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1 of 1

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JPRS L/9389

7 November 1980

# Japan Report

(FOUO 30/80)



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CONTENTS

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

Comments on Suzuki Policy Speech (JPS, 4 Oct 80).....	1
Construction Is Factor in Effort To Stay Neutral in Iran-Iraq Conflict (Minoru Hirano; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 5 Oct 80).....	3
Japan CP Delegation Attends Dinner Given by Kim Il-song (JPS, 15 Oct 80).....	5
Briefs Nishizawa Meets Kim Il-song	6

MILITARY

Suzuki Cabinet Places Priority on Defense (ECONOMISUTO, 26 Aug 80).....	7
White Paper, by Haruo Fujii Increasing Expenditures, by Tsutomu Hanayama	
Japanese Defense Official: Nuclear Arms Acceptable for Self- Defense (THE JAPAN TIMES, 16 Oct 80).....	24
'YOMIURI' Criticizes Hawkish Trend of Defense Arguments (Hiroshi Tarazaki; YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 14 Aug 80).....	25

ECONOMIC

'JAPAN TIMES' Supports Japan's Views Given at U.S. Auto Hearings (Editorial; THE JAPAN TIMES, 16 Oct 80).....	29
'ASAHI' Views Recent IMF-World Bank Meeting (Editorial; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 9 Oct 80).....	31

- a -

[III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]

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Industrial Bank of Japan Surveys Equipment Investment (MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 8 Oct 80).....	33
'YOMIURI' Raps Oil Industry for Forming Price Cartel (Editorial; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 28 Sep 80).....	34
Japanese Firms Win Alaska Pipeline Orders (THE JAPAN TIMES, 9 Oct 80).....	36
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	
Status of New Satellite Launcher R & D Discussed (Pierre Lavereux; AIR ET COSMOS, 20 Sep 80).....	38
Japanese Weather Satellite Sends Faulty Data (MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 15 Oct 80).....	49
P4 Level Research Center To Be Established (NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 16 Jul 80).....	50

- b -

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

COMMENTS ON SUZUKI POLICY SPEECH

OWO40941 Tokyo JPS in English 0854 GMT 4 Oct 80

[Text] Tokyo Oct 4 JPS--Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki delivered his first policy speech at the Diet on October 3.

At the beginning the premier stressed the "strict restrictions Japan is facing both internally and internationally," expressing that "Japan will make active contributions proper to its economic potential." Thus the premier announced that the government will call for austerity on the people, and that it will meet demands from the United States and business circles.

Giving no words at all on the elimination of plutocratic and corrupt politics, Suzuki made clear his intention to place restrictions on freedom of election movements, on the pretext of "establishing morals in politics." Evading admitting LDP-government's responsibility for the present deficit in the national finance, the premier said the prime cause of the deficit was "the expansion of social insurance," to launch an attack on the people's welfare.

On the foreign affairs, Suzuki said that Japan will expand solidarity in every field with the so-called "free countries," with the Japan-U.S. relations as its core, and will "fully perform her responsibility and role" as a Western ally. He expressed that Japan will actively take part in the U.S. global strategy, and stressed Japan will strengthen aid to south east Asian countries.

In his policy speech Suzuki set up an item especially on the "total security system." He stressed that Japan's basic policy is in the "maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security treaty," expressed efforts for "highly qualified self defense forces." Thus he expressed his intention to push ahead with military buildup in line with demands from the United States. He also said that he will "promote a policy of comprehensive security system" which is to be established from broader viewpoints including the economy and foreign policy. Thus he declared to push ahead with militarization of every field of the people's living.

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On the constitution, the premier deleted the phrase "strict observance of the constitution" from the draft speech, and only said that he will "strictly maintain the idea of the constitution."

Giving no words at all on the death sentence on Kim Tae-chung, the premier on the contrary expressed praise and support for the Chon Tu-hwan regime in South Korea, by saying that the Japanese Government "heartily hope that a steady progress will be seen in the efforts for the stabilization and development of South Korea."

AKAHATA in its comment dated on October 4 said that so many issues have appeared in the two and a half months since the inauguration of the Suzuki cabinet, which have caused concern over the cabinet and uneasiness among the people. Those include the surfacing of a new suspicion over the sale of DC 10s, the case of fund donation to Welfare Minister Kunikichi Saito from a slanderous hospital, the special favor given to military budget by lifting the ceiling in complication of the next fiscal budget, and the virtual group visit by ministers to the Yasukuni shrine.

The reply given by Premier Suzuki in his policy speech was, however, a declaration of "strengthening an all-out reaction in every field of security, diplomacy, people's living and democracy, with the backing of the majority of the LDP in the Diet."

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

CONSTRUCTION IS FACTOR IN EFFORT TO STAY NEUTRAL IN IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 5 Oct 80 p 3

["Behind the Scenes" column by Minoru Hirano: "Why Japan Must Be Neutral"]

[Text]

When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa lost no time in issuing a statement that the Japanese Government desired an early cessation of hostilities and conveyed this statement to the governments of both countries.

This step is natural because Japan depends heavily on Mideast oil, and non-escalation of the war and an early cease-fire are vital to this nation's economic survival.

Japan, however, lacks the power to force the warring nations to stop fighting immediately or even to serve as a mediator to bring about an early truce. Therefore, while staying aloof from the dispute, this nation must avoid involvement in any external moves which may escalate the fighting.

Japan has economic relations with both Iran and Iraq. There are many Japanese in both countries. Japan should maintain strict neutrality in order to maintain its relations with both countries and protect the lives of the Japanese in Iran and Iraq. The Foreign Ministry is strictly avoiding any comment on the war.

This is Japan's basic position toward the war. In line with this position, Japan did not support President Carter's call for a six nation conference on freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. France and West Germany reportedly opposed the call on the following grounds:

(1) Instead of a summit or ministerial conference, a working-level conference behind the scenes should be held.

(2) Instead of setting up a new body, talks should be held through such existing organs as the International Energy Agency (IEA) or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

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(3) If the Western camp stages a large-scale political show, the Soviet Union will be given a pretext to intervene in Middle East affairs. Then, the war will escalate, crushing hopes for an early end. Formation of an international surveillance fleet composed of the fleets of Western countries would enhance this danger.

By saying it would take part in discussions on economic problems, not military issues, Japan virtually sided with France and West Germany. Inasmuch as Japan cannot send ships of its Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to take part in the proposed international surveillance fleet, the nation would find itself in a predicament if military issues are brought up. It is natural that Japan is reluctant to take part in such a conference, knowing this danger.

One ranking Foreign Ministry official said nonchalantly that the six-nation conference plan has been dropped.

A more urgent problem for Japan is whether to continue the construction work on the Bandar Khomeini petrochemical complex, a Japan-Iran joint venture in southern Iran, and how to protect the 750 Japanese engaged in the project. Some of them desire to return to Japan, but the sea and air routes between Japan and Iran have been cut by the war. Moreover, the Iranian side is opposing repatriation of the Japanese. Unable to abandon the hope of continuing the construction work, the Iranians are trying to make the Japanese stay there by saying that the war is developing favorably for Iran and that once the Japanese withdraw, it will take much time to assemble them again.

The government cannot ignore the Iranian wishes but securing the safety of the Japanese is a more important task. Foreign Minister Ito Wednesday instructed Foreign Vice Minister Masuo Takashima to consider the safety of the Japanese to be of top importance.

However, the government says no preparations to repatriate the Japanese engaged in the construction work have been made yet. The government has decided to ask for Iranian cooperation to enable them to take refuge in Tehran temporarily.

If the war becomes protracted or escalates and the petrochemical complex is bombed again and if the danger to the lives of the Japanese in that country increases further, the government will have to take the last action. To avert that, the government strongly wishes that the war will end quickly.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JAPAN CP DELEGATION ATTENDS DINNER GIVEN BY KIM IL-SONG

OW151005 Tokyo JPS in English 0915 GMT 15 Oct 80

[Text] Tokyo Oct 15 JPS--The delegation of the Japanese Communist Party headed by Tomio Nishizawa, vice-chairman of the JCP Presidium, attended a dinner given by Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK] on the evening of October 14 after the 6th congress of the WPK ended.

The JCP delegation on October 12 attended a mass rally welcoming them in Taaen City. The meeting in which about 1,000 citizens participated in honor of the Japanese Communist Party was the first time in these 14 years in the DPRK. [passage as received]

Head of the delegation, Nishizawa gave a speech. He expressed greeting to the 35th anniversary of [the] founding of the WPK, and its 6th congress. Nishizawa said that the JCP had struggled in prewar days in support of the Korean people's struggle for independence and liberation, and that, now in Japan broader struggles are being carried out to save democratic persons in South Korea, including Kim Tae-chung.

Vice-chairman of the JCP referred to the 1966 joint statement between the two parties which stressed the important norms of equal rights and noninterference in other party's internal affairs. Nishizawa pointed out, based on this principle, cooperation between the communist and workers' parties should be developed for the commonly agree tasks. [as received] The Japanese Communist Party will continue its activities in line with this policy, stressed Nishizawa.

Head of the JCP delegation concluded his speech expressing solidarity to [the] Korean people who, led by the Workers' Party of Korea, are making progress in their socialist construction and reunification of the country, and he expressed his hope for a new success of the WPK and Korean people.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

BRIEFS

NISHIZAWA MEETS KIM IL-SONG--Tokyo Oct 11 JPS--Vice Presidium-Chairman Tonijo Nishizawa of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party on October 10 met with General Secretary Kim Il-song of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea. Nishizawa is now staying in Pyongyang to attend the sixth congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. Nishizawa delivered a congratulatory message to the 6th congress and the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea. The vice presidium chairman of the JCP on the same day met and exchanged views with 12 foreign delegates attending the congress, including Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Communist Party of Spain; Guillermo Garcia Frias, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba; Petar Stambolic, member of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; Ilie Verdet, member of the Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and prime minister. [Text] [OW110945 Tokyo JPS in English 0907 GMT 11 Oct 80]

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MILITARY

SUZUKI CABINET PLACES PRIORITY ON DEFENSE

White Paper

Tokyo ECONOMISUTO in Japanese 26 Aug 80 pp 10-16

[Article by Haruo Fujii: "White Paper on Defense: Psychological War Planned for the Public"]

[Text] The sixth White Paper on Defense ("Defense of Japan") was released. The white paper is essentially a government report on the state of affairs. Does this year's white paper reveal the actual facts about defense administration?

The White Paper on Defense was first drafted in October 1970, when Yasuhiro Nakasone was the director general, and since the second report (June 1976) by Director General Michitaro Sakata, it has been published annually in summer. When the white papers, totalling six reports in all, are analyzed and compared in detail, it becomes apparent that the reports are gradually becoming less objective. The trend became noticeable in last year's white paper and is especially glaring in this year's paper as noted below. It reflects the degree of rightist turn of defense administration.

Under the Meiji Constitution, the people were not permitted to meddle in the exercise of military authority. The governing rule, "issue orders, do not inform," was most clearly demonstrated in the military circle. Is that tradition still being followed faithfully by today's defense authorities?

It seems that the democratic principle of maximum disclosure of government information to the people, who are the sovereigns and taxpayers, does not apply to defense matters. Reading the White Paper on Defense, one does not feel that he has received a satisfactory, logical explanation as to the true conditions of defense.

Why is that? One of the reasons is that the white paper is being prepared in accordance with the public information strategy of the Defense Agency. The one who is teaching us "how to read the white paper" is Army General Yoshio Takenaka who was superintendent of the Ground Self Defense Force Staff College (equivalent to former Military Staff College) until March of this year.

As important measures in seeking national security, he has listed, together with military, diplomatic and economic strategies, public information strategy and explains it as follows:

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"In governing, we have advanced to an age where we must pay increasing attention to the domestic situation. In execution of overseas strategy, winning support of the people is a prerequisite and is an important and an increasingly difficult task. This writer places public information on the same level with military affairs, diplomacy and economics in security strategies because he believes that the public information intended for overseas and domestic audiences plays an important role in the pursuit of security strategies" (December 1978 issue of KANBU GAKKO KIJU [Staff College Articles]).

In public information strategy, what will be disclosed and what will be kept confidential are decided upon after analytical, evaluative and comparative processes based on objectives and circumstances, conditions, etc. The Takenaka theory further states: "Probably, there does not exist, in the past or present, a single person who believes that whatever is publicly disclosed reveals the whole truth. How publicly to reveal the objective is an essential facet of public information strategy. Not only are public announcements withheld but instead, it is customary to release "black information" or "grey information," i.e., false information, the source of which is unknown, or information which distorts facts, although the source can be verified.

He continues to say that public information activities are "frankly, a part of psychological war but to conduct 'psychological war' in peacetime and against one's own people is senseless and difficult to justify as a governmental task." Therefore, the term "public information" is used.

The White Paper on Defense is the product of public information activities, which are a part of the psychological war against the people, and only by realizing this, can one correctly interpret its contents.

The Defense Agency established, in May 1973, the public information committee chaired by the administrative vice minister. According to the organizational guidelines, the public information committee has the objective to "deepen the people's understanding and awareness of defense" and the responsibility to perform the following duties:

1. To consider, from a comprehensive viewpoint, the various problems related to public information activities of the Defense Agency.
2. With respect to the various problems affecting defense, to consider which information to disclose publicly.

Committee members belong to the top echelon, including chiefs of internal bureaus of the Defense Agency, chiefs of staff of Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces, chiefs of auxiliary organs, et al. Information considered by the public information committee as appropriate for public disclosure is being presented to the people.

The Ground Staff Office made official stipulations, regarding psychological war on the people, in March 1968 at the time of revision of "field order" (former operational field service regulations). At this time, psychological war was separated into psychological war (narrow sense) directed against the enemy and psychological war (broad sense) against the people and self-defense forces [SDF] members. Propaganda was considered a means of psychological warfare in the narrow sense and public information a means of counter psychological warfare.

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In June 1978, "Field Order 2d Section" was revised, and together with disaster prevention support, public welfare support, etc., public information was consolidated into external liaison and cooperation functions and a responsible staff was established. The anti-people activity was raised to the level of operations, intelligence, personnel and supply as one of the basic functions of operational command. Psychological war in a narrow sense (against the enemy) was put under the jurisdiction of the operations staff.

#### Deceptive Myth of "Northern Threat"

The first distinguishing feature of the 1980 white paper is clear mention of the Soviet threat. To be specific, in Part 1 on "World Military Situation," a portion touches on "Military Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan," and here it states, "...strengthening of Soviet Far East troops and their stepping up of activities are affecting the military balance between Americans and Soviets in the Western Pacific and can be regarded as an increase in the potential threat to Japan's security." In the 1979 white paper, this statement concluded, "...has become a military capability over which close vigilance must be maintained for Japan's defense."

What was considered as requiring "close vigilance" came to be regarded as a "potential threat." It is said that in the preparation of the 1978 white paper, the Defense Agency tried to clearly designate the USSR as a country to defend against but a consensus could not be formed within the government and the Soviets were mentioned, only indirectly, as targets of national defense. From the standpoint of military geography, Northeast Asia was designated as an important front equal to Europe and it was hinted that both fronts faced USSR.

Throughout the 1979 white paper, the "fact" of Soviet military increase is mentioned to attract attention. In this year's white paper, the government's judgment was added and it was affirmed as a "potential threat." Since the defense white paper is a document approved by the cabinet, it is an official acknowledgment of Suzuki Cabinet's defense policies and the bases of those policies. It is authoritative and does not simply reflect Defense Agency's views.

However, is the quality of the analysis made by the white paper worthy of its authority? In July 1979, the Soviet navy assigned the anti-submarine aircraft carrier Minsk (32,000 tons) to the Pacific Fleet. Let us compare the 1979 white paper which was drafted before the Minsk deployment and this year's white paper.

Changes can be noted in two places. One is the number of carrier-based aircraft which increased from about 30 to 40 aircraft. Secondly, the statement, "when compared with U.S. navy carriers, there is a great difference in operational capability, such as the offensive and defensive powers of aircraft, etc." has been entirely omitted.

The data vary as to the number of aircraft aboard the Minsk (Kiev-class carrier). Probably, about 40 aircraft is correct. It should be noted, however, that it has certain weaknesses since it carries only vertical take-off and landing [VTOL] aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters. It has the capability for reconnaissance within 500 km and for anti-submarine attacks but its capability for landing assaults and air defense is woefully weak as compared with U.S. carriers. Therefore, in emergencies, it cannot venture out into ocean areas which cannot be covered by land-based aircraft.

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To continue, the following account in the white paper is inconsistent. "This ship... in emergencies, within an ocean territory which can be defended by land-based aircraft, can become the command center of the fleet and function in anti-submarine warfare, surface battles, landing assaults, etc." (The statement is correct up to this point.) It then emphasizes the threat by stating, "Although on a limited scale, the fact that it was assigned to the Far East...newly possesses air support capability for landing assault troops..."

To be accurate, it should have read: (1) Kiev-class antisubmarine carriers have limited air support and fleet command capabilities, and (2) it would be difficult to operate in open waters which cannot be defended by land-based air power. Its activities, since its assignment in Vladivostok in July of last year, should also be disclosed. It is said that in its new assignment, the new ship has shown no movements for over a year and not even emitted an electronic signal.

Only one-sixth of the ships in the Soviet navy are deployed. Of the U.S. ships, 30 percent are fully battle ready and deployed overseas, 40 percent are combat ready and based at home ports and the remaining 30 percent are under repair or conducting basic training ("FY 1979 U.S. Navy Budget and Plans," Admiral Hollaway, Chief of Naval Operations). Soviet ships have a low operational rate. Probably, there are problems with the technical level of construction and repair and with facilities.

In other words, with the publicity aim of focusing on the "Soviet threat," the white paper gathered and colored only suitable data and deleted facts which did not serve the purpose. For example, in assessing military balance, the U.S. 7th Fleet and the Soviet Pacific Fleet are compared on a graph. This is the lowliest of tricks even in psychological warfare. If changes in strength are to be shown, comparisons should be made with the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Since Pacific Ocean deployment accounts for 45 percent of U.S. ships, the total tonnage is 2.56 million tons.

To get into details, the Soviet Pacific Fleet increased by 140,000 tons over the previous year and totals 1.52 million tons. Including the Ivan Rogov, which was deployed with the Minsk, there was an increase of 50,000 tons but there is no explanation as to the remaining 100,000 tons. On the other hand, with regard to the U.S. 7th Fleet, three ships, including the nuclear aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz which was deployed in the Indian Ocean, account for 50,000 tons. Since the U.S.S. Nimitz alone weighs 91,400 tons, why is it claimed that there was an increase of only 50,000 tons for U.S.S. Nimitz and accompanying ships?

Presentation of accurate facts is sought in the white paper. However, one-sided data and distorted evaluations are noticeable in this year's white paper. On the one hand, it demonstrates the low caliber of Defense Agency's analytical and research capability while on the other, it reveals that the whitepaper is being used more and more as a psychological warfare tool.

#### Internal Drive Toward Military Expansion

The RIKUSEN KENKYU [Land War Research] has begun a campaign directed toward reorganization of the division. The RIKUSEN KENKYU is a military periodical which began publication in January 1980. It is the successor to KANBU GAKKO KIJI (publication terminated in December 1979) of the Ground SDF. On 22 December 1979, the "Rikusen Gakkai" [Land War Research Society] was formed and the monthly RIKUSEN KENKYU began to be published as the society organ.

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Reasons given for the change of periodical title and formation of a research society are to eliminate any impressions that they might be governmental in character. To avoid misunderstandings, a voluntary organization was formed and the periodical was made its organ. However, as president of the "Rikusen Gakkai," the superintendent of the staff college was automatically chosen and, in reality, there has been no change.

Proposal for division reorganization was carried in the July issue of the said periodical and in the following August issue, a special edition was published. The introduction to the special edition notes "contributors' names are kept confidential," and four unusual, unsigned proposals are presented.

At the beginning of the August issue is a proposal by a certain Mr "KI" titled, "a truly effective division capable of winning." As the image of the new division is pictured a "division which can fight on equal terms with the maneuver counterforce unit (A)." The "A" unit points to the Soviet forces and its 1969-type division (69Z) is the goal of SDF. The present SDF division has 9,000 members or 40 percent of the strength of "A" unit. Therefore, the standard division to be organized should be "a mechanized or armored division composed of ten and several thousand troops equipped with over 200 high-performance tanks and over 400 armored vehicles." Mr "KI" claims that if defense outlays equal "about 2 percent of GNP, it is fully possible to build the division portrayed in the image" and strongly advocates that, in politics, one should "resolutely demand what is due."

If a division "capable of fighting on equal terms" with the Soviet division is to be deployed, a drastic increase in strength is required. According to the article, "The Division Has Aged," in the July issue of the said periodical, one GSDF division has only about 30 percent strength of the Soviet 1975-type division (75Z). The Soviet division has been strengthened from 62Z to 69Z and then to 75Z. Present GSDF organizational plans, against an imaginary enemy, are based on 69Z "maneuver counterforce unit (A)" (April 1978). In the near future, the plans should be revised and based on 75Z. Comparisons in strength between a Soviet division and a GSDF division are shown in the following table:

	Soviet Division			"A" GSDF Div.	[units]
	62Z	69Z	75Z		
Troops	10,500	10,100	12,000	9,000	persons
Medium Tanks	190	188	266	60	tanks
Armored Cars	31	410	320	13	cars
APC's	--	--	90	--	carriers
Artillery	93	126	126	48	pieces
Ground-to-Ground Rockets	16	22	22	--	rockets
Ground-to-Air Missiles	--	57	166	--	missiles
Antiaircraft Artillery	48	28	24	20	pieces
Antitank Missiles	36	36	36	15	missiles

Source: July 1978 issue, FUJU GAKKO KIJI [Fuji School Articles], August 1980 issue, RIKUSEN KENKYU [Land War Research], etc.



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If they are to fight on equal or better terms against the super military power, USSR, the SDF must be greatly strengthened, quality- and quantity-wise. The second distinguishing feature of this year's white paper is the creation in Part 3 of a new section, "Present Status of Defensive Power," which presents a general review of the capabilities of Ground, Maritime and Air SDF. It exposes the weaknesses in all areas including the armament to be used on the frontline to rear logistics support, military bases, human fighting strength, etc. What emerges are a demand for complete modernization of materiel fighting power and hopes for the establishment of an emergency readiness setup. Related to this, in the buildup of defense power, this year's white paper is conspicuous in that it totally rejects the "Basic Concepts of National Defense" [adopted by Cabinet in 1957].

The "National Defense Program Outline [Outline]," which was approved by the National Defense Council [NDC] and the Cabinet in October 1976 was based on the basic concepts of national defense. The intent was to adapt defense buildup to cope with new threats as they appeared. Since it was evaluated that chances were slim for the emergence of new threats at this time, quantitative buildup of defense capability was to be limited. Based on this assumption, the 1978 white paper delineated the limits of defense buildup.

That was entirely omitted in the 1979 white paper. Furthermore, in actuality the basic concepts of national defense are denied in this year's white paper and instead, the day-by-day maintenance of military strength to cope with emergencies is strongly advocated. The reason given is that "since defense capability buildup requires a lengthy period, it is not an easy task, in the event of sudden change in the international situation, to rapidly build up defense power to cope with the change" (Section 1, Part 3).

Thus, the "Necessary Concepts for National Defense" were revived. The intent is to build up defense power on the basis of realistic capabilities against "threats." As for the Outline, only buildup goals shown in the table remain intact and the basic policy has been repudiated. That is, the Outline states that "in actually implementing the program, the economic and financial situation, etc. existing at the time will be considered and harmonious coordination will be maintained with various other measures of the country."

What will happen now?

As for the 1981 estimated budget requests, the Suzuki Cabinet decided on 20 July to handle defense-related expenditures separately and approve a 9.7 percent increase (7.5 percent increase for all other government expenditures). From a position of "harmonious coordination" with other measures, the stance changed to priority on "defense." The government, on its own, repudiated the basis of the Outline.

Viewing Southeast Asia and Middle East

What role will this strengthened defense power play? It is noted that in Part 2, "Japan's National Defense Policies," to the "independence and security of this country," a new section on international responsibility was added. It states, "In conjunction with Japan-U.S. security arrangements, Japan's defense capability contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia, and thereby, contributes to the maintenance of world peace." Thus, the third distinguishing feature of this year's white paper is that it made clear the posture to extend strategy overseas.

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With regard to East Asian problems, the explanation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula changed greatly. This year's white paper acknowledges that "preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is urgent for the maintenance of Japan's security." The wording in last year's white paper, "possesses an important relationship," has been changed to "urgent." On the military strength of North and South Korea, it evaluates that ROK is "somewhat inferior" in land forces and that "situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable."

A new section was established on the military situation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. As a result of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, following the Iranian revolution, the Middle East and Indian Ocean have become target areas of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The white paper states that guarantee of "peace and stability of oil-producing countries of the Middle East and safety of maritime transportation routes from the area" is an important problem for the Western countries, including Japan, and takes the attitude of supporting, as an "indispensable measure," the continued presence of American forces in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas.

For the first time, this year's white paper makes detailed comments on ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand. The following comment must not be overlooked: "The various ASEAN countries are located in strategic positions along the routes to transport natural resources to Japan and also hold close economic ties with Japan. Therefore, the security guarantee of ASEAN countries has an important relationship with Japan's security maintenance. Japan is increasing its cooperation in the effort to strengthen ASEAN countries, notably Thailand, and is watching future trends with considerable interest."

The white paper clearly stated that the Korean Peninsula was an "urgent" area and that the security guarantee of ASEAN countries has an "important relationship" with Japan. It can be interpreted as an indication of military strategy directed abroad, i.e., of cooperating to strengthen the governmental setup of these ASEAN countries and of promoting closer ties based on defense of ocean transportation lanes.

As can be seen from MSDF participation in the Rimpac-80 maneuvers (February-March 1980), with the U.S. Navy as the core and involving the navies of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the joint defense or maritime transportation routes is looming as a significant task in the overseas strategy to maintain security.

In the explanation of the present status of defense power, this year's white paper states that the main duties of MSDF are: (1) defense against invasion from the ocean; and (2) maintenance of traffic safety in Japan's peripheral waters. However, it is said that the MSDF ships and aircraft are intended mainly for anti-submarine warfare. In other words, MSDF can carry out the first duty only with the support of the mobile striking power of the U.S. Navy. While protecting the U.S. Navy, MSDF forces will perform the second duty.

If defense of ocean transportation routes are limited to "Japan's peripheral waters," it is meaningless. Of the 600 million tons imported annually, 99.95 percent depend on maritime transportation and via the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, the routes range all over the world. The Strait of Hormuz in Middle East is 11,000 km away and America is 9,000 km away.

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The MSDF regards as its duty, the defense of ocean transportation lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles (1,852 km) from Japan proper. What will it do if attacked in waters 1,001 nautical miles away? No matter how strongly the MSDF is reinforced, it is unlikely that it can defend the ocean transportation routes spreading throughout the world.

Thus, the concept of maritime joint defense was born. The navies of the Western countries determine their respective ocean areas to defend and conduct joint defensive actions as necessary. The Americans have suggested the formation of a Pacific patrol fleet and the Defense Research Council of the Liberal-Democratic Party is proposing revisions of the laws to assign and authorize MSDF the mission of patrolling territorial waters and high seas. In these actions, the movement toward maritime joint defense can be discerned.

#### Bring Up the People's Burden

In order to counter the massive military power of the Soviets, on the one hand, and on the other, to "contribute to maintenance of international peace" from the Pacific basin to the Indian Ocean, including the Middle East, it is inadequate simply to build up and strengthen the SDF. It is only natural that establishment of an emergency readiness system and insuring of the people's cooperation (general mobilization) will be sought.

The 1979 white paper simply revealed that studies were continuing on legislation for emergency situations. This year's white paper reports that priority has been placed on studies concerning problem areas in SDF laws and Defense Agency Establishment Laws and that revisions of these two defense laws will be carried out first.

Discussion of reserve strength, which will become necessary in the event of emergencies, has taken up considerable space in this year's white paper. Troop strength and system of reserves are considered in detail, giving comparisons with the situations in other countries, and a reserve officers' system in the SDF is strongly advocated as "extremely necessary." The white paper reports that in England and the United States, recruits without any military experiences are being organized and from this, it can be surmised that revisions of the system are being studied.

An article titled, "Inclusion of Reserve Officers in Division Formation," in the special edition of RIKUSEN KENKYU (August 1980 issue) on division reorganization proposals, makes the following comment:

"No one now believes that 180,000 troops can provide adequate land defense. The backbone of Japan's defensive power is the unified, combined strength of active and reserve forces...We look forward to the inclusion of reserve officers, as a bold step, to form divisions which can adequately battle the opposing forces."

In this event, reserve officers will be recruited from "youngsters with sound beliefs (excluding ex-SDF)." For the present, while maintaining the volunteer system, recruitment will be expanded to cover all youths. It is said that the Defense Agency and GSDF are thinking along these lines.

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In addition to above, the defense burden of the general populace extends to many other areas, e.g., (1) system to convert civilian transport capability to military uses; (2) securing of support of commercial shipping in emergencies; (3) procurement of various types of operational supplies, including fuel; (4) repair and maintenance of armaments; (5) elimination of various restrictions on maneuver grounds, airfields, etc.; and (6) consolidation of technological strengths of non-governmental enterprises and of all domestic endeavors.

In order to wage battles, the SDF must obtain the people's cooperation and build a system whereby the people can fight together. The fourth distinguishing feature of this year's white paper is the mention that all-out consideration toward this end is on the day's agenda.

Adequate buildup of defensive power and maintenance of Japan-U.S. security arrangements are the "most essential elements" (1979 white paper) in the government's policy to preserve security.

Military defense is the basis of national security and its buildup is advocated in each year's white paper. Only data suitable toward that end are selected for the situation analyses. The merits of security and SDF are propounded but the dangerous aspects or limitations of defensive capability are not touched on.

When discussing defense of ocean transportation routes, it should be mentioned that it is extremely difficult, strategically, physically and geographically, and it should also be pointed out that defense on the high seas is useless unless the cargo handling ports and pipelines are secure and safe passage through the straits can be guaranteed. Switzerland has commercial ships but no navy. However, its ocean shipping has never been threatened. This fact should also be brought out.

Of the approximately 130 countries which have commercial ships, only 30 countries possess forces (over 10,000 persons) which can be called a navy. Countries with antisubmarine capability are even fewer. Regardless, since World War II, the safety of maritime traffic of all countries has been guaranteed. This is due to nonmilitary measures. By maintaining maritime order and deepening multifaceted mutual cooperation, ocean transportation can be ensured and that is the way it should be.

The same can be said of land and air defenses. The government should study the possibilities and limitations of all military and nonmilitary means, then point out the options and obtain the people's judgment. The white paper should not be used as a tool of information manipulation.

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#### Increasing Expenditures

Tokyo ECONOMISUTO in Japanese 26 Aug 80 pp 16-20

[Article by Tsutomu Hanayama: "Medium-Term Operations Estimate"]

[Text] The chorus of voices, including those of the United States and Japanese politico-financial circles, supporting increase in defense buildup continues to grow louder. Decision has already been made for priority increase in next year's defense expenditures. [This article] scrutinizes the expectations and realities of the arms industries which have come to life.

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## Priority Increase in Defense Expenditures

One of the highlights of the defense issue was the heated clash between the Ministry of Finance and the Defense Agency over allocations of the FY 1981 defense budget requests. Since implementation of the medium-term operations estimate [hereafter, abbreviated as "medium-term operations"], which was to actually start in 1981, hung in the balance, not only the Defense Agency but the arms industries watched the development with interest.

Japanese arms industries have been steadily increasing their production but the annual total output amounts to no more than 500 billion yen. Since that is the case, it is only natural that the arms industry circle should intently await to see how the medium-term operations would be budgeted. The clash was eventually resolved politically, at a top-level meeting between Finance Minister Watanabe and Defense Agency Director General Omura, with the agreement that, including the automatic increase of personnel expenses, there would be an increase of 12.2 percent over the previous year (9.7 percent without personnel expenses).

Although the amount requested by the Defense Agency was not fully granted, it is significant that it won the commitment that "in the event it becomes necessary to make supplementary requests because of changes in internal and external situations, such requests will be considered separately." Accordingly, not only has it become possible to "accelerate" the medium-term operations but the door has been kept open for supplementary requests when the final budget negotiations are held at year end. At any rate, the course has been set for headlong expansion of defense expenditures.

What are the goals of this defense program called the medium-term operations which are to start in FY 1981? Much of the plan is still veiled because the Defense Agency has disclosed only a part of the operations for the reason that they are considered as "reference materials for internal use of Defense Agency only." It is possible, however, to grasp the rough outline from the supplementary explanations submitted to the Diet and the media such as newspapers. Putting the bits of information together, one can say that the plan follows the basic guideline of the "National Defense Program Outline [Outline]" (adopted by the Cabinet in October 1976). For the present, the plan aims to increase total defense expenditures to 1 percent of GNP by FY 1983. If the plan materializes as scheduled, the goals shown in the tables attached to the Outline will be practically attained, with the exception of a certain number of MSDF ships. In that sense, it is a defense plan that has the earmarks of a post-4th Buildup Plan.

Concretely, the buildup plan is as follows--

1. Estimates of "frontline expenditures" of the tri-services within 5 years subsequent to FY 1981 are: GSDF, 760 to 790 billion yen; MSDF, 1.08 to 1.12 trillion yen; ASDF, 860 to 890 billion yen; total, 2.7 to 2.9 trillion yen.
2. Particular emphasis is being placed on the strengthening of MSDF armament. Plans are to: build 16 escort ships, 5 submarines and 39 other ships of various types; remodel and equip active escort ships with missiles; and import 37 P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft and 51 antisubmarine helicopters.

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3. GSDF plans are to: obtain 301 Model 74 tanks, 180 self-propelled howitzers, 110 armored vehicles and 110 aircraft (including helicopters) for tactical operations; deploy improved Hawks; and conduct speedily the feasibility study of air defense system, including Nike-J's.

4. ASDF plans are to import 77 fighter-interceptors (F-15s), 13 support fighters (F-1's), 4 early warning aircraft and 12 replacement aircraft (C-130's) for C-1 transports.

Although the goals of the medium-term operations are within the parameters set by the Outline, implementation of such a plan without deliberation of the National Defense Council [NDC] runs counter to popular sentiments and raises a number of questions.

Unclear Nature of "Medium-Term Operations"

First, if such a detailed defense plan were to be drafted, why wasn't it placed before the NDC for deliberation? In drafting the medium-term operations plan, the views of the Defense Agency were: (1) it would conform to the Outline and it would be on a single year basis rather than for a designated period as heretofore; (2) the goals would be based on the charts attached to the Outline; and (3) the plan would be nothing more than a reference material for budget requests.

However, as the Defense Agency itself recognizes, although the defense plan is to be drafted on an annual basis, it is necessary in carrying out actual operations to determine the future course, within possible limits, of critical and important tasks. Actually, the medium-term operations incorporated such objectives when it was drafted as the medium-term defense capability buildup plan. Putting aside the formalistic argument as to how it was drafted after adoption of the Outline, the medium-term operations plan is clearly, in fact, the 5th defense buildup plan and therefore, it will not be limited to being the reference material of Defense Agency's internal bureaus.

As a matter of fact, in the procurement plan of frontline equipment, e.g., import of the F-15 fighter-interceptor aircraft or the P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft, their deployment was decided upon not only on a yearly basis but with a certain future outlook. Since this has been made clear in previous discussions and if its conformance to the Outline were not considered, how can one deny that the true nature of the medium-term operations is not that of the 5th defense buildup plan?

Unless the medium-term operations are reconsidered, from this viewpoint, it is only natural that consensus-building within the government would face rough sledding. The awkward confrontation between the Defense Agency and Finance Ministry arose not simply out of financial matters but because there was an undercurrent of doubts about the attitude of the Defense Agency. Since this is a plan that would require a great amount of public funds over a long period, it is only natural that the entire plan should have been presented to the people and discussions sought, especially at this time when defense issues are being debated as matters of public concern.

The second problem is that the "basic concepts" which form the basis of defense buildup, that is the "philosophy," is missing. Increase in defense capability should be proposed from the standpoint of protecting "what against what kind of

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threat" and this is the fundamental issue when considering defense. Of course, as long as the medium-term operations follow the basic policies of the Outline and conform to the underlying defense concepts, it might be logically contradictory to present anew "defense concepts," as the Defense Agency claims. However, nearly 5 years have elapsed since the NDC adopted the Outline and during this period, the international situation has greatly changed.

- Particularly, after the 1970's, compounding the shock of Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, there has been a retrogression in detente, which signifies the real collapse of post-WW II U.S.-Soviet strategic arrangements, and a resulting increase of military tension in Europe. On the other hand, the expanding and worsening Iranian revolution not only hurt American pride but greatly cut down America's role as the leader of the dollar market and world military police. American journalism seriously views this situation as the "beginning of a new cold war." We must be aware that "short-sighted" defense proposals are being presented in Japan with these changes in international situation and deepening crises as the background.

To comment further on the Far Eastern situation, the continuing warfare on the Indochina Peninsula and the increasing deployment of Soviet navy in Far Eastern waters, about which the Defense Agency is constantly harping, are factors which are greatly changing the Japanese defense environment. It is a fact that Japan is at the crossroads of new options, including that of self defense. In this situation, it is inconceivable that long-range defense buildup can be planned and designed without an analysis of the new international situation and consideration of realistic counterstrategies.

It is true that Japan's defense concepts specified in the Outline are based on strategic reliance upon the Japan-U.S. security setup and for the present, on maintenance of fighting strength capable of resisting small-scale aggression, directed against possible Soviet attacks.

It should be emphasized again here that the medium-term operations plan is not merely reference materials for internal use in making budget requests. As long as it is conceived as a defense buildup plan with long-range viewpoints, the government has the obvious duty of presenting the plan in entirety, including defense concepts adapted to the newly unfolding international situation.

Is 1 Percent of GNP Possible?

- The same can be said about the question of scope of defense force strength to maintain which should be specified in "defense concepts." Although the scope of defense force strength is clearly indicated as an "objective" in the Outline charts, military strength must not be judged solely by direct combat standards such as the unit organization. The rapid progress of military technology in recent years, due mainly to computer systematization, has greatly altered the concept of fighting strength and this reality must be considered in the evaluation. Therefore, the fundamental concept of "defense of what against what" must be clarified and without considering it, it is meaningless to discuss the limits of defense force strength.

In the past, during the time of Tanaka Cabinet, the "scope of peacetime defense force strength" became an issue. The Defense Agency came out with the figures that four escort flotillas and 250,000 tons of naval ships were required by MSDF.

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However, when the medium-term operations plan was completed, the goal of naval strength had become 260,000 tons and is certain to exceed the "scope of peacetime defense force strength." The issue here is not simply one of deciding what is the appropriate quantitative level of defense strength. Rather, it is the fear that once increase in military buildup gains momentum, it cannot be arrested. Even if limitations were set on the defense plan through monetary means, in terms of GNP, since the latter is based on the anticipated economic growth of the "new economic society 7-year plan," which has strong variables, it would be also pointless to discuss, from that angle, the limits of defense force strength.

For this reason, it was clearly stated in the basic policies for national defense that in implementing the defense buildup plan, the government will "consider the economic and financial situation, etc. existing at the time and maintain harmonious coordination with other government measures of the country." A braking mechanism to arrest limitless expansion of military expenditures is sought in the "defense concepts."

The third problem is whether, in view of the financial situation, it is possible to carry out the various plans, including procurement of frontline equipment, of the medium-term operations. Furthermore, owing to American pressure to increase defense expenditures, a new demand has been made to accelerate execution and complete the medium-term operations by 1983.

Here are projected figures compiled by the Finance Ministry on the assumption that defense expenditures would amount to 1 percent of GNP. This projection is based on the condition that Japan would fulfill the U.S. diplomatic request of "making steady and noticeable increase in defense expenditures." First, the GNP for various years were calculated on the assumption that the economic growth rate would be 11.4 percent, based on projected financial situation and the new "economic society 7-year plan." Then, on the assumption of a certain general account with certain financial outlays, the financial burden was projected if defense expenditures amount to 1 percent of GNP.

According to the projected calculation, to secure [GNP] 1 percent defense expenditures from FY 1981, financial revenues must increase 23.8 percent or 2.76 trillion yen over the previous year. To attain the same goal in the 3 years between 1981 and 1983, defense expenditures must increase 15.4 percent annually for a total increase of nearly 1.2 trillion yen.

Except for tax and grant allocations to local governments and national bond outlays, which can be called fixed charges, increases in annual expenses must be held down to between 8.9 and 9.2 percent over the previous year. If defense expenditures are extended to 1985, the growth rate for the respective years would be 13.8 percent (total increase of about 2 trillion yen) and increases in expenditures, aside from defense and fixed costs, must be restricted to between 9.0 and 9.3 percent. In spite of that, if priority is to be placed on increases in defense expenditures, it would become necessary to reduce social welfare expenses and it is absolutely certain that new problems would arise.

At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in May, to the U.S. request that "completion of medium-term operations be accelerated by 1 year," the late Prime Minister Ohira replied, "we will give it serious consideration and efforts." Therefore, Japan is

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obligated, diplomatically, to increase defense expenditures to 1 percent of GNP within the 3 years but even without the projected calculations, it is clear as to whether or not its realization is possible. For the moment, in formulating the budget estimates for 1981, a political decision was reached to approve the Defense Agency's request of 2,393 trillion yen as general funds and 55.2 billion yen as special funds for purchase of already contracted aircraft. Because of the financial situation, as to whether or not the medium-term operations can be realized as planned is still up in the air.

#### Increasing Reliance on Imports

The last problem that should be pointed out is that the medium-term operations is a plan that relies heavily on imports. The plan is focused on qualitative improvements of equipment, in keeping with the progress in science and technology, and its most important tasks are the buildup of various types of defense capabilities and the modernization of weapons system. What must be expedited is the buildup of planned equipment and only the required units must be procured in as short a time as possible. Furthermore, another requirement levied on the medium-term operations is the easing of economic friction between Japan and United States through purchase of weapons from the United States and it is under that premise that Japan-U.S. negotiations have been conducted. If that is so, it is only natural that to that extent, reliance on imports would increase in the medium-term operations and because of such practices, there is still deep-rooted opposition against the plan by defense arms industries.

The problem became a real one in the selection of an aircraft to replace the C-1. As the mainstay of the air transport unit, the C-1 aircraft was manufactured with independently developed technology and 24 aircraft have been actually deployed. However, for the reason that with a limited cruising range (700 nautical miles), the C-1 cannot adequately fulfill the varied transportation needs arising in emergencies, the Defense Agency included in the medium-term operations a decision to replace 36 C-1 aircraft, which was slated for deployment, with the Lockheed-manufactured C-130s.

If the C-1 aircraft cannot meet performance requirements, even if it is a domestically-made aircraft, replacing it with an imported aircraft might be a necessary measure from the defense standpoint. However, it appears that this measure was adopted because top priority was given to the political decision to accelerate the medium-term operations and this is the reason for the opposition by arms industries.

As though it were speaking on behalf of the arms industries, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI] states: (1) do not rush imports of C-130s and wait for an economic arrangement for licensed production (30 aircraft); (2) piecemeal imports planned by the Defense Agency will not only aggravate the shortcomings of the aircraft industries but hinder the maintenance of defense capability; and (3) domestic capability to produce transports has received a certain international recognition and is not as poor as claimed by the Defense Agency and procurement of domestic aircraft will not adversely affect the defense plan. Thus, the MITI plans to obtain detailed explanations from the Defense Agency.

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It is said that within the MITI, strong opinions are being voiced that if satisfactory explanations cannot be obtained, they will use the import quota rights of trade control laws to demand concessions while the Defense Agency is taking an adamant stand that to expedite modernization of defense equipment, there is nothing wrong with deploying imported aircraft. It seems that it will take some time to resolve the differences between the two parties.

The deployment of transports might be an extreme case but even at that, the ratio of domestic production of equipment earmarked in the medium-term operations is still too low. It also reflects the existing situation of Japan's arms industries. For example, with the F-15's, the deployment of which is planned by the Defense Agency, the ratio of domestic production is limited to 75 percent, which means that aircraft parts for the remaining 25 percent must be imported from the United States. Similarly, in the licensed production of F-4EJ Phantoms, for which the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. was the prime contractor, the domestic production ratio was 85 percent.

The problem is not simply the decreasing ratio of domestic production. With the increasing sophistication of military aircraft production technology, the United States is taking a passive attitude toward overseas transfer of technology and "black box" restrictions are increasing in the licensed production of weaponry. For example, the "black box" of F-15's includes the software of various electronic parts carried aboard, knowhow of the engine intake controls, the [CFRP] used in speed brakes, etc.

Of course, if it so desires, with its level of industrial technology, Japan can produce high-performance items but the costs are exceedingly high and when the problem is compounded by the restricting time factor, the only way out is to import from the United States. The increase of "black box" restrictions for new equipment, such as the F-15's which are considered the key to strengthening Japan's defense and the antisubmarine patrol aircraft P-3C's, creates concern as to whether it might not become a serious hindrance to defense buildup in the future.

To explain further, one begins to have doubts when the medium-term operations, which is to be the axis of defense capability buildup during the first half of the 1980s, promotes a weapons production system which relies heavily on the United States and is manipulated by clever U.S. tactics to restrict independent weapons development of various countries by increasing "black box" restrictions and thereby, maintain its relative supremacy.

#### Hopes for Arms Export

In order to promote the development of domestic weapons production, the Defense Agency is concerned about strengthening the industrial-military complex through increasing expenditures for defense procurements and R&D. A step in this direction is the beginning of a study to change the method of calculating prices and profits in defense procurements. This study was undertaken in response to the dissatisfaction of the arms industries that "the profits of arms makers are being held down unreasonably by using the present calculation method which is designed for profits of main manufacturing industries," and in the deliberations underway, advice is being sought from third parties. At the same time, there are other objectives such as:

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(1) by making arms manufacture attractive, to stimulate defense production and investments; and (2) with increases in the unit price of Defense Agency's procurement items, seek increases in the defense budget. This is part of the move to strengthen the industrial-military cooperative setup.

It is true that since the procurement system has been based on and implemented according to the "directive concerning calculation method" issued in mid-1930's, there are many aspects which are not compatible with the present situation. There are doubts, however, that profit inducements will lead to increased defense production and structural improvements or promote the development of independent technology in defense production. It seems that the problem lies in the defense production system which is becoming extremely reliant on American imports for production.

The proposal is being made to reevaluate the self-restraining policies concerning arms export. There has been criticisms from before that unlike other manufacturing industries, arms production cannot count on the merits of mass production and that practically all of the main weapons production are dependent on U.S. licenses because of continuing policies which ban exports.

Recently, new arguments tying arms export with resources acquisition are being presented to eliminate the export ban. Deepening diplomatic and political commitments with selected countries through arms export might invite the antagonism of a third country. Therefore, as to whether it is an effective means to secure resources is debatable but it is a fact that the arms industries are trying to find a way out through abolishment of the export ban.

Still, as given in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, arms exports did amount to \$20 million in 1978 and was not totally nil.

The problem may well include the definition of what is arms and by narrowing the definition, a means to dissolve the ban is being sought. This frontal approach to dissolution is unique and different from previous attempts.

Although the government cannot be expected, at present, to permit exports of weapons, the issue is certain to become a political one from the pressure of the arms industries. The immediate issue is the "Japan-U.S. joint weapons development plan," scheduled to be presented to the NDC by the defense production committee of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations. This is a plan to export electronic parts, prided by Japan, to the United States and to assemble them into weapons for joint use. Concretely, precise guided missiles (PGM) and cruise missiles are being considered. Of course, the aim is to tear down the government's export-ban policy through implementation of the joint development plan. In other words, the objective is to begin arms export without waiting for the government's decision to eliminate the ban.

There is danger in the conduct of short-sighted defense talks which completely disregard past taboos and which are dominated by hard-line arguments. There is danger in the actual implementation of the plan without awaiting the people's consent. In view of these dangers, the defense buildup must be carried out with self-restraint.

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Also, the aim of the United States in applying pressure on Japan to strengthen defense capabilities is to obtain Japan's aid to lessen its financial burden in reestablishing "Pax Americana."

To make it clear that that is an entirely different matter from Japan's defense problem, it seems that defense issues must be reconsidered from another standpoint.

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JAPANESE DEFENSE OFFICIAL: NUCLEAR ARMS ACCEPTABLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE

OW170425 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 16 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] A top-ranking official of the defense agency told a DIET committee Wednesday the agency is of the view that the nation is able to possess nuclear arms but for strictly self-defense purposes even under the present constitution.

In reply to an opposition interpellator's questions, Akira Shiota, director of the agency's defense bureau, told the house of representatives audit committee that although the government maintains the so-called three-point non-nuclear principle not to possess, manufacture, or introduce nuclear arms, what are subject to the constitutional constraints are those weapon systems whose destructive power "is irrelevant to the nation's need to defend itself."

"The question of whether such devastating weapons fall into the category of nuclear arms or conventional arms is not a matter of concern from the constitutional viewpoint," Shiota said.

Shiota said that Japan cannot possess for instance, the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) because they do not conform to the nation's defense needs.

In this connection, another top-ranking defense agency official told reporters later that "there is no (legal) problem at all" for the self-defense forces (SDF) to be armed with such weapons systems as the 155 mm and 203 mm Howitzers and the Nike surface-to-air missile all of which can be tipped with both nuclear and high explosive warheads.

In fact, the SDF presently has these three types of weapons in its ordinance inventory.

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24

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YOMIURI CRITICIZES HAWKISH TREND OF DEFENSE ARGUMENTS

Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 14 Aug 80 p 5

["Opinion" column by Reporter Hiroshi Tarazaki; opinions given by 'A' and 'B'-- no specific names given: "'One-sided' Arguments on Defense in Vogue, Unusually Hawkish '15 August'"]

[Text] [A] "15 August" is coming again. Thirty-five years after the lost war, a desire to go on talking about the experience of the war seems to be still strongly rooted among the people, as it is evidenced in the YOMIURI SHIMBUN's special column for readers' contributions. Digging up and reexamining the facts related to the experience of the bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and "the experience of the assailants," as seen from the U.S. side, go on endlessly.

[B] On the other hand, debates on defense, or more specifically arguments for increasing the military strength of Japan, are vociferously in the air. As a result, this year's "commemoration day for ending the war" is, unlike other years, steeped in hawkish atmosphere. What can we make out of this?

Ikutaro Shimizu's Monograph.

[A] In journalism, a work which recently touched off controversies was the monograph of Ikutaro Shimizu (former professor at Peer's University), "Nuclear Option." It was published in the July issue of "SHOKUN!" a magazine put out by Bungei Shunshu Company, which included unusually provocative elements, as can be seen in the cluster of opinions expressed in it such as the Liberal Democratic Party's argument on defense, the business world's argument for increasing the defense expenditure, and former Joint Chief of Staffs Hiroomi Kurisu's argument on emergency defense legislation.

[B] There are two main points in the Shimizu monograph. One is, as the title of the first part of the monograph indicates, an advocacy of "Japan, be a state." It says: "The United States absolutely forbade Japan to maintain any military power under the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. A state is supported by moral authority and physical power. Therefore, Japan, forbidden to maintain the armed forces which, together with the police, constitute the physical power of a state, is an entity devoid of the main substance of a state." In other words, it argues that Japan is not a state, and it should have military power to become a state.

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The other point is, as the title of the monograph itself indicates, an advocacy that Japan should have nuclear weapons. Mr Shimizu wrote it in the following manner. "If the nuclear weapon is important, and if we are privileged to have been the first nation victimized by the bomb, wouldn't it be Japan above all others who should have the privilege of making the nuclear weapon first and foremost and of possessing it? Isn't this commonsense?" But this cannot be read as a theme supported by adequate logic.

[A] No wonder it created controversies. Mr Shimizu used to be a "shining" opinion leader of the post-war peace movement, and he launched his polemics at the side of the student movements and the workers' movements during the Security Treaty struggles of the 1960's. That person has changed to this extent...so in this respect, too, it probably cannot be but a target of controversy.

Even to the Extent of Lies and Agitations....

[B] Against the Shimizu monograph, Mr Masamichi Inoki (former president of Defense University, the director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security) raised a criticism, even though he himself maintains the position of strengthening the military, saying "do not be misled by dangerous agitations" (September Issue, CHUO KORON).

[A] Aside from the Inoki's essay, Professor Ikuhiko Hata of Takushoku University recently wrote a criticism in Tokyo Shimbun under the title of "What Was the Pacific War?" Thus, the ripples caused by the Shimizu monograph do not seem to go away easily.

[B] According to the 5 June issue of SHUKAN BUNSHUN, Mr Shimizu made a statement about the monograph as follows. "Because I wanted you people in the Self-Defense Forces and the Defense Agency who are responsible for, and active in, the real problem of military affairs to read it, I printed it (at first) in an unadulterated form for limited circulation." Thus, (he) threw the provocative remark about the nuclear weapon at the Self-Defense Forces, and then let it be pitched toward the general audience through journalism. It may not be wrong to say that the remark was intended to give defiantly a shock treatment against the nuclear allergy, isn't it?

[A] In that sense, the ripple-effect it caused may be exactly what he wanted as an agitator. But one thing that cannot be overlooked is the fact that the Shimizu monograph cut out only one aspect of history to give convincing logic to his arguments.

[B] It must be difficult for many Japanese to accept "the dogmatic assertion" that today's Japan is not a state. Moreover, Mr Inoki, the aforementioned, said that "Mr Shimizu has completed a 180 degree turn from chimerical pacifism to chimerical militarism," and that the monograph, "Japan, Be a state", can be regarded as "a gigantic lie, to put it bluntly, studded with brilliant truth."

[A] Also, in the special column for readers' reactions to the Shimizu monograph provided in the August issue of "SHOKUN!" one reader sharply pointed out: "I cannot understand why it is so necessary, in the discussion of the defense of Japan for the 1980's, to emphasize that the old war which was fought more than 35 years ago was a "sacred war."

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Debates on the Constitution Also Show a Common People Version

[B] Jun Eto's "the Constitution of 1946--Its Restrictions" in the same August issue of "SHOKUN!" also bothers me because, whereas it gives a detailed account of what went on between the Occupation Army Headquarters and the Japanese Government in the process of making the constitution after the war, it does not put proper weight to the circumstances leading to the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the surrender and the occupation, nor to the occupation policies and the domestic political situations of Japan, or international situations of that time.

[A] Mr Eto says that the constitution, particularly the Article 9, was forced upon by the McArthur Headquarters, and the headquarters used its censoring system to the fullest extent in order to conceal the imposition and to put up an appearance that the constitution was initiated by the Japanese Government, so that it could "manipulate the psychology of the people."

[B] Even if it was an "imposition," not only was there the so-called "Matsumoto draft" formulated by the Shidehara Cabinet of that time but also were other constitutional drafts proposed by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and even by private individuals, and the consensus for establishing a democratic constitution was thus strong in the nation. In this midst, because the government tried to muddle through with a partial revision of "the Meiji constitutional system" while it had accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the Occupation Forces who aimed at the demilitarization and democratization of Japan had to exercise, it seems, "coercive power."

[A] The account of how the ordinary people took the constitution of Japan should not be neglected, I believe. Did (they) think it "unsuitable," as did the leadership? The contrary was true, wasn't it?

[B] Incidentally, how do we explain the tendency of building an argument by slicing out only one aspect of history and linking it to the current defense arguments?

[A] Of all possible reasons, it is due to the weathering of war-experience and bomb-experience in 35 years after the war. When a slice of history is taken out of the context and thrust upon to people, they can hardly judge it it is a correct view or not--this must be the reason. "The generation who do not know the war" now constitute one-half of the people; herein lies an opportunity to be exploited by the agitators.

[B] In that respect, the opinion of a university student which was presented in this column on the 13th was sharp indeed. It said "the stories of war-experience are either a one-sided story of sufferings or a story of the complete victim. I will not listen to any story that is devoid of a reflection that war is a catastrophe for the humanity." The continuing tales of war experience should be elevated from the utterly individual level to a social and historical level. It will not be easy, though.



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[A] In addition to these arguments stemming from journalism, the heightened arguments on defense coming from the financial world also make this year's "15 August" hawkish. In February and March this year, the president of Japan Chamber of Commerce, Shigeo Nagano, and the president of the Kansai Federation of Economic Organizations, Hosai Hyuga, asserted one after another: "work out a plan to promote defense industries," "the defense expenditure should be increased to 1.9 percent of the GNP," and "look into the conscription system for the time of emergency." These statements are made with the knowledge that the increase of defense expenditure is directly linked with the interest of the business world, and "the elders" who make such statements do not, of course, become soldiers. Those who are to become soldiers are the younger generation who are lamented for their lack of determination to defend the country. Hasegawa Nyozeikan, a social critic renowned for his pointed remarks, once uttered a warning: "as the law of preventing wars, make it obligatory for the marshals, the generals and big businessmen to stand on the foremost frontline," and I wonder if Mr Nagano or Mr Hyuga remembers it.

[B] The Iranian crisis since last year and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accelerated debates on defense. But, international situations are always fluid. At this moment China is supporting the arms build-up of Japan; but until a short while ago, it was severely criticizing the rearmament of Japan. It is indeed now more than ever that we need cool-headed debates, keeping our eyes on every possibility, and not to be washed out by the weathering of war-experience and A-bomb experience.

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ECONOMIC

'JAPAN TIMES' SUPPORTS JAPAN'S VIEWS GIVEN AT U.S. AUTO HEARINGS

OW170441 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 16 Oct 80 p 14

[Editorial: "U.S. Hearings on Auto Imports"]

[Text] The four days of hearings held recently in Washington on the problem of auto imports served to clarify main points at issue over the central question: whether imports of Japanese cars have caused, or threaten to cause, any substantial damage to the American auto industry.

The hearings, sponsored by the International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent government agency that advises the White House on import relief measures, came against the background of two concurrent economic developments in the U.S. One is the slump in the U.S. car industry and the other the growth in the U.S. sales of Japanese cars.

The two developments raised the question of whether there exists any cause and effect relationship between them--namely, whether the influx of Japanese cars is the cause of the difficulties facing the U.S. car industry. This is not an easy question, of course, as shown by past controversies on dumping charges, for example.

But the four-day session at least provided Japanese and American automakers, in particular, with a good opportunity to give their views a full public airing.

The United Auto Workers (UAW) and Ford Motor Co., which are requesting action by the ITC to limit imports from Japan, maintained that the plight of the U.S. car industry stemmed directly from the expansion of Japanese imports. And they argued that U.S. carmakers needed protection from import competition for at least five years in order to modernize and produce their own fuel-efficient, small cars.

On the other hand, representatives of Japanese automakers, including Toyota and Nissan, argued that the cause of predicament lay in the failure of the U.S. auto industry to meet effectively the structural changes in the domestic car market. The energy crisis, they pointed out, pushed up gasoline prices, prompting U.S. consumers to buy small, fuel-saving cars imported from abroad, especially from Japan.

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The difficulties have been compounded, the Japanese argument went, by changes in the U.S. business cycle. That is, the recession in the U.S. economy itself further reduced the demand for large, "gas-guzzling" cars, traditionally the mainstay of American cars. As a result, the stocks of unsold cars increased, and sales dropped sharply, forcing the producers to lay off large numbers of workers.

It is up to the ITC to determine which side, USA and Ford or Japanese makers, is correct. Our own impression of the hearings is that the Japanese argument is well-grounded. It is the production and sales of large cars that have suffered. Obviously, they do not directly compete with small Japanese cars.

In this respect, the Japanese side received "support" from none other than General Motors, which made it clear that the growth of imports was not the direct cause of the slump. When the largest U.S. maker is saying, in effect, the same thing as Japanese producers, what is one to make of the complaint by Ford, for instance, that imports are chiefly to blame?

The Japanese argument against import restrictions was also endorsed by the U.S. Fair Trade Commission (FTC). The commission made a point that is hard to refute: import quotas or higher tariffs on cars will impose sacrifices on U.S. drivers in the form of higher car prices, they will also make it less compelling for the American auto industry to make itself more competitive.

Conspicuously absent from the hearings were representatives of the U.S. Government, which decided not to attend--for reasons not fully explained. But Washington's known position is that it is against import restrictions--a position which is likely to be supported also by U.S. buyers of imported cars.

As for the question of whether Japanese cars will pose a "threat" to the U.S. auto industry when cars of a similar type start rolling off assembly lines, Japanese makers stressed that no such threat existed. And it may well be. Sales of American small cars are already beginning to pick up. If U.S. producers can do what Japanese makers can, and we are sure they can, then there ought to be no need for them to fear.

On balance, the auto trade hearings seemed to have strengthened the position of Japanese makers. Although the debate will not be the only determinant in an ITC ruling in November, we hope that commission members will make a fair and just decision by taking these arguments fully into account.

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'ASAHI' VIEWS RECENT IMF-WORLD BANK MEETING

OW102012 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 9 Oct 80 p 5

[ASAHI SHIMBUN 5 October Editorial: "Currency Diplomacy"]

[Text] The joint annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington, D.C., has ended quietly. This is not because the global economy is in a good state--the foreign exchange problems faced by the developing countries in particular are grave. The conference was no more successful than any other in coming to grips with the true situation because of the uncertainty created by the war between Iran and Iraq and the elections in the United States and West Germany.

Nevertheless, the fact that the participating nations reaffirmed the importance of curbing prices was noteworthy. The U.S. Federal Reserve Board recently raised its official discount rate. From the end of May, it had been keeping interest rates low, but reverted to a tight-money policy because of signs that inflation was increasing again. The Federal Bank of West Germany is also keeping interest rates high.

Japan can afford to ease its monetary policies because of the improvement in its international balance of payments and the drop in the rate of inflation. But there is a limit to what Japan can do toward increasing its economic growth rate when the global economy is sluggish. Jacques de Larosiere, the managing director of the IMF, said in his concluding remarks that the adverse effects of relaxing monetary and banking policies too soon were likely to appear over a period of several years. Japan should heed this warning.

At the joint meeting, support was given to a World Bank plan to create an organ that would be exclusively concerned with financing the efforts of developing countries to develop energy sources. An agreement was also reached to expand the IMF's financing framework and to reduce the interest burdens of countries with low incomes.

Unfortunately, although they acknowledge that preventing the developing countries from becoming bankrupt is an urgent task, the advanced nations are still hesitant about extending a helping hand.

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At the meeting, the countries of the south asserted that the IMF was too much under the control of the advanced nations of the north and demanded reforms. G. William Miller, the U.S. secretary of the treasury, responded in a conciliatory way by saying that the IMF should change at a speed commensurate with changes in the world. The other advanced countries, however, were less prepared to accept the demand.

The Japanese finance minister, Michio Watanabe, asserted that the IMF should not take on tasks that would make it indistinguishable from organizations whose function it is to finance development projects. With respect to the IMF's procuring funds for the loans it will extend to the developing countries in the private money market, Watanabe said that this should be strictly temporary.

It is true to say that the IMF is likely to encourage inflation if it grants special drawing rights and extends loans too easily, but if the advanced countries remain intransigent because of this, the gulf between the north and the south will never be bridged. To encourage understanding, the door for dialogue must be opened wider than before.

Because the Palestine Liberation Organization was not allowed to participate as an observer in the recent joint meeting, the oil-producing nations in the Arab world have little trust in the IMF. But if the global monetary instability is to be corrected, the cooperation of those nations that possess oil dollars has to be gained.

At the joint meeting, Muhammad al-Ali Aba al-Khayl, the Saudi Arabian minister of finance and national economy, said that the amounts that individual nations are required to invest in the IMF are not commensurate with the economic strengths of these nations. This is what Japan has long been maintaining. It is only right that the advanced nations should recognize what is reasonable in the oil-producing nations' representations, that both groups of nations should join in stabilizing the global economy. Japan should try to mediate in this.

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ECONOMIC

INDUSTRIAL BANK OF JAPAN SURVEYS EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT

OW092134 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 8 Oct 80 p 5

[Text] Amid growing signs of an economic slowdown, plant and equipment investments by business corporations are increasing at a higher pace than a year ago, according to a bank report.

The Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd. compiled the report on the basis of a survey covering 1,732 corporations capitalized at 1 billion yen or more on their investment plans as of mid-September for fiscal 1980 ending March 31, 1981, and for fiscal 1981.

Total investments planned by the corporations for the current fiscal year came to 12,648.5 billion yen, up 21.9 percent over a year earlier. This compares with the 16.5 percent increase in fiscal 1979.

Investments planned by manufacturing companies remained high at 4,157.6 billion yen, a 18.2 percent gain over a year before while those of nonmanufacturing firms rose 16.2 percent to 4,067.8 billion yen.

Notable among such manufacturers were those in the electrical, auto, machinery and shipbuilding industries. Reflecting brisk exports, these processing and assembly industries will increase investments 30.6 percent and those in material-oriented industries, 9.4 percent.

In the nonmanufacturing sector, electric power firms will boost investments 34.2 percent. Gas, shipping, leasing and mining companies involved in oil development also will increase investments, sharply, while construction and land transportation firms, department stores and supermarkets will reduce their investments.

Meanwhile, all the corporations surveyed planned to increase investments in fiscal 1981 by 4.7 percent from fiscal 1980. Among them, electric power firms are planning to increase investments 16.4 percent.

Total investments planned in fiscal 1981 are expected to rise further depending on the future situation, officials of the bank added.

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33

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ECONOMIC

'YOMIURI' RAPS OIL INDUSTRY FOR FORMING PRICE CARTEL

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 28 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Illegal Oil Price Cartel"]

[Text]

The Tokyo High Court Friday ruled that the oil industry was guilty of forming a price cartel but was innocent of jointly limiting its production following the first oil crisis in 1973. The ruling supported the general view that the cartels were responsible for shortage of certain goods and extraordinary price increases which caused a panic among consumers.

The trial drew attention because it was the first criminal trial of cartel cases under the Antimonopoly Law. Although the court recognized the two illegal conducts of the oil industry, it acquitted the defendants of the charge of forming the production cartel on the grounds that the companies had not been aware of the illegality of their conduct because of excessive "administrative guidance" on production by the International Trade and Industry Ministry (MITI) and obscure implementation of the Antimonopoly Law by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC).

The ruling virtually proved that not only oil executives but also the administrative authorities went astray beyond the objective of the Antimonopoly Law which is aimed at protecting consumers by ascertaining free competition in domestic economy.

#### Guiding Point

The oil industry, the administrative authorities concerned with the national economy and the FTC should accept the verdict modestly and use it as a guiding point in their subsequent business and administrative activities.

The prosecutors charged that the Petroleum Association of Japan and the then association president and the association's supply and demand committee chairman had instructed oil refiners to limit their production.

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The court said that MITI had guided the oil industry in regulating its production and the FTC had failed to warn the oil refiners or take any action against them.

Taking this background into consideration, the court acquitted the three defendants, saying that such actions of MITI and the FTC made the defendants believe that their conduct did not constitute illegality.

Regarding the price cartel, the court ruled that MITI had not issued any guidelines in this respect and that the defendants had raised the prices at their own initiative, but administrative intervention by MITI had made it easier for the oil companies to agree on the price cartel.

#### **Cozy Relationship**

The court, therefore, sentenced 15 executives of 12 oil companies to prison terms up to 10 months with probation of two years and ordered the companies to pay fines up to ¥2.5 million.

In this instance, we cannot ignore the existence of the Oil Industry Law and administrative guidance which prompted the oil industry to so easily resort to cartels.

The oil companies and the administrative authorities concerned are reflecting on their conduct while carrying out restructuring of the industry, but the cozy relationship between the industry and administrative authorities is yet to be eliminated.

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JAPANESE FIRMS WIN ALASKA PIPELINE ORDERS

OW100529 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 9 Oct 80 p 7

[Text] Japanese steelmakers have won a slice of American orders for steel pipes for construction of an Alaska natural gas pipeline, industry sources said Wednesday.

Northern Plains Natural Gas Co. of the U.S. is about to place a formal order with the consortium of four steel mills--Nippon Steel, Nippon Kokan, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Kawasaki Steel--for 120,000 short tons (108,000 metric tons) of large-diameter pipes, the sources said.

The figure accounts for about 20 percent of 581,000 tons on bidding in what was billed as one of the largest pipeline deals ever offered in the world.

Northern Plains is undertaking construction of a 1,300-km segment of the Alaska highway pipeline project for Northern Border Pipeline Co.

Apparently mindful of an industry-advocated buy-American policy, the sources said, Northern Plains has awarded American producers more than 67 percent of the total orders.

They said Bethlehem Steel has won an order for 139,000 tons, Kaiser Steel 136,000 tons and U.S. Steel 73,000 tons.

The balance--113,000 tons--has been ordered from Italsider of Italy.

The deal started in November 1979 and estimates were resubmitted several times because the 42-inch pipes are required to meet the stringent quality specifications of API X-70.

The segment, called the eastern leg, forms part of the 7,660-km Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System, consisting of four sections running through Alaska, Canada and the continental U.S.

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The Canadian segment will be linked with the eastern leg leading eventually to Dwight, Ill., and the projected western leg reaching near San Francisco.

The eastern leg will initially carry natural gas from Alberta in western Canada to the midwestern and eastern U.S.

The contracts call for delivery in January-June, providing the suppliers with a relatively short lead time.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

STATUS OF NEW SATELLITE LAUNCHER R & D DISCUSSED

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 20 Sep 80 pp 47-50

[Article by Pierre Lavereux--passages enclosed in slantlines published in bold face]

[Text] The Japanese have been interested in rockets for 25 years (since 1955) following upon the work performed by Professor Hitokawa, director of the Industrial Science Institute of the University of Tokyo (TODAI). Shortly thereafter, incidentally, the TODAI launched its first rocket probe, Kappa 6, which reached an altitude of 50 kilometers.

But it was only 10 years ago that the Japanese space program truly got underway with the launching of the OSUMI, the first artificial satellite by means of a solid fuel rocket, the Lambda 45, on 11 February 1970. Everything then proceeded very rapidly, thanks above all to American aid.

/In a single decade Japan has launched 18 scientific technological, and applications satellites/--more than any other space power except the United States and the USSR.

Since 1978 Japan has thus surpassed France which for long held third place behind the two space greats, both in the number of satellites launched and in the size of the space budget. At present--and for so long as Europe shall not have placed the Ariane launcher into service--/Japan has established itself as the third ranking space power./ The space ambitions of the country of the rising sun, moreover, forecast the intention of remaining such. /Launching of 14 satellites over the next 5 years has in fact been decided./

The National Space Activities Commission, established in 1960, kicked off the Japanese space program by organizing activities and creating the necessary infrastructure.

/The Aerospace Sciences Institute (ISAS) of the University of Tokyo was made responsible for the construction and launching of the scientific satellites./ It has its own facilities for this, in particular, /the

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Uchinoura-Kagoshima launching base/ (131°-05' east, 31°-15' north). The first rocket, the Lambda 45, which began its career with four successive failures between 1966 and 1969, was abandoned. It made way for the new Mu solid fuel rocket series. It was a Mu-45 which launched the Shensei, the first scientific satellite, in September 1971. Since then the Mu rockets have been constantly improved (Mu-3C, Mu-34, and Mu-35 versions). And, /beginning in 1985 a new and still more powerful version, the Mu-3S-Kai 1 will be placed into service./ This three-stage solid fuel rocket, 27.2 meters long and 1.41 meters in diameter, will have total weight of 61.2 tons with two solid fuel boosters for take-off assistance. It will be able to place a payload of 720 kilograms into a low terrestrial orbit (250 kilometers), which is two and one-half times the launch capability of the present Mu-35 rocket.

/Up to the present the University of Tokyo has accomplished 17 rocket launchings which have enabled 11 scientific and technological satellites into orbit./ Since 1970 there have been only two failures of Mu rockets. The TODAI plans to launch /five more satellites between now and 1985/, including the first Japanese interplanetary probe, PLANET-A, to Venus. /Eleven other scientific satellites are for the 1985-90 period and beyond are in the planning stage./

/The National Agency for Space Development (NASDA)/ was established on 1 October 1969 for the purpose of constructing and launching applications satellites. The NASDA also has its own facilities, in particular /the Tanegashima launch base/ (131°-50' east, 30°-34' north) situated upon the island of the same name, about 100 kilometers from the Kagoshima launch base.

The NASDA also has available its own N rockets, the Japanese version of the American Delta launcher, constructed under license in Japan.

/Since 31 July 1969 Japan and the United States have a space cooperation agreement/ enabling the Japanese to have direct access to American technology (unclassified) for construction of launchers and satellites. It is also believed that Japanese industry is participating to the extent of 50-60 percent in the construction of Japanese rockets and 70 percent in construction of Japanese satellites.

The large American aerospace firms have contributed, sometimes greatly, in the construction of numerous Japanese satellites: ETS and EOS (Ford Aerospace), BSE (General Electric), GMS (Hughes Aircraft), and so on.

Likewise, the Japanese N 1 launcher, which uses the first stage of the American Delta, is built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) under licenses from McDonald Douglas (stage) and Rockwell International (motor); the third stage is built under license from Thiokol. Only the N 1 rocket's second stage was developed in Japan, by MHI, with a license from TRW for the verniers. The Castor solid fuel boosters are made by Nissau under the license from the Thiokol Corporation. Development of the N 1 rocket was

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completed in May 1975; the first NASDA satellite, Kiku 1, was launched with this rocket from Tanegashima on 9 September 1975. In its wake the NASDA has started development of a new and more powerful version, the N 2, which, this time, will be built completely under license, the second stage being replaced by an American stage with an A110-118 F motor of the Aerojet Liquid Rocket Company made by Ishikawajima-Harima Industries (IHI). The N 2 rocket is the Japanese copy of the American Delta 2914 launcher, alias the Straight Eight because it has a total diameter of 8 feet (2.44 meters). The first flight test of the N 2 launcher is planned for February 1981 with the technological satellite Kiku 4 (ETS-4) and the first operational launching a year later, in February 1982, to launch the geostationary meteorological satellite GMS 2. The N 2 rocket can place 350 kilograms into geostationary orbit [line or lines of source text apparently omitted] ...of the N 1 rocket (130 kilograms).

The NASDA also has the benefit of American launchers for putting into orbit three geostationary satellites which are too heavy for the N 1 rocket.

/In toto seven NASDA satellites have been placed into orbit. The NASDA itself, since 1975, accomplished six launchings which have placed four technological and applications satellites into orbit./ The last two launchings by the N 1 rocket (Ayame/ECS satellite) in February 1979 and February 1980 were marked by failures, which caused the resignation of NASDA's president, Akiyoshi Matsuura, replaced last June by Maseo Yamanouchi.

Japan is in fact preparing a very ambitious space program based in part on /the space development plan/ presented in March 1978 by the Space Activities Commission to Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. This plan proposed no less than /launching 80 satellites over the space of 15 years to 1992 at a rate of at least five satellites annually./ The cost of such a program was estimated at 3 billion yen (13 billion dollars) to construct and launch 17 telecommunications satellites, 39 observation satellites, 14 experimental satellites, and 6 satellites intended for various applications. The plan also contemplated sending an automated probe around the moon in 1985 and two probes to Venus in 1990 (with release of balloons in the atmosphere). In toto this would necessitate 76 rockets of various types. This plan, which would have required doubling the annual budget devoted to space, has not been adopted in its entirety. But some projects have nevertheless been retained, such as sending a probe to Venus (PLANET A), the flight of a Japanese in space aboard the Shuttle in 1983, and construction of the H 1 launcher.

#### The H 1 Launcher

/On 2 July 1980 the Japanese government decided to authorize construction of the new H 1 launcher of three stages, one of them fueled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen./ This will be the most powerful Japanese launcher and the first such launcher to use cryogenic propulsion, and is to be equipped with an inertial guidance system.

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The H 1 launcher, which will be the principal Japanese launcher of the 1980 and 1990 decades will, in fact, be developed in /two versions:/ the first version, H 1A, will be able to place a /550-kilogram payload into geostationary orbit/ and the improved H 1B version will be able to launch a payload of at least /850 kilograms--and even 1 ton--/ into the same orbit, which corresponds to the present performance capability of the European Ariane launcher.

For the time being only development of the first version, H 1A, is committed. The development of the H 1B version (also designated the H 1) will be decided later on, depending upon the results achieved with the initial version. The configuration of this future H 1B rocket, moreover, has not yet been defined. It is only known that it will probably be a /rocket of about 200 tons/ retaining the "upper portions" of the first launcher, including the second cryogenic stage, with a new first stage equipped with either two motors of the H 1A or a new LOX-RJ1 motor with 120 tons of thrust. But the design may evolve further.


/The development cost of the H 1A rocket is now estimated at between 137 and 150 billion yen, or between 2.560 and 2.720 billion francs,/ including the two flight test launchings of the new launcher and one operational firing. /The construction cost of the H 1A launcher is estimated at 14 billion yen, or 260 million francs./

/The first flight test firing of the H 1A rocket/ at Tenegashima, Japan, where a new launch area is under construction, /is planned for 1987./ The flight tests are above all intended for qualification of the cryogenic second stage for the first stage of the H 1A launcher uses, with little change, that of the new N 2 rocket, itself directly descended from that of the present N 1 rocket which has been flying since 1975. The two test flight firings of the H 1A rocket will therefore be with a three-stage version, but with a dummy third stage. /The first operational firing/ --with an applications satellite--is supposedly planned for /1988./

Studies of the first H 1A launcher began a few years ago. Several options were contemplated (see configuration table below): solid or liquid fuel first stage and launching capacity of 500, 600 or 750 kilograms into geostationary orbit. The choice finally made was a rocket retaining the liquid fuel (LOX-RJ1) of the N 2 launcher with launching capacity of 500-550 kilograms to reduce the risks and expenses of the launching. Innovation was effected at the levels of the second stage (cryogenic) and the third stage (solid fuel, improved in comparison with that of the N 2).

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Configurations studied for the H 1 launcher with first stage using either liquid fuel (three versions on the left) or solid fuel (three versions on the right).

The adopted configuration is thus a three-stage rocket with liquid fuel first and second stages and solid fuel-third stage with nine solid fuel boosters to assist take-off. This rocket, 39.6 meters long, weighs 140.1 tons of which 124.8 tons are fuel and develops 220.2 tons of thrust at take-off (six of the nine boosters being ignited along with the first stage and the remaining three later). The capability in geostationary orbit (550 kilograms) is one and one-half times as great as that of the N 2 rocket (350 kilograms) which will fly in the beginning of 1981, and four times as great as that of the present N 1 rocket (130 kilograms). This capability of the H 1A rocket still modest in comparison with its rivals (Delta, Ariane, and Atlas-Centaur), will nevertheless be sufficient to launch the new Japanese telecommunications, direct television, meteorological, teledetection, and oceanographic satellites planned for the end of this decade. The H 1A rocket can also launch a 1.3-ton payload into heliosynchronous orbit at 1,000 kilometers altitude or 3.2 tons into low terrestrial orbit (2,000 kilometers at 30°) which is indeed not negligible.

What is essentially new in the H 1 launcher family is therefore at the second stage level, /cryogenic propulsion and inertial guidance./ The guidance system will in fact use an inertial platform, jointly developed by the University of Tokyo and the National Aeronautics Laboratory, as well as a guidance computer derived from the NEAC 3200 minicomputer of the Nippon Electric Company the logic for which is by Mitsubishi Space Software Company. This inertial guidance system may be flight tested on a N 2 rocket in 1982.

The cryogenic second stage, whose development had been practically decided in 1978 will be 5.5 meters long and 2.44 meters in diameter and weigh 800

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kilograms empty. It will carry 8.45 tons of cryogenic fuels, including 100 kilograms not burned, in the ratio of 6,400 liters of liquid oxygen (LOX) and 20,000 liters of liquid hydrogen (LH2) in tanks of isogrid structure in aluminum alloy (Al 2219). These pressurized tanks are protected by polyurethane foam heat insulation, the intermediate common bulkhead or honeycomb construction also being insulated. The stage's altitude control is provided by gas jets (roll) and by piloting of the main motor (pitch and yaw).

The cryogenic motor develops a /thrust of 10 tons/ (in vacuum) with a nominal specific impulse of 440 seconds at the present (initially it was 430 seconds). Weighing 200 kilograms, with diameter of 1.65 meters and length of 2.7 meters, this motor has turbopumps with separate shafts, is fitted with a combustion chamber cooled by circulation of liquid hydrogen and extended into a divergent "eggcup" (cross-sectional ratio 140). The ratio combustion pressure is now 35 kilograms per square centimeter (initially it was 25) with a mixture ratio of 5.5. The turbopumps for the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen circuits rotate, respectively, at 16,500 and 50,000 revolutions per minute with discharge pressures of 52.5 and 56 kilograms per square centimeter; the respective fuel flows are 19.28 kilogram per second (LOX) and 3.5 kilograms per second (LH2). Electrical ignition of the fuels is effected in a combustion antechamber and each of the turbopumps is driven by a turbine actuated by a gas generator operating under pressure of 26 kilograms per square centimeter with a mixture ratio of 0.9.

Testing of the critical components of the second stage--cryogenic tanks, supply lines, combustion chamber, turbopumps, guidance computer, and inertial platform--have been intensified since 1976. New test installations have been specifically built at Tashiro and Kakuta for tests of the motor and the stage, and at Tsukuba for perfecting the inertial guidance system.

The first complete long duration tests of the combustion chamber (with regeneration) and of the turbopumps took place last year; the cryogenic tanks are being fabricated. The NASDA plans on verification of the designs being completed in the vicinity of April 1982.

The first stage of the H 1A launcher has been assigned to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and the second stage to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in cooperation with Ishikawajima-Harima Industries; the third stage and solid fuel boosters are being fabricated by Nissan

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NASDA N 1 launcher

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
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
Mu-3 H rocket firing at Kagoshima

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NASDA rockets




University of Tokyo rockets


NOTE: Symbol  $\phi$  means diameter  
All dimensions shown are in millimeters

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General configuration of second stage cryogenic motor: 1. gas generator; 2. liquid hydrogen turbopump; 3. liquid oxygen turbopump; 4. combustion chamber; 5. nozzle; 6. main LH2 valve; 7. main LOX valve; 8. thrust control valve; 9. mixture control valve; 10. motor starting valve.



General configuration of cryogenic second stage of the NASDA rocket, H 1A

Characteristics of the Future NASDA Launcher, H 1A

	1st stage	2nd stage	3rd stage	Boosters (9)	Nose	Launcher
Fuel	LOX-RTI	LOX-LH2	Solid	Solid	----	----
Length, meters	22	10	2.7	---	----	----
Diameter, meters	2.44	2.44	(1.3)	1	2.44	2.44
Total weight, tons	85.8	10.1	3.1	4.5	0.6	140.1
Weight of fuel, tons	80.9	8.33	1.85	3.75	----	124.8
Thrust, tons	78.0	10.0	8	142.2/71.1	----	220.2
Specific impulse, seconds	252/254	430/440	285	238	----	----
Manufacturer	MHI	MHI&IHI	Nissan	Nissan	----	----

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Characteristics and Performance of the TODAI and NASDA Japanese Launchers

	University of Tokyo Rockets							NASDA Rockets				
	Lambda 4S	Mu-4S	Mu-3C	Mu-3H	Mu-3B	Mu-3S Kai 1	N1	N2	H1A	H1/H1B		
Number of stages*	4S	4S+8B	3S+8B	3S+8B	3S+8B	3S+2B	3 S/L	3 S/L	3 S/L+9B	3 S/L + ?		
Length, meters	16.5	23.6	20.2	23.8	23.8	27.2	32.6	35.4	40	42		
Diameter, meters	0.74	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41	2.44	2.44	2.44	2.44		
Weight, tons	9.4	43.6	41.6	46.7	49.6	61.2	90.3	134.5	140	200		
Thrust, tons			197				149	149	220	?		
Payload**, kilograms												
Geostationary	12	75	86	134			130	350	550	800/1,000		
Circular (250 km)		184	195	270	290	720	1,200					
Nose diameter, meters	0.48	0.79	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.40	1.65	2.44	2.44	2.44		
Entry into service	1966	1970	1974	1977	1980	1985	1975	1961	1968	1988		
Present status	Launchers retired from service							In service	Under development	Under development	In project stage	

\*Rocket with 3 or 4 solid fuel stages (3S or 4S) or solid and liquid (3 S/L) with 2, 8, or 9 solid fuel boosters (2B, 8B, or 9B)

\*\*payload for a launching from Kagoshima or Tanegashima (30° N)

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

JAPANESE WEATHER SATELLITE SENDS FAULTY DATA

OW161347 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 15 Oct 80 p 12

[Text] The unreliability of pictures sent from the Japanese weather satellite "Himawari" was causing the meteorological agency to make wrong predictions about the course of typhoon no. 19, it was found late Monday night.

The disclosure, which came as a great shock to the agency, was learned after 10 a.m. when data about the typhoon were sent from a U.S. observation plane.

The U.S. plane observed the typhoon near Yasushima Island at 9:39 p.m. but the location was some 40 kilometers away from the point set by the agency on the basis of pictures sent from the Himawari.

At that time, the typhoon was at a point very important for weathermen to predict whether it would hit Kyushu or not.

At that time, the agency was saying that the typhoon was likely to hit southern Kyushu. After it was found that the storm was actually located some 40 kilometers eastward, the agency quickly changed its forecast, saying that the storm would skirt the southern tip of Kyushu.

Together with the alteration of the prediction, the agency had also to revise the projected course of the typhoon it had earlier announced on the basis of Himawari's pictures received every three hours.

The revision demonstrated the lack of dependability on data sent from the weather satellite launched under great fanfare.

Shocked officials of the agency said that they would immediately start checking on the cause of the satellite's transmission of incorrect data.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

P4 LEVEL RESEARCH CENTER TO BE ESTABLISHED

Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Jul 80 p 2

[Excerpts] The Science and Technology Agency [STA] plans to allocate 800 million yen in JFY 1981, the first year, and expend a total of approximately 2 billion yen to complete the "P4" level research facility in FY 1983. It is anticipated that with the completion of the facility, gene engineering in which Japan had lagged behind Europe and the United States will make remarkable progress. The STA had decided to build the installation--which requires the highest degree of airtightness--in the Tsukuba university town. While the P1 level research facility is a common experimental laboratory for microorganisms, the P2 level a laboratory which prevents waste matter and aerosol from escaping, and the P3 level an isolated research area, the P4 level is equipped with shower rooms, high-pressure sterilizing apparatus, etc. and is a research facility completely isolated from human beings. With this facility, sophisticated gene-recombination research utilizing cells of primates can be conducted and Japan will come to possess a world level research center.

Plans are to construct a building with total floor space of 6,000 square meters to house not only the P4 level research facility, established according to guidelines, but the P1, P2 and P3 experimental laboratories, a research wing (2-story ferro-concrete) and a dormitory. The planned construction site, to be rented, is a 5-hectare plot adjoining the research installation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Shimoyokoba, Yatabemachi, Tsukuba-gun, Ibaraki-ken.

For the present, this research center aims to develop Japan's lagging gene engineering by conducting researches on safety aspects of gene-recombination technology and re-evaluation of guidelines as well as training personnel and undertaking new gene-recombination researches.

"Tsukuba Research Center" to Open

Upon completion of the transfers of nine research organs, including the Mechanical Engineering Laboratory and the Electrotechnical Laboratory of the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], to the Tsukuba

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university town, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry held the opening ceremony of the "Tsukuba Research Center" from 1500 hours, 15 Jul 1980, at the lecture hall of the AIST Tsukuba Administrative Office. Present at the ceremony were guests, including Benzaburo Kato, chairman of the R&D Division of Industrial Techniques Council, Buzaemon Shindo, chairman of [Japan Industrial Standards Research Association], et al., and about 500 interested persons.

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51

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