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# Latin America Report

(FOUO 22/80)

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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

BRAZIL

PETROBRAS PRESIDENT ASSESSES IMPACT OF FUEL IMPORTS ON BRAZIL

PY151905 Rio de Janeiro LATIN AMERICA DAILY POST in English 13 Dec 80 p 8

[Special for the DAILY POST by PETROBRAS President Shigeaki Ueki]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro--The sudden and unexpected oil price hikes, from year-end 1973 onwards, jumping to US\$11/bbl from US\$3, have provoked a great change in the international economy, aggravating even more the world' economic and financial imbalance which had become evident at the end of the 60's.

Consequently, energy assumed a predominant role in the development strategies of the countries, with special emphasis on those in the economic developing stage which are dependent on oil imports, given their increasing rate of energy consumption, a remarkable characteristic of their development.

Adjustments of these economies to the new international situation have become very difficult because, in addition to the impact caused by increase oil costs, they also suffered the effects of the recession and of the policy for the equilibrium of payment balances of industrialized countries--protectionism and oil price increase pass-through by way of prices of their export products.

In Brazil, as a developing country, energy consumption is hard to restrain, due to the need of its economic expansion, compatible with the increasing labor supply and with the national objective of reducing our distance from more advanced countries.

Thus, in view of the new conditions of the international economy, the country was forced to rearrange strategies and plans. In the 1974-1977 period, the policies for expansion-diversification of exports, for import replacements and reduced dependence on foreign energy sources, allied to a certain stabilization of the real oil price, played a positive contribution for Brazil to recover equilibrium in its commercial balance in 1977.

Investments required to keep a minimum growth rate began to demand a higher financial participation abroad to complement the formation of domestic capital.

This is how the country could be developed at an annual GDP rate of 7 percent, though supported by external resources permitted by the country's reliability and credibility in the international financial markets. As a result, the net foreign debt rose to US\$24.8 billion in 1977 from US\$6.2 billion in 1973.

It is worth mentioning that, in the said period, even though the value of exports doubled, the net foreign debt/export ratio changed from 1 to 2.

When the world seemed to return to a fair equilibrium, with the near disappearance of current account surpluses of the OPEC countries, the situation was reagravated in 1979. Another oil price escalation, from US\$12/bbl to US\$32.00/bbl in 1980 in less than a year, resulted in significant current account deficits for oil importers, increasing their foreign debts, partly to meet commitments previously assumed. The debts themselves grew higher resulting from increased interest rates, reaching levels never reached before.

It should be observed that the absolute oil price hike was almost US\$20/bbl, with no exaggeration intended, if compared to the increase of US\$8/bbl registered in the so-much-talked-about 1973 oil crisis.

It is important to emphasize that the new situation does not permit a solution simply in terms of foreign trade or of a policy for energy alternatives, which demand effectively more time for their execution. In a short and medium term, the matter is directly linked to the recycling of international financial resources and to our capacity to absorb them.

On this table, awareness of nature of the Brazilian foreign debt makes indispensable the utilization of other concepts, besides the traditional ones, to infer their real meaning. One of the more evident ways would be to appraise foreign commitment through the medium itself which has been generating a new international economic order: petroleum.

The net debt in 1970 was of the order of US\$4.1 billion and corresponded to 2.7 billion bbl of crude at import prices on that occasion. Today our debt of US\$50 billion corresponds to 1.563 million bbl of crude, showing a decrease of more than 40 percent.

Another form of analysis shows that the Brazilian recoverable reserves of oil and gas at year-end 1970 (1.0 billion bbl) represented about one-third of the net debt at that time, while such reserves in June 1980 (1.582 million bbl) exceed the existing debt, always thinking in terms of barrels of petroleum.

Although the national economic patrimony and its annual flow--the world's eighth largest gross domestic product--by themselves give us a favorable position, the present situation leads to a comparison in terms of what could be agreed upon as the latest international monetary standard--petroleum--a comparison, as we have seen, also presenting a favorable result as for the possibilities for us to continue having access to the world financial system.

(Shigeaki Ueki is the president of PETROBRAS, Brazil's state oil company, and a former energy minister of Brazil.)

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Brazil-Foreign Debt in Terms of Petroleum

Years	Foreign Debt/US\$ Million			Ave value FOB Oil Imports US\$/BBL	Net Debt Shown in million bbl of oil	National Hydro-Carbon Reserves in million bbl	Reserve /net debt Ratio percent
	Gross	Reserves	Net				
1970	5.294	1.186	4.108	1.51	2.721	1.025	38
1971	6.622	1.723	4.899	1.88	2.606	1.021	39
1972	9.521	4.183	5.338	1.99	2.682	962	36
1973	12.582	6.416	6.166	2.79	2.210	937	42
1974	17.166	5.269	11.897	11.10	1.072	944	88
1975	21.171	4.040	17.131	10.48	1.635	946	58
1976	25.985	6.544	19.441	11.50	1.691	1.091	65
1977	32.037	7.256	24.781	12.31	2.013	1.362	68
1978	43.511	11.895	31.616	12.44	2.541	1.423	56
1979	49.904	9.689	40.215	17.11	2.350	1.548	66
1980	56.500	6.500	50.000	32.00	1.563	1.582 (1)	101

(1) Until June 1980.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COLUMNIST VIEWS PROGRESS TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 2 Nov 80 p 12

[Article by Sergio Ceron: "Argentina and Uruguay Set Courses in the Southern Cone"]

[Text] According to what leaked out last Wednesday in official circles, the agreement for the establishment of a free trade zone between Argentina and Uruguay will probably be signed during this week. The putting of this initiative in concrete form provides reasons for reflecting on bilateral relations and also on the trend being observed in Latin America toward integration of the region as a geopolitical and geoeconomic space capable of taking on a leading role in the world as a whole in the next century.

This agreement would be the first one to take concrete form in the framework of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), an institution that replaces the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), whose structure revealed its obsolescence with regard to the new problems raised by complex, conflicting present-day economy.

Of course, it is not easy to reconcile interests that are opposed, in both nations, to the economic complementariness implied by the agreement. It is logical and even legitimate for sectoral groups to feel the impact of a relatively revolutionary measure, but it is also necessary to realize that Latin American integration, the maximum objective of the nations in the region in the remainder of the 20th century, entails not only clear-sightedness but also a minimum spirit of sacrifice and understanding. At this point in the events, it is impossible to move backwards or to bring the incipient continental integration movement to a standstill. Latin America cannot lose the rate of development or agree to continue passively in the role of an eternal subordinate of the central powers.

This rapprochement between Argentina and Uruguay, therefore, becomes the first concrete step toward the maximum objective and ideal of Latin American unity.

It is not by chance that the two countries in the Plata region are precisely the ones to open fire. There are so many ties of legal origin, common culture, blood and interests that unite them, that it is often heard that we Argentinians and Uruguayans are actually one single nation organized in two independent, sovereign states.

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#### An Example of Cooperation

In the decade of the 1970's, starting with the signing of the Treaty of Rio de La Plata, which put an end to boundary controversies, the process of rapprochement moved along at an increasingly accelerated rate. The high point of that policy of fraternal understanding was set, undoubtedly, by the harmonious coexistence on the Joint Salto Grande Bilateral Commission. The manner in which the representatives of both countries were able to overcome difficulties and even differences of opinion and devoted their enthusiasm and talent to materialization of the first Latin American hydroelectric powerplant shared by two states on the same river has frequently been displayed as an example of international cooperation.

When the last turbine in the complex delivers its power, Salto Grande will provide 1,890,000 kilowatts as a contribution to the region's economic development, benefiting the surrounding inhabitants and making its contribution to supplying the large industrial concentration centered around Buenos Aires and Montevideo. But not only this aspect is important. The contribution of the dam to navigation on the Uruguay River, the formation of a large lake, turned into a piscicultural reservoir and an unquestionable tourist attraction should be stressed. Moreover, the United Nations has set up the Santo Grande project as an example of a concern for maintaining ecological equilibrium so often altered in other regions by the accomplishment of large infrastructure jobs, to whose objectives only material interests have been devoted. Argentina and Uruguay, on the other hand, are concerned over maintaining and, if possible, increasing the quality of living by offering their people an adequate natural setting.

When the dam is crested, both nations will soon be able to unite their railroad and highway network. With regard to highways, the two bridges over the Uruguay River -- the one joining Colon with Paysandu and the one connecting Puerto Unzue and Fray Bentos -- had already established that connection long awaited for generations. But now, for the first time, the Urquiza Railroad line will be linked with Uruguayan railroads that have the same track gage. When the Posadas-Encarnacion bridge is built, between Argentine and Paraguayan territory, the railroads of the three nations will be complementary, a singularly important achievement in the undertaking to integrate their respective economies. That job, which is in the bidding stage, already has a "green light" from the Buenos Aires and Asuncion governments. Meanwhile, the ferryboat system will facilitate the movement of trains between both banks of the Parana River.

#### Gas Exports

We must point out, in this brief review of bilateral relations between Rio de La Plata dwellers, the possibility that Argentina will make a definite contribution to alleviating the total lack of energy sources of their own suffered by our neighbors. Experts on both sides of the river are giving the final touches to the pre-feasibility study for construction of a gas pipeline that would make it possible to export Argentine fluid to Uruguay. When the Center-West gas pipeline that will transport gas from the Neuquen Basin deposits to Argentina's industrial coast goes into operation in 1982, a considerable volume will be available for sale abroad. It is believed, in principle, that Uruguay will probably request daily delivery of 1 million cubic meters. It will be necessary, for that purpose, to have a gas pipeline between Montevideo and the area bordering on Rosario where the Center-West gas pipeline will connect with the national network.

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Another amount -- much larger because of the different size of the market -- will be for Brazil, if the incipient agreements between the two nations prosper. Argentina would provide 15 million cubic meters of gas a day to the industries in the Porto Alegre region and possibly Sao Paulo, with the exception of periods during which domestic demand peaks would make it necessary to reduce deliveries circumstantially.

In short, establishment of the free trade zone would complement and crown a policy of friendship and cooperation that is not free from mutual effort and renunciation, but that will definitely help both Argentina and Uruguay to reduce their dependence on the industrialized nations and will guarantee for them a greater decision-making capability.

In the middle of 1979, we discussed several times, in the pages of LA OPINION, the visit made by the former foreign minister of Venezuela, Dr Aristides Calvani, to Buenos Aires. At that time, we said that Argentine politicians and analysts who had an opportunity to talk with him observed that the image of a statesman and of a visionary came together in his person. Calvani proclaimed the absolute, pressing need for Latin American integration and proposed that this action should start with the Spanish-speaking countries to add Brazil later, as a balance of potential. He believed that the neighboring country's calling as an emerging power required that Hispano America be united first, for an equitable negotiation of regional integration. But he made it very clear that this proposal in no way implied an attempt to exclude Brazil, or, much less, to form an opposing bloc. Neither Brazil nor the rest of Latin America -- Calvani maintained in his Buenos Aires talks -- could afford the luxury of remaining disunited. Because, on the assumption that Latin America does not integrate, the nations making it up would be easy prey to the ambitions and prepotency of a conflicting, merciless world.

There was no lack of voices that raised an ideological problem. Was it possible to move ahead in the integration of a region in which there were democratic regimes with military governments having autocratic characteristics? Calvani, whose democratic vocation is beyond question, stated that it was possible and he also added that the process of economic and cultural integration would help to accelerate a return to the republican way of life of those nations in which, owing to necessity of circumstances, autocracies prevailed. That reasonable opinion was put to test recently, when the Andean Pact countries refused to recognize the Bolivian government of Gen Luis Garcia Meza. Nevertheless, so far La Paz has not carried out its threat to withdraw from the Andean Group and it would seem that the moderate position of the president of Peru, Fernando Belaunde Terry, will facilitate some kind of solution in the medium term.

Nevertheless, there is some truth in the warning that the existence of de facto governments in Latin America may delay the process of integration, as long as the existence of a process directed toward normalizing the institutional situation is not in sight. Moreover, the military government leaders in the Southern Cone have realized this. In different ways and with a different handling of timing -- adjusted to the idiosyncrasy of each nation -- they intend to recreate conditions for a democratic way of life.

The Uruguayan military are getting ready to confirm, by means of a constitutional reform, the establishment of a new legal structure that will provide them with reassurance against regression of Uruguayan society into anarchy and terrorist

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violence. The instrument chosen is the powers being proposed for the National Security Council (COSENA) that would permit a kind of institutionalization of the Armed Forces as custodian of the country's political normality. In Chile, President Augusto Pinochet is setting the limit for the autocratic conception of political action. Nevertheless, he felt a need to confirm his position by means of a plebiscite that, with all the observations that it deserves as a procedure for consulting the will of the people, indicates, at least, the intention to obtain an explicitly expressed consensus.

#### The Case of Brazil

The presidency of Joan Baptista de Figueiredo in Brazil was received as the transition stage toward a more open democratic regime. Up to now, a "half-way democracy" prevails, in which the military authority has decisive weight. But everything indicates that, unless a political disturbance makes the present regime fall, the neighboring nation is moving toward its institutional normalization. Of course, we must not overlook the risks confronting Brazil. The increase in inflation, the energy shortage that forces it to import 85 percent of the oil that it consumes, the increasing amount of its foreign debt and the recession prevailing on the world's markets raise a serious doubt on the viability of its economic model. Any slip in this respect implies an economic and social crisis in the short term, which, in turn, would involve the almost fatal need for freezing the process of democratization to concentrate the power again in the Armed Forces.

The case of Argentina is different. Our country is one of the few exceptions that the political and economic leaders of the industrial powers observe at present. Let us see why. Practically at the brink of energy self-sufficiency, it has a great potential for increasing production and export of foodstuffs. In today's world, countries with great industrial development depend, in their majority, on imported energy for maintaining their standard of living. The oil exporting nations, with a very few exceptions, have to import foodstuffs and manufactured products. Argentina has oil reserves for 13 years, gas for 50 years, with excellent possibilities of doubling them in the short term. It is self-sufficient in uranium and it is still far from having exhausted its prospects for producing hydroelectric power, even after building Yacyreta, Corpus and Middle Parana.

Experts of the multinational corporations participating in offshore exportation by means of aleatory contracts on the underwater continental shelf believe that there are very good possibilities of locating hydrocarbons in marketable amounts in the South Atlantic region. Opinions vary from the optimists who talk of possible reserves on the order to 200 billion barrels to the more cautious ones who believe that it is feasible to locate deposits that will make it possible to export oil to Brazil, Uruguay and Chile and perhaps to industrialized countries, by the end of the decade.

But there is a third factor that does not generally enter into this kind of analysis and that, nevertheless, the executives of the large foreign corporations take into account to advise a large-scale investment policy in Argentina as the firmness, coherence and continuity of the political process is observed. That factor is the human resource, undoubtedly the one with the highest relative level on the continent, even in spite of the qualitative deterioration undergone in the last three decades by our education.

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
To summarize, both the repeatedly expressed desire of the Armed Forces and the calling of the civilians and our country's objective conditions indicate that the road is cleared for moving toward the democratization of our institutions. Of course, the success of this undertaking requires a fine handling of timing, awareness by all Argentinians that it is not possible to take a false step and that they have to be sure that they are waking on firm ground at each step. If this desire is accompanied by an understanding of the Argentine phenomenon by the large Western industrial nations, we cannot doubt the final result. Argentina will consolidate its republican institutions and its influence will also help the process of democratization to move forward in the Southern Cone.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ARGENTINA

UK SUGGESTS TRANSFER OF FALKLANDS' SOVEREIGNTY

LD261303 London THE TIMES in English 26 Nov 80 p 1

[Report by Michael Frenchman: "Transfer of Falklands Sovereignty Proposed"]

[Text] Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentina, according to a report reaching London last night. The islands, which are in the South Atlantic some 450 miles off the coast of Argentina, have been the subject of a 100-year-old dispute between Argentina and Britain.

This is said to be one of a number of options which are being put to the islanders by Mr Nicholas Ridley, minister of state in the foreign office, responsible for Latin America, who is now in the Falklands.

According to Air Commodore B. G. Frow, of the Falkland Island office in London, Mr Ridley addressed a meeting of the islands' sheepowners association and told them that Argentina was getting impatient at the lack of progress in the attempts to solve the problem.

Mr Ridley suggested that it would be in the islanders' best interest if they agreed to a transfer of sovereignty. The other options are a 25-year-freeze over the sovereignty issue, and a lease of the islands similar to that in force for Hong Kong.

Air Commodore Frow said that the lease-back solution, which has been raised before, is the one which is preferred by Whitehall.

A spokesman at the foreign office said last night that he could neither confirm nor deny the reports as they were awaiting a report themselves on the results of Mr Ridley's talks.

He continued: "There are no proposals as such. The government has been considering since the April exploratory talks with the Argentine republic how best to achieve a solution of this difficult problem which would be acceptable to all parties. Mr Ridley is now consulting the islanders to establish their views on a basis for further talks with the Argentines."

When asked if Britain intended to cede the sovereignty of the islands to Argentina the spokesman said they were looking for a solution which everyone could live with.

He added: "The important thing is the wishes of the islanders. If they agree, we can explore the possible basis for a solution. However, no solution can be finally agreed without the endorsement of the islanders and parliament."

The island's legislative council is to meet to discuss the propositions. This is the first time that such a package of alternatives has been put to the islanders publicly.

During his meeting with the sheepowners, Mr Ridley said that another option would be to break off talks altogether but he felt that this might antagonize the Argentine Government.

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COUNTRY SECTION

COLOMBIA

MILITARY STRENGTH VERSUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jun 80 p 60-61

[Article by Alberto Carbone]

[Text] Colombia is one of the four Latin American countries--the others are Brazil, Mexico and Cuba--whose armed forces have taken part in military operations outside the continent.\* The Colombian armed forces (FAC) were part of the UN forces during the Korean War; and the Colombian navy sent a ship, the frigate "Almirante Padilla," which, with a 140-man crew under the command of Capt Julio Cesar Reyes Canal, formed part of the UN Naval Forces in charge of surveillance and blockade in the Sea of Japan. The army furnished a battalion (1,012 soldiers and 42 officers) under the command of Lt Col Jaime Polonia Puyo, also a writer and historian. This Colombian battalion played an important part in the battle for Old Baldy Hill near the present armistice line which separates the two Koreas. Colombian casualties during the Korean War were 140 dead and 517 wounded and missing.

Before the Korean War, the FAC fought an international war on the continent, when they confronted Peru between 1932 and 1933 for the possession of the Leticia Trapezoid. (See DEFENSA No 21) Since 1948, the year when liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was assassinated, the Colombian army has waged a continuous battle against guerrillas. The assassination of Gaitan set off a bloody conflict between the two main parties in Colombia--the liberals and the conservatives--which ended 10 years later with an estimated total of 200,000 deaths. This period is known in Colombia by the name of "La Violencia."

The 1958 agreement between liberals and conservatives to alternate in power put an end to the civil war, but new forces took up guerrilla warfare. At present the FAC is fighting against guerrilla movements with pro-Castro, pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese ideologies. These prolonged campaigns to secure domestic order have given the Colombian army profound experience in counterinsurgency, which is summarized in a doctrine worked out by the Infantry School. The Colombian army's antiguerrilla policy can be summed up in these four points:

---

\* Brazil with an expeditionary force during World War II which was integrated into the U.S. 5th Army in Italy; Mexico with a squadron of P-47s which took part in the closing months of the war in the Pacific in the Philippine theater; Cuba in recent years with contingents in the wars in Angola and Ethiopia.

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1. The guerrilla lives off the civilian population of the affected area. He receives supplies and information and is hidden by this population, which protects him through sympathy or fear. Conclusion: it is essential to deprive him of the support of the civilian population.

2. The guerrilla operates in combat by conditioning his actions to those of the regular army, watching for its mistakes, weaknesses, carelessness or lack of flexibility in order to strike at vulnerable points with his forces. Conclusion: it is essential to become irregular, to depart from routine, to lighten equipment, to adapt one's own actions to those of the enemy, all the while preserving the advantages of regular units.

3. The guerrilla seeks to compensate for his material disadvantages by detailed knowledge of the terrain and the protection of night. Conclusion: the troops should know the terrain as thoroughly as the enemy, and move him out of it, both by night and by day.

4. The guerrilla, the armed band, is not a cause, but a result. Therefore the cause must be discovered, and made to disappear. The specialized antiguerrilla nucleus of the Colombian army is made up of a "ranger" battalion in the garrison of Tolomaida, some 100 kilometers to the southeast of Bogota. The Colombian troops receive instruction in counterinsurgency. Soldiers from Ecuador and Venezuela are also trained in that establishment.

However, the FAC, since the decade of the 1960's, has acquired certain equipment designed for use in case of major conflict; if there should be a worsening of the disagreement existing between Colombia and Venezuela over the demarcation of the continental shelf of both countries in the Gulf of Maracaibo. The Guajira Peninsula is a quadrangle 100 km wide by 120 km long, which closes off the Gulf of Venezuela to the west in the oil-rich area of Maracaibo. Some 12,000 square kilometers belong to Colombia, and 2,600 to Venezuela. The cause of the tension is the oil deposits of Lake Maracaibo--thanks to which Venezuela is one of the leading oil producers of the world--which probably extend under the waters of the gulf. It is important for Colombia to secure a wider expanse of its territorial waters along the Guajira peninsula. Venezuela considers the gulf to be an inland sea which it owns completely. Negotiations have been dragging on for years, with periodic peaks of tension. Finally, the FAC is in charge of the struggle against the drug traffic.

#### General Information on the Country

Population: 26,520,000  
Military Service: 2 years  
Total Armed Forces: 67,500  
Gross National Product: \$19.3 billion (estimated)  
Defense Costs: \$215 million in 1979  
Army:  
Troops: 55,000  
11 infantry brigades (regional brigades)  
1 Presidential guard  
1 ranger battalion  
4 airborne battalions  
1 AA artillery battalion  
6 battalions of mechanized cavalry

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26 of infantry, 7 of artillery  
6 engineer units  
Armament:  
M4-A3 medium tanks, M-3 A1 light tanks  
M-8 and M-20 armored vehicles  
48 105 mm M-101 howitzers, 40 M-1 40 mm cannon  
Navy:  
Troops: 8,000 (including 2,800 naval riflemen)  
2 Type 209 submarines  
2 SX-506 pocket submarines, less than 100 tons  
3 destroyers (2 Halland, 1 ex-U.S. Sumner)  
6 ex-U.S. frigates (1 APD, 1 Courtney, 4 Asheville)  
16 patrol boats of less than 100 tons  
2 Battalions of marines  
Bases: Cartagena, Buenaventura  
Air Force:  
4,500 men, 18 combat aircraft  
1 combat and reconnaissance squadron with 14 Mirages-500A, 4 SCORD/D  
Transport: 2 C-130Bs, 5 C-54s, 19 C-47s, 2 HS-748s, 1 F-28, 10 DHC-2s, 3 Piper  
PA-23s  
Helicopters: 13 AH-1As, 3 UH-1Bs, 6 UH-1Hs, 1 UH-1N, 20 OH-6As, 8 OH-13s  
R.530 air-to-ground missiles  
Paramilitary Forces:  
National Police: 50,000 troops

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

UN ENVOY SAYS WEST PROVOKES FLOW OF REFUGEES

PA022225 Havana PRELA in English 1812 GMT 2 Dec 80

[Text] United Nations, 3 Dec (PL)--Cuba denounced the Western countries' attempts to meddle in the internal affairs of the developing countries through so-called "international cooperation to prevent a new flow of refugees."

Cuba's permanent representative Raul Roa Kouri censured the FRG and the United States for attempting to create an international body which "will control the flow of refugees" which the capitalist countries themselves have provoked with the exploitation of the so-called Third World and their support of repressive (?forces).

When addressing the special political commission related to the topic proposed by the FRG, Roa Kouri pointed out that the Western countries are trying to legalize a mechanism which will protect them from any economic affection produced by the emigration which they themselves have promoted.

The Cuban ambassador rated the attempt as an "insult to the intelligence of our peoples" and "shamefaced [few words indistinct] sovereignty and their human rights."

In his address he also denounced the attempts of the U.S. delegation to rate as "refugees" the emigrants who left Cuba legally and voluntarily with their [word indistinct] visas and passports and in accordance with the Cuban migration laws.

Roa Kouri recalled that for 20 years the United States has been encouraging the illegal departure of Cuban citizens through hijackings of planes and ships, and that in the first years of the revolution it received war criminals with open arms and provoked the departure of professionals and technicians from Cuba.

"Those who for years kept Cuba in a state of underdevelopment, illiteracy and ill-health, striving afterwards to block our independent development, to even destroy our revolution, are greatly responsible for the existence of conditions which still lead to potential or real emigrations in Cuba and all the underdeveloped countries.

The Cuban representative drew the delegations' attention to the fact that the repentant concern for the flow of refugees on the part of the Western countries practically ignores the real problems of refugees caused by the existence of regimes like those of South Africa and Israel.

He also underlined that those same Western countries are reluctant to note the urgent need of taking steps leading to the new international economic order, "of finding a peaceful and wise solution to the injustices and inequalities between the world of opulence and the world of hunger," as a way to contain one world migration phenomenon.

In his address Roa Kouri also pointed out that the FRG's proposal makes no reference to the brain drain, inasmuch as it is in the interest of the Western countries to promote the exodus of highly qualified personnel from the developing countries with the utilization of methods of a migratory, wage and ideological nature.

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

DOCTOR STATES 700 'SPECIALISTS' WORKING IN ANGOLA

PA092008 Havana PRELA in English 1924 GMT 9 Dec 80

[Text] Luanda, 10 Dec (PL)--[date as received] The head of the Cuban medical mission in Angola, Doctor Saidel Sanchez, said that there are hundreds of specialists and health workers from the largest of the Antilles working in this country.

At an interview granted to PRENSA LATINA, Sanchez underlined the importance of a scientific meeting held in this capital on December 3, and which was attended by 250 delegates.

During that meeting, he recalled, 90 scientific papers were discussed, eight of which obtained awards and others mentions.

Questioned about Cuban medical collaboration with Angola, Sanchez stated that this dates back to the middle of 1967, and there are now close to 700 specialists (300 of them technical personnel) working in 17 of the 18 Angolan provinces.

He added that next year that contingent will be increased by 50 new members.

When speaking about the teaching aspect of the medical collaboration, the head of the group of Cuban health workers stressed that this is applied with a high scientific level in surgery, pediatrics, obstetrics and general medicine, specialties which have four university professors.

Another 42 specialist instructors of intermediate level technicians give classes in provincial capitals, in disciplines such as dietetics and microbiology, among others, he said.

The Cuban official underlined the work of the internationalist doctors when attending the victims of South Africa's systematic armed attacks against this country.

When listing the achievements of Cuban medical collaboration in Angola, during the last 5 years, Sanchez referred in particular to the results of the preventive work, as well as the high valoration given by this people to the work of the Antillean doctors.

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

WESTERN MEDIA ATTACK ON IOJ CRITICIZED

PA141805 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1440 GMT 14 Dec 80

[By Pedro Garcia of PRENSA LATINA]

[Text] [No dateline received] The open sabotage and destabilization being promoted and intensified through the so-called free flow of information by the United States and the Western powers against the socialist nations, is currently acquiring dangerous dimensions.

The intensified propaganda campaign against the socialist community is centralized in Europe and quite particularly on the work being performed by the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), that is headquartered in Prague.

This is by no means accidental, according to the principal Western publicity spokesmen, and is due to the fact that the organization is seated in a socialist country and that most of its views have been heeded by the underdeveloped nations, the UNESCO and other specialized UN entities.

It was precisely on the recommendation of the IOJ and the nonaligned nations, with the socialist states' support, that the so-called free flow of information started. However it is claimed that it is free only on the side of the capitalist nations.

The fundamental objectives of such a strategy of misinformation are to divide the nonaligned nations, neutralize IOJ efforts and discredit the socialist nations, as has been exposed by recent documents released by that international organization.

The true facts, however, published by the United Nations and by the IOJ belie such claims. It was precisely the developed capitalist nations, particularly the United States, which openly used pressure and blackmail to force the closing the UNESCO's communications branch as such and the return of its functions to the organization's cultural sector, taking away its legal status, decisionmaking power and influence

Elsewhere, 95 percent of that alleged free flow is handled through the capitalist logic and depends on the market and the commercial values of 130 publicity agencies in 45 countries, all of which are mostly financed by U.S. capital, or totally owned by that nation's transnationals.

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Thus, it is impossible to believe the editors of ORBIS, organ of the Research Institute on Foreign Affairs of Tuft University, in the United States, which in its executive staff includes William Kintner, Robert Strauss and Nils Wessels, former officials and advisers of the State Department, and some members of the CIA such as Richard Bissell, one of the operation chiefs of the aggression on Playa Giron, in Cuba, in 1961.

This publication, as has been stressed by the IOJ in its various documents, encourages and leads a systematic campaign charging the socialist bloc with trying to control information international channels.

ORBIS and its ideologists, also supported by U.S. foundations such as Ford, Carnegie and Guggenheim, claim that the Marxist-Leninist IOJ members act as spokesmen for the socialist bloc in the growing and ever more sharp confrontation of the so-called Third World with the presumed free Western press.

In recent years, such a policy emphasizes on the "sensationalist defense of the so-called socialist nations' dissidents" which, according to the IOJ, is the same as ignoring the real problems affecting the true human rights of 75 percent of the world's population, threatening the climate of detente and the possibilities of peace created with great effort by the Helsinki Conference.

To the IOJ, such a free flow of information "does not try to establish social justice, but tries to improve the international image of governments that resort systematically to violence in order to defend class privileges and remain indefinitely in power." It also tries to divide, discredit and destabilize demands for a new international information order.

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

FIVE YEARS OF COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS REVIEWED

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 31 Oct 80 pp 16-23

[Article by Gregorio Hernandez: "Five Years of Cuban Communications"]

[Text]. With the date of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba drawing near, we have wanted to make a general review in this article of the work done in the past 5-year period in the communications branch in our country.

Coaxial Cable

There are several areas of information to be discussed. Before that, however, we shall start with the most important work of infrastructure undertaken, the coaxial cable, following that with other subjects which range from television, radio, telephones and international communications, to postal, telegraph and press distribution services, among others.

"We must advance as much as possible in the installation of 1,800 kilometers of coaxial cable, a service which guarantees the introduction of national telephone dialing during the 5-year period. At the same time, the long-distance network must prepare to absorb the increase in traffic during that period."

This is what is stated textually in the resolution on transportation and communications approved by the First Party Congress.

We can state, therefore, that the objective of the coaxial cable consists of satisfying the needs for telephone, telegraph, data transmission and long-distance channels for radiobroadcasting in our country. It will also be used as a reserve for one television channel in case of a breakdown in the existing National Microwave Network. Moreover, the coaxial cable can serve as a means of press transmission via facsimile, eliminating the need for its transportation by air to other provinces.

First of all let us say that at the beginning of the 70's the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Cuba, respectively, signed a technical-economic cooperation agreement, and among the agreements reached, was the planning, construction, installation and placing in operation of a cable communications line. This line will join the 14 provincial capitals from Pinar del Rio to Guantanamo, with branches to other large cities: San Cristobal, Artemisa, Guanajay, Guines, San Antonio de los Banos, San Jose de las Lajas, Mayari and Palma Soriano.

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Although the entire system will be completed in the next 5-year period, its execution had been scheduled in such a way that it could be used in sections, that is, when two points have been linked and they have the necessary equipment, planned telephone channels or links between those points could be put into service.

#### Cooperation With the USSR

From the beginning, Soviet help has been decisive. At first Cuban technicians did not know this new system and it was necessary to obtain Soviet help and the necessary vehicles and machinery. In this 1973-1974 period, the technical contribution of 40 Soviet specialists (communications engineers, civil engineers, architects, geologists, topographers) who worked with Cuban technicians was outstanding. In this aspect they traveled and studied many variants of routes for the coaxial cable.

On the basis of this work, the technical and execution plans of the technological part of the project were prepared in the USSR and contracts began to be signed for the shipment of machinery, transportation, technological and electrical power supply equipment, cables, materials, and diesel plants, which made up the complete equipment for the construction and installation activity of the coaxial cable.

#### Cable Installations

All this complex of installations, which are now being built, is to continue under construction during the next 5-year period of 1981-1985. At this time around 20 Soviet technicians are in Cuba to provide help in the construction and laying of the cable, installation of repeater houses and the installation of technological equipment. A large quantity of machinery has come from the Soviet Union for this purpose: bulldozers, tractors, excavators, cranes and cable-laying machines, all necessary for the execution of a project of such large scope. The quantity of material received reaches some 6,000 tons, with a value of 12 million pesos.

On the Cuban side, work is going on in the construction of 11 exchanges, of which three have been practically completed, and five of a total of 46 installations to be completed have already been delivered. This year it was proposed that nine more installations be initiated, which will provide great possibilities for long-distance service.

Parallel with civil construction work, there is the digging of trenches and the laying of 380 kilometers of symmetrical coaxial cable of a total of 2,179 kilometers. In the construction of telephone ducts, which total 80 kilometers, 30 of them are already available. The installation as such has run into difficulties such as 650 highway crossings, 235 river and dam crossings, construction of 250 unattended repeater houses, as well as the installation and placing in operation of the equipment necessary in each unattended telephone exchange, semi-terminal and repeater station.

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#### Present Status

As of 1978, with the creation of the First Front in the municipality of San Jose de las Lajas, cable excavation and installation work began. In 1979, the Second Front was inaugurated in the municipality of Ranchuelo.

Up to date, nearly 400 kilometers of cable have been installed and 35 kilometers of ducts are available. There are 28 repeater station houses in the process of installation. So far this year, a good boost has been given to civil construction by the Ministry of Construction, with contracts for 27 installations distributed to 11 provinces.

#### Telephone Distribution

Going on to this subject, which is always of much interest, we can show as a statistical figure that at the end of 1975 the number of telephones existing in the country was 3.18 instruments per 100 inhabitants, this figure being affected by the City of Havana, which had around 11 instruments per 100 inhabitants.

In the 5 years between 1975 and 1979, the number of automatic switching telephone exchanges increased by 94, which represented an 87-percent increase in growth, making it possible to offer this service to localities and towns, primarily in rural zones, whose communications in some cases were manual and in others were entirely lacking. As is logical to conclude, the increase in telephone exchanges brought with it an increase in the availability of equipped subscriber lines, broadening the possibilities of providing this service to a larger population in keeping with the economic development of the country. The installation or automation of 57 exchanges of this type was planned for 1980.

As a result of the increase in the number of automatic telephone exchanges in use, the number of equipped lines increased by 41,600 in the 1975-1979 period, which meant a growth of 14.8 percent. The foregoing has allowed a substantial increase in facilities for facing the growing demand for telephone service in the state and residential sectors, depending on existing priorities.

These installations also made it possible to increase automatic telephone lines by 458,000 nationally, an increase in growth of seven percent between 1975 and 1979. This year, according to schedule, this figure will increase by 12,100 new automatic telephone lines installed. By the end of this year, this will allow a level of telephone service automation in the country of about 97.7 percent.

Telephone terminals in service, which include every type of instrument in use--main sets, extensions, public telephones, and so forth--have experienced an increase of 58,800 new instruments from 1975 to 1979, which means an increase of 19.7 percent. The installation of 29,200 new terminals is planned for this year.

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The result of all the foregoing demonstrates that the number of telephones, which at the end of 1975 was 3.18 instruments per 100 inhabitants, increased by December 1979 to 3.63, it being estimated that by the end of 1980 it will have increased to 3.88 telephones per 100 inhabitants.

The increases we have listed have resulted from compliance with installations plans for new telephone exchanges, primarily in rural localities and towns and the installation in the main cities of private switchboards with their corresponding extensions.

The main difficulty faced in this period is in the City of Havana. This is due to the fact that exchanges in this province are very large by comparison with those of the rest of the country and because in their majority they are of an old technology of capitalist manufacture. This also is the case in the cable network of the outside plant, which consists mainly of lead-sheathed cables installed more than 40 years ago. In some areas, because of the lack of underground cable conduits, the network has not been able to grow, as is the case of the Marianao zone, for example.

Therefore, the increase in equipped telephone lines in the City of Havana during the 1975-1980 period has been practically zero and the increase in telephone stations has been possible only because of the installation of private switchboards with their corresponding extensions, which means that in this period the number of telephone instruments in the City of Havana has practically remained static.

#### Television

As we all know, radio and television are services shared in our country by two central state agencies: The Ministry of Communications in matters relative to installation, maintenance and operation of the systems, and the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television (ICRT), the latter with similar responsibilities with respect to studios and programs.

In the Cuban long-range broadcasting plan, television occupies a prominent place due to the important role it plays in the education, information and recreation of the people.

Before the victory of the revolution, television in Cuba had been developed under the control of private commercial interests and, therefore, service was provided to those areas with the greatest buying power such as the cities of Havana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, Holguin and Santiago de Cuba.

To see television in the rest of the cities or towns of the country, it was generally necessary to install home antennas of unconventional heights and complexity, which in most cases only allowed the reception of mediocre pictures. In other areas there was absolutely no service.

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To improve that deformed structure, which did not benefit genuine national interests, the revolution decided to establish two national programs or channels-- what is now Channel 6 and Tele-Rebelde--and to extend the service to as much territory as possible, using existing equipment for that purpose. This made it possible to add the service to other important cities or regions such as Pinar del Rio, San Cristobal, the Isle of Youth, Guantanamo, Baracoa, Moa and Nicaro, although with only one channel to some of them.

The positive results obtained in the first year of the decade of the 70's were very superior to those found in 1959, without having made any expenditures of any size. However, it was necessary to attend to other needs in areas not covered or poorly served and to confront the limited possibilities and aging of the equipment which made up the system as a whole. The means used to carry the signal originating in the studios of Havana to each of the transmitters installed in the country from Pinar del Rio to Baracoa can only be described as exceptional. At that time that was the greatest problem and the reason why the service to more than half of the national territory which enjoyed the service was of inferior quality or absolutely intolerable.

One of the directives of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, dealt with this problem and it oriented the work of the 1976-1980 5-year period in four main directions:

The planning, acquisition and installation of a new main artery of the National Microwave System, which would serve as a support for the national telecommunications services from Pinar del Rio to Santiago de Cuba, to replace the insufficient and obsolete means in use up to that date.

To extend television service to new areas and improve it in others, all of this in both channels.

Replace that equipment, which because it no longer had spare parts on the international market or because of deterioration, no longer guaranteed the quality of service.

Introduce the technology required to make possible color transmissions on Channel 6.

After important studies, intensive planning and installation work by workers, technicians and engineers of the Ministry of Communications and its enterprises, the plan conceived was mainly completed around the middle of 1977. As we shall see further on, it consisted of four main areas of work.

#### National Microwave System

At a cost of almost seven million pesos, the main artery of this system was installed. It is of French technology, of high capacity and quality, and it performs the function of linking the main national centers by microwaves, by means of which--using secondary links--information handled by the national telecommunications services (telephone, telex, telegrams, radio, television and so forth) is distributed through local networks. Essentially, this main artery has the

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capability for satisfying present needs and those of the immediate future of the country, with 960 telephone channels, two video channels and the national radio programs, all of this in both directions, that is, in both directions between Pinar del Rio to Guantanamo.

The system consists of 27 stations or buildings provided with equipment, towers and antennas, suitably distributed throughout 1,000 kilometers, stations which like links merge with the next one and make up the chain.

Particularly for television service, this new artery has meant changes which are hardly comparable to the previous situation, because even when installations for providing the service existed in the interior of the country, the signal they had to handle (video and audio) was poor when not useless.

At this time, this network allows the same high degree of fidelity and definition from one end of the country to the other on both national channels and, at the same time, the same facilities in a reverse direction.

As far as the Isle of Youth is concerned, a branch of that network was made available, which allowed the same high level of quality on both channels.

Another important task performed during the 5-year period was that of providing all the installations belonging to Channel 6 with the equipment required for color transmission and now this channel has those facilities for color transmission to the entire country.

#### Radiobroadcasting

The systems which provide radio services in Cuba are organized into three basic structures called "national networks," "provincial networks" and "local stations."

The national networks (5) are individual systems made up to a number of installations scattered throughout the territory so as to transmit a certain program. They are RADIO REBELDE, RADIO LIBERACION, RADIO PROGRESO, RADIO RELOJ and RADIO MUSICAL. The provincial networks (14 at this time) have a similar responsibility but restricted to the province in question, while the local stations are restricted to a municipality or city.

These three structures took shape as of the victory of the revolution in response to needs of a political nature, for which reason it was necessary to change the availability of the largest part of the infrastructure inherited from capitalism and bring this important mass news medium to the entire country. With the exception of a few transmitters acquired in the decade of the 60's, the equipment for the service in these systems had more than 20 years in use in 1975, much of it made by hand in the country for profit. In the early years of the decade of the 70's, the radio service thus organized was also affected by other problems:

Large areas of national territory with scant population had acquired new socio-economic value.

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The political-administrative division of the country caused an increase of from six to 14 provinces.

The technology inherited and acquired to that date was not enough to satisfy even the minimum coverage required by the political division of the country.

Because of a certain suitable geographic configuration and formation in some regions of the northern coast, the only radiated signals used were those produced by biased foreign missions.

Some of the 118 transmitters which made up the three systems had to be withdrawn from service because they did not meet the minimum requirements.

All these problems led to the preparation of a long-term development plan, a part of which was to be put into execution in the 1976-1980 5-year period. This part of the plan had two main objectives: increase the coverage of three of the five national networks and develop and expand the provincial networks in accordance with the new political-administrative division. For this it was necessary to make the following major investments:

Acquire 11 10-kilowatt, and 28 1-kilowatt transmitters made in Japan with all their auxiliary equipment.

Provide the trunk network of the French-made National Microwave System, also in the process of installation in the 5-year period, with the suitable facilities for carrying the five national programs to the various distribution points throughout the country.

Build 24 galvanized steel towers averaging some 100 meters in height each.

Build 24 buildings for the new radiobroadcasting installations.

Relocate 24 of the 118 transmitters in service.

The total amount of these changes brought the following results:

The equipment of the five national networks was increased from 54 transmitters in the entire country in 1975, to 73 in 1980, and that of the provincial networks from 25 transmitters in 1975 to 47 in 1980.

RADIO REBELDE, RADIO LIBERACION and RADIO PROGRESO programs were provided with more power or were heard for the first time in Bahia Honda, the Isle of Youth, Trinidad, Media Luna, Mayari Arriba, Pilon, Guantanamo and Cienfuegos.

The 14 provinces each had a system to transmit their provincial program to all their territory.

As a conclusion to this radiobroadcasting aspect of communications, we can say that the general quality of all the service improved appreciably and the basic technical conditions were created so that in the successive stages of development the programs of national coverage would have the same quality as they had in the capital of the country.

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#### International Communications

Dealing with this other area of work, let us say at the beginning that the services of telephone, telegraph, radiobroadcasting, and generally any means of long-distance communications by electrical means between two or more countries, are international services.

To the overall means of communications, such as submarine cables across the seas and oceans and communications satellites, are joined the national systems to make up among them the world communications network, these being the means whereby traffic of these services is moved.

When the revolution triumphed in 1959, the international services of the country were handled through the United States and the two means available for it were a submarine cable with a capability for 24 telephone channels and a microwave link using the mode known as "tropospheric scatter," with a capability of 36 telephone channels and one video channel occasionally, the latter being used at the expense of a reduction in quality of the telephone channels. Economic relationships established before the operation of those means were such that the loss in foreign credits for that purpose, and other obvious reasons, led to the establishment of other means such as short-wave links.

These links were established with 13 countries for telegraphic services and were of extraordinary usefulness until 1975 when the Caribe earth station of the Intersputnik system was put into operation. This system has a capability of 24 telephone channels and one television channel with socialist countries.

As services were consolidated by means of the space system, short-wave links were abolished or placed in reserve because of their inferior quality.

During the 5-year period about to end, two important international events were held in Cuba: the Eleventh World Youth and Student Festival and the Sixth Summit Meeting of Nonaligned Countries. Because of their nature, they required international communications facilities, which added and adapted to the future plans for these services, led to the significant increase achieved in this period. We shall make a short review of them.

The capability of the Caribe earth station was increased from 24 to 60 telephone channels. At the same time, it began to operate permanently with geostationary satellites, avoiding the four daily inoperative periods to which the system was subjected during the changes in satellites in elliptical orbit. This was an important advance in this link system.

Another earth station near the previous one was installed for operation of the Intelsat system. It has 24 telephone and one television channels.

The link capability with Jamaica was increased from two to 24 telephone channels.

An international automatic exchange with a capacity of 120 lines was installed.

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The sum total of these new capabilities meant a considerable increase because there was an increase of from 93 telephone and one television channel in 1975, to three channels [as published], which meant the establishment of new direct relationships with several more countries, and the way to reach others was made possible without having to be relayed through other nations, thus deriving economic benefits.

Together with the increase in capabilities, important changes in the methods of operating these services were accomplished, for example: The automation of international telex through four international automatic communications centers located in other countries. This allowed any user of our national network to dial directly any of the 124 countries in the world having this automatic service. These facilities increased the capabilities of telegraph channels from 16 in 1975, to 64 in the 5-year period.

International telephone service began to operate in semiautomatic form for outgoing traffic (from Cuba abroad) to the more than 80 countries which had the facilities for it, significantly reducing the waiting time in this service. This also took place in incoming traffic from many countries, but automatically, which had these facilities.

These facilities were obtained, increasing direct telephone links between Cuba and other countries from 10 in 1975, to 17 during the 5-year period.

Finally, with respect to international communications, let us say that our Caribbean island has enough facilities to establish television links with more than 100 countries when necessary.

#### Postal Service and Telegraph

On this subject, which also includes distribution of the press and times of delivery, we hope to write an article soon, given the amount of information available.

We do want to say with respect to the efficiency of the postal service from 1975 to 1979, that there were no significant improvements because times of delay in handling correspondence remained almost at the levels of 1975.

The various factors which have contributed to this situation are more or less problems of operational discipline as well as supervisor laxity, low rate of development with respect to the rest of the communications branch in our country, organizational shortcomings, difficulties with the labor force and in the training of skilled personnel. Also present are difficulties with personal and other transportation.

In 1980, although the situation mentioned above persists, there has been some improvement in the quality of that service, which tends to approach the levels planned.



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With respect to telegraph, we wish to state that since 1978 some recovery has been made, not all that is necessary, of course. As a negative example we cite the fact that in 1979 approximately 700,000 telegrams were delivered with delays of more than 5 hours.

With respect to messenger service, the most outstanding negative facts are shortage of messengers and the existence of a system of incentive which does not guarantee quality standards or the permanence of the man in the job.

Press Distribution

There has been a constant increase in the distribution of national magazines and weeklies since 1976 due to the increases in copies printed, assimilation of the distribution formerly made by some publishers and the appearance of new publications.

The quality goal for the present 5-year period establishes that 85 percent of the morning newspapers must be distributed by 1300. The goal has been met, although there was a decline in 1979 caused, among other things, by the temporary closing of the Camaguey and Guantanamo airports, cancellations and changes in schedules of Cubana de Aviacion flights, late publication by some publishers and the closing for nearly a month of the Jose Marti Airport due to Hurricane Frederick.

During that time, the press of the eastern provinces and Camaguey was taken by highway to the latter and from there by light aircraft to each of the provinces mentioned.

We also wish to add that all direct distribution made by some publishers was taken over by the Ministry of Communications.

Elsewhere, the creation of a commercial network of newsstands specializing in the sale of newspapers and magazines has greatly improved the facilities for acquisition by the population, although it is still not enough to satisfy that need completely.

At this time, work is going on in developing another type of newsstand, using less costly materials than lumber. This is a prefabricated prototype, which allows an increase in their production. It is expected that the next 5-year period will end with the construction of 1,000 newsstands and establishments for the sale of the press.

National Telex

This system is one of the main means for the exchange of information between the agencies of the economy, as well between the political and mass organizations. It is the first step in the development of the public network for the transmission of information.

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The telex system began to operate in 1964 in the City of Havana with 110 lines, rapidly spreading to the rest of the country. Thus we see that in 1972 the telex system had 800 lines installed and 430 subscribers connected to the network. When the First Party Congress was held, it consisted of 14 automatic exchanges scattered throughout national territory. It already had 1,380 lines, of which 700 were in operation.

We can also report that the telex network will continue to grow and it is expected that by the end of 1980 only 3,660 of the 4,220 lines planned will be installed, since Santa Clara and Camaguey will not have the buildings required (now under construction) until the end of this year. Around 1,941 of these lines were in operation, which means there are 195 subscribers per million inhabitants, a ratio lower than the 333 per million forecast. This was due primarily to nondelivery of telegraph multiplex equipment by the usual suppliers which meant they had to be acquired elsewhere, with the subsequent delay since it could not be obtained in what is left of the year.

#### Data Transmission

Parallel with the national telex system, and in experimental form, a transmission network is being installed in coordination with the Ministry of the Sugar Industry for obtaining daily reports on the harvest. A pilot plan, which includes the interconnection of the sugarmills in Cienfuegos Province with the computer center installed in the capital of that province, has been prepared.

It is the intention of the Ministry of Communications to study and develop a national public data transmission network. The old State Science and Technology Committee included that study as a principal state problem for the 1976-1980 period, calling the study which consisted of six subjects the PPE-022-Data Transmission.

Within the framework of the plan of this PPE, several pieces of equipment have been developed with satisfactory results.

With respect to the connection between the computer centers, a large investment is being made, which consists, as we said at the beginning, of the installation and placing in operation of the coaxial system with the help of the Soviet Union. This will allow the availability of high quality links for this purpose.

This is the end of this picture, highly summarized, of the main areas of developing and providing services in the communications branch, so important in economic, political and social relationships, during the 5-year period about to end.

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COUNTRY SECTION

EL SALVADOR

CANADIAN EX-MINISTER AMONG LAST TO SEE NUNS

PA061303 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0035 GMT 6 Dec 80

[Text] Montreal, 5 Dec (PL)--Former Quebec Minister Jacques Couture said that in El Salvador people are being massacred and annihilated by the (Military-Christian Democratic) junta.

In an exclusive interview with PRELA this afternoon on his return from El Salvador, the Quebec deputy and Jesuit priest accused the Salvadoran army of murdering the four North American nuns last Tuesday.

Couture, who attended the funerals of the six Revolutionary Democratic Front [FDR] leaders, assassinated 27 November by the government junta, said he was perhaps the last person to see two of the nuns alive and that he had spoken to them on his arrival.

"They were waiting for two other nuns arriving on a later flight. In fact we were almost murdered," he added.

"We left the airport Tuesday at 1800, and a few kilometers from there we were stopped by a military patrol. We were fortunate because one of our companions from the archdiocese recognized one soldier and greeted him. Perhaps this saved us."

This patrol, Couture continued, searched us and it was at this spot where the station wagon in which the four U.S. clergywomen were traveling was found burned.

"I have no doubt that the patrol that stopped us was the same that raped, tortured and murdered the nuns," he added.

The Salvadoran right is doing everything possible to prevent social, political and economic changes in the country. "This is why there are killings daily. They kill those working for the liberation of their people." Couture added.

I hope the murder of the four nuns will make the North American people aware of the situation. I appeal to them in the name of a people being murdered and with whom we must join.

The confrontation in El Salvador, he said, is between the privileged and an impoverished and exploited people; between those who do not want to lose their privileges and wealth and those who want justice and a decent life.

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He said the new FDR leaders were "brave and courageous" and so were the members of the organization, who remained calm during the funerals and did not allow themselves to be provoked by the regime.

He also said that there is systematic persecution against the church "which has sided with the people," especially against many priests and nuns, some of whom have been murdered and are missing.

As for the participation of Christians, the former minister left no room for doubts: "True Christians are with the people, they are for justice and against oppression by the rich."

Concerning the armed struggle, Couture explained that in El Salvador violence is not created by the left: "The left defends itself and fights for a justice. The murderers are the rightists; this can be proven by the bodies found daily."

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COUNTRY SECTION

GRENADA

BRIEFS

GDR DELEGATION VISITS--St Georges, 11 Dec (PL)--A friendship delegation from the GDR ended its visit to Grenada after talks here with government organizations and institutions. The delegation visited government and private enterprises to find out what assistance is needed in various economic areas. An official communique at the end of the visit reported the interest of Grenada and the GDR in strengthening commercial, scientific, and technological cooperation. It was announced that a high-level delegation will visit this Caribbean island next year to work on this cooperation. A delegation from Grenada headed by Deputy Prime Minister [as received] Bernard Coard recently visited Berlin. [PA122104 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1420 GMT 11 Dec 80]

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COUNTRY SECTION

GUATEMALA


BRIEFS

EMBASSY BOMBING--Managua, 7 Dec (ANN)--The Salvadoran Embassy in Guatemala City was destroyed by the explosion of a bomb placed inside by members of the Poor Peoples Guerrilla Army [EGP], it has been learned in this capital. A war communique received here reports that units of "armed workers" of the Otto Rene Castillo Guerrilla Front staged the attack against the embassy of the Salvadoran military junta in the neighboring country. The action was staged last 4 December, says the communique, as "combative support for the struggle of the sister Salvadoran people and their mass fronts" as well as to repudiate the killing of the six revolutionary leaders last week in El Salvador. The guerrillas occupied the embassy building after overpowering the security guards. Afterward they evacuated all persons from the building and exploded a powerful bomb, which completely destroyed the diplomatic installations. The Poor Peoples Guerrilla Army reiterated its unconditional support of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of El Salvador and appealed to all Guatemalan workers to condemn the repression unleashed by the Salvadoran military junta. [Text] [PA071757 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1747 GMT 7 Dec 80]

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
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