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7 November 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 45/80)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN

'DEFENSA' POLLS READERSHIP ON ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO ENTRY

The People Should Decide

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jul 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Let the People Decide"]

[Text] Since the poll by DEFENSA among its readers regarding the still pending though so far moribund theme of Spain's joining the Atlantic Alliance was taken--with the effects of a veritable bomb--the Spanish and foreign mass media as well as top personalities, some Spanish and some foreign, have been speaking nonstop about the problem. The starting gun was fired by the minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, when he disclosed that the Madrid government hopes to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance before 1983. On the subject of these statements, scored by the Spanish left and hailed in Brussels, where the secretary general of NATO continued to promote Spanish membership which he considers desirable, discussion has continued at a high level--discussion which was undoubtedly triggered by the disclosure of our poll's results.

We have already stated on more than one occasion on this editorial page that as far as the thorny issue of NATO is concerned, we seek only one thing: that Spain's interests should prevail over those of other powers and that on this score we consider two questions to be key ones: the solution of the intolerable and humiliating problem of Gibraltar, and the linking of our membership in NATO with our entry, as full-fledged members, into the European Common Market. It is neither tolerable for us to be allied to a power which occupies militarily part of Spanish territory nor, in the well chosen words of Jose Ramon Alonso, would it be wise for us to participate in the Europe of the guns but remain outside the Europe of the butter.

But there is something else. If in a specialized periodical like DEFENSA a really high percentage of readers admit their knowledge of NATO to be scanty or nonexistent, one can imagine what this means to the man in the street. For that reason we believe that before deciding whether to join NATO, we must inform public opinion so that the latter, with sufficient information at its command to make a judgment, may approve a resolution. For that purpose it is necessary to mobilize the mass media, the parties, and therefore parliament.

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To decide Spain's entry into NATO without undertaking this type of information campaign would mean making a decision by force--a "fait accompli"--something improper for a country which believes in democracy and whose people consider themselves sufficiently mature to be able to express an opinion on matters that affect their own survival and that of their children whenever they are given the opportunity to become informed and to speak out. If, once that point has come, they say "yes," all the more power to Spain's joining NATO. But if they answer "no," let the will of the majority be upheld in that case, too.

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Poll Results

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jul 80 pp 64-68

[Text] We have polled our readers on whether or not Spain should join NATO in the belief that the time has come for the citizens to express themselves about an issue of such importance which will not only affect their security but also that of other nations. What we did not imagine was the immediate and overwhelming response we would receive. Not only did the completed questionnaires begin to reach us in very large numbers, but many individuals, dissatisfied with the form, wrote us to elaborate on their opinions and to formulate suggestions of the most varied nature.

Finally, at a discotheque in downtown Madrid we presented the results of the poll, and once again, we had occasion to be surprised since, even though we had anticipated some degree of attention, at no time did we think that so much play would be given to our endeavor. Deputies, senators, diplomats, Spanish and foreign military personnel, politicians, top newsmen, and others personally wished to determine what the first poll ever taken on the subject of NATO among Spanish public opinion had shown.

After distributing a tally sheet with the basic results and following a few words of introduction by our director, Jose de Sanmillan, coordinator of DEFENSA, a discussion got under way in which several of the personalities attending took part. Darlos Argos of the Popular Alliance [AP] came out in favor of widespread participation in the planning of our foreign policy, arguing for a national discussion so that everyone might express himself. He described as excessively oversimplified our question of "NATO yes, NATO no," which in his opinion should be asked within the framework of the definition of a foreign policy for Spain. Fernando Faba of the Spanish Communist Party [PCE] emphasized the fact that those who said "yes" and those who said "no" were almost equal in number and noted that in a period of stabilization of democracy such as the one now being experienced by Spain it does not seem appropriate to open a debate that could cause a dangerous polarization of public opinion. He held that the recent pro-Atlantic Alliance statement by the Spanish minister of defense, Rodriguez Sahagun, had made things more complex.

The deputy chairman of the defense committee of the Congress of Deputies, Socialist Enrique Mugica, after stating that his party [the Spanish Socialist Workers Party--or PSOE] is opposed to Spain's joining NATO, especially when there are problems such as that of Gibraltar which have to be solved first, expressed his

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satisfaction with the result of the poll, assuming that since so far military issues have not been of interest to the Spanish left, the average reader of DEFENSA is of "liberal-conservative" persuasion. This means that if a broader spectrum of people had been polled, the responses would undoubtedly have been negative. The Socialist deputy added that if Spain joined NATO its hands would be tied and it would lose its enviable present position respecting Latin America and the Arab world.

In complete contrast to the opinion of Enrique Mugica was that of the chairman of the defense board of the Senate, Alberto Ballarin, a member of the Democratic Center Union [UCD], which is the majority party in Spain. Alberto Ballarin, in a very lively manner, said he felt satisfied with the results of the poll since, as DEFENSA (according to him) has published an editorial against Spain's entry into NATO, this would have influenced its readers whose share of "yes" responses without such an editorial would have been much higher.

At this point our director asked for the microphone and he pointed out that our publications had adopted an independent stance since its first issue. He denied that an editorial of this type had ever been published and he cited, alluding to two diplomatic delegations present in the room, that DEFENSA had carried its neutrality to the point of holding back for several months an interview (still unpublished) with a Soviet general because that same set of questions, officially submitted to an American general, had still not been answered.

Among the newsmen the comments of the director of the daily PUEBLO and of the state newspaper network, Jose Ramon Alonso, were brilliant. He said: "If Spain has to join the Europe of the guns it must also join the Europe of the butter. The issues of the European Common Market and NATO must be linked in a single package. To assume the risks without enjoying the benefits would be a mistake." Jose Ramon Alonso explained that "there is no communist threat but rather a Soviet threat: the imperialism of the USSR. Cuba does not threaten us and neither does the Spanish Communist Party."

One of the numerous foreign newsmen, Eppo Jansen of the Dutch television network, also spoke to say that he does not think that Spain will join NATO because "I believe that it is more interested in remaining outside to cultivate its potential special relations with Latin America and the Arab countries."

The next day the entire Spanish press--especially that of Madrid--made extensive comments on the poll. ABC carried the headline "The majority of the field officers are in favor while junior officers are against. There is a generational discrepancy among the military regarding NATO." In its headline EL IMPARCIAL wrote: "The fans of DEFENSA wish to join NATO," while EL PAIS had a large box stating that "junior officers and noncommissioned officers do not favor Spain's joining NATO." YA noted the words of Alberto Ballarin to the effect that Spain's membership in NATO will not decrease Spain's bargaining position with the European Common Market and will make it possible to solve its dispute concerning Gibraltar and reassert the Spanishness of Ceuta and Melilla. EL ALCAZAR, in an extensive article, quoted some statements by the deputy secretary general of the Popular Alliance, Guillermo Kirkpatrick, who seized the occasion to criticize the government and to wonder about the satisfaction of Alberto Ballarin and of

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Enrique Mugica with the results of the poll. Among editorials that of MUNDO OBRERO, the organ of the PCE, noted that "Spain is not about to touch today, busy as it is with so many complicated and urgent problems, that not potato of NATO thrown in its lap from the outside."

With the issue catapulted to the fore in this manner, a few days later Spain's minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, made a few explosive pro-Atlantic Alliance statements to EL PAIS which Radio Nacional, in its program "Spain at 8," linked (as was obvious) to the results generated by the DEFENSA poll. As a reaction to those declarations the parliamentary left requested, through its Socialist and communist representatives, a referendum on Spain's entry into NATO, an event announced by Minister Oreja as slated to occur prior to 1983. On that same day the president of the Congress of Deputies and spokesman for the UCD, Landelino Lavilla, requested that Spain end its isolation from the Western community and move from simple pacts with the United States to "coresponsibility, the only viable approach in a system of multilateral cooperation and integration such as that of NATO where our present and potential military weight is greater than that of many of its members."

We hail, should there be any doubt, the dynamic effect that the poll by DEFENSA has had, but now that we have arrived at this point, we remain outside the debate. We did not poll our readers looking after our own interests. Only to the extent that we have completed an enlightening endeavor do we believe we have done a good job.

Results of the Poll: 10,307 Readers Responded

Of the Spaniards polled 40 percent were military and 60 percent civilians.

The military was broken down as follows: 40 percent field officers; 53 percent junior officers; and 7 percent noncommissioned officers.

The civilians were broken down as follows: 64 percent technicians; 16 percent liberal professions; and 20 percent other occupations.

Spanish Military Personnel

1. Field officers

Up to 40 years of age, 26.6 percent; from 41 to 60 years of age, 53.3 percent; and over 60, 20.1 percent.

These consider their knowledge of NATO to be as follows: high, 12.5 percent; average, 68.7 percent; scant, 18.8 percent.

Some 93.75 percent believe in the so-called "communist threat" while 6.25 percent do not believe in it.

Some 50 percent believe that Spain's entry into NATO would significantly affect the existing international strategic situation while 43.7 percent consider that it would affect it little and 6.3 percent believe that it would not impact on it at all.

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Some 31.25 percent believe that Spain is already highly involved in NATO despite the fact that it is not a member state of that organization, while 62.5 percent consider Spain to be relatively involved in it. Some 6.25 percent feel that Spain is not involved at all.

One hundred percent of those answering are of the opinion that Spain's entry would enhance the NATO bloc a great deal.

Regarding whether in a general way Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for Spain, the responses were as follows: 68.7 percent said very positive; 18.8 percent said not very positive; 12.5 percent said that it could be negative; and 0.0 percent said it would make no difference.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace the answers were as follows:

It would place world peace in danger: 0.0 percent; it would not affect world peace: 37.5 percent; it would strengthen world peace: 62.5 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain were to join NATO, the respondents thought that Spain would be affected in case of conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 50 percent; somewhat, 50 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

And in case of nuclear war: a lot, 93.7 percent; somewhat, 6.3 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain were to remain outside NATO it would be affected in case of conventional war between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 37.5 percent; somewhat 62.5 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

And in case of nuclear war: a lot, 62.5 percent, somewhat 31.25 percent; not at all 6.25 percent.

Regarding the principal benefits or disadvantages (one or several) which Spain's entry into NATO would bring: political benefits, 62.5 percent; political disadvantages, 25.0 percent; military benefits, 93.7 percent; military disadvantages, 18.75 percent; economic benefits, 50 percent; economic disadvantages, 56.2 percent; other benefits, 6.2 percent; other disadvantages, 6.2 percent.

Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 87.5 percent; no, 12.5 percent; indifferent, 0.0 percent.

2. Junior Officers [below the rank of major]:

Up to 25 years of age, 61.9 percent; from 26 to 40 years of age, 33.4 percent; from 41 to 60, 4.7 percent.

Knowledge about NATO: high, 19.2 percent; average, 66.6 percent; scant, 14.2 percent.

Some 76.2 percent believe in the "communist threat," while 23.8 percent do not believe in it.

Spain's entry would affect the international strategic situation: a lot, 43 percent; a little, 52.3 percent; not at all, 4.7 percent.

Some 61.9 percent believe that Spain is already very involved in NATO; 33.4 percent believe that it is relatively involved; and 4.7 percent believe that it is not involved at all.

Some 95 percent feel that for NATO Spain's entry would be a very positive step; 5 percent feel that it would not be very positive.

Regarding whether entry would be positive for Spain: very positive, 47 percent; not very positive, 38.1 percent; would make no difference 0.0 percent; perhaps negative, 14.9 percent.

Some 14.2 percent believe that Spain's entry into NATO could endanger world peace; 57.3 percent believe that it would not affect world peace; 28.5 percent believe that it would strengthen world peace.

Regarding whether if Spain were to join NATO it would be affected in case of conventional war with the other bloc: a lot, 61.9 percent; somewhat, 38.1 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

In case of nuclear war: a lot, 85.7 percent; somewhat, 14.3 percent; not at all 0.0 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain remained outside NATO it would be affected by a conventional war: a lot, 28.54 percent; somewhat, 66.6 percent; not at all, 4.76 percent.

And in case of nuclear war: a lot, 42.8 percent; somewhat, 57.2 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

Regarding benefits and disadvantages for Spain if it joined NATO (one or several responses): political benefits, 42.8 percent; political disadvantages, 38.1 percent; military benefits, 95.2 percent; military disadvantages, 4.7 percent; economic benefits, 19.0 percent; economic disadvantages, 71.4 percent; other benefits, 4.7 percent; other disadvantages, 19.0 percent.

Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 42.8 percent; no, 47.6 percent; indifferent 9.5 percent.

3. Noncommissioned Officers

From 19 to 25 years of age, 57.2 percent; from 26 to 40, 42.8 percent.

Regarding their knowledge of the Atlantic Alliance: high, 28.5 percent; average 61.5 percent; scant, 10.0 percent.

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Those believing in the "communist threat," 71.5 percent; not believing in it, 28.5 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would significantly affect the existing international strategic situation: a lot, 42.8 percent; not very much, 57.2 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

Regarding whether Spain is already involved: a lot, 71.5 percent; not very much 28.5 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry would be positive for NATO: very, 14.2 percent; not very, 42.8 percent; would have no effect, 28.5 percent; would be negative, 14.5 percent.

Regarding whether world peace would be affected by Spain's entry into NATO: peace would be endangered, 14.4 percent; peace would not be affected, 71.4 percent; peace would be strengthened, 14.2 percent.

Regarding whether, if it were to join, Spain would be affected in case of conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 71.4 percent; somewhat, 28.6 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

In case of nuclear war: a lot, 71.4 percent; somewhat, 28.6 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain did not join NATO it would be affected in case of conventional war: a lot, 28.5 percent; somewhat, 57.3 percent; not at all, 14.2 percent.

In case of nuclear war: a lot, 57.3 percent; somewhat, 28.5 percent; not at all, 14.2 percent.

Benefits and disadvantages (one or several responses): political benefits, 71.4 percent; political disadvantages 28.5 percent; military benefits, 85.7 percent; military disadvantages; 0.0 percent; economic benefits, 0.0 percent; economic disadvantages, 100 percent.

Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 42.8 percent; no, 57.1 percent; indifferent, 0.1 percent.

Spanish Civilian Personnel

1. Technicians (representing 38.3 percent of the Spanish total)

Knowledge about NATO: high, 24.3 percent; average, 72.7 percent; scant, 3.0 percent.

From 19 to 25 years of age, 16 percent; from 26 to 40, 66 percent; from 41 to 60, 18 percent.

Regarding their belief in the "communist threat": 60.6 percent believe in it; 39.4 percent do not believe in it.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect the existing international situation: a lot, 54.5 percent; not very much, 42.5 percent; not at all, 3.0 percent.

Regarding whether Spain is already involved: very, 45.5 percent; not very, 51.5 percent; not at all, 3.0 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for that organization: very, 78.7 percent; not very, 21.2 percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for Spain: very, 45.4 percent; somewhat, 18.1 percent; indifferent, 0.2 percent; negative, 36.3 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace: it would endanger peace, 15.2 percent; it would not affect peace, 60.6 percent; it would strengthen peace, 24.2 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain were to join NATO it would be affected in case of a conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 61.5 percent; somewhat, 38.4 percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.

In case of nuclear war: a lot, 84.8 percent; somewhat, 15.2 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain did not join NATO, it would find itself affected in case of conventional war: a lot, 21.2 percent; somewhat, 60.6 percent; not at all, 18.2 percent.

In case of nuclear war: a lot, 57.5 percent; somewhat, 33.3 percent; not at all, 9.2 percent.

Benefits and disadvantages (one or several responses): political benefits, 60.6 percent; political disadvantages, 45.4 percent; military benefits, 72.7 percent; military disadvantages, 18.1 percent; economic benefits, 33.3 percent; economic disadvantages, 39.3 percent; other benefits, 24.2 percent; other disadvantages, 18.1 percent.

Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 48.4 percent; no, 45.4 percent; indifferent, 6.2 percent.

2. Liberal Professions

From 19 to 25 years of age, 11.1 percent; from 26 to 40, 66.6 percent; from 41 to 60, 21.2 percent; over 60, 12.1 percent.

Regarding their knowledge of NATO: high, 33.2 percent; average, 66.6 percent; scant, 0.2 percent.

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Regarding whether they believe in the "communist threat": yes, 88.8 percent; no 11.2 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry would affect the strategic international situation: a lot, 65.3 percent; not very much, 23.2 percent; not at all, 11.5 percent.

Regarding whether Spain is already involved: a lot, 89.8 percent; not very much, 10.1 percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for that organization: yes, 100 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for Spain: very, 54.5 percent; not very 1.0 percent; would have no effect, 24.2 percent; would be negative, 20.2 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace: it would endanger peace, 12.3 percent; it would not affect peace, 53.5 percent; it would strengthen peace, 34.2 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain were in NATO a conventional war between the blocs would affect it: a lot, 77.7 percent; somewhat, 22.3 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

In case of nuclear war would Spain be highly affected? yes, 100 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain remained outside NATO, in case of conventional war it would be affected: a lot, 45.5 percent; somewhat, 43.3 percent; not at all, 1.2 percent.

In case of nuclear war: a lot, 74.5 percent; somewhat, 24.6 percent; not at all, 0.9 percent.

Benefits and disadvantages of Spain's joining NATO (one or several responses): political benefits, 57.3 percent; political disadvantages, 45.4 percent; military benefits, 88.4 percent; military disadvantages, 19.1 percent; economic benefits, 33.7 percent; economic disadvantages, 58.5 percent.

Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 50.5 percent; no, 38.3 percent; indifferent, 11.1 percent.

3. Other Professions

Up to 18 years of age, 14.2 percent; from 19 to 25, 35.4 percent; from 26 to 40, 37.8 percent; from 41 to 60, 12.6 percent.

Regarding how respondents consider their knowledge about NATO: high, 21.0 percent; average, 74.9 percent; scant, 4.1 percent.

Regarding their belief in the "communist threat": 68.4 percent believe in it; 31.6 percent do not believe in it.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect the international strategic situation: a lot, 63.1 percent; not very much, 36.4 percent; not at all, 0.5 percent.

Regarding whether Spain is already involved in NATO: a lot, 73.6 percent; somewhat, 21.2 percent; not at all, 5.2 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for that organization: a lot, 84.4 percent; not very, 10.4 percent; not at all, 5.2 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's joining NATO would be positive for Spain: very, 31.5 percent; not very, 21.4 percent; indifferent, 10.3 percent; negative 36.8 percent.

Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace: it would endanger peace, 15.9 percent; it would not affect peace, 52.6 percent; it would strengthen peace, 31.5 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain joined NATO it would be affected in case of a conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 73.6 percent; somewhat, 26.3 percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.

Regarding whether if Spain remained outside NATO it would be affected in case of conventional war: a lot, 15.7 percent; somewhat, 68.4 percent; not at all, 15.7 percent.

In case of nuclear war: a lot, 84.3 percent; somewhat, 15.7 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.

Benefits and disadvantages (one or several responses): political benefits, 31.5 percent; political disadvantages, 57.8 percent; military benefits, 68.4 percent; military disadvantages, 36.8 percent; economic benefits, 21.0 percent; economic disadvantages, 63.1 percent; other benefits, 10.5 percent; other disadvantages, 21.0 percent.

Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 42.1 percent; no, 57.8 percent; indifferent, 0.1 percent.

Note: We shall publish the results of the responses from our readers in Latin America and Europe in our next issue since we are still receiving answers especially from Latin America.

Some of our questions are subject to more than one answer, for which reason it will be found that in a few cases the responses add up to more than 100 percent.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PCF DISSIDENT ELLEINSTEIN VIEWS NEW BOOK ON SOVIET RULERS

Paris LA NOMENKLATURA in French 1980 pp 15-28

[Preface by Jean Elleinstein of book by Michael Voslensky translated from German by Christian Nugue, published by Belfond, 1980]

[Excerpts] Nomenklatura, the Russianized latin word that until now was known only to a few specialists, is becoming as famous as the term Goulag which was ignored until Solzhenitsyn thought of using it as the title of his works describing the system of Soviet concentration camps. Michael Voslensky did not invent this word, no more than did Solzhenitsyn invent the word Goulag. His merit is giving it a new dimension, a symbolic character, because behind this word lies what Moliere described as a well-established fact, and that well-established fact is the leading class of the Soviet Union. It is indeed an enormous fact since the Nomenklatura directs the second largest power of the world and by virtue of the influence that it exercises in the world it is equal to playing a determining role in the evolution of history.

Michael Voslensky, born in 1920, is a historian by profession. He completed his studies at the Lomonosov University in Moscow. He then worked as a translator at the Nuremberg trials, and later at the Council of Allied Control in Germany. At the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, he prepared a thesis on the history of German reconstruction, and was later a journalist and Soviet editor at the Council of Peace in Prague and in Vienna. Professor at the Lumumba University in Moscow, he assumed various responsibilities at the Academy of Sciences and became vice president of the Commission of Historians of the USSR-GDR. He left the USSR in 1972 and became a university professor in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Austria. He has been closely associated with the ruling apparatus of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and himself belonged to the Nomenklatura. "Brought up in the seraglio, he knows all the ins and outs." He writes as a professional historian and at the same time from his personal experiences obtained over several decades.

I do not intend to summarize Michael Voslensky's book; one simply does not summarize such a book, one reads it--and I not only hope but believe--with passion. I only wish to draw the reader's attention to a few ideas and to a few facts capable of maintaining and stimulating debates which have been underway for decades concerning the Soviet Union. France is in fact one of the countries'

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where the Soviet experience has stimulated great interest and always animated and often acerbic polemics. The reasons for such interest are quite diverse. They stem in part from the rational but also from the irrational. The existence of a powerful and influential communist party is an important reason. However it is not the only one. There are the links that a century of history has woven first with Russia and later with the Soviet Union, the ties established by the united allied forces during the two world wars, the good diplomatic relations, the influence of General de Gaulle, etc. For millions of French over a score of years, the Soviet Union constituted more than a model: a type of test continent very different from our country and in many respects worthy of admiration. This idea extended over and above the ranks of communist voters. But it took the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 and its consequences before the truth of the Soviet Union came to light to penetrate sufficiently to the greatest part of the working class despite the resistances and behind-the-line combat of the French Communist Party. Even in 1980 with the PCF again maintaining a pro-soviet attitude which it had abandoned in part for a short period, no one any longer dares say--with the exception of a few unwavering supporters--that the Soviet Union is a model. What remains however is that it continues to exist--and to dominate the left--as a still very optimistic conception of Soviet reality and taboos which should not be underestimated.

These last few months I was quite surprised by the refusal of a number of communist and non-communist intellectuals to clearly and firmly condemn Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A few approved it, but many still back away from the necessary condemnation and manifestation of solidarity.

For us, men of the left, the situation is more difficult in many respects. That is why many of us content ourselves with condemning the unacceptable, which is honorable, but in the process overlooking the reasons for such a situation.

Michael Voslensky's book forces us to give a most exacting proof--under pain of intellectual dishonesty and above all as concerns ourselves. Either what he has written is false--making it thus necessary to respond to him and contradict him--or what he says is true--thus requiring us to draw all the conclusions. Namely, that the Soviet Union is not a socialist state, that it does not really have a socialist economy and society, but on the contrary that it is a society of classes or of one class--the Nomenklatura--relatively few in number which exploits the majority of the population and dominates it by virtue of a totalitarian state. The difficulty for us other westerners is that we study and judge the Soviet Union by our own criteria, our own habits, our own mentality. We ask ourselves for example whether the USSR is capitalistic or socialistic. We speak of capitalism of the State, or even of primitive socialism, or pre-socialism, etc.

The USSR is not capitalistic. If it were, its economy would function better and it would certainly have resolved a number of economic problems which continue to crop up there and which no doubt have compounded: agriculture, the industry of consumer goods, the quality of production, the methods of management and planning. The entire economy has become State owned and almost every trace of the private sector has disappeared. However, it is wrong to think that the disappearance of the private sector has given rise to a socialist economy and

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society. The mechanizations of domination and of exploitation are not the same as in a capitalist country. This does not imply that they may have less severe consequences and that man is more free and less alienated: and above all by virtue of the omnipotence of the State and the total absence of political democracy.

We thus have assigned ourselves the problem of knowing the real state of the classes in the USSR and their relations. In our country in the capitalist West, we are familiar with them to a certain degree thanks to economic and sociological studies and to statistics that are detailed, controllable and criticizable. This is not the case in the Soviet Union. The total absence of freedom of the press and freedom of research makes a sociological account of the country extremely difficult. The reality of the classes is hidden under incomplete or manipulated information. The social truth is camouflaged more than it is in our country where all the information can be found and verified by researchers and where the social transparency, without being either total or perfect, is in no way less real.

The conditions which gave rise to the Nomenklatura were more favorable than others, but it was a question of a new phenomenon which developed in the years after the death of Lenin. Stalin was in effect the product of that new Nomenklatura that was controlled by an organ of the Secretariat of the Party, created in 1924, called the section of organization and assignment (orgraspred). It conducted nominations not only in the party apparatus, but in all administrative organs, the sections of government, the OGPU (the political police), the Red Army, and economy and culture.

The bureaucratic phenomenon was incontestably a dominating characteristic of what was called Stalinism, but Stalin emanating from, as well as forming an essential part of, the Nomenklatura was leading a State which was playing a relatively autonomous role as compared to that of the social classes. The Nomenklatura suffered the terrible purges that the State made as its expense. It lived in both terror and in insecurity. One could even ask whether Khrushchev wasn't, at least at the beginning, a new avatar of the Nomenklatura, destined to bring it security and well being. Nevertheless, the concept of the existence of a dominating class in the USSR gradually became stronger.

Reading the work of Voslensky convinced me of the existence of a real dominant class in the Soviet Union. I still think that it is rather a matter that for 30 years there has been a leading social group, a caste perhaps.

Since 1956, the Nomenklatura has enjoyed security. The bloody purges of the Stalin period had come to a close. For that reason and also because of economic and cultural development the Nomenklatura had expanded.

The system of socio-cultural reproduction functions much more efficiently. "Heirs" certainly exist and in turn occupy positions left by their parents, not necessarily the same, but equivalent positions. Voslensky is correct in saying that in contrast to the capitalist West where the large middle class possesses and thus governs, in the Soviet Union the Nomenklatura governs and for that reason possesses. It is true that the part of the product of work extracted by the Nomenklatura cannot be reinvested. It is thus consumed, which from an economic point of view is a disadvantage rather than an advantage.

The existence of this dominant and exploiting class obviously constitutes an obstacle, a slowing down of the development of productive forces.

The Nomenklatura has privileges that extend in all sorts of areas. These privileges are material and financial, which count a great deal more than can be imagined in the West.

Perhaps above all are the privileges of power. The complete absence of political democracy and public liberties gives the Nomenklatura even greater facilities to develop its interior hegemony and extend its power even outside the USSR.

Let's take as an example the military budget. In France there is a parliamentary control such that it is difficult to dissimulate the funds earmarked for the army. Perhaps it can be done to a certain extent, but in very limited proportions. This is not the case in the Soviet Union where the absence of freedom of the press and of real parliamentary control allows all possible manipulations with all the appropriate camouflages. This is what makes the role of the Nomenklatura particularly dangerous internationally.

I do not doubt the desire for peace of the people of the Soviet Union, and it is probably one of the difficulties encountered by the Soviet leaders. They must to a certain degree take into consideration the profound pacifistic feelings of the Soviet people. Obviously they throw the responsibility of international tension on the United States, but the decisions of the Helsinki conference have allowed western radio stations to be heard over large areas of the Soviet Union. The "Iron Curtain" which Stalin fashioned to prevent the circulation of information from the West to the East really doesn't exist any longer. For this reason the Nomenklatura runs into difficulties more serious than can be imagined in the West. Dissidence is only the most visible part of the iceberg, because it is the most courageous.

For a long time, the Soviet people have resisted power by removing it from the sphere of politics. Today, they have begun in a realistic and limited way to focus on this or that aspect of daily life, its difficulties and its contradictions. The coat of mail that the Nomenklatura has clothed the Soviet Union with is no longer as impenetrable as before. Workers have started to demonstrate for their rights despite the fact that strikes and free unions are forbidden, as opposed to the official and obligatory unions. The intellectuals, researchers, and other creative persons are fighting to impose a minimum of liberty which still does not exist.

One cannot be optimistic in regard to the evolution of the Soviet Union over a short term, but one can imagine that in the next 10-15 years, that country will undergo great transformations. It will question in one way or another, peacefully or not, the power of the Nomenklatura.

And in all of that, how will marxism and communism fare? In my understanding they only constitute an ideological disguise designed to maintain order. The Soviet Union stands above all others as the country of moral order because all that threatens this moral order risks placing in question the power of the Nomenklatura, in the same way as in the France of MacMahon or in Victorian England, the moral order is intimately linked to political order and to economic and social order.

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The Nomenklatura is not an ordinary class. It possesses a power unprecedented in history since it is the State itself.

We can question ourselves constructively on the expansion of this system, not by means of military intervention or war, but by repetition or the simulation of the conditions which gave rise to it. Since the role of the State is essential and that it absorbs a decisive part of economic and cultural activities, and since there is neither political democracy nor public liberties, the birth of such a system seems inevitable to me and contemporary history clearly shows that it has appeared and that it exists everywhere where conditions permit, especially in insufficiently developed countries. This system offers more or less extensive varieties.

It could be very bloody as it was in the USSR during the Stalin years or in Cambodia under Pol Pot, or it could be just the opposite. It is characterized by the absence of public liberties, the existence of a single party, the absence or the mediocrity of a market economy and often the presence of a charismatic leader. In all cases it results in the formation of the Nomenklatura.

I certainly do not advocate the system which predominates in our country or in the capitalist West. It has multiple disadvantages which have not been surmounted but rather aggravated by its recent evolution. The contradictions which it produced are exasperated by a whole series of factors which are becoming even more weighty. The crisis of western capitalism is deep and touches not only the economy, the society, but also the culture and ideology. Let's not harbor illusions, the case of Germany in the thirties with the victory of Hitler shows the threats which weigh upon a society in a crisis. We ourselves are not protected from a totalitarian adventure under different forms, but no less dangerous. If alienation due to work has fallen back because of technological transformations and the struggle of the workers, that caused by the State has increased over the last century. The present crisis does not favor immobility. It risks obliging the western society to return to the established order with all the disadvantages that that suggests, unless it allows going towards a new organization of the economy and the society, towards a new democracy, towards a new culture.

In truth we do not really know what this new thing could be. We know only that we are not satisfied with that which exists and that the equilibrium upon which our society rests is threatened and fragile. We also know that this new thing cannot be and should not be similar to that which is the Soviet Union today.

To speak of an "anti-model" is to show clearly and firmly that the Nomenklatura-- a word coined by Voslensky, that is, the country where the Nomenklatura rules-- is neither socialist, nor communist. That does not mean that socialist and communist aspirations do not come to light. The contradiction between ideology and reality provokes numerous reactions and creates a zone of turbulence that one must clearly see.

The Nomenklatura in essence is ashamed of itself. It does not want to be recognized. It does not consider itself as such. It only lives at night and fears the light. It hides in places where the science of sociology has a difficult time detecting it. It masks its privileges. It is in complete contradiction with the ideas that it inculcates in citizens of its country. Rarely has the gap been so great between what is said by a dominating class and what it does,

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between the ideal it advocates and the reality of its domination. It is this that makes the Nomenklatura particularly dangerous and at the same time vulnerable.

It is dangerous because not being transparent it does not consequently and immediately provoke the criticism that it would otherwise provoke in the contrary case. One only has to look at the western world and the violence of the criticisms aimed at the dominating class, that is at the upper middle class, criticisms which in my opinion are well founded, but which are only made and are only possible to the extent where public liberties obviously exist and where the domination of that class appears openly. In France a child entering the 6th class knows all this by heart! The Nomenklatura is however vulnerable because it has to preach in complete contradiction with reality.

It is nationalistic and speaks of internationalism. It is racist and speaks of antiracism. It is privileged and speaks of the struggle against privileges. It is expansionist and hegemonistic and speaks of the struggle against imperialism.

The Soviet Union is dominated by two essential contradictions which permits being not too pessimistic as far as the future is concerned. The Nomenklatura applied breaks to the economic rise of the country which resulted in the failure of all the economic attempts at reform over the last 25 years. Its only real success is seen in the military field. By its discourse, it feeds the forces which could crush it. Sakharov in his exile to Gorki, the editors of the Metropole Almanach, the authors of numerous books, films, and plays that were published, toured and played in the Soviet Union--even the works of Zinoviev, of Solzhenitsyn or of Voslensky published in the West--are also certainly dangerous for the Nomenklatura as were the writings of the philosophers, of Voltaire, of Diderot and of Rousseau for the Old French Regime.

In the Soviet Union today there is a real working class, millions of intellectuals who do not belong to the Nomenklatura, millions of kolhozniks. The forces therefore exist to use the contradictions, the importance of which we have emphasized.

Without a doubt, never in history, and I say this weighing every word, has a regime ever given proof of such hypocrisy and underhandedness. This should not be seen as only the result of an iron will, but rather the systematic setting up of methods of government and of direction without precedent.

We can obviously smile at the account Voslensky wrote at the end of his book about the day in the life of Denis Ivanovich Vokhouch, Section Chief of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since I know quite well all those Vokhouches in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, I felt like laughing as much as I did crying; no doubt it is this that causes the tragic destiny of the Soviet Union's contemporary history, if not of all contemporary history.

Let this book upset us, let it challenge us with all its truths, let it push us to the very edge of our powers of reflection; for it is just these qualities that make it outstanding and deserving of our attention.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

OTRAG MISSILE DEAL WITH SAUDI ARABIA ALLEGEDLY PLANNED

Hamburg STERN in German 25 Sep 80 pp 324-329

[Article by Karl Guenther Barth: "A General as a Secret Weapon"]

[Text] German firms want to equip the sheiks in Saudi Arabia with rockets. The middleman in the shady transaction is the former commander-in-chief of the Federal Armed Forces, General Harald Wust.

Friday, 20 June 1980. On the second floor of the building at 29 Leimenrode, Frankfurt, staff members of the "Hessian Peace Research Committee" are engaged in a heated discussion on the subject of "disarmament." Three floors higher up, in the conference room of the "Meaplan" AG [Middle East Industrial Construction and Development, Inc.], a group of 10 men is no less heatedly studying ways of arming the oil sheiks in the Near East, one of the hottest trouble spots in the world, with rockets.

The coffee has hardly been served when a man--1.94 meters tall--gets up and states with military brevity: "Gentlemen, my impression is on the whole positive." The nine men are beaming with pleasure and host Dietrich Nickel, chairman of the "Meaplan" supervisory board, nods his approval to the 59-year-old man: "Carry on, General!"

Harald Wust--Inspector General, ret., who until the end of November 1978 had been the highest-ranking soldier of the Federal Armed Forces and who then resigned from his office after a clash with Defense Minister Hans Apel--is reporting on his recent secret mission to the Near East.

This mission was the prelude to an unprecedented arms deal--the rearmament of the Arab world. Wust reported that the King of Saudi Arabia in particular wanted to free himself from the influence of the United States and--by means of rockets from the Federal Republic--"to cement his position of leadership in the Arab world" (Wust).

So far, all of the Saudis' official arms requests--such as that for the "Leopard 2" combat tank--have been turned down by Bonn. Bonn has pointed

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out that Arabia was a trouble spot and that according to German law, arms exports to such regions were a criminal offense and that even an arrangement of such transactions was punishable under the Arms Control Law. According to the Federal Ministry of Economics, which has jurisdiction over matters of this kind, a license for the export of rockets and rocket accessories has not been applied for and would not be granted in any event.

On 5 June 1980, at 11:15 o'clock, General Wust, ret., had flown from Frankfurt to Ryad. Upon his arrival at 19:55 o'clock, he had been welcomed by Shuya H. Khan, secretary of the Saudis' Prince Nawaf, who had then escorted the German guest to the Intercontinental Hotel, where room 503 had been reserved for Harald Wust by the Saudi Government.

Prince Nawaf Bin Abdul Aziz, one of the numerous sons of the legendary Ibn Saud, had made the preparations necessary to bring the General into contact with the interlocutors appropriate to the occasion. Wust conferred with Defense Minister Prince Sultan, with the chief of the General Staff, Habbam, and with Sheik Saleh Kamel, the head of the desert state's secret service.

The German General presented his hosts with a 200-page booklet on the "Delta" project--the code name of the secret rocket deal. The "gift volume" (Wust) had been produced in Zurich at the cost of 37,254.55 Swiss francs; it was printed and bound by the Schoeb Printing Co. and contained illustrations by Rudolf Gerbig and cliches by Ritter Co. The contributors informed STERN that they had been ordered by their client to "observe strict secrecy," since this was a matter of "national security."

In Ryad, the profusely illustrated prospectus produced the desired effect. According to Wust, the head of the secret service "was obviously satisfied and expressed the willingness to support the project." Prince Nawaf of the Royal family would "do his utmost to promote the project."

Only infrequently did questions interrupt the precise report of Wust, who aside from his rocket job holds the position of defense policy adviser of the FDP's parliamentary fraction. Talking to STERN, Juergen Moellemann, the FDP's expert on military affairs who is party boss Genscher's closest adviser on defense matters, had nothing but praise for the ex-General: "We simply could not let this expertise go to waste, especially since this man turned down fantastic offers on the part of industry."

At least in regard to this point, deputy Moellemann is in error. For Wust's clients in the deal with the Arabs are leading industrial concerns: Present at that Friday conference in Frankfurt were Rolf Degele of "Gode Planning Ltd", Zurich; Yves Bertrand of "Blanchut & Bertrand S.A.", Geneva; Director Dr Schroeder of the Nuremberg arms manufacturer Diehl and Messrs Schulz and Winkler of "AEG-Telefunken."

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A rather dubious figure in the Frankfurt group was Frank Wukasch of the Munich rocket firm "Otrag"--the enterprise that with inexpensive rockets had wanted to launch satellites from the African state of Zaire.

The activities of Wukasch's boss, Lutz Kayser, caused considerable turbulence in the FRG's foreign relations (see STERN 22/1978: "Monumental Bluff in the Kayser-Reich" [pun on the term "Kaiserreich"=Empire]). Neighbors of Zaire such as Angola feared Kayser's projectiles might be aimed at them rather than at the cosmos. The Soviet Union was not the only country to suspect these activities were concealing secret, internationally outlawed rocket experiments of the Federal Republic.

However, Otrag boss Lutz Kayser had repeatedly and verbosely denied any military use of his rockets. This now appears to be outdated. For Wust informed his Arab interlocutors that the new Otrag rockets had been "redesigned for military purposes." For October, two test launchings are scheduled, which are intended to test "homing accuracy from A to B, a distance of 300 kilometers."

However, the test launchings will no longer take place in Zaire. For in the meantime, chief of state Mobutu has turned out the German rocket designers on account of his difficulties with his neighbors. For the time being, Otrag has left undecided the question in which country it now wants to launch its rockets. Executive board member Helmut Billen stated: "For political reasons, we will not disclose this until after the event."

According to information received by the Bonn Foreign Ministry, Brazil, Libya and Saudi Arabia were the countries under discussion. A well-known German arms dealer provided more detailed information. He claims to have seen--as early as 12 months ago--rockets and equipment containers bearing the inscription "Otrag" in Libya--in a desert area between Bengasi and Sirte. This man told STERN: "I saw that with my own eyes."

Kayser's economy projectiles could be likened to a people's Porsche among the highly complex rockets of the superpowers. His simple recipe is based on old Nazi plans and reads: Aggregation of simple propelling charges that "are turned into space transport vehicles for 200 to 10,000 kilograms of payload."

Objections such as have repeatedly been raised against the Otrag rockets by space scientists were not even voiced at the Frankfurt conference. According to the minutes of the secret Frankfurt session, the group was agreed that the electronics specialists of AEG-Telefunken--who were also furnishing the fire-control system for the Federal German show tank, the "Leopard 2"--should "contribute their share." The representative of the Nuremberg Diehl Concern assured the group that "conventional rocket warheads" could be delivered "at once;" only the "advanced technologies of the end-phase-controlled munitions" (examples: "Copperhead" and "Bussard"), guided missiles, would require "adaptive changes."

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In regard to "adaptive changes," Diehl should have no difficulties. The Nuremberg enterprise is one of the last family concerns. It derives its income from "Junghans" watches, "Mauser" rifles and machine guns, highly advanced electronics such as the system used in NATO's "Tornado" multi-purpose aircraft, ammunition and tank tracks. Defense technology accounts for approximately 40 percent of the concern's turnover, which in 1978 was quoted at just under DM 1.5 billion.

Patriarch Karl Diehl, 73, is an entrepreneur of the old stamp and an intimate friend of Franz Josef Strauss, the CDU/CSU's candidate for the chancellorship. There are also personal ties between the CSU and the enterprise, which in the 1970's furnished the Shah of Persia with a tank track plant. Bernhard Goppel, a son of the former minister president of Bavaria, is head of Backhaus, a Diehl-owned company in Remscheid. According to information received by STERN, that firm already tested tracks for Chinese tanks. After equipping their tanks with this German quality product, the Red Chinese planned to sell them in Third World countries. This Diehl deal collapsed, when the Federal Criminal Police Bureau arrested the middleman of the transaction for violation of the Arms Control Law (STERN No 31/1980: "Always Trouble With the Expense Account").

The Remscheid firm--presently a Diehl subsidiary--also played a role in the notorious "Uncle-Aloys-Affair" during Strauss' term as defense minister. By the good offices of the Defense Ministry, "Uncle Aloys" Brandenstein, a friend of Strauss' parents-in-law, had been appointed adviser of the Remscheid Backhaus Co.

When shortly afterwards the flow of Bonn orders suddenly stopped and the firm was on the verge of bankruptcy, "Uncle Aloys" quickly came up with a buyer: the firm of Karl Diehl. After the change of ownership, the orders from the Strauss ministry suddenly started to come in again.

At the Frankfurt meeting with Wust, the Diehl men were especially cautious. Like the colleagues of AEG-Telefunken, they demanded "strict secrecy" and insisted on including in the minutes the statement that in the rocket deal with Saudi Arabia they would function only as "subcontractors" and that the responsibility for the hot deal rested with the Geneva firm of "Blanchut & Bertrand." The Swiss need not be concerned about the strict provisions of the German Arms Control Law.

The Frankfurt gentlemen's party also played it safe in regard to the future negotiations with the sheiks. All of the firms participating in the secret "Delta" project want to prepare themselves for all questions the Saudis could conceivably ask. In a role-playing exercise, they then want to test the persuasive power of the arguments. The prospects "of obtaining in advance the Ryad test questions from the Saudi-Arabian commission were considered not very good" (conference minutes). This task had proved too much even for ex-General Harald Wust.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

TRADE UNIONS QUARREL ON LEADERSHIP, POLICIES

Hamburg STERN in German 25 Sep 80 pp 288-290

[Article by Heiko Tornow: "Disconcerted Functionaries--the Causes of the Ferment in the Trade Unions"]

[Text] The medics of the Worker Samaritan Association had settled down to what they thought would be a leisurely week in Mannheim's Rosengarten Congress Center. According to the experience gained at previous congresses, first aid was unlikely to be required during the Union Congress of the IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik [Chemical, Paper and Ceramics Workers Union]. On the 4th day, however, the first-aid center was filled to capacity. The Samaritans had to attend to functionaries who--beside themselves and shaking with crying fits--could be calmed only with difficulty. Dieter Schreiber, a union staff member, lay on a stretcher--unconscious; and the Saarbruecken delegate Egon Bielefeld was hospitalized on account of symptoms suggestive of a heart attack.

With nervous and circulatory breakdowns, a number of--usually hard-boiled--trade unionists reacted to a ballot defeat that they regarded as a political and personal catastrophe: In the elections to the full-time executive board, Paul Plumeyer, leader of the intra-union opposition against the conservative union leadership of Chairman Karl Hauenschild, lost his post.

Plumeyer's defeat signified the collapse of his followers' hopes for a more democratic IG Chemie. They consider their union a clique, in which battle-weary board members make underhand deals with the conformist workers' council princes of the large chemical concerns.

The struggle for political positions and influential posts is not a specialty exclusive to the functionaries of the IG Chemie; but in no other DGB [German Trade Union Federation] union do the members of the two antagonistic camps attack each other so mercilessly and publicly.

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Last week, the Trade, Banking and Insurance Trade Union (HBV) demonstrated that a radical change of power and direction can be brought off smoothly. In Wiesbaden, the delegates replaced the entire executive board. Second Chairman Volkmar--a man with leftist leanings--took charge and without much ado he arranged for a brand-new detachment of progressive junior functionaries to be elected his assistants.

However, that is the exception. Once elected, trade union officials--like civil servants--customarily remain in office until they reach retirement age, regardless of whether or not their work performance is satisfactory. Thus the full-time functionaries in the sister unions watched with some concern the quiet uprising in the HBV, for it could possibly set a precedent. The malicious catchword of an alleged "communist infiltration" went the round. It was circulated by the HBV's competition, the DAG [German Salaried Employees Union], and disseminated by Loewenthal's ZDF [Second German Television Program] Magazine, and DGB boss Heinz-Oskar Vetter promptly fell for it.

Immediately before the Wiesbaden Congress, Vetter sent a "personal/confidential" letter to the chairmen of all 17 DGB unions. In this letter, SPD-member Volkmar was accused of shunning a confrontation with the Communists in his organization, "because he needs the DKP [German Communist Party] votes to get elected chairman of his trade union."

Volkmar, who last Tuesday obtained after all 87.5 percent of the vote, protested against this unprecedented "interference by the DGB in the internal affairs of a member organization." The IG Metall [Metalworkers Union] and the OeTV [Public Service, Transport and Communications Union] reacted similarly.

In fact, in the HBV--as in any other DGB union--there are a few Communist members and functionaries. Bound to the by-laws of his centralized union, Guenter Volkmar has to accept the fact that his 345,000-member union even includes DKP Chairman Herbert Mies: Just as it unionizes the party staff members in the SPD, CDU and FDP, the HBV unionizes those in the DKP.

However, Communists participate only rarely in intra-union intrigues. In accord with the guiding rule of their party--namely not to jeopardize the sacred principle of the centralized union--the organized veterans of the class struggle exhibit--almost without exception--a loyalty toward the executive board that borders on blind obedience.

The real rift within the workers' organizations is that between leftist and rightist Social Democrats. If they joined forces, they would have a solid 75-percent majority in all DGB unions. The attendance of the traditional "party evenings", to which the union conference delegates are invited, reflects especially clearly the actual distribution of forces in the workers' organizations. In Wiesbaden, the general secretary of the SPD, Bahr, had to book the Rhein-Main-Hall, in order to be able to entertain all HBV comrades. For the CDU followers, the backroom of a small hotel in the city

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was sufficient, and the DKP's executive board had to resort to a little trick and a lot of money to produce the impression of a "broad basis": In the "Ratskeller", the veterans of the class struggle had a sumptuous buffet set up and thus inveigled a few independent leftists and a handful of hungry youths into temporary disloyalty to their respective causes. Such culinary meetings are sufficient to give rise in veteran functionaries to concern about infiltration.

Thus even IG Metall boss Eugen Loderer has to put up with being told by DGB officials that his youth organization is being infiltrated by the SDAJ [Socialist German Workers Youth], a junior DKP group. The chairman of the world's largest individual labor union (2.7 million members) regards such reproaches as a malicious imputation cooked up "in the poison kitchen of the political enemy and--absurdly--taken up by DGB representatives.

Loderer's concerns are of an altogether different nature. For years, he has been trying to find a way of getting rid of Franz Steinkuehler, leftist Stuttgart district leader of the IG Metall and SPD follower. For the militant and strike-experienced Steinkuehler is favored by many metalworkers as Loderer's successor.

Loderer, however, who this week has the delegates at the Berlin Union Congress elect him chairman--for the last time--would prefer in 3 years to hand over his office to his deputy, Hans Mayr (58). But Mayr, too, would for reasons of age be able to hold office for no more than 3 years. Opponents as well as friends believe the collective bargaining expert Steinkuehler will have that much staying power.

In contrast to his behavior in the past, Steinkuehler is presently exercising restraint in regard to criticism of the executive board; apparently, he does not want to jeopardize his career through careless radical utterances. Thus he prefers noncommittal, well-balanced statements: "The strength of any organization is proportionate to the extent to which it reflects the interests of its members. Our great achievements of the last few years prove that in the IG Metall this is the case."

That this is not the case in the IG Chemie was demonstrated by its Mannheim Trade Union Congress. Trying to prevent a split of his union, Chairman Hauenschild now has his hands full. To his opponents, he is making overtures of peace. He announced he would be willing--on a trip across the Federal Republic--to listen to the criticism of the rank and file. And staff members at the Hannover headquarters of the IG Chemie are pointing out that the presently unemployed Paul Plumeyer is not starving: For 3 years, he will be paid his monthly salary of DM 7,000 and--they claim--there is a good chance he will be provided with another chairmanship in a public enterprise.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

GONZALEZ ON PSOE'S FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH SUAREZ GOVERNMENT

LD021101 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 5 Oct 80 pp 16-19

[Interview with Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) Secretary General Felipe Gonzalez by Jose Manuel Arija: "I Want To See the King"--date not specified]

[Text] CAMBIO 16: What assessment have you made of the debates on the motion of confidence submitted by Prime Minister Suarez in the Congress of Deputies?

Felipe Gonzalez: Well, that the government has made a mistake again in acting with an inconsistency from which it does not wish to extricate itself and which involves the prime minister himself, not because he is Suarez but because he is the person who has remained throughout several governments--five over the last 4 years.

The inconsistency lies in the fact that Suarez should give at the same time the impression of the government's continuity and the impression of ability to regenerate a program which will increase its credibility as a government. But they did badly, because they did not tackle this clearly and honestly before the country but rather in a government operation after the manner of the previous ones.

CAMBIO 16: But this cabinet has a qualitative difference from the previous ones. Suarez could have found himself obliged to include the "barons" and end a personalist form of government.

Felipe Gonzalez: In this connection I would say that the prime minister has returned to 1977 and to that electoral situation in which he needed to have all the elements comprising his political group in the government. There is an assessment which I believe to be correct: it is not that Suarez personally chose the best people in the Union of the Democratic Center [UCD], but that this is probably his last chance of appearing in a government with recognized personalities. And that this, instead of elevating his figure above the government as a whole, gives the impression that these figures are sharing decision-making and that Suarez is reducing the degree of freedom of maneuver within his own government. But this is subjective.

CAMBIO 16: But do you believe that Prime Minister Suarez will change his way of governing, as he said in his replies?

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Felipe Gonzalez: I do not believe so. He had his opportunity in the gestation of the new government and threw it away. That is why I told him with some harshness but without bitterness that this country deserves that for once a program should be formulated and government action conducted on the basis of it. A government to serve a program and not a program to hastily bind together a government. They chose an image-boosting operation without explaining the whys and wherefores of this new cabinet.

CAMBIO 16: Yet, the prime minister's statement was clear with respect to the economic field and the autonomies, was it not?

Felipe Gonzalez: It is noteworthy that in his statement he put forward a quite logical argument of economic philosophy--rightwing, tough and even threatening, but with a clear internal logic. But setting out an economic argument is one thing, and putting it into practice is another.

With respect to the autonomies, they followed an approach deplorable for the country, because they laid down exactly the same guidelines as in foreign policy and public safety. These topics were evaded because they could lose certain votes. Thus the agreement on the majority is a fragile agreement, which for one of the interlocutors is confined solely to an autonomy or partial autonomy issue of one kind or region.

This is why, when I read in the newspapers that this government has a majority, I cannot help thinking how short people's memories are. It is forgotten that at the investiture Suarez secured 184 votes, which were supposedly for the 4-year program of the investiture. How long did those 184 votes last? Three [censure] motions; on the fourth they collapsed, and because of one of the same interlocutors who are now supporting him.

That is, in the autonomy issue the basic approach was evaded and only the issues capable of gathering votes were touched on. The issue of Andalusia was mishandled for an inescapable reason: the people's will must be respected and the constitution must be respected--two factors which must be observed by the government.

CAMBIO 16: What will the socialist proposal for Andalusia be?

Felipe Gonzalez: Our proposal will take shape in a very simple manner: since there is now once more a legislative initiative seeking an amendment to the organic law governing the various forms of referendum--which is an infinitely clearer course, from the viewpoint of respect for the laws and the constitution--we will see what happens. And that will happen very soon. Does the government believe that it has a majority for carrying through an organic law granting Andalusia a statute? Let it do so. The difficulties already exist within the government itself.

CAMBIO 16: Are you not sure that this government will last until 1983?

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Felipe Gonzalez: This country needs stability. And democratic stability sometimes means enduring even misgovernment. I fully accept the elections which gave Suarez victory. The only thing is that, if the government is not functioning and is incapable of offering solutions with respect to the country, we must perform our task, as in the case of the censure motion last May.

In all sincerity I would like this government to do well for the good of the country. It is difficult to say this from the opposition, but let them do well, even from a rightwing stance. I will always be opposed to the rightwing policy, but what I am even more opposed to is not conducting a government policy.

Regrettably, I believe that they will not do well, and I base myself on the experience of the last few years. That is why I gave the example of the soccer coach who after changing many teams reaches the conclusion that it is the coach who should be changed for the team to function.

CAMBIO 16: If, in accordance with your hypothesis, this government reaches the end of its tether in a few months' time, and the problems of unemployment, the autonomies and terrorism continue to beset us, what proposal would the socialist make to the Spanish people?

Felipe Gonzalez: If the situation continues to deteriorate and another collapse occurs--the impression of lack of government--we would use the constitutional machinery for replacing the government. Bearing in mind that nobody wants general elections to be brought forward and the country to suffer a new trauma, we would once more begin a process of censure against the prime minister.

If in the censure motion in May our intention was to tell the government that it was doing badly and that the situation was deteriorating, on the next occasion the censure motion would have more a nature of offering an overall alternative. Last May we offered the first part of the operation--the program part; that is, the cry of hope that things could be done well. In the future, to supplement this, the composition of the majority and the social base of support for that possible majority government would be offered.

Although the government will perhaps not like my saying this in advance, this is the only solution left: making the chamber--350 deputies--responsible for surmounting the problems confronting the country from the viewpoint of governability. And there is no other way out.

CAMBIO 16: Would you currently like a coalition government with the UCD?

Felipe Gonzalez: I do not want that. In the abstract, if I were asked whether I would be prepared for socialists of my party to take part in a task of government in light of a critical situation in the country, my

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personal answer--and, I believe, that of my party--would be: Yes of course, in light of a critical situation. To say also, in the abstract, that it is bad for democracy for the two majority parties to form part of the government, well yes, in principle it is bad. But throughout the world there have been experiences of this kind at critical moments.

CAMBIO 16: With what yardstick does one gauge whether or not the critical moment has been reached?

Felipe Gonzalez: It is partly a subjective assessment, but there are facts which can help. Viewed from the European perspective, there is a difference of thousands of kilometers for the German, British or other observers between the critical point which has brought Turkey to a disastrous situation and the critical point which could exist in Spain. That is, we assess our internal crisis far more anxiously, because we are not capable of distancing ourselves, that is true.

Therefore, with respect to turning points of the crisis, subjective assessments are difficult. For instance, I imagine that the critical point for [Popular Alliance leader] Fraga came long ago in his estimable interpretation. And the critical point for Mr Suarez will never come. He will probably have to be told from outside, because he will not see it.

But in addition, the country's objective realities will give clear signs. And I believe that one of these signs of the dramatic state of the crisis and of the fact that we can go no further will be the 2 million unemployed which we will reach, or the dizzying collapse of a host of medium and small enterprises which constitute the country's socioeconomic framework.

Then there will be turning points in the deterioration such as the 7,000 kilos of "goma-2" explosive or the killings of civil guardsmen, policemen or other people. There could even be another point in the crisis, probably connected with foreign policy problems.

CAMBIO 16: Under what conditions would you meet with Prime Minister Suarez?

Felipe Gonzalez: The basic conditions should be fulfilled in order to extricate ourselves from the present tense situation. First of all, that the meeting should be public and, second, with topics known in advance. Meeting knowing the whys and wherefores.

The reason why is clear. There is a critical situation, and perhaps the head of government believes that he should see the person who represents the majority opposition party. What must not be done is to create more obscurity.

CAMBIO 16: And with the king? Would it be desirable to meet now?

Felipe Gonzalez: It would be desirable to have rather more regular communications with the king. A meeting every few months would be logical and consistent. For instance, I believe that one would be desirable now.

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Perhaps I am speaking prematurely, but there is a new government functioning, and the king will probably need to know the opinions of each of the political leaders, especially the leader of the majority force, on the new composition of the government.

CAMBIO 16: I imagine that various more or less likely future alternatives will have been analyzed on the PSOE's political chessboard. What would the socialists do in these three hypotheses: If the PSOE wins early elections, if a state crisis occurs or if the UCD breaks up?

Felipe Gonzalez: First of all, if the elections are brought forward and the party wins, the PSOE must govern, and govern with a majority. I have already said that a socialist minority government does not appear to me to be desirable. It should be a majority government with a program, determination to implement it and a sound social majority supporting it, not only in parliament. That is as far as I can go at present. I am giving no further information in order not to provide grounds for criticism. The time for this will come, and it will be told like it is.

With respect to the state crisis, the socialist party would defend the institutions. And in this defense it must accept the sacrifice which falls to it. I have not the slightest doubt. That is, confronted with a situation of state crisis, it will immediately abandon all party aspirations other than defending democracy and the institutions. And the PSOE will do all that the situation requires to rescue the country.

I do not like bandying the hypothesis that the UCD could break up, because that would be to increase that possibility. If the UCD broke up, it would be a misfortune for the country. Strong parties are needed, and that does not depend on whether or not the UCD is criticized, because parties sometimes grow stronger the more they are attacked.

In this third hypothesis of there being groups in the UCD which would leave one sector or another, a bridging party would probably be created which would be genuinely either a force of progress or a force for curbing progress, allying itself with the left or with the right. That is, conducting a center-left or center-right bridging policy. But it would be irresponsible to encourage this crisis, from the historical viewpoint.

CAMBIO 16: Returning to reality, will the PSOE get along better now with the new ministers--for instance, Ordóñez, at the Ministry of Justice...?

Felipe Gonzalez: What I can assure you, and I take the opportunity to tell Suarez something that I did not wish to say in the debate to prevent further difficulties in the government and because it would have been far more noticeable to say this on television than now, in an interview...: What I can assure you is that we socialists will not wage, as we did with respect to the tax reform, a battle side by side with the minister of justice in order to surmount the UCD's opposition. We will not take part in this game, and the minister of justice must know this right now: we will only uphold our stances.

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CAMBIO 16: And with Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs Calvo Sotelo?

Felipe Gonzalez: There is a test of fire for all the economic ministries-- the state budget. The news media do not seem to attach much importance to it, but the budget affects the whole of political and economic life during the year.

If the government says now that public investment will extricate us from stagnation, attract private investment and create employment, we will begin to ascertain this in a few days' time, we will see then whether this is true from the viewpoint of figures.

I believe that it will not be true, through inadequacy. One fact: the emergency plan for Andalusia to which the prime minister has committed himself. This means in practice millions of pesetas, which should be specified in the budget or in a separate law. But a similar operation is needed in Extremadura or in the Canary Islands, and one of a different kind in other regions.

Thus we will see where the government is heading; whether its economy is redistributive among the regions and among people or whether, as it has done so far, it will promote disparities.

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According to the document, Father Tumiri, 69 years old, wrote his testimony on toilet paper while he was in jail. According to that document and the testimony of other prisoners, Father Tumiri was "horribly tortured."

Father Envis, who went to the authorities to inquire about the whereabouts of other Jesuits, was also arrested and tortured, according to the document.

A letter accompanied the document. It was from "the mothers in the town of Caracoles" some 100 kilometers south of La Paz. They denounced "looting, rapes, mass arrests and other atrocities committed by the armed forces."

The former president said that "the Bolivian people are fighting against the monopoly of the communications media and weapons by work slowdowns and civil disobedience."

Siles Zuazo predicted that, before the end of the year, "that movement will have created total isolation and internal dissent within the armed forces, opening the way for a return to democracy."

Meanwhile, it was reported from La Paz that the Permanent Bolivian Episcopal Council was convoked for an urgent meeting to analyze the deterioration of relations between the Catholic Church and the military government.

The secretary general of the episcopal conference, Monsignor Alejandro Mestre, did not set a date but church sources thought the meeting would be held this week.

The sources said that the government has not complied with agreements with the church hierarchy concerning the arrest of priests, raids of religious orders and aid to political prisoners.

The meeting would study the case of Father Alvaro Puente, study prefect at the main Jesuit school in this city, who was arrested on Friday by a group of civilians and exiled to Buenos Aires over the weekend, according to Jesuit superiors in Bolivia.

Victor Blajot, superior of the Jesuit order, and Vicente Beneyto, rector of San Calixto School, stated that Father Alvaro Puente's arrest "violates the verbal agreement between church authorities and the military that no priest, monk or sister can be arrested without an agreement between both authorities."

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BOLIVIA

INTERIOR MINISTER'S DRUG CONNECTIONS WITH MILITARY CITED

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 8 Oct 80 p 72

[Article by Luiz Claudio Cunha: "The Minister of Cocaine"]

[Text] La Paz--During the first week of July this year, a two-engine Piper-Azteca aircraft exploded over a village 14 kilometers from La Paz and killed its three passengers. Near the bodies, Bolivian police found several suitcases containing \$2 million in \$50 and \$100 bills. Intrigued, they were examining the baggage when a helicopter landed amidst the wreckage and the owner of the air-taxi company that owned the Piper aircraft stepped out: it was Col Luis Arce Gomez, then chief of the Army Intelligence Service (SIE). He brusquely tore up the report the police were writing, ordering them to return to La Paz and maintain absolute silence about the episode.

This year alone, three of Arce's aircraft were destroyed in tragedies that have never been explained--in Bolivia, affairs of the colonel, minister of the interior since the takeover by Gen Luis Garcia Meza, are not subject to investigation by the police. "El Loco," as he is called by his barracks comrades, or "Arcesino" to his countless enemies, Col Luis Arce Gomez, 42, is a veteran lawbreaker. In the Rene Barrientos government, while still a captain, he was implicated in smuggling leather and cigarettes into Paraguay. As he acquired more gold braid, he was also rising through the ranks of contraband traffic. Today, Arce is the brains of the military men involved in the billion-dollar cocaine trade.

Arce's girlfriend, Rosario Poggi de Quesada, an attractive brunette of 37 who smuggled narcotics between Spain and Bolivia during the 1970's, is, officially, the secretary general of the Interior Ministry and, unofficially, second in command of the colonel's clandestine empire. Norberto "Bubby" Salomon, air-force colonel and Arce's partner in air-transport companies, is also accumulating positions in the government and in the illegal organization headed by the interior minister. After the successful coup led by Garcia Meza, Bubby Salomon was rewarded with the post of military attache in Caracas. In May, one of Salomon's aircraft had crashed at the Beni airport with 320 kilograms of cocaine aboard.

In Bolivia, a colonel's pay is equivalent to about \$800. But Salomon owns three farms and three rented homes in La Paz. As have most of the military officers who conduct the drug trade, Salomon has served in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, center of cocaine traffic in Bolivia. From Santa Cruz come rebel generals headed for La Paz and cocaine bound for the rest of the world.

Night Landings

Last June, at a meeting with Santa Cruz cocaine magnates, Gen Hugo Echeverria, commandant of the II Army Corps based in that city, was given a donation of \$2.7 million to overthrow the government and drive out the specter of traffic repression. Echeverria promised Garcia Meza he would raise the \$3 billion needed to pay off the nation's foreign debt with a groups of friends--"My friends from Montero," according to the general. Montero, 45 kilometers from Santa Cruz, is virtually the first free-trade zone for cocaine on Bolivian territory.

Outside of Bolivia, friends of Arce are always subject to unexpected happenings. Alfredo "Cutuchi" Gutierrez, owner of a landing strip at kilometer 7 on the Santa Cruz-Cochabamba highway surrounded by high walls and equipped with searchlights perfect for night landings, was arrested in Miami during May of last year piloting an aircraft loaded with cocaine. He wasn't in jail more than 24 hours--but the case alerted Colonel Arce to the special precautions that must be taken in Miami, the main point of entry for drugs in the United States.

At the present time, Bolivia has six consuls in Miami--one of them is Arce's father. All of them were chosen personally by the interior minister, who is afraid of diplomatic slipups, but seems convinced that he is not exposed to unforeseen economic reprisals from the U.S. government.

At a recent party given by friends in La Paz, Colonel Arce quite enthusiastically summed up the figures on which his confidence is based. "Tin represents \$400 million a year, but cocaine brings in \$1.2 billion," the interior minister explained. "If the Americans cut off their aid, it won't be my fault if the United States is flooded with cocaine."

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BOLIVIA

GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE COCA PRODUCTION

President Appeals to Farmers

La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 21 Sep 80 pp 1, 12

[Text] Cochabamba, 20 Sep--The president of the military junta, Gen Luis Garcia Meza, said: "We have to replace coca production with other products so that it will not be said of us that we are a nation of cocaine addicts." Garcia Meza added that to achieve this the National Reconstruction Government will take "drastic and harsh measures toward living with dignity and so that we will not be accused of poisoning the Bolivian people with cocaine."

He said that for 20 years the politicians did not do anything, "because instead of working for their homeland they worked to line their own pockets, by taking money abroad to live like pashas."

Garcia Meza announced that to organize peasant cooperatives he has delivered five tractors so that the Seventh Division Command can distribute them to rural centers.

He said he will immediately enact a decree through which all the production of Chapare will be centralized in Sacaba. He added that the Tutumayu and Warawara dams will be built but that the peasants have to demand the achievement of these projects from the district authorities, since the latter are ready to work. If they were not, they would be "replaced."

Peasant Demonstration

The chief executive made these statements at a peasant rally that took place this afternoon in the main square of Sacaba, Chapare Province. Garcia Meza was welcomed by schoolchildren, peasants and general public.

Various ministers of state and military chiefs, as well as district and provincial authorities, attended.

President Garcia yesterday visited the district prefect, Lt Col Javier Pammo Rodriquez at Setton Hospital where the latter underwent delicate surgery. This morning, before going to Sacaba, Garcia Meza was in the Magy restaurant and attended the national horse show.

- Tomorrow he will be in Cliza where his wife, the first lady of Bolivia, will be
- named "favorite daughter" of Cliza, where a new anniversary is being celebrated.
- In the afternoon Garcia Meza will fly by helicopter to Morochata and Calchani,
- some 200 km from the capital.

- The events in Sacaba began with the welcoming address of Mayor Fidel Via. Then
- there were speeches by the president of the civic committee, Carlos Angulo, and
- agrarian leaders Tomas Quiroga of El Morro Peasants Union and Leoncio Torrido,
- departmental executive of the farmers. They all expressed their support for the
- National Reconstruction Government and offered to fight against extremism. They
- asked that several projects be carried out, such as dams and the centralization
- of products from Chapare in Sacaba.

The President Speaks

The Chief of State made the following address: "As we have been doing since the
military-peasant pact was again brought up to date, today we are again seeing
this massive spontaneous demonstration by our brother peasants and the people of
the town of Sacaba, as a show of support by all of you for the National Recon-
struction Government."

"We have often thought--and when we go through the various towns in Bolivia, we
see that we have not progressed at all--we continue as we were 20 years ago, and
we also wonder what the political parties did, what the politicians have done for
Bolivia, what the politicians have done for their peasant brothers, what they have
done for the workers and the miners. All they have done is make the people not
have faith in anything. All they have done is make the Bolivian people's back-
wardness continue. Now the new National Reconstruction Government, with a new
generation and new men believes that we cannot deceive the Bolivian people, and
we cannot end up promising that which we are not going to do. We have come, and
for a long time we have been carrying out a dialog with our peasant brothers, with
the worker and with the miner, to find out their needs. We are coming to realize
that we need everything, because we do not have anything; because instead of work-
ing for their homeland, many rogues who are deceiving the Bolivian people have
started to work to line their own pockets. And that they have not even left in
Bolivia all the resources that they have put into their pockets. Rather they have
taken them abroad to live like pashas, while we, the Bolivians who love our land,
are living under the same conditions and thinking about how to repair our nation.
We are thinking about how we are going to straighten out the economic problem.

"Nevertheless, during these 3 years, the politicians, through constant and continual
elections, have emptied the national treasury. They have used the money of the
poor and of the children, leaving them without food and without bread, to pursue
their election campaign, to deceive their peasant brothers. There was a Genaro
Flores who was selling our peasant brothers to an extremist party, to a party
that does not love Bolivia, to a party that was also selling Bolivia to certain
foreign powers. Peasant Brother, for this reason we are here to speak with you in
plain Spanish, so that we all understand one another, and let us speak the same
language and not talk promises. We do not come with promises. We come to find
out your needs, because the Armed Forces are going to work alongside all of you.

"Peasant brothers, what this National Reconstruction Government asks is that once we start to work, our nation needs the efforts of all its children. The government is starting to distribute the necessary tractors so that our peasant brothers will form cooperatives. For Sacaba we have brought five tractors that we are going to deliver to the commander of the Seventh Division for the cooperatives to be organized, and then the tractors will be handed over to them.

"A short time ago, the president of the civic committee asked us for a decree to centralize all of Chapare's production in Sacaba. We are going to order the decree, but since the government is giving them what they need, they also have to support this government, not with political consciousness but with nationalistic consciousness. We have to change the face of Bolivia, peasant brothers, and you, who are near Chapare, must replace coca with other things, so that it will not be said of us that we are a nation of cocaine addicts. To this end the government is going to take harsh and drastic measures, because it is better for all of us Bolivians to live with dignity and not be accused of poisoning the Bolivian people with cocaine. You must improve your thinking, so that you make suggestions to plant a better product than coca."

Finally, Garcia Meza announced that construction is underway on the Tutimayu and Wara Wara dams [as published]. He said that the peasants must demand these projects from the local authorities "so that they will fulfill what the President is speaking about. If not, the authorities will be replaced."

Garcia Meza added that the government has raised the flags of Villarroel, Busch and Barrientos, through which action "we have now called upon all the nationalist forces."

He declared, "We are forgiving those who hold foreign or mistaken policies, because we are all Bolivians, and I believe that it is necessary for us to examine our conscience and live first as Bolivians. Let us work for our homeland, for our household and for the community that you represent."

'PRESENCIA' Hails Initiative

La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 22 Sep 80 p 3

[Editorial: "Coca Growing"]

[Text] The problem of cocaine manufacturing in our country is at least 25 years old, and it has not been met with sufficiently effective measures. We cannot say that nothing has been done, but preventive and punitive measures have not substantially decreased manufacturing and trafficking in cocaine. Moreover, the tremendous profits obtained from this illegal trade have attracted more and more persons--including peasants--with the result that the authorities' struggle is increasingly difficult, despite all the willingness they may devote to this effort.

The situation has led to the President of the Republic himself, in a recent visit to Chapare, stating to the peasants the need to eliminate coca growing and replace it with other products that will not bring the same results. Thus, he touched upon one of the solutions that can be effective, as similar ones taken in other countries have demonstrated.

We must emphasize the harm that Bolivia has suffered up to now because of the narcotics traffickers' activities. Above all, the country's good name is at stake. For many years we have had the unfortunate reputation of being one of the big suppliers of cocaine for the whole world. But this is not all the damage. Given the ease of obtaining the narcotic, Bolivian drug addicts have already become evident, especially among youth. In the face of this dangerous fact we will have to react forcefully, because this problem touches a sector of the population especially deserving of protection.

The profits from this business do not go to the nation. The gains are for the drug traffickers, for gangs of international scope, and as crumbs for some coca growers who have observed that this item attains considerable rises in price.

No crime results from a single cause. But we can and must try to eliminate some of the foundations of these causes. Among these causes is, certainly, the fact that the raw material coca can be obtained in Bolivia at low prices; only some recently enacted precautions for its marketing have to win out. One of the basic points, perhaps the main one, lies in coca production. Therefore, if the growing were reduced, we would have taken a big step in regulating this type of offense.

Let us not forget that there have been other countries that faced similar problems. This happened, for instance, in Iran, which up to a quarter of a century ago was the main supplier of opium and its derivatives to the Western world. Since then the production of narcotics decreased because the government eliminated growing legally and physically and closely supervised the enforcement of these measures. Something similar was done in other nations, such as Turkey, with good results.

In Bolivia regulation over growing has to be extended, and those dealing in cocaine should be seriously investigated. The quantity required is small to supply the domestic market and to satisfy a habit that, otherwise, must tend to disappear.

Obviously this action will harm some growers. But we have to consider that it is not possible to follow the present course, with a production that we know for the most part ends in physical and mental damage both domestically and abroad. The excuse that there will be growers who are harmed is not acceptable. We will have to stress the need to replace the products being grown, even with less profitable ones, but which are also less dangerous. We do not believe that, in the long run, there is a lack of means and of foreign and international help to carry forward this campaign that has to be fulfilled, as much through an effort of persuasion as by vigorous punishment, if necessary.

Report Cited

La Pas PRESENCIA in Spanish 21 Sep 80 p 8

[Article: "International Report: Excessive Growing of Coca Threatens Agricultural Production in Bolivia"]

[Text] A report by the International Commission on the Fight Against Drugs points out that Bolivia's agricultural production is threatened by the excessive growing of the coca leaf.

It notes that traditionally Bolivia was compelled to produce the necessary food products. The report states that a large part of the country is not suitable for agriculture and that half of the population has to work at farming to satisfy the people's minimal food needs.

"But now," it adds, "in view of the expansion of illegal narcotics production, the Bolivian farmers are replacing the planting of food products with the coca leaf."

The report determines that unless this trend is corrected, Bolivia will soon be facing the problem of not being able to provide the necessary food for its people.

The commission explains that signs of an imminent food shortage are seen in the markets, where the prices of essential items, from potatoes to corn, are rising rapidly, and the effects are being felt by workers tied down to a salary. The report adds that "the only ones who have not been affected are those holding the largest part of the profits from the narcotic drugs industry."

According to the International Commission, the profits from illegal trading in this alkaloid have created 50 new millionaires in Bolivia, some of them on the scale of more than 30 million dollars. "Also," the commission says, "this trade has created countless new, poor farmers who must earn their living dangerously by growing coca shrubs high up in the mountains, while most of the population is facing an alarming shortage of food products because the farmers are no longer planting food products."

The report states that the other by-products of the illegal coca industry are well known. It adds, "Recently accusations were exchanged among government bodies responsible for reducing the narcotics traffic." It says rumors are common of bribery and that addiction is increasing. The report goes on to point out that the regions where coca production is the main occupation have become virtual states in which drug traffickers rule through heavily armed gangs.

Government Action

The document which, on the whole, refers to Bolivia, states that the government, upon realizing the low production of food products, has taken measures to reduce the harvesting of coca leaves. A special license, says the report, is needed for growing and selling coca. The Bolivian police force is carrying out inspections throughout the country to find and destroy the illegal coca shrub plantations. Despite this action, an increasingly larger area is being devoted to growing coca, since the profits for selling this plant illegally are greater--between 40 and 100 percent--than the profits from selling coca legally.

Referring to ways of battling the excessive production of coca, the International Commission suggests that the government increase its operations against the traffickers, since these measures would make trafficking in the refined drug much more risky. The report adds that the government must focus its efforts on programs that will allow the poor farmers to have an adequate income so that they do not have to resort to the illegal growing of the coca leaf.

Price of Coca Protested

La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 25 Sep 80 p 9

[Text] The continual increase in coca prices on the legal market is causing serious economic damage to the mining industry, states the National Mining Board, which unites Bolivia's small miners.

A letter sent by the organization to Minister of the Interior Col Luis Arce asks that urgent measures be taken to check the excessive rise in coca prices, to avoid problems with the mine workers.

According to the small miners, "The supplying of coca leaves for our workers, who number several thousand, has substantially worsened, creating at the present time a grave problem, first because of the tremendous difficulty in obtaining coca on the legal market and secondly because of the unrestrained and excessive rise in prices, which have reached an incredible increase of 1,400 percent."

"The seriousness lies in our not being able to compete in price with the illegal market," adds the small miners' letter, which suggests that a way be studied to make easier the supplying of coca to the mining districts.

The letter suggests that coca consignments seized by the authorities of the Office of Control of Dangerous Substances be transferred for sale to workers in the mining companies.

Prices

According to the small miners in January 1979 a drum of coca cost 600 Bolivian pesos. At the end of 1979 the price rose to 3,000 Bolivian pesos.

The price rise continues. Last August a drum of coca sold at 9,000 pesos.

The small miners are asking that the system of price restraints be improved in the legal coca market, as an aid to the fight against narcotics trafficking.

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BRAZIL

SHORTAGE OF FUNDS LIMITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST COCAINE

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 21 Sep 80 p 36

[Article by Manoel Lima]

[Text] Manaus--A shortage of financial resources and lack of support from bodies affiliated with the sector have caused the federal police to suspend "Operation Cocaine," which was launched 2 months ago and which culminated in the discovery of a major international network of drug traffickers operating in the Amazon region since 1970. In that period, they established sophisticated laboratories in Manaus for the extraction of cocaine hydrochloride and exported about 3 tons of the drug to the United States and European countries. As if the lack of resources and means for dispatching its agents to capture drug traffickers who are still at large were not enough, the federal police now find its activities hindered by the release from preventive imprisonment of drug trafficker Jose Augusto Basilio (alias Padeirinho), believed to be one of the leaders of the network. This situation of financial crisis in the federal police may encourage drug traffickers to reorganize the network, using new routes, on the basis of the cocaine plantings being cultivated in the upper Negro River region.

This situation is also preventing the federal police from organizing an expedition to the Negro River region, on the Colombian frontier, which can only be reached by airplane or helicopter, to assess the plantings of epadu, a plant which the Maku and Uanapixuna Indians cultivate and use in their rituals. However, special laboratory tests have established that the plant is "erytroxilum coca lamk," a variety of cocaine cultivated in the Andean regions of Bolivia. Epadu, a native name which means "brute force," is found in large quantities in the natural state in the Negro River region. According to federal police, the Indians in that region are being encouraged by drug traffickers to cultivate the plant on a large scale. The superintendent of the DPF [Federal Police Department], Ivo Americano, expressed regret at the lack of funds with which to continue "Operation Cocaine," and says he fears this shortage may lead the drug traffickers to reorganize in a short time and undertake to exploit the plantings of epadu. "In order to take drastic steps against cocaine traffic in the Amazon region," Ivo Americano said, "a great deal of money is needed. And we do not have it." The lack of resources of all kinds--material, human, financial and logistic--has prevented the federal police from arresting the most important drug traffickers, in particular Arlindo de Oliveira Cabral, who maintains a large laboratory for the processing of the cocaine into powder, currently located in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Arlindo Cabral was responsible for the processing of the greater part of the

cocaine and the large exports of it to the United States. "The drug traffickers have every facility for functioning in the region," Ivo Americano commented. "They know the Amazon region, they have money, and they have the protection of important people."

Using all types of transportation, the network of drug traffickers had no difficulty establishing its headquarters in the Amazon region, as well as support points within it. A map seized from drug traffickers arrested showed that the network used a number of routes through widely varying points in the Amazon region to bring in cocaine paste and process it into powder. The network converged at Manaus and Moufifn, an abandoned settlement on the right bank of the Negro River 150 kilometers from Manaus. The cocaine was transported from Bolivia across the Rondonian border to Guaraja-Mirim. From there, by car or plane, using "mules" (couriers) it went to the laboratories located in Manaus and Moura. From Manaus, after processing into powder, the drug took various routes: to Letitia, from Moura, or to Tefe, in Alto Solimoes, where the drug was taken out of the country by ship or small plane. Another route led directly from Santa Cruz de la Sierra to Moura, where Arlindo Cabral operated a large laboratory on board a fast launch which could move elsewhere when the drug traffickers' network felt police were closing in.

The steady stream of small airplane flights to Moura led the police by chance to the discovery that the processing center for cocaine was located somewhere on the Negro River. Along with this, the forced landing of a Bolivian Aztec biplane, license CP1502, on Lake Xiparu, in Moura, confirmed the federal police suspicions that Manaus was then the hub of the cocaine world. Orders were then given to arrest all Colombians suspected of links with the drug traffickers' network. In the residences of the Colombians, police found veritable chemical laboratories where cocaine was processed. The biplane which landed on Lake Xiparu was carrying 600 kilograms of powdered cocaine, which was taken out of the region by Indians hired by the drug traffickers. This aircraft is still in the region, while the FAB [Brazilian Air Force] and the federal police are attempting to recover it. But money to pursue the recovery operation is lacking.

The Great Discovery

All of the discoveries made by the federal police concerning cocaine traffic in the Amazon region were made almost by chance. This was the case with the arrest of 34 drug traffickers in the middle of July, the forced landing of the Bolivian plane in Moura in June, the arrest of drug trafficker Jose Augusto Basilio, or "Padeirinho," and, finally, the cocaine plantings being cultivated on the upper Negro River. A report coming from the Colombian frontier revealed that the Matu and Uanapixuna Indians were engaging in strange dealings with Colombians in Mitu and San Jose Guaviare, exchanging large quantities of epadu leaves for farm equipment--machetes, hatchets, power saws and boat engines, and were thus abandoning their clearing operations and the rudimentary farming in which they engage. A police expedition was made to the area and large plantings of epadu were found near the Indian villages and in large clearings cut in the brush by the natives. The Indians then said that they plant epadu for use as a stimulant in their rituals and celebrations. In view of the interest of the Colombians in the plant, a sample was sent to Manaus, and, when tested in the laboratory of the National Institute for Amazon Region Research (INPA), it proved to be coca, from which cocaine hydrochloride is extracted.

The Indians, lacking substantial resources for diversifying their crops, were readily persuaded by the Colombians to plant epadu on a large scale. Today, they do nothing but grow the leaves they sell to the drug traffickers at 1,000 or 2,000 cruzeiros per 60-kilogram sack. Access to the frontier region, according to the federal police, is very easy. The Papuri River, which separates Brazil and Colombia, is narrow and shallow, making it easy for both Brazilians and Colombians to cross the frontier. There is no Brazilian police authority in the area except in Iuarete and Jandia, where the Salesian missions are located. And it was in Jandia, where the Uanapixuma Indians live, that the police found large plantings of epadu. The area on which the Indians cultivate the plant exceeds 200 square kilometers and is located in Cabeça do Cachoro, in that sector where the map shows Brazil has its longest stretch of frontier with Colombia and Venezuela.



The Various Routes of the Drug Traffickers in the Amazon Region

5157
CSO: 5300

BRAZIL

MANAUS JUDGE SENTENCES COCAINE TRAFFICKERS

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 1 Oct 80 p 7

[Text] Manaus--Federal Judge Orlando de Souza Reboucas passed sentence yesterday on three Colombians and one Brazilian charged with trafficking in cocaine. They were members of an international gang which used Manaus for the processing of the drug. Their sentences varied from 4 to 10 years in prison, in addition to fines of between 20,000 and 50,000 cruzeiros.

A few weeks ago the federal police arrested 28 Colombians and several Brazilians while investigating the landing in the municipality of Barcelos of a Piper carrying cocaine. The Colombians, who operated clandestine laboratories, represented themselves as businessmen in renting the elegant mansions in which they lived.

In the first sentence for a member of the group, Judge Orlando de Souza sentenced Raimundo Salvador to 6 years in prison and a fine of 40,000 cruzeiros. Yesterday, Rodrigo Angarita, who controlled the organization's laboratories, was sentenced to 10 years and 8 months in prison, as well as a 52,000-cruzeiro fine. Goncalo Hurtado Marin, one of the 2 chemists, was sentenced to 4 years and a 40,000-cruzeiro fine. Maria Evelin Arias Ruiz was sentenced to 4 years in prison and a fine of 20,000 cruzeiros, and Jose Lima de Almeida, a Brazilian who supplied the chemical products, such as ether and acetone, will spend 4 years in prison and must pay a fine of 40,000 cruzeiros.

In the 29-page decision, the judge explained that he acquitted Colombians Humberto Pastrana Cardona and Sandra Mesa Hincappie for lack of sufficient proof incriminating them. However the two are being held at the Central Penitentiary pending an administrative inquiry which is likely to lead to their deportation from the country.

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BRAZIL

HABEAS CORPUS PETITION OF CUBAN COCAINE TRAFFICKER GRANTED

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 1 Oct 80 p 7

[Text] The Federal Appeals Court (TFR) in Brasilia yesterday authorized the further questioning of Cuban drug trafficker Larry Moreno Fernandez, currently being held at the Sao Jose prison in Belem, by the federal courts on his possible addiction to cocaine.

Fernandez was arrested on 7 August in front of the Hotel Gentil in Belem, in possession of a suitcase containing 3.808 kilograms of cocaine. The record of his arrest shows that the Cuban presented as identification a false passport in the name of Raul Leon Viales, a native of Costa Rica.

Federal agents were able to discover his true identity, however, with the assistance of the drug authorities in the United States and the FBI. The Cuban has a criminal record in the United States as an international trafficker in cocaine.

At a location in the municipality of Cameta, in Para, on a property owned by a relative of Fernandez, the federal police found a small laboratory where the Cuban produced cocaine hydrochloride from pure coca leaves. After his arrest, Fernandez claimed he was an addict, for which reason the TFR granted his habeas corpus petition for interrogation as such.

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KUWAIT

BRIEFS

OPIUM ARREST--Men of the narcotics squad of the General Department for Criminal Investigations were able to arrest two suspects in a drug case, the first called "Hoshenk" and the second "Jankiz." Inquiries by the investigators indicated that the first suspect was the one who acquired the narcotics. After the information was verified, Director of the General Department for Criminal Investigations Lt Col Fahd Ahmad al-Fahd's approval was obtained for carrying out a plan to arrest the suspect. Investigators were subsequently able to arrest the suspect at his home in the al-Sharq area, after surrounding the area to prevent his escape. When his automobile was searched, a matchbox was found inside which were two packets of opium. When the second suspect who was with the first one was searched, another matchbox was found in his pocket, inside which was a parcel of opium. A search of the first suspect's room revealed nothing, and the two suspects are still being interrogated after being detained. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 18 Sep 80 p 5] 8559

FIVE-MAN HASHISH RING--Investigators of the capital province, under the supervision and direction of Province Investigations Inspector Maj 'Abd-al-Ghaffur al-'Awdi, succeeded in arresting a gang which was dealing in narcotics and pushing them within the country. The accused are Haydar, 'Abd-al-Rahman, Ahmad, 'Adnan, and another person who is still at large. The investigators had information indicating that the first suspect would acquire the narcotics. After collecting inquiries about his activity, it became clear that he actually was the one who acquired the narcotics, in addition to pushing them, and that he had been on his way to purchase some hashish from the second suspect. The third suspect expressed his willingness to lead the investigators to the original source from whom he was getting the narcotics, and who was living in al-Bada'. An investigator accompanied him to buy two blocks of hashish. The third suspect went with his companion under close surveillance by the al-Fayha' investigative officer and his men, and they saw the fourth suspect bringing a sack and handing it to the investigator, whom he believed wanted to buy it. At this point the investigators raided the place and arrested the fourth suspect along with the third, and seized the sack, in which there were two blocks of hashish. Upon searching the place, they found 14 other blocks of hashish underneath a water tank on the ground. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Sep 80 p 7] 8559

FOUR MAN NARCOTICS RING--Agents of the anti-narcotics squad in the Bureau of Criminal Investigations were able to seize four men charged with partaking of and possessing narcotics. A quantity of narcotic pills was found in their possession. They are: Shihatah, Fawzi, 'Abd al-Mun'im and 'Ali. The director of the Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Lt Col Fahd al-Fahd, pointed to the fact that the accused men were involved in the possession, partaking of, and sale of drugs. An apartment was raided, and three of the accused were arrested. Following a search, the first was discovered to have in his possession 30 pills of the drug "mandrax." Twenty similar pills were found to be in the possession of the second. The third was found to have 13 pills as well. All of the accused said that they bought the pills from the fourth man, through the third man. Upon his arrest, the fourth man confessed to selling quantities of the pills to the third accused man. He said he acquired these pills from someone about whom he knew nothing. The four accused men have been turned over for questioning. [Excerpt] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 4 Sep 80 p 4] 9614

CSO: 4802

LEBANON

BRIEFS

MARIJUANA CROP YIELD--Yesterday the harvesting of the green hashish crop began in the Ba'labak-al-Harmal area and in the Biqa' in general. This narcotic plant occupies the greater part of the region's farmlands, and its production takes priority, especially these days, because of the incidents and the prevailing security chaos. This year's crop differs from those of previous years from the standpoint of the plant's growth and success, since it is more than 2 and 1/2 meters tall this year. The improvement this season was helped by the abundance of water and by the reliance on ground water resources for irrigation now that artesian wells have become widespread. A single dunum yields 2 to 3 qantars of green hashish, i.e. about 850 kilograms. A dunum will ensure the farmer from 1,000 to 1,800 Lebanese pounds depending on the yield. As for the workers' wages, they vary from 20 to 25 pounds a day for women and 30 to 35 pounds a day for men. In spite of the "flourishing" cultivation of hashish, there have been attempts to wipe out these farms, through the establishment of a potato cooperative farm in Ba'labak and another farm for yellow watermelon and pineapples in Dayr al-Ahmar, and a project to encourage the use of modern irrigation for vegetables. There is also a new project under study calling for importing a number of milk cows and distributing them to small farmers, on the condition that land be planted with fodder crops for this purpose. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 18 Sep 80 p 6] 8559

CSO: 5300

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

FOOD INSTEAD OF HEMP--The traditional ruler of Ezinifite in Aguata Local Government Area of Anambra State, Chief Stephen Ofomata, has warned those who grow Indian Hemp instead of food. Chief Ofomata, who was addressing the Ezinifite community during the celebration of the town's second new yam festival, observed that contrary to government's noble intention, some mischievous elements in the society had chosen to cultivate weed for commercial purposes. He drew the attention of those involved in the practice to a law prohibiting the growing and smoking of the weed in the country and warned that anybody caught violating the law in the town would be regarded as an enemy of progress. The traditional ruler appealed to the people of Ezinifite to co-operate with him in his effort to track down these wicked elements in their midst. He advised anyone who is in difficulty or has problems to approach him for fatherly advice. He, however, expressed dismay over the current trend of leaving farm work to the feeble and aged in the villages, and warned against its consequences. Chief Ofomata prayed for bumper harvest next year and asked God to spare the lives of all so they could join in the celebration of the next festival. In his own speech, the chairman of the occasion, Mr E. Umudu, thanked the people of Ezinifite as well as people who came from different parts of the federation to grace the occasion. He appealed to the people of Ezinifite to give their chief maximum co-operation so as to enable him deliver the goods to them.
 /Text/ /Enugu DAILY STAR in English 12 Sep 80 p 8/

STRICTER PENALTIES FOR DEALERS--A renowned psychiatric, Dr Bartha C.A. Johnson has called for stricter penalties for hemp-peddlers. Dr. Johnson maintained that such a measure would not only serve as a deterrent but also reduce the circulation of Indian hemp within the society. She made this suggestion in Abeokuta while contributing to a symposium titled: "Indian Hemp Abuse" under the auspices of the National Mental Health Association as part of activities to mark the Mental Health Week. Dr. Johnson who is a chief consultant at the Yaba Psychiatric Hospital in Lagos, observed that Indian hemp whether chewed, drunken or smoked could be injurious to health both mentally and physically. She held the view that about 70 percent of mental cases at the psychiatric Hospital were caused by hemp smoking, adding that smoking of the weed could also cause impotence. In his own contribution, Dr. Ona Soley, of the Department of sociology at the

University of Ibadan, maintained that some people indulging in hemp smoking nearly forget their problems which he added was always temporary. Dr. Soleyee blamed the social ills in the country like armed robbery to smoking of Indian hemp. He therefore suggested that an imprisonment of 20 to 25 years should be imposed on all culprits of hemp smoking. /Text/ /Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 7 Oct 80 p 5/

CSO: 5300

AUSTRIA

BRIEFS

DRUG RING HEAD ARRESTED—On 8 October, Austrian police arrested 50-year-old Canadian citizen Peter John Newall, the head of an international drug ring, in Taxenbach near Salzburg. Simultaneously, another 20 members of the ring were arrested in numerous other countries including Great Britain, Australia, Holland, New Zealand, Cyprus, United States, Italy and the FRG. The organization was completely smashed. Newall, his wife and his 27-year-old son Peter had come to Austria on 22 November 1979. Acting upon information from Canadian police, Austrian police placed the family under surveillance. It was established that Peter John Newall's organization operated on all continents, with his wife acting as "treasurer" and his son Peter as his right-hand man, while 10 "major lieutenants" were in charge of regional operations in various parts of the world. According to Austrian police, it is not believed that the gang supplied any drugs to the Austrian scene, as this would have meant an unnecessary risk for its operation. [AU141830 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 14 Oct 80 p 8]

CSO: 5300

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

POLICE FIND TONS OF HASHISH--According to a police announcement four tons of hashish have been found on a vessel under the Lebanese flag. The vessel had developed engine trouble and was towed into the old Limassol port yesterday. As a result of a search of the vessel, a large quantity of hashish was discovered. All eight crew members have been arrested; the crew included three Lebanese, two Italians, two Chileans and one Egyptian. [Text] [NC212132 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 2100 GMT 21 Oct 80]

CSO: 5300

DENMARK

HEALTH OFFICIAL URGES CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT ON YOUNGER DRUG ADDICTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Sep 80 pt II p 2

[Article by R.E. Knipschildt, chairman of the Society for Health Care of Denmark, chairman of the select committee under the Committee for Health Information and of the contact committee of the Health Administration on Alcohol and Narcotics Problems: "We Must Create a New Attitude Toward Drug Addiction"]

[Text] Five to 6000 persons of age 25 to 35 have been drug addicts for over 10 years. Treatment institutions have been unsuccessful in curing them and restoring them to normal life, and they constitute a group of very great risk.

When for over 10 years one has dealt with the drug problems of young people, the question of whether it is at all possible to combat this present-day evil in an effective way becomes increasingly urgent.

The sale of narcotics is so profitable a business, controlled by so clear-headed and cynical men that thus far it has been possible only to a limited extent to dam the massive importation of narcotics, in particular of heroin. As is known, this drug is effective in so small amounts that if only one kilogram of it enters the country it is a matter of sales of about 1 million kroner.

This explains why it is so difficult, not to say impossible, for customs officials and the police to win this game.

The former chief of the United States narcotics police expressed it as follows: Even if all U.S. military forces, on land, at sea, and the air, were engaged in the battle against importation of narcotics the fight could not be won.

The reduction in the amount of drugs offered for sale that is due to a particularly skillful effort by customs men and the police is thus not adequate to prevent the presence in our country of the drugs.

This is a state of affairs we must learn to live with for many years.

Another weapon in the struggle is reduction of the demand. This is what is being attempted through an extensive information and preventive effort in schools, youth clubs, and where youth gathers.

It seems justified to evaluate the effect of this positively since the increase of new young addicts has lessened to some degree.

This is gratifying, of course, but at the same time we are confronted by a group of 5-6 thousand persons, almost all of whom have been addicts for over 10 years, and who have not been successfully weaned away from drugs and rehabilitated by our treatment institutions.

These young people are now in the 25 to 35 age group and represent a very high risk group, a high mortality rate (over 100 deaths annually), and considerable social problems. Why has it thus far been possible to only a very limited extent to help these people?

There are probably several reasons. First and foremost, only few of them wish to be helped on the conditions presented to them. A number of them have been treated repeatedly in our treatment institutions, but after some time they have given up and gone back to drugs.

A report by county youth centers responsible for treatment in the counties states: "It is difficult to establish cooperation with the clientele." "Increasing age is one of the primary difficulties in presenting alternatives to this group. They feel they are too old to accept treatment in families, and they feel themselves to be too old to accept treatment from considerably younger pedagogues in institutions. "This group takes a very negative and rejecting attitude to alternatives offered."

In brief, this means that the treatment institutions do not reach the clients and are unable to engage them in cooperation. It is clear that as concerns treatment the best chance of obtaining a reasonably good result is found among the younger, well motivated clients with short addiction careers.

In an article in MAN, DRUGS AND SOCIETY Peter Ege states: "Increasingly, the clients say that the street institutions have become 'institutionalized' in all the negative meanings of the word, that they are being treated as by guardians, from above downward, and that they no longer care about them. A tendency reinforced by the constantly narrowing entrance doors of the institutions, abandonment of contact centers, limiting of open hours, and visiting procedures being made inhuman and bureaucratized. Where can an addict turn in the evening or at night and be well received?"

I have also seen the institutions becoming better at ejecting or turning away the clients, often because of lacking motivation and noncompliance with arbitrarily selected criteria, but in reality because clients who do not present their motivation on a silver tray or cannot adjust to the narrow criteria often are the most difficult to treat and the most "ungrateful" and work with them produces the poorest results. This means that the clients most in need of treatment are turned away from or out of the institutions and left to themselves in the most deviant environments or in the traditional caretaking institutions--the state hospitals or prisons. Here I should like to reiterate that just these existentialistically oriented forms of treatment, with their often unrealistically high demands upon the clients, serve to justify this process of separation of the clientele.

J. Lange Jacobsen ("Treatment of Deviants") has in some more general comments on the social clientele stated that "the capacity (or perhaps the quality) is not available to cover the need for help," and that therefore the most "promising" cases are given priority, which introduces a "worthiness criterium" in attending to the clients. Further, he states that an unrealistically high goal in client treatment in some cases is "not only inadequate but counterproductive by the mere fact that, as already mentioned, one deprives the addict of his legal rights by rejecting him, so that he does not receive the help we postulate he has the right to."

Unless drastic changes are made in the organization and basic philosophy of the treatment institutions and the youth centers it is a question whether treatment of the older addicts should remain the responsibility of these institutions. With their present structure and treatment possibilities, it seems at times a waste of time, effort and money to work with the older addicts within this framework.

We are much in need of alternative methods of treatment for this unhappy group of people. But one of the problems is that such new efforts to satisfy requirements are particularly demanding, as concerns both treatment and financing.

At the present time a proposal is before the Copenhagen City Council involving experimentally reinforcing socio-pedagogic treatment with methadon for shorter or longer periods, thereby stopping the addicts' criminal acquisition of money for drugs and keeping them in a treatment situation.

Every day we receive appeals for help from hard hit addicts and their relatives. For them all ways out seem closed, leaving only crime, which sooner or later takes them behind prison bars, causing grief to the addict and an unreasonable load upon the prison system.

Forced treatment of such persons has been tried in some countries, but without convincing results. Since the treatment in itself is so difficult and demanding it makes necessary to a high degree the personal involvement of and acceptance by the addict, which is hardly obtained by force. We must thoroughly review our entire philosophy of treatment and try to discover which groups of addicts our system can help and try to discover alternative methods for others. Alternative methods refers also to other measures, perhaps not involving treatment in the traditional sense on the basis of the assumption that certain addicts are in fact untreatable, at least in their present situation. These are often characterized by abandonment of hope, resentment of society's offers of help, and in both social and psychic respects in very poor situations. A long period of life outside of general social rules has put its stamp on them in the form of asocial patterns of behavior and low demands for a life content. The sooner we acknowledge that this untreatability exists in certain cases the better. In such cases one helps the addict much more by making society's assistance apparatus available to him first and foremost for the purpose of decriminalizing him and humanizing his existence.

Today, if they refuse treatment offered them, they are in practice deprived of some of the rights and obligations other social groups enjoy by virtue of social legislation. This causes many of them to see only a choice between drug addiction and an, to them, inadequate offer of treatment.

It should also be considered in which situations the older drug addicts should be offered pensions as invalids, and, finally, what types of institutions should be used in cases when, without being on the road to rehabilitation and resocialization, they have need of institutional care.

I know that this whole question is very sensitive. Ideological, political, and economic points of view easily make the debate diffuse, but I believe we must throw ourselves into it. After all these years of uncertainty and experiments the time has arrived to find an attitude toward these problems. Svend Heinild's words in his critique of the book "Treatment of Deviants," are still applicable: "Only thirty years have passed since the question of attempting to bring concord between the aspirations of the deviants and the practical possibilities of realizing them lay beyond the range of the daily debate.

The deviant was regarded, and still is to some degree, as an isolated individual--an objective of treatment or punishment. His existence, in the more immaterial sense as a social being, was left out of consideration."

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DENMARK

POLICE CRACK ALGERIAN DRUG GANG WHICH SMUGGLED HASHISH

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Anders Wiig]

[Text] Suicide pilots, that's what the Copenhagen narcotics police call a gang of hashish couriers who walked one after the other into traps set by the police and customs officials at Kastrup Airport over the last 8 weeks. All are unemployed Algerians hired by professional gang leaders in Paris and London to smuggle several hundred kilograms of hashish to the Danish and Swedish markets from Karachi, Pakistan.

They were called suicide pilots because they always turned up with their suitcases filled to the brim with 15 kilograms of hashish--unconcealed, simply wrapped in something like Bjorn Wiinblad gift wrap, but never cleverly hidden out of sight in double bottoms, lids or tucked into the sides of the suitcases.

Big Hauls

Since 12 August the Copenhagen narcotics police have cracked an extensive hashish gang which in the opinion of the police is led by three or four Algerians. As of now the gang is accused of smuggling in several hundred kilograms of hashish. The police are investigating the possibility that this goes back to 1978 when Algerian hashish smugglers apparently took over smuggling operations after a Danish-Pakistani gang. Since then 42 Algerians have been detained and a half ton of hashish has been seized.

The latest wave of arrests included two Danes and 19 Algerian couriers and gang leaders--arrested in Copenhagen and in Paris. It started at Kastrup on 12 August. A suitcase aroused suspicion when it was delivered to the passenger luggage office by one southerner, picked up shortly afterward by another and finally brought back by a Dane. The police kept an eye on the baggage office and arrested three Algerians who came to pick up the suitcase for the second time. It contained 350,000 kroner. The same amount of money was found in their rented car along with false passports and a pistol. One of the Algerians was going to travel to Geneva to hand the money over to one of the leaders of a hashish gang dominated by Algerians. He went under the name of "Mr Interpol," lived in London but traveled frequently between London, Copenhagen, Paris, Geneva and Karachi.

Mr Interpol Seized in Paris

The same thing happened to two other gang leaders the police found out about in an intense secret investigation, the details of which are being withheld pending court proceedings. Several hundred kilograms of hashish, almost 1.5 million kroner and 18 couriers ended up in the hands of the police after airport seizures and raids in Copenhagen. The couriers turned up one after another with suitcases full of hashish without suspecting that the gang had been found out.

The police know that the couriers were to get 50,000 kroner for a successful smuggling trip with 15 kilograms of hashish at a "retail price" of 600,000 kroner. The starting point was a hotel in Karachi where gang leaders often had a dozen couriers sitting and waiting for a trip. When it was their turn, they were told to go to Karachi Airport where they were shown a suitcase brought on board by corrupt officials. The couriers saw the suitcase in Kastrup when they arrived and their job was to take it to someone else. But in 18 instances the trip ended up at the police station.

The police know the gang leaders suspected each other and the couriers of cheating when one shipment after another disappeared. So did one of the gang leaders when he came to Copenhagen from London to pick up some money. Thus it took a long time before they discovered that the police had been rounding up the gang leaders. Those working on the case also know that leaders had cynically counted on losing a certain percentage of couriers and shipments. In addition those who had been arrested were kept in total isolation while they were being detained.

On Thursday Mr Interpol was arrested at the Apollo Hotel in Paris just after he arrived by plane from Africa--and after he had received special delivery letters from Copenhagen and London containing two false ID cards. It was requested that he be turned over to Denmark and his position on the charge is still not known. On the same day four suspects were detained in Copenhagen and in a cellar in Osterbro the police found 240,000 kroner hidden in a plastic bag.

6578
CSO: 5300

FINLAND

PHYSICIAN SAYS FAKED PRESCRIPTIONS WERE FOR OWN USE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 20 Sep 80 p 18

[Article: "Doctor Wrote 650 Prescriptions: 'I Used All the Drugs Myself'"]

[Text] The female doctor imprisoned on Thursday by the Helsinki criminal police has confessed under interrogation that she herself used all the drugs she received on the over 650 prescriptions she wrote.

According to her statement, she must have used about 16,000 strong doses of morphine during the last 5 years.

"It seems impossible," say the police and the Central Medical Board.

The drug section of the criminal police imprisoned a female doctor of the surgical department of a Helsinki hospital. According to the investigations, the doctor had written a total of 664 drug prescriptions during the last 5 years.

She wrote 318 "pro auctore" prescriptions for herself, and 346 prescriptions in the name of another person.

With the prescriptions the doctor received over 8 liters of morphine, 6,300 Dolorex tablets, and almost 500 milliliters of the drug Petidin.

Under interrogation she persistently claimed that she used the drugs herself. According to that she would have had to use 16,008 half-milliliter doses of morphine, in addition to other things. Morphine doses for medicinal use start at 0.2 milliliters, for example.

According to her claim, the doctor must have used 4 milliliters of morphine every day.

"It seems impossible. No proof of the woman's explanation was found during the investigation," says section head Unto Vuono of the Helsinki criminal police.

The police are not yet prepared to state whether or not the doctor may have sold some drugs to others.

Drugs Stored at Home

Morphine is a narcotic drug, and the doctor apparently wrote also some prescriptions for cancer and asthma medicines, among others, in an effort to mislead so that no attention would be paid to the drug prescriptions.

She kept the medicines at home. In a house search, the police found at the doctor's home dozens of kilos of these medicines, some of which were already too old [to use].

The doctor explained during the investigation that the person in whose name she wrote some of the prescriptions suffered from cancer. According to the investigation, this claim is not true. The person does not exist, but according to Vuono the person has nothing to do with the matter.

Discovered Already in 1977

Office manager Antti Marttila of the general office of the administrative section of the Central Medical Board says that the imprisoned doctor was caught during an inspection by the Medical Board already in 1977, but the doctor was able to give a satisfactory explanation for the drug prescriptions at that time.

Now the doctor has been caught again, but this time the Central Medical Board is not reacting favorably to her explanations.

"We let the police investigate the matter, because we thought that drug offenses might be involved."

Vuono says that the Dolorex scandal uncovered last summer is continuing to spread. Prescriptions written for 300,000 Dolorex tablets have been uncovered so far.

According to this, over 10 million marks have been spent on Dolorex in street sales, but the amounts will still increase as the affair keeps growing the more the investigation progresses.

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CSO: 5300

FINLAND

BRIEFS

FEWER YOUTH ON DRUGS--A poll of recruits shows that the use of narcotics by youth has clearly decreased. Of those inducted last spring, 9.2 percent had used drugs at least once. According to the corresponding poll made by the research section of the Social and Health Ministry in 1971, the percentage of drug users was 16.2 percent. The use of drugs continues to be concentrated in Southern Finland. Eleven point one percent of the group from Southern Finland and 2.6 of the group from Northern Finland reported having used drugs. Most of the use of drugs represented experimentation out of curiosity, however: about 60 percent of the "users" had tried drugs only once. The drug experimented with was almost always one of the cannabis preparations, hashish or marijuana. About 16 percent of the experimenters had used thinner or some other solvent. Researcher Markku Heinonen observes that the results from recruits cannot be directly generalized to use by youth in general. Those that work with young drug users have, however, observed the same direction of development since the beginning of the 1970's, the use of drugs among the youth has decreased noticeably. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Sep 80 p 12] 9611

CSO: 5300

FRANCE

BRIEFS

DRUG SEIZURES NOTED--Between 1 and 13 August, 500 kilograms of various drugs worth 26 million francs were seized by French customs personnel. The Finance Ministry points out that these seizures, which did not occur in Paris alone, are the largest since 1972. At the border between France and Spain, Perthus customs officials uncovered more than 220 kilos of cannabis resin, while in Marseilles, 79 kilos of liquid cannabis were seized, and 85 kilos in Toulouse-Blagnac. Also, maintenance workers in the SNCF [French railroads] shop at Oulins (Rhone) found 4 kilos of Indian hemp worth 60,000 francs in one of the cars of the "Corail" train linking Amsterdam to Paris. In Spain, according to AFP [FRENCH PRESS AGENCY], 1.222 kilo of extremely pure heroin, which could have been used to produce 80,000 doses, was found in a Madrid apartment. A couple was arrested. Also as reported AFP, Yugoslav customs officials have, since the beginning of the year, seized 259 kilos of heroin and 1.2 ton of hashish. In 1979 only 34 kilos of heroin had been seized on Yugoslav soil. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 17-18 Aug 80 p 5] 11936

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ITALY

BRIEFS

UNEMPLOYED HEROIN ADDICT ARRESTED--Sandro Frau di Quartu, an unemployed youth 19 years old, was arrested yesterday for possessing drugs: he was found to be in possession of 380 milligrams of heroin which the police considered to be more than a "small quantity" and therefore for personal use. With the expression, "small quantity," the 1975 Antidrug Law opened the way to ambiguous interpretations: this is shown by sentences which, from time to time, absolve or condemn drug addicts from whom small quantities of drugs have been confiscated. Sandro Frau was arrested by agents of the police department's narcotics squad; he was traveling with three friends in an automobile when stopped for inspection in Viale Marconi. After a thorough search he was found in possession of the heroin which, wrapped in tinfoil, he was carrying in a pocket of his blue jeans. Taken to the police station, the youth maintained that he was a drug addict and had purchased the drug in Selargius. [Text] [Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 25 Sep 80 p 5] 8568

INTERNATIONAL DRUG 'COURIER' EXPELLED--Sassari, 27 September--An international drug "courier" was expelled from the country this morning shortly after being released from the Alghero territorial prison. A police car was waiting at the exit to transfer the "courier," Singaram Kerisnan, a Malaysian citizen, 30 years of age, immediately to the offices of the foreign division of the town's police department. Singaram Kerisnan had been arrested by the Genoa police in January 1977; stopped at the port for normal inspection, he had been found to be in possession of 3 kg of pure heroin valued at more than 3 billion lire. [Text] [Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 28 Sep 80 p 11] 8568

HEROIN SEIZED IN NAPLES--A Fedelissima patrol arrested Aniello Benestare (32 years old, of Torre del Greco) and Antonio Conte (40 years of age, of Castellammare) in San Giorgio a Cremano. Upon seeing the officers, the two had fled, scattering the contents of some small envelopes in the street. However, one of the "packets" was recovered and was found to contain 1 gram of heroin. [Excerpt] [Naples IL MATTINO in Italian 26 Sep 80 p 15] 8568

ARRESTS IN ITALY--Three Frenchmen were arrested in Italy on Friday, 15 August as they were leaving a bar reputed to be a drug users' hangout. Patrice Badin, 29, of Longue (Maine-et-Loire), Pierre-Didier Mathieu, 27, of Paris, and Yves-Alain Pensa, 35, of Nimes were found in possession of several doses of cocaine and heroin. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 17-18 Aug 80 p 5] 11936

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NORWAY

DISORDER IN IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR CHEAP HEROIN WAVE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] The turbulent political situation in Iran has led to a breakdown in control over the illegal drug trade and the country will very probably be the world's biggest heroin producer this year.

The chief of the Oslo police force's narcotics division, Arne Huuse, told NTB [NORWEGIAN PRESS AGENCY] that on the basis of reports from international contacts.

Up to 2 years ago the Chinese dominated the illegal narcotics market in Europe with shipments of heroin from the so-called Golden Triangle, Thailand, Burma and Laos.

"Now most of the heroin comes from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan which constitute an important new triangle. Suppliers from that area are now delivering drugs at outright dumping prices to outcompete the Chinese heroin syndicates and that is perhaps the most disturbing thing about this development," Huuse said.

"With that kind of price drop there is an overwhelming danger that addicts will find it easier to go over to the use of a harder drug, heroin which would lead to a further increase in the number of drug-related deaths," Huuse said.

In several recent narcotics cases the Norwegian narcotics police have been given clear indications that international drug rings are increasingly operating their own routes to Norway and that they probably see the Norwegian market as a very attractive one due to a traditional high price level. These are professional profiteers who do not belong to the addict scene.

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NORWAY

AREA NARCOTICS POLICE CHIEF DETAILS NEW DRUG ROUTES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 25 Sep 80 p 9

[Text] Oslo and the Ostland area in general are no longer the only ports of entry for narcotics entering Norway. "We have a number of examples of smuggling routes that go directly from the continent to places like Sorland, Vestland and North Norway," the chief of the national central narcotics division, Police Inspector Arne Huuse, told NTB [NORWEGIAN PRESS AGENCY].

There have also been other marked changes in narcotics supplies. The price paid for drugs in this country is remarkably high compared with the prices in the rest of Europe. This makes Norway attractive to the more professional suppliers who don't belong to the drug abuse scene themselves.

NTB has learned that several recent cases provided clear indications that international narcotics rings have their own contacts in Norway. In the past it was more common for Norwegians to travel to the big narcotics centers to buy drugs. At the same time the addict milieu has become more brutal and harder for the police to penetrate.

Although heroin sales are now a daily occurrence throughout the country the smuggling of hashish is still widespread. According to the police there are strong indications that a new "hash wave" has arrived in this country. Hashish is the drug young people usually come in contact with first.

Police Inspector Huuse also said that the police are noting a rise in the supplies of cocaine which is mainly smuggled in from the cultivation areas in South America via Spain to the rest of Europe. Morphine and speed (amphetamines) are still being sold extensively.

Police Inspector Arne Huuse said Tuesday that they are noting a substantial reduction in the price of heroin because suppliers from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan are trying to outcompete Chinese heroin syndicates in an effort to knock them out of the European market altogether.

"I am not ruling out the possibility that this could affect the narcotics situation in Norway. A price war with heroin being sold at prices far below normal increases the risk that more addicts will go over to the dangerous drug," said Huuse.

In Denmark the price of heroin has gone down to 1000 kroner per gram. In this country, by comparison, the price is ten times that. One gram provides 32 doses each costing 3-400 kroner.

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SWEDEN

GANG OF THAI, SWEDISH DRUG SMUGGLERS CHARGED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Sep 80 p 12

[Article by Leif Dahlin]

[Text] A Thai and Swedish drug ring managed to sell heroin worth over 10 million kronor on the Stockholm market before being exposed. Six Thais and four Swedes were indicted Monday by prosecuting attorney, Bernt Adamsson of Stockholm's District Court. The heroin was smuggled in specially made shoes. A large portion of the profit was deposited in Swiss banks.

One of the principle figures, a Thai, began smuggling heroin to Sweden back in 1978. He was in collusion with a shoemaker in Bangkok who "sewed" the heroin shipments into newly made platform shoes.

It was in 1978 that the Thai and a fellow-countryman smuggled in the first shipment of 400 grams. Over 6 kilograms of heroin was smuggled to Sweden in this manner, a part at a time. In most cases the courier traveled by air from Bangkok by way of Copenhagen to Arlanda.

This May, two of the Thai couriers were apprehended. They were attempting to smuggle 70,000 kronor out of the country, a part of the profit from sold narcotics. They had hidden the money in a cigarette carton.

One of those arrested had smuggled part of the profit to Switzerland. It is suspected that hundreds of thousands of kronor have been deposited into accounts there. One of the couriers bought a gold bar, which was placed in a Swiss safe-deposit box. It has been delivered to the police here.

The contacts in Sweden were two Swedes who distributed the drugs to solvent buyers. Two of the larger hotels in downtown Stockholm were used as meeting places for the deals.

Drugs valued at over a million kronor have been confiscated. The ring leader's profits from the drug sales are estimated to be around 800,000 kronor. For this reason the prosecuting attorney has requested that the sale of the Thai's row house in Sigtuna be prohibited. When the man's house was searched, 38,100 kronor in cash and a bankbook with tens of thousands of kronor on deposit were found. It is believed that those closest to the ring leader made at least 400,000 kronor. Bankbooks, gold watches, a gold medal and a gold bar have been confiscated.

With confessions from several of the gang members and physical evidence, the prosecuting attorney has enough material so that all the gang members will be convicted. The ring leaders may expect long prison sentences.

The prosecutor will request that all the Thais be deported.

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SWEDEN

COURT GIVES STIFF SENTENCES TO TURKISH DRUG SMUGGLERS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by Claes von Hofsten]

[Text] Last Wednesday the sentences of both principle figures in the Turkish drug ring that was exposed last winter in Stockholm were upheld by the Svea Court of Appeals. According to the sentences, 36-year-old Naif Durak and 27-year-old Tefvik Seker will serve 10- and 9-year prison terms respectively before being permanently deported from Sweden.

The other three main figures in the ring, which smuggled 8.5 kilograms of heroin into Sweden, had their sentences reduced somewhat. One had his sentence reduced from 8 to 7 years in prison and another received a reduction from 6 to 5 years. The third member had his 8-year sentence upheld but was spared the deportation sentence handed down by the district court.

The court of appeals felt that since he had come to Sweden as a child and had attended school primarily in Sweden, then in accordance with the new alien laws he should be considered sufficiently adjusted to Sweden that he should remain here even if he is guilty of crimes.

The district court concluded in its sentence that the five should pay the state a total of 3.8 million kronor, corresponding to the profit made in the heroin trade. The court of appeals reduced the sum to 2.2 million kronor, although only a half million has been secured. The court of appeals decided that the state would pay the extensive court costs.

Altogether, 19 people in the ring have been sentenced. One of them will request a new trial in the near future. Among other things, he was convicted of once having smuggled 3.7 kilograms of heroin into the country. He confessed to this under interrogation, but he later withdrew his confession and has subsequently denied committing the crime.

He also appealed the conviction, but the court of appeals also convicted him of smuggling. After the conviction had gained legal force, this same smuggling episode came up in connection with the trial of the five gang leaders. It was deemed proper to divide up the trial of the 19 into separate trials.

Even if the request results in a new trial and an acquittal, the man will probably not escape punishment. In addition to smuggling, he was also convicted for possessing 1 kilogram of heroin and for illegal firearms possession.

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SWEDEN

GANG SMUGGLED HEROIN FROM THAILAND

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] At least 10 years' wages--this was what the drug smugglers earned for one trip from Bangkok to Stockholm and back. The heroin was smuggled in hollow platform shoes. Money was smuggled on the return trip.

This was revealed when yet another drug ring was brought to trial Monday at Stockholm's District Court. The gang members are accused of a total of 17 drug smuggling trips to Sweden with heroin from Thailand. It is estimated that they have brought a total of 5 kilograms of heroin worth many millions to drug users in Stockholm.

As early as last fall the police received an anonymous tip from Thailand that two Thais with business in the Stockholm region were involved in heroin trade.

After half a year of surveillance, the police believed that the time was right to step in. A Thai couple that had arrived in Sweden several days earlier was apprehended as they were about to return by plane from Arlanda. They had hidden 150,000 kronor in a package of toys.

The money was apparently a partial payment for delivered drugs. The arrest at Arlanda was soon followed by others in the Stockholm region. By Monday a total of ten persons had been charged.

The gang leader in Thailand entrusted the smuggling missions only to his relatives and lovers. The payment was 50,000 kronor plus spending money. An average worker's wages in Bangkok is 4,000 kronor per year.

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END