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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 53/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

BRIEFS

M-4 MISSILE TEST--The first test of the M-4 missile (10,000 kilometer range) which is to replace the M-3 (6,000 kilometer range) has been effected at Biscarosse [test center?]. The results show it to have received a rating of 20/20 [presumably, perfect]. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 5 Dec 80 p 74]

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

ITALY

## OBJECTIVES OF NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN SUMMARIZED

Rome ATOMO E INDUSTRIA in English 15 Oct 80 pp 8, 9

[Text]

Among the various measures that the sudden fall of the Rome Government has paralysed, the official presentation of the definitive version of the new National Energy Plan (PEN) was of vital importance for the energy future of the country. This document was being completed at the Ministry of Industry, which was making the last modifications resulting from the recent journeys of the Minister himself, Sen. Antonio Bisaglia, to Algeria and to the United States, where he had negotiated the supply of important quantities of primary energy sources for Italy. The program of the new government in the energy field will not be able, however, to depart much from what has already been laid down by this new version of PEN, which, in its main lines, has already been made known, even if not officially.

The aims of the new PEN (which also includes projections to the year 2000) are summed up for 1990 in five main points:

- adoption of a vigorous energy saving policy and of its more rational use in all consumer sectors, so as to contain the energy demand within the limit of 200 Mtoe;
- reduction of the present dependency on oil (68% in 1979) to 50% of the total energy requirements, by limiting imports of crude oil to about 100 million tons, and developing the use of alternative and competitive sources, particularly coal, nuclear, gas and renewable sources;
- maximum recourse possible to national energy sources;
- reduction of the risks of energy procurement through the expansion

of primary sources as well as that of the supplying countries, and the creation of adequate strategic reserves;

— choices of technology and of procurement policy which will favour the Italian industrial system in qualifying and marketing its own products and systems on the international market.

Since the energy consumption foreseen for 1990 without the adoption of containment measures, corresponds to about 220 Mtoe, the main aim of the Plan is to save 20 Mtoe/year to that date. This goal is considered « anything but easy: in fact its attainment calls for determination and the consent of social parties ».

The development rate of the Gross Internal Product on which the Plan has been constructed, is estimated at between 3.0% and 3.5 per cent.

The contribution of national sources to satisfy the energy requirements, is foreseen as follows:

— natural hydroelectric production, in an average hydrological year, will go up from the present 44.5 TWh/year to 50 TWh/year in 1990. For this purpose a large part of the plants that can still be realized will be built and dismantled power stations will be reactivated completely;

— geothermoelectric production will go up from the present 2.5 TWh/year to 4.0 TWh/year. This estimate is based on a high degree of success of the researches in progress and planned;

— the contribution of « new » sources, mainly solar energy, will reach 2 Mtoe/year, as a result of

the implementation of the « renewable Sources » project;

— the production of natural gas will drop slightly from the present 12.5 billion cubic metres to 8 billion cubic metres in 1990, in spite of intensified prospecting efforts for new deposits, particularly to make it possible to create a strategic reserve;

— the production of oil will go up from the present 1.8 Mtoe to 2.5 Mtoe in 1990;

— the production of solid fuels, mainly Sulcis coal and lignite, will reach 2 Mtoe ».

The contribution of the sources just listed (national in the strict sense, with the exclusion, that is, of nuclear energy) corresponds to 24.7 Mtoe. To cover the remaining requirements to reach the goal of 200 Mtoe, it will be necessary to have recourse to the importation of foreign sources amounting to a total of 175.3 Mtoe. The document then analyses the possibilities offered by each of the latter, beginning with coal.

The maximum contribution that can be envisaged altogether for imported coal may reach, in 1990, 55 million tons, corresponding to 34 Mtoe. This will imply a considerable extension of the use of coal for non-electric uses, the implementation of an expanded program of new coal power stations, according to CIPE's directives of 11 January 1980. The realization of this aim involves a series of important actions, specified in the project in question, for the construction of infrastructures and the prompt siting and licensing of the new power stations.

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The maximum contribution that can be envisaged, still for 1990, for imported gas, is 31.4 Mtoe (equal to about 38 billion cubic metres), of which about 24 Mtoe have already been acquired on the basis of contracts; the gas project indicates the necessary actions to permit this strong increase in the consumption of natural gas, in particular as regards the infrastructures of transportation and distribution.

The contribution of nuclear energy should reach a value of at least 10 Mtoe by 1990 through rapid siting for the installation of at least 4,000 Mw, as well as the 2,000 Mw of the Montalto di Castro station. In the meantime it will be necessary to start investigations for the siting of the six other plants for which provision is made in the Enel plan. To cover energy requirements, oil would contribute only 103 Mtoe, of which 101 imported, corresponding to just over 50% of the country's energy demand.

The remaining 103 Mtoe would be covered by oil which would thus pass from 68% in 1979 to 50 per cent in covering Italian total requirements.

For all the initiatives to be taken, the Plan indicates in detail the operators who are made responsible for the attainment of the aims. For each energy source, as well as for all the horizontal actions (saving, research, information, environment), investment estimates have been prepared, amounting to 45-50 thousand billion lire at present value. For supplies of coal and the necessary infrastructures, between 15 and 18 thousand billion will be invested, while just to carry out the savings estimated, an expenditure of 5-6 thousand billion will be necessary.

In particular for the implementation of the nuclear program, an expenditure of 10-12 thousand billion is foreseen. This program makes provision for the coming into operation, by 1990, of 4 plants of 1,000 MWe, in addition, of course,

to Montalto di Castro, and the simultaneous start on the other eight plants foreseen. Also as regards sites, the choices of Piedmont, Lombardy, Friuli and Apulia are confirmed. As far as we know, there are no indications in the Plan about the most recent hypothesis which identified a site in the island of Pianosa.

To carry out the coal plan, a start will be made on the construction of 6 power stations with two groups of 640 MWe. The first two will be constructed in Taranto and Bastida Pancarana on the Po, between Pavia and Voghera, two power stations will be constructed in Gioia Tauro, while the sites have not yet been chosen for the Tuscan one and the Abruzzi one.

This is the new PEN in its aims up to 1990. The authors, however, felt the necessity of attempting an approach also to the intermediate period, as the one that separates us from 2000 is now to be considered. In this perspective the Plan identifies in greater recourse to nuclear energy, also with the complete utilization of the uranium-plutonium cycle, the only solution to the energy problems of that time.

*It seems problematical to formulate hypotheses about energy requirements in the year 2000 — It is said in the part of the new PEN that has been made known —: It is extremely probable, however, that the fundamental outline, drawn for the eighties, will maintain characteristics that are similar qualitatively also for the following decade. The energy strategies for those years will have, that is, the same characteristic as the ones defined so far. By and large, for the year 2000 the maximum contribution that can be foreseen for national primary sources is estimated at 34 Mtoe, broken down as follows: geothermal and solar energy will contribute with about 10 Mtoe/year in 2000; hydroelectric energy, even in the hypothesis of a complete exploitation of resources, cannot be*

more than 12 Mtoe/year, while the contribution of national natural gas will remain in the order of 6.5 Mtoe/year, that of oil about 2.5 Mtoe/year and that of national solid fuels (Sulcis coal) 3 Mtoe/year.

The remaining requirements, which in the year 2000 will inevitably have to be covered with hydrocarbon and coal imports and with recourse to nuclear energy, can be evaluated, as a more hypothesis, around 185-205 Mtoe. In the nineties, therefore, a quota of these requirements (about 72 Mtoe) seems destined to be covered by energy sources for the use of which the present plan already foresees the construction of the plants and infrastructures necessary; it refers, in particular, to coal and nuclear stations (the latter evaluated on the hypothesis that the whole complex of 12 thousand Mw will be constructed) and to the infrastructures for the transportation and distribution of natural gas. As regards the remaining quota of requirements (114-134 Mtoe), the choices remain open as to the energy sources to be adopted: in this framework, taking into account the fact that oil supplies, in the nineties, will have become scarcer and procurement more expensive, the necessity of greater recourse to nuclear energy is envisaged, for which preparation must be made immediately.

Even if the year 2000 may appear a horizon that is still very distant, it must be considered, in fact, that energy choices present very long times of implementation (up to 10-12 years). It is understandable, therefore, that the checks to be carried out and the relative decisions can be postponed further only for a very few years: this, among other things, justifies the decision to make this energy plan a « sliding » one, an updating being planned in the next three years.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PCF, MARCHAIS BECOME MORE ISOLATED IN EUROCOMMUNIST WORLD

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 24 Oct 80 pp 42-43

[Article by Guy Konopnicki: "All the European Communist Parties Against Marchais"]

[Text] Under the thunder of applause of the delegates at the National Conference of the French Communist Party, one man appeared triumphant. That man was obviously Georges Marchais. The leaders of his party are unanimously with him after two years of crises, exclusions and resignations. Nevertheless, something is not quite right in this triumph. The assurance of the Secretary General seems to hide a persistent malaise. Something which worries people at the Place du Colonel Fabien [PCF headquarters]. Marchais knows that some men around him are keeping quiet and waiting for his fall and that they have two discreet and efficient allies, Santiago Carrillo and Enrico Berlinguer. Communism is, after all, an international movement, and although the French Communist Party is constantly putting a new layer of tricolor paint on its politics, nothing can be done against this reality. It is all the more impossible to think of it strictly at the national level that Europe now exists politically, and that outside of some very peculiar groups such as the French Gaullists or Basque and Catalan regionalists, only European currents seem to exist. Whether ecologists, neo-Nazis, socialists, liberals or communists, all the political currents are now continental currents. Within European communism, the French Communists are in a more than delicate situation. The Conference of European Parties, which convened in Brussels last week, consecrated the differences, or rather the lack of agreement, between the French Communist Party and all the other Communist parties. Naturally L'HUMANITE attempted to minimize the impact of a meeting whose three main actors: the Spaniard Carrillo, the Italian Berlinguer, and our very own Marchais were absent. But nobody can deny the concrete result of the conference: whereas the line of the French Communist Party is backed by Moscow, the European Communist Parties, including the French speaking ones, show their preference for the Italians and the Spanish.

French Delegation Humiliated

At the conclusion of the Brussels meeting, Manuel Azcarate, a member of the leadership of the Spanish Communist Party, could hide neither his satisfaction with nor his complaints against the French traitor. And how sizable were his complaints! The French delegation had to submit to humiliation for two whole days. From the very beginning, the Italians and Spanish were imposing an

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unusual style to the discussions. Breaking with the traditional droning of the wooden tongue type of speeches peculiar to communist meetings, they started a frank, direct, and controversy-oriented dialogue. This style breaks not only with the past of the Communist movement, but also with the present of the French Party which, this past weekend at Nanterre, preferred to keep with the old traditions of the triumphant type of speech. People argued in Brussels; in Nanterre, they slept while waiting for applause to awaken them from time to time. Naturally these problems of form are related to political problems, and not just any political problem: for Georges Marchais, the European framework is responsible for the economic crisis, the Federal Republic of Germany is the principal enemy of the workers, and Socialists are traitors throughout Europe. No other European Communist Party follows this kind of reasoning, not even the very pro-Soviet German Communist Party which breathed easier when they saw Helmut Schmidt defeat F. J. Strauss in the last elections. The Italian communists, for instance, are making the search for a union with the German socialists the axis of their European policy. The Spaniards are backing their country's demand for integration within the Common Market. And Manuel Azcarate does not appreciate the opposition of the French Communist Party: "It is the Portuguese Communist Party's right to oppose its country's entrance into the Common Market", he says, "but it is intolerable for the French Communist Party to oppose the acceptance of the Spanish. They defend the privileges of the rich against the poorer countries of Southern Europe."

And he adds: "The attitude of the French is incoherent". There is no chance for European communists to be reassured by reading Charles Fiterman's report from Candidate Marchais' coronation ceremony. While the participants in the Brussels meeting agree in considering that the crisis is neither French or European, and not even Western since it involves the Socialist countries themselves, Charles Fiterman proclaims "The crisis comes from nowhere else". And the whole orientation of the electoral campaign of the French Communist Party rests on this illusion of a French solution, on the will to slow the pace of European construction. For the French Communist Party, Europe is still America's private hunting preserve while on the other hand, Manuel Azcarate states "Europe is easing up its subordination to the Americans. The French and German governments and the European capitalists are trying to build their own power. Should we fight against this?"

The differences are certainly not new. Enrico Berlinguer did not hesitate to establish contacts with Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and even the French Socialists. His representative in Brussels Gianni Cervetti told me frankly "we see the continuation of a leftist majority in the Bundestag as a positive element in the European situation". If such a statement were made by a French leftist politician, he would draw upon himself the fire of L'HUMANITE.

French Communist Party Prefers Husayn and Qadhafi to Israel

Statements such as these are indeed made by communists. It is certainly possible to believe that there are several communist lines in Europe but, once again, we no longer live in the days of nations and Georges Marchais' actions disturb his "brothers" because they occur on the same continent. The brothers in question are all the more worried that they fear a renewal of fascism after the terrorist incidents in Bologna, Munich, and Paris and that they are hoping for a large

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scale anti-fascist European mobilization which would include the forces of the Democrats, Christian Democrats and Socialists. But there again, the French Communist Party stands alone. Everywhere in Europe, Communists have suggested unitarian demonstrations to their socialist friends whereas in Paris, Georges Marchais was refusing to appear at the head of a parade together with the Socialist Party leaders. On the day of the opening of the Brussels meeting, the tiny Belgian Communist Party was proposing a unitarian demonstration with the socialists. Two days later at Nanterre, Charles Fiterman minimized the fascist danger by saying: "In countries such as ours, the bourgeoisie and imperialism can no longer resort, or try to resort, to fascism in the same conditions as half a century ago as a means of government". And Fiterman managed to comment on the terrorist bombing at Rue Copernic without ever referring to its antisemitic aspect, being content to use the vague term racism. The National Conference of the French Communist Party which took place in such a troubled atmosphere never bothered to address a few words to the representatives of the Jewish community which, after the Rue Copernic bombing, would have been the least they could have done. But it is true that the French Communist Party considers Jewish institutions as contaminated because of their natural ties to Israel and prefers to entertain relations with Saddam Husayn and Qadhadhfi. The contradictions between communist parties on the question of fascism are certainly more important than it seems. They underscore the fundamental differences between the Eurocommunists and the French Communist Party. The former, having learned from their own history, are more deeply attached to democratic liberties than Georges Marchais' party. They believe that, in the world where we live, Europe is an incomparable democratic area, even if social injustice, attacks upon liberty, and insecurity are still significant. One can appreciate this position of the Eurocommunists as one wishes, but it is impossible to deny it.

#### They Retain the Presumptiveness of the French Spirit

The Spanish Communists, for instance, have had to bear with Franco's totalitarianism for too long not to be able to make a difference between their new regime and the previous one, even if capitalism governs Spain under Juan Carlos as it did under Franco. Italians, who have withstood the first fascist regime in history, have remained deeply scarred. It follows that the break with Stalinism was more obvious in communists who knew better than anyone the price of democracy. The French, or at least the present leaders of the Party are less sensitive to these problems. They are carrying out a short-sighted policy whose only preoccupation is to retain their own power and their score at the voting booth. It is remarkable to see the difference with leaders such as the Spanish Manuel Azcarate. One can say that our communists are French in the worst sense of the word. Of French philosophy, they have only retained Descartes' mathematical reasoning and of the French spirit they have only retained the presumptiveness. The other two Latin communist parties deal in politics with an attractive brilliance and finesse. On the European scene, the French Communist Party is not up to fighting the influence of Carrillo and Berlinguer. The Western Communists have stopped taking Georges Marchais seriously. Even the small Belgian Communist Party is tired of this too powerful neighbor and its domineering ways. Brussels is closer to Rome than to Paris and Georges Marchais irritates militants from French-speaking Belgium by his presence everywhere in the media and by the image of communism he presents to Belgians. Because in Belgium, French and surrounding

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radio and television stations have such an influence that the Walloon audience knows Marchais better than their own communists, and as seen from Belgium, Marchais does not look well: the chauvinism he shows is badly felt by people who are the constant target of the French lack of humor. An anecdote will serve to illustrate the state of mind of the Belgian Communists: a militant whom I was asking his opinion of Marchais replied: "when I see him on TV, I always think he is going to tell a Belgian joke" [an ethnically derogatory joke]. Marchais' international posture has been badly battered during the last few months, and even if our boxer can take punches, it looks bad on the eve of an electoral campaign. At longer range, the maintaining of the Eurocommunist line in the rest of Europe may become a factor in the evolution of the French Communist Party. At the present time, Marchais remains on his positions.

But if he cannot lead his party to success, the foreign communist parties model will assume new strength in France. Some signs may lead one to believe that there is no obvious consensus behind the Secretary General. Logically, Maxime Gremetz, the Secretary General's most trusted friend should have been representing the party at the Brussels meeting. But within a few months, the man responsible for the French Communist Party's foreign policy discredited himself with the international communist movement by the unbelievable emptiness of his thinking.

#### Georges Surrounded by Traitors

It is therefore Rene Piquet who went to Brussels. More flexible and more open to discussions, he was the man of the situation. But he preferred to return to Paris at the very start of the discussions and leave it to two lower ranking colleagues to defend the party's theses. Traitors are really surrounding the unhappy Georges .

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

TEN-YEAR PROGRAM, BUDGET FOR EAS OUTLINED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 1 Nov 80 pp 48-50

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Annual Ceiling of 2.5 Billion Francs To Be Set on ESA Budget"]

[Text] The European Space Agency's new director general, Erik Quistgaard, briefed the ESA Council, at its 22-23 October 1980 meeting, for the first time on the proposed European space plan for the 10-year period 1981-1990.

This is the first 10-year plan established by ESA since the agency's formation in 1975. The plan sets forth principles, establishes budgets, and defines those programs ESA will "reasonably" be able to initiate over the next 10 years in a climate of relative austerity, indeed even of declining financial resources. Hence the plan calls for reducing ESA's annual budget to 450 million accounting units (MUC) at 1979 prices, i.e. about 2.5 billion francs, beginning in 1983 and continuing to the end of the present decade. It may be recalled for purposes of comparison that the current 1980 budget is 670 MUC. This new 450 MUC-ceiling would permit implementation of a "basic program" consisting, as is currently the case, of mandatory programs--general budget, science--and optional programs--application, technology, launchers--in which participation by member countries is voluntary and according to their means. In outlining the plan, the director general told the ESA Council that this ceiling of 450 MUC per year "will not permit Europe to be competitive in all fields." This reduced budget will merely allow ESA to maintain Europe's space effort at its present level "in certain fields," namely those for which Europe is best prepared.

Quistgaard also said that this plan "cannot be implemented with the ESA's present organizational structure." In fact, he is now reorganizing the agency's top management staff in an effort to increase the agency's efficiency by reducing administrative tasks. Henceforth, all directors will have full and complete responsibility for their programs.

The director general pointed out that while total outlays for research and development--calculated on a per capita and percentage of GNP basis--are approximately the same in Europe and the United States, 1.8 and 2.2 percent respectively, the same is not true in the space sector. The United States actually allocates 0.2 percent of GNP to space programs, whereas Europe limits itself to 0.04 percent,

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or five times less. Annual space expenditures--civilian and military--total about 8 billion accounting units (UC) in the United States--and the USSR--but only 1 billion UC in Europe for national and European Community programs combined. Furthermore, Europe's chief space powers--France and Germany--are largely outdistanced by Japan which has been steadily expanding its space effort these past few years.

Quistgaard said he believed it was "unrealistic" to expect European financial resources for space programs to rise appreciably above 1 billion accounting units per year in the 1980's. As a result, he has concluded that Europe cannot hope to become "fully competitive" and must rather seek to become competitive "in a limited number of fields" while continuing, however, "to remain active" in all of its present activities!

Placing a 450-MUC ceiling on the ESA annual budget from 1983 to the end of the decade would thus make it possible to implement that basic program which is considered "the minimum critical program" required to enable Europe to retain a high standing among space powers.

Yet the ESA director general did foresee an inevitable "decline" in activities during 1982-1983 owing to the absence of duly-approved new programs, particularly in the telecommunications and earth observation fields. But the situation is expected to return to "normal" by the end of the decade.

Quistgaard also felt it might be possible to augment the basic program with optional (a la carte) "supplemental programs" in which certain member states could participate. Such initiatives would enable the annual budget to be raised to about 680 MUC by the end of the decade, in other words regain its 1980 level (in constant prices). But under present circumstances, it is by no means clear that such a prospect is feasible, or at the very least, it is still difficult to perceive what level the supplemental program could really attain. Consequently it would be risky to count too much on these resources.

On the assumption that a consensus of the ESA members will approve a budget restricted to 450 MUC per year, the plan calls for the following efforts in the 4 main areas of ESA activity: science, earth observation, telecommunications, and launch vehicles.

#### Scientific Program

This program involves a community of some 2,000 researchers and technicians working in about 100 European laboratories. Its budget is expected to rise from its current (1980) level of 90 MUC to 130 MUC per year by 1990. But its first appreciable increment will not occur until 1984. This budget would, however, permit implementation of only two major scientific satellite projects plus three or four other smaller-scale projects during the 1980's. The number of projects is also affected by the noticeable trend toward some sophisticated missions these past few years: Exosat [X-ray research satellite], ISPM [International Solar-Polar Mission], Hipparcos [astronomy satellite], and Giotto [Halley's Comet flyby]. Such projects also reflect European ambitions and competence in this field.

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Contrastingly, it would be possible to initiate an average of one new project per year in the 1990's. These would include three or four major projects-- large optical telescope, high-energy telescope, magnetospheric and planetary probes, etc--as well as six or seven small projects involving more specialized satellites. There would also be continued cooperation with NASA.

A new microgravity research program is to be initiated by ESA in the early 1980's. This field of research has generated mounting interest among specialists in the life sciences and materials sciences. It will be a minor program, however, with a budget of only some 5 MUC per year in the final years of the decade. ESA's role in this program will consist mainly in furnishing technical assistance to new experimenters, coordinating the use of common space resources, and conducting certain basic research experiments. The program essentially involves continuing--after the first Spacelab mission (FSLP [First Spacelab Payload])--to use the manned orbital laboratory for a few experiments in space biomedicine (with such devices as the space sled and the Biorack) and space metallurgy (with furnaces, etc).

#### Earth Observation Program

This program encompasses both climatology and the remote sensing of earth resources. It will be a major activity which the ESA's director general described as likely to lead to "considerable economic benefits." Quistgaard did, however, deplore the program's belated start. He also noted "the important national initiative"--France's SPOT [Earth Resources Observation Satellite]--already taken outside the agency, a project ESA rejected a few years ago. In Quistgaard's opinion, the European earth observation program must be considered "complementary" to national programs. It must, therefore, concern itself with disciplines not being exploited elsewhere, by giving priority, for example, to climatology, including observation of the oceans. ESA's objective is to participate in the world climatology program. To this end, the earth observation program's budget is to be doubled in the 1980's, increasing from its current 43 MUC per year to 86 MUC per year in 1990, with a "peak" of 99 MUC in 1985.

The earth observation program for the 1980's thus calls for the use of the European Sirio 2--for 2 years--and Meteosat 2--for 3 years--satellites to the exclusion of future operational weather satellites not included in the basic program. It also calls for extension of the remote sensing program. All of this still has to be approved, however. There are also plans to launch two new satellites in the 1980's: a climatic research satellite called Climatsat and an ocean and ice observation satellite designated ERS-1, and perhaps a third earth observation satellite known as ERS-2. It is also planned to begin preparation in the late 1980's for the launch of a small Earth Kinematics satellite in the 1980's. This satellite would monitor rotation of the earth and movement of the poles as a possible aid to navigation and earthquake prediction.

#### Telecommunications Program

Unlike the two aforementioned programs, this program will decline drastically-- from 133 MUC per year in 1980 to 45 MUC per year by 1990--despite mushrooming

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requirements and the prospects of developing new geostationary satellites. The ESA program calls first for launching the L-SAT [large communications satellite] in the 1980's. Production of this satellite has not yet been approved. L-SAT is designed to test and demonstrate new items of equipment. The program then calls for development of a new experimental satellite, the AOTS (Advanced Orbital Test Satellite) for exploring, inter alia, intersatellite communications links. Also included in the program is preparation of a giant communications satellite, the OAS (Orbital Assembly System), consisting of a large orbital station assembled in orbit, or of a "cluster" of small satellites positioned in the same geostationary location and interconnected by radio.

#### Launch Vehicle Program

This program is also likely to undergo important changes in the 1980's. The actual direction this program should take is still not clearly discernible, and will not be as long as the Ariane launcher has not proved itself and Spacelab has not demonstrated its usefulness. ESA has wisely decided, therefore, to keep its two major options open, without firmly choosing, for the moment, between conventional launch vehicles--Ariane and follow-ons--and manned spacecraft such as the Space Shuttle, Spacelab, and follow-ons. Funds for the launcher development program are to drop sharply from the current 344 MUC per year to only 93 MUC per year by 1990. This reduction can be ascribed, however, to completion of the two major development programs approved in 1973, namely Ariane and Spacelab.

Continued upgrading of the independent European Ariane launcher family through the Ariane 4 version is called for in the ESA plan, and even approved for the larger launchers designated Ariane 2 and Ariane 3. The requirement--by early 1985--for a second launch pad, ELA-2, in Kourou, French Guiana, is also recognized. ESA has not earmarked funds for this project in its basic program because it considers construction of this launch pad to be the responsibility of Ariane-space, the commercial launcher organization that is to handle the European launch vehicle's operational flights. Funds for the European launcher program also drop sharply from 212 MUC in 1980 to merely 18 MUC per year by 1990.

Hence long-term options beyond Ariane 4 remain open with respect to what ESA calls the Future European Launcher (FEL). Europe will have to decide whether it chooses automatic or manned systems, expendable or recoverable launch vehicles, and whether it wants to retain its independent launch capability or, on the contrary, prefers cooperation (with the United States). ESA will, however, assume responsibility in 1986 for the Ariane 5 project whose HM-60 high-thrust cryogenic motor is now in the predevelopment phase in France. ESA is also planning to develop for future missions an independent power system that is reignitable in flight and called the "propulsion module."

In discussing Spacelab, the ESA's director general said he "understood the reluctance" of potential users "to invest in that project" until the first Spacelab flight fully demonstrates the new space laboratory's usefulness. Yet in the present draft of the basic program, ESA has no funds with which to include full use of Spacelab or finance the launching of payloads prepared by experimenters

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(as ESA does for satellites). ESA plans only a "limited effort" on the study of future Spacelab developments, with due consideration of the possibilities of cooperation with NASA, possibilities which still have to be defined, however. Funds for the Spacelab program are drastically slashed from 132 MUC per year in 1980 to 15 MUC per year in 1990.

Implementation of these future scientific and applications programs also rests upon an "important technological research program" which ESA hopes to develop in the 1980's. Funds earmarked for the ESA technology program will climb, therefore, from 32 MUC per year in 1980 to 50 MUC per year by 1990.

The proposed European space plan for 1981-1990 has been "well received" by member states. So we were told by the director general who views the discussions in both the ESA Executive Board and Council as having been "positive." The plan does actually seem to have been favorably received by a certain number of member countries, France included, but it has also been highly criticized by others, such as Great Britain, for example, which believes the telecommunications program is not sufficiently expanded. Several small member states are also very sensitive to any changes in the science and technology programs because they constitute a large part of their space activity.

Consequently the problem is now one of refining the proposed plan by taking into account each member's resources and interests. A revised version of the 10-year space plan is scheduled, in principle, to be submitted to the ESA Executive Board at its next meeting on 25 November. It seems most unlikely, however, that all viewpoints can be reconciled in so little time. Instead it will necessarily take another several months to obtain a final consensus on a document which, given its importance to the future of the European space effort, obviously ought to receive the approval of member states at the highest level. In fact, the ESA's director general has recommended convening a ministerial conference to confirm the commitment of Europeans to this 10-year space plan.

#### Reorganization of ESA Directorate

In preparation for ESA's future activities and particularly its 10-year plan for 1981-1990, the agency's director general, Erik Quistgaard, has reorganized its directorate.


Michael Bignier has been named director of space transport programs. This is a new office consolidating the Spacelab and Ariane programs. Bignier retains direct responsibility for the former and Raymond Orye for the latter.

Mr Mallet of Great Britain was appointed director of the communications satellite program replacing Mr Luksch effective 31 January 1981.

An ESA programs planning and control group attached to the director general will replace the former office of future programs.

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- Key: (1) Proposed Breakdown of Budget Allocations for ESA Programs in the 10-year Program 1981-1990
- |   |                              |
|---|------------------------------|
| (2) MUC: million accounting units       | (9) Telecommunications (new) |
| (3) Approved                            | (10) Remote sensing (new)    |
| (4) New                                 | (11) Remote sensing          |
| (5) Baseline 450 MUC per year           | (12) Science (new)           |
| (6) Launchers (new)                     | (13) Technology (new)        |
| (7) Spacelab (new)                      | (14) Microgravity (new)      |
| (8) Future space transportation systems | (15) General budget          |

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

TERRORISTS MAY PLAN ATTACK AGAINST BUNDESWEHR, CHANCELLOR

Hamburg STERN in German 5 Nov 80 pp 306-309

[Article by Michael Wesener: "RAF Man Inside Chancellor's Office"]

[Text] A strategy paper found in Heidelberg discloses new plans of underground fighters. New targets are the SPD and the Bundeswehr.

At the present time, the FRG terror scene lacks personnel, shelter and information. Furthermore, the activists of the "Red Army Faction" (RAF) are undecided when it comes to the means with which to continue their underground struggle.

The agents of the Federal Criminal Police Bureau received the latest information from the terror scene free of charge. In October, when a conspiratorial apartment was discovered in Heidelberg, the officials found among other things a strategy paper. When comparing handwritings, it was established that it had been written by Adelheid Schulz. The author, however, was identified by experts as RAF chief Brigitte Mohnhaupt because of the language that had been employed. The self-assessment by the RAF fighters was nothing less than resignation: "...any occupation would end in a massacre. There could be no question of a kidnapping."

The main problem of the terrorists consists of difficulties in communication between the hard core of the "illegal people" and the "legal ones," between the "guer" (for guerillas) and the "rear."

Those supporters (perhaps from "antifascist groups") who are not yet on the wanted list and who are therefore "legal," "clean" or "cool" are strictly admonished to remain that way and to avoid risking their legality thoughtlessly: "You must be in control of the moment of going underground...I am strongly opposed to see you getting involved in operations like barn, baby or bre. (provided that this was the case)." Apparently, "bre." is a reference to the disturbances during the swearing-in ceremonies of the Bundeswehr in Bremen.

Instead, the "legal members" are to restrict themselves to political propaganda and services of practical assistance: "Supplying residences, something which seems to be more necessary than ever."

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Already in June 1980, BKA (Federal Criminal Police Bureau) agents had uncovered the new tactic of the RAF people. Classical "conspiratorial apartments," which are rented by RAF people themselves under false names, now exist primarily only in foreign European countries. In the FRG the illegal people are more or less "living with the legal ones who are not subject to police surveillance, staying for short periods of time." Or they "make use of apartments the owners of which are on trips and who, apparently in good faith, place their apartments at the disposal of others. It was such an apartment in Heidelberg where the RAF paper was found. As a specialty of Christian Klar's, "occasional visits to students' quarters south of the Main line" were established.

The second major task for the "legal ones" is to gather information: "Collecting knowledge about types and institutions in all areas." An example is given, the information that FRG Minister of the Interior Baum has a small garden plot in Cologne. "If it is not handled professionally from the very beginning, it will always remain patchwork." And the "perseverance that is needed will not be available."

The authors of the RAF paper hope that they will be able to enlist new members by utilizing propagandistically "the role played by the RFG and Social Democrats" in the exploitation of the Third World. "The dropping out and the refusal" by disappointed young people must be remolded "into support for the guerillas." The goal is "liquidation of the existing exploitative conditions." Means to be employed for this purpose are "military actions" against the U.S. Army and Bundeswehr bases and attacks on SPD "types": "Dwarf"--national security agents suspect that they mean Chancellor Schmidt whom the RAF wants to downgrade by calling him a paper tiger--"Wischnewski, Apel, Ehmke etc. etc., not forgotten should be the second line, for instance, Boelling."

As much as 5 months ago, the BKA and the protectors of the constitution received "reliable tips" to the effect that RAF members "are planning and preparing in countries outside of Europe attacks on leading politicians and economic leaders in the FRG." They are using as a model the assassination attempt on NATO General Haig, who only barely escaped a time bomb. Following numerous mishaps, such an action and the death of a leading politician could again demonstrate the power of the RAF. The conclusion by the Federal Criminal Police Bureau: "After all, an attack on NATO establishments, particularly the Bundeswehr--even if it were only symbolic--would represent an act that would serve as a signal for the terrorist environment and would...motivate further actions." The authors of the RAF paper are quite concretely planning the "destruction of the computer" of the Federal Criminal Police Bureau.

"Considering the current strength, the measure must be kept as uncomplicated as possible." The FRG chancellery is cited as a location that would permit an "uncomplicated" but "technically refined action"; apparently an RAF confidant with the code name of "Kei" is to sneak into the building: "Kei (the latter one, for instance, seems to fit very well into the barn of the dwarf)."

At the present time, the terror scene does not feel strong enough for large actions such as the 1975 occupation of the German Embassy in Stockholm or the September 1977 kidnapping of industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer: "The rear guard must first create the right political conditions."

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Considered a task for a later date in the future is the liberation of RAF prisoners. Here is a quote from the RAF paper: "Within the framework of an off(ensive), I feel that it might be the right thing to do to get them out. You will finally have to comment on that." Plans for such an action are apparently ready--"Place and time can be added." If something is to be done yet this year, "get the uncertain things taken care of right away so that it can be forgotten as long as it is still warm."

As self-criticism the author remarks: "My head tells me that other things need to be done; still, everything is rebelling against it." Nevertheless, if such a liberation action is not feasible at the present time, "put an end to the dreams."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

POLL: GISCARD AHEAD OF MITTERRAND, RPR DIVIDED, PCF-PS CLOSE

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 8-14 Nov 80 pp 137-140

[Article by Albert du Roy: "Rocard-Mitterrand: The Gap Is Widening"]

[Text] Second "presidential straw poll": The French are more decisive--and concerned. They are most concerned about international problems. As for the candidates: Rocard is up, Mitterrand and Giscard are down. Marchais stays the same at 17-18 percent.

There is enough here to stir the passions, challenge some of the conventional wisdom, and keep the lights burning all night in French political circles.

Mitterrand or Rocard? The same day (Saturday 8 November) that the committee leader of the PS is confronting this choice, the second "presidential straw poll" taken by L'EXPRESS and the Louis Harris Institute confirms that, more than ever, Michel Rocard is the best socialist candidate.

But the two fraternal adversaries of the PS are not the only ones concerned: Georges Marchais, once again, on 4 November, on TF-1, is launching obviously extremist attacks against his old ally of the left ("It was on orders from the Socialist International that the PS renounced the strategy of the Union of the Left. As for us, we do not belong to an International..."). Now these excesses are paying off: our survey indicates that Marchais should be close at the heels of Mitterrand on the first round.

#### A Climate of General Campaigning

Jacques Chirac has decided to keep quiet for 2 more months, gambling that the delay will be to his benefit. But his Gaullist challenger, Michel Debre, who chose the opposite tactic, is chalking up points, and the RPR [Rally for the Republic Party] is disoriented.

At the Elysee as well as at the party headquarters, the president is seen coming out unbeatable. No doubt, he is still winning. But his score is down. "The nation expects its president to hold himself apart from the agitation of the moment," said Valery Giscard d'Estaing on 31 October at Autun. Our "straw poll" shows that it might be in the president's interest to be a bit more of a candidate.

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And in any case, isn't he himself yielding to the generalized climate of general campaigning when on 4 November, to go from Clermont-Ferrand to Paris, he takes the scheduled Air Inter flight rather than his personal aircraft?

Let's look at the figures (see, on the following pages, the charts prepared by Tanguy de Remur) and the lessons that can be drawn.

--Interest is slightly up: 15 percent of the French describe themselves as very interested in preparations for the election (up 1 percent from the "straw poll" of 6 September) and 38 percent describe themselves as somewhat interested (up 8 percent).

--Expectations remain stable: only 23 percent of the French continue to believe that the election will have a great deal of influence on their living conditions. And 35 percent (up 1 percent) think that it will have much influence on the independence and the international security of France.

So there seems more at stake, and the tendency is growing, with respect to the international situation.

--More voters have definitely decided: 55 percent of the voters (up 4 percent from September) say that they are certain that on 26 April 1981 they are going to vote for the candidate they prefer today. But this degree of decisiveness varies strongly from one candidate to another. It remains very high among Marchais voters: 76 percent. It is clearly growing among supporters of the two majority leaders: 62 percent of Giscard's voters are "sure of their vote" (up 5 percent from September), as are 48 percent of Chirac's voters (up 13 percent). This degree of decisiveness, by contrast, is declining among those supporting the possible socialist candidates: 61 percent for Mitterrand voters (down 5 percent) and 58 percent for Rocard's voters (down 5 percent). The PS is paying for its delays.

For purposes of voting intentions, we are assuming only two possible scenarios: with Mitterrand or with Rocard. Six lessons can be drawn from the answers.

1. Freezing of the Marchais vote at around 17-18 percent is confirmed. The unfolding of the struggle within the Parisian communist apparatus (with the sanctions against Henri Fiszbin), the repression against insubordinate intellectuals (notably the expelling of Jean Kehayan) are not encroaching on the communist electoral bloc, which has been about 20 percent for the last 22 years. But only because of the candidate's frantic campaigning, scouring France and monopolizing the television screens. A hard pace to keep up without respite for 6 more months. This hard-line approach, which pays off with communist voters, has disastrous effects on the socialist vote, where one observes a rapid deterioration in Marchais' image.

2. The Mitterrand-Rocard contest continues to drift toward Rocard. Our survey was half-completed when the first secretary of the PS made his speech at Marseilles. But the results are sufficiently clear to remain convincing: Rocard is 6 points ahead of Mitterrand on the first round, compared to only 4

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in September. A special chart, which we are presenting on this decisive "match" shows that, on the first round, Rocard gets more support from communists, socialists, UDF [French Democratic Union], RPR, and Ecologists than his rival. The difference, a bitter pill for the first secretary to swallow, is especially clear-cut among socialist sympathizers: 62 percent vote Mitterrand, and 72 percent Rocard [sic].

3. The leftist primary could be closer than anticipated. This is the consequence of the first 2 points: if Rocard cleanly outstrips Marchais (25 percent to 17 percent) [in the "straw poll"], nevertheless the communist leader is right on Mitterrand's heels (18 percent against 19 percent). In the second scenario, the oft-repeated ambition of the PCF secretary general to outpoll the socialists would no longer seem to be mere rhetorical posturing.

4. The Gaullists are more and more divided. Our survey came too soon to take into account the effect of the quite freshly-hatched candidacy of Marie-France Garaud. But one can observe, in the first round, that the RPR sympathizers are split: one-third right off are for Giscard, 43 percent find themselves backing Chirac, and 18 percent are with Debre, whose campaign, begun early, is beginning to see results.

5. The first round looks ticklish for Giscard. It is generally considered that it will be a psychological defeat for the president if he does not receive a first-round total higher than he did in 1974, when he polled 32.9 percent. Now he is just barely over that mark (34 percent) in a race against Mitterrand, and he misses the mark (30 percent) against Rocard. In both scenarios, Giscard is lower in our "straw poll" than in September.

6. No "little candidate" can break in. We have not factored them into our poll. Altogether, Arlette Laguiller (Workers Struggle), Alain Krivine (Revolutionary Communist League), Huguette Bouchardeau (Unified Socialist Party), Roger Garaudy, Michel Crepeau (Left Radical), Jean-Marie Le Pen (National Front), Pascal Gauchon (New Forces Party), and Michel Jobert get 6 percent of the intended votes. None of them gets more than 1 percent.

It is in the second round that the two scenarios diverge more clearly: against Rocard, Giscard runs neck and neck (51 percent); against Mitterrand, he is very comfortably reelected (59 percent). Rocard (see chart) benefits, as in the first round, from wider appeal in the electorates of all the parties.

#### Handicaps and Assets

Comparing the tallies in the two rounds against each other also illustrates the advantage he has over Mitterrand. The first secretary still benefits from the image of "symbol of the united left" acquired in 1965 and in 1974, when he was the only candidate. The 60 percent of those who voted for Marchais in the first round would give him their vote on the second, compared to only 52 percent who would vote for Rocard, most of the others being undecided. In the expectation, probably of getting voting orders from the PCF. But Rocard, in the second round, clearly attracts more of the vote than Mitterrand from the electorates whose candidates were eliminated: 56 percent of the supporters of Ecologist Brice Laconde,

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21 percent of those who had voted for the Gaullists Chirac and Debre. While Mitterrand attracts only 38 percent of Lalonde's voters, 14 percent of Chirac's, and 11 percent of Debre's.

Similarly, Giscard can count, in the second round, on the support of one out of every eight who voted for Marchais. But a full one-fourth of those voting for Chirac and Debre would defect.

The handicaps from which Giscard, relatively speaking, suffers, and the assets that he still has stand out clearly when one asks the French what are their top priorities.

The struggle against unemployment, still more than in September, is the be-all and end-all. Rarely has such unanimity (89 percent) appeared in a survey. Now, in contrast to our September survey it is Rocard, and no longer the present chief of state, who appears best qualified to deal with it. On this point, on a basic subject, his credibility is eroding.

Conversely, one notes that the great problems of international policy--"assuring oil supplies," "assuring France's defense," "strengthening ties with the Western allies," "conducting relations with the East"--are mounting in importance. A quite unusually large number of Frenchmen are worrying about the first two of these. Now these are the priorities on which Giscard buries his rivals.

The other changes which have occurred between September and November in the chart of priorities seem more tied to circumstances. If the objective of "maintaining law and order in the country" appears currently in third place, it is probably as a result of the antisemitic terrorist actions and of a recent wave of bloody hold-ups. Similarly, the large increase in the desire to see "morality in political life assured" seems linked to the controversy stirred up about the police following the Copernicus Street affair. Since our last "straw poll," in fact, the great affairs of "morality"--diamonds, de Broglie, Delpey...--have not gone anywhere.

Examination of all the results of our "straw poll" leads to a grave conclusion.

On the one hand, when it is a question of choosing the man who will be responsible for governing France for 7 years, the French appear hesitant, even turned off. Now under the Fifth Republic, the choice of this man is the essential act in which the citizens are invited to participate.

On the other hand, a quite large consensus is evident on the most worrisome of the great problems. Their keenness is recognized. The urgency of finding solutions to them is emphasized.

Under these conditions, the fact that no one man appears clearly, if not a miracle worker, then at least to be a symbol of hope, raises again the disjuncture between traditional political pronouncements and the anxieties of the citizenry. Are the candidates, and the parties that support them, mired in their campaign maneuvers, taking this into account?

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
## The Priorities of the French

For Each of the Following Objectives:

	Say which of these you consider to be the very top priority: (in percent)	Comparison with September 1980		Trend
		Rank	Percent	
1. Struggle against unemployment	89	1	84	↗
2. Struggle against inflation and increased prices	71	2	76	↘
3. Maintaining order and security in the country	65	4	60	↗
4. Struggle against social inequalities	60	3	62	↘
5. Assure France's oil supplies	57	6	49	↗
6. Improve social infrastructure (hospitals, schools, public transport, etc)	51	7	48	↗
7. Defend the interests of the social class to which you belong	49	5	50	↗
8. Modernize the French economy, make it more competitive	48	8	45	↗
9. Assure France an adequate national defense	44	9	42	↗
10. Assure the morality of political life (scandals, corruption, etc)	39	11	31	↗
11. Ecology, preserve the environment	36	10	33	↗
12. Strengthen France's ties with the Western allies	28	12	26	↗
13. Conducting relations with the USSR and the Eastern countries to our advantage	23	15	18	↗
14. Helping the under-developed countries	22	14	22	—
15. Building Europe	20	13	23	↘

Survey conducted for L'EXPRESS by the Louis Harris Institute (France), between 23 and 29 October 1980, with a sample of 966 individuals representative of the French population age 18 and over.

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


Presidential Straw Poll 1981

Key:

- 1. November 1980
- 2. Level of Interest
- 3. Expectations
- 4. Are very interested in the election
- 5. Believe the election will greatly influence
- 6. Their daily life
- 7. France's independence
- 8. Decisiveness
- 9. Are completely sure of their vote

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Key: [continued]

- 10. Voting intentions
- 11. Scenario #1
- 12. On the first round
- 13. Scenario #2
- 14. No opinion
- 15. No Opinion
- 16. Scenario #1
- 17. In the second round
- 18. Scenario #2
- 19. No opinion
- 20. No opinion
- 21. In parenthesis, the change from September 1980

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The Socialist Party Contest

On the first round:

	have the intention to vote for...	
	<u>Mitterrand</u>	<u>Rocard</u>
	in percent	
Communists	5	10
Socialists	62	72
UDF	-	9
RPR	1	4
Ecologists	7	18

In the second round:

	have the intention to vote for...	
	<u>Mitterrand</u>	<u>Rocard</u>
	in percent	
Communists	55	54
Socialists	66	77
UDF	-	6
RPR	5	15
Ecologists	36	56

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FRANCE

PS ADHERENTS INCREASE GREATLY TO FORM 'AXIS' OF SOCIETY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10-16 Nov 80 pp 54-55

[Article by Roland Cayrol: "P.S.: A Party Which Mirrors the Country"]

[Text] Like it or not, the socialist electorate today is the axis of French society. Socialist France seems henceforth in fact to be the central motive force of a possible political consensus in this country. Geography, sociology, the political attitudes of this Socialist France prove it--it being understood that the presence of Francois Mitterrand or Michel Rocard at the head of the Socialist struggle would change things somewhat.

First, geography. What a change between today's Socialist vote and its characteristics not only 20 or 30 years ago, but even just before the 1971 Epinay Congress! One recalls the structure of the SFIO (former name of French Socialist Party) electorate, reduced to the constituencies of the great figures of nord-Pas-de-Calais, of the Bouches du Rhone, and west Massif Central. Rarely in French political life has the socialist situation--without ignoring completely its strongholds--been so quickly and so deeply changed as in the elections between 1973 and 1978. Today the distribution of Socialist Party votes is infinitely better divided: One can really say that socialist influence has been nationalized, the result of a double development. Moving into zones that had become practically deserted for it (as in the Paris region), conquering what had by Socialist tradition been missionary territory in Catholic France in the East and above all in the West, taking advantage of the trend toward urbanization, the Socialist Party now is strongly represented in Lorraine (26 percent of the votes in the 1978 legislative elections) in Brittany (24 percent) in Poitou-Charente (27.9 percent), in lower Normandy (23.3 percent), or in the Paris region (20.7 percent).

In some of the departments the progress was spectacular, even amazing:\*  
(see table on following page)

\* These figures and a few others are extracted from the study recently published in the United States by R. Cayrol and J. Jaffre, in the book edited by Kay Lawson, "Political Parties and Linkage" (Yale University Press).

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<u>Department</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1978</u>
Mayenne	6.6	13.9	22.8	28.2
Meuse	12.9	17.7	26.7	29.9
Moselle	4.4	5.8	16	23.9
Savoie	10	10.8	23.3	32.2
Vienne	6.6	11.7	22.1	29.1

Another aspect of this display of socialist influence: Losses in the old constituencies. Beginning in 1973 it could be seen that the new PS (Socialist Party) was far from regaining all the votes from the traditional socialist clientele in the Nord, Centre, Limousin, and Auvergne regions. Compared to 1967 the loss was for example 14 points in Correze, 6 points in Aude, 9 points in Tarn-et-Garonne. This drop obviously was for political reasons: The most centrist voters of the SFIO did not follow the policy of union with the PC (Communist Party) and slipped toward the reformists, then toward the majority. At the same time another fringe of the Socialist electorate went off toward the PC--as in the Nord, Bouches du Rhone, or Haute Vienne, thus showing its disaffection from local socialist notables failing to conform to the left positions of the party.

#### White Collars

The 1978 legislative elections and the 1979 European elections confirmed this tendency. Although the loss was braked in Pas-de-Calais, it tended to accelerate and become disquieting in the south-east (Bouches-du-Rhone, Var, Alpes-de-Haute Provence, Vaucluse).

All told, this double movement of conquest of new places and erosion of old strongholds brought the PS to a remarkable geographic homogeneity, much greater than in any of the other French political parties, especially the PC. The Socialist Party no longer has any really vacant areas--it has succeeded in entering the communist strongholds as well as the zones of rightist strength.

In this privileged situation one can note a favorable element and an element of uncertainty, concerning the presidential election. Favorable: In a presidential election each vote counts. While the astonishing socialist gains nevertheless did not win the party elected representatives in certain districts (as in Alsace, or, often, in the Paris region), the presidential candidate himself can count up all these locally useless votes on the national scale.

Problem: Unlike the presidential election, in municipal elections and legislative elections local personalities play a more important role than national party affiliation. This was seen last year in the European elections: The PS does not gain everywhere in a national election the votes of some of its regional stars. From this point of view it is not absurd to think that Rocard has a slight advantage over Francois Mitterrand. Apt to reflect the new PS image--all polls show that the new socialist voters prefer Rocard to Mitterrand--he can also count on the mobilization of a network of elected representatives wishing to add to their personal sources of

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strength the party image at the national level of conquering dynamism. The sociology of Socialist France also puts the PS in a median rank in French society. While the SFIO was rooted in the areas of the common people, at first among employees of the public sector, the PS began to resemble the whole of France, as if a cross section had been cut in each social category, of about one-fourth the members of that category. That is the PS electorate today--the only real inter-class French party, a real catch-all party as the Americans say.

Judge for yourself. According to the IFOP (French Public Opinion Institute) in the 1978 elections the PS received 8 percent of the farmers' vote (farmers count for 9 percent of the total French population), 7 percent of the commercial workers and artisans (6.5 percent of the total population), 24 percent of the middle level technical administrative and clerical workers (21 percent of the total population), 31 percent of the workers (27 percent of the total population). Gone is the day when the miner of the Houilleres and the public school teacher could symbolize Socialist France.

Today the Grenoble engineer, the upper level administrator in a Parisian bank, an employee of the Textiles du Centre, all equally represent the new PS image.

Its social dynamics made the PS become the reflection of France at least as well as General de Gaulle succeeded in doing formerly. And what has been said for the social field holds true in the groups based on sex, age, size of housing area and, henceforth, even for religion. Sometimes there are, slight differences, a little over-representation of men, of those 25-34, and under-representation of strict Catholics. Socialist France is the France of the individual, the France of everyone. One can easily gauge the success this implies, in relation to other great parties in the world, and how difficult it is to govern a society for long without the support of this vast group, this cross section of the French population.

But there too this judgment must be tempered by two considerations. First, is there not some risk in simultaneously representing such diverse interests as all the French population? Certain socialist parliamentary candidates are well aware of this and their platform looks like a catalog of demands from each and every group. Tomorrow if the Socialist candidate were elected would he not be forced to make choices which might displease this or that component of Socialist France?

The other question concerns, once again, the Mitterrand-Rocard rivalry in the race for nomination. On the social level Michel Rocard holds an undeniable advantage for the period now beginning: the active sympathy of the mid-level managers and technicians. Leaving aside the aspect of mere popularity, so often analyzed, for the aspect of voting intentions, the polls show us (Tableau Louis Harris-France) that according to whether Mitterrand or Rocard is the nominee in the first turn the PS candidate would get the same percentage of votes, within about 1 point, among farmers, commercial workers, workers, and among those not in the labor force. But Rocard brings to his name 22 percent of the upper level managers and technicians (against 18 percent for Mitterrand) and 35 of the middle level managers and clerical employees (against only 25 percent for Mitterrand). This advantage gives one pause if this time as in 1978 the white collar workers and managers and technicians play the determining role. It is understood that one will never know if this advantage will hold throughout, since in the last analysis only one of the two will be nominated.

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## The Soft Underbelly

So far as profound political attitudes, opinions on events, hopes and aspirations are concerned, Socialist France is decidedly average France. Make the test. Whenever the polling results of some political subject are published, look at what the overall responses of French persons are. Then look at the distribution of responses according to political preference and note the response of Socialist sympathizers. You will see: It is the same--give or take a few points. Clearly, Socialists constitute not only the sociological axis but also the political axis of this country. And that holds true regardless of the subject--domestic politics, foreign policy, economic and social questions.

Even on problems involving changing mores, or sexuality, abortion, family authority, where it is easy to imagine that Socialist sympathizers would be among the most progressive. But no, in those matters as in the others the distribution is identical. PSU and extreme left sympathizers occupy the most advanced positions; the most libertarian, the PS is set in the middle, between the most progressive communist sympathizers and the UDF and RPR who are clearly more to the right. How can one really think seriously of enacting reforms in this country without the assent of that Socialist France? Again, what a strong position for French socialists!

But this being said, one should not stop midway in the analysis. Although Socialist France is so average, that average nevertheless contains many opposing realities. A close study of the polls shows that in general at the level of political attitudes Socialist France is divided into three parts. The first is very close to the attitudes and hopes of communist sympathizers. The second is much like the UDF supporters and the third--kind of a soft underbelly of the Socialist electorate--oscillates between the first two. It is this third part which, according to the economic situation and the balance of political forces will swing either toward a more or less reluctant union with the left, or will lend an ear to the sirens of the Third Force. It is really difficult for a party to manage all three parts of this heritage at the same time! In fact what is the strength of the PS--its ideological and political diversity--also constitutes its weakness, its lack of consistency regarding a coherent plan. One gets the impression of a co-existence of these several traditions, rather than a real synthesis of them.

At the table of honor among those optimistic views of the Sofres barometer the PS prances unfailingly at the top of the curves. That is because in a way everyone feels close to the PS. Nearly everyone has voted or might vote socialist, if only the second time around. Communist or leftists sympathizers, Giscardians or Gaullists have all, for quite different reasons, a certain sympathy for the PS, naturally after their own party, because the PS is at once democratic, antitotalitarian, worker, leftist, etc.

But sympathy is not always translated into a vote. And the center left voter distinguishes between his active sympathy for the PS which he will go so far as to vote for in the cantonal elections (1976 and 1979) or municipal elections (1977). But until now he has always drawn back (at the last moment in 1978) from the prospect of Socialist France carrying off all the national posts of command, above all if it is the ally of the communists. Once again it is on him, the center left voter, that the results of next May's election will depend: No doubt it is one of the reasons why Socialist voters see, by a broad majority, in Michel Rocard--who have never really espoused union with the PC--a better presidential candidate than Francois Mitterrand. Will they be right? Or will the Rocardian advantage in the centrist faction dissolve? We will not know unless the Socialist politicians concur with the deeper Socialist France and nominate the deputy from Yvelines. But that, we know, is another matter.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MANUFRANCE II LIQUIDATED: FATE LINKED WITH 1981 ELECTION

Tapie's Role

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 27 Oct-2 Nov 80 pp 51-52

[Article by Anne Gaillard]

[Text] Thursday, 23 October, 4 pm, 24 Avenue de Friedland, a stylish setting. For the second time in 10 days at the headquarters of the "Bernard Tapie Group," I have before me the man who will soon become one of the most detested in all France. At 7:45 pm, on the PCF [French Communist Party] broadcast on channel 2, against the backdrop of the tricolor flag, a solemn Joseph Sanguedolce, mayor of Saint-Etienne, will testify before the tribunal of public opinion, along with another defendant named Giscard.

"So, who are these industrialists whom you promised to call in to buy the various divisions of Manufrance, in order to pay the debt of 500 million?"

"I can't give you their names for reasons of their personal safety. But Marius Boutrand, president of the commercial tribunal, has the list."

"No, I just phoned him. He didn't mention it."

As Bernard Tapie watches, I phone Boutrand again, who states that he has no list, adding, of course, that even if he had one, he wouldn't tell me.

Tapie appears stupefied. He phones Boutrand and switches on the amplifier to allow me to hear the conversation.

"You just told Anne Gaillard that you didn't have any list."

"Oh!" answers Boutrand, "I didn't know that you wanted me to let on about the list. We're going to have to agree on what we're doing."

Thus, a triumphant, bantering Bernard Tapie is again in the limelight as PDG [chairman and managing director] of Manufrance I, which owns the real assets. After the 7 February 1979 court ruling, Manufrance II was created on 9 May as agent for the former, to run the factories and shops. But after three PDG's and futilely awaiting the 300 million Swiss francs promised by Jean-Claude Dumas, the Bordeaux businessman, Manufrance II in its turn came to a halt and Manufrance I is re-covering its interests, of sorts.

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Now the very name "Tapie" makes Joseph Sanguedolce sick--and this, perhaps, is one of the reasons for the unbelievable confidence which the mayor of Saint-Etienne displayed toward Jean-Claude Dumas. The latter no doubt "discovered" 40 million Swiss francs last year; but this brilliant conjuring trick inspires laughter in the halls of the ministry of the economy whenever mentioned.

"The city of Saint-Etienne guaranteed them! With a public guaranty, any bank could provide!"

Now that he has his "go-ahead," I ask Tapie if he has made contact with the ministry. He answers magnificently, "I have no need of the government other than to find new jobs for the workers. In financial matters, I will manage alone." "Great," says the minister's entourage, recalling the anecdote of the 10 million francs Bernard Tapie had promised to bring to Manufrance the first time he appeared in Saint-Etienne in July ("If my plan does not work," he said, "it will be my fault."). No one ever saw so much as the color of his money. It is also noted at the ministry that nothing is stopping the industrialists from dealing directly with the president of the tribunal without going through Tapie.

The next legal step is the Manufrance I bankruptcy hearing; that is, the meeting of the creditors and prospective buyers of the various divisions of Manufrance. The first objective will be to discharge the Manufrance I liability of 500 million. It is another story for Manufrance II. Since the plan is occupied, it is impossible to have access to the account books. It is hard to see how the investors could form an opinion on the state of the various divisions.

Bernard Tapie wryly admits that it will be a good 6 months before the bankruptcy hearing can be held and before the commercial court could possibly accept a settlement. It is known that the fortune of Manufrance has always been tied to politics. Already, from 1976 (first deficit year) to 1977, nothing was done so as not to hurt Durafour in the local election (bad figuring, as everyone knows). Tapie and the others know that they have until the presidential election to peacefully do their "editing."

The opposing camp is also preparing for trench warfare. The PC [Communist Party], with its union and municipal driving belts, is marking out the terrain with occupation of the factory and free food stamps for the children, and other social measures which will allow the licensed workers to hold out until spring. At that time, they will be held up as symbols of the betrayal of power before all of France--whose name "she" [Manufrance] bears--much as Sanguedolce and Krasucki appear on television, the first armed with his flag, the second with the constitution, to stir up the "petitioners."

As for the approximately 1800 licensed workers who will submit to the 6-month siege and be seen on the posters, who will bother to take them in when the party is over, when no one will be legally obliged to them? The PC? The government? What a sad ending France is preparing for the party in Saint-Etienne!

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Those Responsible

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Oct-2 Nov 80 p 31

[Article by Jean-Francois Gautier]

[Text] Liquidation of assets, occupation of shops, political maneuvers, union recoupment. After several months of watchful waiting and exciting developments, the people of Saint-Etienne have finally been confronted with a problem willfully hidden by their local government--Manufrance is an economically intolerable enterprise.

After 5 years of crises, 8 directors and 9 rescue plans, Joseph Sanguedolce, communist mayor of Saint-Etienne, clung to a last Bordeaux "miracle man," Jean-Claude Dumas.

Dumas claimed to be the intermediary of Swiss financiers, then of Libyan investors, ready to inject 300 million francs into the enterprise. On 22 October, Marius Boutrand, presiding judge of the Saint-Etienne commercial court, ordered liquidation. He had waited to the last moment for a single franc from Dumas, but nothing came.

"The only one responsible for the Manufrance situation is the government," states Sanguedolce, forgetting that the communists themselves took direct responsibilities in the affair--Macif, the mutual insurance company directed by Pierre Juvin, communist and major shareholder of the corporation, refused in June to deliver the 15 million treasury francs as promised a few weeks earlier; the town, also a shareholder, guaranteed a loan of 40 million francs while unable to control its use, nor to straighten out the enterprise; the Dumas project had received the support of the communists, who were ready to modify the floor occupation plan to permit the "rescuers" to carry out a property transaction on the factory grounds.

Moreover, behind the Dumas bid was the canvassing of Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, who supposedly searched in vain for additional financing in the Middle East.

Added to this political context is the Saint-Etienne union dissension. The CGT [General Confederation of Labor] demonstration of 18 October was called "Operation Spectacle" by the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor].

All during the demonstration," adds the Maire group, "the communists systematically initiated unprovoked attacks on management, elected officials, and active socialists. (...) All indications are that it was planned to launch Marchais' campaign."

The communist party could use the social bonfire kept going by its troops in Saint-Etienne to set the situation before the presidential election. Raymond Barre announced at the end of September that Manufrance no longer existed; to which Marchais responded last week, "Manufrance is just beginning."

As for the government, it seems to have finally given up on the 22 million francs loaned to the enterprise--aid which calmed a few creditors and raised some hopes, but which is now harshly judged.

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"Sabotage and swindle," says the CNPF [National Council of French Employers].  
"A business is not saved with sedatives. Governmental oxygen tents are useless,"  
adds Yvon Gattaz, president of Ethic [Human-Size Businesses] and bully of  
"industrial milk cows."

Such is the social problem created in Saint-Etienne. Nearly 2,000 employees,  
exploited by their local government, are still waiting for it to provide a  
solution and a future. A paradoxical, but revealing, situation--who else, outside  
of Barre and his clear-cut opinion, has spoken understandably to them?

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

USE OF 'CANASTA' LIGHT AMPLIFICATION APPARATUS DISCUSSED

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 80 p 11

[Article by Javier Taibo Arias]

[Text] Thomson-CSF has developed an innovative night-vision system based on light amplification, known as "Canasta," which allows a combat vehicle's crew to detect, recognize and identify any stationary or moving target, as well as take aim, fire upon it and observe the results, both by night and by day, within its area of responsibility, determined by the mission assigned to the vehicle, its methods of observation and its weapons' capability.

Basically, the Canasta system includes a TMV 562 model night-and-day television camera with its own control box and one or two television monitors (TMV 563), which has been fully tested by the French Army and has been integrated into the CONTAC automatic fire-control system mounted on AMX-10RC's and AMX-30 B2's.

It offers plenty of flexibility for installation, both external--typical of a modern device--and internal--more usual in the case of new programs--so that it is compatible with any kind of turret, without requiring major modifications. It is set up to allow two modes of operation, manual and automatic, and the control box can be programmed to operate on four ballistic tracks. It is therefore compatible with all firing calculators. The monitoring screen is flat and does not have an eyepiece, thus preventing the parallax effect because it is independent from the eye's position.

It has a very simple movable electronic reticle that can be adjusted manually or automatically for setting the firing parameters. Its electronic tube is protected from glares produced, for example, by a bullet's impact or any other intense light source, with an automatic shutter.

Among the main advantages enjoyed by the Canasta over other methods employed for the same purpose is the fact that it is passive, obviously because its use does not expose the vehicle carrying it to detection, in addition to its insensitivity to interference. The camera supplies the same information simultaneously to the gunner's and the vehicle commander's monitor, before, during and after the firing takes place, which increases the efficiency of detection, recognition and identification, because two people are looking, and it helps speed up the exchange of information among the crew, decreasing the reaction time to a minimum. In addition, it provides the vehicle commander with permanent control over his gunner.

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Within its broad range of use it can also be linked with other optical and fire-control devices, and the system can be amplified to include a daytime sight, or a laser telemeter can be added to the sight.

In the important area of maintenance, Thomson-CSF points to the minimal time required for repairs, the ease with which personnel can be trained, the simple way in which it can be mounted and dismounted, the possibility of exchanging units and its high degree of availability. Thomson-CSF has defined several degrees of maintenance, related to various tasks (adjustments and tests, changes and repairs) and to the resources necessary (personnel, documentation, tools, spare parts, audiovisual training and technical assistance), in addition to which it is possible to adapt it to the maintenance techniques of each army, according to the organizational structure of its operational units, its tactical deployment and its policies, resources and development of its maintenance.

In conclusion, we point to the demonstrated fact that the Canasta can be used on any vehicle, having been successfully tested on the M-47, M-48, Centurion, Leopard, AML-90, TAM, T-55 and T-62, among others.

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

CIVIL DEFENSE EXERCISES--Jean Royer [former government minister and presidential candidate] wants to organize some civil defense exercises in Tours [Indre-et-Loire Department] based on the theme: "What to do in case of a nuclear war alert."  
[Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 5 Dec 80 p 74]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

INTERVIEW WITH SPADOLINI ON PSI-PGI DISPUTE

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 3 Oct 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Gian Paolo Vitale]

[Text] After Enrico Berlinguer's speech in Bologna and Bettino Craxi's harsh response, the PCI and the PSI are fighting again. Like 2 years ago, after the appearance of Craxi's article on Proudhon, the dispute is in part ideological (there is the socialist congress at the doors with a perspective of launching a labor program), but this time the prevailing difference is over the government and its relations with the Christian Democrats and the minority lay parties. IL MONDO asked Giovanni Spadolini, secretary of the PRI, to appraise this new PCI-PSI polemic, its motivations and risks.

Question: Do the divisions within the left add an element of instability to the political picture and, therefore, present dangers for democracy?

Answer: Ugo La Malfa was convinced of it and struggled a long time to improve relations between the PSI and the PCI with the view of favoring the gradual overcome of the scission of Leghorn in 1921. This is a theme that has dominated non-Marxist democratic thought for years and not only that: From diverse sides, men like Giorgio Amendola and Francesco De Martino have followed the same design. A coalition of leftist parties, according to this theory, would bring an advantage through the mending of this break. La Malfa deemed socialist ferment essential, which is always the ferment of liberty, and considered it indispensable that the Communist Party experience it, with the view of encouraging its orientation toward the West.

This turn, according to La Malfa, is equivalent to the full westernization of Italian life. At the same time, they thought that the modern and well-articulated structure of the PCI and its strong organization should influence the weaker and more fragile socialist structure, which was still Jacobin or libertarian, reviving it and infusing it with new life. Of course, the process of reunification, if not of a bond, between the two parties, experienced a halting blow after the death of La Malfa and after a sharpening of a conflict which is no longer only ideological but also programmatic and sometimes only pragmatic.

Question: This is what explains the hard line Berlinguer is taking with his insistence on limiting the growth of the PSI.

Why isn't communist hegemony in the worker movement discussed?

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Answer: It is a struggle for hegemony, of course, and not only nor so much over the working class, which would not constitute a sufficiently large social base in present-day Italy, but the PCI often represents more social-democratically tending groups, that is, more moderate than the socialists. In this the PCI inherited something of the reformist socialism of Filippo Turati, with respect to those factions in the Socialist Party which are still linked to anarchist and libertarian unrest originating in the Italian Risorgimento.

Craxi, a follower of Pietro Nenni, belongs to that humanitarian and voluntarist faction of the PSI that is inspired with a strong will for autonomy. Behind the harsh action of Craxi, there is the memory of the idea of socialist unification, a great opportunity that Italian democracy missed.

In 1968 when I was editor of IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA and supported socialist unification, I received two letters from the Honorable Mariano Rumor, secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, in which he explained the concern of the Christian Democrats about a possible domination by the Socialist Party, and therefore the fear of an overthrow of the traditional political equilibrium. Today the story is repeating itself--with one difference: Craxi is looking resolutely at an alternative; he has never forgotten the example of Francois Mitterrand. His goal is the reappraisal of the power relationship with the PCI.

Question: The PRI has never interrupted the dialogue with the PCI and at the same time has been able to renew a tie with the socialists, with whom there have often been troubles in the past.

Answer: The dialogue between socialists and republicans follows national history from 1870 up to today and is a dialogue between the two oldest forces of the Italian left. Today union between the PSI and the PRI is indispensable to guarantee the governability of the country, as experience with the tri-party coalition has demonstrated.

Question: And today, faced with the continuing disagreements between the PCI and the PSI.

Answer: We have never tried to orchestrate in any way dissensions and differences between socialists and communists. With the worsening of the emergency, we should not lose the thread of this minimal national solidarity which must subsist, beyond parliamentary combinations; otherwise, the way is open to the worst of adventures. The true center is the emergency today.

Question: Regarding the communist stance today, how much influence does the international picture have after the crisis in Poland?

Answer: The lack of words addressed by Berlinguer to Poland in his Bologna speech struck me. This shows an increased concern over the unknowns of the international situation, or, for the pressures that Moscow already exercises and even more, could exercise in the future. The Soviets fear an ideological-political encirclement, as the Polish reforms reflect, by Chinese revisionism. Thus the domain of Eurocommunism risks being further narrowed; and the role which La Malfa already allotted to the Socialist Party, as an international guarantor of the evolutionary process

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of the PCI within the European community, has acquired greater relevance. It is in Europe that Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism will be able to find further points of contact in the future.

Question: Berlinguer even attacked the foreign policy of the three-party coalition.

Answer: This attack amazed me. Between socialists, republicans and the Christian Democrats the agreement on international political options has been total in the last months, linked to Helmut Schmidt's Social Democrat line. What sense is there in reproposing negotiations on Euromissiles without conditions on the eve of the talks announced between Moscow and Washington? This is a trend that seems contradictory with regard to the dynamism demonstrated by the communist leaders in contact with Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterrand and Olof Palme. To subordinate a distinct opposition of the PCI to a modified stance on Euromissiles is equivalent to reinforcing the present government; or, in any case, to outlining a government identical to the present one.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

UDC'S 'YOUNG TURKS' REACT TO PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 29 Jun 80 p 26

[Article by J. Luis Gutierrez: "The 30 'Virgins'"; for additional information on the political ideology and principal objectives of the UCD's "Young Turks" see JPRS 76926, 3 December 1980, No 1663 of the WEST EUROPE REPORT, pages 223-225]

[Text] We know that the word "virgenes" is spelled with a "v," but the word "varones" sometimes is spelled with a "b," as it is in this case. Because the 30 centrist parliamentarians who since the end of last April have been holding regular dinners, and who have just formed the group called the "Young Turks," have done it for one main reason. It is the same one which allows the virgin to preserve the immaculate and innocent intactness of her hymen: not having known a male (varon). Here the subtle distinction between the "b" and the "v" explains very substantive differences.

Because the "Young Turks" stick together in reaction against what they consider the clannish elitism of the so-called "barons" of the UCD [Democratic Center Union], who head up the various ideological currents within the party, and form part of the Standing Committee, their name does not come, as some have said, from the wild youths who overthrew the Ottoman Empire under the orders of Mustafa Kemal. They take it from the democratically directed teams which gathered around the then young politician Mendes France in the French Radical Party in the 1930's.

At the end of last April, at the time when violent unrest shook the centrist party as a result of the government crisis, the "Turks" met for dinner at the Jai Alai restaurant in Madrid. From the start, certain minimal rules were laid down. There were to be no more than 30 members--"because with more there is no way to be heard, and for everyone to participate"--and everyone should take part. Therefore, they decided to begin the meetings with everyone present in turn taking 2 minutes to speak and analyze the situation.

Later, a minimal joint and improvised secretariat would be in charge of preparing an agenda, which would be sent to each of the members of the group before the next meeting.

As to its intended program, Jose Manuel Garcia Margallo, a deputy from Melilla and one of its leading figures, told CAMBIO 16: "The UCD springs from the ideological contribution of the three known factions: Christian Democrats,

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liberals and social democrats. In my opinion, it is not correct for certain individuals to boast that they have a hereditary right to these three labels. Especially when some of those persons who call themselves liberals or social democrats do not adopt many of the most important assumptions of those groups. It does not seem very accurate to me to say that Fontan is a liberal, especially if you observe the positions which this known member of Opus takes on some points such as divorce--positions very far from the liberal thinking on this problem."

UCD, Inc.

The "Turks" feel that one of the great failings of the party is that it has not known how to "sell" to public opinion the monumental work carried out by the UCD from 1977 to today.

For the "30 Turks," positions like the one expressed by some members of the centrist leadership about the possible alliance with Fraga--"If Fraga comes into the government, I go out the other door," said Fernandez Ordonez once--are not admirable. "The UCD," states Margallo, "began as a coalition. There is a feeling that the party is a corporation, originating from the merger of three earlier ones, where each one retains its original shares. And we others, who do not belong to any of the factions, where do we have our shares?"

On the list of "the 30" there can be noted a complete absence of Christian Democrats, who are perhaps the most homogeneous and cohesive group of the centrist party. Margallo explains this saying that "normally, at a dinner, if you sit at one table you cannot sit at another."

The initiative has not been very well received in the party, especially in the groups captained by the "barons." The secretary general, Calvo Ortega, has even suggested that they need to be dissolved.

Given the closeness among some of the prime movers of the group, such as between the Valencian Pin Arboledas and vice president Fernando Abril, the group has been considered by almost everyone to be a pressure group under the direct orders of President Suarez. Margallo says: "We think that at this time there is no substitute for President Suarez, and that he is one of the most important activists in the party. It would not be a solution to change him in the short term, although the great failures around him should be corrected." The reference is very clearly directed at the so-called "Moncloa plumbers," the team of advisors led by Alberto Aza.

"We think," concludes Margallo, "that there should be varying opinions within the party, but that they must be expressed within the framework of the directing bodies. There should be permanent tensions within the party because this is healthy, but these must be worked out behind closed doors."

Why They Are

Although the group of deputies known as the "Young Turks" appeared very recently, some of its members have already become well-known. Thus, the Salamancan Alberto Estella, the father of the well-turned phrase: "Use the pole on the

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ox; use words on man," recently made the headlines in the newspapers by resigning from the presidency of the RTVE [Spanish Directorate General of Radio Broadcasting and Television] parliamentary investigation committee because of differences with other members of the party and the government. These are his companions: Jose Manuel Garcia Margallo (Melilla), Nona Ines Vilarino (La Coruna), Juan Quintas (La Coruna), Jose Antonio Trillo (Orense), Jose Sabalete (Jaen), Antonio Orpez (Huesca), Antonio Diaz Fuentes (Lugo), Julio Ulloa (Lugo), Francisco Olivencia (Ceuta), Jose Luis del Valle (Burgos), Jose Miguel Bravo de Laguna (Las Palmas), Jose Nasarre de Letosa (Vitoria), Jose Ramon Pin Arboledas (Valencia), Jose Manuel Pineiro Amigo (La Coruna), Josefa Lafuente, J.A. de la Casa Ayuso (Murcia), Juan Sabater (Tarragona), Ricardo Leon (Oveido), Leon Buil (Huesca), Jose Maria Martin Oviedo (Avila), Martiniano Martin (Avila), Juana Arce (Albacete), Joaquin Garcia Romanillos (Granada), Francisco Gari (Balears), Jose Anti Antonio Gago Lorenzo (Pontevedra), Alberto Estella (Salamanca), Antonio Faura (Tarragona), Francisco de la Torre Prados (Malaga) and Ignacio Huelin Vallejo (Malaga).

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWEDEN

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' STRATEGY IN OPPOSITION DISCUSSED

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 23 Oct 80 pp 34-37

[Article by Stefan Mehr: "Social Democrats Prepare Recapture of the Government Offices--Invite the Economy"; passages between slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /With 2 years until the next election and almost half of the voters polled behind them, the Social Democrats are now taking firmer hold--by a vote of no confidence--against the nonsocialist administration. At the same time the recapture of the government offices is being prepared. "We have devoted too much time towards parliamentary work," says party secretary Sten Andersson. "Now we must prepare for what we will do when we capture the power of government." "One feature of this policy will be to tie the knots closer to the economy." "We want the old Harpsund spirit back," says Anderson./

With almost half of the voters behind them in the last Sifo-poll and reliance in the nonsocialist administration, the Social Democrats should be filled with the feeling of victory, self-confidence and unity.

Still the party leadership, with Olof Palme in the forefront, is overrun by the parliamentary party on the issue of vote of no-confidence. What is actually going on?

Presently the Social Democratic Party is a national movement in an awkward position. Two lost elections and 4 years and the opposition has forced the party to review its positions on important issues; tax policy being a good example.

"It is first now that we have found our role as an opposition party," says party secretary Andersson. "It took time but now we know what to do."

However, the new signals have not yet reached through the party ranks. There the demand for more aggressive opposition policy is heard.

In private discussions with top Social Democratic leaders, on the municipal level, party leader Palme has received the question: Are we to assume that there will be new elections and conduct an opposition of even greater responsibility and careful statements and promises--or shall we assume that the government holds through the period and drive a harder opposition where we can be noticed?

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The question was placed before the claim of vote of no-confidence. Palme answered: "We must be prepared for both. We can assume that the government holds but we cannot exclude the possibility of a new election."

"Your answer is without rhyme and reason," says the Social Democrat who placed the question. "We know just as little now as we did before."

#### Criticism in the Party

There have been different opinions within the party as to how to conduct the opposition. One line has been to lay down, point for point, detailed alternatives in government policy.

Thus, it has been done in the parliamentary group and the motions have been long like expositions and formulated as propositions.

But in the party, the party leadership has been criticized for devoting too much time to parliamentary work. The foundation work, campaigning and the contact with the voters had disappeared.

Anderson acknowledges this: "We have put too much work into parliamentary motions that have landed directly in the waste basket and party members have had no idea about. It is not good to devote too much time to parliamentary work--as it is then impossible to be out among the people. The political information work and campaigning are essential for the labor movement and must not disappear in detailed alternatives into the government policy."

The vote of no-confidence declaration is just such a combination of propagandistic weapon and constitutional finesse.

Both party members and now even Anderson complain that the party discusses the policy far too much on government terms. "We have not had any opposition practice. We have become a reflex of the government policy which has been most unfortunate."

#### More Long-Term Policy

Now the Social Democrats are rearranging the opposition work.

"The party must take time and vigor from the parliamentary work and instead formulate a program for what we will do when we regain the government power. We must have more long-term perspectives," says Anderson.

The Social Democrats have about 30 work groups operating that are dealing with everything from tax policy to children's rights in society. The first mentioned group is led by Gunnar Strang and the latter by Palme himself.

The work in the groups in many cases involves reevaluating their own earlier policy. The tax policy to be abolished now, for example, bears Strang's signature.

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"When we have seen that our tax policy does not hold as a means to reach the goal, we must change," says Anderson. "It has gone surprisingly fast to get out of prestige liaisons."

There is also a new and more tentative attitude in the party leadership. John-Olof Persson, Stockholm finance commissioner and deputy on the party's executive committee:

"With the great trouble we have in the social economy, it would be strange if we had ready solutions. We are not faced with a recession--we are facing economic crises. In that kind of a situation one should not be too cocky. We must have a searching direction. It would be wrong for the critics to believe that there is irresolution when there is submission."

The Social Democratic group leader, Hans Gustavsson, who is earmarked as Palme's successor by the mass media, has sent off similar signals: increased accord policy.

Seek Contact With Industry

Party secretary Anderson also makes motions regarding the industry:

The Social Democrats want contact with industry. We want to conduct discussions with people from the business world. Even if we do not share the same opinions, we can exchange experiences. We have already had informal talks with many company leaders in heavy industry. Now we want to conduct these talks openly. We want the old Harpsund spirit back."

The mass media puts these signals in opposition to Palme's profile and interpretation, and the parliamentary group's declaration of distrust. Person says: "The fact that we are being accused of dissatisfactory policy cannot scare us into silence. We must be extremely firm and resolute when we see how the administration specifies the demand for everyone's right to work and relinquishes the impartial allocation policy."

The pressure on the party leadership was extremely hard from around the country. People wrote, called and made a fuss for a more aggressive opposition policy. Once again the party leadership seems to have underestimated the party opinion. There were that many arguments against a distrust declaration: one was that constitutional instruments without any practical significance; another was that it was an empty clamoring--and that the split nonsocialist parliamentary majority should get together again.

But there was one argument for a vote of no-confidence that was stronger than all rational arguments together: the emotional element.

Around the country there was the distrust in the administration's economic policy and the impatience was so great that from all directions within the party thundered: The leadership must do something!

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The party's executive committee did not want any distrust—but was overruled. The parliamentary members returned to the group with fresh reports on the sentiment within the party districts, and it was so unequivocal that the party leadership could not withstand the pressure.

But the disappointment over the administration's industrial policy, for example, also leads to problems for the Social Democrats. If the party now changes its course in the industrial policy and accepts that unprofitable companies must be abolished—how will it then be possible to go out to the people who connect everything with the Social Democrats and talk about this?

How will the Social Democrats talk to the workers in the Oresund shipyard; or to the miners from Spanhyttan?

"We will, of course, replace unprofitable jobs with other jobs, applying it to social responsibility," says Anderson. "We must maintain the industrial investments, concentrate on research and develop the cooperative industry. We will use both the carrot and the stick. The administration cuts back in expenditure but does not increase the income."

Gr Anderson also admits a flaw in the policy pursued by the Social Democrats earlier: "We got caught in the belief in permanent growth and development optimism. It was not just us, even industry felt there was a lack of performance."

#### Nuclear Power No Explosive Wedge

The nuclear power voting was never the explosive wedge in the Social Democratic Party as many believed, even within the party. At that time, before the nuclear power voting, Palme's position was weaker.

Now it seems stronger. In a conversation with Social Democratic representatives, party workers, union officials, local government politicians and even the most opposed within the party, the answer is always the same: "In the labor movement we do not blame any one person for a setback."

Palme said at one time about Strang: "There is only one person who can remove Gunnar Strang, and that is Gunnar Strang himself."

The same may be said about Olof Palme.

In order to understand Palme's position, it must be kept in mind that he is the fourth and rapidly descending Social Democratic Party leader. The party leaders have survived party dispersion and faction fighting. They have been criticized and attacked. But the demand for resignation has never been placed and never has anyone resigned as a result of fighting.

Jan. O. Karlsson, editor-in-chief for the debate paper TIDEN, says:

"It is only the Left Party Communist, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, in that order, that do what is done in industry: fire the director

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when the profit decreases. We do not do that in the labor movement, nor do we do it in the Center Party. They are national movements."

The newly published book about Olof Palme by Dieter Strand, journalist with AFTONBLADET, has become important regarding candor within the party. This comes clearly forth in the Social Democratic Party paper's review and when one tries to catch the mood of the movement.

Strand covered Palme during the election, the nuclear power voting and the wage negotiations. He got to observe Palme involved in secret tactical talks and attending internal meetings. Palme's frankness to Strand has aroused both astonishment and criticism within the party leadership. Gr Lars Engqvist, newly appointed editor for ARBETET, says in one section of the book: "Palme has too few sincere friends. I do not think he gets to hear what is said about him. Especially up to this spring. In the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions]. At the local party office at Sveavagen. And in the parliamentary group, and including the old government circles.

"Invite Strang for a drink," says Engqvist, "and you will hear him get going about Palme. Thage Peterson needs no drink. He believes that he, himself, should be party leader."

Engqvist has acknowledged these statements and excused them in a big article in ARBETET that has made party secretary Anderson shake his head. This article dismisses Engqvist's chattiness, and he dismisses Dieter Strand's book. Han calls it "keyhole-journalism."

But the book has brought candor to the party in more taboo areas, for example, the party leader's position and the relationship between LO and the party.

The Administration's Clumsiness

Strand writes in the book how disturbed the trade union movement was because the party politicized the wage negotiations this spring.

"There was no request at all to politicize the wage negotiations, and the first time we tried everything we could to keep out. It is out of the question to negotiate the talks with trade union means only, political means are necessary, too. The tax policy belongs in this category. The administration's clumsiness last spring cost the country many billions of kroner. We could have obtained a higher standard of living at lower cost," says Anderson.

Anderson says about the relationship with the trade union movement: "Right now there are issues where we are of different opinion. We have been out of step a few times, for example, regarding the employees funds, but that is better now."

Stig Malm, assistant union chairman in Metall, confirms this: "The feeling between the party and the trade union movement is much better now than it was half a year ago. The north-south dialogue and the Brandt commission are, of course, important issues, but that is not what the steel workers discuss on the job. They talk about the price of food and their salary."


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It is more difficult for Palme, personally, to talk to the LO director, Gunnar Nilsson, who is on the party's executive committee, than it is for him to talk to Bert Lundin, director of Metall, who is also a member of the VU. Nilsson prefers not to attend the VU meetings, but that is not any new behavior--the same applies to Arne Geijer.

When one talks to the Social Democrats about a successor to Palme--as if Palme /himself/ should want to leave--three names are mentioned. They are Hans Gustavsson, Stend Anderson--and as a dark horse after the Line 2 victory, LO secretary Rune Molin. Will Palme resign if the Social Democrats lose the election in 1981? That is what the nonsocialists papers said he should do in case he lost the elections in 1979.

Nobody but Olof Palme can answer this question, and that confession will not pass his lips.



Will They Close the Circle in 1982?

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[Photo caption] These are the innermost circles of the Social Democrat Party: In the center of the circle is the party's chairman, /Olof Palme/, and /Sten Anderson/, party secretary since 1963. The circle around them consists of /Ingvar Carlsson (VU, group management. Speciality: unwieldy advisor, general policy, energy, issues, housing), /Kjell-Olof Feldt/, party management, but not VU. Specialities: economy), /Thage G. Peterson/ (VU, group management). Speciality: industrial policy), /Anna-Greta Leijon/ (party management, but not VU. Speciality: the employment market, equality rights, immigration policy), /Gunnar Nilsson/, LO chairman with a seat in VU, and /Bert Lundin/, chairman of Metall and is more often at VU than Gunnar Nilsson. /Gunnar Strang/, the last of the old generation, does not get a circle. His influence is getting less, but he must not be disregarded yet. He is the chairman of the tax group and partially responsible for economic issues. After this there are some heavy names in the Social Democratic Party and different areas of responsibilities: /Gertrud Sigurdson/ of the LO secretariat specialist in international issues and aid. /Lena Hjelm Wallen/, responsible for the school policy, /Rune Molin/, LO secretary and a successful Line 2 general, /Bert Winberg/, chairman of Byggnad, /Kurt Ward/, chairman of the Provincial Council Federation and VU member, /John-Olof Persson/, deputy member of VU and Stockholm's minister of finance, /Anna-Lisa Lewen-Eliasson/, involved in disarmament and peace issues, /Birgitta Dahl/, specializes in equal rights issues and accommodation democracy, /Sven Hulterstrom/, deputy member in VU and the party's Goteborg member, /Nils Yngvesson/, expert in housing policy and /Majbritt theorin/, defense policy expert, influential revolutionary whom the party leadership cannot ignore.

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