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1980

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JPRS L/9354

20 October 1980

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 693

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF OAU INTERVIEWED ON THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT

LD071257 London THE TIMES in English 7 Oct 80 Europa Supplement p 1

[Interview with Edem Kodjo, secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity, by Gerard Viratelle; no place or date given]

[Excerpt] [Question] How do you view the economic situation in the Third World in general and in Africa in particular?

[Answer] There are more and more dangers. Inflation is running on. Unemployment is getting worse. The poor countries' balance-of-payments deficit in 1980 could be as much as \$700,000M [Africa's share being \$44,000M], whereas the oil-exporting countries' combined surplus is likely to be 110,000 million pounds. At the same time, the industrialized countries' official development aid is 0.36 percent of GNP this year and likely to be no more than 0.35 percent by 1990.

The situation in Africa is especially tragic. The World Bank has described it as close to catastrophe. It calculates that the African countries average annual growth rate during the period 1980-90 will be no more than 1.1 percent.

Africa is still a poor continent, ravaged by natural disasters and famine. Its population will have doubled by the year 2000 and it is likely that it will then be able to meet only 60 percent of its food requirements. Africa has about 70 million unemployed, the shortest life expectancy and the highest mortality rate. How will it be able to survive under these conditions, especially if it also suffers losses of export trade?

[Question] What solutions do you have for remedying this situation?

[Answer] Two development decades have yielded only very limited results for the majority of the peoples of the Third World. It is clearly necessary to make a fresh start--not to try to make something of past efforts but completely to reverse the course followed over the past two decades.

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In Africa's case it is necessary to bring a new approach to the problem of development which does not rely on global negotiations and the north-south dialogue, however important or even essential they may be.

Africa has very substantial resources. It has outstanding proved potential. But its output is extraverted, geared to supplying foreign markets rather than to meeting the needs of its populations. This situation must be reversed.

The African economies need to be reorganized so that the emphasis is placed on local consumption and satisfaction of essential needs (food, housing, health, and so on). Every one claims to be giving priority to food and agriculture, but this is not so. There is therefore a need for a major shift in the pattern of investment.

[Question] Is not this the philosophy behind the programme for African development adopted by the conference of heads of state at Lagos in April 1980?

[Answer] Lagos reflects our choice of the type of society in which we wish to live. This was an occasion on which Africa resolutely opted for a courageous policy of change. It made up its mind to aim for "endogenous" or "autocentric" development, in other words a new form of development.

The action programme adopted by the heads of state defines the ways and means of achieving national and collective self-sufficiency. This programme has become a reference document for the international development strategy to be pursued during the third decade. How it works out in practice will depend largely on what is done by individual countries, but progress will be evaluated on a continuing basis.

[Question] Do you also consider it desirable to apply a regional economic policy and to set up regional groupings?

[Answer] This is becoming increasingly essential in order to bring a new approach to the problem of poverty, getting away from the "catch up at all costs" attitude. After 20 years of independence, little progress has been made in this sphere. There is no coherent regional development.

One of the themes of the Lagos programme is the need to take account of regional realities. This will entail the formation of regional economic groupings over the period running up to the year 2000. This objective will be presented during the political debates in the OAU.

We have to go beyond a customs union, such as that in East Africa, and build a genuine trade community making for the establishment of an African economic community. Such an approach is not only constructive from the development viewpoint, but it should also be conducive to a better north-south dialogue.

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[Question] And the Elysee's proposals for a "trilogue" on European Arab and African cooperation?

[Answer] The ideas were well received this year by the African heads of state meeting in Nice with President Giscard D'Estaing. At the African summit held in Freetown a little later a number of countries called for further examination to be made of these proposals. This task was entrusted to the secretariat of the OAU which should be submitting its conclusions by next February.

[Question] In New York you were very harsh in your judgment of the oil-producing countries, stating among other things that no purpose was served by raising one objection after another to get out of cooperation over energy, or by trying at all costs to link this difficulty to the problems of commodities and multi-lateral negotiations.

You also suggested that an examination should be made of the possibility of setting up a collective guarantee system which would reassure the holders of financial surpluses and help to recycle these surpluses. Would this be enough to help the poorest countries, many of which are in Africa?

[Answer] The oil-producing countries are not doing what needs to be done. Most of them--at least those with financial surpluses--are devoting well above 1 percent of their GNP to aid (the average for the OPEC countries is 5 percent in 1980 and they are setting up machinery for increasing their development aid still farther). But the African countries have been left reeling by the successive oil price increases and they cannot wait.

We do not blame the oil-producing countries for starting the crisis. But they have made it worse. Nor do we say that they are wrong--on the contrary, we support their action. But their right to sell their raw materials at a high price must be matched by obligations. This is why we are calling for more coherent and more rational energy cooperation. States should operate in the market so that recycling is not left mainly to private interests.

[Question] Do you take hope from the text of the strategy for the third development decade in the 1980's?

[Answer] It is a general document which does not go far enough. In many countries, such as in Africa, efforts are being made to evolve a new style of development. The strategy defines general objectives and sets out quantitative data. It is a conventional document which does not challenge the accepted development models, some of which are copied from the West.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PRC AID TO TAZARA REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2201

[Text] China has granted a new loan of \$13 million to Tanzania and Zambia to insure the proper operation of Tazara, a railroad belonging to both countries, which is in virtual bankruptcy.

This loan, granted under the same conditions as the one which made possible the building of the railroad from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian "Copperbelt," would make possible the purchase of spare parts for the rolling stock.

The agreement was reached at the end of August, in the course of the talks between China and the two co-owners and is included in a third cooperation agreement between China and Tazara, Gen Kingsley Chinkuli, Zambian minister of transports, energy and communications, pointed out on 1 September.

The agreement which was concluded on 30 August stipulates that China will assign technicians starting with this month to consider Tazara's requirements and plan the repairs of its stock.

China will let Tanzania and Zambia purchase new diesel engines to rebuild in West Germany the locomotive engines for the 1,860 kilometers-long railroad. Originally, these locomotive engines were powered by West German diesels.

Furthermore, technical aid provided by West Germany will be used to purchase 14 other locomotive engines for Tazara, 7 of which in each country.

The \$360 million loan for the building of the Tazara will be repayable, interest free, over a 30-year period, starting with 1983, and after a 10-year grace period. Since its inauguration, 4 years ago, Tazara has lost \$25 million, General Chinkuli stated last month.

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In turn, returning from Lusaka, where he had attended a conference of representatives of China, Zambia and Tanzania, Augustino Mwingira, Tanzanian minister of communications and transports, announced that Beijing was dispatching immediately 150 experts to join the 400 Chinese technicians and interpreters currently working on the Tazara.

Furthermore, China, which will be selling Tazara spare parts at reduced prices, has agreed to allow the company to make purchases from other countries as well.

Finally, China will dispatch representatives of locomotive engine industries to help to improve Tazara locomotive engines which are no longer giving full satisfaction.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

REPRESENTATIVE AT OIC--Angola has decided to create in London the post of representative at the International Coffee Organization (OIC). A joint decree issued by the Ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Relations says that this representative will be posted at the Angolan Embassy in Great Britain when the latter will be officially accredited. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 2374]

NEW VICE-MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS--The Angolan head of state has just completed his government with the appointment of 4 deputy ministers in the fields of construction, communications and health, it was officially announced in Luanda on 12 September. Jose Eduardo dos Santos appointed Lucinio Tavares Ribeiro to the post of deputy minister of communications, replacing Ilideo Alves Machado. Two deputy ministers were appointed in the field of construction: Luis Manuel Fonseca Santos and Amilcar Pimentel Aguiar; the latter will be in charge of material for construction. Dos Santos also appointed Flavio Joao Fernandes deputy minister of health, while the post of deputy provincial commissioner for Bango [as published] will be temporarily occupied by Jacinto Pascual Fortunato. With the exception of the post of deputy minister of communications and transportation, the other appointments are of a more technical nature--as noted in Luanda--a fact which is emphasized still further by the character of the new members of the Angolan government. Indeed, most of them are technocrats who had been working in those same ministries for a long time. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 2374]

ODP ANNIVERSARY--The People's Defense Organization (ODP) celebrated on 13 September the fifth anniversary of its establishment, under the chairmanship of its general commandant Lt Col Paiva Domingos da Silva, deputy minister of defense and member of the MPLA central committee. In a message to the ODP, the Angolan head of state noted that this "paramilitary structure" is of paramount significance to the security of the state and constitutes "a reliable auxiliary of the regular People's Armed Forces (FAPLA)," "for the defense of the motherland's sovereignty and integrity." The ODP, whose ranks are mostly made up of workers and peasants, numbers many hundreds of thousands of members, 20 percent of whom are women contributing to a great variety of tasks such as the custody of official buildings and the fight against smuggling, black marketeering and speculation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 2374]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

PRESIDENT'S POSITION 'REMAINS TERRIBLY UNSTABLE'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Sep 80 p 15

[Article by Franco's Soudan: "Dacko At the Bar"]

[Text] Following is a short letter sent by David Dacko, president of the Central African Republic, to Henri Maidou, vice president of the same republic: "I ask you to submit your resignation." The brief answer was: "No, and this is not how it will be!"

In effect, this was not the way it took place: After two fruitless attempts to insure the peaceful removal of his number two, on Friday 22 August, in the evening, David Dacko signed a decree relieving Henri Maidou of his functions. On the same occasion, Prime Minister Bernard Christian Ayandho, whose departure was demanded in the streets, was also dismissed.

That is how, for the time being at least, the political crisis which had been paralyzing the country since the dissolution of the public salvation government, at the beginning of July (J. No 1022) was resolved. Henri Maidou, the very ambitious former prime minister under Bokassa, and the very unpopular Bernard Christian Ayandho, whose head carried a price in the poor districts of the capital, vanished in the trap of lost illusions.

Why? "Paris no longer wanted them," it is being said in Bangui. This is a concise formula but quite accurate. Certainly, it is true that, for a while, the Elysee was tempted to play the Moidou trump. Here some people still think that the ex-vice president was the only one to have the "stature of a statesman." Finally, however, notice was taken of his lack of popularity to the point that Valery Giscard d'Estaing's councillor for African affairs, Martin Kirsch, had gone in person to Bangui at the beginning of August to ask for Moidou's head. Furthermore, no one ignores the fact that nothing, or hardly anything, takes place in Central Africa in opposition to France which is still keeping there some 1,000 paratroopers.

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The French pressure, however, was not determining in the summit sweep which has just shaken the country. A confidential document signed by a dozen new ministers, members of the government since July, was, in fact, sent at the end of August to President Dacko. In this long letter those known as the "young Turks" of the system--mostly greedy technocrats--had expressed their "concern" at the persistent social agitation and their will to "treat the root of the evil," i.e., to see Maidou and Ayandho disappear from the political stage. Otherwise, naturally, regretfully, they would be forced to submit their own resignations. This factual ultimatum unquestionably swept off the last presidential hesitations.

In terms of David Dacko this blunt operation, his "barracuda," could turn out to be politically profitable. Sylvestre Bangui, minister of foreign affairs, a person with contacts among the opposition, factually becomes man number two of the system.

In the middle term, however, the position of the Central African president remains terribly unstable. Ayandho and Maidou had focused upon themselves the frustrations of the common people whose daily life, one year after Bokassa's fall, remains dramatically precarious. Deprived of his scapegoats, David Dacko will no longer be able to dodge the blows.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

ENERGY STRAIGHTENING PLAN--The directors of the National Energy Company (SNE) met on 11 August under the chairmanship of R. Adada, minister of mines and energy. The directors examined the plan for the recovery of the SNE which stipulates the following: the implementation of immediate measures, policy, and targets for 1982 to 1986 and a financial plan covering the same period. The plan includes a certain number of general recommendations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Aug 80 p 2146] 5157

SOVIET CEMENT DONATION--A donation of 1,000 tons of cement was presented on 29 August to the Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC) by the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions. The cement will be used for the building of a complex for workers' training in Central Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2198] 5157

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

VICE PRESIDENT ESCAPES ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Aug 80 p 23

[Unsigned article: "One No 2 Too Many"]

[Text] The second vice president seems to have escaped an assassination attempt during the night of 18 July. A military man armed with a machine gun seems to have attempted at that time to get into the well-guarded house of Eulogio Oyo Riqueza, the No 3 man in the regime and president of the military tribunal which had passed judgment on ex-president Macias in September 1979.

In Malabo, where on 3 August the first anniversary of the "Tiger's" fall was celebrated quietly, discretion regarding this matter is the order of the day. Oyo Riqueza is regarded as a rival of the first vice president, Florencio Maye Ela.

Indeed everything sets the two men apart. Oyo Riqueza is a Bubi, the ethnic group mistreated by Macias Nguema; Maye Ela, the former dictator's nephew, is a Fang like him. Oyo Riqueza and Maye Ela took part in the coup and are both members of the Supreme Military Council. But the former left his guarded residence to fight against Macias, while Maye Ela remained almost to the end in the dictator's entourage. The last difference is that Maye Ela is building up a budding concentration of economic power around him, in particular thanks to Spanish-Guinean joint ventures (CEPSA [Spanish Guinea Petroleum] for example). This whole business is one to keep your eye on.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ONE YEAR AFTER COUP NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Aug 80 p 2144

[Report: "Balance After One Year Of Freedom"]

[Excerpts] One year after the fall (3 August) of Francisco Macias Nguema, who had terrorized them for 10 years, the people of Equatorial Guinea are relearning how to live in freedom, without the violence of his Youth on the Go. Over 500 murders have been directly imputed to the tyrant by the Malabo Military Tribunal which sentenced him to death on 29 September.

The solemn mass celebrated in the Malabo Cathedral on 3 August to mark the anniversary of the freedom coup also marked the end of religious persecution.

Several attempted coups d'etat, none of them successful, had put chinks in Macias' reign. The 1979 "Golpe" was successful thanks to the army chief. Lt Col Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who lived in the capital Malabo (on Bioko Island) had been summoned by the dictator on the continent but had refused to go. He had no doubt that it would have been a one-way trip, as the president had already appointed his successor: one of his nephews.

After 11 years of tyranny, the country has been bled white. "Macias had eliminated the administration, the postal services, archives, and banks. He ran the country like his own tribe. Huddled in his native village of Mongomo, protected by his guards, whose great sorcerer he was, Macias had sent back, 3 years before his fall, his Cuban Praetorian guard, loaned by Fidel Castro, because of their "grumbling attitude" at his rites.

The fleeing of Nigerian manpower and of the country's youth, and the exodus of the elite had led the country to economic ruin. Paradoxically, public finances, having become Macias' property, were healthy. Following the sale of 4,000 tons of cocoa and 50,000 tons of timber, despite the catastrophic decline in this output, there were some \$25 million in the cash registers, the more so since the dictator paid neither the military nor his officials who subsisted either as best they could or through extortions.

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If the country is to be rebuilt it needs its elite. Nearly 2,000 cadres who had sought refuge abroad, mainly in Spain, would not be greatly inclined to return to the country where a high official earns some 138,000 ekweles (2 ekweles per peseta) or 60,000 CFA francs per month.

If the economy is to be rebuilt it must reach the 40,000 tons of cocoa beans (best in the world), 300,000 tons of okoume, and 12,000 tons of fish it produced before independence. Guinea could, furthermore, become a small petroleum-producing state, bearing in mind the deposits discovered on its continental shelf.

"Aware of its historical responsibilities," in a single year Spain has provided substantial technical aid; 400 volunteers are at work, 100 of which in public health and another hundred in public education, the most neglected of all services.

Madrid's financial aid is insuring the country's survival with a direct aid of \$24 million (food, transport materials, pharmaceuticals...), \$24 million for development (infrastructure), \$4 million for fishing, and \$20 million in commercial credits. On the initiative of Claude Cheysson, the European commissioner, the European Development Fund has pledged 6,372,000 units of account (about 1,867,000,000 CFA) for the emergency restoration of public health, agriculture, public works, fishing, and energy.

French aid has exceeded 11 million francs (550 million CFA) in scholarships, restoration of the Malabo port, development of family fishing and geological prospecting in particular.

Present in the country since 1973, the Chinese are building a hydroelectric dam near Bata (capital of Rio Muni), a radiobroadcasting house in that city, and roads. They have completed the Malabo telephone exchange which opened on 3 August.

Whereas the "discretion and effectiveness" of Chinese aid are frequently mentioned by the new leaders, relations with Moscow have nothing in common with what they were under Macias.

The hostility of the populations toward the Soviets is obvious. A huge contract signed with the dictator had given the Soviets a fishing monopoly, whereas a total ban on fishing had been imposed on the Gunieans.

A large number of Soviet people had settled in the port of Luga, on the island, with a floating dock which repaired their fishing vessels. After the new leaders asked them to leave, last January, the Soviet armada sunk the floating dock offshore of Cameroon.

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Today the Soviets limit themselves to supplying Guinea with petroleum at a price which is clearly below that on the international market. In his speech the new chief of state welcomed the reestablishment of friendship with the United States. After withdrawing (last May) its recognition of the Sahraouie Democratic Arab Republic (of November 1978), the new system has clearly shown where its sympathies lie, observers have noted.

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IVORY COAST

PRESIDENT'S SEARCH FOR SUCCESSOR DESCRIBED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 80 pp 38-40

[Article by Special Abidjan Correspondent Jos-Blaise Alima: "Houphouet Searches for a Successor"]

[Text] On the subject of the succession, the "Old Man" is letting the applicants do all the talking. At least until he discerns their ambitions.

For the Ivorian political class the countdown has well and truly begun. Already, in August, the renewal of the basic organs of the PDCI (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast) had set the tone of the democratic game instituted within the party. Among the outgoing officers, over half the 190 secretaries general of the subsections had then bitten the dust, which confirmed the absence of popular foundation for most of the political leaders. Even in Yamoussoukro, the president of the Republic's own cousin, was beaten. So who will stop this wind of change? The question is really haunting minds. And the party's preliminary congress, which was held in Yamoussoukro from 1 to 4 September, only added to the suspense.

A Hit Parade

Proposals made by those at the meeting, which are certain to be adopted, except for a few details, by the actual congress (29 September to 1 October in Abidjan), will lead to the complete upheaval of the political chessboard. First, there is the abolishing of the post of secretary general of the PDCI-RDA [African Democratic Rally], whose occupant for 15 years has been Philippe Yace (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1028). President Houphouet-Boigny has apparently decided to take the party back into his own hands now, with the assistance of a technical director. By doing so he intends to prove that he is still the only master of the game and put an end to speculation about his succession.

The second important section of the proposals of the preliminary congress at Yamoussoukro concerns the politburo and the executive committee, the number of whose members is being considerably reduced. From 70, politburo members are now 25, and executive committee members are going from 200 to 100. The least that can be said is that the battle will be very rough between the old members and the new first of all, and then will come the fight to occupy the chairs.

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But this course will enable the president to renew his team. By introducing eight or nine new figures into it, who will be added to the few elements he will keep because he recognizes their loyalty. Two ministers are high on the hit parade of possibilities: Paul Guidibo (Mines) and Lamine Fadika (Marine): an ambassador, Amouakon Tiemele (UN), and a dynamic and restless executive, Emmanuel Dioulo, president and general manager of the Southwest Region Development Authority (ARSO) and probably future mayor of Abidjan, to make the great decisions as members of the politburo. In case the anticipated presidential election took place, the choice of a candidate would then be easier: the future president will be proposed (or appointed) by said bureau.

It remains to be seen which happy elected representatives will be called upon to preside over the party's destinies and thus the destiny of the Ivory Coast. Never have the marabouts been so sought after by politicians anxious about their future. Cut off in his residence in Cocody when he is not Yamoussoukro, President Houphouet-Boigny receives less often than usual. They say he may have encouraged the members of his immediate family to go away on holiday, to avoid potential pressure. He may even have decided on the disappearance of the Abidjan parking meters because members of his family were participating in their management. During this time from salons in sumptuous villas in Cocody and Marcory, but also the people's neighborhoods of Adjame and Treichville, and even from the interior of the country, echoes are reaching him of the reaction of the Ivorians to what one young executive calls "the coup d'etat that allows Houphouet to replace Houphouet."

Shortly after the football finale which for the first time in 20 years saw the victory of a club from the interior, the Entente from Daloa, the president explained his step to us: "Fifteen years ago I had asked the population to accept the 60 percent rejuvenation of the National Assembly. Those young deputies were not known to the masses and they have done nothing to implant themselves in their respective localities. Instead they considered themselves the president's elected representatives. And their objective was no longer to serve, but to be served."

Today, the time has come for the "Old Man" to measure the popularity of all of them. Until now President Houphouet-Boigny's custom has been to entrust the technical ministries to technocrats, reserving the political departments for his old companions. This has not prevented the explosion within the party of the traditional conflict of the generations--ancient against modern. In any case it is now everyone who is called upon to solicit popular votes. In this context the incumbent ministers are in an uncomfortable position. Officially, there is nothing to keep them from running in the legislative election at the end of October or early November. But can they get away when it involves proving that one is not necessarily a "creature of the president?"

Equal Weapons

On the other hand, it is certain that failure in a popular election of this importance means ipso facto the eviction of the government. Consequently it

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is understood that ministers from the same region (as in the case of Daloa, where Seri Gnoieba (Commerce), Denis Brakanon (Agriculture) and Lorougnon Guede (Scientific Research) are in competition) are somewhat embarrassed. The women themselves will defend themselves with equal weapons. They will confront other candidates. Without distinction as to sex, the quota reserved for them having been abolished.

Dismantlement

This democratic openness within a single party will have its extensions all the way up to the election of the president of the National Assembly. The former minister of the Economy, Henri Konan Bedie--who later became the top director of the International Financial Company--has returned to the Ivory Coast to run in the legislative election. He would be tempted to bid for the presidency of the Chamber. But his sensational return on the political scene makes no one forget the grievances formulated against him when he lost his ministry in 1977. The chief of state did not fail to shoot several arrows at him at the preliminary congress.

It makes no difference! He or another! Provided it is not Philippe Yace! In fact everyone was betting on the removal of the irremovable president of the National Assembly, Philippe Yace, decidedly the most debated-about man in the Ivory Coast.

The dismantlement of the PDCI apparatus will be of no help to him. And the party that was his instrument has become the instrument of his loss. An affair going back to 1978 is taking up the whole drama. With Houphouet resting in Switzerland, it was Philippe Yace, the second most important person in the government, who organized the municipal elections that year. Nothing could be more natural. But at the same time, he reorganized the party. For which he was continually reproached afterwards. And, in a country that is rediscovering the delights of the political game, alliances are being formed today to permanently bar the way for "Gringrin" or "Big Y," as his detractors nickname Philippe Yace.

The friends of the former Number Two of the regime believe that certain French circles are not strangers to his disgrace. They gladly recall that several months ago Philippe Yace, on a trip to London, declared to British businessmen: "The Ivory Coast is no one's private hunting ground." The allusion to France was obvious.

Prudence and Pragmatism

The question being asked today is who will profit from Philippe Yace's disgrace. In a country where there is an active political elite plenty of names are circulating. President Houphouet-Boigny is showing himself to be sparing of confidences. "Did Mao Tse-Tung appoint his successor?", he points out. And he goes on to mention Lenin, Stalin, Krushchev, de Gaulle. He mentions the Tunisian example, Bourguiba thinking in turn of his own son, of Bahi Ladgham, of Hedi Nouira.

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The "Old Man's" step seems to be taking shape this way: put in place a team that is as homogeneous as possible, from which will emerge the man called upon to take over the relief. This scheme combines prudence and pragmatism at the same time. In this case pragmatism consists of stirring up candidacies. Less to choose successors than to separate the most impatient. Ivorian democracy being less the people's doing than Houphouet's doing.

[Box by Jos-Blaise Alima: Mr Presidents]

"I had asked them to step aside to make room for the young. They showed self-sacrifice." Thus does Felix Houphouet-Boigny pay homage to his fellow travelers, those who have been by his side for over 30 years and who today hold only honorific posts. The principals number four and the "lowest of the low" (translation: the people) call them "the cardinals."

All are rewarded with the title of "president," either because of the offices they hold (sometimes not for the first time) or in memory of the posts they occupied in the past.

Men of the Past

Philippe Yace (60) is the youngest of this "gang of four." President of the National Assembly since independence, he was also the party boss as its secretary general from 1965 to 1980. He was at the apogee of his power when President Bouphouet-Boigny decided to make him his heir in 1975.

Since then his star has dimmed to the point where his being maintained at the head of the Assembly appears most hypothetical.

Mamadou Coulibaly (70), a former adviser to the French Union and a former senator, has since 1962 been president of the Economic and Social Council. Treasurer of the PDCI-RDA since 23 March 1959, he led the Ivorian delegation to the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, when the Ivory Coast was admitted to the UN.

Alphonse Boni (71) was minister of Justice in 1959. Since 1963 he has been president of the Supreme Court.

Auguste Denise (74). Minister of State, he owes his title of president to the fact that he directed the Ivory Coast Council of Government and the provisional government of the Republic (July 1958-April 1959), Mr Houphouet-Boigny having been minister to Paris at that time. It was President Denise who until now filled in (in case of absence) for the chief of state. His ministerial department is being reduced to very little. The annual operating budget is 60,000,000 CFA francs.

Other personalities are part of the officers' mess of the early days. Among them one might mention Matthieu Ekra, minister of State in charge of the Reform of Government-Owned Companies, as well as Koffi Gadeau, the Grand Chancellor of the Orders.

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Not without nostalgia, these "men of the Past" are watching the wheel of history turn. With the rise of the "young Turks" their influence has been crumbling over the years. In a gallant last stand they sought to convince President Houphouet-Boigny not to go far with the reforms. They lost that final battle.

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IVORY COAST

FIGURES ON 1979 FOREIGN TRADE GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Aug 80 pp 2134-35

[Text] It was in an international context of clearly increased difficulty that the Ivory Coast maintained for the year 1979, a positive balance of its exchanges on foreign markets. Since 1976, the Ivorian trade is summed up as follows, in billion CFA's:

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
Imports	312	429	522	529
Exports	393	529	524	535
Surplus	+81	+100	+ 2	+ 6

In volume, imports for 1979 totaled 4.1 million tons and exports represented 5.1 million tons. The distribution per supplying countries is thus established (in billion CFA's):

1 France	193.1	21 USSR	4.0
2 United States	35.3	22 People's Republic of China	3.9
3 Japan	31.6	23 Sweden	2.8
4 GFR	27.3	24 Argentina	2.7
5 Venezuela	24.6	25 Cameroon	2.5
6 Italy	20.9	26 Mali	2.4
7 Belgium-Luxemburg	19.3	27 Brazil	2.3
8 Netherlands	18.6	28 Romania	2.2
9 Spain	16.9	29 Poland	2.2
10 Nigeria	14.2	30 Algeria	2.1
11 United Kingdom	11.8	31 Hong-Kong	1.7
12 Iraq	11.5	32 Czechoslovakia	1.7
13 Iran	8.2	33 CDR	1.6
14 Pakistan	7.8	34 Israel	1.6
15 Taiwan	7.1	35 Portugal	1.3
16 Senegal	6.8	36 Trinidad	1.2
17 Switzerland	6.0	37 Morocco	1.1
18 Canada	5.0	Others	17.1
19 Saudi Arabia	4.4	Total	528.9
20 Austria	4.1		

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Crude palmetto and copra oils	4.2	20 000 t
Refined palm oil	1.8	7 300 t
Refined copra and palmetto oils		3 000 t
Margarines and fats	0.1	500 t
Condensed oils	1.5	10 000 t
Glycerin	0.2	1 600 t
Soaps, soapbars	0.2	900 t
Oil cakes	0.4	16 000 t
Coconuts	0.3	14 000 t
Pineapples	13.2	180 000 t
of which:		
Fresh fruits	4.3	91 000 t
Juices	1.1	18 000 t
Canned	7.8	71 000 t
Tuna	6.1	16 200 t
of which:		
Fresh	0.3	5 200 t
Canned	5.8	11 000 t
Rubber	4.1	18 100 t
Fresh bananas	3.5	118 000 t
Insecticides	1.9	3 000 t
Motor vehicles (assembled in I.C.)	1.8	500
Plants, flowers	1.5	2 000 t
Tobacco	1.1	12.5 million packs 73 million cigarillos
Plasticware	1.1	2 100 t
Kola nuts	0.9	34 000 t
Confectionery	0.6	1 500 t
Maggi bouillon cubes	0.6	800 t
Aluminum sheets	0.6	1 200 t
Essential oils (lemon, bergamot)	0.6	170 t
Frozen shrimps	0.5	300 t
Refuse grain	0.5	24 000 t
Bicycle accessories	0.4	-
Footware	0.4	800 000 pairs
Matches	0.3	-
Flashlights	0.3	4 000 000 units [as published]
Perfumery	0.3	25 000 carats [as published]
Rough diamonds	0.2	800 t [as published]
Cardboard boxes	0.2	800 t
Nails	0.2	-
Beer	0.2	700 t
Biscuits	0.2	300 t

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France, 1st supplier of the Ivory Coast with 37 percent Ivorian imports, is followed by the United States (7 percent) and Japan (6 percent); then come West Germany and Venezuela (5 percent each), then Italy, the Economic Union of Belgium-Luxemburg and the Netherlands (about 4 percent for each), Spain and Nigeria (3 percent each); finally the United Kingdom, Iraq and Iran represent about 2 percent of Ivorian imports.

Ivorian exports represent 331.8 billion CFA's of products for the primary sector (63 percent of the total) and 20.3 billions industrial products. Following is the detail of exports, in volume and value:

	Value (Billion CFA's)	Quantity
Coffee	174.3	264 100 t
of which:		
Raw beans	166.5	260 000 t
Ground	7.7	3 900 t
Roasted	0.1	200 t
Cocoa	154.8	217 100 t
of which:		
Beans	115.0	169 000 t
Butter	16.0	16 000 t
Paste	11.8	13 000 t
Cake and Powder	9.5	15 000 t
Chocolate	2.5	4 100 t
Wood	83.7	
of which:		
Unbarked timber	67.5	2 192 000 t ₃
Sawn wood and blocks	10.9	250 000 m ₃
Peeled veneer, cut	1.9	34 000 m ₃
Plywood	1.5	17 000 m ₃
Miscellaneous	1.9	-
Petroleum products	32.2	564 000 t
Cotton	27.4	
of which:		
Bundles, shelled	11.8	564 000 t
Yarns and Fabrics	5.8	35 000 t
Prints	7.2	23 000 000 m
Clothing, Hosiery	1.5	4 000 t
Cottonseed meal	1.0	26 000 t
Gauze, Compresses	0.1	-
Oil Palm Trees and Cocos	16.0	116 300 t
of which:		
Crude palm oil	6.4	39 000 t
Palmetto almonds	0.5	4 000 t

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Enameled houseware	0.2	500 t
Galvanized iron sheets	0.2	500 t
Paints and varnishes	0.1	300 t
Noodles	0.1	200 t
Cashew nuts	0.1	
Band saw blades	-	-
Cloth, bags, polypropylene ropes and strings	0.1	100 t
Telephone wires	0.1	100 t
Sisal strings and ropes	0.1	200 t
Ball point pens	0.1	8 000 000
Powder washing detergent	0.1	500
Miscellaneous	3.0	-
TOTAL 1979	534.8	4 099 000 t

Thus coffee represents 33 percent (in value) of Ivorian exports, cacao (29 percent), wood (16 percent), petroleum products (6 percent), cotton (5 percent), oil palm and coco trees (3 percent), pineapple (2 percent), tuna (1 percent), rubber (1 percent), fresh bananas (1 percent).

The allotment per client countries is thus classified (in billion CFA's and in percentage):

	<u>Billion CFA's</u>	<u>Total percentage</u>
1 France	127.7	24%
2 Netherlands	93.4	17%
3 United States	51.3	10%
4 Italy	45.0	8%
5 FRG	31.3	6%
6 United Kingdom	24.0	4%
7 Spain	17.6	3%
8 USSR	14.3	3%
9 Mali	13.7	3%
10 Upper Volta	12.8	2%
11 Algeria	11.4	2%
12 Japan	10.0	2%
13 Belgium-Luxemburg E.U.	9.1	2%
14 Greece	6.1	1%
15 Senegal	5.7	1%
16 Niger	5.6	1%
17 Morocco	5.4	1%
18 Nigeria	4.7	1%
19 Republic of South Africa	4.2	1%
20 Israel	3.5	1%
21 Portugal	3.1	1%
22 Cameroon	2.7	1%

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23	Benin	2.5	
24	Rumania	1.5	
25	Ghana	1.6	
26	Denmark	1.6	
27	Yugoslavia	1.4	
28	Switzerland	1.4	
29	Togo	1.3	
30	Canada	1.3	
31	Taiwan	1.3	
32	Gabon	1.1	
33	Tunisia	1.1	
34	Ireland	1.1	
35	Liberia	1.0	
	Others	13.9	3%
	TOTAL	534.8	

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IVORY COAST

PLAN FOR A NATIONAL COLD STORAGE SYSTEM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Aug 80 p 2135

[Text] The ministry of Economy, Finance and Plan of the Ivory Coast ordered Sema to undertake a plan study for a national cold storage system.

The existing fixed installations are already important in the Ivory Coast, concerning storage as well as hydric ice factories. The volume built is in the order of 125,000 cubic meters, or 15 cubic meters per 1,000 inhabitants (200 cubic meters per inhabitants in France). Nevertheless, the global existing volumes in the Ivory Coast are far from being negligible. However, the Ivorian network represents numerous shortcomings:

--most units are very small (about 50 cubic meters) and their operation costly;

--the regional distribution is not homogeneous, being mostly concentrated in Abidjan (80 percent) with more than 100,000 cubic meters;

--the technical value of the installations is very unequal, satisfactory in Abidjan, mediocre in the other centers;

--maintenance is most often inadequate, except for the large units.

The industrial capacity of ice production is important in the large cities: Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa and San-Pedro; they exceed needs and are used only to 50 percent of the installed capacities.

The transport motorpool is not very important[;] controlled-temperature vehicles are overly used beyond normal permissible distance limits. There is little railroad transport, and air transport is relatively little used.

Moreover, the qualified personnel in charge of the operating, maintenance and repairs of the installations is insufficient and badly located.

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In function of demographic increase: 8.5 million inhabitants in 1980, then 12.8 millions in 1990 and 19.2 millions in the year 2000, Sema estimated at each of these dates the needs of the population for food stock, transport and distribution by cold storage system.

A first plan was adopted, ambitious in its realization: 1.6 million cubic meter installations to be built, and in its financing: 135.3 billion CFA's, including a motorpool.

And thus Sema recommends the following plan:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Volume to be built</u> (m3)	<u>Number of warehouses needed</u>	<u>Average volume of warehouses</u> (m3)	<u>Investments to engage (billion CFA's)</u>	
				ware- houses	vehicles total
1980-1985	110 000	24	4 600	5.4	4.2
1985-1990	150 000	26	5 800	6.6	8
1990-1995	230 000	27	8 500	10	13.4
1995-2000	340 000	28	12 000	13	22
Total	830 000	105	7 900 [as published]	35	47.6

The Ivory Coast should be provided with an organizational framework for administrative and professional activities in cold storage operations.

In the implementation of investments, national resources should be used to the maximum, in order to reduce the outflow of currencies for the purchase of foreign equipments.

A vast program for the training of cold-storage technicians and electro-mechanics must start.

Transportation representing an important part of investments and the annual cost of operations deserve a rational organization in order to achieve an economical management.

To this end, the following recommendations were formulated:

- use of large capacity cold-storage trucks, preferably on asphalt roads;
- use of controlled-temperature trucks, on distances compatible with the climate, on secondary roads and dirt roads;
- increase of transportation throughput by use of railroads towards Upper-Volta and beyond, bound to Mali[,] costs being highly competitive;
- study of the use of containers which, closed and sealed, hold temperature and eliminate thefts.

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It will also be necessary to optimize the management of warehouses by creating polyvalent warehouses which will also allot capacity for utilization by public organizations, run by competent specialized technicians. Such warehouses and the structures necessary for their construction and their operation already exist in the Ivory Coast (Socef and Sogeg particularly).

As for financing, the use of public funds, at least partially, must be envisaged, certain warehouses being put afterwards, by means of an agreement, in the hands of a private operating company in which would participate diverse noncommercial authorities (local government, chamber of commerce, etc.), the presence of these authorities guaranteeing commercial neutrality in the utilization of capacity by public organizations. The Ivory Coast must put into action an important program for cold-storage equipment. Considerable efforts must be accomplished especially in the planning of operations, feasibility studies, inter-professional cooperation, in order to avoid wastes. Independently from the necessity of storage and conservation of its provisions, the Ivorian national cold storage system could be utilized to develop the exportation of local products to neighboring West African countries.

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LIBERIA

1980-1981 BUDGET APPROVED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2195

[Report: "Approval of the 1980-1981 Budget"]

[Text] On 1 September the Liberian People's Redemption Council approved the 1980-1981 budget.

The predicted deficit, initially assessed at \$146 million (MTM, 29 August, p 2141) has been considerably reduced, totaling \$75.3 million only, taking into consideration the grants which the country will receive this year (\$25.5 million already) and the repayment of its debt (\$20.2 million).

Revenue has been assessed at \$215.5 million with expenditures totaling \$372.5 million (of which \$246.5 million for administrative expenditures and \$126 million for investments).

The theoretical deficit of \$121 million, therefore, has been reduced to \$75.3 million thanks to such aid. The latest figure is the maximum amount accepted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) if Liberia is to receive from it another aid totaling \$85 million in special drawing rights (SDR) over a 2-year period.

Despite the adopted austerity system, the new budget is some 20 percent higher than last year's.

Let us point out that the rates of direct and company taxation, have been substantially raised. Conversely, the minimum taxable level has been lowered from \$1,500 to \$1,000 per year in order, as the chief of state pointed out, "to broaden the tax base and introduce some equity among the unemployed who are the majority of the population."

Furthermore, Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe has pointed out that investments had been reduced drastically and limited exclusively to current projects financed by foreign countries.

Finally, he announced that the 5-year development plan which was to have started last July, will be promulgated not before next year so that the order of priorities it stipulated could be reviewed.

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

MILITARY GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING--In the middle of August Karn Karlor, coordinator general of the People's Redemption Council (PRC) gave details on the operational system of the provisional military government. The council (consisting of seven members of the military who participated in the coup d'etat of 12 April 1980, and 11 associate members, also military, subsequently co-opted) performs the functions of a parliament. The ministers (mostly civilian) submit suggestions to the chief of state who passes them on to the PRC for deliberation and approval. The decision is subsequently submitted to the chief of state who signs it before passing it on to the ministers. According to Mr Karlor the chief of state and president of the PRC is the chairman of the executive branch. However, the factual presidency of the council is in the hands of the vice president, Gen Thomas New Syen. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2195] 5157

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SENEGAL

RECENT FACTORS IN ECONOMIC SITUATION NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Aug 80 p 2077-2078

[Text] A recent (July 1980) BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States] bulletin of economic and monetary statistics was devoted exclusively to Senegal.

The principal agricultural outputs of the 1978-1979 season rose to 781,000 tons of peanuts for oil and 33,800 tons of seed cotton sold on the market. Food crops provided 48,600 tons of corn, 795,000 tons of millet and sorghum and 127,000 tons of paddy rice. In value terms, this harvest represented 32.4 billion CFA francs for peanuts, 31.8 billion for millet/sorghum, and 5.3 billion for paddy.

At the start of the 1979-1980 season, the purchase price paid to the grower was hiked from 41.50 CFA francs per kilogram to 45.50 for peanuts and from 49 to 55 for seed cotton.

The 1979-1980 peanut season shows a sizeable deficit relative to the previous one and cumulative purchases by the end of April 1980 only add up to 318,900 tons compared with 641,000 tons by the end of April 1979.

Calcium phosphate production (Taiba and Thies) during the first four month period of 1980 amounted to 442,100 tons (8,500 tons up from 1979); aluminum phosphate rose to 624,000 tons (up 18,100 tons). There has been 30,100 tons of clinker and 106,500 tons of cement produced.

During the month of January 1980 the contribution made by tuna fishing was very small; 71,000 tons were brought ashore and delivered to processing plants.

In 1979 the Dakar international airport recorded 15,275 take-offs and landings of commercial aircraft and 566,400 arrivals and departures in passenger traffic.

At the end of March 1980, the commodity turnover index for major commercial enterprises was set at 213.5 compared with 234.5 one year before (based on 1970=100).

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Excluding oil mills, the industrial production index came out to 179.4 at the end of 1979 (4.6 up from the end of 1978), based on 1969=100.

At the end of March 1980, the general consumer price index for African families was at 257.8 compared with 230.6 at the end of March 1979 (based on 1969=100).

Put into effect on 1 January 1980, the hourly rate of the guaranteed minimum wage was brought from 108.05 to 133.81 CFA francs.

During the first four month period of 1980, duties collected by the customs service totalled 13.4 billion CFA francs, 9.5 percent of it on imports, a sum comparable to that for the corresponding four months of 1979.

The budget for the fiscal year 1 July 1979 to 30 June 1980 was set at 134.2 billion CFA francs (down 2.3 billion from the previous one) for receipts and expenditures; in the receipts it included 15 billion CFA francs of foreign financial assistance (down 18 billion) and the volume of capital goods expenditures was held down to 24 billion CFA francs (down 11 billion).

At the end of 1979, the outstanding public debt rose to the equivalent of 133.1 billion CFA francs (up 28.3 billion from the end of 1978) and net borrowing amounted to the equivalent of 99 billion CFA francs (compared with 86.8 billion at the end of 1978). In 1979 debt service, interest payments and amortizations, took up 22.6 billion CFA francs (19.8 billion in 1978).

On 31 March 1980 money in circulation, currency and coins, was at 50.5 billion CFA francs (down 0.5 billion from March 1979). The total of demand and time deposits in banks equalled 133.1 billion CFA francs (up 18.6 billion).

On the other hand, outstanding credit amounted to 253.4 billion CFA francs, compared to 225.5 billion at the end of March 1979. Credit utilizations in public or semi-public enterprises exceeded private-sector utilizations.

Also at the end of March 1980 the Senegalese Treasury was domestically a net debtor by 25.9 billion CFA francs (compared to a debt of 18.8 billion one year before); advances from having resorted to the currency-issuing Institute amounted to 8.8 billion.

Externally, Senegal was in debt for the foreign exchange equivalent of 83 billion CFA francs on 31 March 1980, and the shortfall rose to the equivalent of 58.1 billion by the end of March 1979.

During the first 3 months of 1980 peanut product exports classified as under the 1979-1980 growing season brought in 12,700 tons of unprocessed oil, 1,628 tons of processed oil, and 33,263 tons of oilcake; the oil exports were made at a slightly slower pace than that of the fourth three month period of 1979.

Over the same period, calcium phosphate exports from Taiba totalled 333,500 tons.

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SENEGAL

REDUCTION IN FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Aug 80 p 2077

[Text] Senegal is going to reduce the presence of foreign technical assistants in the country by 63 percent from now to 1985, Mr Louis Alexandrene, minister of planning and cooperation, announced in an interview in the daily LE SOLEIL.

This means that for France, which is by far the principal supplier of personnel for foreign aid efforts in Senegal, the number of its personnel will go from what is currently 1498 to 542 in 5 years.

The minister indicated that this step will allow Senegal to save 4.7 billion CFA francs from now to 1985. At present the cost of French technical assistance is in fact estimated at 10.2 billion CFA francs, of which France takes on 5.2 billion, the rest being borne by Senegal. One technical assistant comes to about 5 million CFA francs per year, the minister said. Mr Alexandrene stated that a plan for reducing the technical assistance had been set up between France and Senegal.

The minister added that France had agreed on an assistance effort of two billion CFA francs to help Senegal in training the cadres needed to replace the technical assistants.

The number of French technical assistance personnel in Senegal have continually fluctuated, it is pointed out in knowledgeable circles, according to the needs of the moment. The numbers, which went up to 1656 in 1961, went down to 1087 in 1974 and then back up again to 1498 at present.

Since the country became independent in 1960, a massive reduction in public services has been recorded. Currently more than 85 percent of the technical assistants are used in the public school system.

Apart from teaching, technical assistance is now oriented towards accomplishing large projects (shipyards, the chemical industry, cement factories, iron).

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Since France had hit its "ceiling" of foreign assistance personnel in 1977, everything over and above what it was scheduled to cover was borne by Senegal. But since then inflation has increased the cost of technical assistance up to a level difficult for Senegal to support.

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROPOSALS--Al-Noor Kassum, Tanzanian minister for water, energy and minerals recently stated in the Tanzanian parliament that a number of foreign petroleum companies had offered to conduct petroleum surveys in Tanzania on the basis of "reasonable" possibilities based on studies conducted so far in the country on land and at sea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2201] 5157

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ZIMBABWE

MUGABE, WIFE SALLY HIGHLIGHTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Sep 80 pp 20-25

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Mugabe, A Disturbing Leader"]

[Text] The great African tenors of the 1960s are either dead, old or obsolete. The newcomers of the 1970s have not as yet left a mark on their time. Today Mugabe is asserting himself as a statesman and is bringing to Africa a dimension which it has frequently lacked, that of political realism.

"I have no secret. I have no prescription nor model to sell. However, 10 years in jail and 5 years in exile have brought home to me the following truth: Dogmatism is the enemy!" Dressed in black, wearing a blue tie, drops of sweat glistening on his face, Robert Gabriel Mugabe lapses into silence. He is tense, closed.

One after another, the lights go off and the cameras disappear in the shadow of the plateau. Comrade Bob wipes his forehead with a handkerchief, drinks a sip of iced orange juice, and stretches his legs which he kept crossed and virtually motionless for a full hour. Admiringly, the director of the famous American program Meet the Press, whose subject the prime minister of Zimbabwe was on Saturday 23 August, whispers in his ear: "You were perfect." With the humble smile of a timid child he affects when he wants to be ironical, Mugabe whispers: "And that is how Robert the devil became...Gabriel the archangel!"

Five months after the historical night of 17 April, at Rufaro Stadium in Salisbury, when the Zibabwe flag replaced on the highest mast of the country the British Union Jack, and 6 months after his crushing electoral victory and his appointment by the governor, Lord Soames, to the position of prime minister, Robert Mugabe has almost broken into the screen, that of American television, naturally, but also the far more difficult one, of the stage of international politics.

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There has not been a single one of his decisions or moves which has not been analyzed, weighed, and commented by chancellories and the media. When he gives the order, as was the case at the beginning of July, of tumbling down in all cities monuments to Cecil Rhodes, the white founder of the colony which was to be named after him, or when he welcomes warmly and with a deployment of his forces the Marxist Samora Machel, paying a state visit, he remains the revolutionary that everyone knows. However, when he jails one of his ministers for the murder of a white farmer, and when he outlines for the decade to come an economic policy which would not be rejected by any capitalist state on the continent, or else when he describes Ian Smith as a "sincere patriot," after having wished, only one year ago, that the latter be shot, Robert the Red becomes, as he has been described, another Kenyatta or another Houphouet. Unquestionably, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the nonidentifiable, is troublesome.

Where is he going, this 55-year-old man with a slightly clumsy walk, with long delicate hands which emphasize each intonation, this man with a calm eloquence and a rare smile? To answer this question it may be necessary to know where he comes from. Let us consider first the childhood of this son of a peasant-miner born in Kutawa, 90 kilometers west of Salisbury: His first years were spent between a mother who was authoritarian and pious--"Mama Bona," who was 76 several days ago, and remains a woman with an extraordinary vitality--and the mission Jesuits. His youth was spent at the black South African university of Fort Hare, which was a real nursery for nationalism, the William Ponty of southern Africa. He graduated with a teacher's diploma and his fellow students were Oliver Tambo (the current president of the ANC [African National Congress]), Robert Sobukwe (the founder of the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress]), and Gatsha Buthelezi, the Zulu leader of Natal.

In Fort Hare he met with members of the South African Communist Party--mostly Jews--who made him read Karl Marx' "Manifesto" and Lenin's "Imperialism." However, at that time he preferred Gandhi who fascinated him, and attended mass every day.

In 1955 he returned to Rhodesia, to Gwelo, where he taught grammar school. Poorly paid, feeling the enmity of his superiors because of his "humanist" ideas, and also attracted by the rising comet of Kwame Nkrumah, Robert Mugabe applied for, and obtained, a position as professor at St Mary's College in Sekondi Takoradi, in Ghana. He stayed there 2 years, the time to marry Sarah Hayfron, the daughter of an agricultural technician, to become close with the Osagyefo, and to establish ties with the future president of Malawi, Hastings Banda. The two men have quarreled since, Malawi being the only African state to preserve diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa.

The follow-up such as his return to Rhodesia in 1960, his joining the ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union], headed by Ndabaningi Sithole, his

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10 years in prison (1964-1974), the death in 1966 of his only child, 6 years old, from encephalitis, and whose funeral he was not allowed to attend, the exile in Mozambique and the armed insurrection are the known, the public side of his life.

This is a life which focuses, which integrates within itself, which digests 20 years of African independence: Mugabe lived the illusion of pan-Africanism, Nkrumah type. He has known the violence of the white presence and has understood--his break with Banda was determining in this respect--the trap of new colonial freedoms and of savage capitalism. However, he has also seen in Mozambique the errors of a hasty socialization, the emergence of a bureaucracy from the left, and the dramatic drop in economic production. Finally, in a climate marked by internal conflicts and settlement of accounts among factions, he has waged 5 years of armed struggle. No other African leader has focused within himself so much experience or has been able, like him, to draw so many lessons.

Robert Mugabe's initial balance may be summed up in a few words: the need for political realism. All his actions for the past 6 months have been noted by the total absence of dogmatism, restraints, or models. This is surprising and troublesome. Pushed to its extremes, such realism sometimes resembles cynicism. Thus, Mugabe does not conceal that that same pendular movement which has made him abandon the churches--"religion was useful to me when I had to believe in something in order to forget the miseries of my life. This is no longer necessary"--leads him today to forget a good part of the Marxism which he once proclaimed. "Marxist propaganda," says he, "was important to us in wartime. It no longer is now when we have peace."

His economic policy which takes up, in its general lines, the plan formulated in 1978 by the assistants of Ian Smith and which emphasizes an increase in the rate of output rather than a redistribution of wealth, is indicative of this realism. The way in which he was able to exploit the "Tekere affair"--the matter of his minister of labor charged with the murder of a white farmer--is equally model. By charging him, Mugabe blocks the hard wing of his party, the one which blames him for "selling out Rhodesia to the whites," offers his hand to Joshua Nkomo, his enemy brother of the ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union], one of whose most violent bullies was Tekere, and reassures a white community reduced to 195,000 people, whose mass departure from the country he would like to avoid at all cost, preventing what happened in 1975 in Angola and Mozambique.

This is because Robert Mugabe's realism comes with a sharp feeling for political opportunity. Thus, in the field of foreign affairs, so far he has refused to the Soviets as well as to the eastern European countries to open an embassy in Salisbury. It is not that Robert Mugabe particularly dislikes Moscow, even though the Soviet Union has always played the Nkomo

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trump card, and even though, following his grand return to Zimbabwe in January 1980, no representative from a socialist country had seen him off at Maputo Airport. It is simply that he waits, as he has said, for the "comrades in the Kremlin" to have something to offer him other than Kalashnikovs, of which he has plenty, military trucks he would not know what to do with, or economic advisors whose competence or the possibility to adapt to the realities of Zimbabwe remain hypothetical.

For the time being, Robert Mugabe is turning to the West, close to 800 trade delegations (American, British, Japanese, German, French and South African) were invited to attend the big Salisbury fair from 1 to 5 September. The booth of the Lonrho Multinational Mining Company, one of Joshua Nkomo's financial supporters, was side by side with that of Union Carbide, the American chromium trust, which spent a long time courting Robert Mugabe. However, whereas Western companies are quite interested in Zimbabwe, their governments seem to maintain a cautious mistrust. This is because Mugabe disturbs them as well. It is as though no one, in his presence, could abandon a strange feeling of malaise: What does he want? Could he suddenly throw himself in the arms of the Soviets once he has collected the Western manna and once he has put to work his one million unemployed and rebuilt his economy?

His American trip at the end of August was significant in this respect: He was enthusiastically applauded at the United Nations, with parties, champagne, and congratulations in the White House. All this had been remarkably well prepared by the new ambassador of Zimbabwe to Washington, Kenneth Towsey, who happens to be...the person who formerly represented Ian Smith in the United States. However, there was no increase in the stipulated aid: \$50 million over a two-year period, whereas the 1976 Kissinger plan was mentioning the sum of one billion! It is true that 1980 and 1981 are in the United States, the FRG, and in France electoral years and that Great Britain is sinking every day a little bit deeper into an economic crisis. In a word, this is a period during which one has little inclination to spend several more dollars for a country whose name is barely known to the Western electorate.

Robert Mugabe will have to impose a system of austerity. However, he has a great need for this additional money to cross what is developing as his main obstacle: the organization of the future army.

As far as white officers are concerned, the problem was eliminated following the resignation of Gen Peter Walls in July; 60 percent of the European ranks have left the country or are about to do so, unquestionably in order to join the South African army.

The question is far more crucial when it comes to the former guerrillas. For over 8 months 30,000 of them (two-thirds belonging to Robert Mugabe's

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army, the balance loyal to Joshua Nkomo) have been confined in camps, kept idle, and becoming ever more nervous. Meanwhile, the new army will consist of nine battalions or 10,000 men. Theoretically, the remaining 20,000 should return to civilian life and become integrated within rural community projects. However, initial efforts to implement "Operation SEED" (Soldiers Employed for Economic Development) have met with the refusal of the boys who have been unwilling to give up their arms. In some cases force had to be used to force them out of the assembly points. Other confrontations--perhaps far more bloody--could not be excluded.

The success of Robert Mugabe is a major necessity for all of southern Africa. Currently, the most important thing is not to set up guerrilla camps of the ANC [African National Congress] on the Bulawayo or Beitbridge side, for this would only result in drawing Zimbabwe into a war which it cannot sustain.

The prime objective is to defeat the plan for a "constellation of states" formulated by Pieter Botha and his friends: a kind of common market for southern Africa under the complete economic domination of Pretoria. This would end up by paralyzing any political position to the white regime.

A rich country exporting minerals and agricultural products, Zimbabwe could help the surrounding countries to fight off the "white temptation." Actually, this was the meaning of Samora Machel's message during his visit to Salisbury: "We need you."

The responsibility weighing on Robert Gabriel Mugabe is enormous. Could it be that this man, this "gut socialist," as he describes himself, who profoundly believes that in order to be credible one must be nonaligned, would become the new leader of Africa and the Third World? At a time when the old "chiefs"--Senghor, Houphouet, Nyerere, Castro--are getting old and losing their charisma, and when no one among the generation of chiefs of state of the 1970s seems to be able to take over, those who are best acquainted with Robert Mugabe and who have always believed in him, such as Andrew Young or David Owen, think so.

However, Robert Mugabe is not in a hurry. The popular rumor is that whenever faced with making an important decision, he sits down on a leather armchair, listens to a shona record or an old hit by his favorite singers Bing Crosby, Elvis Presley, or Pat Boone, and remembers the sentence he repeated every day of his 10 years in prison: "Impatience alone is counterrevolutionary."

A Realistic Plan

Submitted at the beginning of July by Finance Minister Enos Nkala, the Zimbabwe budget perfectly illustrates the realistic line adopted by Robert

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Mugabe of "adapting socialism to the specific requirements of the country." In fact, it is a version of a slightly touched up "Muzorewa plan" drafted in 1978 by the experts of Ian Smith.

The planned growth rate for 1981 is 10 percent. This would make it possible to create 100,000 new jobs. Such a strong growth will be secured thanks to the large expected investments, essentially in the mining sector. Foreign companies would be allowed to take out 25 percent of their profits; another 25 percent will have to be reinvested and 50 percent will go to the government as taxes.

Military expenditures will be reduced by one-half. Conversely, the budgets of education, housing, and public health will be doubled.

In agriculture, massive aid will be granted to white farmers whose operations are deemed "profitable"--i.e., to 30 percent of them. The others, most of them heavily in debt, will have to make their land profitable by themselves. A fund will be created for aid to the African peasants with a view to encouraging them, without forcing them, to engage in collective farming.

This very detailed budget plan--it took Enos Nkala 2 and 1/2 hours to read to the parliament--was largely drafted by Robert Mugabe's trusted man in the field of economics: Bernard Chidzero, minister of economic planning, 53, Oxford and Harvard alumni, who, only a few months ago, was deputy secretary general of the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development.

In a recent statement Bernard Chidzero assessed that the overall cost of a development plan which could "definitively eliminate pockets of underdevelopment" would be \$4 billion.

For Sally the Struggle Goes On

Only 6 months ago no one or virtually no one knew her. Today everyone has seen her face on television or heard her voice on the radio, as she addresses meetings. Unquestionably, Sally Mugabe has become a first-rate actress in Zimbabwe's life. Like it or not, this 47-year-old woman does not meet the idea of the discreet and attentive wives in the background, cherished by the readily misogynous world of men in politics: "I have always fought by my husband's side; I will not become his shadow under the pretext that he is now prime minister."

Representing Mashonaland-West, member of the ZANU Central Committee and secretary of state for the condition of women, Sally Mugabe experienced her initial political passions in Ghana, in the 1950s. In fact, it was in Accra that Sarah Hayfron was born to a family of the Ashanti petite bourgeoisie. As a very young girl she attended the stormy meetings of

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Kwame Nkrumah's party and became truly devoted to him. At the age of 16 Sally was wounded during a battle with members of a rival party.

She met Robert Mugabe in 1959, while she was completing her studies as a nurse. He was one of those Africans attracted by the Ghanaian experience and was teaching in the small town of Sekondi. She married him in 1961 and followed him to Salisbury.

In 1964 Mugabe was arrested and Sally, forced into exile, went to London. She then moved to Dar es Salaam where she promoted the movement of ZANU women. Ten years later, in 1974, she rejoined her husband released from Ian Smith's jails, in Lusaka. "I saw him just one second before I fainted from happiness." The two settled in Maputo (Mozambique). Sally went from meetings to training camps, and learned Portuguese and Swahili.

Finally, victory and the return to Salisbury arrived. Together with Terrai Nhongo, the wife of the commander in chief of the ZANLA [Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army] and minister of youth, sports and recreation, Sally Mugabe is the only woman member of the government. "This is not enough," she emphasizes. "We shall have to fight."

Yet, she has another small dream: "to take in a movie just once with Robert. This has never happened to us."

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