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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

QADHDHAFI'S CHADIAN OPERATIONS WORRYING SAHELIAN NATIONS

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Dec 80 pp 37-38

[Article by Jean Grandmougin: "The Colonel's Legions"]

[Text] "It is time for Chad to appeal for United Nations troops," Senegalese President Leopold Sedar Senghor said with anxiety. Like an echo, the Quai d'Orsay proclaimed on 24 November: "France is in contact with the African states on this matter and they, like ourselves, are concerned by the worsening of the situation."

These concerns are quite late in coming: the UN troops risk arriving like Offenbach's carabineers.

Traversing the 1,500 km separating the Libyan frontier from Ndjamena, 3,000 Arab and African "volunteers," lured and equipped by Tripoli (with jeeps and Land Rovers armed with heavy machine guns, Ural rocket-launching trucks or trucks equipped with Soviet automatic guns, T 54 tank-carrying platforms, and Cascavel or Ferrett armored and automatically firing tanks), have penetrated to the gates of the Chadian capital.

Attacked in a position of retreat, Hisssein Habre, commander of the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), launched a "solemn and urgent appeal to all countries of Africa and the world" to help him combat "Chad's invasion by Libya."

Presided over by Weddeye Goukouni, who sojourned in Tripoli before accompanying Colonel Qadhdhafi on a tour of inspection in northern Chad, the Provisional National Union Government (GUNT) would like to see an end to the rebellion of its former minister of defense, Hisssein Habre. Colonel Kamougue, GUNT's vice president who represents the ethnic groups of the south, explains:

"He must be physically eliminated; otherwise, we shall see him foment new insurrections in Chad."

Ever since the last French troops were withdrawn last May, the country has been split between the Islamic forces of the north and the Christians and

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animists of the south. Their hostility, which stems from the color of their skin, is bound to break out again; but for the time being, in order to eliminate Hissein Habre, the southerners have joined forces with the northerners: 2,500 soldiers of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT), commanded by Colonel Kamougue, were taken to Ndjamena on board Libyan helicopters. His argument:

"France having adopted a neutral position and the Western countries having remained indifferent, the Chadian Government was forced to knock at all doors, even if it had been that of the devil."

Colonel Qadhafi is pursuing a threefold objective:

Faced with increasing internal opposition, principally in Cyrenaica, he hopes to stifle any Libyan dissidents so that they will not dare compromise any far-reaching operation outside the country's borders.

He wants to plant the Islamic flag ever farther toward the south.

He is nourishing the "grand design" of seeing a large portion of Central Africa fall under his thumb.

President Senghor has accused Colonel Qadhafi of wanting "to convert a number of Sudanese-Sahelian black states (Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania) into a confederation under his domination." Thus, reproaching the Niger Government for taunting its Toubou minority (related to the Toubous of the Libyan Fezzan and Tibesti), Colonel Qadhafi incited them to revolt. It should be noted that Niger ranks fourth in the world among countries which produce uranium.

Senegal itself is threatened. In the "plot" which the Senegalese forces were called upon to suppress in Gambia, Leopold Sedar Senghor revealed the hand of Colonel Qadhafi: in order to turn Senegal toward the south, the Libyans were planning to install a Radio-Tripoli relay station in Bathurst.

Moreover, in pillaging Chad, Colonel Qadhafi, who is endeavoring to replace Algeria in its role of supplier of arms to the POLISARIO Front, could convey armaments directly to Western Sahara where a hotbed of conflict could be maintained. The ultimate objective: a "United States of the Sahel."

The Sahelian countries do not agree, but they are virtually incapable of defending themselves. The ball is therefore in the Western camp. But the United States, in a period of transition between a president who is leaving and a president-elect, is leaving the way open. The State Department simply remarked that it "was profoundly concerned" (a term identical to that used by Paris).

As for Egypt, it is supplying Hissein Habre's troops with arms through Sudan. President Senghor journeyed to Cairo carrying a message from Giscard

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d'Estaing. According to certain sources, President Sadat had sought to take advantage of Libya's engagement in Chad to attack Libya. A unique opportunity; but the Americans supposedly dissuaded him from that plan.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FRENCH INTERVENTIONS, POLICY 'AT ORIGIN' OF CHADIAN CHAOS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov-7 Dec 80 pp 15-16

[Article by Antonia Bliss--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text]..should not be forgotten that the main danger lies in France's maneuvering to remain in Chad by whatever means.

Eight months after the outbreak of Ndjama's second civil war, 21 March 1980, the Chadian conflict has just taken on a new dimension. While the /ad hoc/ OAU mission continues with difficulty in its efforts to get the belligerents to accept a ceasefire, fighting has widened and intensified. And if, up to mid-November, one could not yet be absolutely certain of the scope and nature, Libya's commitment to the side of the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) headed by Goukouni Oueddei left no doubt. We know, moreover, that the GUNT leader has said on several occasions that he would call on Chad's friends in case of necessity. And on 15 June a treaty of friendship was ratified between Tripoli and Ndjama. In this document--which has not received any publicity--the two sides are supposedly committed to exchange of information in the military domain, both that respecting internal and that respecting external security, and to give each other the necessary support in case one or the other of the sides is confronted with a direct or indirect danger.

To strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the economic, political, and military domains; to struggle against colonialism under any of its forms and to repel any foreign aggression: such are the aims apparently envisaged in this accord.

Up to mid-November, the leaders of the GUNT observed great discretion with respect to Libya's actual commitment on the ground. The most spectacular signs of this enhanced aid from Tripoli to the governmental coalition were given, we know, in the bombardments inflicted on the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) positions of Hissene Habre, both in Ndjama and in the northern part of the country, starting 9 October.

However, on 13 November, in a communique published in Paris, Ahmat Acyl, minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation in the GUNT, stated that the Transitional National Union Government /"reserves the right to call upon all its friends who may be able to help it. Libyans and Chadians,"/ he added, /"are united by [ties of] blood, history, geography, and culture, and they constitute a single people."/

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For his part, Col Wadal Abdel-kader Kamougue, vice-president of the GUNT and leader of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) also went to Paris on 7 November to meet with the French minister of cooperation, Robert Galley, and said, in response to a question on the Libyan military presence in Chad: /"We are a government faced with a rebellion. We had to find help to regain control of the situation."/

In any case, it was learned that the president of the GUNT, Goukouni Oueddei, had just made, from 2-5 November, a visit to Libya at the head of an important delegation, and had held with Col Qadhafi a series of talks bearing on /"relations between the two fraternal peoples of Chad and Libya as well as on the situation in Chad."/ On 4 November, the Libyan chief of state went, accompanied by the GUNT president, to Faya-Largeau, principal town of the northern region of Chad, to make what the Libyan press agency Jana called /"an inspection visit to the quarters of the city recently liberated by the GUNT forces."/ Col Qadhafi also went into one of the military barracks of the city, where he was welcomed by the chief of staff of the GUNT forces, Adam Togoy. /"With the liberation of Faya-Largeau,"/ commented the Jana agency, /"the governmental forces achieved a decisive victory over the mercenary forces of the rebel Hissene Habre."/

At that time the leaders of the GUNT were expressing a great deal of optimism as to the outcome of the fighting which, according to Col Kamougue, may have resulted in between 5,000 and 6,000 deaths, at a minimum, since last March. In the course of a press conference held in the Libyan town of Sibha on 5 November, Goukouni Oueddei stated that /"the situation (should) soon be resolved completely in a military sense, in favor of the legal government."/ Several days later, Col Kamougue for his part predicted, during his second trip to Paris, that /"the armed conflict in Chad (would) end quite soon. Within about 10 days,"/ he said, /"the situation will change, the balance of forces being such that Hissene Habre will be unable to do anything more."/

Making much of /"the uninterrupted and unlimited assistance furnished by the Libyan Jamahiriya to FROLINAT,"/ the president of the GUNT stated, in the Sebha press conference, that this lawful assistance, supplied in implementation of the resolutions of the last African summit in Freetown, /"consisted of food products, medicines, and in the presence on the ground of military advisers."/ Goukouni Oueddei also denounced again the aid given to the Northern Armed Forces of Hissene Habre by reactionary forces, and especially by Egypt, whose airplanes coming from Sudan land at Abeche (east of the country) loaded with material destined for the FAN. According to the GUNT, Cairo and Khartoum supplied military experts to the FAN forces, and Egypt allegedly installed diplomatic representation equipped with telecommunications equipment in Abeche.

It goes without saying that the differences which divide the Chadian belligerents seem today more intractable than ever. If, for Goukouni Oueddei and Ahmat Acyl, the alliance with Libya is a vital necessity for Chad's survival and future, then by contrast for Hissene Habre's FAN everything goes to prove that Tripoli constitutes the principal threat.

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The Northern Armed Forces were constituted after the nomination, under France's auspices, of Hissene Habre to the post of prime minister in August 1978, in the Malloum government--the old Toubou rebel at that time had only a handful of men--and FAN claims to have benefited from the dynamics of the war, first of all from the civil war in Ndjamena in February 1979, and then more especially from the one which broke out last March; for, in recent months, Habre's troops are believed to have grown tremendously in number. Claiming themselves ready to seek support from anywhere--even from Israel if necessary--the spokesmen for FAN say that they will continue their "patriotic" fight through any means available, in order to preserve the integrity and the sovereignty of Chad. According to them, the Libyan intervention could have repercussions all the way to the south of the country, where the population, which is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the military-administrative measures and structures put in place by the Kamouguists, could rally behind the FAN.

It must be said that the arguments and propaganda of the FAN are finding fertile soil not only in the West, but also in Africa, where the Libyan involvement in Chad has aroused, especially in the francophone capitals linked to Paris, an outcry of protest such as war never provoked by the repeated French interventions in Chad or elsewhere.

While transiting France, the Senegalese president, whose country broke diplomatic relations with Libya last June, suggested the convocation of a special conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the OAU. Describing the situation as /"grave"/, he stated that /"Libya is training an army of 5,000 in order to create confusion in Chad, in Niger, in Mali, and in Senegal, to promote the creation of a Republic of the Sahara to be put under the control of Colonel Qadhafi."/

Not so long ago it was the Cuban specter which was raised whenever one wanted to obfuscate a problem and avoid the necessity of pointing the finger at the real destabilizers of the continent. For some time now, the scapegoat has been Libya and the fine hand of Libya is searched for everywhere as soon as discontent and problems break out in an African country. In such circumstances several states, including Gambia, Gabon, and Central Africa, have also broken with Tripoli.

No Illusions

If this new diversion can only be satisfying to Paris, it is no less true that Libyan diplomacy, as it has shown itself to date, lends itself ready to harsh and not easily dismissed suspicions of Tripoli and scarcely promotes its popularity south of the Sahara.

Also in Africa we have seen the urgent appeal for peace in Chad launched by presidents Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, and Seyni Kountche of Niger, who, in a joint public communique published on 12 November at Maroua (Cameroon), denounced /"the foreign interference which stirs up factions and contributes to prolonging the increasingly murderous fighting."/ Egypt, as one could have expected, denounced /"Libyan intervention"/ and urged the OAU to put an end to it.

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In the West, finally, it was the United States (an American company holds the monopoly on oil prospecting in Chad) which reacted first, on 7 November, by declaring itself /"deeply concerned by the Libyan armed intervention."/

In Paris, by contrast, where the prevailing attitude seems to be to let things go on by themselves for a while before pulling the chestnuts out of the fire, the tone is more moderate.

From this point on, at least if one believes the leaders of the GUNT, everything could unfold much more rapidly. On 14 November, there was a great commotion over the near total encirclement of Ndjamea, which up to that point was three-fourths under the control of the FAN of Hissene Habre, by forces of the governmental coalition, including Col Kamougue's FAT which, after being withdrawn from the south, following the murderous fighting of June and July, took up new positions near the Chagoua bridge. In the interior, the eastern road, by which the FAN was supplied, is supposed to have been cut.

It remains no less true that the ultimate outcome of the Chadian tragedy is still uncertain. Above all because the danger of internationalization of the fighting has grown. France's apparent neutrality should fool no one. France is in effect present in the south through its economic and diplomatic agents stationed at the consulate in Moundou; it is also present militarily on the southern borders of Chad: on the Central African base of Bouar, commanded by Colonel Forest, former head of the French intervention force in Chad, and also in a less concrete manner but no less systematically, at Cameroon border crossings where French military elements are patrolling.

In fact, and this is the main point, the Libyan involvement must not in any case make one forget that the main danger lies in the maneuvering of Paris and in its determination to remain present in Chad by whatever means.

In the extremely confused skein of the Chadian imbroglio it appears, from the evidence, that it is foreign interference--France's repeated military interventions and the policy of division which it has followed unceasingly since the independence of the country, in the first place, but also the pressure exerted by some of Chad's neighbors--which is basically at the origin of the situation of murderous chaos in which the country is plunged.

If it is urgent to break through the present impasse, it is still difficult to see how Chad could survive this long and bloody fratricidal tragedy without a settlement decided upon and imposed, ultimately, by the Chadians themselves.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHAD LEADER INTERVIEWED ON TIES WITH LIBYA, FRANCE

LD311143 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 2 Jan 81 p 41

[Interview with Chad President Goukouni Oueddei by Patrick Forestier in Ndjamena: "With the Libyans to the Death"--date not given]

[Text] Patrick Forestier: What will your relations with the French Government be like in future?

Goukouni Oueddei: I am not displeased with the French Government. Before the conflict broke out I thought that the French forces were going to form an alliance with the Northern Armed Forces [FAN]. A few days after hostilities started I noted that the French forces had not been involved with Hissein Habre in this conflict either directly or indirectly. However, we still have cultural cooperation ties with France.

Patrick Forestier: What is Libya's precise role in Chad today?

Goukouni Oueddei: First, Libya has supported the Chadian National Liberation Front since 1969. Since that date it has always given material and moral aid to the Chadian people. The Chadian people and the Libyan people are tied by blood and geographical position and will fight together to the death.

Patrick Forestier: Does your country's interest now lie with the Libyans?

Goukouni Oueddei: My country's interest requires that I maintain good relations with Libya. Otherwise, it would be in danger. All countries, including several African countries are mobilizing against Chad on the pretext that Libya is supporting the National Unity Transition Government [GUNT]. Why? From 1966 until our arrival here, the Tombalbaye government received material and manpower aid from France and other countries. So did Malloum. Why should we not? Why not? We govern a country.

Patrick Forestier: How do you intend to reconcile the cooperation you want with France and with Libya, your preferred ally?

Goukouni Oueddei: Are there not French technicians in Libya? Libya buys Mirage aircraft. France trains Libyan technicians. So why could we not maintain relations with both France and Libya? We are entitled to do so.

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Patrick Forestier: Are you aware of the reaction which the situation in Chad is prompting in the United States and among the big Western powers?

Goukouni Oueddei: The United States and the other powers are not aware of our determination. If the United States or other countries are unaware of the situation they only have to send diplomatic missions to find our own view and our political opinion.

Patrick Forestier: I think that they are, above all, very worried about the Libyan penetration in Africa.

Goukouni Oueddei: When the Gambian president had an internal problem, Senghor sent in his soldiers. Did anybody then mobilize to talk about a Senegalese thrust in Gambia? Nobody said a word. When Tanzania sent troops into Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin Dada, did the world make a fuss? I am entitled to appeal to Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger or anybody prepared to come to our aid and put down the rebellion.

Patrick Forestier: Can you give more details about the materials and manpower placed at your disposal by Libya.

Goukouni Oueddei: I will never tell you. You can write that there are 200 or 200,000 tanks. Say what you like, it makes no difference. Say anything which comes into your head. Do what you like. The main thing is that we know what we are receiving from Libya. We are completely happy. It was in full knowledge of the facts that we appealed to Libya.

Patrick Forestier: Did Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi ask you for anything in exchange, for instance relating to the uranium mines?

Goukouni Oueddei: Libya is rich enough not to ask us for anything in return. It is for us to ask for the necessary means to rebuild our country, which has been completely destroyed. We must hold out our hand to Libya and any country willing to come to our aid.

Now is the time to rebuild this country which is destroyed and shattered after 14 years of war. Therefore, any aid coming from another country does not mean that anything has been given in return.

Patrick Forestier: What did you say in the message which you sent to Mr Giscard d'Estaing after your victory?

Goukouni Oueddei: There was an explanation by the French Government justifying its intervention in Chad in favor of the rebels. After discussing that explanation, we summoned the charge d'affaires to explain our displeasure. We gave him a letter whose contents will possibly be communicated to you by the recipient. It is not for me to inform you of it before the letter is handed to your president.

Patrick Forestier: Was the letter intended to reassure him?

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Goukouni Oueddei: It is not for me to answer your question.

Patrick Forestier: Are you planning to organize a parade to celebrate your victory?

Goukouni Oueddei: No, indeed my first concern is to restore order in Ndjamena and dress our wounds. Later perhaps we might be able to talk about a parade or a people's rally to celebrate our victory.

Patrick Forestier: Do you need aid in the sanitation and medical spheres?

Goukouni Oueddei: We need such help badly. We are living amid ruins.

Patrick Forestier: Will you ask for aid from France? If so, what kind of aid?

Goukouni Oueddei: Yes, but I will not ask France to give us military aid. We are entitled to ask it for help in the medical, food, technical and cultural spheres.

Patrick Forestier: Would you have been surprised by a French military intervention, or did you never really believe that such a thing would occur?

Goukouni Oueddei: I never thought that Giscard's government, which had observed a completely neutral stance for 9 months, would decide to intervene to help a dying rebellion.

Patrick Forestier: Did you have assurances from France, or is that your personal impression?

Goukouni Oueddei: It is an entirely personal impression. I never received any assurances; however, I know that in its correspondence President Giscard's government vigorously confirms our legitimacy.

Patrick Forestier: Nonetheless, the French Government is showing its anxiety?

Goukouni Oueddei: We are a government, a state. It should ask us.... It should send a delegation to tell us, to confirm that we have military agreements: "If you are in difficulty, tell us. Otherwise, do not ask for aid from another country." The French Government should put the problem to us in specific terms instead of beating about the bush, as it has.

Patrick Forestier: I have met officials who were displeased with the aid which France apparently gave to Hissein Habre. Have you any proof of French military aid to the FAN?

Goukouni Oueddei: I attach no importance to that type of speculation. To tell the truth, I never thought that France would help Hissein either militarily or materially. The question which still has to be answered is why France placed a press service, a news service at Hissein's disposal....

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I also wonder for whose benefit France is trying to stir up a number of countries against Chad. I wonder why France is prompting some disgraced ministers or former politicians from Chad to make inappropriate remarks here....

After the stance taken by the French Government, I could say that France, if it did not supply arms [directly] to Hissein, did help him either on the financial plane or by means of the weapons which Hissein is receiving from Egypt and for which France is paying. In the final analysis France, which is an ancient and intelligent nation, should not take the risk of indulging in such maneuvers.

It is not worthy of France and its past, or of its intelligence with regard to the present and the future.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MULTIPARTY STATES OF AFRICA EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 p 19

[Article in the form of an answer by Patrick David to the question asked by Amadou Konate of Man, Ivory Coast: Which Countries of Africa Allow Party Pluralism?"]

[Text] A magazine like JEUNE AFRIQUE is duty bound to be useful to its readers and to play an educator's role. Therefore, each week in this space from now on we will answer questions of general interest which you put to us.

The proliferation of political parties and liberation movements--most of the time clandestine - which orchestrate nationalist activity during colonial times has most often, once independence has been obtained, led into the strictest monolithic style of politics. In this connection the figures are instructive: out of the 50 member states of the OAU, 37 have adopted the single-party system or have suppressed any kind of political party formation pure and simple. The reasons put forward by leaders are varied.

Some have chosen the path of Marxism-Leninism and therefore they stick to the dogma of the single party. By dominating the machinery of government it holds a monopoly on truth and action. One class is worthy of interest, that of the "workers"; one party is legitimate, the one supposed to be responsible for their aspirations and to be their spokesman.

Inconceivable

In these conditions any pluralist solution is inconceivable and electoral consultation useless. This is the argument championed by Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique. In Ethiopia the military junta has not yet succeeded in setting up its revolutionary party.

Some other single-party countries belong to "moderate" Africa, even though several display support for some form of socialism. For them pluralist democracy is a luxury. It must be sacrificed to achieve more pressing objectives: economic development, and the primacy of national solidarity over ethnic solidarity. The governments want to be able on the economic level as on the political level to act without

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any constraint: they do not tolerate opposition and do not accept debate, both of which are interpreted as being sources of division and of losing time. About 30 states are in this situation. This is perhaps no longer the case for Ivory Coast which is attempting an experiment of "leader-led democracy."

Authorized

Whether they are Marxist or not, whether they are governed by military men or by civilians, these states maintain the idea of a "unanimous" society grouped together behind its leader. Private political groupings are invited to dissolve themselves and be integrated into the sole party, which is held out as the expression of a unity which is proclaimed and set out by decree. Whatever the justifications given for the single-party system, it represents a particularly effective technique for governing without sharing power and at the same time for holding on to power.

However, there is a minority of countries which accept and operate within the multi-party system: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Morocco, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. It is true that the dominant parties generally have an overwhelming majority in Parliament. With the exception of Morocco, these countries are imbued with British parliamentarianism.

Limited

Some other more cautious countries accept the idea of "limited multiparty government." This is the case of Upper Volta, Senegal and Lesotho, which nonetheless put together the ingredients for open political activity. In other cases, such as Egypt, limited multiparty government is a mere surface democracy.

There remains Madagascar, a country claiming to draw on Marxism-Leninism, where certain parties are authorized but they are contained within a Front which is in power.

Certain people have been wont to see in this movement from single party to limited multiparty government a progression towards democracy, a moderating path. However, there is cause to be wary, for such a multiparty system can deviate in practice towards something little different from a single party.

Finally, in Chad 11 factions are tearing each other to pieces, and in Uganda legislative elections are supposed to be held in 1981 with several parties in attendance. But the current situation hardly gives one any room for illusions.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OFFICIAL DISCUSSES WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp 10-11

[Interview with CEAO Secretary General Moussa Ngom, date and place not given]

[Text] The success of a regional community certainly depends on the will of the chiefs of state who created it and the determination of the peoples it comprises. But it also depends on those who work therein daily, such as the secretary general, Moussa Ngom, who has just been reappointed to his post for 4 years.

[Question] Mr Secretary General, are you satisfied with the way the conference of chiefs of state developed?

Moussa Ngom: Certainly, for at a time when there might have been doubts about the community, the chiefs of state decided to continue along the path we have set for ourselves to achieve the economic integration of our countries. "The effort undertaken will be continued" President Leopold Sedar Senghor stated. It might be noted moreover that this desire for solidarity which to date has been only a concept, an intention, has become a reality. The impact of customs cooperation on intra-community trade is an example. Such trade increased by 241 percent between 1976 and 1979. And this was thanks to the arsenal of tools and technical and institutional mechanisms established since 1976. For example customs declarations and certificates of origin were standardized, as were the main customs systems. Moreover, crop, fishing and livestock products circulate freely without hindrance, as do craft products, which have just been coordinated with this regime. Finally, approved industrial products benefit from privileged tax treatment--the regional cooperation tax. And it is our firm hope that a true community can be achieved soon, by 1 January 1986. On that date, customs duties should have disappeared within the CEAO and a joint foreign rate should have been established. I should add that my satisfaction is not purely formal. I am happy that the confidence of the chiefs of state of CEAO countries was evidenced in Niamey, the capital of a country which symbolizes African simplicity, tenacity and dignity, and which sets an example of courage and firmness in the search for just solutions to the inequities of the economic system in the modern world.

[Question] Free trade has its limits. For example, Mali and Senegal had to reach mutual agreement on contingents in the textile sector this year.

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Moussa Ngom: In certain very sensitive sectors, in fact, there are protectionist reflexes here and there. Recently bilateral agreements have resolved the majority of disputes. But we do not want to come back to the basic principles of the CEAO with one arrangement after another. Even within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) there are agreements of this type. This state of affairs is the result above all of the disparities in development policies. These arrangements can thus be explained but not justified. In Niamey it was agreed to retain 1 January 1986 as the date for the total elimination of customs barriers within the community, despite a delay of two years.

[Question] But aren't some of the products which benefit from the regional co-operation tax (TCR) products imported from Europe, the local added value of which is small?

Moussa Ngom: Without question it is necessary to refine the TCR system, which along with the Community Development Fund (FCD) constitutes the foundation of our structure. It is urgent that we draft discriminatory measures reserving the various preferential facilities the community offers for community enterprises alone, solely for the products of strategic value to our economies.

[Question] Are the member nations of the CEAO entirely up to date in their commitments with regard to the Community Development Fund?

Moussa Ngom: For two years, the economic situation has been the reason that certain nations have not met their obligations. Our treasury cannot tolerate this situation for long. But let us note the warning voiced by President Seyni Kountche himself at the closing session of the conference of chiefs of state: "We cannot overlook the negligence of our financial officers whenever it becomes a question of honoring our commitments." For our part, we find ourselves forced to limit compensatory payments in favor of states which do not pay up their back debts.

[Question] Stress has been placed in the austerity of the budget of the secretariat general.

Moussa Ngom: This budget is consistent with the demands of the situation in each nation, as well as our real needs as we have been able to establish them in the past three years. It is certainly very austere (the 1981 operational budget comes to 878 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs, in other words slightly less than that for 1980, while at the same time the FCD estimates come to 6.76 billion CFA francs), but we want to show by this that we are ready to accommodate the realities of the national administrations. This budget was impressive and doubtless the source of the praise we have received.

[Question] What development actions are accorded priority?

Moussa Ngom: Water remains the top priority and the village and pastoral water resources program will thus mobilize a major part of our efforts. But we have many other ambitions. We are working on a program with the CILSS and FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] aid to establish food stocks, as well as on problems of farm mechanization and seed selection. In brief, it is a matter of attacking first of all the main farm production factors: water, fertilizer, seed and machine tools. Moreover, four sectors are the focus of our attention in the realm of economic

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cooperation: transportation (we have drafted plans for a maritime transportation company and a truck factory); the development of tourism, as well as pharmaceutical supplies of modern and traditional medicines; and finally fishing, with the establishment of a pilot fish farm at Bouake, in the Ivory Coast.

But if we know that almost 50 percent of the population of our subregion is rural, we also know that 90 percent of our income comes from the cities. This is why we are working with the UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] to perfect an industrial program on a community scale, involving on a priority basis the processing of raw materials and farm products. We envisage not only small national units, but also regional centers which would be open to adjacent countries, in particular in the realm of applied research and training. In fact, the CEAO action should seek on the one hand to meet the needs which are common to all the nations but which cannot be achieved by a single nation alone, and on the other hand, to coordinate, indeed redirect, the actions which are undertaken simultaneously in several nations at the same time. Finally, we must not forget information and the perfecting of our cadres, which will be guaranteed in part thanks to our community institutions for the technical training of cadres and directors in the mining, textile, fishing and management sectors.

[Question] What relations do you maintain with other regional organizations?

Moussa Ngom: With some of them we have excellent relations. This is the case with the Inter-State Committee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), the West African Development Bank (WADB), and the Council of the Entente, with which we are pursuing telecommunications and transportation projects and the village and pastoral water resources program, at its origins. We have frequent contacts with the Mano River Union, which brings together countries as varied as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. The Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) has aided us in the drafting of an agreement pertaining to the free circulation of capital and payment facilities.

Obviously, we maintain relations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Our trade exchange goal goes beyond the geoeconomic area of our six member nations, which are all adjacent to other nonmember nations. Whether it be a question of the ECOWAS or the future African common market, we are prepared to serve as a laboratory for all of the mechanisms, all of the taxation procedures, for the transportation and customs handling of goods, to provide useful experience, to show the stages to completed, the concepts to be applied, the success which is possible, on condition that we are not asked to sacrifice our palpable gains for distant and "historical" objectives!

Finally, a list of all of the international bodies with which we have established relations would be too long--the OAU, the ADB [African Development Bank], the United Nations organizations (ECA [Economic Commission for Africa], UNDP [United Nations Development Program], UNCTAD, UNESCO), the Arab cooperation institutions (BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development], Islamic Development Bank, Arab League, Arab funds), not to overlook our partners at the source, the EEC and its member nations, basically France and the FRG.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN OCEAN EXAMINED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov 80 p 25

[Text] Squeezed by the progressive opposition in his country, subject to the pressure of the OAU, the prime minister of Mauritius has just made a 90-degree turn in his foreign policy. In October, at the plenary meeting of the United Nations, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam astonished the world by taking a very firm position with respect to Washington and London on the subject of the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean. He officially demanded the complete retrocession of the Chagos archipelago (of which Diego Garcia is a part) to the isle of Mauritius, its legal owner under international law. He contested the juridical existence of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and demanded its dissolution.

Since then, the prime minister has held talks with Edmund Muskie and members of the British government. Promises--but what?--are supposed to have been made by the Americans, whereas the British seem hesitant. In India, at the beginning of November, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam obtained the support of Mrs Gandhi and did not hesitate to describe the London government as neo-colonialist and imperialist. While he was at it, he accused the imperialists of wanting ceaselessly to appropriate new colonies. One will recall, however, that the same Ramgoolam asserted, barely 2 months before, that "the English were in their own home on Diego Garcia"!

The opposition, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) for its part does not believe in the miracle: this maneuver could well be a smokescreen for a plan to regularize the American presence in Diego Garcia. In fact, the atoll could be retroceded legally to Mauritius, then a site leased out for the base immediately following. This legal legerdemain would put an end to the objurgations of the OAU, the isle of Mauritius being free to "lease" a parcel of its own territory to whomever it pleases. Bravo!

While these shady dealings take place, a meeting between Le Pen (extreme-right candidate for the presidency of the French Republic) and Gaetan Duval (leader of the Mauritian Social Democrat Party, reactionary and member of the Mauritian governmental coalition) may have occurred during Le Pen's trip to Reunion and Mauritius. The newspaper of the Reunion Communist Party (PCR), TEMOIGNAGES, and the Port-Louis journal LE MAURICIEN report in this connection a statement by a Reunion advocate, Mr Alix Morel. In a press conference on 25 October Mr Morel (who describes himself as representing Le Pen in Reunion) stated that the two men, Duval and Le Pen, could organize an anti-communist front directed against the MMM in the Indian Ocean. This would find its actualization starting with the independence of the isle of Rodrigues, detached from Mauritian territory.

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It is known that, for some time, Gaetan Duval has been brandishing the threat that Rodrigues would secede if the MMM should win the general elections in December 1981-January 1982.

No one believes that Le Pen has the slightest chance of being elected in France, but everyone guesses what lobby is acting through him in the Indian Ocean. The fact that the Mauritian government lets Duval act and does not bar his access to the territory of Rodrigues is moreover a scandal pregnant with meaning. That it authorizes a meeting between Le Pen and Duval in Mauritius in such an avowedly secessionist context is incomprehensible. Or, perhaps, all too understandable...

In any case, the [game of] musical islands continues in the Indian Ocean. So many possible bases coveted by you know who...

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SIMON MALLEY EDITORIAL ON REAGAN VICTORY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov 80 pp 6-7

[Editorial "The Prey of the Hawks"--passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] Any activity that could politically, militarily and economically destabilize the progressive African, Ara, Asiatic and South American regimes--by means of mercenaries, saboteurs or puppet organizations such as UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the FNLA [Angolan National Liberation Front] in Angola, the MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] and the FR [expansion unknown] in Mozambique--will be encouraged. The nuclear potential of South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, and, conceivably, Morocco and Egypt, will be developed. All means will be employed to bar access to nuclear power to any Arab country labelled "progressive."

All steps and efforts will be taken to establish, in the short and medium term, a "discreet" Cairo-Riyadh-Tel Aviv axis--which Tehran, perchance, might rejoin if the present regime fell back into America's lap--an axis whose objectives would be fixed in a framework conforming to the vital strategic interests of Washington. It will be necessary, through diverse means, to foment a military conflict--limited in duration and geographic scope--between Damascus and Tel Aviv, in such a way that an overturning of the internal Syrian situation facilitates the coming to power of a regime similar that that in Cairo and ready to negotiate a Camp David II. Strong pressure will be put on Jordan and Saudi Arabia for the former to return to its demand for the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967--despite the Rabat accords--and for the latter (Saudi Arabia) to support that position. Morocco's defense and offensive armament will be strengthened, with the prospect of a gradual substitution of Washington for Paris in the Maghreb countries where the latter still plays a preponderant role. The accession of Namibia to a sort of "independence" will be assured: but in the framework of a close association with the racist regime of Pretoria, which must remain the main power of southern Africa and oblige Cuba to withdraw from Angola, making it all the more vulnerable to the blackmail of Pretoria. The American intervention fleet in the Sea of Oman, in the Indian Ocean, and in the Mediterranean will be enhanced in order to "hold back" the Soviet Union. Border incidents between People's China and the Soviet Union will increase and the renewal of war between Hanoi and Beijing will be hastened. The "side-effects" of Ostpolitik will be eliminated and thwarted; perhaps the SALT II accords will be buried forever, and an effort will be made to confuse them with SALT III.

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Bizarre? Inconceivable? Unrealistic in the present international conjuncture, taking into account the balance of power in the world? Doubtless. But all the same, such are the broad lines of the policy which, for several months--and especially since the nomination of Reagan as a presidential candidate by the Republican convention--dozens of political, military and economic advisers, experts from the special "private" services, have patiently refined in connection with the race to the White House, which came to an end on 4 November. If it turned out to be feasible--even "step by step"--this policy would open up one of the darkest pages in the international policy of the United States since the end of World War II. It assumes, in reality, both considerable increases in the war budget of the Pentagon, and close though problematic coordination of moves between Washington and its principal friends and allies in Europe, Asia, the Arab world, Africa and Latin America.

But Ronald Reagan should stop and think before going too fast and too far. The history, for more than 30 years, of the defeats and disappointments suffered by his country should remind him that the balance of power in the world has changed; that Washington is no longer the only nuclear power; that the people's forces in the Third World, not to speak of those in the West, will not permit him to lead his country back to the good old days of the imperialist conquests of the Nineteenth Century and the beginning of the Twentieth; that the oppressed peoples have--and can have recourse to--objective allies who know that their own vital interests depend in large measure on those of the Third World; that peace today is indivisible, even if most of the wars, if not all those we have known since the end of World War II, have taken place principally on our own territories, in our own countries.

Jimmy Carter did not understand the essential needs of the American people, traumatized by the death of thousands of compatriots in Indochina and by the humiliating defeat of the formidable military power of the United States by a people whose primary weaponry consisted of conviction and the determination to defeat the aggressor; he suffered the backlash and was the first Democratic president since Grover Cleveland--in 1888--and the tenth president in the history of the United States to not be reelected for a second term as provided for in the Constitution of the United States.

He wanted to manipulate, to fool the electorate by accepting, for example, on the eve of the elections, the conditions imposed--six months earlier--by Tehran for the freeing of the hostages, and by fostering the belief that their liberation was imminent; nevertheless, he was rejected by the Southerners, even though, for the first time in more than two centuries, he was their own elected candidate.

He failed to control inflation, or reduce unemployment, or improve the continually declining standard of living of his compatriots, or put forward serious thoughts about the future; Georgia, his native land, was the only state of the "Deep South" that he carried. He threw East-West detente into jeopardy by paralyzing SALT II; he manifested gross contradictions in the implementation of his famous "human rights"--on the one hand supporting the bloody repression of the Shah of Iran, and the detention of thousands of political prisoners in Latin America, Asia, Africa and elsewhere, and by contrast criticizing the policy of countries whose regime did not happen to please him: his credibility, the confidence that he wanted to get from his people had been seriously compromised among the liberal intelligentsia, [many of whom] preferred either to abstain or to vote for a marginal candidate who had no chance to win.

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He did nothing to force the fascist South African regime to modify its policy; he continued to let it develop its nuclear weapons; he ignored too the legitimate socio-economic demands of the black Americans, failing also to take into account their rights to equitable legislative representation in accordance with the Constitution; he shamelessly disavowed the first black ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, thereby yielding to the pressure of the anti-black, pro-South African and pro-Israeli lobby, which ultimately eliminated him; Jimmy Carter lost the majority in the traditionally Democratic states, like New York, [where voters] preferred to abstain or to vote for Ronald Reagan.

A man of 70 years of age, ultra-conservative, thus arrives at the White House with, for the first time since the Eisenhower Administration of the Fifties, a Republican majority in the Senate and, for the first time since 1966, a House of Representatives that also has a Republican majority [sic]. Many spokesmen for the liberal and in some respects progressive--wing were likewise brought down in the fall of their president; senators like McGovern, Church, Bayh, Magnuson, Culver, etc.

The fate of Carter was definitively sealed when, just a few days from the election, Reagan, in a televised broadcast, posed the question: /"Americans, ask yourselves for a moment if today you are happier than when Carter took office in 1977..." / The biting response came back from the ballot-boxes: out of 538 electoral votes, Reagan got a total of 489, and Carter only 49. The 40th president of the United States, who is to go into the White House on 20 January, inflicted on the Democratic Party one of its most serious defeats since 1932 [sic], this party which has held the reins of power during 32 of the 48 years that have elapsed since the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

How could the American people, in fact, answer "yes" to the skillful question Reagan posed? /"This is exactly what scared us so much," / commented one of Carter's collaborators subsequently. /"When he posed that question, we knew it was all over for us..." / How could Americans, from the poorest to the wealthiest, pretend to be satisfied with the dismal record of the 4 years of the Carter Administration? Galloping inflation reaching 14 percent per year; interest rates topping 18 percent; millions of jobless; no serious prospects for improvement of the quality of life of the average citizen; a policy that was impulsive, contradictory, ambivalent and confused on the international level; "cool" war with the USSR and its allies; a neglected and hostile Europe, whose contempt for Carter wrestled with profound distrust; an Arab World almost unanimously hostile to the Camp David accords; Africa where one listened to and supported those regimes that were neo-colonial and close to the racist South Africans more than those that enjoyed popular support; Asia, where the bizarre decision, inspired by Brzezinski, to support China against the Soviet Union could not fail to produce both anxiety and a hardening in the Kremlin; Latin America, where, on the one hand, no effort was spared to impede the advent of the revolution in Nicaragua and where, on the other hand, the bloody repression of El Salvador is countenanced and the conspiracy against the progressive regime of Michael Manley of Jamaica is openly financed.

From the protection of the Shah's regime and SAVAK to the hostage affair in Tehran and the American commando attack at Tanriz; from the coup fomented by the American secret services in Turkey to the vain attempt to impose mandatory sanctions against the USSR because of Afghanistan; from the refusal to impose sanctions against Israel for the annexation of Jerusalem to the casual stance adopted with respect

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to Zimbabwe--whose president, Robert Mugabe, received only a token \$25 million, while a billion had been promised him; from military aid to Morocco, despite formal assurances by Carter to Algiers, to the recent decision of the Senate to authorize the CIA to finance new subversive operations against Angola; from the deployment of American force in the Gulf with a view to the application of the "Carter doctrine" against the independence and sovereignty of the region to the installation of a series of aero-naval bases across the length of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Sea of Oman: everything fits.

The Carter policy was nothing but a succession of threats and blackmail [directed] against the socialist camp and especially the Third World. Will Carter's successor in the White House understand the lesson that the American people have just inflicted on Carter? It is difficult, very difficult, to believe so in light of what is known of the deep convictions and the statements of Ronald Reagan and the advisors that surround him. Certainly, scenarios can be modified; positions can be nuanced; the players, replaced. What will remain is the [enduring] nature of American imperialism.

As long as the peoples of the Third World do not succeed, through united coordinated action, in resisting the designs--whether avowed or not--of their oppressors, in frustrating the real or potential schemes of the aggressors and their allies; as long as they do not use their real economic, financial, strategic and political power to demand the place that is rightfully theirs in the international scene; as long as they do not realize that nothing fundamental can change in American policy, that it's Tweedledum and Tweedledee, they will be the easy prey of the "hawks" who are building their nests in the White House.

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AL-QADHDHAFI AGAINST BARRE--Al-Qadhdhafi wishes to destabilize the regime of Siad Barre in Somalia. He has offered military and financial support to certain leaders of tribes in the Sosaf known for their autonomist tendencies. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 38]

GUINEA-BISSAU-CAPE VERDE TRANSPORTATION--Guinea-Bissau's State Commissioner for Transportation Manuel Santos arrived in Praia on 6 December to discuss questions related to transportation between his country and Cape Verde. The two countries run a joint maritime transports company. Manuel Santos was supposed to be received by Aristides Pereira, president of the Republic of Cape Verde and meet with Herculano Vieira, Cape Verdian minister of transportation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472]

FORTHCOMING BENGUELA RAILROAD CONFERENCE--Zambian Minister of Energy, Transportation and communications Lufoma announced on 5 December that the Zambian, Angolan and Zairian ministers of transportation will meet in mid-January in Livingstone, Zambia, to discuss the reopening of the Angolan Benguela railroad. This railroad, built especially to provide an outlet for Zambia and Zaire, has been closed to international traffic since 1975 following the damage caused by UNITA guerrillas. The railroad could expedite shipments of Zambian and Zairian copper to the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean. However, all previous attempts at reopening the railroad have failed because of the insecurity created by the guerrilla war in the eastern part of Angola. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3427]

LIBYAN AIRSTRIP IN CHAD--For the last few days Libyan troops have had access to an airstrip in the Dougoula area, 70 km from Ndjamena, suitable for large planes. The terrain had been prepared by a French parachutist unit in September 1979, a few months before the total withdrawal of the French troops from Chad. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Dec 80 p 21] 8568

UPPER VOLTAN 'QADHDHAFI'--This is what we may suppose from the past of the new Ouagadougou leader, Col Saye Zerbo, classified for a long time in African dossiers as a progressive. Houphouet-Boigny's entourage is concerned about this aspect: after the destabilization of Chad, Ghana, Liberia, the two Guineas and Upper Volta, Ivory Coast is the only stable point on the West African chessboard. And it employs a million Upper Voltans. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Dec 80 p 21] 8568

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

CAPTURED SOVIET AIRMEN--In a communique that reached Paris on 4 December, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), has confirmed that during the month of November its forces captured two Soviet military belonging to the USSR air force. They are mechanical engineer Ivan Cherniestsky, 46, and pilot Mollaeb Kola, 38. The Antonov-26 aircraft was downed on 23 November in Kuando-Kubango province, 250 kms east of Menongue (formerly Serpa Pinto). According to UNITA, "Soviet involvement in the Angolan theater of operations has become more flagrant and more direct," because, it reports, of the reluctance of "Cuban and East German pilots to participate in combat," given the "efficiency of the anti-aircraft defenses of UNITA, which downed 3 Antonov-23 planes and 5 MI 8 helicopters between 7 and 24 November." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3427]

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

ELECTION STATISTICS--The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bassau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won 92.48 percent of the vote during the 7 December elections. The percentage of voters was 75.01 percent. A total of 88,309 persons voted for the PAIGC and 7,052 against, while 125 ballots were annulled. The total number of registered voters was 126,028, and 95,486 ballots were cast. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FRENCH UNDERTAKE OPERATION TO AID BIRAO

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3168

[Text] The French detachment in the Central African Republic has just taken part in a humanitarian operation in the Birao region, in the northern part of the country, where famine struck, the French minister of defense announced on 21 November. This operation was organized following a request for aid directed to the president of the French Republic by President Dacko.

The mission, which was carried out in two phases (from 10 to 16 October and from 4 to 12 November) was directed from the command post of the French detachment stationed in Bangui. It involved airlifting 96 tons of food to Birao, and then distributing 66 tons to the villages located within a 150-kilometer perimeter. To distribute this aid, 60 members of French parachute units and Ground Forces Tactical Air Support (ALAT) experts used 2 Transall C-160 military aircraft flown in from Libreville to carry the food supplies to Birao, and 2 Puma SA 330 helicopters based in Bangui to distribute aid. The operation required the establishment of a logistic base at an aerodrome 800 kilometers from Bangui which had no infrastructure at all.

The French detachment in the Central African Republic is made up of rotating companies stationed in Bangui and Baraoua. There are currently some 850 men, some of them in the 3rd and 8th Marine Light Infantry Parachute Regiments (RPIMA) and the Toulouse 11th Parachute Division, and some in a mechanized infantry regiment of the Saint-Malo 9th Marine Light Infantry Division, according to the French minister of defense.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

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PATASSE OUT ON BAIL--Ange Patasse, head of the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) and former prime minister under Emperor Bokassa, was released on bail by the Central African authorities because of the deterioration in his health, among other factors. The former prime minister, who was arrested in October 1979, is being prosecuted by the Central African courts on charges of threatening the internal security of the state. A number of observers in the Central African capital believe that the release of Mr Patasse on bail comes within the framework of the measures planned by the chief of state to "relax the political atmosphere." President Dacko did in fact announce "measures benefiting persons currently deprived of freedom for crimes of opinion" during a meeting with public officials on 19 November. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3168] 5157

INCREASING BUDGETARY DEFICIT--The status of public finances in the Central African Republic involves a growing deficit and a budget impasse in the amount of 13 to 14 billion CFA francs. The Central African authorities believe that this situation is not at all temporary. It reflects a structural imbalance and merits a direct explanation to the whole of the nation, the AFP, which carried this report, stressed, noting that the Central African government plans to undertake a series of specific measures pertaining to budget discipline and the modernization of government departments. Let us recall that in presenting the main options of the government which has just been established in Bangui, the new prime minister of the Central African Republic, Mr Jean-Pierre Le Boudier, announced on 18 November that the correction of state finances and the trial of Bokassa and his accomplices, as well as the clarification of the fate of the others arrested, were the government priorities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3168] 5157

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CONGO

BRIEFS

PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING--President Denis Sassou-Nguesso delivered in Brazzaville on 7 November 1980 the opening speech at a meeting of the Central Committee of the PCT [Congolese Labor Party], the single party. In the economic field, the head of state declared, "the conference of state enterprises has drawn up a document containing the conclusions of the nearly 7 months of discussions involving political cadres and technicians, representatives of workers, and for foreign jurisdictions. An important proposal was made. What is involved is the charter on state enterprises. This charter, which will become a public law after its examination and approval by the People's National Assembly, deserves all our attention. After everyone's approval each one will have to abide by that law or be subject to the pertinent sanctions. "We shall concentrate...on program 1981. That will be the occasion to penetrate in more depth this sad reality of the contradiction between our needs and our means to satisfy them considering our nearly complete lack of funds and the existing state of our finances. Program 1981, dubbed a stopgap program by the party's Third Special Congress, prepares the initiation of the 5-year plan that we propose to discuss next year. Once again the people will be consulted to a large extent and a democratic discussion will be mandated. For the time being it should be stated that the 1981 budget prompts us to adopt a rigorous attitude. You will find that our finances are still carefully checked and we shall have to hold on firmly to our present stance." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3040] 2662

RISING INFLATION--According to information published by UNICONGO [Interprofessional Employers Union of the Congo] which draws up twice a year, in April and October, a statement of essential expenditures for a household of one childless European couple, the general price index computed on 109 articles reportedly rose by 14.32 percent between October 1979 and October 1980. For the same period of the preceding year (October 1978 to October 1979), the aggregate increase computed on the same basis was only 10.33 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3040] 2662

FRENCH BANK LOAN--The government of the People's Republic of the Congo recently signed a financing agreement involving 5 billion CFA francs (100 million French francs) with a French banking consortium made up of the International Bank for West Africa (BIAO) and the Financial Company, an affiliate of the Rothschild group. This is an overall agreement allowing the financing of French exports to the Congo in the form of buyers' credit through a loan under advantageous conditions. The Congolese government will subsequently determine the detailed allocation of this overall amount. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3170] 5157

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO FRANCE--From 13 to 17 November 1980 the president of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Lt Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, is paying an official working visit to France. On the evening of President Obiang's arrival in Paris on Thursday, 13 November, Jean Francois-Poncet, French minister of foreign affairs, offered a dinner in his honor at the French Foreign Ministry. The next day, Friday, 14 November, President Obiang was the guest of France's President Valery Giscard d'Estaing for luncheon at the Elysee Palace and was the dinner guest of Robert Galley, French minister of cooperation. The visit of the president of Equatorial Guinea will end in the French provinces. On Saturday, 15 November 1980, President Obiang will visit installations of the BRGM [Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office--France] and will have lunch at the prefecture. On Sunday, 16 November, he will visit a refinery of the CFP [French Petroleum Company] in the environs of Marseilles and, in the afternoon, he will go to Pau and the Lacq gas deposits. He is scheduled to leave France on Monday morning, 17 November 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3039] 2662

FRENCH COOPERATION STRONGER--In October 1979 Robert Galley, French minister of cooperation, paid a visit to Equatorial Guinea, a visit which led on 28 November 1979 to the signing of cooperation agreements between the two countries. Earlier, French aid to Equatorial Guinea, an independent country since 1968 and whose population was estimated to total 300,000 in 1979, was provided through the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had budgeted an amount of 650,000 French francs for 1979. This aid, now under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Cooperation, has been increased (11 million French francs). The new agreements which involve the technical, cultural, and scientific fields concern the reconditioning of the port of Malabo, the initiation of the first stage of mineral prospecting, and the supply of fishing nets and outboard engines to outfit pirogues. Other projects are under study, namely, the improvement of the Malabo and Bata airports, the maintenance of roads, the development of tourism, the construction of a dam on the Rio Ilachi, the improvement of crops (market garden crops, coffee, bananas), and the realization of a pilot farm. Equatorial Guinea would also like to receive assistance for the construction of a hospital in Malabo and evidenced the desire to set up a program of advanced scholarships in medicine, agronomy, engineering, and French philology. Drilling operations have been undertaken off the coast of Equatorial Guinea with the participation of French firms--ELF-Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France-Aquitaine] and CFP [French Petroleum Company]--drillings which have reportedly yielded positive results. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3039] 2662

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MALABO'S ELECTRICAL SYSTEM--Within the framework of Equatorial Guinea's capital equipment program the CEM [Electrical Mechanical Company] was awarded a contract to build the intermediate- and low-tension electric distribution network and the public lighting system of the capital, Malabo. The various sectors of the city will be served with low-tension current by substations fed in 15 kilovolts by a hooked-up network. The CEM's supply system will include the source, namely, the thermal power station, intermediate-tension overhead and underground links, the 19 intermediate-tension and low-tension substations, the low-tension distribution network by overhead and underground lines, and public lighting. This realization, which falls within the diversification policy initiated by the CEM, will be put into service at the end of 1982. The financing of this order is provided by the EDF [European Development Fund]. Let us recall that at the time of the fall of Nguema Masie [Macias], Malabo was the only capital in the world not to have an electric distribution network. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3040] 2652

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

FAD RURAL DEVELOPMENT LOAN--The Agricultural Fund for International Development (FAD) granted Guinea a 12.5 million dollar loan for the development of rural areas in the Siguiri region on the left bank of the Niger River. The agreement was signed in Rome on 10 December. Approximately 6,000 families will be affected by this project aimed at increasing agricultural production. The annual income of these families should increase from \$225 to \$650. In terms of the national economy, this project will foster an increase of 16,000 tons in the production of paddy. The total cost of the project amounts to 26.2 million dollars. Besides the FAD, other contributors are the African Development Fund (8.4 million) and Guinea (5.3 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3473]

TOURE'S VISIT CANCELED--Expected in Paris on 8 December, the Guinean chief of state, Ahmed Sekou Toure, canceled his visit at the last moment. He was supposed to be received by Giscard d'Estaing, in the name of the Islamic Conference, together with King Hassan II (Morocco) and President Zia Ul-Rahman (Bangladesh). Sekou Toure was convinced that security measures for his protection were not adequate in the French capital. Moreover, following Giscard's official visit to Guinea in December 1978, he believes he can only visit France under the same conditions. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 p 51]

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IVORY COAST

RISE OF THE YOUNG LIONS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "The Rise of the Young Lions"]

[Text] "It is important that we older generation have constant concern for that borderline age group including those who were born 15 years before independence and those who have been born since then." Did not this statement of President Houphouet-Boigny's before the 7th congress of the PDCI (Democratic Party of Ivory Coast), which took place 29 September - 1 October, mirror the classic speech given by all professional politicians on the eve of elections? Everything a priori might have made one think that. Did not the presidential elections occur scarcely 10 days after the closing of the congress?

"Ivorianization"

We are forced however to admit that, in the mind of the chief of state, this statement is a genuine expression of faith in the future, that is to say in young people, more than being a mere campaign program. That can already be seen via the effort displayed for the education of young people.

On the eve of independence, the government devoted less than 12.5 percent of its budget to education, the level of children attending school was less than 10 percent, and higher education was provided exclusively outside the country. In 1980 the portion of the budget devoted to public education is 33 percent, the percentage of children attending school is reaching 75 percent, and 9,000 Ivorian students, boys and girls, are enrolled in Ivory Coast establishments of higher learning.

So it is hardly surprising that people talk a lot about "Ivorianization." But at the same time the process seems slow and tricky. Employers, the major part of whom are foreigners, need a lot of persuading to put this policy into effect and they hold it up as much as they can. The result is that young cadres who have recently left university and who increasingly have trouble finding a job are no longer hiding their discontent. They do not understand it when, 20 years after independence, Frenchmen continue to take pride of place.

As a sign of the times, Ivorian cadres are no longer content to swagger around through ministerial antechambers in search of technocrat jobs with fat paychecks. Here they are, long shut away in a position of being silent grown-ups, of being concerned most of all about being effective and advancing in their jobs without

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missteps, now bounding forth suddenly on the political scene. Like springs compressed for a long time that an invisible hand incautiously lets go, the young lions, starved for politics, are unwinding and bursting out, letting loose extraordinary energy. These are "mischievous kids whose mouth still smells of mother's milk," confided to us one of those old soldiers of the party whose only claim to fame is having talked back to a colonial administrator in 1949! "These mischievous kids," he added, "must be patient. The country still has need of our experience to prepare for their future in the best conditions."

In the Ring

Except that here they are, these "mischievous kids," whose age varies from 35 to 50 years of age, not wanting to learn anything more. After having been patient and listened for a long time, seated under the palaver tree without saying a word, they now intend not only to break up the monologue of the "oldtimers," but to take over, even if it means tearing the baton away from them by force.

This irresistible rise of young people is first finding expression in the place being occupied from now on by the under-50 set in the new governing bodies of the party. In fact, even though they still are only a third of the members of the political bureau, they make up on the other hand nearly half of the steering committee complement and are seven out of nine included on the executive committee, that is to say the mini-government, not to mention the fact that it is the nerve center of the party. Without even mentioning that they also took the lion's share at the time of elections of PDCI section secretary general slots in July and August.

On that occasion, two thirds of the jobs were grabbed in open competition by the new conquistadors of Ivorian politics. The shock was so violent and unexpected that it was fatal to some oldtimers. Such a one was that old companion of President Houphouet-Boigny who died in a dazed state a few days after his defeat at Lakota.

But after the definite attempt they made during the 7th Congress, it will be most of all the time of the legislative and municipal elections that the young cadres intend to achieve the transformation which, in their eyes, will establish them politically. Presumably the prospect of being elected by and for themselves, on their own merits, and not coopted from above by being favored by the "party" or the president, has something in it which whips up their blood and galvanizes into action the strength of the new wave politicians.

In any case, it is not the hope of getting rich quickly through a career in politics that makes the rivals of the old toothless party barons run. Some of them - who have shown proof not only of their technical competence but also of their spirit of initiative if not their capacity to undertake, create and succeed in business - are not starving; quite the opposite. They have already made their fortune though the circumstances of their getting rich are sometimes questionable. What then makes them run? Basically it is the taste for risks, not to mention the smell of blood which rises and hangs heavy in the air as the atmosphere of the bullfight heats up.

For all these cadres suffocating in the bureaucratic yoke, constrained by administrative routine, lost in balance sheets, graphs and tables, electoral competition could only bring a breath of fresh and revitalizing air. Besides, does not power constitute, as per Henry Kissinger's expression, "the best aphrodisiac there is"? "It doesn't matter much if I win or lose," one of the newcomers on the political scene confided to us, "the important thing is being in the ring. I like that."

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That is the kind of state of mind that is driving all these young lions. For want of experience they are armed with their fangs and claws. Whether they win or lose, they will certainly make trouble in all the constituencies they are entered in. People like Konan Bledou, 43 years old, banker, former boss of the Sogefiha (Company for the Financial Management of Housing), taking part in the assault on the Bouake fiefdom which has been ruled over for 30 years by Deputy Mayor Djibo Sounkalo, 71 years old, schoolteacher; like Emmanuel Dioulo, 30 years old, former chairman and managing director of ARSO (Southwest Region Development Authority), fighting to succeed the current mayor of Abidjan, Mr Konan Kanga Antoine, 60 years old; like Amon Leon, 47 years old, a diplomat turned businessman who will oppose in Dimbokro Mr Kone Samba Ambroise, 71 years old, and old militant from heroic times; and like Fouabi Kouaho, a young science professor who is giving battle in Bouafie to the local mayor, Vame Doumouya, 61 years, a former clerk in administrative services.

Ambitions

There is a veritable galaxy of young cadres in which people stand out like the engineer Amangoua Aime Loo Kensity, the former boss of the BNETD (National Office for Technical Development Studies); Ben Soumahoro, a journalist, the former director general of the Information Ministry; Jean Kambire, another journalist (radio) who is running in Bouna; Mrs Achy Brou Marthe, an electronics engineer; and Djedje Mady, a doctor. This last one, former president of the MEECI (Movement of Students and Pupils of Ivory Coast), who has just made his much-noticed entrance into the PDCI's political bureau, does not lack ambition.

In any case, of the six newcomers to this political coterie, Djedje Mady is the only one to be taking a place at the starting line alongside the 600 candidates competing for the 147 positions of deputy. It is true that, as the youngest member of the political bureau, and himself alone being a symbol of the political authorities' desire for rejuvenation, he has his whole future in front of him. Which is not the case for everyone any more.

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

IDA CREDIT--The International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank, announced on 20 November that SDR [Special Drawing Rights] credit in the amount of 3.2 million (\$4 million) has been granted to Liberia for use in its small and average enterprises. This credit will be redistributed through the Central Bank of the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3164] 5157

SOVIET AIR AGREEMENT--Under the terms of an agreement signed in November in Monrovia between a Soviet delegation and the People's Redemption Council, Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, was authorized to establish a link between Moscow and the Liberian capital beginning in 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3164] 5157

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MALI

BRIEFS

HOUSING TECHNOLOGY FINANCING--The Malian government signed a financing agreement for a center of adaptable technology with the UNDP and the U.N. Center for Social Habitat. This agreement, which was signed in Bamako on 11 December, amounts to an estimated 867.12 million Malian francs. The UNDP is allocating a grant for \$1,374,000 (567.83 million Malian francs) and Mali will raise 290.29 million Malian francs for the implementation of this project aimed at "research and development in the field of urbanism and housing." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472]

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA--Libya and Mali signed a trade agreement and a manpower agreement following the first session of the mixed cooperation commission between the 2 countries which was held from 9 to 12 December in Bamako. The two delegations approved the statutes for a mixed bank for foreign trade and development and amended the statutes of the Mixed Libyan-Malian Company for Cattle Development (SOLIMA). Libya will specifically participate in the renovation of the Gao slaughter-house and in the improvement of the road network, as well as in the construction of the Village of the Hegira in Timbuctu. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472]

FORMATION OF DISSIDENT FRONT--Three dissident movements opposed to the regime of President Moussa Traore formed a Malian National Front during a secret meeting held at the beginning of December in a West African capital. Constituted by leaders of the former US-RDA (Sudanese Union, in power until 1968), but also by young cadres, dissidents from the sole official trade union and by student leaders, the Front does not include, however, pro-Libyan dissidents. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 38]

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

SABOTAGE CLAIMED BY NRM--One of the stations of the giant hydro-electric Cahora Bassa complex was reportedly destroyed in part by a guerrilla movement opposed to the Maputo government, entailing blackouts in South Africa, the Johannesburg STAR states. A spokesman for the ESCOM company, which is in charge of South Africa's electricity network confirmed that the supply of electricity from Mozambique--which constitutes approximately 10 percent of total South African consumption--was interrupted. The Johannesburg paper notes that the NRM (National Resistance of Mozambique) reportedly claimed responsibility for the 29 November sabotage. The NRM also declared that it damaged the oil pipeline between the Mozambican port of Beira and Umtali in Zimbabwe, and that it recently occupied three cities in the southern and central regions of Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3495]

ROMANIAN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION--A project for the agricultural development of 400,000 hectares is underway in Mozambique in the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. A total of 275 Romanian technicians is in charge of this project which will be carried out over a period of 20 years and will affect not only the agricultural sector, but also animal husbandry, the industry, the forest industry, mechanization and research. It is envisioned that cotton, corn, beans, sunflowers, meat and milk will be produced, as well as animal feed; a project for the extraction of oil and another for an industrial meat processing center are also planned. The project will eventually employ 20,000 persons, of whom 460 will receive special training. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3495]

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NAMIBIA

NEWS REPORTERS VISIT ROESSING URANIUM MINE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2980

[Article: "Uranium Mining in Roessing"]

[Text] For the first time, news reporters have been allowed inside the Namibian Roessing mine, the largest uranium mining undertaking in the world.

Let us recall that in 1966, the Rio Tinto Zinc group, headquartered in London, had undertaken a systematic geological and geophysical survey of the Roessing site where uranium ore had been discovered in 1929. After positive clues had been found, Roessing Uranium Limited was created in 1970.

Contracts were negotiated with many discreet clients, and the first shipments of Namibian U-308 left Roessing in 1976 for destinations which, even now, still raise many questions.

On 13 December 1974, the UN Council for Namibia published a decree prohibiting foreign undertakings and countries from "prospecting, exploiting or selling" Namibian natural resources. The decree also stipulated (Article 5) that "any vehicle, ship or container (...) found carrying mineral resources of Namibian origin could be confiscated by the UN Council for Namibia, or in its name."

As is known, this council is considered by the UN General Assembly to be the only legitimate authority on Namibia which, at present, is occupied by South Africa in violation of international regulations. Nevertheless, the South African Republic has refused to give Namibia back to the United Nations because it believes that the latter are not the heir of the Society of Nations which had entrusted the mandate on the former German Southwest African colony to the Union of South Africa.

This is why the exploitation of the Roessing uranium goes on almost clandestinely.

The principal shareholders of Roessing Uranium Ltd are: Rio Tinto Zinc (Great Britain, 41.35 percent), Industrial Development Corporation (South Africa, 13.47 percent), Rio Algom Mines Ltd (Canada, 10 percent), Minatome (France, a joint subsidiary of Total and Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, 10 percent), and General Mining and Finance Corporation (South Africa, 2.3 percent).

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The other shares are held by undisclosed shareholders who, according to Mr Craig Bigson, general manager of Roessing Uranium Ltd, "wish to remain anonymous."

According to information received from London through AFP, Namibian uranium is again exported to Europe on ships via the South-African enclave of Walvis-Bay, after a temporary airlift organized by the French Air Transport Union and South African Airways (the national South-African airline) was suspended (at the end of 1979).

The 350-kilo metallic drums in which the yellow cake (U-308 powder) is placed at Roessing are said to be loaded in containers and shipped on freighters of the West German Deutsche Afrika Linie. According to the same sources, the uranium is unloaded at night in the Belgian port of Zeebrugge from where it is said to be forwarded to the various purchasers.

A study published in Great-Britain in January 1980, the "Roessing File," recalls that the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd had bought 7,500 tons of Namibian yellow cake and that deliveries started in 1977.

The Roessing File also suggests that France, West Germany and the Netherlands have received or are still receiving uranium from Roessing, despite the injunctions of the United Nations.

During the first visit of reporters to Roessing, the AFP reporter was not able to check the accuracy of all this information; however, there were containers of the Deutsche Afrika Linie and of the Dutch Nedlloyds on the loading platforms of the mine station. Answering questions about this situation, the head of Roessing Uranium Ltd public relations department, Mr Clive Algar, stated: "We are a company with a majority of British shareholders, and we align ourselves on the position of the British Government." Mr Algar then gave to understand that, should the British Government order Rio Tinto Zinc to stop exploiting Namibian uranium, that company would obey the order. In this connection, experts note that the present Foreign Office Secretary, Lord Carrington, was a member of the board of directors of Rio Tinto Zinc until his appointment as a member of Mrs Margaret Thatcher's cabinet, in April 1979.

About 3,000 people are now employed at the Roessing site of whom 900 are white, 600 "colored," 800 Ovambo, 470 Damara and 200 Herero.

The mine management, who do not fail to underline that if Roessing were to be closed all of its employees would lose their jobs, also indicate that present salaries are never less than 202 rands per month, i.e. approximately 1,100 French francs, for 8 hours per day, and that they are "much higher" than the average for Namibia. They also stress the quality of the housing placed at the disposal of Roessing workers for rents which rarely exceed 50 rands (about 265 francs).

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For the managerial staff of the mine--which produces more uranium than all of South Africa, i.e. somewhat under 5,000 tons per year--the "main trump" is that all racial segregation had been eliminated at Roessing long before the Windhoek government had modified its position on the question.

The AFP correspondent in South Africa also noted that Roessing shareholders are not the only ones to ignore the position taken by the United Nations: between diamonds and uranium, foreign investors are literally jostling each other in the former German colony.

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NIGERIA

OIL; WEAPON AGAINST APARTHEID

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Oct 80 p 45

[Text] Nigeria is brandishing for the first time the threat of the oil weapon for an eventual "holy war" against the Pretoria regime. The 56 year old Nigerian President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, in an interview with American journalists from ME Magazine and the NEW YORK TIMES on the occasion of the anniversary on 24 October of the return of civilians to power, "This war is just as much ours as it is that of the oppressed people of South Africa." Nigeria, Mr Shagari explained, is arriving at an end of its patience in the face of occidental passivity with regard to the murderous extortions of Pretoria. "I am convinced" he said in speaking about the occidentals, "that if they really shared our sentiments with regard to apartheid it would have disappeared by now."

President Shagari benefitted from a favorable set of circumstances for this interview. The deterioration of the political situation in the Gulf--from which they obtain half of their supplies of oil--is disturbing the United States, and a Nigerian embargo would have very grave consequences for the American economy: half of their imports of crude oil (1,000,000 barrels a day) comes from Nigeria. "We don't have the least doubt," an American diplomat in Lagos had admitted "that Nigeria would cut off deliveries if it determines that we are weakening in our support for a majority government in South Africa."

To Boycott, a Solution?

The subject dominated the conversation between Presidents Jimmy Carter and Shehu Shagari who was received in Washington from the 6th to the 8th of October. Mr Shagari said once more, "The United States thinks that the apartheid regime can be convinced by good words to cease its monstrous blows against humanity. But I do not believe this." According to him the only way to lead Pretoria to listen to reason would be to boycott "all of those who engage in commerce with South Africa."

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NIGERIA

EXPORT SALES PRICE DECLINE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2484

[Text] The Central Bank of Nigeria has prepared a table indicating the decline registered during a year between January 1979 and January of this year in the export sales price of the majority of industrial agricultural products.

This decline varies according to the products between 7 and 82 percent, the least being registered by rubber and the largest being ginger.

Only coffee and sesame have recorded an increase.

We are reproducing below this index table covering these variations and giving the percentages of the differences (the base year is 1974 which is 100):

	<u>January 1979</u>	<u>January 1980</u>	<u>Difference (percent)</u>
Cocoa	217.2	164.3	-32.1
Copra	107.5	80.5	-33.5
Peanuts	103.4	72.1	-43.4
Ginger	211.4	116.2	-81.9
Coconut	107.3	78.6	-36.5
Rubber	169.7	157.9	-7.4
Coffee	224.6	247.9	+10.3
Soybeans	109.7	92.8	-18.2
Cotton Linters	117.9	134.1	+13.7
Sesame	119.7	130.2	+8.7
Palm Oil	95.4	86.9	-9.7

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

POSTS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRAINING--The Posts and Telecommunications training school in Lagos, which closed for more than 2 months following strikes and brawls which occurred, reopened in November. The students were not admitted again to their courses until they signed an agreement to behave themselves and not to provoke any further disturbance. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3408]

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RWANDA

INCREASED CAPACITY FOR PACKAGING TEA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Oct 80 p 2565

[Text] The Rwanda association for production and marketing of tea (Sorwathe) is going to double its capacity for packaging in its factory at Cyohoba-Rukeri increasing it from 1,300 tons to 2,600 tons.

The financing of this expansion which will cost \$1,051,000 consists of two loans of \$226,000 each furnished by the "Societe Financiere Internationale" (SFI) which is an affiliate of the World Bank and also by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the United States and a third loan of \$148,000 furnished by the "Banque Rwandaise de Developpement." (Rwandan Bank for Development) A capital participation of \$209,000 by the Tea Importers of the United States, one of the most important North American firms for the importing of tea and \$242,000 of self financing completes the financing plan.

These investors conjointly with the tea department of the Office "des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda" assisted in financing the initial phase of this venture which began operations in 1978. This enterprise was crowned with success and produced tea of high quality on reclaimed marshland. The small planters have rapidly increased their production and without the new packaging facilities a portion of their production would be lost. Aside from the advantages for the small planters this project ought to realize net gains in foreign exchange of a \$1,000,000 a year. The completion of this project is anticipated for the fourth quarter in 1981.

The modalities of financing the expansion of the tea factory of Cyohoba-Rukeri, let us recall, were the subject of negotiations on the part of the Rwandan delegation which accompanied President Habyarimana when he made his last trip to the United States in September (see MTM of 3 October page 2433).

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SENEGAL

DETAILS OF 1980-1981 BUDGET PROVIDED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3154

[Text] The considerations taken into account in drafting the Senegalese budget for the 1980-1981 fiscal period (1 July through 30 June) were set forth in our issue No 1805 dated 13 June 1980 (p 1500), while that budget was still in the planning stage.

The budget was approved by the finance law of 26 June 1980, published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU SENEGAL on 1 October.

The budget total comes to 191.6 billion CFA francs, an increase of 11.1 percent over the 1979-1980 budget, distributed as follows in billions of CFA francs:

Resources		Expenditures	
Public debt	34.6	Public debt	34.6
Ordinary income	115.6	Ordinary expenditures	115.6
Extraordinary income	22	Capital expenditures	22
Other special treasury accounts	21.2	Other special treasury accounts	19.4
Total	193.4	Total	191.6

With lower estimates (-3 billion CFA francs) than in the draft 1979-1980 budget, operational expenditures were set at 115.6 billion CFA francs (+9.6 billion in comparison to the final 1979-1980 budget).

The grand total for the equipment budget was reduced from 24 to 22 billion CFA francs, said budget being covered by loan funds.

The 1980-1981 budget includes the following sums, by income category, in billions of CFA francs:

Ordinary Income:		
Taxes on income	25.1	(+3.2)
Real estate and other direct taxes	2.4	(+1.6)
Customs duties on imports	52.7	(+5.7)
Customs duties on exports	2.9	(-2.1)
Domestic consumer taxes	11.1	(-0.8)

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Taxes on transactions and production	13.2	(-3.3)
Registry fees and stamp duties	5.8	(+1.2)
Revenue from state-owned property	0.6	(+0.3)
Income from services	0.2	--
Miscellaneous income	1.6	(+1.1)
Total	115.6	(+9.6)
Extraordinary Income:		
Deduction from the equipment budget	2	(+0.5)
Loans	17	(+2)
Price equalization and stabilization fund subsidy	3	(-4.5)
Total	22	(-2)

The income expected from direct taxation was increased in comparison to the preceding budget. The same is the case with regard to customs duties and taxes on imports, while the estimates of income from customs duties on exports and taxes on consumption and transactions were reduced.

The main allocations for operational expenditures were for the following ministries (in billions of CFA francs): National Education (20.1), Armed Forces (14.1), Interior (11.7), Foreign Affairs (6.8), Public Health (6.7), Higher Education (6.7), Finance and Economy (6.2), Equipment (3.2), Rural Development (2.7), Scientific and Technical Research (1.3), Youth and Sports (1), Urban Affairs, Housing and Environment (0.9), Water and Forests (0.7), etc.

Apart from the 22-billion-CFA-franc equipment budget, special treasury accounts include various special investment allocations: road fund (3 billion CFA francs), local collective equipment fund (4 billion), national energy fund (1.5 billion) and investments on foreign loans (1 billion). Also, the special treasury accounts include, under income and expenditures, a transfer of 30 billion CFA francs to the autonomous amortization fund, including 16 billion taken from the income from the tax on added value.

Credit allocated to the 1980-1981 equipment budget is distributed by sector as follows, in billions of CFA francs:

Social and community equipment	6.8	(+3.8)
Administrative equipment	6.1	(+4.2)
Rural production	2.9	(+2.4)
Financial investments	2.6	(-6.7)
General studies	1.4	(+0.3)
Water resources	1.2	(-0.1)
Transportation and telecommunications	0.7	(-0.7)
Non-agricultural production	0.3	(-0.1)
Operations carried forward	--	(-3.1)
Total	22	(-2)

The finance law authorizes the negotiation of loans up to 17 billion CFA francs (15 billion by the finance law dated 25 June 1979) on foreign financial markets and/or with international or foreign financial bodies.

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Similarly, the finance law of 26 June 1980 authorizes the floating of medium- and long-term loans on the domestic market to cover treasury costs, recourse to advances from the Central Bank of the West African State, and the rediscounting with this issuing body of guaranteed obligations payable to the treasury.

The ceiling for guarantees the state can provide during the 1980-1981 financial period is established at 10 billion CFA francs (5 billion authorized by the finance law of 25 June 1975).

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT FOOD AID--During the 1979-80 season the Senegalese Government spent 3,254.19 million CFA francs, the Dakar daily, LE SOLEIL, indicated on 9 November 1980 to assist [drought] stricken populations. This financial effort was applied to the purchase and transportation of 42,000 tons of local millet as well as the shipment of gifts from foreign ports. This transpired from the survey made by the Commissariat for Food Assistance. Despite a difficult economic situation the government will have to continue as in the past to take over from the international community whose gradual disengagement since 1978 has been evident. This is because the donors wish to become more concerned in insuring the food autonomy of assisted countries rather than responding to specific situations. On its part Senegal has undertaken to build up a reserve food stock using available local cereals. Failing this it will resort to imported sorghum. The Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, and France are taking part in the establishment of this stock, either by financing the building of storage facilities or by taking charge of purchasing products. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3026] 2662

- CCCE LOANS--The French CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation] has just granted to Senegal 3 loans for a total amount of 291 million French francs (equivalent to 14.55 billion CFA francs), namely, (1) a loan of 11 million French francs (550 million CFA francs) slated to insure 90 percent of the financing of an emergency program which the Senegalese Radio and Television Office must initiate with the technical assistance of the TDF [French Television Office] to preserve the existing production and broadcasting capabilities and avoid in the coming years very costly expenditures involving the complete renovation of equipment and installations; (2) a loan of 80 million French francs (4 billion CFA francs) and a loan of 200 million French francs (10 billion CFA francs) to the National Development Bank of Senegal which will assist the Senegalese Government in keeping its self-financing commitments in the investment programs that have been initiated. These loans constitute one of the elements of French participation in the special international assistance which Senegal has solicited to face the economic and financial difficulties it has experienced for several years now. This assistance was dependent on the establishment of a government rehabilitation plan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3026] 2662

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FRENCH LOAN--France has granted Senegal 10 billion CFA francs (200 million French francs) for the financing of Senegalese projects under the terms of an agreement signed in Dakar on 11 November 1980. This loan complements the 21.5 billion CFA francs which France had committed to place at Senegal's disposal to enable it to restore the equilibrium of its rural sector and the reactivation of its economy, strongly affected by drought and inflation. This assistance of which part (11.5 billion CFA francs) has already been paid had been negotiated in July 1980 by Abdou Diouf, Senegalese prime minister, on a visit to Paris. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Nov 80 p 3026] 2662

USE OF DUNKERQUE PORT--At the beginning of December, the port of Dunquerque will welcome the first vessel flying the Senegalese flag. The new national shipping enterprise, the Senegalese Maritime Navigation Company (COSENAM) will begin activity on that date and has already established this northern port as a major base. At a time when the efforts of all Dunquerque personnel need to be focused on the regular shipping lines, the inclusion of a new one reflects the greatest confidence in this port. It is true that Dunquerque leads the European ports in shipping links with Senegal. The COSENAM will be represented locally by the Delmas-Vieljeux Maritime Shipping Company. The COSENAM announcement that it will serve Dunquerque comes a year after the port authorities made an "African tour," visiting Senegal among other countries, at which time the national shipping company and the interest of the Dunquerque authorities in Senegalese shipping was discussed. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3154] 5157

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TANZANIA

ADB-FINANCED DAKAWA RICE PROJECT DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3043

[Article: "ADB Financing for the Dakawa Rice Project"]

[Text] On 28 October 1980 the ADB [African Development Bank] approved a loan of 4.5 million units of account [UCs] (approximately \$5.9 million) to Tanzania for the financing of the revised Dakawa rice-growing project. The loan is reimbursable over 20 years with a 5-year grace period for repayment. The loan will be used to finance 18 percent of the aggregate cost of the project, which represents 26 percent of the total cost in foreign exchange.

The project fulfills three major goals: The reduction of grain imports; the provision of jobs to unemployed and underemployed individuals living in the villages and communes around the project area; and the exercise of a stimulating effect on small growers working land close to the zone.

The project, whose execution will be spread over 4 years, will consist in clearing 2,110 hectares of which 2,000 hectares will be improved for irrigated paddy cultivation with 980 [sic] hectares of sorghum as the second crop. It also includes the installation of a rice mill where the paddy will be ginned. Credits are anticipated, too, for the purchase of materials, vehicles, and agricultural equipment. The project also involves the construction of infrastructural elements such as local service roads and plantation tracks, functional buildings, and housing. Finally, the project includes credits for the purchase and installation of irrigation pumps as well as for the remuneration of consulting engineers and technical assistance personnel.

The breakdown proposed for the financing by the ADB group is the following: For the ADF [African Development Fund], improvement of the land, housing, and functional buildings, consulting engineers, and fixed agricultural installations. For the ADB, the rice mill. The total cost of the project before taxes, estimated on the basis of prices prevailing in 1980, comes to 262.85 million Tanzanian shillings. The aggregate cost in foreign exchange is the equivalent of 190.5 million Tanzanian shillings.

The revised project will be financed by the ADB group, the EEC [European Economic Community], the Tanzania Investment Bank, and the Tanzanian Government. The execution of the project will be done by the Dakawa Rice Farm Limited of Dar es-Salaam. The work began in 1978-79 and will continue for 4 years. All the invitations to bid already published have been issued according to the directives of the ADF and the bids have been processed in satisfactory manner.

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TANZANIA

TANZANIA INVESTMENT BANK CELEBRATES 10TH ANNIVERSARY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173

[Text] The Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), established by a law promulgated in November 1970, has just celebrated its 10th anniversary. Its purpose was to guarantee the development of Tanzania through the granting of medium- and long-term loans to industry or other economic sectors and the encouragement of the establishment of large enterprises in the farm, forest or fishing sectors.

The government of Tanzania holds 50 percent of these stocks, the National Bank of Commerce 40 percent, and the National Corporation the other 10 percent. This capital totaled 100 million (authorized) and 50 million Tanzanian shillings (paid up) in 1970. It totals 100 million (paid up) and 20 million (authorized) today.

In June 1980, the bank granted 178 loans to 138 companies. It also provided technical assistance (feasibility or production capacity improvement studies) to some enterprises.

Tanzanian Vice Minister for Finance Venance Ngula asked the TIB to increase its loans for farm or agroindustrial projects in connection with the 10th anniversary of the bank. According to the annual report of the TIB for the 1979-1980 fiscal period, the bank granted loans totaling 408.96 million shillings for industrial or agroindustrial projects in the course of that fiscal period. This comes to more or less half the sum allocated for loans for infrastructure projects or "vital" economic sectors.

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

POWER RATIONING ENDS--The rationing of electrical energy in Tanzania, the imposition of which we reported on page 3107 of our 21 November 1980 issue, was ended on 20 November by the Tanganyika Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) because of the return of the rainfall regime in the southern part of Tanzania to normal. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173] 5157

AIR AGREEMENT ENDS--The national airline, Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC), has announced that the contract it signed with Caledonian Airlines, a Beirut-based company which leased it to Boeing aircraft, has been broken off following renewed disagreement. Henceforth, the SOBELAIR company, a SABENA affiliate, will lease the ATC a Boeing 707 to allow it to carry out its intercontinental flights. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173] 5157

TOBACCO PRODUCTION DROPS--During a conference of World Bank experts held in Arusha at the end of October, it was stressed that Tanzania's production of tobacco will henceforth be limited to 18,000 to 20,000 tons, while the processing capacity of the domestic plants is 51,000 tons. Soil exhaustion, the shortage of fuels for the processing of fire-cured tobacco and a shortage of warehouses were given as the main causes for the production drop. The Iringa region, which has produced up to 4,000 tons of tobacco alone, now produces only half that. Some 20 to 30 percent of the total domestic production might be lost due to lack of adequate warehousing for the tobacco. Where Iringa is concerned, the director general of the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT), Mr J. Kiboda, expressed the belief that an improper dosage of fertilizer as well as the lack of wood for fuel, because of massive deforestation, were the reasons for the decline in production. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173] 5157

AIRPORT EXPANSION, IMPROVEMENT--The Tanzanian Ministry of Public Works will proceed with the expansion of the Mafia airport whose runway will be extended to 1,800 meters in length and 30 meters in width compared to its present 1,219 meters by 18 meters. The Kilwa airport will witness analogous improvements and the two airports will then be upgraded to grade C airports. The Tanzanian National Assembly had allocated 4.2 million Tanzanian shillings for the reconditioning of these airports. The funds, which had been lacking, halted the projected work in 1977-78. Funding has finally been secured and the work is slated to begin momentarily. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3043] 2662

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TOGO

BRIEFS

AIR AGREEMENT WITH SWITZERLAND--Switzerland and Togo signed an air agreement on 3 December, according to which the two airlines, Swissair and Air Afrique, will fill the needs of air traffic between the two countries. Swiss cooperation is active in many sectors, notably the Namiele project in Mango and the training of pilots at the airlines school. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3481]

JAPANESE HEALTH VEHICLE DONATION--Japan offered Togo on 3 December a total of 28 vehicles, which include 15 ambulances, 10 trucks, 2 vehicles equipped with X-ray machines and a bloodmobile. The total value of the donation amounts to 300 million CFA. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3481]

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ZAMBIA

ATTEMPTED COUP IN OCTOBER DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov 80 pp 17-18

[Article by Tania Vasconcelos--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] *On 27 October Zambian President Dr Kenneth Kaunda denounced an attempted coup, following which curfew was instigated in all the towns of the country. A series of individuals was arrested, among them a minister, officers of the army, and businessmen. The same fate hit AFP correspondent Francois Cros--subsequently released--accused of having lent money to one of the plotters. If this allegation remains up to this point to be proven, this arrest, which aroused some protest almost everywhere, is in any case testimony to the climate of exasperation and extreme vulnerability which reigned in the leadership circles of Lusaka during the events of October.

Moreover, none of the plotters having been arrested red-handed in the act of conspiring, while, on the other hand, the social situation was ready to explode, the discovery of this attempted coup left most western observers quite skeptical.

One cannot, however, fail to be struck by the coincidences observed between the actions denounced by President Kaunda and the unfolding of events.

The first symptoms of the plot, which resulted altogether in 2 deaths and several injuries, were, according to the Zambian president, appeared in incidents created by Zairian "mercenaries" led by Zambians and supported by Pretoria. When mercenaries attacked the Zambian Army some 15 km south of Lusaka as well as in the copper-producing region of the north, South Africa dispatched warships and two ferry-boats onto the Zambezi River with a view toward a possible invasion. At the same time, officers from Pretoria tried to make contact with the Zambian garrison installed on the border at Sesheke which, under threat of bombardment, was to adopt a position of "neutrality."

The attack on strategic objectives in Lusaka, including the seat of government and the presidential residence was set for the night of 16-17 October, the day of the 16th anniversary of the independence of the country. Some 40 /"heavily armed"/ Zaireans, who were allegedly part of a group of some 200 mercenaries, were arrested.

* [Preface]: The economic situation after 16 years of independence is liable to inspire any kind of conspiracy or social explosion, despite the efforts toward recovery made by the Lusaka government.

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Uncontrolled Bands

The Zambian president also claimed that a longtime Zambian businessman, Elias Kaenga, had recruited Zambian dissidents as well as "ex-Katangans" at the beginning of the year to be trained in the mining region of Bindura and in Rhodesia with a view to overthrowing the Zambian government. This action was prepared in case Bishop Muzorewa should win the general elections in Rhodesia.

It seems that a link with the illegal opposition can be made if one adds to this series of events one other fact, which also came into the picture last October: the discovery, in a farmhouse belonging to an advocate of British extraction, Pearce Annfield, a well-known figure in the Zambian political world, of a hundred armed men. Pearce Annfield, who is presently being sought by the police, had been responsible for representing the two Zambian opposition parties, the ANC as well as the UPP [United Peoples Party], of which Simon Kapwepwe, who died a year ago, was the leader. It will be recalled that Simon Kapwepwe, who had played an important role in the government of Dr Kaunda in the early Seventies, had been accused of plotting against the Zambian state, in league with Pretoria.

Relations between the forerunners of the disorders which periodically afflicted western Zambia (a fiefdom of the SNC and the UPP), the Portuguese colonialists, and the South African secret services had been openly denounced during the period of the liberation struggle waged by the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in Angola. The activities of uncontrolled bands on the border between Zambia and Angola--where the ethnic groups are mingled together--ceased after the independence of the RPA [Peoples Republic of Angola]. By contrast, along the border with Zaire, where similar bands were also at large at the time, the situation never returned to normal; which is because of the instability which characterizes the provinces of this part of Zaire. A dispute over the delineation of the borders has, incidentally, been put on the diplomatic agenda recently.

In the region between Lake Moero and Lake Tanganyika, along a 150-km-long track, the boundary has never been established with precision, and the Zambians attribute the chronic infiltration of bandits, who may be responsible, especially in recent days, for the insecurity in the northern copper-belt regions of Zambia, to the absence of control along the border.

The increase in crime had also excited serious anxiety among the expatriate technicians working in the Zambian mines, to such an extent that some of them fearing for their safety, left the country.

Last September, Interior Minister Wilthed Phiri had already announced that means would be deployed for strengthening border surveillance in order to reduce crime and banditry, phenomena which do not seem to spare the rest of the country either.

The economic problems which have further increased the number of jobless and considerably reduced the purchasing power of the workers, go a long way toward explaining this solution. When one realizes that a special allocation of \$2 million was put at Wilthed Phiri's disposal to provide for the "scouring" of the towns, one has an idea of the scope of the malaise, especially in Lusaka where plots against the state, crime, banditry, and popular discontent have an additive effect and intermingle to produce an explosive and complex situation.

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Copper and Cobalt

And so the Zambian president, with his first statements concerning the abortive plot, labelled the recently perpetrated criminal acts in the capital as destabilizing events /"probably not unrelated to the plot."/ The chief of state went so far as to accuse Mr Chiluba, president of the ZCTU [Zambia Congress of Trade Unions], who had threatened to unleash a general strike if the demands of the workers went unanswered, of being in liaison with the conspiracy movement. These accusations, made heatedly, in the grip of emotion, were however to be withdrawn several days later, following a meeting with the syndicates and UNIP [United National Independence Party]--the government party--which was asked to examine the situation and create a special tribunal to judge the conspirators. On that occasion, Mr Chiluba vigorously defended himself from [the charge of] ever having thought to plot against the state, and he published a communique inviting /"the workers, in particular the labor leaders, to abstain from any statement that could be exploited by the enemy."/ Which did not prevent a inquest from being opened to determine whether the Zambian labor movement had been infiltrated, from abroad, by elements liable to try to overthrow the present Lusaka government.

The regime in Lusaka thus remains confronted with especially grave immediate problems.

To try to surmount these problems unfortunately implies the restructuring of the very foundations of the Zambian economy, which is excessively dependent, as everyone knows, on the export of copper¹ and cobalt². The distortions inherited from the colonial period could not be corrected. On the contrary, they seem to be aggravated with the collapse of agricultural production, which is well short of national needs. Providing, as they do, the bulk of the nation's resources, with all that entails by way of hazard--the prices of raw materials being dependent on the caprices of the world market--the ores of the Copper Belt are extracted by companies bringing together the Zambian state and British, American, and South African capital.

As one might imagine, the situation which results from this is rather uncomfortable--especially when it comes to a country which supports the movements for the liberation of southern Africa, and this is the case--and it presents aspects which function as strong constraints to the policy of economic development.

It is true that the nationalizations effectuated up to now have not brought about the anticipated results, primarily because of the inefficiency, indeed often the corruption, of functionaries of the state who took the place of the private companies. But as for the delays in the implementation of the gradual "zambianization" of the technical cadres in the mining sector, the multinationals involved in the exploitation of the minerals are not really strangers to such delays.

¹ Second largest exporter in the world.

² 13 percent of the world's exports.

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This measure, as well known, was to go along with control by the state of this vital national sector and stem the hemorrhage of currency due to the transfer [out of the country of the salaries] of thousands of foreign technicians. So 16 years after independence, the Zambian state redistributes 30 million kwachas (\$45 million) per year to foreign nationals. A situation which is moreover at the origin, several years ago, of a quasi-revolt by Zambian students in technical courses who had obtained from the state the formal promise that the best students from the specialized schools would be systematically signed up for work. This promise, which was recently re-issued, is not to the taste of the Zambian state's economic partners, these latter not feeling very comfortable with the eventuality in the near future of a massive sub-situation of [Zambian] nationals for foreign nationals, while the latter are fighting to obtain an increase in their own numbers. The insufficient numbers of imported personnel, no less than the lack of spare parts, are in fact spelled out by the annual report of Zambia Copper Investments, in conjunction with the Zambian state, as the major reasons for the diminution of registered production.

This decline has certainly barely affected the partners of the Zambian state. The profits of the countries engaged in operations³ have in fact grown by 50 percent, where they have not actually doubled, in the period 1979-1980. It remains true that Zambia--which lives to the beat of the copper market pulse--being the fifth largest producer in the world, and copper being the mainstay of the GNP--can only view with concern this decline in production. Especially as the market prices established at the whim of the importing capitalist countries have a strong tendency, over the long run, to weaken. And one recalls the catastrophic political consequences created in the case of Allende's Chile by the vertiginous fall of prices that came on the eve of the 1973 coup. And, which is more, the mining industry in Zambia continues to suffer from outlet problems.

The railroad that links the copper belt to the port of Dar Es Salaam has built up, according to recent statements by the Zambian minister of transport, a deficit of \$25 million since its construction by the Chinese in 1976. A large part of production must still be forwarded through South African ports.

The recent import from the Federal Republic of Germany of 14 electric-powered locomotives, which will replace the Chinese engines, which have inadequate power, when loaded, to traverse the 500 km through mountainous regions to the Tanzanian-Zambian border, should in part alleviate these problems.

Out of wind on several fronts, the regime of President Kaunda is doubtless going through a particularly delicate phase, the issue of which is yet to be seen. Aware of the necessity of a change in the predicament in the countryside, the Zambian chief of state has just made a one-month trip to the European and Asiatic socialist countries where he obtained the financing and equipment necessary for the launching of a vast operation, the Food Production Program, at a total cost of 400 million kwachas (approximately \$500 million). The project envisions the creation in each province of the country, of two state farms endowed with modern equipment and the setting up of several peasant cooperatives, establishment of which is moreover everywhere encouraged.

³ Roan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines.

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Distribution of Provisions

This is obviously a long term project, the results of which will not be visible for several years. As for more immediate prospects, there is predicted a mild increase in the production of maize (from 3.6 to 4 million bags), which represents half the annual consumption. Meanwhile, in order to cope with the danger of famine in the regions of Senanga and Sesheke, affected by the South African raids which prevent the peasants from cultivating their land, some \$800,000 of provisions have been distributed to the population.

For, beyond its internal problems and the fall-out of the international economic crisis, Zambia is also paying its oft-painful dues as a "Front Line" country in the face of the racist South African regime.

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