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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 700



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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MOBUTU, DACKO CLAIM SOVIETS PLAN AGGRESSION FROM CONGO

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 13-26 Oct 80, pp 44, 45

[Article by Maryan Sysle: "'The Plot of the Four' Capitals"]

[Text] The Brazzaville regime must still face new threats linked to a theory of "African dominoes" made in Paris and relayed by Bangui, Kinshasa and Libreville.

If one is to believe David Dacko, who was brought to power in Bangui a year ago by the "barracuda" operation, the new Central African leader went to Paris from 22 to 24 September in order to "set up a balance sheet and thank France and its president for the help which they have brought." It is true that he went away apparently more sure of himself, confirming that he would be a candidate in the presidential elections which should take place within a year, and bearing away in his luggage promises of help and supplementary cooperation: 7,000 million CFA francs in credit, an unspecified amount in budgetary aids, a sum of 2 billion to reimburse the state's debts to the private sector, plans for the study of several big economic projects of which France would take charge. Enough to show that everything is for the best between Paris and Bangui and that his advisers are pleased with him.

There are, however, some strange coincidences. Indeed, it has been noted that during the same period it was not only David Dacko of Central Africa, but also Mobutu of Zaire and Omar Bongo of Gabon who paid a visit to the host of the Elysee. What is the objective causing these three "heads of friendly states" of Central Africa, all of whom owe a great deal to the French Government and have problems with their own populations, to hurry over to Paris? In Gabon complaints and resentment persist. In Central Africa the game is up for the regime which was imposed on the country. As for Zaire, after the uprisings in Shaba, Kasai and Kivu and the strikes and demonstrations of last March, there is now a general expectation of outbursts of urban guerrilla warfare by the Oppressed Forces of the Congo (FOC).

The Scapegoat

Under those circumstances it has become essential to stop the "contamination" and find a scapegoat; and there is one made to order. The Popular Congo Republic--in spite of all the hard blows directed against her, such as the assassination of President Marien Ngouabi, the attempts to stifle economic life, and the dangerous accession to power of a friend of the West, Yhombi Opango--persists in its socialist policy against winds and tides. Furthermore, the country seems to be reviving: Significant progress can be observed, several jobs of national construction have

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been undertaken--Brazzaville is a swarming workshop at the moment--and staffs are regularly paid. All this is being accomplished without any concessions to imperialism. Quite the contrary.

The Brazzaville leadership is watching more attentively than ever the struggles taking place throughout the continent. Indeed it is well known that the former and new colonialists hold grudges and are stubborn: Beating down the Popular Congo Republic remains one of their main objectives in the region, in spite of repeated signs that its people are attached to the ideals of a socialist revolution. For the Congolese example is dangerous.

Furthermore, last August, Dr Abel Goumba's Ubangui Patriotic Front (FPO) held a 2-week meeting somewhere in Africa, attended by delegates from exterior sections and militants from the interior. In spite of precautions taken, and thanks to the French general information services, news of the meeting leaked out, with the result that Bokassa's successor became frantic. At the same time, this whole affair generated a series of ideas and dealings which might seem grotesque and ridiculous if they did not have much more solid and extended ramifications.

It so happens that Mobutu, for his part, was literally panic-stricken because he found on his own desk an appeal from the Oppressed Forces of the Congo, and was unable to understand how this document could have reached his desk--whereas it was being distributed throughout the capital. Mobutu and Dacko are therefore collaborating; and, in order to arouse their friends and protectors, they are forging documents on alleged Soviet preparations for aggression threatening neighboring countries. The chiefs of state of Zaïre and Central Africa are asking their friend Omar Bongo to serve as referee at the earliest opportunity in a conflict which, as they see it, sets them in opposition to the Congo leaders.

Under some pretext or other the Gabonese chief of state got President Sassou-Nguesso to come to Libreville, where he was presented with false documents. This meeting, to be sure, did not have the foreseen effects. Consequently, Dacko then sent post-haste to Brazzaville one of his emissaries, who, after cooling his heels for several days, was finally received by the Congolese leaders. He not only presented him his forged documents but insisted upon the extradition from the Congo of Central African refugees who were claimed to be militants of the FPO [Ubangui Patriotic Front], and he threatened to bring the matter up before the UN Security Council if his request was not taken under consideration. Of course Congolese leaders had to unequivocally decline all response to this flagrant blackmail. President Sassou-Nguesso perforce replied to his interlocutors that the Congo was a sovereign nation which would accept no blackmail whatsoever. Shortly thereafter, at a meeting of its central committee, the Congolese Labor Party publicly reaffirmed its solidarity with all struggling liberation movements and all African peoples fighting for socialism. At the same time, the Popular Congo Republic took all necessary measures to stand up against eventual aggression.

This affair is too important to be ignored, and it is evident that the pressure exerted by Dacko, Mobutu and Bongo in September are only the most visible part of a vaster plot prepared at the instigation of the French secret service--and also, so it seems, of the CIA. For the moment it appears that the Central African Republic is the turntable of this destabilization plan aimed against the Popular Congo Republic.

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A "New" Ambassador

It is within this context that Matsika, former minister of Justice under Fulbert Youlou and head of an alleged Congolese opposition without any following within the Popular Congo Republic, spends his time going back and forth between Bangui-- where he is received like a minister and chauffeured around by Dacko--and Paris. Christian Jayle, former president of the National Assembly under the Fulbert Youlou regime and responsible for the publication of the weekly LETTER FROM AFRICA, is supposed to be involved in this affair also. In any case, he is not afraid of repeating that, as far as he is concerned, the Congo and the Soviet Union are responsible for the persistent political crises in Central Africa, Zaire and Gabon.

It is, moreover, in the furtherance of this plot that the new Central African Society for River Transport (Socatraf), managed by Frenchmen, is used as a spying antenna, thanks to its representative in Brazzaville. Finally it is certainly not just by chance that Dacko has changed his ambassador in Brazzaville. The new one who is expected to be appointed very soon is no other than a former "journalist" at Bokassa's imperial court, who has been proved to be a CIA agent. He had, indeed, been arrested for spying under the Bokassa regime. It is on the advice of the U.S. ambassador in Brazzaville, formerly first counsel of the Embassy in Bangui, that the "journalist" in question is said to have been proposed for the Brazzaville post.

For imperialism the calculation is simple: Central Africa must be prevented at all cost from passing to the camp of the revolution, for this would inevitably lead, through a process of contamination, to a conflagration throughout the region. And in order to maintain and reinforce the "status quo" it is necessary to defeat the Congolese revolution which, in spite of some very understandable inadequacies, remains a contagious example for Central Africa. All this depends upon ignoring the determination of the peoples to put an end to colonial history and foreign oppression whether it is direct or imposed through puppet regimes.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WEST GERMAN AID TO AFRICA DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Oct 80 p 75

[Interview with Dr Manfred Lohmann, president director of the German investment bank Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft, by unidentified JEUNE AFRIQUE correspondent: "To Invest in Zimbabwe? Why Not!"; date and place not given]

[Text] Established in 1972, the Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) is a bank to promote investments in developing countries. It was created by the Federal Government for the main purpose of helping medium-sized German firms to cooperate under the method of "shared risks" by opening enterprises in Third World countries.

JEUNE AFRIQUE discussed this subject with Dr Manfred Lohmann, president director of the DEG.

[Question] How would you describe the institution which you direct?

[Answer] It is a development bank which can be compared to the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation in France. Each bank has its special fields of operation. Our task is to help with the development of Third World countries by various methods, either through the financing of projects or through participation in the capital stock of the firms; to grant long-term loans to the firms; to give advice to German firms; to give advice to the governments of Third World countries telling them about the conditions of investments. The purpose of all these activities is to promote projects. More than 250 companies in the Third World have received assistance from our bank.

[Question] What proportion of this aid has gone to Africa?

[Answer] Over 51 percent of our investments went to Africa.

[Question] To how many countries and in what fields?

[Answer] To 27 African countries. The DEG is involved with 24 African banks. They are development banks of obvious importance. It is so in the case of the BIDI [Ivorian Bank for Industrial Development] in Ivory Coast. We have invested in processing industries but have practically made no investment in agriculture. The truth of the matter is that we have few Germans who are tropical agriculture experts. Then we must turn to the French and the British.

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[Question] Do you favor any countries in Africa on account of their political system, for instance?

[Answer] No. Our main criteria are development, naturally, and trade policy. We take into account the political climate but we are not concerned by the political system. We operate in Ivory Coast as well as in Benin or in Kenya. We will invest in Zimbabwe if the climate is favorable. We are satisfied that this country has gone through an evolution and not through a revolution.

We are an instrument of development and not a political instrument. We never carry out a project without a local partner. We prefer a situation where two local partners, a private enterprise and a development bank, are involved. We also require that there be a German partner willing to accept the risks. We also cooperate with foreign and international banks such as the French Central Bank for Economic Cooperation or the World Bank.

[Question] Are the Germans more interested in Latin America than in Africa?

[Answer] Fourteen percent of our investments in the Third World go to Africa.

[Question] Do you favor countries formerly colonized by Germany?

[Answer] No. The main countries where we invest are Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Kenya. We were fortunate in that we had few colonies and lost them very early.

[Question] Is the aid granted by the bank subject to conditions or not?

[Answer] The cofinancing of the DEG is not subject to conditions. Our philosophy is that one must choose the best equipment. And this choice is left to the firms. The project must be profitable and consistent with the industrialization policy of the country. An industrial project which goes bankrupt does not help the country concerned but has the opposite effect. What the DEG seeks is not so much aid as a wider cooperation which the countries themselves want.

[Question] What do you think of the transfer of technology?

[Answer] It is interesting. One must convince firms from the developed countries to effect the transfer of technology accepting to take the risks which this involves. There is no general rule. Every product must be adapted to a given country. The product must match a given market, it must have the necessary quality. We believe that cooperation between German enterprises and African enterprises is a very good thing, particularly when it involves small and medium-sized enterprises.

[Question] Which are the sectors that are best suited for this transfer of technology?

[Answer] It is hard to say, but in Africa one could mention development banks, textile industry, manufacture of spare parts, tourism.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WEST AFRICAN MONETARY UNION FINANCES EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Oct 80 pp 2534-36

[Text] The Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) recently published its analysis prepared at regular intervals to review the economic and financial situation in the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). In page 849 of our issue No 1796, published on 11 April 1980, we already gave an account on the situation at the end of 1979.

During the early months of 1980, the economic and financial performance of the UMOA deeply felt the combined effects of a deterioration in the terms of trade and of the drought areas which started appearing in some countries of the Sahel.

The union member states have suffered the effects of the higher cost of oil supplies and have been directly affected by the lower prices of the main agricultural products which they export: coffee, cocoa, cotton and groundnut products. The prices of cocoa, for instance, dropped by almost 30 percent between June 1979 and June 1980. The decline of sale prices has also affected uranium ore in Niger.

Agricultural Year

The tentative results of the 1979-1980 agricultural year, which present great contrast depending on the product, fell below the forecasts. The marketing of cocoa and cottonseed registered strong gains, 12 percent and 11 percent respectively, while coffee (-15 percent) and groundnuts (-46 percent) registered a serious decline. Food production was mostly satisfactory except in Senegal where the size of the grain deficit increased sharply.

The changes in the main export crops since the 1975-1976 agricultural year are presented in the following table:

UMOA's Agricultural Production					
(In 1,000 tons, by agricultural year)					
	<u>1975-76</u>	<u>1976-77</u>	<u>1977-78</u>	<u>1978-79</u>	<u>1979-80*</u>
Oil producing peanut					
In the shell:					
Senegal	1,178.0	956.4	441.7	781.7	422.5

*Tentative figures

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Shelled:					
Benin	7.0	7.9	3.9	1.3	4.0
Upper Volta	13.1	4.7	1.8	1.0	1.0
Niger	3.8	7.2	14.5	8.9	3.2
Cocoa					
Benin	1.1	2.3	1.4	4.1	5.0
Ivory Coast	234.6	235.8	306.0	312.0	350.0
Togo	17.8	14.1	16.7	12.6	12.5
Coffee					
Benin	0.1	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.3
Ivory Coast	308.1	291.3	195.7	277.0	230.0
Togo	8.5	10.4	4.7	6.2	10.0
Cottonseed					
Benin	20.1	17.5	13.9	18.7	26.0
Ivory Coast		75.5	103.0	115.0	125.0
Upper Volta	50.7	55.3	38.0	60.0	78.0
Niger	11.1	7.2	3.8	4.4	3.4
Senegal	39.0	45.4	37.0	33.8	25.0
Togo		7.0	4.5	12.6	13.0

The cocoa crop benefited not only from normal climatic conditions but also from higher production prices and from the policy of progressive regeneration of the old plantations.

For coffee, the 1979-1980 agricultural year turned out not to be as good as initially expected. The old age of the plantations and the consequences of the 1976 drought are the factors which make production specially susceptible to climatic changes.

The results of the cotton crop would have been even more satisfactory but for the deterioration of the climate conditions in the Sahel zone, particularly in Senegal where the harvest dropped by 32 percent during the 2 latest crop years.

A return of drought conditions in the Sahel zone has affected more particularly groundnut production in the UMOA countries: the 46 percent drop in production, the biggest in a period of over 20 years, is also due to the fact that this crop is not favored by the farmers who prefer crops which guarantee them more substantial, and particularly more steady returns.

As regards the food crops, the contrasting climate variations (pluviometric deficit in the Sahel zone, excessive rainfall in some areas of the tropical zone) have considerably reduced the production level for recent harvest in the various countries. This is particularly true in Senegal where millet and sorghum crops registered a 38-percent drop in 1979-1980 creating an estimated 335,000-ton grain deficit by the end of 1979.

There has been a certain slowing down in forestry, particularly in timber exports, as a result of measures adopted by the authorities to protect the ecological system of the region already scarred by the continuous desertification which has taken

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place in recent years. Timber exports from the Ivory Coast consisting, in 1979, of 2.789 million cubic meters of rough timber and 263,000 cubic meters of sawed lumber, could therefore decrease in 1980. On the other hand, afforestation programs have started in all the UMOA countries.

The fishing industry continues its drive to acquire equipment. Already in 1979, the canned tuna industry had processed 22,000 tons in the Ivory Coast and this level of production reached 30,000 tons in 1980. Senegal registered a substantial recovery in 1980 after the poor 1979 season when the catches dropped by 39 percent and amounted to 9,110 tons.

In the livestock sphere, efforts undertaken to modernize this sector have resulted in the creation of many breeding and fattening centers and in the improvement of the marketing distribution chain. In countries such as the Ivory Coast, which did not have a strong pastoral tradition, the results are still poor and it will take several years before the livestock reaches satisfactory numbers. In the Sahel zone, the recurrence of the drought is seriously threatening the livestock which had hardly recovered following the 1972 great drought.

Mines and Industry

So far, the mining activity seems to be the one least affected by the gloomy economic situation in 1980. The total amount of exports of calcium phosphates from the 2 producing countries of the union was 4.567 million tons in 1979 compared to 4.382 million tons in 1978, or an increase of 4 percent. The rates of production registered during the early months of 1980 show a slight improvement compared to the previous year, up by 2 percent in Togo and by 4 percent in Senegal by the end of the first 6 months. With a new production line going into operation in Togo, the production for 1980 should be higher than on the previous year.

The mining of uranium deposits in Niger produced 3,540 tons of dressed uranium in 1979 compared to 2,109 tons in 1978, an increase of 67 percent as a result of the Akouta Mining Company (COMINAK) going into production. The output of the 2 units now in service should reach the 4,000-ton figure in 1980, up 13 percent compared to the 1979 output.

Prospecting for oil, which has been going on for years with the allocation of important resources, has given tangible results in the Ivory Coast which will benefit from the exploitation of its first off-shore deposit.

Also, in 1980 the West Africa Cement (CIMA0) plant fired up its first kiln which went into operation last February. Production during this first year should yield 695,000 tons of clinker, of which 450,000 tons will be exported with equal shares going to the Ivory Coast and to Ghana.

The favorable trends registered in the industrial sector during 1979, were generally maintained in the first quarter of 1980. This is particularly so in the case of the Ivory Coast where the average level of the industrial activity indicator for the first quarter of 1980 was 325.9 points, up by 24 percent compared to the 263.8 points registered during the same period of 1979. On the other hand, in Senegal, the figures for the first quarter of 1980 indicate a slowdown in the industrial activity due to a poor groundnut crop since less than 271,000 tons of seed will be

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delivered to the oil mills compared to 661,464 tons delivered during the 1978-1979 crop year.

Furthermore, the pattern remains sluggish in the textile sector which had already shown signs of difficulties in 1979. In Senegal, the index for "leather clothing textiles" registered a 5.2 percent decline during the last quarter of 1979 compared to the same period of the previous year. In the Ivory Coast, the firm Etablissements R. Confreville, the largest textile plant in the country, had ended their latest business year, on 30 September 1979, with a deficit balance of 700 million CFA francs. In Togo, the Togolese Textile Industry (ITT) was forced to close some of its workshops at the beginning of 1980 while waiting for a program of financial recovery to be implemented. The crisis now affecting this sector seems to be connected with problems of selling in foreign markets while at a local level the massive and often fraudulent import of foreign goods is a source of particularly strong competition.

Budget and Monetary Situation

With regard to prices and wages, the first 6 months of 1980 were marked by the presence of inflationary trends resulting from a readjustment of prices and, sometimes, from an undersupply of food products. In January 1980, wages were increased in Benin, Senegal and Togo.

Confronted with a difficult economic situation, the states of the union have continued to follow a balanced policy to implement the projects included in their 1980 budget which establishes a progress rate of 17.7 percent for the union as a whole. The aggregate budget for the 6 countries (Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal and Togo) thus went up from 848.6 billion CFA francs to 998.7 billions. The share of tax receipts in the overall current revenues remains stable, at 94 percent in 1980 compared to 93 percent in 1979, which keeps the fiscal burden rate at 15.8 percent compared to 16 percent in the 2 previous years.

With regard to expenditures, there is an ever-increasing trend in favor of investment activities where allocations have increased from 29.8 percent to 33.7 percent, therefore strengthening the state's role as top investor. The states which have earmarked the largest amount of appropriations for equipment expenditures are the Ivory Coast, at a progression rate of 42.3 percent, Upper Volta (21.9 percent) and Niger (18.7 percent). Senegal and Togo, on the other hand, have registered sharp declines of 31.4 percent and 41.3 percent respectively.

Internal cash generation represents an increasingly larger share of the overall revenues while external contributions only represent 36 percent, compared to 48 percent a year ago, as a result of stagnation in public aid for development. The treasury of the states was further tightened up in 1980 and required increased financing by banks, mainly by the Central Bank.

Therefore, the governments which used to have credit balances with the monetary institutions, had a debit balance of 36.1 billion CFA francs in April 1980 while a year ago they had credits amounting to 90.1 billions. This drop of 126.2 billions, which stands out against the upward figure of 21.4 billion registered a year ago, is found in almost every member state of the union and generally reflects the tightening of the liquid assets of the states.

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According to the World Bank, the total borrowing by the UMOA member states amounted to 1,480.7 billion CFA francs in 1978, 37.8 percent of which could come from drawing rights, while in 1975 the borrowing only amounted to 599 billion CFA francs, almost a third of what it was in 1978. Between 1975 and 1978, the 38.4 percent average annual rate of growth brought the principal of the debt of the union member states up from 327.2 billion CFA francs to 921 billions. The increase of the principal of the debt by 593.8 billions compared to the 1975 figures is the result of a 378.5 billion increase of the debts to private creditors and of a 215.3 billion increase of the debt to the public sector. The developments recorded during the period under review are explained by the decline of contributions from governments funds which had been until then the main source of loans; in 1972 these funds represented 56.5 percent of the commitments while between 1975 and 1978, this percentage dropped from 53.9 to 35.3 of the overall commitments.

The fact that the union is dependent on private financing sources explains the faster growth of the debt servicing. The service of the debt amounted to payments totaling 123.7 billion CFA francs in 1978 compared to 42.6 billions in 1975 showing an average rate of increase of 112.7 percent in contrast with the figure of 41.2 percent for the principal.

As regards the 299.4 billion CFA francs borrowed by the end of 1977 from foreign banks--with short-term financing and at high rates--which represent 68.5 percent of the loan commitments contracted with the international private sector, the servicing of this debt to the banks required 99.8 billion CFA francs which is 80.6 percent of the total burden assumed by the 6 states for their entire external debt. This is why since 1978 the governments have tried to cut down on their borrowing from the private sector. Consequently, the private share in the total loan commitments dropped from 68.5 percent in 1977 to 64.7 percent in 1978, for a total contribution of 180.9 billion CFA francs.

The increase of the total amount of the debt has had consequential effects on some of the borrowing indicators: for the states as a group, the service of the debt, expressed in terms of a percentage of exports of goods and services, went up from 4.5 percent in 1972 to 6.1 percent in 1975 and to 7.7 percent in 1977.

Balance of Payments and External Assets

In the sphere of foreign trade, the transactions carried out by the UMOA, which already in 1978 had resulted in a total negative balance of 16.4 billion CFA francs, registered a deep and serious deterioration in 1979 reflected in a deficit of 178.7 billion CFA francs.

In spite of the improvement registered in the sphere of products which results in the value of exports increasing by 8.5 percent, the UMOA's deficit in trade transactions increased in 1979 reaching 70.3 billion CFA francs compared to 48.5 billions a year earlier. The higher cost of imports (consumer goods, oil products and equipment goods) contributed to this imbalance with imports rising from 931.8 billion CFA francs in 1978 to 1,028.4 billions in 1979 (up by 10.4 percent).

The structural deficit of the accounts for services also went up from 314.2 billion CFA francs in 1978 to 356.6 billions in 1979.

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Transactions and payments for goods and services from the balance of payments of the six countries are given in the following table:

Balances of Payment

(Tentative for 1979; projection for 1980; in billions of CFA francs)

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Benin		
Imports	- 74.6	- 89.0
Exports	+ 40.3	+ 47.0
Services	- 4.6	- 2.9
Deficit	- 38.1	- 44.9
Ivory Coast		
Imports	-485.3	-547.0
Exports	+595.3	+640.0
Services	-232.0	-270.0
Deficit	-122.0	-177.0
Upper Volta		
Imports	- 62.4	- 66.6
Exports	+ 27.5	+ 30.7
Services	- 22.5	- 24.1
Deficit	- 57.4	- 60.0
Niger		
Imports	- 90.8	-124.2
Exports	+105.1	+135.2
Services	- 41.3	- 58.7
Deficit	- 27.0	- 47.7
Senegal		
Imports	-220.1	-207.7
Exports	+129.2	+113.9
Services	- 26.8	- 23.3
Deficit	-117.7	-117.1
Togo		
Imports	- 95.2	-109.4
Exports	+ 60.7	+106.0
Services	- 29.2	- 35.5
Deficit	- 63.7	- 38.9

Between 30 April 1979 and 30 April 1980 the monetary stock rose from 1,022.2 billion CFA francs to 1,102.8 billions, an increase of 80.6 billions or 7.9 percent instead of the 15.8 percent a year earlier. The only source of this additional money supply was an increase of internal credit; it affected the paper money as well as the bank deposits.

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Banks deposits went up from 727.9 billion CFA francs to 763.8 billions showing an increase of 35.9 billions or 4.9 percent compared to 14.7 a year earlier. The slowdown in the rate of growth of this aggregate involved deposits in banks of the private sector as well as in those of the public or almost public sector.

Credits to the economy rose from 1,170.5 billions by the end of April 1979 to 1,370.9 billions by the end of April 1980, namely, an increase of 200.4 billions or 17.1 percent instead of the 25.7 percent of a year earlier.

Furthermore, the worrying trend of the balance of external transactions resulted in a sharp deterioration of the net external assets held by the monetary establishments of the union and between April 1979 and April 1980 the exchange value of these assets went from being +41.9 billion CFA francs to -155.9 billion CFA francs showing a sharp drop of 197.8 billions, more important than the drop recorded a year earlier (74.7 billions). The official exchange reserves have followed the same trends as the net external assets but their drop was less pronounced. For the 6 countries, these reserves represented an exchange value of 19.6 billion CFA francs at the end of April 1980 compared with an exchange value of 153.4 billions a year earlier, which means a decrease of 133.8 billions.

In an address delivered on 19 September 1980, during a meeting of ministers of economy and finance from the countries which are members of the franc zone, the chairman of the West African Monetary Union's Council of Ministers declared that "In view of the unfavorable prospects for the economies of the member states, budget increases in the Union member states are likely to be limited in 1981 while they will continue to follow a careful and strict policy with regard to external borrowing. In the monetary sphere, the main purpose is stabilization and, if possible, to improve the net external standing of the monetary establishments reconciling the imperatives of a monetary policy and the requirements of financing the economic development. To this end, the union member states intend to mobilize all their available external resources to finance the foreseeable deficit of their external transactions to avoid putting this burden on the external assets of the monetary institutions. On the other hand, it is essential that fair prices be offered when their products are sold and that the protectionist barriers facing their products be lifted."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TANZANIAN TROOPS IN UGANDA--President Nyerere and the president of the Military Commission which is running Uganda, Paulo Muwanga, began talks in Dar-es-Salaam on 8 November principally on the subject of bilateral questions. The Ugandan leader was accompanied by the minister of regional cooperation, Dr Picho Owiny; the secretary of state for supply; Moses Apiliga; and the chief of the Uganda Army General Staff, David Oyite Ojok. Tanzania feels that it would be unwise to withdraw its troops from Uganda before having completed the task undertaken at the request of the Ugandans, according to an editorial in the government newspaper, DAILY NEWS of Dar-es-Salaam, commenting on the appeals issued by Zaire and the Sudan to Uganda which demanded the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from the country so that free and honest elections could take place. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3044] 8143

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ANGOLA

OFFICIAL IN LONDON SPEAKS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2501

[Article: "Pacavira Recalls in London the Problems of Southern Africa"]

[Text] Manuel Pedro Pacavira, Angolan minister of agriculture, who last week visited London, mentioned in a press statement on 1 October various problems in the southern African region.

In Namibia, he said, Angola will continue to support SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization) and the efforts displayed by Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations, to reach a solution to the Namibian question. Angola, Pacavira added, harbors many Namibian refugees. Because of its attitude, Angola is repeatedly attacked by South Africa. According to an Angolan document, South Africa has launched at least 21 attacks against Angola from the beginning of last August to mid-September.

With respect to South Africa, Luanda's position is restricted to "not interfering in the affairs of a country with which Angola does not even have a common border."

Pacavira again denounced the attention given in the West to "phantom groups" supported by South Africa, such as UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)--a movement that asserts it is leading a guerrilla war against the Luanda government--whose leader, Jonas Savimbi, made a private visit to London last July. Pacavira, who notably met with Sir Ian Gilmour, deputy minister in the Foreign Office, affirmed that Savimbi had not obtained any aid from Great Britain.

Finally, Pacavira, after having recalled that the United States had never recognized the government of Angola, under the pretext, he said, of the presence of Cuban troops there, stated that Luanda was ready to respond to "any positive change" in Washington's attitude toward Angola.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

ALLEGED UNITA OPERATIONS--The UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] opposition movement, led by Jonas Savimbi, published on 30 September in Paris a communique citing the occupation by UNITA during September of two settlements in southeast Angola. On 19 September, the communique specifies, guerrillas from Savimbi's movement took control of Mavinga (250 km north of the Namibian border), major road center for control of the province of Cuando Cubango. On 11 September the guerrillas were already in possession of Chirumbo, according to the communique, a settlement located in the region of Menongue (formerly Serpa Pinto), about 300 km north of Namibia. During these operations, UNITA states having disabled "78 enemy soldiers, including a Cuban commander" and seized equipment, especially a dozen SAM 7 missiles and nearly 600 AK 47 guns. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2501] 9545

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CAMEROON

CNLAA ADOPTS BUDGET FOR ANTILOCUST CAMPAIGN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2622

[Article: "Antilocust Struggle: A 272.6 Million CFA Franc Budget"]

[Text] On 19 September, President Ahmadou Ahidjo created by decree a national committee for the antilocust and antibird struggle, headed by the prime minister. In fact, according to the Cameroonian press, Cameroon is threatened by the largest locust invasion that the Sub-Saharan countries have known since the years from 1928 to 1941.

On 8 October, the CNLAA [National Antilocust Committee] adopted its initial budget for the campaign in progress, which amounts to 272.6 million CFA francs, 172.6 million furnished by the state, 65 million by the PNUD [UNDP], and 35 million by the FAO.

The basic tasks for the CNLAA involve the continuous study of the development of the locust and bird situation in national territory, particularly by the establishment of a system to alert and inform the technical departments of the incidence and the extent of the infestations; the organization of all national campaigns to combat locusts and crop-destroying, seed-eating birds; coordination and orchestration of all antilocust and antibird activities. Since the beginning of the year, search and spraying operations (using land equipment and helicopters) have begun. Unfortunately, the swarms multiplied rapidly due to climatic conditions.

On the bilateral level, several months ago Cameroon and Nigeria launched actions which should contribute to the struggle against the current locust invasion. For Cameroon this involves financing a minimum of 100 hours of helicopter flight time and stockpiling kerosene products in the Ngaoundere and Tibati area.

To conduct the common struggle against the migratory locust, the intervention teams circulate freely between Nigeria and Cameroon. Unfortunately, this is not the case with Chad, tormented for several months now by fratricidal war. Result: the swarms of migratory locusts install themselves there and develop, and then cross Lake Chad to ravage neighboring countries, particularly Cameroon and Nigeria.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NATION DESCRIBED AS POWDER KEG READY TO EXPLODE.

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 13-26 Oct 80 pp 42-43, 44

[Article by special correspondent Zilegue: "Disastrous Balance Sheet: Is It for Reassurance that Bokassa's Successor Has Come To Visit His Opposite Number at the Elysee?"]

[Text] A year after Bokassa's overthrow and the parachute landing of the Dacko team at the head of the Central African state, the time has come to try to set up a balance sheet of the economic, political and social situation of the country.

On the economic plane, as everybody knows, the situation is catastrophic as a consequence of the period between 1969-1970 when Bokassa began to pillage and exploit to his personal advantage the wealth of Central Africa. The increasingly desperate need for capital has brought about a steady decrease of production in all fields. It is that same phenomenon which we are continuing to experience. This is not astonishing when one knows that it was Dacko--who is now in power again--who was at the root of the country's first economic and financial recession in the course of the first five years of independence. One cannot see how or why he might have reformed. Quite the contrary.

Thus, every week, he delves into the coffers of the Treasury and extracts sums of 2 or 3 million francs CFA to "fill the refrigerator, because of the numerous guests" who come to Central Africa, and to face other expenses. Intrigues in the Bokassa style also continue, with the same paralysing consequences on the affairs of the country.

The following is a concrete example. At the head of the Coffee Fund--one of the organizations that should set up the country's finances--a man has been placed who is incapable of exercising that function: no other than Faustin Dacko, the chief of state's own son. And, while we are on the subject of anecdotes, what should one say about the ostentation displayed on the occasion of the marriage of another of his sons, Bruno Dacko, taking on the proportions of a national celebration carried out with great pomp, which included a visit to the town in an official procession, a reception in the palace of the Republic--all of this followed by ridiculous elaborations for the benefit of a people who are nevertheless not credulous. As can be seen, the nepotism so fatal to the economic and political life of the country is far from having ceased.

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Whether it be in the public or private sector, wherever one ventures to look, one is struck by the insufficiency--if not the total absence--of Central African upper or intermediate cadres. Today the infrastructures are totally in the hands of foreigners, specifically French. The famous moneyleaders' conference seems to have been nothing more than a decoy with which it was hoped to soothe the Central Africans, and which most particularly made it possible to measure the depths of the abyss into which the state was floundering. The truth is that Dacko and his team are going to deliver the death-blow to the country, and that nobody--not even those who put him in power--have confidence in them.

The balance sheet is a heavy one. The network of roads--of top priority--is in such a state that the movement of produce is becoming more and more problematical. To mitigate this situation one might consider the rich Central African waterways, but this would be to forget that access to the Ubangui is the preserve of the French experts and business men to whom the strategic key sections of the nation have been entrusted.

Thus it is that the Central African Agency for River Transportation was dissolved and replaced by a new enterprise, the Central African Society for River Transport (Socatraf), managed by Frenchmen. This society started out by laying off two-thirds of the workers and replacing all the Central African cadres by French "cooperators." It is rumored that the essential mission of this new enterprise--directed in Bangui with a representative in Brazzaville--is to spy on the Popular Republic of the Congo. At any rate there has not yet been any opportunity to measure its effectiveness. The first boat of the Socatraf was not able to sail up the Ubangui toward Mobaye until two weeks ago (as we write). When it is known that this is the route through which the essential food supply of the capital has to pass one can measure the grave consequences of the delay, which the Dacko government tried to justify on the grounds that the waters had not risen enough, whereas in fact the rainy season was at its end.

Agriculture--priority of priorities--registers a continual decrease in production. This is due to the precariousness of the means of moving produce and to defects in the system of monetary circulation, but also to the fact that the peasants have no confidence in the regime and are--like everyone else around here--engaging in a sort of slow-down by increasingly reducing their activities to subsistence farming. That is to say in other words that to live in town and to try to feed oneself there is a real calvary for the popular masses.

The processing industry, largely tributary of agriculture, is equally paralyzed by this situation. The result is that workers from various factories and manufacturers either are the victims of technological unemployment or are "compressed"--that is laid off in great numbers, without having, of course, the slightest hope of finding other work very soon.

"In Spite of Himself"

In this climate of uncertainty and deprivation some people, of course, are profiteering: trafficking in gems or pawn-broking. For everyone here there is no doubt that the present chaos is the work of three men: Henri Maidou, former vice-president of the Republic, who backed French intervention before he began to advocate "controlled multipartyism;" former prime-minister Ayandho, known for his tribal

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attitude, his blunders, his erratic behavior, and also his thievery, which has characterized all regimes that have succeeded each other in Bangui; and finally David Dacko, who never ceases to do everything that will earn him his reputation as a puppet subject to manipulation, and who profits from the situation by maintaining his lines of communication for his own benefit and that of his minions.

Indeed, opinion is unanimous that the chief of state does not intend to remain in power, even though--after his visit to Paris--he confirmed that he too would be a candidate in the presidential election of 1981. For it is almost against his own will that he was elevated to the presidency by the French. He is nevertheless obsessed by one fear: the eventual return into the country of Abel Goumba, president of the Ubangui People's Patriotic Front, who is now living in Cotonou, and who, if he should return to the country, could reveal the inside story of the plot (involving, among others, the Bangui Chamber of Commerce), which made it possible for Dacko to succeed Boganda.

This obsession is such that it is said Dacko became ill, a few weeks ago, because he was sent a bogus telex bearing Goumba's forged signature telling him to resign and go into exile if he wanted to keep his head. It is, indeed this panic fear--Dacko keeps repeating: "Goumba must not set foot on Central African soil"--which explains the astonishing eviction of Maidou. For initially the only departure anticipated was that of Prime Minister Ayandho, under pressure from the General Union of Central African Workers (UGTC) and the neighborhood committees of the Central African Democratic Union (UDC, party founded by the Dacko team in March 1979).

Meanwhile Maidou was preparing for a coup with a plan of action initiated, so they say, in Cairo, and he was hoping to succeed by manipulating the opposition to achieve his end. Hence the back-handed declarations by the former vice-president about the so-called "controlled multipartyism." That was precisely what made him lose credit with Dacko, who, as soon as he discovered the plot, accused Maidou of being "a man of the Ubangui People's Patriotic Front (FPO)." This accusation, as everyone here knows, is certainly without foundation--Dr Abel Goumba's movement having ceaselessly proclaimed that it would not participate in any dialogue which would not accept the following assumptions: removal of occupation troops, free and democratic elections. But he has a lot to say about the chief of state's lack of self-control.

It has been learned also that, 2 days after the double eviction of Maidou and Ayandho last August, Dacko had received Ange Patasse (still in prison, with his case at the investigation stage) and F. Pehoua (an international financial administrator posted in the Cameroon), doubtless to find other scapegoats. At the moment, Maidou and Ayandho are under house arrest, guarded in the daytime by the Central African Army. At night it is the "barracuda"--the name given to French military personnel--who are posted on guard in front of the former vice-president's house, whereas the former vice-president can go about freely.

Difficult Replacements

It is predicted that Dacko's tantrum--as French circles view his decision as regards Maidou--will cost him dearly. While keeping up appearances (Didn't Dacko come to Paris recently, and didn't he bring back in his luggage 700 million's

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credit in CFA francs?), the "advisers" are in the process of creating a vacuum around him. Nevertheless it is assumed that the present "status quo" will be maintained at least until the French presidential elections.

In the meantime, however, Paris is increasingly extending its tentacles over the country, through the intermediary of its ambassador and its numerous civil and military experts. The exploitation of mines and forests, freight transport and processing industries--such as the ICAT (Central African Textile Industry)--and many other sectors are in French hands. All this is defended by a veritable invasion army comprising all services, and even a police force, not to speak of the French military advisers who are working at the heart of the Central African Army.

In the meantime also the search is on for a future replacement solution. General Kolingba, chief of staff of the Central African Army and former ambassador to Canada, had been a candidate. But his card was quickly burned as Dacko let out the secret, for the Central African Army was unwilling to follow its chief of staff because of his kinship ties with Ayandho. Today the "advisers" seem to have their eye on the under-chief of staff Sana, former ambassador to Cairo, whom Bokassa had called in for consultation shortly before his fall and had had arrested upon arrival for personal reasons. Replacement plans envisaged by the French include, of course, prospects of contacts with the opposition.

Meanwhile the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) has been thriving from the lawsuit filed against the chief of its leader Patasse, who had been seeking the limelight, spreading his propaganda with abundant distribution of money and all sorts of receptions. He seems to be taking root among the new social strata whose only god is Money. But the great masses have little confidence in him, for they surmise that the MLPC would indulge in even more flagrant waste if it should come to power. On the other hand, the "maoists" (whom one can meet at the homes of some intellectuals coming from France) seem to be losing momentum, as their representative in the government, Blague, has alienated the students through the numerous measures that he has taken in their regard.

Simmering

As for the Ubangui People's Patriotic Front [FPO], which, it must be admitted, is the only opposition movement which has not compromised itself with the various puppet regimes, its hold over the people is real. Its militants, whose patriotism is above reproach (indeed, revelations are expected about its role in the insurrectional demonstrations of 1979), are concerned about all classes of society without exception. It is not surprising that the FPO is the object of intense surveillance and that its members are a favorite target of repression. The most recent victim of this policy--after Mageot Manuel and Bomba Cyriaque, who were deported several months ago in the interior of the country--is Nditifer Boysembe Marc, arrested on 16 August, 1980, in Bangui.

Furthermore, the government is promoting a simplistic propaganda campaign against Dr Goumba's movement, brandishing the threat of a "communist FPO" which would snatch away from the peasants their wives, their children and their property, and which would not leave them so much as one field to cultivate for themselves. It is true that this type of propaganda, belonging to another era, does not taken any

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more nowadays. By the same token, the foreign force of dissuasion--however considerable--which is stationed in the country hardly seems to impress.

A radical change has taken place at the level of political consciousness and popular aspirations which President Dacko's "advisers" do not seem to have measured precisely. The thirst for freedom and the determination to fight for it are such that any solution imposed from the outside--including the Dacko experiment--is doomed to failure. It has become clear that nobody will ever be able to continue keeping the lid of restraint on the simmering pot which is what Central Africa has become.

Whether in the countryside or in the cities, everyone speaks up and criticizes openly. The peasants, who are more and more interested in their country's affairs and who are conscientiously slowing down their production, want to be abreast of everything and show a realism which many Central African intellectuals might envy. In the cities the situation is explosive; and, in spite of the posters on the walls exhorting employees to be punctual, civil servants sulk against work, arriving at nine instead of seven, and going home after being there 2 or 3 hours.

The beginning of the academic year promises to be turbulent, as teachers have addressed an ultimatum to the Dacko government. They are demanding minimum salaries of 60,000 CFA francs. If he fails to meet the demands, they will call a strike which has been thoroughly prepared and which can be expected to have popular support.

While one can observe progress in nationalist sentiment within the Central African Army, humiliated and scorned, policemen and soldiers no longer inspire fear. "What do you want? Are we not living in a democracy?" retorts an old bicycle rider, with a broad smile on his face, to the policeman who is summoning him. An anecdote? Of course, but one that is repeated 10 times daily, and which reveals a lot about the state of mind of the population.

The Central Africans are no longer a people bowed down with fear and humiliation. Central Africa resembles a powder keg which needs nothing more than a spark for it to explode.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

RECRUITMENT OF NIGERIAN WORKERS--Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria have just signed an agreement whereby several thousand Nigerian workers will be recruited to work in the cacao plantations of Equatorial Guinea. The mass departure around 1972-1973 of some 25,000 Nigerians employed in the development of the cacao plantations, as a result of ill treatment by the Macias Nguema regime, had caused cocoa production to drop from 40,000 tons in 1969 to 4,000 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2624] 9434

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GABON

DETAILS PROVIDED ON 1979 ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 pp 2490-2491

[Article: "The Gabonese Economy at the End of 1979"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface and italics]

[Excerpts] The report on the activities of the Gabonese Bank for Development (GBD) for the financial year 1979 (partly analyzed in our issue of 26 September 1980, p 2364) is introduced by an account of Gabon's economic situation at the end of the year just elapsed.

The /gross national product (GNP)/, at market prices, since its maximum level in 1976, that is 719.1 billion CFA (African Financial Community), decreased to 690.2 billion in 1977, then to 600.2 billion in 1978. In 1978 taxes represented 17 percent of the GNP, against 16 percent in 1976.

The difficulties of certain public-related firms brought about an increase in budgetary subsidies for balancing operations: 1.3 billion CFA in 1976, then 2.6 billion in 1977 and 2.9 billion in 1978.

Taking into account the rate of inflation (17 percent in 1977 and 10 percent in 1978), the /growth of the Gabonese economy/ is expressed by a backward movement of 18 percent in 1977 and 20 percent in 1978, while 1976 had shown a rare positive rate of 30.7 percent.

/The balance of payments/, strongly adverse in 1977 by 44.8 billion CFA, due to the equipment outlay undertaken at that time, was practically balanced in 1978 with the negative balance returning to 0.9 billion. The components of the balance of payments for these 2 years apportioned in billions of CFA are the following:

	1977	1978
	-	-
Goods and services	+17.1	+28.9
Free allowances	- 6.7	- 4.1
Nonmonetary assets	-84.2	-13.9
Errors and Omissions	-21	-11.8
Deficit	-44.8	- 0.9

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/The trade balance/ is favorable. In 1978 petroleum, with 207.7 billion CFA represented 70.4 percent of Gabonese exports; wood, with 28 billion, represented 9.4 percent; manganese ore, with 24.2 billion, represented 8.2 percent, and uranium, with 21.9 billion, represented 7.5 percent.

France is Gabon's chief trade partner. Its sales of capital good exceeded its purchases, and the trade balance shows a positive balance of 85.9 billion CFA in 1978 in favor of France. The balance is in Gabon's favor in trade with Great Britain (+24.1 billion), the United States (+19.4 billion), and FRG (+10.3 billion), the Benelux countries (+6.5 billion), etc. The balance was positive with Cameroon (+ 5.9 billion) and negative with the Congo (-4 billion).

/The agricultural campaign/ of 1978-1979 yielded 4,754 tons of cacao (+27.8 percent over the previous campaign) and 233 tons of coffee (-53 percent).

With 9,205 tons of sugar in 1979, the production of the /Sugar Company of Upper Ogooue (Sосуho)/ is already covering the national consumption. The umbrella organization for this group, the /Sugar Food Company (SAS)/, stopped operating in 1979, and manufacturing was reopened by Sосуho. Because of the difficulties in exporting surpluses in production, the latter will be deliberately limited to 8,000 tons in 1979-1980.

During 1979 the /Agrogabon/ project entered its execution stage; the program is based on construction of a 6,000 hectare oil palm tree plantation and on building an oil mill. The cost is estimated at 13 billion CFA.

Fishing provided 8,000 tons, of which 6,000 tons were for industrial fish.

The production of /okoume/ wood in 1979 was calculated at 1.06 million cubic meters, against 1.22 million in 1978. Foreign demand increased a little bit, and exports slightly exceeded 1 million cubic meters, while use by local unrolling companies decreased by 30 percent. The main buyers of okoume wood were France (46.3 percent), Israel (13.3 percent), Greece (13.2 percent), and then Spain, Morocco and the FRG.

Regarding /ozigo/ exports were 53,000 tons, and the main buyers were France (67.5 percent), Lebanon (13.3 percent), Spain and Morocco.

/Oil production/ in 1979 reached 9.8 million tons (-7.56 percent), with /Elf-Gabon/ the major producer (6.7 million tons), followed by /Elf Aquitaine/, /Shell Gabon/, etc.

The commercialized production of /natural gas/ was calculated at 60.8 million cubic meters (+8.2 percent), and is used by 'Gabon Electricity and Water Company/ (SEEG) and /Gabonese Refining Company (Sogara)/.

/The Ogooue Mining Company (Comilog)/ extracted 2.3 million tons of /manganese ore/, which is an increase of 34 percent over 1978, due to the diminishing of stocks in ironworking. Regarding shipments, Western Europe represents 53 percent, North America 21 percent and Eastern Europe 13 percent. With 1,100 tons of /uranium/

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held, the /Franceville Uranium Mines Company (Comuf)/ increased its production 7.7 percent. Comuf covers one fifth of French uranium needs. The constantly declining /gold/ production of the /Gabonese Mining Research Company (Sogarem)/ produced only about 30 kg in 1979.

With basic treatment capacity for 1 million tons of crude a year, the /Gabonese Refining Company (Sogara)/ and the /Gabon Elf Refining Company (Coger)/, both at Port-Gentil, treated 1.25 million tons in 1979 (-27.8 percent). Refining absorbed only 12.7 percent of the national petroleum production, against 16 percent in 1978.

The persistence of the decline in public investments is affecting the production of the /Gabon Cement Company/, whose three-factory capacity totals 400,000 tons of cement and 350,000 tons of clinker a year. Its 1979 production was calculated at 96,200 tons (-28.3 percent).

The Draconian reduction in public investments has especially affected the /building-public works/ sector, bringing about the retreat of several foreign companies, due to lack of projects.

After the opening of the Libreville-Ndjole section, the /Transgabonais/ projects are continuing in the direction of Franceville. These projects basically consist of embanking, deforesting and building art works between Ndole (Km 185) and Ayem (Km 257). The cost of the railroad, put into operation again on 31 December 1979, is 452.5 billion CFA, of which 182.6 billion is for work already completed.

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GAMBIA

FAD ROAD FINANCING AGREEMENT SIGNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2612

[Article: "Roads: Nearly \$10 Million from the ADF for the Laminkoto-Passimus Link"]

[Text] Al Haji Mohmadu Cadi Cham, finance and trade minister of the Republic of Gambia, and Mr Wila D. Mung'Omba, president of both the African Development Bank and Fund, on last 17 September in Abidjan, signed an agreement according to which the African Development Fund (ADF) would grant Gambia a loan of 8 million UCF [expansion unknown], or about \$9.8 million, for financing the Laminkoto-Passimus road. The loan, approved by the ADF board of directors on last 28 August, will be repaid in 50 years with payment deferred for 10 years.

The project concerns the improvement and asphaltting of a two-lane road (a 6-meter roadway) with two shoulders, each 1.5 meters wide, between Laminkoto and Passimus (120 km) and two feeder roads, one leading to Bassang (18 km) and the other to Basse (13 km), or a total length of 151 km.

The total cost of the project is \$20.3 million, of which \$17 million is in foreign currency and the balance in local costs. The ADF loan is intended to cover 57.4 percent of the component in currency, or 47.9 percent of the costs as a whole. The Gambian Government and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), with, respectively, \$3.4 million and \$7.2 million, will jointly finance the remaining 52.1 percent. The acquisition of goods and services financed by the ADF will be made on international invitation to tender at the level of the ADB [African Development Bank] and ADF member countries.

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IVORY COAST

ELECTION RESULTS, PROCESS REVIEWED

Houphouet-Boigny Reelected, Delegate Elections

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 80 pp 58-60

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] On 18 October, one week after celebrating his 75th birthday, Mr Felix Houphouet-Boigny was reelected president of the republic for the fourth consecutive term. With 99.9 percent of the deciding votes. Out of 2,795,456 voters, there were 306 blank or invalid ballots. From Abidjan to Odienne, from Binger-ville to Katiola, going through Daloa, Man, Korhogo, Bouake, the Ivorians made for the polls in great numbers on 12 October, in a fun-fair atmosphere, to bear witness to their "indestructible loyalty to the founding candidate," who thus begins his fifth term.

For these elections, undoubtedly the last at which Houphouet will be present, have taken on the appearance of a plebiscite. In both the working-class districts of Abidjan and in the inland towns, the crowd was relaxed and good natured.

Strategy

Circumspect, the police only stepped in to prevent a scuffle. "It's impossible. You will have to find a solution to my problem," an old pensioner cried out in desperation to the prefect, Leon Koffi, as he stepped out of an imposing black Mercedes into the middle of a crowd congregated in the court of a school on the outskirts of Bouake. "I'll be deeply upset if I don't fulfill my duty toward my friend Houphouet," explained the complainant who had not received his voter identification card. And he displayed his precedents, with PDC [Ivory Coast Democratic Party] membership cards and many others proving his loyalty. "Too late," replied the polite but intractable prefect. "There is nothing I can do. Come back tomorrow. I shall see what I can do to allow you to vote at the coming elections."

The coming elections? That will be very soon. In fact, the Ivorians are to elect their 147 delegates on 9 to 23 November and the mayors of the main urban centers on 30 November. Now, for the first time since independence there will no longer be any "president's delegates and mayors"--contrary to what generally takes place in Africa. Every Ivorian citizen can present a candidacy certificate. But no one is entitled to wrap himself up in the folds of the party's flag or claim kinship with the head of state.

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The delegate candidates, it must be added, have not waited until 25 October, the official opening date of the electoral campaign, even though all have not thrown off all disguise. Since public opinion polls are forbidden, some set about in another way to calculate their chances before committing themselves. Such a one consults the Treichville priests, another the village juju priest, if not the clairvoyants brought in at great expense from Mali or Upper Volta.

In the Abidjan well-to-do villas, as in the simple thatched cottages in the forest and on the savannas, the battle is already raging. Any weapon at all is suitable as long as it serves its purpose: defamation, money, of course, but also tribal system and descent. The only thing missing is the discussion of ideas so dear to the Western mind. How could it be otherwise since the candidates belong to the same party (in power)? How could they offer different programs since, once elected, all the delegates will belong to the same parliamentary group? To defend and serve the same government.

It does not much matter. Caught unprepared by the storm of renewal, a good many outgoing delegates preferred to pull out, either to avoid a humiliating defeat, or because of a genuine desire to make room for young people. For instance, some old campaigners on the Ivorian political scene, such as Jean-Baptiste Mockey, minister of state charged with public health, in Grand Bassam; Antoine Konan Kanga, deputy mayor of Abidjan; Kouissou Keletigui in Man; Samba Ambroise in Dimbokro. However, other "oldsters," unable to give up the dangerous intoxicant of political combat, were bent on staying on. And they went down once again into the arena: Djibou Soukalo, deputy mayor of Bouake; Gbon Coulibaly in Korhogo; Amon Daby in Aboisso.

Groups of determined, self-assured young people are getting ready to go over the top of these strongholds. On the other hand, at Facobly, near Man, it's the other way around: Jean Thea, former deputy, former secretary of state, is planning to unseat someone who is far younger than he, his...own daughter, Simone Leroux. "I did all I could to prevent this unseemly fight," this eloquent little lady glowing with vitality told us. "But," saddened she added, "all the village wise men called to the rescue could not succeed in convincing my Old Father to give up. Well, what do you expect, that's democracy." But Facobly was not the only scene of opposition among members of the same family. At Korhogo, the outgoing deputy, Gbon Coulibaly, will encounter a lawyer, his own uncle, Lancine Coulibaly Gbon. Likewise, at Aboisso, just as at Agou in the Adzoge region, real brothers are expected to go down into the ring. Although there were 11 of 120 outgoing assembly delegates, there are more than 12 women soliciting an electoral mandate; Berthe Sawadogo, wife of the former minister of agriculture, in Fresco; Achy Brou in Bassam; Sangare Ansanna in Dabakala; Danielle Boni in Tiassale, who besides her male rival candidates will encounter two other women. The former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Paris will not be the only one representing journalism: Ben Soumahouro is coming forward as a candidate in Abidjan; Marcel Bile in Port-Bouet; Jean Kambire in Bouma Bouna, in the North.

The Test

Ardent and all-absorbing battle. Even though the presidential elections went off in good humor, the 9 and 30 November polls promise to be very heated. Whereas in

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July and August, the elections of the Party's secretaries general were the occasion of only three minor incidents, the delegates' elections promise to be very exciting. Although all the necessary steps have been taken, the minister of the interior, Mr Alexis Thierry Lebbe has made this very clear to us. For democracy has not only some advantages. it also has its drawbacks which the democrats should foresee and assume responsibility for them.

Speculation on Future

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 80 pp 58-60

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado]

[Text] The Ivorians, baffling. Disappointed or skeptical (J.A. No 1032), but "on the whole contented." At least if we are to believe the results of a poll which the Ivorian Institute of Public Opinion (IIOP) took in April-May 1980: 55 percent of the people questioned considered themselves happy with the situation, as against 34 percent who were dissatisfied. In 1979, however, the "contented ones" represented only 37 percent and the "dissatisfied ones," 40 percent. Based on a sampling of 1,800 people distributed among Abidjan (66 percent), Bouake (12 percent) and nine other towns, the sample survey brought out one of the Ivorian facts of life today: anxiety due to the high cost of living overrides any yearnings for political change.

But this was before the upheaval brought about by Houphouet in the name of democracy. Before the congress was supposed to bring about the renewal (29 September--1 October, see J.A. No 1031), even before June 1980 which saw the "Old Man suspend the one-party machinery. At the time, it's true, even the head of state noted that the Ivorians, their minds beclouded by the struggle for individual and daily survival, could hardly be deeply concerned about public service. Since and shortly before the congress, JEUNE AFRIQUE also tried to conduct a survey among the Ivorian readers (see p 83). Democratization was already the burning question of the day. But, to our surprise, in the sphere of acknowledged concerns, priority still went to the high cost of living (22 percent of the replies received). Democracy only comes in second (15 percent), closely followed by another material preoccupation, housing (12 percent).

Does this mean to say that Houphouet was wrong to worry and to wish to democratize his form of government? In fact, material concerns also bring political unrest to light. In this manner, the IIOP survey brings out very clearly that if the Ivorians attribute their economic problems to the international crisis, they also imputed the blame to their party in power, which "missed the mark" in matters of salaries, employment and education. Still worse, Ivorian society's disease was unmercifully diagnosed: corruption, according to the IIOP survey. This is confirmed by the J.A. mini-survey in which Ivorian readers cite corruption (50 percent) and partisanship (23 percent), and are of the opinion that, during the past 45 years, priority should have been given to mitigating social inequalities (55 percent) whereas only 23 percent attribute it to political reorganization.

The future, nevertheless, leaves a great many readers skeptical: 53 percent of those in the Ivory Coast foresee fewer opportunities of success for their children than even they had, as against 37 percent who believe that their offspring will be more

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fortunate. Since the declaration of intent regarding democratic reorganization, there is a veiled hope for a change for the better: 51 percent of those who replied to our questionnaire do not believe that the promised reforms will be carried out, but 49 percent think that they will. As for the choice of institutional ways and means to bring about this reorganization, among the rules anticipated, 43 percent believe that Houphouet-Boigny should remain in power, 39 percent would like greater freedom of the press, while 32 percent are hoping for multipartisanship (the total exceeds 100 percent because several replies were given). As for current politics which could transform the Ivory Coast, hopes are divided between socialism (54 percent) and Houphouetism (43 percent). One thing is certain: Marxism receives...0 percent.

What are we to conclude from this? For the time being, very little. The Ivorian Institute has not published the entire results of the public opinion poll and the JEUNE AFRIQUE survey covered only a limited margin of Ivorians. But one fact is striking: international experts on public opinion, specialists on Africa, positively state that today Africans are still skeptical regarding promises of reorganization, they are less afraid of their ruling powers and more willingly express their opinions. The fact that the immediate concerns are material ones, however, should not deceive us. They frequently act as a leaven for political upheaval, indeed even for violence.

Houphouet-Boigny understands this: the democracy he is suggesting to his fellow-citizens is a safety valve whose purpose is to relieve the congestion of a community where the economic crisis emphasizes social inequalities. It is in this respect that the Ivorian venture at the end of this year is a momentous occurrence. If successful, it would set a precedent in Africa and would be a lesson to other leaders. Failure would mean that Africans are no longer satisfied with belated relief. And that the desire for change is deeper. In the Ivory Coast as elsewhere, in the months to come, we must therefore expect some violent ground swells.

Foreigners Disfranchised

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 80 p 60

[Text] On the long queues which very early had crowded into the polls for the 12 October presidential elections, there were not only Ivorians. Numerous Upper Voltans, Malians, Guineans, Mauritians, Lebanese and others were easily singled out by their language, their dress or their complexion. The Ivory Coast is, in fact, one of the few countries in the world where aliens have the right to vote.

This liberality, however, has met with vigorous opposition among the ruling authorities and young staff members. President Houphouet-Boigny consequently had to give way, just as he did in the dual citizenship matter which in 1965 he wished to grant to the nationals of countries which were members of the Mutual Agreement Council established on the Ivory Coast. The electoral law passed in August specifies that this is the last time non-Ivorians will be voters. This is in accordance with laws in force in virtually all states.

In regard to the Ivory Coast, a country in which one-third of the population is made up of aliens, it is obvious that this will present a delegation problem. Considering their numerical importance and especially the part non-Ivorians are playing in the country's economic development, wouldn't it have been wiser to allow them to

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participate in one way or another in political discussions? Whether by keeping the electoral system in force since independence or by making it easier for these aliens to become Ivorian citizens. Also, aren't these voting records in which are entered not only the voter's nationality (which is understandable) but also his ethnic group, excessive? This final touch of colonial inspiration seems to be anachronistic, indeed dangerous, 20 years after independence.

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IVORY COAST

PREELECTION SITUATION DESCRIBED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Oct 80 pp 52-54

[Commentary by Siradiou Diallo: "Orderlies vs Ministers"]

[Text] In the race for the National Assembly, unknown candidates are pitting their innocence against the money of the notables.

Following the ocean breeze which, from June to September, softened the sun's heat and dropped the temperature, Abidjan is once again bathing in alternate waves of heat and rain. But, this year, the sudden rise in the number of storms and the temperature which, beginning in October, threatened to pop the thermometer, will not only be due to climatic factors. The political situation will also have a lot to do with it. For the electoral competition throughout the country for the selection of 147 deputies and dozens of mayors is not exactly peace and quiet.

With respect to the legislative elections, the campaign which opened officially on 25 October is to last only 2 weeks. However, the candidates had not waited until that date to jump into the race (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1033). The short period of time which they were given, it is said, is explained by the desire to "avoid long skirmishes and the deep wounds that threaten to arise out of such skirmishes." In other words: it is hoped that the battlers will be prevented from inflicting incurable mutilations. That is something which is not always guaranteed. In this connection, it so happens that one day of frontal combat is more deadly than months of skirmishing.

What is more, the leaders are so conscientious that they are not content with abridging the campaign. They are resorting to important means of deterrence. In particular, well before the opening of the campaign, the army and police, generally inconspicuous, are making themselves increasingly visible. Every evening, men in combat uniform patrol the various districts of Abidjan as well as the cities of the interior. The state in this manner intends "to show its force so as not to have to make use of it."

The Springboard

Will this classical means of deterrence be enough to temper the combative spirits of the participants? That is not certain. Everyone here is expecting that things will be much more difficult than they were during the elections of the secretaries

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general of the PDCI (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast in power) in July and August. At that time shots were fired in Korhogo and Man, two cities in the interior, as well as at Adjame, a popular district in Abidjan. Not only were there material losses, but there were also wounded. Some say that there were even deaths. But that has never been confirmed. What is certain is that of the outgoing 179 secretaries general only 90 were reelected.

The stakes involved in the election of deputies is more important moreover. Not so much because of the monthly compensation of 400,000 CFA [African Financial Community] francs (8,000 French francs) which the deputies receive (although this gold mine is not something for certain candidates to sneeze at) but principally because of the influence and fame which attach to the position. As a matter of fact, a deputy's seat is an excellent springboard in Ivorian political life. Not only are the representatives of the people known and respected, at times even beyond the country's borders, but the chief of state has clearly let it be known that this time a good number of ministers will be chosen from within the chamber. This has aroused a resurgence of interest.

Circumventing the Prohibitions

The day after the National Council meeting on 12 June, during which President Houphouet-Boigny announced his intention of once again starting up the train of democracy which was "parked somewhere," some believed that to be a minister is necessary to have been elected a deputy. This had the effect of arousing very high tension in certain persons, in addition to veritable pandemonium. Automobiles and airplanes heading for the cities of the interior were jammed with aspirants to deputy positions. Each of them was seeking a district.

Fortunately, the chief of state later said that it was not necessary to be a deputy to enter the government. Nervous tension has abated but has not for all that diminished the interest in the position of deputy. Be that as it may, in the Ivory Coast officials elected by the people do not limit their activities strictly to the political field. They also play a considerable economic role.

A number of deputies are directors of companies. They may have been appointed to represent the state in mixed economy companies, or private foreign companies may have felt they had to give minor positions to nationals in the hope of thus preserving the future of their interests in the Ivory Coast. Of course, the incompatibilities established by the electoral law passed in August limit more than in the past the possibilities for action of deputies in the economic sector. However, through the interplay of family alliances and many other forms of figure-head operations, many elected officials are circumventing the prohibitions of the law to protect their economic interests while occupying a seat in the National Assembly.

Is not the free enterprise system in this country as elsewhere the favored arena in which influence peddling, games of chance and corruption flourish? Having deliberately chosen the capitalist path to development, the Ivory Coast should not complain about nor should it, with greater reason, escape the defects and weaknesses which characterize this system, of which, I might add, it is harvesting the advantages.

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The Battle of the 'Little Guys'

Still, 5 times the number of candidates for the 147 deputy positions have left the starting gate. Among them, the representatives of the new bureaucratic or business middle class evidently are carving out the lion's share for themselves: doctors, attorneys, professors, engineers, directors of companies, merchants, forestry exploiters, planters, etc. But, alongside these nouveaux riches, we find several more modest candidates: farmers, orderlies, teachers, students, prison directors, trade unionists, minor clerks.

These "little guys" have thrown themselves without complexes into the fray. We are told that some of them may cause considerable surprises, for they have been sought out by their fellow countrymen of the "village" in preference to big and prosperous cadres. We are also told that certain rich candidates are running the risk of exhausting their fortunes for nothing. Like the man who, aspiring to the position of secretary general, in the month of August, gave food and drink to his village several days running. And who, the day of the election, was given the disagreeable surprise of seeing no one vote for him. Although they had enjoyed his largesse, all the villagers preferred his impoverished opponent over him.

However, that is an exception which, like all exceptions, only proves the general rule. This rule states that the wealthiest people make themselves more readily seen and heard than candidates without money. That may be because they have more means of transportation and movement and of necessity create for themselves more opportunities to make contact with the electorate. Similarly, dignitaries known at the national and international levels have more aces in the hole than candidates who are as unknown as they are nameless. This is the particular case of ministers and other personalities who have occupied the political scene for many years.

Without an Opponent

However, this is the situation: in the final analysis, ministers have not presented themselves in great numbers. Some of them out of fear of not being elected (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1033). Others, promoted to first-line positions at the party level, have judged it preferable to not be too greedy. Instead of concurrently holding all the positions within the party, government and National Assembly, they felt it advisable to yield the position of deputy to a fellow villager.

Preferably a grateful fellow villager who, in a period of hard times, would not take much persuasion to yield the position to his protector of today.

The situation is all the more delicate because Ivorian deputies do not have alternates. In spite of everything, five ministers did not hesitate to launch themselves into the adventure. They are: Mbahia Ble Kouadio (Armed Forces) in Mbahiakro; Dikebie N'Guessan Pascal (Primary Education) in Sikinsi; Theodore Koffi Attobra (Water and Forest Resources) in Arrah; Paul Gui Dibo (Mines) in Duekoue; Kone Ibrahima (Tourism) in Boundiali.

Former ministers are also taking advantage of the confrontation to make their political comeback. For example, Bouazo Zegbeh Edmond (Information) in Issa and

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Henri Konan Bedie (Finance) in Daoukro. The latter, who by far received the most applause during the presentation of the list of members of the Politburo to the recent PDCI congress, is one of the rare candidates to not have an opponent in his district.

Less Flexible

Another first level personality present in the competition: Philippe Yace, outgoing president of the National Assembly. A candidate in his native village of Jacquerville, former secretary general of the PDCI (who does not seem to have suffered too much from his recent political reverses) is assured, it is said, of being elected by an overwhelming majority of the Alladians of whom he is one of the principal customary chiefs.

Already the National Assembly which will be produced by the balloting on 9 and 23 November promises to be more representative of the Ivorian people. And younger, too, and surely more dynamic. But will it be as flexible as previous National Assemblies? The question is already being asked--and not only in Abidjan. On the other hand, everyone is in agreement in believing that out of the 120 outgoing deputies, only half will be reelected to their seats in the National Assembly.

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IVORY COAST

HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY'S DEMOCRATIZATION DRIVE SEEN AS 'REAL GAMBLE'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Mawdo*: "Houphouet-Boigny's Real Gamble"]

[Text] The political evolution that Ivory Coast has been undergoing has been able to surprise some because, for someone who knows its leaders' actual options, it seems unexpected. Ivory Coast is ranked among the countries that are called "moderate." Its head, President Houphouet-Boigny, who has received the label "Wise Man of Africa," is not a man to risk adventure. Yet this man is little understood or misunderstood.

Saved From a War

Although an aristocrat by birth, in addition to his religious training that made him consider all men as brothers, Houphouet-Boigny has preserved the stamp of his early years when, as a young doctor, he came into contact with human poverty, which further strengthened in him his love for his neighbor.

The colonial regime prevailed then. One of its most contemptible manifestations was forced labor that required Ivorian peasants to leave their plantations and go and work on those of Europeans who allocated them poverty wages. Consequently young Houphouet--he was then in his 40's--looked for a way to help his brothers, beyond the practice of his profession. His ideas led to the creation of the Union of African Planters to make it possible to protect the interests of an everexploited peasant mass.

Individually the peasants could not make themselves heard. Joined together in the union, they could protect themselves. This was the first demonstration of the confidence that Houphouet put in the strength of the people. Everything has already been said about the effective activity of this Union of Planters that led to the creation of the African Democratic Rally (RDA), of which Houphouet became the president.

From the outset, this great movement set as its objective the liberation of the African people. In partnership with France. But life is constant evolution and,

*Pseudonym of an African politician who was one of the original comrades of Houphouet. Mawdo means "the old man" in Fulah.

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in the heat of action, this objective was soon transcended. The work undertaken by the RDA to educate the African masses is the ferment that was at the source of the process of African independence. Would it have to be acquired in a blood bath, as happened in other countries under France's domination, or could the lesson be learned from these peoples' struggle, whose combat was ours, to achieve the same result?

"The Wise Man of Africa" chose the second way, saving black Africa from a war. His tactical positions at the time have often been misunderstood, even among militants of the RDA, a party that underwent several divisions between 1950 and 1955, following the breakdown of the alliance of its representatives with the communist group, then the last in 1958, following the constitutional referendum of 28 September 1958 sponsored by France under General de Gaulle.

Fraternity

The administrative ties between our states having been broken, each looked for the most appropriate paths for its nation's development. Nevertheless, the acronym RDA was preserved all over; whether it had as its basis one ideology or another, the fraternal ties woven within the movement were maintained. Even when the various parties no longer acted on the phraseology issuing from a collegiate leadership, the activities continued to be inspired by the common ideology wrought in the fraternal struggle against the colonial regime and all the retinue of troubles for which it was the vehicle.

A New Phase

Some were able to think that Houphouet was going too far in his policy of cooperation with international capitalism. As a good "fisherman," he saw more clearly and farther than his disparagers, for one cannot catch fish with an unbaited hook. Whether we liked it or not, we had inherited a country with no resources. Consequently our development could not take place without the collaboration of outside capital. Can the concessions made to attract this capital have an influence on the profound convictions that have laid the theory of a man's intentional choice of society? It is certain that, while cooperating with other countries, Houphouet did not permit his political choices, always carried out at the opportune moment, to be undermined at all. This explains the "revolution" that he has just launched in his country under the name "democratization of the regime." No matter how unforeseen and unexpected it may appear, it fits into the logical sequence of Houphouet's political gait and itinerary. For those close to him, there is nothing surprising: he had announced the hue for several years by the punctual taking of positions including the government reorganization of 1977 and the donation of his personal country properties to the state in 1978. If some of the regime's high dignitaries are finding themselves caught unawares now, the reason is that they did not know how to correctly analyze the deeds and gestures of President Houphouet, for whom everything starts from the people in order to return to the people.

Houphouet is going to allow a new phase to begin in the country's political life. The generation of leaders who led the country to independence is gradually disappearing. Therefore the country needs new personnel to continue a campaign that goes well beyond Ivory Coast's borders. Trusting the sovereign people totally,

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Houphouet is leaving it up to them to designate the nation's children to whom he intends to entrust the management of its affairs.

This process, launched in July, will be carried out to the end, via the congress of the PDCI [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast] and RDA, which is meeting at the end of this month of September. It will also be carried out via the presidential election that will see Houphouet--he himself is ready--in competition with other Ivorians, if there are any who feel themselves capable of facing their fellow countrymen's approbation through the legislative and municipal elections. The Ivorian people have the floor. It is up to them to know how to use it dispassionately and calmly.

People have talked a lot in Africa about revolutions that do not go beyond words. The current experiment is really a revolution because, if it is carried out to the end, as Houphouet wants it to be, it will make it possible to demythologize the single party that rules most of our country. It will have been proved that democracy can be installed within such a party.

To Be Pondered

The Wise Man of Africa, in the twilight of his life, will have taught his rivals a lesson. They should ponder it because, as Governor General Van Vollenhoven said in his doctoral thesis in law (1931) about the French policy of the time in Algeria, "it has been substantiated since Denis Papin that, if the pot boils and the lid is not taken off, the steam ends up making it explode." What this other visionary had seen in 1913 ended up happening in 1954 and, in 1962, the Algerian people, as a result of the French colonists' mistakes, regained their independence.

Houphouet, after the gamble on economic development that he won, has just launched another challenge to Africa, this time on the political level. Let's hope that he will win this one also, thus crowning a career well performed in the service of Africa.

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MOZAMBIQUE

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FINNISH AGRICULTURAL AID--The Finnish Government decided to grant 37.5 million marks (10.28 million dollars) for 1981-1983 to Mozambique to develop the agricultural sector. The financial aid is part of a program of the Nordic countries to develop agriculture in Mozambique, but the amounts that will be paid by Denmark, Sweden and Norway are still not known. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2501] 9545

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

CACAO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM--Within the framework of the Fourth National Development Plan, which is to begin 1 January 1981, the federal government intends to carry out the third phase of the program for the development of cacao plantations worth 259 million naira. This program provides for the renovation of about 300,000 hectares of old plantations and an expansion of 80,000 hectares in new plantations; i.e., 30,000 hectares in Ondo state, 26,000 hectares in Oyo state, 12,000 hectares in Ogun state and 12,000 hectares in Bendel state. The program also provides for the building of a processing plant. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3036] 8143

FISHING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM--The Nigerian Federal Government is planning to launch a development program in the coastal and ocean fishing sectors which will permit the country to attain an annual production of 66,000 tons of fish and 1,600 tons of shrimp. In a related matter, Cross River state has been selected by the FAO as the site for a training project in the fishing sector. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3036] 8143

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SENEGAL

NEW PEANUT MARKETING SYSTEM ESTABLISHED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2611

[Article: "Peanuts: A New Marketing System"]

[Text] The working group which, since the abolition of ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development], has met on the initiative of the Ministry of Rural Development to define a new organizational framework for the peanut marketing campaign, adopted three measures which concern, in particular, the setting up of collection equipment (scales, sacks), primary transport and the removal of the seeds from the bulking points to the oil mills, as well as the financing of the marketing campaign.

The setting up of the scales, the distribution and the recovery of the sacks, and all the equipment needed for the normal development of the peanut marketing campaign will be provided for the coming campaign by the now nationalized oil mills. The financial means needed for all these operations will be deducted from the peanut price list. This temporary measure will be in effect only for the coming campaign. Future operations will be taken over by the cooperatives.

Primary transport, from the cooperatives to the bulking point warehouses managed by the oil mills, will be the responsibility of the cooperatives. But they are being offered the possibility of calling on the oil mills to put at their disposal a sufficient number of vehicles which they could not find locally.

As to the so-called secondary transport, consisting of removing the seeds from the bulking points to the oil mills, it will be provided in its entirety by the oil mills themselves. A number of risks encountered as a result of too early rain will be avoided, because with the elimination of any intermediaries, the oilmen will be able to watch over their own peanuts.

The third and last measure concerns the financing of the marketing campaign. This financing will be provided this year by the oil mills. At the beginning of the marketing campaign, an estimate will be made of the total volume of the tonnage that each cooperative will have to market during the campaign, and as soon as the campaign starts, an amount corresponding to the purchase of 20 percent of this total volume will be paid to the cooperative president at the village level.

This procedure will not, however, bring about a break in financing, since the inspectors designated by the oilmen will constantly drop in on the cooperatives to

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supervise the removal rate. These inspectors, who will be two in number at the basic levels, will be recruited from among the oil-mill staff and from former cooperative workers.

Besides these general measures, several other special measures have also been taken, in particular, with regard to the price to the peanut producer, the weighers' wages, the bonuses to the cooperative presidents and the establishment of a marketing margin.

The price to the peanut producer, which was set at 50 CFA francs per kilo, will be divided into three sections: 46 CFA francs (per kilogram marketed) will be paid directly to the peasant immediately after the purchase operation; 3 francs will be retained on each kilogram marketed to serve as a guarantee for debts contracted with the authority of the cooperative entity (it being understood that this sum will be paid back to the rightful owners as soon as these debts are paid). Lastly, 1 franc will be retained as an antifraud rebate on each kilo, to serve as a guarantee of the cleanliness and oil content of the seeds (a franc which will also have to be repaid to the cooperative in the event the seeds marketed are pure.)

Provisionally, the weighers' wages and the cooperative presidents' bonus will be taken over by the oil mills on the peanut price list until the cooperatives take over in the near future.

Lastly, a marketing margin amounting to 1,000 CFA francs per ton deducted from the peanut price list will be granted to each cooperative and will be paid monthly. This sum will not be paid to the cooperators individually, but will be left at the disposal of the board of directors, who will have to use it for the operation or equipment of the cooperatives or for any other purpose in conformity with the community interest and the cooperative spirit.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

RETURN TO SCHOOL CALM--After the strikes which marked the last school year in Senegal, the return to classes took place calmly for the 370,000 elementary school pupils. The teachers from Sudes (Sole Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers), which was at the origin of the strikes, resumed their duties normally, except for 28 who were dismissed and for 110 others who were suspended as a result of the movement. The movement, according to the trade-union leaders, had not had the success counted on, the government, on several occasions, having called upon private-school teachers, on nonteachers and on technical assistants to supervise and correct the tests for competitive and other examinations, instead of the Sudes members. For his part, Mr Kader Fall, minister of education, recently stated that facing Sudes, another teachers' trade union favorable to the government is being formed. Mr Fall finally brought out that the budget for his ministry, whose prerogatives go from the nursery school to the secondary school certificate, was set at 20,103 million CFA francs as against 18,530 million in 1979. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2611] 9434

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

ADB WATER SUPPLY LOAN--The African Development Bank (ADB) recently granted Tanzania a loan of 10 million currency units (about \$12 million) for the financing of the Dodoma water supply, sanitation and drainage project. The loan is repayable in 20 years, including a 5-year deferment of payment. The aim of the project is to provide more water and to increase the new national capital's purification and drainage facilities. The total estimated cost of the project is about \$21 million. The executing agency for the project, whose implementation will take 40 months, is the Capital Development Authority. The acquisition of goods and services relating to the ADB loan will be made by international invitation to tender in accordance with customary ADB procedures. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2627] 9434

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UGANDA

BRIEFS

DISSOLUTION OF PROVISIONAL PARLIAMENT--Uganda's Provisional Parliament, the National Consultative Council, was dissolved on 8 November by the Military Commission in power, according to an announcement by Uganda Radio in a brief communique. According to diplomatic sources in Kampala, this measure means that the Military Commission has decided to apply the present election law during the conduct of elections. This law provides for separate ballot boxes for the different candidates but does not provide for the presidential election by direct, universal suffrage, as requested by the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) of Dr Milton Obote. Parties opposed to the UPC requested a common ballot box for all candidates. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3044] 8143

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