functions of the CID and in particular the new aspects as defined in the new Lome Agreement. This seminar will bring together three participants from each country chosen from ministries of industry or planning, from development organizations, from banks or private industry, from technical ministries, agencies or institutions. Also present will be representatives of the Commission of European Communities, of the European Investment Bank, of the Council of Ministers, of the ACP secretariat, of the ACP-EEC Committee for Industrial Cooperation, of the local branches of the CID, of regional organizations of the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] and of the European Office of Patents.

The seminar will be presided over by Mr Peter A. Afolabi, co-president of the ACP-EEC Committee for Industrial Cooperation.

The agenda will allow for, among others, sessions of dialogue in the course of which the two following points will be discussed: promotion of the CID for the establishment of new industrial enterprises in the countries of West Africa with the intervention of EEC industry; potential assistance of the CID in the adaptation of technology and assistance to the existing industries.

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INTERNATIONAL COCOA ACCORD EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3133

[Editorial: "Economic or Political Priorities"]

[Text] We must no doubt rejoice that it was possible to arrive at an international agreement on cocoa in Geneva. Naturally, dialog between producers and consumers is always preferable to absence of negotiations, no matter how difficult the latter. Nevertheless, in spite of the conclusion of the talks which were staggered over 2 years, questions remain. Without discussing in detail the technical provisions *, it is significant that two of the countries most directly concerned have refused to sign. One, the Ivory Coast is the chief cocoa producer, the other, the United States, the chief consumer.

Their principles are simple and typical of the misunderstanding prevailing between the rich countries of the industrialized world and the poor countries producing the basic products or raw materials.

The Ivory Coast states that its present marketing prices do not permit the suitable remuneration of the planters, and that the totally erratic fluctuations of the rates on the world market are to be explained not by economic considerations, but by the interplay of unbridled international speculation which precludes any reasonable planning of its development. Such a situation can only lead to the land being abandoned by discouraged farmers, who come and increase the population of the suburbs of the large cities and the number of unemployed, with all the risks of internal "destabilization" resulting in the country. The Ivory Coast is therefore attempting to obtain the guarantee for the regular and negotiated increase of the sale prices for export, in the same way exactly as the consumers, the industrialized nations, wish to obtain from the oil producing countries an engagement on progressive price increases fixed by common agreement. The Geneva accord did not seem to the Ivory Coast to be accomplishing this objective, so it refused to be associated therewith, and it is extremely probable, as it asserts, that its evaluation of the agreement is shared by other producers. On the contrary, the United States, and to a lesser degree, the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain maintain that price fluctuations are caused by the phenomenon of the adjustment of supply and demand according to the laws of a liberal economy. The

* The broad lines of the contract may be found in MARCHES TROPICAUX of 21 November 1980, p 3116

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world stocks now amount to about 450,000 tons, and the cocoa crop is abundant for the fourth consecutive year. It is therefore not surprising that the market is on a downward trend. Being faithful to the principles of liberalism, the United States who have nevertheless just ratified the accord on the Funds of Stabilization of Raw Materials, are hardly favorably inclined towards agreements which distort the market interplay. By the way, they had signed neither of the two previous international accords on cocoa, of 1972 and 1975. On the other hand, the United States point out that cocoa is not an indispensable product and that the democratic governments have no means of compelling their industrialists to give up the use of the synthetic products which may be taken as cocoa substitutes. What can the producers do then? Try to change the volume of the production offered on the market? It is impossible for them to reduce the production, unlike the oil producers, whose resources are maintained intact in their subsoil, in this case lack of maintenance of cocoa plantations leads to their premature aging and has an adverse effect on their future production capacity. Should they store some of their crop? Storage costs are high, since the proper preservation of cocoa requires costly solutions. Should they establish a cartel and use the regulating funds created in the execution of the two previous agreements, and which amounts today to about \$230 million? At present rates, the fund would permit the purchase of about 100,000 tons, that is an amount insufficient by far to affect the rates. After the expiry of the second international agreement in March 1980, the producing countries had agreed, in a spirit of conciliation, not to demand, as they were entitled, the dissolution of this fund and the reimbursement to the producing countries of the 90 percent to which they were entitled, desiring thus to leave the chance of arriving at another international agreement. The Ivory Coast now considers that it has been very poorly paid for its good faith. Actually, to be able to affect effectively the rates, the cartel of producers should have at its disposal a mass of financial resources which they do not possess today. Unless they request the countries which have an excess of available capital, such as certain OPEC countries, or the cocoa producing countries should discover oil deposits on their own territories--that is the case of the Ivory Coast--and should use their oil resources to maintain the cocoa rates...

Since at the present time, cocoa is not a strategic product, the producers are practically disarmed, and after a rear guard struggle for the sake of their honor, have no solution other than to bow to the law of the mighty. Therein lies precisely the core of the problems of development. In all the international forums, the representatives of the governments of the industrialized countries proclaim loudly their solidarity with the Third World countries, and acknowledge the imperious need to raise the standard of living of their populations, if only to facilitate the creation of a market for their manufactured products. These same industrialized countries are prepared to accomplish non negligible efforts to help the Third World countries to restore the equilibrium in their balance of payments, and to achieve progress in the setting up of infrastructures, the improvement of the productivity of agriculture, basic education and professional training. But the industrial world does not seem capable of understanding that the most rational means of permitting the Third World to achieve these objectives is to guarantee it the receipt of stable export income, especially when these revenues come from a single product, such as is the case for many developing countries. It is quite apparent that the simple interplay of the laws of the market

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between unequal partners, even if it is not distorted by purely speculative maneuvers, cannot assure this stability of resources.

It is therefore the prerogatives of the governments to choose between the immediate interests of their industrialists, in this case, the chocolate manufacturers-- but cocoa is only taken as an example here--and their long term interest, that is, their economic and political relations with the whole of the developing world, which holds a considerable part of the basic products and raw materials, not to mention oil, indispensable to the industries of the developed countries of the world. It is essentially a political choice which represents a heavy future commitment. A real desire to help the development is manifested at least as much in the positions adopted in the secret negotiations in Geneva or elsewhere, in connection with any agreement on products as in the declarations naturally impregnated with the greatest understanding and deepest generosity at the tribune of the United Nations, but which have hardly any other merit than that of being non-binding.

It is inconsistent to denounce the risks of destabilization of the Third World in Africa in particular, and at the same time to contribute to this very destabilization by removing from the local governments the means of fighting against it by improving the lot of their people. The example of the international accord on cocoa is a timely reminder for us of this fact.

Not all the governments of the Nine Nations of the EEC have as yet become aware of this. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the officials of the Brussels Commission, whom it is fashionable in certain circles to refer to as "technocrats" prove to be more far-seeing politicians in the area of this type of problems.

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BRIEFS

PROGRESSIVE FORCES GROUPING--The creation of a "grouping of African progressive forces" was central to Soviet-Ethiopian discussions from the beginning of the official visit by Lt Col Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow (where he arrived 27 October). Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Liberia would be members. But not Guinea or Guinea-Bissau. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Nov 80 p 41] 9693

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ANGOLA

WEST ADVISED TO ABANDON HOSTILE ATTITUDE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Nov 80 p 36

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Time of the Commissioners"]

[Text] Independence was achieved 5 years ago on 11 November, but the anniversary was not a euphoric one.

The Angolan file, the results of 5 years of independence, reads a bit like a court case. With the indictment, the defense, and the extenuating circumstances. Those who see Angola as a state on probation stress that nothing, or almost nothing, has changed there since 1975, and that 5 years later, this state still does not control its territory: 20,000 Cuban soldiers are permanently stationed between Cabinda and Benguela, and insecurity continues to reign in the four southern provinces (Moxico, Bie, Cuando-Cubango, Cunene) where UNITA's (the rebellion movement's) forces continue to operate with varying results.

Their chief, Jonas Savimbi, who benefits from the discreet support of Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and particularly of Senegal (he claims to support "black socialism"), has established his general's headquarters in the north of Namibia. His troops are armed by South Africa, but also--Savimbi recently repeated this--by the People's Republic of China.

Indictment

To the north, the enclave of Cabinda is also agitated by autonomist rumblings, while the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave has been deprived of its leadership by the death of its "historic leader" N'Zita Henriques Tiago at the beginning of September, no doubt the victim of a settling of accounts.

Reconciliation policies seem to be excluded, since during the month of August, again, 25 antagonists were executed.

Others, the "advocates", note, however, the successes in the areas of education and of health, as well as the "spirit of democracy" which reigns at the time of the imminent replacement of the Council of the Revolution by a popularly elected assembly. Above all, they feel that the true source of all the problems is the constant intervention of the South African Army. These many territorial violations,

which culminated at the beginning of June with the "operation Smokeshell" (J.A. No 1016) have obliged the Angolan government to devote almost half of its budget to national defense.

Nothing is untrue in this indictment, or in the defense, except that to the list of handicaps must be added the death of Agostinho Neto, a little more than a year ago, on 11 September 1979. The cautious attempts at internal and external political openness, initiated during the last months of his life by the one that was affectionately called "Netinho" have since been blocked. Only Neto, no doubt, had sufficient authority and charisma to criticize his own errors. His successor, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, is primarily a puppet, around whom men like the minister of security, Kundi Payama, the head of defense, Pedro Maria Tonha (who replaced Iko Carreira in this post), and the head of the party organization, Lucio Lara, play an all-powerful role. This is without counting the 17 provincial commissioners who, with ministerial rank, practically constitute a parallel government.

On the Condition...

This tendency towards extreme militarization and "sovietization" of the country will only be reinforced if the West continues to adopt its frankly hostile attitude towards Angola. Recall that, in 1978, returning from a visit to Luanda, the European development commissioner, Claude Cheysson, strongly recommended large-scale economic assistance. Nothing, or little, since has come from the West.

The United States, who still have not recognized Angola, even risk turning their hostility into open defiance. At the end of June, in fact, the senate in Washington decided to annul the "Clark amendment" which, since 1976, has prohibited the CIA from intervening with the FNLA, and particularly with UNITA. The pro-Savimbi "lobby" (which includes such prestigious names as Henry Kissinger, Henry Jackson, Thomas O'Neill, and Stansfield Turner) thus hopes--and they are not hiding it--to make the Soviets pay for the invasion of Afghanistan. On the condition, of course, that they will have an attentive ear in the White House. Ronald Reagan's, for example.

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ANGOLA

NEW EQUIPMENT, IMPROVEMENTS FOR BENGUELA RAILROAD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3258

[Text] The question of whether the Benguela Railroad did or did not provide domestic service, even sporadically, during the period 1976-1978 can be argued ad infinitum. One thing is certain, however, namely that the railroad was closed to international traffic during that period. Furthermore, this denial of access to the port of Lobito was financially detrimental to Zaire and Zambia. This situation has now--November 1978--returned to normal, but the feeling of insecurity persists all along that section of the railroad in areas still controlled by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. Nevertheless, the shipping of copper has resumed via this line which, all things considered, governs the future development of regional railroad projects.

Fears expressed about inevitable competition from the TAZARA [Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority] railroad once that line became operational, have proved to be highly exaggerated, inasmuch as Zambian copper continues to be exported mainly via Atlantic ports. Moreover, there is apparently no reason to believe such fears would revive if a new railway line connecting Kinshasa to Ilebo were to become a reality.

Consequently investment funds are once again being granted the Benguela railroad for the purpose of enhancing its operating efficiency. The EEC, for example, recently approved financial aid designed to further dieselize the railroad's locomotive fleet (18 diesel locomotives) and increase its freight carrying capacity (900 freight cars). This EEC assistance amounts to 8 million dollars. In addition, an agreement recently signed with the Arab Bank for African Economic Development will enable Angola to have 10 million dollars for capital expenditures.

The railroad unquestionably has major requirements both for infrastructure facilities and equipment. The infrastructure requirements are topped only by the priority need to replace and qualitatively improve equipment. These requirements are expressed in financial terms in the 1980 equipment budget's goals. This budget totals some 45 million pounds sterling, including 9.2 million for the purchase of locomotives (17 road diesel-electric locomotives and 12 diesel-hydraulic switch engines), 28 million for railroad cars (52 passenger cars and 900 freight cars), and 3.7 million for track repairs and improvements.

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Angola's three main railroads all nationalized, are not connected one to the other. This disadvantage is a recurrent major topic of discussion. Interconnecting these three lines would, among other advantages, provide better distribution of the traffic load among each of the ports whose current capacities are not flexible enough to handle variations in the volume and rate of traffic. A north-south line --Luanda-Benguela/Lobito-Mocamedes--will probably be the subject of very detailed and rather long-range study. If funding for this long-awaited project can be obtained, it will undoubtedly become a reality. Mining of Zambia's rich uranium deposits would condition, at least in part, any development of the western rail line of that country's Atlantic outlet.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

USSR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION--USSR specialists recently visited Angola to make a profitability study concerning the establishment of agricultural companies for cotton and wheat cultivation. Regarding cotton, the area under consideration measures about 30,000 hectares for the production of approximately 80,000 tons. The cultivation of cotton is on an upswing in Angola and should become very important in an economic and social context during the next 5 years. Established in 1978-1979 on a modest scale, cotton plantations reached 9,000 hectares in 1979-1980 and 13,000 hectares for the 1980-1981 season, with an estimated production of 13,000 tons. Increased production will thus satisfy the needs of the domestic textile industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3179]

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BENIN

UNREST WITHIN LABOR GROUPS EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3346

[Text] The labor world of Benin is undergoing a crisis due to conflicts of influences and interests and to partisan clashes. All these conflicts make it difficult to view with confidence and serenity the situation that prevails at the present time. Nevertheless, it is possible to recall certain lines of force of the union movement since the accession of President Kerekou's régime 8 years ago.

The advent of President Kerekou's régime was not a union move, but the unions quickly gave him their support and cooperation. Nevertheless, in 1975 the National Federation of Unions succeeded in removing from its secretariat Mr Ghézo, who had been a member of that secretariat for many years. When Mr Ghézo was expelled, an open crisis arose in the union movement. The faction led by Mr Ghézo remained loyal to him, and Mr Ghézo found himself secretary general of the managing office of the National Federation of Workers Unions of Benin (UNSTB). That organization became one of the basic organizations of the party. But certain local cells called in vain for the summoning of a clarification congress which never took place. On the contrary, these cells were centered around elements favorable to the so-called "opportunist" line. As these groupings made possible a strict control, it was decided to hold a congress in December 1980, whereas it was supposed to have been held after at least 4 years. That explains the excitement that has been observed; for the last 3 or 4 months local cells of the Ghézo faction of the UNSTB have been holding mini-congresses every week end. But, contrary to what might have been hoped, unanimity has not been achieved.

For after having eliminated, in 1975, the purist unionist faction, which might be called Leftists in European terms, the UNSTB has been encountering within the Revolutionary Party of Benin itself, of which the UNSTB forms a part, resistance by opposition groups which do not recognize the present managing office run by Mr Ghézo. These oppositions have led to the formation of outlaw unions, of parallel unions. Expulsions have already been announced and arrests made. It is useless to say that yesterday's "leftist" faction should be rubbing their hands today. The situation is such that President Mathieu Kerekou's arbitration will be found necessary. And if in addition to the economic problems due to improvisations and to chaotic and irrational management of the state corporations, he must confront union agitation and turmoil among the members of his own party, he runs the risk of not being master of the situation for long.

The shortcomings of the UNSTB arise from the erosion of its leadership, from their continual compromising with all the régimes that have replaced each other in the

country, which has led to a lack of credibility among the rank and file, who judge somewhat severely the concentration of rôles and the plurality of offices that they observe in union officials. Thus one may be both cabinet minister and secretary general of a union; one may be retired and resume office in a field that is not his own; one may remain secretary general in his sector, in which he has been allowed to take advantage of his retirement rights; or still better, one may be vice president of the Revolutionary General Assembly, director general of the Benin Social Security Office, and secretary general of the union...

Another tragedy of the UNSTB is not having provided itself with any known program, having bound itself to international union institutions when its everyday concern should be the training of its members and staff. This lack has been remarked upon several times by the chief of state in the course of his visits to the corporations, when he observed that when the workers do not even know their rights, it is useless to demand that they meet their obligations.

The worker in Benin holds industry congresses because it is demanded of him. He also looks on impassively at the leaders' squabbles. He certainly considers that he has not yet been given the floor. And the unanimity that is observed at these congresses conceals much too much resentment in a country where the labor world is traditionally undisciplined and rebellious. It is said at Cotonou that criticism should be voiced at all stages. It might be useful, by way of suiting the action to the word and in order to get in out of the storm, to allow the real worker to speak, as the higher echelons were allowed to do in October 1979...

.....

ACEC: Representative at Cotonou for West Africa

The Charleroi Electrical Engineering Shops (ACEC) have just installed a representative at Cotonou for the countries of West Africa. He is Mr Francis Monin, and may be contacted at BP 1881, Cotonou 1 or by Telex N° 5085.

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CAPE VERDE

COUNTRY SUITED TO NEW ENERGY SOURCES RESEARCH

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10 Nov 80 p 36

[Article by Augusta Conchiglia]

[Text] Diversification and augmentation of foreign assistance have become a vital necessity.

The visit which Pedro Pires, prime minister of the Republic of Cape Verde, made to Paris at the end of October--where he met his French counterpart, Raymond Barre, as well as the ministers of foreign affairs and of cooperation, Jean Francois-Poncet and Robert Galley, respectively--was concluded by the guarantee on France's part of an increase in the aid supplied to the archipelago.

New Energy Sources

France is also involved in projects of national interest, such as the installation of an inland station for radio coverage of the whole archipelago, and establishment of a center for applied research into new energy sources. The latter project, which would be financed and implemented within the framework of the Inter-State Committee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel, should enable exploration of new technologies for the use of solar and wind energy.

Cape Verde, exposed throughout the year to the sun and to violent winds, in fact constitutes an ideal location for experiments in the field of research of "energies of the future". Petroleum bills are becoming insupportable for this small country which is deprived of significant natural resources. "Thus, we must profit from scientific progress in this area," remarked the Cape Verdian prime minister during a press conference in Paris. In this regard, he indicated, there are prospects for development of economic relations with Nigeria, which is interested in importing salt--of which Cape Verde is a large producer--and in cooperation in the area of fishing. On the other hand, Lagos could supply oil.

While awaiting or, better, while looking at, the future, Cape Verde wants to be a pilot country for nonconventional energies. As the archipelago is of volcanic origin, the applied research could also bring results in the area of geothermal energy. Sweden and Belgium, moreover, have undertaken studies in this area.

To counteract the effects and also, in part, the causes of drought, Cape Verde, since its independence, has launched a spectacular campaign to retimber and to work on the "protection and restoration of soils" on all the islands. In 1979, 1 million trees were planted, and hundreds of dikes and miles of terraces were built to "anchor" the mountains and protect the fertile lands which the rains, as rare as they are violent, have carried towards the sea for decades.

Absorption of Unemployment

The results of this work are already visible in the increase in agricultural production over the past few years. Progress in collecting underground water as, for example, on the island of San Nicolau, which will soon have large water reserves for both consumption and irrigation, is encouraging and assures, at the very least, a better existence for the people. Let us also note that the work for soil protection and the rearrangement of the agriculture, also achieved by means of funds from foreign food aid, have enabled maximum employment, with Praia thus absorbing the chronic unemployment which, for almost half a century, has compelled mass migration of Cape Verdians.

However, Cape Verde is still far from being able to depend on its own resources, and it must go abroad to cover its essential needs.

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DOWN--The total volume of Cape Verde's agricultural production for the present year will only be 14 percent of an average year (with 7,164 tons (because of the drought which has again affected the country, the Cape Verdian Ministry of Rural Development indicated on 19 December. A team from donor countries and organizations has just visited Cape Verde and has recommended that emergency foodstuffs assistance be granted, as well as assistance aimed at the regions under irrigated cultivation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533]

BADEA FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT LOAN--The Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA) has granted Cape Verde a 2.4 million dollar loan to finance a project aimed at the development of the fishing sector. According to the terms of an agreement signed on 21 December in Khartoum between the ambassador of Cape Verde in Senegal and the deputy director general of the BADEA, this loan is reimbursable in 12 years following a grace period of 3 years, at an annual interest rate of 4 percent. The total assistance granted Cape Verde by the BADEA amounts to 11,464 million dollars in the form of emergency aid. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CCCE AID TO TRANSPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3416

[Text] Following the official visit to CAR [Central African Republic] by Robert Galley, French minister of cooperation, from 27 November to 2 December, France granted a loan of 1 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs (20 million French francs) to CAR. This loan was made by the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) for the purchase of an oil fleet made up of barges and tugboats for the transport of hydrocarbons from Kinshasa and Brazzaville.

In addition, an agreement in principle was reached for the granting of financial aid of 450 million CFA francs for the purchase of materials and the operation of a light piece of machinery for the maintenance of the Berberati-Carnot-Baoro road (202 kilometers).

In the rural development sector, an agreement in principle was also reached for continuation of research and development of cotton cultivation, as the current program is about to expire.

As regards infrastructures, a credit of 25 million CFA francs was granted for a modernization study of the Bangui-Mpoko Airport with a view to the accommodation of heavy cargo planes. Also, two negotiations involving 580 million CFA francs are in progress for the supplying of equipment and the renovating of river transport facilities.

The present status of renovation of the Bangui urban telephone network, with the cooperation of the BDEAC (Development Bank of the Central African States) (240 million CFA francs) and the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) (100 million CFA francs) was the subject of long discussion as was the project to expand the Bangui telephone network which was studied by SOFRECOM [?French Communications Company]. Agreement was reached on the need for postponing the implementation of this important telecommunications program, provisionally estimated at 3.5 billion CFA francs, until the Central African Office of Posts and Telecommunications has been restored to operation.

Finally, an agreement was reached on the need for periodically sending technical assistance to all sectors, concomitant with the growth of needs and the training of Central African cadres.

Additionally, shortly after Galley's visit, the director for economic development of the French Ministry of Cooperation, Mr Joudiou, was received by President Dacko with whom he discussed the technical financial assistance given by France to Central Africa and also studied the resources needed for the economic recovery of Central Africa.

Finally, it was learned on 8 December that France would supply the Central African Republic with a shipment of repair kits for the 100 kilowatt short-wave receiver installed in Bimbo and spare parts for the Bangui production center. The agreement amounting to 60 million CFA francs also covers the supplying of supplementary repair kits for the equipment and maintenance of low and high frequency radio gear. French aid will also be used for equipping a low frequency recording studio.

The two countries also signed an agreement covering a share by France in studies on the Central African section of the Mombasa-Lagos Trans-African road. French aid, which totals 29 million CFA francs, will be available in the form of FAC grants.

This aid from France will permit in particular the building of the Sibut/Kaga-Bandoro/Sido roads and the access roads to Mbres and Batangafo in the first 6 months of 1981.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

BOKASSA AIDES QUIT--Two of ex-Emporor Bokassa's companions in exile have recently left him. And not the least among them, since they were the former chief of protocol, Eugene Makouta, and former aide-de-camp, Colonel Bongo. The former sovereign also suspects one of them to have carried off some papers bearing his personal signature. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 37] 9516

RELEASE OF OPPOSITION MEMBERS--Several political activists of the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) of Ange Patasse, the Ubangi Patriotic Front (FRO) of Abel Goumga and the Ubangi Liberation Front (FLO) of Sylvestre Bangui, who were arrested or confined to their residence for the crime of dissidence, have been released. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3416] 8143

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CHAD

HABRE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONTINUING GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST GOUKOUNI

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 22 Nov 80 p 116

[Article by Christian Hoche: "Chad: A Trap for Qadhdhafi? Libya. Commits Its Commandoes to Chad. Danger for Africa or a Trap for the Overweening Colonel?"]

[Text] "In the old days the Arabs sold the Blacks. Today, they buy them..." Must one see only impertinence in the declarations of this diplomat who is evoking the recent participation of Libyan units in the fighting ravaging the north and central regions of Chad?

Of course, not. It was in mid-October when the head of state, Goukouni Oueddei, who only had shreds of authority left, appealed for Libya's military aid. This was in application of an aid agreement signed in June with Tripoli. The opportunity was just too beautiful for Colonel Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi, who dreams of a Saharian republic stretching all the way from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Egypt.

The military situation, at the end of October, was clearly in favor of the Defense Minister Hissein Habre's FAN [Northern Armed Forces]. They repelled to the north of Ndjamenà the soldiers of the President, the so-called FAP [Peoples Armed Forces], and for months had been holding Faya-Largeau, a key town of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti area. On 3 November, in a joint communique published in Tripoli, Goukouni Oueddei thanked Qadhdhafi for his "unconditional support." The following day, the two men made a whole inspection tour to Faya-Largeau, which fell into the hands of the FAP and of the Libyan units, which came overrunning from the Aouzou band. There is no longer any doubt: in the central part of the country Libyan "Islamic legionnaires," brought to Ndjamenà by plane, fight by the side of Goukouni's men. In the north, they "sweep out" the last FAN pockets of resistance. How many are they, these "Islamic brigades" accompanied by their artillery and antiaircraft defense force? According to different calculations, one thousand men are at work in the Chad capital and almost three thousand are operating at 600 kilometers to the north. Their objective? It is to chase Hissein Habre and his partisans from their defense positions and put an end to

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the "duality of power." Up to now, the ancient jailer of Francoise Claustre is resisting. But his forces, weakened, dispersed and especially not having any heavy equipment, are risking very much being chased out of the capital.

At once people are getting nervous in the neighboring countries of Chad. From the Mali to Niger, from the Cameroon to Central Africa, and also from Tunisia to Egypt, people demand the respect of the Lagos armistice agreements while condemning the "foreign interference." Some heads of state, not only among the less important ones, apparently have asked that France intervene in order to stop the Islamic crusade of Qadhdhafi. For the moment, Paris keeps to a most prudent course. Not without afterthoughts. At 6 months away from the presidential elections it is inconceivable that one would go trap oneself again in Chad: let Qadhdhafi trap himself in there," declares one expert at the Quai d'Orsay with a complice's smile. Alone against everybody, it is thought Hissein Habre would still be capable of leading a harassment war against the occupying force. Moreover, he can also benefit from the active support of several African states which considered him, only yesterday, a "Marxist adventurer."

Thus, one will have to follow attentively the meeting of the Niger River Commission which takes place, since 20 November, in Conakry. Thirteen heads of state are expected, among whom Nigeria's, whom his peers reportedly have asked for an energetic condemnation of the "Libyan coup." It's a voice which the colonel should not ignore if he recalls his sad venture in Uganda. After Kampala, will it be Ndjamená?

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CHAD

BRIEFS

NEW CHAD FLIGHTS--Air Afrique may soon once again be serving Chad. At least in partnership with a small airline that would assure connections between the cities of Moundou and Sarh, in the south, the only region that is relatively stable.
[Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 37] 9516

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CONGO

BRIEFS

CABINET DECISIONS--The Congolese Council of Ministers which met in Brazzaville on 3 December made the following decisions: It decided to continue cooperation with Cuba in the sectors of rural economy, public works, national education, health and social affairs, labor and justice. The Council also examined the mining research dossier and on this score Minister of Mines Rodolphe Adaga was instructed to continue negotiations with a view to intensification of exploration and mining exploitation. Finally, the Council approved a project authorizing the state to grant a credit of 900 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs for the realignment of the Congo-Ocean Railway. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3417] 8143

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENT--On 1 December, Congo and France signed a financing agreement in Brazzaville amounting to 185 million CFA francs for construction of the port of Oyo, in the northern part of the People's Republic of the Congo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3417] 8143

WEST GERMAN SENTENCED--A West German citizen, accused of economic and industrial espionage, has just been given a 2-year suspended sentence and a fine of 2.4 million CFA francs by the Congolese courts. Gunter Runge, an engineer of the Austrian Voest Alpine company and Pointe Noire, had to set up an inventory of the repair work to be done on the Congolese national petroleum refinery built by that company. According to the indictment, he is said to have gathered information on this refinery which he communicated to his company despite the cancellation of its contract with the Congolese Government. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3105] 6108

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

FRENCH ECONOMIC AID NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 35

[Text] After visiting Spain, Morocco and its neighbors Cameroon and Gabon, Lt. Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was in France from 13-17 November.

The new man, very much Equatorial Guinean, met with Valery Giscard d'Estaing and various French ministers. Besides the projects that are in progress since the November 1979 cooperation agreement (a total of 11 million francs for fishing, mine prospecting and improvements of the Malabo harbor), there was discussion concerning France's financing of a hydro-electric power station of 8 billion watts and cooperation in the oil industry.

France is taking its place in this country that has for a long time been reserved for the Spanish, then the Soviets. Which will no doubt suit Elf Aquitaine and the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration (BGME). The assets of the French: an ambiguous attitude at the time of the Macias dictatorship (maintaining a diplomatic representation helped preserve the ties): the large number of Equatorial Guineans who today speak Moliere's language, after being forced to go to neighboring French-speaking countries in search of work that the dictatorship was refusing them in their own country.

This return of refugees, political and economical, remains in fact the weak point in the new regime: many still do not trust the leaders who collaborated with Macias before overthrowing him and who are in no hurry to initiate democratic institutions.

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GABON

DATA ON CURRENT, PROJECTED STATUS OF TRANSGABONESE RAILROAD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 pp 3254-3255

[Excerpt] The Transgabonese Railroad was inaugurated on 27 December 1978. It has been open to traffic since May 1979, but only on its 182-kilometer Owendo-Ndjole section. This section is obviously the first stage in a much larger project that is still under construction.

The line is to be extended to the rail junction of Booue, PK325 [325 kilometers from start of line], and will then continue on to its terminus in Franceville, PK680. At Booue, the line will split into two branch lines, construction of which is scheduled to begin simultaneously: a 320-kilometer branch line to Franceville and a 240-kilometer branch line to Belinga.

The Booue-Belinga section justified the original project by providing rail service to the mineral resources of the Mekambo region with its estimated iron ore reserves of 1.2 million tons of hematite combined with magnetite and goethite, including 600 million tons assaying at 65 percent. When these rich deposits are mined, their output is to be hauled by rail to the future ore port of Santa Clara--processing capacity of more than 10 million tons per year; estimated cost of construction and equipment: 68 million CFA francs--via a 35-kilometer spur line starting from the timber port of Owendo. Definitive studies of these railroad projects have now been completed.

Construction of the Booue-Franceville branch line is justified by the magnitude of the mining operations at Moanda. The Moanda mine ranks as the world's third largest producer of manganese. Promoters of the Transgabonese railroad believe this new branch line will stimulate production which could, as a result, increase to 4 million tons per year--estimated reserves of 90 million tons--compared with the current 2.4 million tons per year, the maximum carrying capacity of the Congo-Ocean Railroad (CFCO). The terminus of this section is situated in a uranium-bearing region--the Mounana deposit--whose annual production is close to 1,000 tons from an estimated reserve of 20,000 tons. The Franceville branch line may also increase this mine's annual output.

Work on the Ndjole-Booue section is continuing. The stretch from Ndjole to Ayem (PK257), half-way between Ndjole and Booue, will probably be completed in 1981 and the stretch from Ayem to Booue in 1982. Deforestation and grading work is practically finished between Ndjole and Ayem. At the project's current rate of progress, track-laying operations could resume in June 1981, unless construction is deliberately slowed for financial reasons, as was the case this year. Roadbed construction work which started in Franceville has advanced approximately 30 kilometers and all

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work which started in Franceville has advanced approximately 30 kilometers and all grading was completed on that stretch last September.

When the Transgabonese Railroad is completed, ocean-bound traffic on the railroad as a whole is expected to consist mainly of timber, manganese ore, ferromanganese ore, manufactured goods (batteries), foodstuffs, and sugar. Inland-bound traffic is expected to consist mainly of staple commodities, supplies necessary to the mining industry and forest products industry, hydrocarbons, cement, building materials, and capital goods.

Operating results on the section now open to traffic have not yet confirmed these expectations. It will not be possible to really assess this railroad's importance until it is fully operational. In 1979, however, the line carried an average of 5,000 passengers per month, but freight traffic remained at its initial very low level despite the decision granting the railroad the monopoly on transporting timber, a decision which timber firms claim is designed to forcibly make the railroad show a profit at their expense.

On the other hand, the railroad's positive aspect as an instrument of regional development and economic expansion has already been confirmed by the establishment of industrial firms along its route: the cement plant in Ntoum, the crossties manufacturing plant in Essara, and the gravel quarry in Makora.

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GABON

BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES FUTURE COOPERATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3170

[Report on statement by Joao Areias Neto, Brazilian ambassador to Gabon, made in Libreville--date not specified]

[Text] Mr Joao Areias Neto, Brazilian ambassador to Gabon, confirming that Brazil will henceforth import 46,000 barrels of oil per day (2,300,000 metric tons per year) from Gabon, expressed the opinion in Libreville that the imbalance in trade exchange between the two countries (Brazil currently sells Gabon \$30 million worth of goods a year) will be soon corrected by the arrival of Brazilian company of the "Engexco" group, charged with increasing trade exchange with Gabon. Such will be the case with the "Enplanta" company which, by building sheds and houses for the presidential guard, will use up part of the \$25-million line of credit granted to Gabon by Brazil; this credit has allowed the Gabonese Government to purchase from Brazil four "Bandeirante"-type planes and public transport buses.

The Brazilian Government has also granted to Gabon another line of credit for \$10 billion. This has been used by the Gabonese Government and semigovernmental enterprises such as CODEV (Commercial and Development) to purchase electric appliances, furniture, vehicles, buses, and recently vedette boats, which were presented to the public during the parade held last 17 August.

Another line of Brazilian credit worth \$140 million, granted in 1978, has not been used as a result of the austerity policy decreed in 1977.

Technological cooperation will enter a new phase with the approaching arrival of Brazilian technicians in Libreville to evaluate Gabon's possibilities to produce alcohol from cassava and sugar cane.

The ambassador also announced the imminent opening in Libreville of a branch of the "Banco Real," a private Brazilian bank, which should be followed sometime in 1981 by a branch of the "Agencia do Brasil," a publicly owned Brazilian bank.

According to Mr Joao Areias Neto, Gabon and Brazil also intend to develop their trade exchange and to create a joint commission for cooperation.

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

COMMISSIONS FORMED--Five commissions have been created on 16 December by the Council of the Revolution in power in Guinea-Bissau since 14 November; they will be responsible for supervising the activities of the government. Two of them, the defense and security commission and the economy and finance commission will be under Gen Joao Bernardo Vieira, chairman of the Council of the Revolution. The commission for interior, information and culture will be under Victor Saude Maria, deputy chairman of the Council of the Revolution and state commissioner for foreign affairs. The commission for education, health and social affairs is headed by Samba Lamine Mane, state commissioner for natural resources. Finally, the commission for justice and administration is presided by Manuel Saturnino da Costa, state commissioner for interior. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 pp 3532-3533]

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IVORY COAST

STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION TO PRESIDENCY DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp 32-34

[Article by special correspondent Sennen Andriamirado: "New Successor Sought--after the elections, a struggle is going on to rule the roost; but the assembly president will no longer be the chief of state's constitutional successor"]

[Text] During nearly one month's time only once did I see the forces of law and order get edgy. It was on 23 November, at the time of the second round of balloting for the legislative elections, in the Gbagba polling station courtyard in Bingerville.

A soldier, machinegun slung across his shoulder and a black beret sitting awry on his head, was laying into a band of young people who were trying to cut in line: "They have to get in line," he explained to me, "I am going to hit them. There is more than enough chaos like that."

The chaos in Abidjan as well as other places early that morning made you think that voter participation was going to be greater than at the time of the first ballot on 9 November. All the people running polling stations I ran into that Sunday, 23 November, were optimistic about that.

That was because the candidates, just like the government, had spared no expense. At Bouna, for example, journalist Jean Kambire, who was in second place coming out of the first ballot, got himself elected because he was the best organized: supporters had rented buses or borrowed trucks to set up a shuttle service between the voters' villages and the voting centers.

Between the time of the two ballots, candidates everywhere outdid each other in passion to convince their voters to get their identity cards, which are required for voting, issued to them by election day.

But the statistics were to show that the participation level barely exceeded 50 percent. Of course in certain districts greater political consciousness improved the percentage.

Thus, at Aboisso, 47.63 percent of those registered voted (as against 44.19 percent on the first ballot). At Abobo, on the outskirts of Abidjan, the level went from 19.22 percent to 21.29 percent. But these slight improvements did little to compensate for spectacular reverses such as that at Adzope where, compared to 46.07 percent at the time of the first ballot, only 33.35 percent of the registered voters voted on 23 November.

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Some polling places were still closed during a good part of the morning because the ballots had not arrived on time, the voter lists had disappeared, or the polling place officials had gotten lost in town.

Some people were put off because their names had mysteriously disappeared from the voting registers between the first and second ballots. At Treichville some young voters were challenged because, according to the polling place officials, "a student card is not proof of identity."

And students definitely wanted to vote. Y.J., who had abstained in 1975 and who this time was turned back from a Treichville polling place, cried out to me: "Voting or not voting in 1975 amounted to the same thing. Today there is a chance to come and choose a candidate. Even if he's no good." Because "we enjoy seeing all these people coming nowadays bowing and scraping before us in order to have our petty little votes. It is our revenge." Revenge? Yes. Voters' revenge. The second ballot confirmed that incumbents with expiring terms were being rejected. The turnover in the assembly was 81.63 percent. Out of 147 deputies, 120 are new. Of the 80 with expiring terms who stood for election, only 27 were brought back.

So the veterans literally bit the dust. Thus Mrs Gladys Anoma (50 years old), secretary-general of the Association of Ivorian Women (AFI) for 15 years and vice president of the National Assembly, lost in Cocody. In her defeat she joins another assembly vice president, Maurice Oulate, and questeur Tiebla Ouattara.

When choosing among several veterans the voters sometimes preferred the one who smacked the least of the establishment. At Dimbokro the battle among three members whose terms were expiring ended in victory for the youngest, Amon Leon. But it was a tough one since the patriarchal Samba Ambroise Kone lost by a margin of only 427 votes. And only one minister (out of the six who stood as candidates) remained in the running: Etienne Ahin (Social Affairs) in Bingerville. He was defeated.

Democratic Process

The verdict was final: Ivorians wanted to replace their politicians. Now comes waiting for the new assembly's leadership to be installed, which cannot be done until the day after 19 December, The date on which the present chamber's mandate expires. But, fed by changing rumors, strife among political followings, which is the functional equivalent of ideological debate here, has been heating up the political contest. And the "Old Man" had certainly kept up the suspense. Before the second round of balloting, he had allowed the stakes to rise among the pretenders to the throne. A friend of Philippe Yace's--Yace being the outgoing president of the National Assembly--was still saying to me 2 weeks ago: "It is the party's Political Bureau which is as usual going to designate candidates for the assembly leadership. And since there is only one party, there will be no surprises. Democracy is all very well but it has to stop at some point."

"It" has not stopped. On 24 November, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the party's sole boss, held a meeting of the Political Bureau in order to make his recommendations. He had told me 2 days beforehand at Yamoussoukro: "I do not want to interfere. The democratic process must be fully played out. From now on, the parliamentarians will elect their leadership. Without party interference."

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As I was asking him if he were not afraid of a proliferation of candidates among the 147 deputies wanting to rule the roost, he answered me with a smile: "Don't worry. They know each other. There will be two or three candidates. No more."

Two possible candidates are in any case already well known. First, Philippe Yace, 60 years old, assembly president for 20 years, reelected in Jacqueville on the first round of balloting and who his friends contend is "too much of a fighter" to be content with just being a deputy like the rest.

Then there is Henri Konan Bedie, 46 years old, ("I am actually a couple years older," he confided to me), former minister of economy (1965-1977), elected at Daoukro as of 9 November, and of whom it is said that he "didn't resign from the World Bank (1978-1980) just to have a minor role in the National Assembly."

The two of them, Philippe Yace and Henri Konan Bedie, embody the strife among political followings and the quarrel between oldtimers and newcomers. Except that a third or a fourth may emerge who can keep the new assembly from splitting into two implacably opposed camps. Besides which any and all candidates for chamber president may back out, faced with the prospect of not being the chief of state's official successor.

Elected Vice President

For President Houphouet is definite on this point: for a long time he has been thinking about eliminating Article 11 of the constitution which entrusts the presidency of the republic, in case that office is vacated, to the president of the National Assembly on an interim basis.

In a display of consummate political skill, Felix Houphouet-Boigny on 25 November gave the outgoing assembly the responsibility of changing the constitution. At the end of a turbulent night session, the outgoing deputies passed a bill introduced by the government, that is to say by the president, providing that the interim period, in case of death, resignation or total impairment would be handled by a vice president elected at the same time as the chief of state and designated to replace him automatically. Only here we are: the president of the republic was reelected for 5 years on 12 October, and only the president, without any vice president.

We would bet that before long the "Old Man" will find a way to fill the position before the 1985 presidential election. Above all, let us bear in mind for the moment that the National Assembly president no longer is or will be the constitutional "dauphin." But from now on the withdrawal of anyone in contention to rule that roost would be disgraceful. A Philippe Yace would be revealing that the assembly presidency only interested him to the extent that it would make him the "dauphin," a Henry Konan Bedie that he only aspired to the position in order to become the "dauphin."

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IVORY COAST

HOUPHOUET'S STAND ON COCOA PRICE ASSESSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 43

[Article by Philippe Simonnot: "Cocoa: Houphouet's Hardheadedness"]

[Text] Has the oil gone up to his head? That is the question being asked a little all over in the international economic and financial world when it comes to the case of President Houphouet-Boigny. The Ivory Coast is still not decided to sign the new international agreement on cocoa which has been concluded by the other producers since the end of November in Geneva (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1040), and the instigator, the strategist of this irritating and disquieting hardheaded stand is no doubt Houphouet himself. As the Ivory Coast stands a good chance to become a net exporter of oil in a few years, it is giving itself the luxury, it seems, to upset the cocoa agreement a little bit.

To justify its attitude, the Ivory Coast invokes one stipulation of the agreement signed in Geneva which foresees the situation where, in certain conditions, the key prices on the international market could be revised downward as a function of the situation. The Ivory Coast representatives see this clause as unacceptable insofar as it forces the producer countries to run an unbearable risk.

Compromise

Now all the other great producers of cocoa, notably Brazil, Nigeria and Ghana, have accepted this clause as a compromise solution. It is true that the prospects of the market are not looking good. The formidable price rises of the last few years (27 cents in American dollar terms in 1970-71; 66 cents in 1973-74; 165 cents in 1976-77; 159 cents in 1978-79) have led the producer countries, and in the first place the Ivory Coast, to increase considerably their plantation acreage, whereas during the same time, the consumption of cocoa has ceased to increase due precisely to the same price climb.

Bold Game

The result--a classical one for the economist--of this contradictory movement of the supply and demand is the appearance of more and more enormous

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ment of the supply and demand is the appearance of more and more enormous surpluses and... a drop in the price: the price of cocoa today is a little under 100 cents per kilogram .

In an attempt to contravene the fall in price, the Ivory Coast has decided to store at great cost (for the conservation of this product is costly) large quantities of cocoa, using up the finances of the Stabilization Fund which is now in the red. This is an operation made all the more costly by the fact that the production cost of the Ivorian cocoa, given the imprudences that had gone in the investments, is on the average higher than that of the other producers.

In playing this bold game, the Ivory Coast has, it is remarked by the above-mentioned sources, it seems lost "tens of million of dollars."

It seems very doubtful that the Ivorians would in this manner succeed in making the price of cocoa go up, the very existence of the stocks in their warehouses weighing heavily on the market. "One of these days," it is further remarked, "they will have to put these stocks on the market."

The other producers are not the only ones irritated by the hardheadedness of the Ivorians. Claude Cheysson, member of the European Common Market Commission in charge of Cooperation and Development, whose mandate has just been renewed, has recently written to Houphouet-Boigny to make known his concern. It is better to have a not altogether satisfactory agreement than not to have any, he has said in effect. At the European Commission people are even more surprised by the attitude of the Ivorian President since in the past he was the one to attach a great deal of importance to the conclusion of a cocoa agreement; for according to him, what was at stake was the stability of this whole part of Africa where the fate of the peasantry is strategic politically speaking.

French Aid

On the other hand it is remembered also that the Ivory Coast has negotiated with the French Treasury a financial aid. The French Treasury has sent the request to the banks. The Ivorians who began by noting their unhappiness and disappointment (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1033) had in the end accepted the loan proposed to them at market condition: 600 million francs, aimed at consolidating their external debt. In fact, the French banks are not taking a great risk here since they have in hand a "letter of intention" from the Treasury equivalent to a government warranty.

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MALI

BRIEFS

DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION--Mali must import 50,000 tons of cereals (10 billion Malian francs) to face a "food deficit in the country estimated at more than 120,000 tons," the Ministry of Finance and Commerce announced in Bamako on 20 December. Because of this serious economic situation, Malian leaders met on 21 December to review the 1980-81 budget. Despite official determination to restore economic and financial health, receipts for the 1980 budget (77.8 billion Malian francs) did not reach expected levels and the budget is being implemented in a climate of austerity and tension. The Ministry of Finance announces that this is due to the fact that the country is landlocked and is affected by drought, world inflation and by the rise in oil prices. The Ministry specified that Mali's oil bill will amount to 48 billion Malian francs in 1981, compared to 33 billion for the present year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533]

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SENEGAL

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE DEFENDS TREATMENT OF MAMADOU DIA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 21

[Letter to the Editors from Mr Djibo Ka, director of the cabinet in the office of the president of the Republic of Senegal--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] The weekly JEUNE AFRIQUE published in its 12 November 1980 edition (No 1036) an article Siradiou Diallo cited Mamadou Dia, ex-president of the Council of Senegal, in his enumeration of /"personalities in Africa who have been victims of arbitrary actions."/

Because of Senegal's regard for JEUNE AFRIQUE and because of our concern always to remain faithful to the facts, I would like to bring to your attention the following facts with regard to the statement by Siradiou Diallo.

1. Mamadou Dia was not the victim of arbitrary action. In fact, as you know, he tried, on 12 December 1962, to overthrow by force the institutions of the Republic of Senegal.
2. Mr Dia was tried before the High Court of Justice of Senegal, in accordance with the Senegalese constitution.
3. Mr Mamadou Dia had the right to a defense.
4. He was convicted, at the conclusion of the trial, which /"unfolded without restraints"/ according to LE MONDE of 14 May 1963.

At the conclusion of the trial, which took four days, Mr Philippe Decraene, the LE MONDE correspondent, concluded: /"Harsh justice, but justice all the same."/

Moreover, Mr Dia was given a reprieve, and later amnesty, by the president of the Republic of Senegal.

Such are the facts.

From the preceding it is clear that Mr Mamadou Dia was not the victim of arbitrary action.

Senegal is a country of law, of freedom, and its political regime is founded on democratic principles.

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In thanking you for your willingness to publish my letter in your next edition of JEUNE AFRIQUE, I beg you to accept, Mr Editor, the assurance of my highest consideration.

/Answer:/ If JEUNE AFRIQUE militated for the release of Mr Mamadou Dia, I nevertheless recognize that, of all the personalities cited in the article in question, the ex-president of the Council of Senegal is the only one who may have had the right (in 1962) to a regular trial. And, above all, that the Senegalese regime is not founded on arbitrary [or despotic] action. S.D.

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SENEGAL

POWER STRUGGLE, POSSIBLE INCREASED AUTHORITARIANISM EXPECTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4-Jan 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Mariam Sysle: "Senghor's 'Exit'"]

[Text] True or false, it is the signal for a power struggle with, at the end, a potential strengthening of the regime's authoritarianism--unless the opposition is able to express the aspirations of the popular masses.

So the Senegalese president, Leopold Sedar Senghor, has decided to leave the government, or at least his official duties as chief of state. But when such an all-powerful monarch designates a successor to his throne, it is so he can install in his place in the presidency his heir and prime minister for 10 years, Abdou Diouf. That is to say, it is also so in the same stroke he can assure the continuation of his policy, which for 20 years has been dragging the country into a total economic and social paralysis and leading it into a political impasse, while also making it one of the principal strongholds of French neocolonialism in Africa.

Finally, as is well known, the Senegalese were not the first to hear the news, which was of major importance to them above all others. Those who got wind of the affair, at the same time as the whole world, were a minority of Dakarians who are able to buy and read the foreign press--the French daily LE MONDE of 2 December--or those who can catch the international Radio-France. Confirmation was not given them until four days later, through the governmental newspaper LE SOLEIL and the national radio. It will still be necessary to wait until the end of the year to hear what explanations Leopold Senghor himself will want to give to all of his fellow citizens.

It goes without saying that this way of proceeding was resented by everyone in Senegal as a bitter humiliation, which underlines at a crucial time the profound distrust in which the exalter of "negritude" and "universal civilization," whose gaze has always remained fixed on the West, holds his people. The Senegalese president will even have managed that tour de force of alienating the powerful religious brotherhoods, whose support in the past had enabled him to surmount several grave crises, but whose leaders, this time, were not even consulted and learned the news of the chief of state's resignation in the same circumstances as all the rest of the country.

Irritation and malaise are so profound and widespread that the government newspaper has really tried to repair the damage, but it could do nothing, other than to sink

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deeper into increasing contradictions. In this way, in its 4 December edition, announcing "President Senghor is Leaving," it attributed the news that appeared in the newspaper LE MONDE (30 October and 2 December) to "indiscretions deliberately reported so that their author (the correspondent of the French daily in Dakar) could derive some advantage from them." And LE SOLEIL saw fit to state that the president had nevertheless warned his prime minister, his closest associates and the principal leaders and dignitaries of the regime. But on 6 December, in a commentary signed by Abdou Salam Kane, the editor in chief of L'UNITE AFRICAINE, the organ of the Senghorian Socialist Party, LE SOLEIL asserted: "It was not by chance or out of innocence that the president, as part of a conversation, confirmed his approaching retirement to LE MONDE's correspondent." But that in this way "the shock of the news to Senegalese public opinion was considerably diminished."

In reality it can be said here and now that Leopold Sedar Senghor, who, if his eulogists can be believed was dreaming of a departure worthy of an ancient tragedy, missed his exit, pretended or real, and brought to nothing the efforts of those who praised his regime, who were trying to demonstrate that the Senegalese president's initiative was exemplary.

In addition, everyone--or nearly everyone--remains skeptical about President Senghor's real intentions, and is wondering whether it is not again a question of the final role-playing of a chief of state whose extreme manipulative cleverness is no longer to be demonstrated. Be that as it may, it appears that the resigned chief of state in the shadow of the government, after the enthronement of his successor--which should occur in January 1981. According to his own statement, he will return after a brief vacation, not only to occupy himself with setting up the African Socialist Internationale, but he will carry on his task as secretary general of his party, the Socialist Party. Thus a two-headed government is in danger of being created, unless, as is more likely, Leopold Senghor, whether he is in Dakar or in France, continues to pull the strings in the game and to be the initiator of the most important decisions. Finally, one can no longer completely rule out the hypothesis according to which, despite his great age (74), the Senegalese president may be preparing, in case the situation of crisis, upheavals and fights that are already raging in his country should come to reach a critical threshold, to return as the nation's indispensable savior.

A Scenario

For now, one cannot help but see, too, that by organizing his departure--three years before the end of his term--in such a way that the presidency falls upon his constitutional successor, Abdou Diouf, Senghor dealt the last thrust to the democratic image he had wanted or had been forced to give to his regime. In fact, this scenario is known to have founded on the constitutional modifications adopted in 1976, when the governmental party alone was represented in Parliament, without the people having been consulted in one way or another, and against the unanimous opinion of the opposition.

Deals and Maneuvers

By acting like an absolute monarch, in defiance of the most elementary principles of democracy, which would require at the very minimum organizing an advance election free of any constraint and any discrimination, Leopold Senghor precipitated his country into a situation of acute crisis. Whatever the real intentions of the

departing president may be, the lines are in fact broken. In the Socialist Party, which is in complete collapse and leaking like a sieve, the deals and maneuvers have already begun, and it is predictable that the struggle for position will be pitiless. While the old removed "barons" are in danger of emerging from their "exile," one expects with Abdou Diouf and his entourage (the men being presented for the post of prime minister are, like him, technocrats of the party's right wing) a marked accentuation of the regime's authoritarian character.

As for the unrecognized legal opposition forces, whose commentaries and positions upon the announcement of Senghor's resignation support each other, today they are faced with their responsibilities. On their capacity to surmount their differences, to express the aspirations of the popular masses and to come to an understanding around a common political platform and strategy, the evolution of the situation in large measure depends.

But this is a delicate period, and any false step could be fatal. In this completely unsettled economic situation, Giscardian France seems for the moment to be resting in a state of uncertainty, as if it were waiting for the puzzle to become more clearly apparent before making its choice or choices. In the coming weeks and months anything, even the most unpredictable, can happen.

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SENEGAL

REACTION OF OPPOSITION TO SENGHOR'S RESIGNATION NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 pp 18-19, 20, 21

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Senegal--What Does the Opposition Do When An African President Goes?"]

[Text] Senghor has surprised everybody, starting with his adversaries, who did not always react as one might have expected them to do in their capacity as convinced democrats.

The announcement of the early retirement of President Senghor caused a veritable armed uprising in the opposition. Oddly enough, those who had kept shouting "Senghor, resign!" or who had sworn that they would bring him down, suddenly seem to be quite ill at ease. To be sure, the dream which they had been cherishing for a long time, that is to say, a Senegal without Senghor, is about to come true--but without them and, even more seriously, against them.

The paradox in Senegal is that the president-poet's partisans and enemies never, until the very last moment, believed rumors regarding his resignation. In spite of his repeated allusions, the calculated leaks, and the little confidences dropped here and there, the political class remained strangely skeptical. Accustomed to all kinds of maneuvering, trickery, and other acrobatics connected with this man who has been dominating the national political scene for about 30 years, it could not imagine him in any other role--especially through simple retirement.

The fact is, even though it may not have said so, the opposition did need Senghor--as much by habit as by convenience! What as a matter of fact would be easier than to denounce that "troubador of negritude," that "Christian who is a challenge to the Muslim majority of Senegal," that "black-skinned fellow with the white mask," "that man married to a French woman," who "each year spends his vacation in France" and "all of whose actions and moves express a profound complex with respect to the white man."

On the topic of the cultural identity and of the political loyalty toward the former colonial power, the chief of state was a favorite target which the opposition would fire on constantly and permanently. But now this easy target has disappeared. That quite suddenly deprives his adversaries of their usual propaganda themes, their sweeping slogans, and their most caustic caricatures.

With Abdou Diouf, the current prime minister, it will be necessary to find something else because, on the topic of Africanism and nationalism, the future chief of state will not be vulnerable to attack, no more so than the team he will build around Moustapha Niasse, Daouda Sow, Ousmane Seck, Sheikh Hamidou Kane, Ousmane Camara, etc.

These are cadres in whose eyes French education and training constitute not so much a source of cultural assimilation but rather a technique and a prescription for developing their country. Although they remained in power for a long time, one cannot accuse them of having enriched themselves.

Apart from some well known cases in Dakar, the political pillars of the edifice, upon which "Abdou" is expected to rest, carefully made sure that they would not be compromised in any kind of affair or business. They undoubtedly benefitted from their jobs in government but they did so to broaden and strengthen their political base, rather than to make money.

The fact remains that the team is made up of men who have the kind of record and who hold the kind of convictions that tie them to a very specific model of society, the model of democratic socialism. That might be expressed by a society based on free enterprise but guided and controlled by the state. In other words, while retaining his own personality and style, the future Senegalese chief of state, loyal to his predecessor's philosophy, will resolutely continue to face toward the West.

The opposition is perfectly justified in challenging these choices. As in any democratic regime, with many parties and freedom of speech, the administration's adversaries have the right and even the duty to criticize.

It is certain that the Senegalese opposition will not refrain from doing just that. But, for the time being, it reacted in a rather unexpected fashion, feeling trapped and still shocked by the announcement of Senghor's resignation. It called for elections under the control of the army, as did, for example, the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party)--practically by demanding that the army intervene.

How can the convinced partisans of democracy seek the intervention of the army in the nation's political affairs? That might be understood in the case of a country with a single party where any possibility of expression and, a fortiori, a turnover in the government are impossible.

But in a country such as Senegal today, where all legal and clandestine political formations with impunity publicize their fighting platforms, would not the appeal to the army be a mistake?

That makes one think that the experience of democracy in Africa is far from perfect. As we saw in Upper Volta, where the opposition recently did not hesitate to turn to the Praetorian Guard, politicians do not seem to be in favor of this type of government, except when it is good for them.

But the moment it does not permit them to come to power, they do not hesitate to overturn it. Better (or worse) to throw the constitution out the window, if not to trample it underfoot.

A dangerous procedure indeed. Not only does it inevitably bring in the military but it rarely benefits the opposition. Even when, as in the case of Senegal, it includes personalities of talent, culture, and eloquence. And that includes Abdoulaye Wade, whose PDS is represented in the National Assembly by 17 deputies; Bou-bacar Gueye, the famous lawyer of the Dakar bar, president of the Senegalese Republican Movement; or the secretary-general of the PAI (African Independence Party), Mahjmout Diop, a pharmacist--all of whom are perfectly familiar with the possibilities and implications of democracy.

The same goes for former prime minister Mamadou Dia, the man behind the journal ANDE SOPI, and the eminent Egyptologist, Sheikh Anta Diop, leader of the RND (National Democratic Rally). Both of them represent political currents which are not officially recognized but which are active just the same.

It is clear that if these different formations were to overcome their rivalries, the opposition could constitute a serious threat to the team of Abdou Diouf. Also, benefitting from the current situation, they would go into action in order to arrive at a minimum understanding. After having unanimously condemned the announcement of the chief of state's retirement through a foreign newspaper (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1040), their various leaders consulted with each other--to organize protest demonstrations and, if possible, to hammer out a joint fighting platform.

The big unknown obviously remains the attitude of the religious leaders. Their influence in rural areas is so great that nobody could aspire to national office without seeking their blessing.

In particular, that of the powerful khalif of the Mourides, Abdoul Lakhat Mbacke. This is why all political leaders, both those in power and those in the opposition, have for several days been trooping to the holy city of Touba where he lives. Here we have seen Master Abdoulaye Wade, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, as well as President Senghor, not to mention those who had to go there furtively.

However, the grand khalif is entirely too aware of his spiritual responsibilities to compromise his authority with one or the other political leader. While trying to get his support, the pilgrims, on their return from Touba, really do not know whether they should laugh or cry.

In other words, the troubles of the opposition are not over. Although the decision of President Senghor does give the opposition the unique opportunity for getting together, shoulder to shoulder, it knows that it cannot count on anything except its own forces.

Under these conditions, everything will depend on Abdou Diouf. Will he manage to maneuver with sufficient firmness so as not to allow himself to be overwhelmed while displaying the necessary skill in order to assemble all aces in his hand?

In this delicate phase of his career, the advice of the old wolves of the PS (the Socialist Party, the party in power) will not be superfluous. They have fought more difficult battles and they went through periods that were just as stormy, so that they certainly have something to say at this crucial moment in Senegal's history.

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SENEGAL

OPPOSITION ATTEMPTING JOINT ACTION AGAINST ABDOU DIOUF

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 pp 20, 21

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Wade: 'Democracy is Finished.'"]

[Text] One cannot detect any feverish atmosphere or any excitement in Dakar upon the approach of president Leopold Sedar Senghor's resignation.

The only perceptible tension involves the presence of armed police officers in front of some government buildings. At no time was there any call for violence from certain opposition leaders. "We wanted to maintain free access to these buildings by way of prevention. We have to protect government property."

For the moment, violence remains verbal and it suffices to read the opposition newspapers to realize that freedom of expression is still a fact in reality. Some new magazines have come out in recent months, such as VERITE, the organ of the pro-Soviet Marxists, or JAAY DOOLE BI, the organ of the Maoists.

This violence however can be found among the Socialist Party (the party in power). Thus, CAAXAN FAAXEE responded with the same kind of aggressiveness but mostly turned against TAXAW, the journal of Sheikh Anta Diop, and ANDE SOPI, the mouthpiece of Mamadou Dia.

The last one to get involved certainly was Master Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the main opposition party, the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party). Upon the announcement of the imminent resignation of the president on 2 December, Wade published a communique comparing "this hasty departure by Senghor to the flight of Louis XVI to Varennes or the departure of Reza Pahlavi to Morocco."

Wade above all went after Abdou Diouf who "wants to play Shahpur Bakhtiar"; a man of good will, of course, but he has "no new ideas" nor any "popular support."

He urges Diouf as quickly as possible to run in the presidential elections under the surveillance of the army. Otherwise, "that army might someday be forced to intervene."

These statements created a certain ill feeling even among the members of the PDS. Wade took it upon himself to sign this declaration by himself alone. Many people saw this as a form of spite for not having been called upon or consulted.

I went to see the PDS leader in his law office where about 30 men and women, held in check by three secretaries, were waiting patiently. I asked: "Do you not think that you went too far in comparing Senghor to the Shah of Iran?"

He replied without hesitation: "An opposition party lives on the hope of someday coming to power. It believes in turnover in government. But the current administration has demonstrated the opposite. Democracy is finished--hence the appeal to the army."

This was a strategic response to conceal a certain degree of worry. Then he said: "The Senegalese military have no political appetite. There are some very high-ranking officers in our army who have a high concept of neutrality. I do not think for a single moment that they would be attracted by power. Unless of course the crisis gets worse. I will call them in as arbiters."

At Dakar, people have the feeling that the change in government will trigger a new and big wave of wrath. So far, we have had here the eternal debate between two intellectuals, Senghor and Sheikh Anta Diop, who hated each other cordially. They are now going to be replaced by the team of Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade and the damages might well be much more serious.

How is Abdou Diouf preparing himself? "This is going to be very tough but the game can be played and it can certainly be won," he told me in his prime minister's office on the ninth and tenth floors of the Administration Building.

After 10 years in training, this big government official has acquired assurance in his gestures and proposals. For the moment he seemed to be doing rather well in resisting the attacks from his adversaries and he seemed mainly concerned with what will happen within his party, the PS, the moment "the Old Man" relinquishes the helm.

This is especially true since Abdou Diouf will inherit the full confidence of President Senghor. As a matter of fact, and contrary to many rumors, Senghor will no longer remain at the head of the Senegalese Socialist Party either. He would not want to have a two-headed administration: that of the party and that of the government. He must thus entrust the office of secretary-general of the PS to Abdou Diouf.

For the moment, he is rather hobbled. To begin with, by the round-table of all of the opposition groups summoned to Dakar on Saturday, 13 December. Objective: to get together on joint action with a view to fighting the accession of Abdou Diouf to the presidency. That of course involves all opposition groups, the three legal parties, other than the PS, that is, the PDS of Master Wade; the PAI (African Independence Party) of Mahjmout Diop; and the MRS (Senegalese Republican Movement) of Boubacar Gueye; and the parties that are not legal, especially the RND (National Democratic Rally) of Sheikh Anta Diop; the MSA (Socialist Self-Management Movement) of former prime minister Mamadou Dia; the ODP (Proletarian Democratic Organization) of Abdoulaye Ly; the underground PAI; the (pro-Soviet) Democratic League; and the Maoist current.

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For the record, there was a question of excluding the MRS because of its right-wing leanings. Finally, the movement was accepted after the declaration by Mr Gueye, accusing Senghor of behaving like a monarch who hands his succession to his heir. Mamadou Dia wanted to be considered as the principal leader of COSU (Coordination of the United Senegalese Opposition). The others turned him down.

After these issues of procedure and hierarchy had been settled, it was necessary to determine how to talk a common language and what political platform to start from. At the point where they are now, the obstacle represented by that coalition is not yet very serious as far as the future chief of state is concerned.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

DAKAR JOB CRISIS--In Dakar, 40 percent of the employees of ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development] whose positions were eliminated in August, could not be resettled in the three companies that replace the former state company (responsible for marketing of ground-nuts and grains). Those still without positions continue to stay on the work-site, but as the Senegalese government has decided to freeze hiring in the public sector, as an economy measure, their future is bleak. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 3] 9516

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SIERRA LEONE

DISCOVERY OF LARGE GOLD DEPOSITS EXPECTED TO AID ECONOMY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 43

[Article by Carlos Moore: "Gold! Gold!"]

[Text] The discovery of a large gold deposit could help in pulling Sierra Leone-- which is undergoing a severe economic crisis--out of the "cluster of the twenty-four" poorest countries on this planet.

Discovered in an abandoned diamond-yielding mine in the southern forest region, the Baomahun deposit might even be "superior (in grade by ton of ore) to that of the best mines in South Africa", if one is to believe the Sierra Leonean experts. They have put forth the fact that the great exploitation of Black Mountains in South Africa--put into operation in 1980--has a production capacity of 1.1 million tons of gold ore. In 1979, Pretoria extracted 83,529 million tons of ore with an average grade of 8.19 grams per ton.

Baomahun in itself would have the capacity for approximately 20 million tons of gold ore with an average grade sometimes exceeding 8.78 grams. This would ensure an annual production of 1.5 million tons of gold ore for 15 years, according to the most conservative estimates. In a way, it is like manna fallen from the sky for a country whose economy is on its last leg.

The economy of Sierra Leone--70 percent of which depends on its subsoil--is based on the exportation of mining products of which the reserves and the production are rapidly decreasing. The diamond mines, which produce 60 percent of its foreign currency (\$97.1 million per year) will run dry before 1990 and, already, production has decreased from 732,000 carats in 1975 to only 316,000 carats in 1979. The production of bauxite--second product exported--is constantly on the decline: from 727,000 tons in 1975, it has decreased to 673,000 tons in 1979.

Until the closing of the Marampa mine in 1975 (considered at the time unprofitable by the American company Delco), Sierra Leone was one of the major world producers of iron ore. The exploitation of this mine was resumed only in November 1979 with the modest goal of 100,000 tons per year.

To this decrease in production has been added a budgetary deficit of \$126 million, worsened since July 1980 by the invoice that Freetown received from the summit

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meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU): an investment of nearly \$200 million (ref. JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1027). And this in spite of a recommendation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) not to exceed a ceiling of \$100 million in this prestigious operation.

Already in 1979, IMF had strongly recommended a 20 percent devaluation of the leone (national currency equivalent to the dollar). The government turned down this recommendation, fearing that the increase in prices--at least on the surface--might create a social unrest similar to the one that swept through William Tolbert's regime in Liberia in April 1979.

The discovery of the Baomahun gold-bearing deposit thus came just at the right moment. According to the estimates, its exploitation will make a profit of \$100 million per year, of which the state will no doubt get half. "The situation could not be better: it is a golden opportunity", said good humoured Adolph Lundin, president of Eurocan Ventures, a small Swiss-Canadian mining enterprise that discovered the deposit and is considering its exploitation. However, Freetown is not readily persuaded and has not yet granted the exploitation license. But the American giant, Diamond Distributors--which already markets diamonds from Sierra Leone and exploits those of Guinea--seems to be in a good position to receive the license. It has already signed an agreement with Eurocan whereby it appropriates 40 percent of the shares of the company that will exploit the deposit as soon as the State grants the go-ahead. The heavy equipment is already on site and a camp to house the workers is under construction. The rush has already begun.

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TANZANIA

BADEA ROAD CONSTRUCTION, REALIGNMENT LOAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3180

[Text] At the close of its 18th meeting, held on 28 and 29 October 1980 at Khartoum, the board of directors of the BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development] approved the financing of a loan to Tanzania of \$8 million (or 21.8 percent of the total cost) reimbursable in 20 years, with 4 years grace period and bearing an annual interest rate of 5 percent, for the realignment and construction of the Bukombe-Isaka Road.

The EDF [European Development Fund] and USAID will aid the financing with contributions \$14 million (of which \$2.27 million will be in local currency) and \$5 million, respectively. The Tanzanian Government will assume the local currency financing needs, or \$9.65 million. The total cost is estimated at \$36.65 million.

This project consists of asphaltting the 3d section of the regional Rusumo-Isaka Road axis connecting Rwanda and Tanzania, thereby opening the Isaka railhead not only to local traffic but also to trade movements with Rwanda and Burundi. The first section of the axis connecting Rusumo with Lusahunga is at present under construction, and the second, connecting Lusahunga with Bukombe, is about to be put under construction. The object of the BADEA contribution is the co-financing of the realignment and construction of the 3d section (112.5 kilometers) connecting Bukombe with Isaka and the services of the consulting engineers who have to supervise the work. The road, which will have a surface width of 9.5 meters, will be covered with asphalt for a width of 6.5 meters.

This project aims at assuring Rwanda and Burundi access to the port of Dar-es-Salaam. It is obviously of regional importance. At the present time 85 and 26 percent of the imports of Rwanda and Burundi, respectively, transit through the Kenyan port of Mombasa and are trucked through the whole of the territory of Kenya and Uganda. With the opening of the new road axis between Rusumo and Isaka, Rwanda and Burundi will be able to use a transport route about 385 kilometers shorter and thus achieve considerable economies in transport and maintenance costs. In addition the project will make it possible to link to the Isaka railhead (itself connected in the center of the country) the economic system of vast regions of western Tanzania, with a population estimated at almost 2.4 million and trade evaluated in 1976 at about 300,000 tons of agricultural products. The quantifiable economic yields of the project may be summarized as follows, according to BADEA: reduction of the cost of transport for Rwanda;

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reduction of the expenses of vehicle operation for Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi; reduction of road maintenance costs; harnessing the potentials of a vast agricultural area.

The completion of the project, which will take 30 months starting in August 1981, will be placed under the supervision of the roads administration of the Ministry of Public Works of Tanzania.

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

ELECTRIC POWER RATIONING--Electricity must henceforth be rationed for several large consumers in the regions of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanga, Arusha, Moshi, and Morogoro. Forty-eight plants will be closed for 4 weeks in these sectors as a consequence of the abnormally large drop in the waterflow at the Kidatu Dam, the Tanzanian DAILY NEWS said on 10 November. According to the paper, the plants affected by the rationing, certain of which could be halted provisionally, were selected on the basis of essential needs. Industries of national interest, such as the National Milling Company (NMC) will not be closed. On 12 November, the daily published a correction announcing that 6 enterprises, out of a total of 48, were authorized to operate at reduced capacity, instead of stopping all production as previously planned. The companies benefiting from this decision are Tanganyika Packers, Tegri Plastics, Simba Plastics, Metal Box and Yuasa Battery at Dar-es-Salaam, and Tanganyika Coffee Curing Company at Moshi. These companies were authorized by TANESCO, the state electricity authority, to continue their activities because they provided essential services. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3107] 6108

YUGOSLAV AGRICULTURAL AID--Yugoslavia has just offered Tanzania agricultural equipment with a total value of 6.7 million Tanzanian shillings. The package includes 10 tractors, 2 harvester threshers, 2 jeeps, and a bulldozer. This gift is destined for the 1,000-hectare Morogoro palm oil plantation known as "Project Dakawa II." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3108] 6108

SWISS ROAD NETWORK AID--The Swiss and Tanzanian governments recently signed at Dar-es-Salaam an agreement providing for assistance of 42 million shillings from Switzerland for the Tanzanian road network in the districts of Ulanga and Kilombero. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3108] 6108

AFFORESTATION CAMPAIGN--President Nyerere received forestry experts in Dar-es-Salaam on 26 November to prepare a vast afforestation campaign at the national level which will be initiated in mid 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3421] 8143

ADDITIONAL NETHERLANDS AID--Tanzania and Kenya will each receive supplementary aid for development from the Netherlands amounting to 7 million florins (\$3.5 million), according to statements made by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs at The Hague. This sum will be added to the 105 million florins and 58 million florins which the Netherlands has already offered to Tanzania and Kenya, respectively, in 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3421] 8143

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UGANDA

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF MINI-INVASION; REFUGEE STATISTICS

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Dec 80 p 20

[Text]

Regional and world press reports recently suggested that supporters of ex-Ugandan President General Idi Amin had launched an invasion of northern Uganda aimed at toppling that country's present provisional leaders. In retrospect, these accounts appear to have contained considerable exaggeration as regards the number of 'invaders', the degree of fighting, and the purpose of the mini-invasion. What is certain though, is that this episode has further exacerbated the Southern Region's refugee problem. Jacob Akol visited the area and spoke both with those caught up in the conflict over the border in Uganda and with those on this side of the border responsible for dealing with the consequences of this latest disturbance.

AT FIRST I thought he was not in any condition to talk. But Dridci Simon, District Commissioner of Moyo, Uganda, sat up in his Yei hospital bed despite a broken arm and swollen face and lips. 'Is there tea? I am very thirsty,' he said feebly, trying to focus on me. After a sip he said, now more clearly: 'I had gone to the East Bank of the Nile and was expected back in Moyo, but because of the 6-to-6 curfew on the ferry I had to spend the night on the East Bank. We heard shots during the night, but on investigation the following morning we discovered that the cause was a drunken soldier. Upon leaving for Moyo I discovered that the soldiers posted at the ferry had withdrawn towards Gulu. Further, on my way I met over 400 soldiers going south. They told me that they expected Amin's soldiers to invade Moyo town and that they were making a tactical withdrawal. I continued on my

way to the town, which was filled with an air of expectation. Indeed Amin's soldiers were expected at any moment. On the 10th, that afternoon, about three to four youths, who called themselves Amin's soldiers, started shooting into the air with rifles. I ordered the few policemen still in town to disarm them, but they did not react. The number of Amin's soldiers increased as the day progressed. In the late afternoon they came to my house and ordered me to give them guns. I told them that the soldiers had taken all the weapons when they departed. They tied my hands behind my back and started to beat me, all the time demanding that I give them guns. They used sticks - anything they could find. At last they gave up hope of getting any guns out of me and then I knew I was finished as the beating became intense, though I could no longer feel the pain. I lost consciousness. . . An old man woke me up at about 3 o'clock on the morning of 11th. I was in the bush and the old man told me that they had left me for dead. He told me to come with him to Sudan. On the way, the mob caught up with us late in the morning. They tied my hands behind my back again and beat me as I walked to Kajokaji in Sudan.'

A Democratic Party official on his way to Nairobi told *Sudanow* in Juba: 'What happened in Moyo district was that the government soldiers made a tactical withdrawal because they thought their numbers insufficient to meet any large force. When ex-Amin soldiers heard of the withdrawal they walked into Moyo - facing no opposition. The following day it was rumoured that government troops were returning in force and Amin's supporters then began pulling out

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of the town and the countryside. There was no fight at all, but the government soldiers were shooting indiscriminately. In Kajokaji we could still see smoke rising from houses set on fire by the soldiers.'

The situation as described by those two eye-witnesses differed from that in Arua, west of Moyo. In Arua, there was a prolonged fight. Ex-Ugandan Brigadier Hassan Marele, who reportedly led the rebel group in the invasion of Arua, was killed just outside the town. The involvement of Marele, who, long before Amin fell, had left the country and had become what one Sudanese official called 'a mini-millionaire' in Yei District, led many people to believe that former General Amin might not have been behind the recent moves to disrupt elections in Uganda. Sudanese security personnel have hinted that the rebels might have had some links with the Nairobi-based Ugandan politicians, though this could not be substantiated. Indeed it is doubtful that General Amin and his badly demoralised men would have had the organisational ability to attempt an invasion, even one as aimless as it was doomed to failure.

The result of this venture has been an influx of thousands of refugees into Sudan, an additional burden the Southern Region can ill afford. By June of this year the Southern Region office of the UNHCR reported 40,000 refugees in the

South. They were expecting a good proportion of these refugees to return to Uganda before the elections and many of them were in the process of leaving when the trouble started again. Now the comings and goings along the vast unmanned border has become so confused that even the UNHCR office finds it hard to keep track. 'Nobody seems to know exactly how many refugees have gone back and how many have come,' said Andy Steward of the refugee office, 'but it is certain that more have come than gone. We just cannot say how many yet.' At least 17,000 more refugees have come through registration points at Kaya, Kajokaji and Nimule.

Unlike the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in April last year, when there was a lot of sympathy for Amin's soldiers in Southern Sudan, there is little sympathy for what the Regional authorities have called 'a mad venture' that will help no one. Nineteen people, including Amin's former Vice President Mustafa Idrisi and his former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juma Oris, were promptly arrested and placed under detention by the Regional government. Furthermore, the Commissioner of Eastern Equatoria Province, Mr Vanancio Loro, has been directed by the President of the High Executive Council Mr Abel Aljer to clear the border of all refugees, settled or recently arrived.

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UPPER VOLTA

NEW LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO RECTIFY ILLS EXAMINED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80 pp 28-30

[Article by Ginette Cot: "The Dying Country"]

[Text] Will the new Military Committee move on from words to actions and extricate the people of Upper Volta from its neo-colonial troubles?

Less than 15 months after it took power, on 25 November of last year, at Ouagadougou, the CMRPN (Military Committee of recovery for National Progress), formed a 17-member government, presided over by Col Saye Zerbo who in addition also holds the job of chief of state, minister of defense and of veterans affairs, and chief of staff of the armed forces (see AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 228, 8 December 1980). Among the seven other army leaders who have joined the new government we might mention especially Lt Col Badembele Nezien (interior and security), Lt Col Felix Tientaraboum (foreign affairs and cooperation), and the Military Quartermaster Mamadou Sanio (economy, planning, industry, and mining). The latter two had been members of the military government of General Lamizana between 1974 and 1978, the first of them an minister of youth and sports and the latter as minister of finance. None of the nine civilians who completed the government ever held any ministerial posts under the defunct regime. They are nevertheless known for being sympathizers of the opposition parties which existed under the Third Republic that emerged from the 1978 elections.

After the first President of Upper Volta, Maurice Yameogo, ousted on 3 January 1966 by a popular uprising, for whom the "historic proclamation of 25 November 1980" marked "the end of a nightmare," it is the traditional chiefs--whose control over the country's political, economic, and social life was far from negligible--who saved the coup d'etat of Col Saye Zerbo. In a message to the CMRPN, the "wise men of the imperial court of Moro Naba" expressed the opinion in effect that "the event constitutes an unexpected opportunity for the country and the people."

Cardinal Paul Zoungrana, the archbishop of Ouagadougou, congratulated the president and the other members of the Military Committee for "having been the agents of providence of a God who loves Upper Volta." Support committees were established in certain localities and, pending the announcement of the new regime's options, it was noted that the first initiatives taken by the CMRPN were expressed by gestures of appeasement and conciliation.

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Thus it was decided to release all of the October and November salaries for teachers, whose strike had served to trigger the crisis leading to the downfall of the Lamizana regime. Moreover, two of the demands of the strikers were met. The results of the last competition for the assignment of trainees to the National School Administration Institute in Paris--which had been challenged--were annulled. And the two teachers who had been transferred because of their union activities, were returned to their original positions.

On the other hand, expressing its concern for appeasing the discontent caused by the social injustices and lack of care on the part of the old regime, the CMRPN decided to dispatch emergency aid to the three departments in the north of the country whose harvests had been ravaged by invasions of grasshoppers and where it had not rained since August.

Finally, the fact that the Military Committee pledged to respect individual, group, and labor union freedoms and that no obstacles were created for freedom of the press--was taken as an encouraging sign, showing that the new government seems concerned with taking into account the specific democratic gains of the people of Upper Volta. The presence, within the Military Committee, of enlisted men, including one state trooper 1st class, further strengthens this assumption.

Nevertheless, it goes without saying that, after a score of years of having been kicked around, the population of Upper Volta--especially the urban population, which has developed a high degree of political awareness through constant labor union struggles--will remain more vigilant than ever before. It expects, if not miracles, then at least profound changes, first of all, in the management of public affairs and the distribution of the national income. Thus, the CSV (Voltan Trade Union Confederation), the country's most dynamic labor union, as a requirement for its participation in the Military Committee's recovery program, demanded "the very detailed determination of the fortunes that were wrongfully acquired by the former leaders and the management of public affairs, before anybody can demand any sacrifices of the workers." Other disclosures were furthermore expected, concerning the discovery of a big arms traffic operation supposedly involving men connected with the PDV-RDA (Voltan Democratic Union--African Democratic Rally), the former party in power.

Under these conditions, the 25 November coup d'etat seems to sound the death knell for the traditional parties of the generation of independence which, in spite of the popular uprising in 1966, had recovered and definitely made the laws behind the regime of General Lamizana whose laxity, recognized today, allowed room for all kinds of manipulations and, finally, the law of the jungle.

Of course, nobody entertains any illusions. The leeway of the new leaders, regardless of what their undertakings are, is rather tight. Categorized among the world's most deprived countries, stricken by 10 years of drought, further reducing its already limited possibilities and potential, suffering the restrictions deriving from its landlocked location that multiplies the effects of imported inflation, Upper Volta must face a situation whose outcome nobody can visualize--except through miraculous solutions.

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Under these conditions, one cannot see how a real national recovery effort could be undertaken--apart from an expansion and in-depth development of democracy, a really popular democracy this time--without at the same time making a real attempt at gaining control of foreign aid and development projects.

The Traditional Chiefdoms

The 1978 legislative and presidential elections were significant regarding the first point. The thing that emerged after these elections is the lack of interest on the part of a very large majority of the population--especially the people in the rural areas who account for almost 90 percent of the country's population--with regard to the political game which was restricted to the capital and parliament. The heavy abstention rate--which came to 60 percent of the registered voters (the latter furthermore represent only two-thirds of the population of voting age) during the legislative elections and 65 percent during the presidential elections (although General Lamizana, already running during the first round of elections, in reality was elected only by less than 20 percent of the citizens)--cannot be explained, as people tried to do at that time, merely by the hard work everybody has to do out in the rural areas but rather by a profound disaffection toward a regime which had failed in doing its job.

Besides, the election campaign had also shown the bankruptcy of the existing political parties whose number (nine, in the beginning) rather poorly concealed the absence of any specific project for the future. With the exception perhaps of the party of professor Ki-Zerbo--the former MNR [National Movement for Renewal] which became the UPV [Voltan Progressive Union] and then the FPV [Voltan Progressive Front], which talked about a general socialist blueprint but which alienated a large portion of the left because of its participation in a Lamizana administration and above all later on because of its alliance with the return of the old political war horses, such as Joseph Ouedraogo--the existing parties had hardly any slogans other than "return the civilians to power"; but that was far from enough to make up a government program.

The most politically aware strata of the population likewise had become increasingly aware of the need for a broadening and in-depth development of the democratic debate by getting especially the peasant masses--which so far are still tightly "controlled" by the traditional chiefdoms--to participate. The LIPAD (Patriotic League for Development) worked especially along those lines but, it goes without saying, that it was bitterly opposed by the government. And the CSV in turn was fighting for the establishment of a vast anti-imperialist front.

Concerning the second point, it is true that the Lamizana regime had made an effort to restore public finances after the dilapidation of government funds which had caused the downfall of its predecessor. But the easy-going attitude, the absence of any initiative--which had left the field to the upstarts and to shady operators most of all--had characterized all of the administrations which followed each other during the era of General Lamizana. The economic development program of the PDV-RDA--the party in power under the Third Republic--consisted, all in all, of these three words: government-controlled liberal capitalism.

In fact, "government control" was totally absent. Vital projects for the country remained dormant in the drawers for many years; they included the working of the manganese deposit at Tambao or the reopening of the Poura gold mine, while foreign investors had a free hand in pushing through programs designed by them and for them amid the most complete anarchy. This got so bad that irritation began to take hold of the Voltan cadres and technicians who were aware of the waste and the growing alienation promoted by such practices.

Foreign control is expressed for example by such an ambitious project as the AVV (Development of the Valleys of the Three Voltas). This vast operation, whose start goes back to 1973, initially called for the settlement, within 15 years, of 55,000 peasant families (about 600,000 persons) in an area of 47,400 square kilometers (about 17 percent of the territory), following the eradication of onchocerciasis, and, by the end of the project, an output of 150,000 tons of cereal crops, 70,000 tons of cotton, 50,000 tons of sugar cane, and 40,000 tons of peanuts. It is today in doubt not only in terms of its basic guidelines but also in terms of its objectives.

Its implementation as a matter of fact is running into difficulties of all kinds, inherent in the project itself, and the money suppliers think that the cost of settling a migrant is too high. As a matter of fact, as the LIPAD underscored in a study of the situation of rural areas in Upper Volta, this experiment is indicative of the orientation of the regime's development policy. Depending almost exclusively on foreign financing, in other words, the goodwill of money suppliers, "the AVV essentially is aimed at the promotion of income-producing crops."

The Voltan "Sharpshooters"

In the meantime, the rural areas as a whole seem to have been abandoned. To visualize the vast misery of the Voltan peasant masses, we might look at the following two figures. While the average life expectancy, already generally reduced, is 41 years in the urban areas, it drops to 32 years in the rural areas. And while, officially, the monthly minimum earnings of a wage worker come to less than 15,000 francs CFA [African Financial Community] (F300), the income of a peasant family is 18,200 francs CFA (F364) per year.

In spite of the fact that the Voltan peasant consumes a portion of his output himself, he must--in order to meet his family's food needs (at least half a score of persons)--spend almost 50 percent of that small money income for food. "In spite of everything," according to the bulletin LE PATRIOTE, put out by LIPAD, "the Voltan peasant, especially in the country's central region, cannot afford more than a single meal per day, essentially based on millet and sorghum. During years with little rainfall, where annual cereal crop requirements are estimated at 250 kilograms per person, on the average, the harvests in certain regions yield only 60 kilograms per person and sometimes even much less."

How should one then be astonished, under these conditions, that the ancient "traditions" persist? As during colonial times, when the country was treated as a reservoir of civilian and military manpower (the 200,000 "Senegalese Sharpshooters," recruited during World War I, for the most part came from Upper Volta), the Voltans,

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famous for the great value of their work, are forced by the hundreds of thousands to go seek a pittance in neighboring countries, such as Ghana, but above all in Ivory Coast, where they are employed in the plantations, the factories, and in domestic service. Nor is it astonishing that the young people flee from the rural areas in vast numbers, preferring to take their chances in the capital and in urban areas where however they do not find anything to do and only serve to swell the ranks of the unemployed.

We can imagine how this situation creates problems of delinquency and potential revolts. Of course, these are common tendencies in many countries but the crying shortages in social terms, as demonstrated by all of the administrations that succeeded each other since independence at Ouagadougou, even more dangerously accentuate the imbalances and seriously threaten the very future of the country.

Two examples will suffice to illustrate this observation. While no serious education reform has ever been undertaken and while 90 percent of the population are illiterates, the school attendance rate of children of school age is barely more than 10 percent. Out of 1,127,300 children of school age in 1975, only 133,660 were actually in school; just 3 years later, progress was insignificant since the number of children attending school had risen only to 160,528, out of a total number of school-age children of 1,187,600. We must also note that the expenditures of the parents of these students are very high since they come to 60,000 and even 70,000 francs CFA (Fr1,200-1,300) per year. As for high schools, not a single one has been put up since 1966. At the start of the 6th year, in 1979, there were only 1,820 places for 17,000 applicants. The country has 37 high schools, only 14 of which are public while the remaining 23 are private, in other words, they require tuition.

Doctors and Midwives

In terms of health, it suffices to realize that, in 1977 (and there have hardly been any major changes since then), the country had a grand total of 51 doctors (in other words one doctor for every 118,000 inhabitants, whereas the proportion considered necessary by the WHO is one doctor for every 10,000). Besides, out of those 51 Voltan doctors, 41 were practicing at Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso; only three of them were working in the regional centers. There were also 120 midwives, in other words, one for every 50,000 inhabitants (as against one for every 5,000 according to the figures accepted by the WHO), plus 355 government male nurses (one for every 17,000 inhabitants) and 946 registered male nurses (one for every 6,350).

The remark made concerning the territorial distribution of doctors also applies to the other health workers, especially midwives, two-thirds of whom are stationed in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. The very thin medical support structure and the prohibitive costs of medical care given there explain why the vast majority of the population (75 percent) and more particularly the peasant masses are getting no modern medical care at all. Now, when one realizes that no promotion and development effort is being made in support of traditional medicine, when one realizes also that scourges such as malaria and polio are particularly virulent, then one can understand that it is the very survival of a people which is at stake here.

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Finally, concerning international relations, nothing or almost nothing has changed since the first years after independence. Regardless of whether we look at relations with Ivory Coast, which seem sometimes to consist mostly of relations between the father-state and the dependent-state, rather than a situation of cooperation between equal states; or whether we look at relations with France which, through its subsidies, its "aid," its investments, and trade, etc., maintains almost complete control over the country--everything has remained what it always was. Of course, the policy of going along with all of this, pursued by the Lamizana regime, caused more and more rumblings and discontent. At the beginning of the year, prime minister Conombo said that the revision of the cooperation agreements with France was necessary. But all of this of course remained on the level of the vagueness so characteristic of the PVD-RDA politicians.

In view of this situation, the first condition for a real recovery involves a fight against the dilapidation of public funds, embezzlement, mismanagement, and ill-considered expenditures. The decision announced on 10 December by Col Saye Zerbo, to create a special investigating commission, "charged with casting light on the management of public affairs under the Third Republic," does respond to the demand of the CSV and leads us to hope for a real change in the practice and orientation of the new regime. While the options of the CMRPN have not yet been clearly explained, this impression is strengthened by the other intentions that have been proclaimed. "The moment has come to build a real democracy," the new chief of state declared and on the other hand he also announced "the necessary reorganization of the administration" and he asserted that priority would be given in economic terms to rural development and protection of cattle in order to guarantee food self-sufficiency.

Of course, this is an objective that has been proclaimed everywhere. But the thing that particularly attracts our attention is that the CMRPN has declared that it is determined to review the policy of industrial crops in order to make room for food crops. And it also wants to step up mining prospecting (which so far has been neglected, although the Voltan subsoil is not devoid of potential) in order to promote industrial development.

While a minimum of caution is necessary in waiting for the promises to turn into real efforts, one may nevertheless hope that a new day is about to dawn over this country which so long has been left to itself.

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UPPER VOLTA

LAMIZANA'S DOWNFALL ANTICLIMACTIC

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 31

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "A Putsch That Was Almost Dull--General Lamizana Overtaken by Events; A Military Recovery Committee Puts an End To Democratic Experience"]

[Text] Africa has just recorded its 5th military coup in 11 months. After Mauritania (4 January), Liberia (12 April), Uganda (13 May), and Guinea-Bissau (14 November), Upper Voltan power is changing hands. At dawn on 25 November Ouagadougou was the scene of a putsch that was almost dull.

Gen Sangoule Lamizana, in power for nearly 16 years, was overthrown--painlessly, and, above all, without bloodshed. A "Military Recovery Committee For National Progress" seized power, dissolved the National Assembly and the government, and suspended the constitution and political activity.

Calm and Authoritarian

This did not prevent that committee from proclaiming its intention to set up a "real democracy," bringing together all the nation's active forces and insuring individual and collective freedoms "other than political ones."

The new strong man in Ouagadougou is not quite an unknown in the corridors of power. Saye Zerbo, the colonel who chairs the Military Committee, was in fact General Lamizana's minister of foreign affairs between February 1974 and February 1976. That was in the "national renewal" government set up following the political crisis which had broken out on 22 January 1974 setting Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, the prime minister, against Joseph Ouedraogo, president of the National Assembly.

A veteran of the Indochina and Algeria wars, Col Saye Zerbo comes from Tougan, in western Upper Volta. From the Samo tribe like Gen Sangoule Lamizana, he took the Frejus (France) officer training school course in 1958 before attending staff school and staff college in Paris. Most recently he held the jobs of commander of the Ouagadougou combined service regiment and head of the studies office at staff headquarters. Calm and authoritarian, he is 48 years old.

Why this coup in a country envied by the rest of Africa for its democratic experience and which prided itself on respecting individual and collective liberties, while gradually getting used to tolerating things like a free country

does? Because life for Upper Voltans was getting worse and because of political confusion, the new leaders maintain.

To be sure, since the start of the new school year, the unions, in collaboration with the opposition parties, kept things increasingly tense (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1038). But can democracy live without clashes and struggles?

A Man Who Was Finished

In truth, the Upper Voltans were fed up with Lamizana. Worn out by 16 years of power, the general (as he is commonly called in Ouagadougou) seemed to be increasingly overtaken by events.

Faced with unrest among some and the intrigues of others, he took refuge in a wait-and-see approach which bordered on resignation. "Lamizana is finished," one of his colleagues confided to us recently, indignant at the inability of the Upper Voltan chief of state to resolve the crisis brought on by the openended strike activity of the unions. "I cannot conceive," added the person we were talking to, "of a president of the Republic who, having met with the union members, would let them go at it again without having made a decision." In the same way, opposition leaders like Joseph Ki-Zerbo, secretary-general of the FPV (Upper Voltan Progressive Front), were constantly denouncing the paralysis and inaction of the officials in charge. "Lamizana," they would say, "is like a corpse at the summit of power. He does not act or react, whatever you do."

In the face of their chief's ineffectiveness and good-naturedness, the Upper Voltans clearly needed a change and particularly to be ruled by a self-confident head and a firm hand, provided that their new strongman does not carry that too far. The Upper Voltans, spoiled rotten by Lamizana's laissez-faire approach, might before long become disillusioned and, who knows, react in turn.

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UPPER VOLTA

LABOR UNREST PRECEDING RECENT COUP DISCUSSED

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[Article by Ginette Cot: "The End of a Myth"]

[Text] The 25 November coup d'etat put an end to the reign of General Sangoule Lamizana and his entourage, a regime that had retained but the outward trappings of democracy.

What for months had appeared to be an increasingly definite probability became an actual fact on 25 November 1980 in Ouagadougou where a bloodless coup led by Colonel Sayo Zerbo overthrew General Sangoule Lamizana's regime which had governed Upper Volta since January 1966. The coup was engineered by the Inter-Service and Support Regiment (RIA) commanded by Colonel Zerbo and the Paratrooper-Commando Regiment (RPC) normally stationed in Dedegou some 230 kilometers northeast of Ouagadougou. The coup was followed by the arrest of several of the former regime's leaders. These included: President Lamizana; Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, president of the National Assembly and secretary general of the Voltan Democratic Party-African Democratic Rally (PDV-RDA), the new version of the old UDV-RDA [Voltan Democratic Union-African Democratic Party], approved by the March 1980 party congress; Casimir Tapsoba, leader of the PDV-RDA in the capital; General Baba Sy, former army chief of staff, and General Jean Bila, former armed forces chief of staff. All persons arrested were taken to the new military camp in the western section of the capital.

A 31-member Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress (CMRPN) was established with Colonel Saye Zerbo as chairman. A nine-member steering committee has been formed within the CMRPN and some 10 civil servants have been appointed to handle current business in the various ministries pending formation of a new government. The new leaders said their action was justified by the country's political and economic situation "marked by the deterioration of the social climate and all sectors of national life." In what is now a standard procedure, the new leadership's first decision was to dissolve all of the country's institutions, suspend the present constitution and all political parties.

The CMRPN asserted it would abide by all of the ousted regime's international obligations. It also gave assurance that "individual and collective freedoms other than political will be guaranteed." It announced that its objective was "to establish a real democracy in which all of the nation's vital elements are partners." This statement is much too broad and too ambiguous to allow us to speculate in any way, at this early date, about the new government's real intentions.

There are, however, two facts that must be noted, even though they shed no more light on what the future holds than the above statement does. The first fact is that the military coup occurred 5 days after the National Union of African Teachers of Upper Volta (SNEAHV) and the Sole Voltan Union of Teachers of Secondary and Higher Education (SUVESS), meeting in extraordinary session, had decided to suspend their effort to force a showdown with the government of Prime Minister Joseph Conombo who is also the assistant secretary general of the PDV-RDA. This attempted showdown had resulted in a strike of indefinite duration by elementary school teachers. This strike, begun on 1 October, the first day of the new school year, was in support of several demands, one of which--revision of the administrative status of teachers--had previously triggered a 5-day work stoppage in February 1980. The other demands had to do with increased housing allowances for teachers, and with two special cases: reinstatement of two union members transferred because of their involvement in strike action, and the recall to Upper Volta of several trainees sent to the National Institute of School Administration in Paris under conditions the SNEAHV considers irregular.

With every passing day the conflict had expanded and stiffened as the SUVESS and other labor federations joined the dispute. For instance, on 14 October, the Voltan Trade Union Confederation (CSV), the country's most militant union, staged a 72-hour "sympathy and protest" strike which paralyzed air traffic, banks, and the customs service. On 4 November, another 48-hour general strike was called, this time by the four Upper Voltan labor federations: the National Confederation of Voltan Workers (CNTV), Voltan Organization of Free Trade Unions (OVSL), Voltan Workers Trade Union Federation (USTB), and the CSV.

Motion of No-Confidence

While later the CSV was threatening to call for a general strike of indefinite duration to protest the arrest of several union members, the "illegal freezing of wages, and all forms of injustice perpetrated by the regime," a motion of no-confidence in the government--the first such motion since the country became independent in 1960--was filed on 11 November by 24 of the National Assembly's 57 members. Those members supporting the motion were from the following opposition parties: the National Union for the Defense of Democracy (UNDD) headed by Professor Ammanuel Zoma and former president Maurice Yameogo, ousted in 1966, and the Voltan Progressive Front (FPV) headed by Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Joseph Ouedraogo. Under the terms of this motion, eventually defeated by 33 votes to 24, the opposition accused the government of not respecting the Constitution and mismanaging public funds. It blamed the government for the deterioration of the political, economic, and social climate, for the insecurity of citizens, and for the country's inadequate food supplies, particularly in the drought-stricken regions. The motion concluded by calling for the constitution of a government of national unity.

The government had become panic-stricken and its last statements and actions reflected its inability to quell the crisis and find solutions. On 12 November, for example, it promulgated a decree prohibiting demonstrations in public places and, strangely enough, the wearing of military uniforms by persons not belonging to the Upper Voltan Armed Forces and paramilitary organizations. To justify this measure, General Lamizana explained that "a small group, under a labor union cover, had organized a veritable armed militia with weapons and uniforms furnished by the

real directors of the operation." He added that the elementary school teachers' strike had been "largely taken over and diverted by disparate coalitions whose sole common objective was to foment disorder and confusion."

While Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, president of the National Assembly and secretary general of the PDV-RDA, was accusing his lifelong foe and rival, his "brother" Joseph Ouedraogo--former leader of the UDV-RDA, founder of the RDA Denial Front during the 1978 election campaign, and recently affiliated with Professor Ki-Zerbo's movement--of being the chief instigator of the crisis, Prime Minister Joseph Conombo personally went so far as to hold "a foreign power" responsible, a power he claimed had financially backed some trade union leaders.

With Utmost Calm

It was under these conditions of total deadlock, and at a time when the PDV-RDA presidential majority was preparing to throw off its democratic masks once and for all, that, on 21 November, the two teachers' unions decided to suspend their strike action while stating that they intended to continue their struggle, coordinate their demands and submit them to the government.

The second noteworthy fact is that the people received the news of Colonel Saye Zerbo's coup d'etat with utmost calm, without any agitation. There was even no recorded reaction from officials of the trade union opposition or political opposition inside or outside the country. This may perhaps have been an indication of necessary caution, but also perhaps the expression of a wait-and-see attitude. The only reactions noted were the almost unanimous lamentations of the French press and pro-Western African newspapers who viewed the overthrow of General Sangoule Lamizana's regime as the end of an experiment "unique in Africa." The French and pro-Western African media had always depicted Lamizana as a good-natured and conciliatory person, and had somewhat prematurely hailed him as the father of the French-style democracy which reigned in Ouagadougou.

It is true that everyone in the Upper Voltan capital could apparently freely voice their opinions, and that a foreign observer ran no risk whenever he sought to interview any member of the opposition. There was no lack of oratorical jousts and rows, but these could serve as an outlet for frustrations as well as a means of satisfying those persons who like to criticize and challenge authority. It is also true that repressive violence, torture, or political assassination have been practically unknown in Upper Volta up to now. This characteristic is, of course, particularly important.

Yet upon closer examination, it is quite clear that this relative democracy, so highly praised outside the country, had to be doggedly defended everyday against the regime's supporters, and that it owed its existence primarily to the bitter struggle waged by workers. The entire history of the past 14 years is proof of this. And all politicians from Joseph Ouedraogo to Joseph Conombo have been forced to recognize it and by turns act accordingly.

Mass demonstrations organized by labor unions forced Maurice Yameogo, Upper Volta's first president, to step down on 3 January 1966. He had been involved in a series of financial scandals. Furthermore, his government had followed a fundamentally

antisocial policy and truckled to the former mother country and its satellites. In 1975, the labor federations again had to nip one of General Lamizana's plans in the bud. On 29 November, the chief of state had announced his intention to impose a single party loyal to him, namely the National Movement for Renewal. But the very next day, thousands of workers responded to a call from the four labor federations--CSV, OVSL, CNTV, and USTV--and demonstrated their indignation in Labor Exchange Square. A general strike of unprecedented success was staged on 17-18 December in support of four demands: return to normal constitutional life, higher wages, settlement of claims resulting from misappropriation of relief aid destined for drought victims in the Sahel region and also from misappropriation of social security funds.

A "Gimmick"

The chief of state, forced to backtrack, evaded the difficulty by a "gimmick." With the help of all the country's politicians, he formed a special commission entrusted with the task of drafting a constitution. At the same time, this enabled him to dodge demands for an investigation of the aforementioned misappropriation. Contrary to the enthusiastic foreign reception given the constitution approved by referendum in November 1977, that document actually marked a regression from the prevailing de facto situation in the country where, without waiting for official permission, political and labor organizations were already openly working together because the new law specified that only the three parties receiving the most votes in the 1978 parliamentary elections would henceforth be considered lawful. In fact, this law accounts for the sometimes strange regroupings and alliances made, after the elections, within the opposition as well as in the presidential majority. For instance, in late 1979, the Voltan Progressive Front (FPV), an opposition party, was actually a coalition of Professor Ki-Zerbo's Voltan Progressive Union (UPV), Joseph Ouedraogo's RDA Denial Front, the Independents, and elements of the African Republican Party (PRA).

Of the parties having cast their votes for General Lamizana as president, only the UDV-RDA emerged as a lawful party. At its March 1980 congress, the UDV-RDA incorporated elements of other small organizations and on that occasion changed its designation to PDV-RDA. This move strengthened the precarious presidential majority in the National Assembly--33 of the 57 members--and restored respect for constitutional principles (several members of one of those small parties favorable to Lamizana, but defeated in the elections, were already members of the Conombo government). And the proceedings of the PDV-RDA Congress consisted almost entirely of behind-the-scenes wheeling and dealing for a share of appointments and honorary positions (the party of the presidential majority has no less than 100 members in its political bureau).

Corruption, Lure of Easy Money

Though General Lamizana's Upper Volta could pride itself on having no person imprisoned for political or labor union related offenses, it also owed this record to the vigilance of Upper Voltan workers. The many labor protests throughout 1979 confirm this fact. On 22 May, three OVSL officials were confined in the civilian prison at Gnoko for having denounced, at a union rally, the expansion of regionalism since 1966 and the misappropriation of public funds with which the entire capital was

charging numerous key government leaders. As soon as news of this incarceration became known, the four labor federations staged a general strike without waiting for the 15-day cooling-off period prescribed by law. The strike lasted 7 days, from 24 May to 31 May, and despite all kinds of intimidation--including the arrest of several leaders of the merchants union, and the occupation of the Workers Education Center and the Labor Exchange by repressive forces--the strike movement attained its goal: on 31 May, all arrested union members and officials were released and all charges against them were dropped.

Again the labor unions were behind the sudden concern expressed on 21 February 1980 by General Lamizana about "the countless disorders plaguing the Upper Volta civil service." In addressing a meeting of key government staffers, he told them: "Corruption, the lure of easy money, disrespect for public service, and the tendency of certain officials to allow business to intrude into politics are apparently becoming a way of life." He then announced the imminent implementation "of a set of measures designed to successfully carry out indispensable reforms." As for this "set of measures," it would appear that they consisted of nothing more than the decision to create, as recommended by the national administrative reform committee established in February 1979, a single government inspector general's office for the entire country in place of the present "plethoric and anarchic" series of general inspectorates operating in each ministerial departments.

But the labor federations--CNTV, CSV, and OVSL--which, in an open letter to the President of the Republic on 5 September 1979, had drawn the chief of state's attention to various irregularities noted in the management of public affairs, were hardly prepared to let this matter be forgotten. Especially since each time unions submitted demands, they were accused of working towards selfish goals and trying, as it were, to bring about the downfall of a country whose destitution is still exacerbated by 10 years of drought. Actually, such accusations were an attempt to set the city workers unions against the immense peasant majority stagnating on the edge of destitution. This situation prompted Prime Minister Conombo to say quite tactlessly one day, in an outburst of demagogic feeling, that whenever he was faced with wage earners' demands, he personally considered himself to be the leader of a peasant trade union with 7 million members!

Leeches

But in their letter, the three labor federations not only reiterated their wage demands but also let it be clearly understood that funds could be found with which to improve the living conditions of wage earners without hurting anyone, provided, however, the corridors of powers were not filled with so many leeches absorbing public funds. With supporting evidence, the three federations denounced the following instances of the waste in the management of public affairs: numerous missions with inflated delegations; modernization at government expense of the private homes of cabinet members and other officials; misappropriations and malfeasance by government personnel; manipulation of public funds for dishonest purposes; opening of special government-funded accounts and programs for the National Assembly, the ministries, and other public institutions, while keeping the actual use of these funds secret; corruption of ministers and other national officials; systematized favoritism and nepotism resulting in favors granted citizens supportive of the presidential majority, such as, for example, the awarding of government contracts to

friends and relatives of national officials; inclusion in the national budget of more than 100 agents and civil servants for whom no definite functions are specified; the enormity of the salaries paid managers of semipublic companies, etc.

Lastly, workers must also be given credit for the surreptitious but spectacular withdrawal from the National Assembly's agenda of a bill limiting the right to strike. As soon as news of this bill leaked out, the CSV organized a day of protest on 17 January 1980. The bill also promised to create quite a stir in the ranks of the opposition. Consequently no further mention was ever made of it. The special session of the National Assembly called to consider the bill was cancelled without any explanation. And ever since then, no government official has dared even to acknowledge that such a bill ever existed.

Nevertheless, the governmental crisis had become more pronounced these past few months despite the advent of the Third Republic, the "democratic" elections of 1978 and the "patched-up" peace that followed. The deadlock resulted from two traits which have characterized the economic and social policy of President Lamizana's successive governments for nearly 15 years, namely laissez-faire and an excessive tendency to conciliate. Unable to find solutions, supporters of the presidential majority became more and more arrogant.

Everything was happening as if, "having neither learned nor forgotten anything," they expected, despite all contraindications, to bring unions and opposition parties to heel, so as to impose a noncumbersome made-to-order "democracy." In any event, the seizures of newspapers, instances of harassment, and transfers of civil servants belonging to opposition parties continued to increase.

These measures failed, however, to halt the process of the regime's disintegration. And people waited in vain for the municipal elections prescribed by the Constitution. But these elections were clearly postponed sine die.

A CSV official told us a few months ago: "In reality, President Lamizana and his PDV-RDA majority are trapped in an inextricable contradiction. Our leaders take great pride in saying: 'Look at our country, here we have democracy.' For them, in fact, democracy boils down to a public relations campaign aimed at the outside world. For inside the country, our leaders speak an altogether different language and deny full expression to all of the components of that democracy, and organized labor is one such component. These leaders pose as champions of democracy as if they had invented it. It is essential, however, that it be fully understood on the international level that the men of the present presidential majority--those very same men who were already grouped together as members of the single official party of Maurice Yameogo's First Republic--certainly have no hand in the relative freedom we enjoy. It must be realized that when the general wanted to establish his own single party in 1979, these men did not even react.

'Good Family Man'

"Our democratic attainments, which we have to defend in a daily unremitting struggle, were actually achieved by the Upper Voltan people and workers. Moreover, we believe that there will be no real democracy as long as a minority can continue to monopolize the fruits of collective labor, as long as we have not succeeded in establishing economic and social democracy. Outsiders tell us: you have Africa's most generous

general, a good family man who has presented you with democracy. This is a pernicious line of reasoning that further justifies the possibility of repression the moment it is felt we are exaggerating, because the number of strikes will increase and that, it seems, is not possible in a poor country. Therein lies the danger that threatens us and is liable to jeopardize our progress toward democracy. Because if our leaders manage to deceive international public opinion, one morning they will be able to repress us with the blessing or silent complicity of part of that opinion...."

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