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8 October 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 39/80)

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8 October 1980

WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 39/80)

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF EVINCES CONTRADICTIONARY STANCE TOWARD POLISH STRIKES

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 30 Aug 80 p 70

[Article by Robert Schneider: "PCF: Small Echo of Warsaw"]

[Text] "While rejecting demands aimed at the gains of socialism, the decisions presented by Edward Gierek run in the direction toward an in-depth development of socialist democracy." On 25 August, the French Communist Party, through the voice of Maxime Gremetz, the Political Bureau officer responsible for foreign affairs, approved what the leaders in Warsaw had done. On that same day--is this just a coincidence?--the Soviet Union for the first time responded to the events in Poland.

In the same terms as the news agency TASS [Telegraph Agency of the USSR], Gremetz expresses the belief that economic problems are behind the strikes. Like the Soviets, he does not say a single word about political demands: abolition of censorship, labor union pluralism, and release of political prisoners. These undoubtedly are "demands aimed at the gains of socialism."

For the PCF [French Communist Party] the Polish affair is more delicate than the Kabul coup. In this case it is impossible to accuse those who charge communist power with being made up of backward feudal leaders. All one has to do is watch television: the Polish strikers, massed behind the iron fences of the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk, look like brothers of the strikers at the Penhoet shipyards in Saint-Nazaire. How can one explain to the French workers that their Polish colleagues are in the pay of American imperialism?

In Rome and in Madrid, the communists support the Polish strikers. In Paris, the PCF cautiously follows the evolution of the government in Warsaw. Marchais has chosen his position: there must be no question of bothering Moscow in any way. But there must be no question either--upon the approach of the presidential elections--to create too clear an impression as to a lineup with the Polish position. To convince confused militants, the communist press has for the past 2 months been attempting a difficult demonstration consisting of five points.

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1. Conflicts are limited. "The disengagement movements have today been completely terminated" (L'HUMANITE, 6 July). "We may expect that about half of the workers at the Lenin shipyards participate in the movement. The others are at home, visibly less enthusiastic about the new content given to their initial demands" (L'HUMANITE, 22 August). Invited by the Polish party, Gremetz only met happy workers on 11 and 12 July. The special correspondents from REVOLUTION, the weekly of party intellectuals (18 July issue) discovered a town where nothing happens: "Here, the party of the working class plays its role. The self-management structures are very well developed. They resolve their problems through discussion with all of the workers." That idyllic city is Gdansk.
2. The crisis is not political. On that topic, L'HUMANITE on 13 August rather complaisantly gave the floor to Vice Premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski. But not to the strikers. Their demand for the right to strike was to be mentioned only after it had been accepted by Gierek. L'HUMANITE on 21 August reported the arrest of 14 "dissidents" in the following fashion: "In Warsaw, the report according to which 14 dissidents were arrested is considered true although there has been no official news release on it." One must indeed admire this way of putting it. The newspaper never confirmed the arrest.
3. The causes of the crisis are not to be found in shortages but rather on the contrary in excessive abundance. "Supply problems are not due to a crisis but to growth" (L'HUMANITE, 5 July). The living standard has gone up considerably and production cannot keep up with the demand. What to do with this unused volume of money?" (REVOLUTION, 18 July). On 26 August, the leaders in Warsaw themselves figured the Polish debt at \$20 billion.
4. Those who want to go beyond economic-social demands are enemies of socialism. The communist daily picked up the slogan of the Polish government, "The movement has become more lucid regarding the nature of certain demands which are aimed at challenging the socialist system" (L'HUMANITE, 23 August).
5. Relations between the working class and the boss-state are fundamentally different from conventional capital-labor relationships. For the past 2 months, every headline dealing with Poland in the communist press has been including such terms as: discussions, negotiations, dialogue, coordination. Each article recalls that the difficulties mentioned by the strikers had been anticipated long ago by the government. Only the particular economic situation at this time delayed the solution of problems. The institutions are not the cause of that. L'HUMANITE acts like the right-wing press: justification of the employer, a reserved attitude toward the demands of the workers.

On 15 January, after the serious events in the Baltic, L'HUMANITE put out the following headlines: "Gdansk shipyard discussions." The article's

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author was Jacques Coubard, the same man who, as special correspondent in Afghanistan, saw the exact opposite of what the international press saw.

All assertions by the communist press have been disproved by the facts. So what! The PCF does not hesitate, after the conciliatory speech by Gierek, to reclaim for France the example of Warsaw. Seguy, the Boss of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and a CP leader declared on 25 August: "What a contrast between Polish coordination and the kind of repression we have here at home!" On 26 August, the communist elected representatives wrote to Raymond Barre: "Do it the way they are doing it in Poland." On 27 August, L'HUMANITE had the following front-page headline: "At Gdansk, they are discussing; at Le Havre they are beating on the workers."

How is one to justify later on a possible intervention by Moscow, after having praised "Polish coordination" so highly? The following explanation was advanced: "If the antisocialist forces fail, will they not resort to violence"? (REVOLUTION, 22 August).

The Soviets have already been excused.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

HARRIS POLL SHOWS GISCARD FAVORED, MEASURES 1981 ELECTION MOOD

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6-12 Sep 80 pp 91-95

[Article by Albert du Roy: "Presidential Elections: Who? by Whom? Why?"]

[Text] For the next 18 months the presidential election is going to be dramatizing the French political climate. L'EXPRESS and the Louis Harris-France Institute present the first poll making it possible to answer the basic questions.

Who? By whom? Why? Who will be elected president of the Republic in the spring of 1981? By what majority: the young, the old, the rich, the poor? Why that candidate and not another? And why do it?

Who? Early in this September of 1980--eight months before the deadline--the answer to this first question seems easy. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the outgoing president, is the favorite. And even, as of today, almost unbeatable. The first "Presidential Election Instrument Panel," published this week by L'EXPRESS and the Louis Harris-France Institute, confirms the political analysis we did on 30 August, as it confirms even while it corrects the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] poll published afterwards by the weekly LE Point. Our figures, in fact, are different. And that difference is a fundamental one.

By whom will he be elected? Who will vote for his opponents? Our "Instrument Panel" No 1 contributes indications on this point that the political staffs must take into account from now on. An example: can Giscard, who is attached to his modern president image, admit without damage that he is seeing the category of higher officers who had been said to be for him, preferring his challenger, Michel Rocard? Another example: the Socialist candidate--whoever he is, he will carry the colors of a party that claims to be new and dynamic--can he accept the fact that the youngest voters are voting more for a Georges Marchais who carries the colors of the most archaic communism?

Why are the French voting this way? This is the main point. L'EXPRESS did not want to limit itself to being a barometer--spectacular, but superficial--

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of voting intentions. It is the job of a political weekly to attempt to explain the reasons for the voters' choices. Our poll provides the first elements of the explanation. Between now and the ballot it will be rounded out by other "Instrument Panels." And also, soon, by inquiries of a kind that is new to France, which the Louis Harris Institute, strengthened by its American experience, has completed at our request.

Since 1958 the office of president has taken such a decisive place in French political life that the dramatization of the 1981 confrontation is inevitable. From month to month--Debre's announcement of his candidacy already; Marchais' in October; the choice of the Socialists in December or January; Chirac's decision; Giscard's campaign in April--the pace is going to accelerate, passion will mount.

Even though, as of today, the French political pulse is not yet beating, its heart is not far from beating wildly. This is one of the three basic indications of our poll.

The First Indicators

The interest indicator is still low: only 14 percent of the voters say they are "very interested" in the preparations for the election, and 27 percent say they "are not at all interested." Considering the length of time remaining before the ballot, one would be tempted to say that this low indicator is normal. But in this case the norm is subjective, since there is no precedent. The three universal suffrage presidential elections that France has known were themselves abnormal: the first, in 1965 with de Gaulle, because it was--the first; the 1969 election between Pompidou and Poher, because it was improvised in 34 days, after the General's resignation; the 1974 election, because it was organized in 33 days, after Pompidou's death. This is the first time the institutions of the Fifth Republic are operating in an ordinary way.

The influence indicator is still moderate. But a noteworthy difference is appearing: on the one hand, 23 percent of the voters believe the election will have "great influence on their living and working conditions," while an identical number, 23 percent, believe it will have "no influence at all;" on the other hand, 34 percent of the French people believe it will have "a great influence on the independence and the international security of France," while only 10 percent say it will have "no influence at all." The inferior economic and social situation appears at this point to be fatal to any expectation of a miracle coming out of the presidential election. On the other hand, in the world climate of tension and instability, the choice of the Elysee host is much less immaterial. In a country where, traditionally, international themes have never been considered "profitable," electorally speaking, this indicator does not prove that the French are granting more importance than before to these problems--we shall see later on--but that the chief of state as established by the Fifth Republic is the privileged, and perhaps exclusive, depository of the country's international responsibility. In other words, one might conceive of a president who is not France's best economist, but he must be its best diplomat.

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The determination indicator is already high. Over half of the voters (51 percent) say they are certain to vote for the candidate they selected on the day of our poll. Less than one third (29 percent) admit that they might still change their minds, a figure to which it is probably necessary to add the 20 percent who are uncommitted. For a ballot that still stirs little passion, this determination is surprising. But the assurance varies enormously, depending on the candidates. Marchais' electorate is granitic: 77 percent say they are completely determined to vote for him. Mitterrand's and Rocard's is solid: 66 and 63 percent. Giscard's is a little less so: 57 percent. Chirac's is fragile: 35 percent. Which is unusual for the Gaullist electorate.

These last figures by themselves would be reminder enough that a poll is never more than a photo of public opinion at a given moment. And that the game is far from over for the candidates. Notice to the militants who, upon reading the voting intentions, would be inclined to shout victory or throw in the towel.


From the scores obtained by the different candidates, declared or potential--with a Mitterrand hypothesis and a Rocard hypothesis (see our table)--the political staffs can draw six conclusions.

1. Under both hypotheses Giscard in the first round obtains a higher number of intentions to vote (36 and 34 percent) than the number of his votes in the 1974 first round (32.9 percent). Almost all of the UDF [French Democratic Union] sympathizers, one-third of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] sympathizers and one-tenth of the Socialists are voting for him. In the second round, his victory is less clear against Rocard (52 percent) than against Mitterrand (55 percent), the second attracting only 10 percent of the RPR sympathizers, compared with 15 percent for Rocard. But in both hypotheses, Giscard surpasses his limited score of the 1974 second round (50.7 percent).

The Opposing Comrades

2. In the internal competition in the Socialist Party, Rocard is once again revealed as a better flag-carrier than Mitterrand. However, the difference is not enormous (four points for the first round, three points for the second), and does not change the outcome of the voting. In the second round both attain the total of leftist votes of the first round and attract the majority of ecologists' votes. In the Socialist electorate, in the first as in the second round, the two "opposing comrades" have the same score. Rocard, contrary to what one usually would expect, attracts as many Communist sympathizers as Mitterrand. Rocard's slight advantage is due to his being slightly more attractive to the RPR and UDF electorates, and the marginal electorates.
3. Georges Marchais with 17 or 18 percent is not maintaining his party at its traditional 20-21-percent level. One Communist sympathizer in eight votes, in fact, from the first round for the Socialist candidate, which Mitterrand or Rocard claim to be. The secretary general

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Key to Chart on Preceding Page:

1. 1981 Presidential Election Instrument Panel
2. September 1980
3. Interest
4. Very interested in the election
5. Influence
6. Believe election will have great influence
7. On their daily life
8. On France's independence
9. Determination
10. Completely sure of their vote
11. Voting intentions
12. For the first round
13. Hypothesis No 1
14. Hypothesis No 2
15. Uncommitted
16. For the second round
17. Design by Tanguy de Remur

of the PCF is suffering the erosion of his electorate, but **not** the collapse that some were predicting.

4. Despite his campaign's fast start, Michel Debre is not penetrating. But the 5 percent of the voters--most of them Gaullists--whom he attracts for the moment--are enough to place the president of the RPR, Jacques Chirac, with 12 or 11 percent, far short of the already mediocre score obtained by Chaban-Delmas in 1974 (14.6 percent). All the more so since one RPR member in three will vote for Giscard straight away.
5. The unranked candidates in the election carry little weight. With the exception of the ecologist Brice Lalonde (3 and 4 percent) we

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have not shown them on our table. On the extreme left Arlette Laguiller, Alain Krivine, Huguette Bouchardeau and Roger Garaudy total between 3 and 4 percent, the leftist radical Michel Crepeau does not exceed 1 percent, all the others (the No 2 ecologist Jean-Claude Delarue, Michel Jobert and the extreme right candidates Le Pen and Gauchon) are "weighed" in tenths of a percent.

6. The electoral structure revealed by the Louis Harris poll appears to conform much more to the logic of the last IFOP poll, which predicts Marchais' collapse at 13 percent and Giscard's triumph at 61 percent facing Mitterrand and 56 percent facing Rocard. Something to cause perplexity in the staffs! If these extreme figures corresponded to reality, this would mean that a background movement, to say nothing of a tornado, has overturned the French electorate. Well, this electorate has had, since the war, an extraordinary stability throughout the meanderings of the Fourth Republic and the switch-backs of the Fifth. Can the candidates take the risk of counting on such an upset to organize their campaign? A tough bet.

Our poll furnishes elements of information on this point: they indicate movements, not an upset.

If one carves up the first round electorate according to age bracket, three indications must be focused on:

The youngest electorate (18-24 years of age) is divided into three blocs: Marchais and Giscard with 23 percent each; Mitterrand with 20 percent; the rest are scattered. These figures hardly vary if Rocard is the Socialist candidate.

More variable distribution for the 25-34-year-olds. Giscard (27 percent) and Marchais (24 percent) are ahead of Mitterrand (19 percent). But in the second hypothesis Rocard, with 32 percent, is ahead.

In the higher age categories Giscard increases his advantage: from 30 percent for the 35-49-year-olds (where Rocard again is running almost even with 29 percent) to 60 percent of the over-65 group.

The cleavages are much more complex when the electorate is studied according to socioprofessional category.

The president's present advantage is massive (between 53 and 56 percent) with the retired and inactive.

Also a significant advantage (between 42 and 46 percent) among the small merchants and craftsmen, while Chirac, Marchais and Mitterrand or Rocard swing between 13 and 16 percent each.

Among farmers, behind Giscard (between 33 and 34 percent), Chirac--who was an active minister of Agriculture--is evenly matched (between 20 and 23 percent) with the Socialist candidate.

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The working class electorate is divided into three groups: a slight advantage for Marchais (27 percent against Mitterrand to 32 percent against Rocard); equality (between 23 and 25 percent) for Giscard and the Socialist candidate.

It is among the middle executives and white-collar workers that Rocard finds his best advantage: whereas Mitterrand (25 percent) does not appeal to them any more than Giscard does (26 percent), his challenger from the PS [Socialist Party] fills in the gap: 35 percent, against a mere 23 percent for the present chief of state.

An identical mix-up--and even more surprising--among higher executives and liberal professionals: Mitterrand, 18 percent to Giscard's 38 percent; Rocard, 32 percent to Giscard's 31 percent.

Comparison of Two Second Rounds

These cleavages, quite naturally, are found in the second round, in which Mitterrand prevails over Giscard in only two age groups (under 34) and two socio-professional categories (middle executives-white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers), whereas Rocard gets ahead of the outgoing president up to age 49 and, in addition, among higher executives and liberal professionals (56 percent against 44 percent for Giscard).

The last important element to be evaluated: the evolution of the Giscardian electorate between the second round of the 1974 presidential election (SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company]- LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR study of 10 June 1974) and the second round as it would come out if it were to take place today, according to the L'EXPRESS-Louis Harris poll. Comparison shows that during his seven-year term of office the present president has won votes among the female electorate, among older voters (over 50, but chiefly over 65), among blue-collar workers (where his score is nearly even with that of the Socialist candidate) and among the non-working population (where he reaches almost 70 percent).

On the other hand, although he gains ground against Mitterrand among the 21-49-year-olds, he loses ground against Rocard in the same age brackets. And he loses ground against both opponents--but more if it is Rocard--among farmers, among higher executives and middle executives-white-collar workers.

Thus the Giscardian electorate has aged. He wins in the working class what he loses in the middle and upper classes. The majority of the working classes vote left.

The objective of the third section of our inquiry is to bring to light the profound reasons for the French people's vote. Those reasons, at least, that go beyond ideologic solidarities or traditional sociological solidarities.

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 REASONS FOR FRENCH VOTERS' CHOICES

For Each of the Following Objectives:		[in percent]
	What do you consider top priority?	Which candidates are in the best position to attain it?
Fight unemployment	84	Giscard.....23 Rocard.....22 Mitterrand and Marchais...19
Fight inflation and rising prices	76	Giscard.....32 Rocard.....24 Mitterrand.....15
Fight social inequalities	62	Rocard.....23 Giscard.....22 Mitterrand.....21
Maintain order and security in the country	60	Giscard.....37 Chirac.....18 Rocard.....12
Protect the interests of the social class to which you belong	50	Giscard.....26 Rocard.....19 Mitterrand.....17
Assure France's oil supply	49	Giscard.....40 Mitterrand and Rocard.....11
Improve public equipment (hospitals, schools, common carriers, etc.)	48	Giscard.....26 Rocard.....20 Mitterrand.....18
Modernize the French economy, make it more competitive	45	Giscard.....32 Rocard.....20 Chirac.....12
Effectively provide France's national defense	42	Giscard.....40 Chirac.....14 Rocard.....13
Preserve environment, ecology	33	Giscard.....22 Lalonde.....20 Rocard.....11

[Table continued on following page]

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 REASONS FOR FRENCH VOTERS' CHOICES

For Each of the Following Objectives:		[in percent]
	What do you consider top priority?	Which candidates are in the best position to attain it?
Assure morality in political life (scandals, corruption, etc.)	31	Giscard.....24 Rocard and Debre.....13
Strengthen France's ties with its Western allies	26	Giscard.....45 Mitterrand.....12 Rocard.....10
Build Europe	23	Giscard.....43 Mitterrand and Rocard....12
Aid under-developed countries	22	Giscard.....39 Mitterrand.....12 Rocard.....11
Conduct relations with USSR and the Eastern countries according to our interest	18	Giscard.....33 Marchais.....19 Mitterrand and Rocard....11

This poll was conducted for L'EXPRESS by the Louis Harris-France Institute, between 22 and 28 August 1980, with a sampling of 1,000 persons representative of the French population age 18 and over.

These reasons are of three kinds: the criteria by which the French choose their president; the personal image of each of the candidates; their real or supposed capacity for solving the problems judged to have priority.

A Strong Personalization

In France the office of president has, more than ever, a personal tonality that takes precedence over the political aspects of the office. What counts for much more in the voter's decision is "the candidate's competence, his statesmanlike qualities," the criterion placed at the head of the list by 48 percent of the voters. To whom must be added the 17 percent who cite the other, personal criterion: "The candidate's personality, his human qualities." The political criteria are held respectively by 19 percent ("the candidate's program") and 10 percent ("the candidate's party").

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The only electorate that diverges from the national average is that of Georges Marchais, in which the relations between "personal" and "political" are reversed, the program being at the head of the list for 41 percent of the Communist candidate's supporters.

This strong personalization of the choice probably works to the advantage of the man who has occupied the office for almost seven years.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing's second advantage is his personal image: he is considered more sympathetic, more intelligent than his competitors. There again the "incumbent's bonus" plays in his favor: he obvious has, more than any of the others, the makings of a president--since he is one; he is more suitable than any of the others for representing France abroad, since he has done it since 1974. His weak points: he does not have "the authority" with which Chirac is credited, but his Socialist challengers have even less; he is not felt to be "close to the concerns of the people," which is nothing new.

As far as "presidential material" is concerned, Chirac comes in second, before Rocard and Mitterrand. Perhaps because as the former prime minister he has experience of government. A comment that will reinforce the Elysee's intention to stress Rocard's "inexperience."

Rocard has a public image more positive overall than Mitterrand's. As for Marchais, he outclasses the others only in his bulldozer-style performances on television.

On the day of the presidential election, what is going to count for the most in your choice?	
The candidate's personality, his human qualities.....	17 percent
The candidate's competence, his statesmanlike qualities.....	48 percent
The candidate's party, his political label.....	10 percent
The candidate's program.....	19 percent
No opinion.....	6 percent

Finally, the large table on the preceding pages manifestly indicates the third advantage of the incumbent president. On the left, the list of priority objectives, arranged in diminishing order. On the right, in the same order, the three or four candidates in the best position to attain these objectives. In all cases, one exception aside, Giscard is in first place.

A miracle man? Not at all. At the head of the list of priorities is a tierce [French betting system] of economic and social problems: unemployment,

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inflation, inequalities. Two comments emerge. First, it is in fighting inequality that Giscard is being outdistanced by a pretender, Michel Rocard. It is, then, in two of these three domains--unemployment and inequality--that the incumbent president achieves his worst score. Therefore he is suffering, however slightly, the repercussions of the bad social situation.

For each of these qualifiers, can you say which are the candidates to whom it best applies? [in percent]					
	Giscard	Mitterrand	Rocard	Chirac	Marchais
Sympathetic.....	45	18	28	18	13
Intelligent.....	66	30	40	34	19
Has authority.....	25	13	13	41	22
Interesting to look at on television.....	29	13	17	14	34
Inspires confidence....	39	13	23	11	8
Has the stuff of a president of the Republic.	53	18	22	25	6
Suited to represent France abroad.....	54	18	15	18	7
Suited to manage the country's economic affairs.....	38	16	26	16	8
Capable of assuring order and calm in the country.....	37	13	14	21	9
Close to the people's concerns.....	26	20	21	10	20

Total over 100, because of multiple answers.

His predominance over his opponents is much more marked when the question is one of the objectives of international policy. It is true that, with the exception of the oil supply, those objectives are considered to have priority by only a small minority of French people.

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Of the 15 problems Rocard, like Giscard, appears 15 times among the three or four candidates capable of solving them. Mitterrand appears ten times, Chirac three times, Marchais twice, Debre once (for morality in political life) and Lalonde once (for the ecology, obviously).

In the months to come the "L'EXPRESS-Louis Harris-France Instrument Panel" will continue to record not only the variations in voting intentions, but also the in-depth movements and motivations of the electorate.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ELECTION ANALYSIS: DEMISE OF UNION OF THE LEFT HINDERS GISCARD

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Aug-5 Sep 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Robert Badinter: "We Have a Winning Start"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] What is this strange blindness that "sees" Valery Giscard d'Estaing the sure winner this coming May?

To hear the professionals--the political leaders and the news commentators --tell it, there can be no doubt of Valery Giscard d'Estaing's reelection to the presidency of the Republic. Even the opposition are stating, in a low voice and among themselves, that the incumbent president's victory in 1981 is probable--not to say a foregone conclusion. The carefully hedged polls and the sometimes inspired commentaries are constantly reiterating this conviction: absent an unexpected development, a social upheaval or a shocking scandal, Mr Giscard d'Estaing will be reelected in 1981.

Now then, for anyone who can manage to steer clear of the political action and its fevers, and who applies himself to a lucid analysis of the political situation in France, it is the contrary conviction that emerges: The defeat of Mr Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 is probable, absent an unexpected development.

Let us put aside the polls. Nine months before the elections, and taking into account their formulation, these polls are no more significant than those which up to the very eve of the legislative elections were predicting a victory of the left... Let us simply examine the force relationships in being--and that which I will call the new political deal of the cards, which is still poorly perceived by public opinion, but which will determine the outcome of the presidential election.

Let us first consider what is at the heart of every current political analysis: Valery Giscard d'Estaing will be reelected because the left as a united political force no longer exists. The latter fact is undeniable. But its consequences are exactly the opposite of those one constantly hears being drawn from it.

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Valery Giscard d'Estaing was elected in 1974 not /despite/ the Union of the Left but very much /because/ of it. An incontestable mobilizer of political power, the Union of the Left had its dynamism and its limitations. While among the majority of its militants it generated enthusiasm, among many voters it gave rise to fear. Since the leftist vote alone cannot produce a majority in France, and since fear is a more powerful feeling than hope, the candidate of the Union of the Left was foreordained to receive the largest number of votes in the first round and to be defeated in the second round. He was handicapped by a heavy burden in the vying for uncommitted votes, because in the eyes of the voters yet to be persuaded he personified a united political force in which the influence of the dreaded Communist Party was preponderant. In view of this very real handicap, the result obtained in 1974 in the second round by the candidate of the Left was truly remarkable--and almost astounding.

The Union of the Left is dead. And even though, by way of understandable nostalgia, there remains a yearning for it on the left, the international situation is a bar to its rebirth. The Union of the Left, it is now clear, was a product of detente. From the moment the Soviets entered Kabul--where their military power seems to be overshadowing all other considerations--there could no longer be any union of the left, for the simple reason that there could not be a government of the left wherein some would oppose the invasion of Afghanistan and others would approve of it. Henceforth, and for years to come, international tension, whatever its forms, will determine the fundamental political choices.

Confining ourselves to the electoral consequences, the demise of the Union of the Left, far from aiding Valery Giscard d'Estaing in the forthcoming presidential election, will weigh heavily against him. For, the real basis of his electoral majority lay in the fear of a government that would include strong communist participation. This basis has now disappeared along with that possibility. The fundamental law of every election is that second-round votes are cast not for the candidate of one's choice but rather /against/ the one whose election is feared. And the determining force that led many second-round voters then to vote against the candidate of the Left no longer exists. In the second round of the forthcoming election, the opposition candidate, who can be none other than the socialist candidate, will be perceived by the electorate as freed of the yoke of Communist Party influence. And the inevitable violence of the Communist Party attacks against the socialist candidate during the campaign will only serve the latter's cause in the second round.

It will undoubtedly be objected that the votes the socialist candidate will thus gain from the center in the second round will be lost by way of communist vote defections. It is here that the second error emerges on the part of the political analysts. Although the Union of the Left is dead, the fundamental rule of the left--I would call it the electoral reflex of support in the second round for the best-positioned candidate of the left--still holds. The leaders of the Communist Party well know they cannot

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revive in 1981 the "six of one, half a dozen of the other" theme used so effectively by Jacques Duclos in 1969 against Poher. Simply because the communist voters--if not the militants as well--would not respond to it. And because no political leader can risk being publicly and massively disavowed by his constituents.

No longer benefiting from this essential political factor--the fear of seeing the communists access the government of France--where else can Mr Giscard d'Estaing turn in search of a vehicle to victory? The Union of the Left is dead, but together with it--and not by happenstance--the majority coalition is also dead. Politically, this is fully attested by the statements of the RPR's [Rally for the Republic] leaders as well as by the behavior of its parliamentary representation. The inevitable--and ever sharper--criticisms they will level, throughout the long months ahead, against the policies of the president of the Republic, will bring out glaringly the existing conflict between Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the RPR.

The electoral consequences of this conflict cannot be other than the exact inverse of those resulting from his socialist-communist conflict. The automatic shifting of the majority's second-round votes to the sole candidate standing against the Union of the Left has lost its reason for being, since there is no longer either a Union of the Left nor a leftist unity candidate. The majority voters who refused to vote for Valery Giscard d'Estaing in the first round will, /for the first time/ in a presidential election, have to choose between a rightist liberal president and a leftist socialist president. The latter having been freed of any bonds to communist participation in the government, why should the Gaullist electorate, the RPR voters, whose social origin and leanings are more populist than aristocratic, be expected to choose the rightist liberal candidate?

Absent any significant backing from the ecologists or any other political faction, Mr Giscard d'Estaing, to win the new political deal of the cards, can only rely on two factors. The first one is of a personal order: the mysterious political charisma that causes people to identify with one man, as was the case with General de Gaulle. Now then, though it is true that Mr Giscard d'Estaing's rivals are not endowed with that power, it is not underestimating his talent to say that Mr Giscard d'Estaing's public appearances do not give rise to popular paroxysms of enthusiasm. Besides, it is difficult for Frenchmen to identify with Mr Giscard d'Estaing. Certainly a question of build or of pure chance...

The other factor could have been the record of the past 7 years, had they been marked by successes or by outstanding undertakings. But as to the gray dullness of these years, how much of it has been owing to the situation and how much to Mr Giscard d'Estaing's inherent nature? It is too early to pass judgement. It is certain, however, that, in the economic

domain, Raymond Barre's complacency is hardly shared at all by the French. Nor will Mr Giscard d'Estaing's international performance rally voters who still remember France's prestige abroad under de Gaulle. Where then lie the motivations that could bring the majority's minority round to returning a rightist liberal president to power?

Thus, from whatever angle one views it, the new political deal augurs the defeat of Mr Giscard d'Estaing and the victory of the socialist candidate. It is up to the socialists to profit immediately from such a favorable situation, by designating their candidate without further delay, uniting around him, and also drawing up a platform that, designed as it must be to be accepted by the French, who are for the most part not socialists, cannot be an electoral translation of the "Socialist Plan." Besides, perhaps it is on the divisions among the socialists and on the doctrinal passion among some of them that Mr Giscard d'Estaing is secretly banking to come up the winner. We will soon know whether that hope, in the manner of Frederick II, will prove well founded.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

NLW BOOK INDICATES EX-PCF MEMBERS' MOTIVES, FATE

Outline, Review

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6-12 Sep 80 pp 50-52

[Article by Max Gallo: "The Heretics' Victory"]

[Excerpts] They are suppressed, suspected, unknown...
But they are an innumerable multitude: the heretics
of the PCF [French Communist Party]. Pierre Daix
speaks out for them in a work that leads into the
most burning question of the day. Max Gallo reviews
it.

"The Heretics of the PCF," by Pierre Daix. Laffont, 348 pages, about 65 Fr.

Their story is cursed, suppressed, distorted, always suspect, and most often ignored: these are the heretics of the French Communist Party. Their party, when they broke with it, accused them of being renegades, traitors, agents of the City of London, of Hitler, or of the CIA. Traitors, they went into the service of the bourgeois and imperialism. For Maurice Thorez, the writer Paul Nizan, who refused to approve of the German-Soviet Pact, was nothing but a "police informer." But calumny was not enough. These heretics had to disappear from History, in the same way as in the stereotypes of the October Revolution, the Soviets rubbed out the silhouette of Trotsky. "The annihilation of comrade Nizan was thus decided," Sartre could write. "This death would clean up History, his name would fall into dust, his birth would be exfoliated from the common past."

But the party was not alone in pushing its heretics back into the shadows. The adversaries of the communists, who one imagines had to listen to them, seemed to respect the excommunication and, after a brief period of attention, to forget them and even to share the suspicions. Heretics are always unsettling the game of the Churches.

The most outstanding feature, and it is a fine one, of the book that Pierre Daix consecrates to them, is to give them a voice. He covers, from the beginnings in 1920 all the way to the present day, this other side of the

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history of French communism. He recounts, compares, sheds light on, and explains the ruptures, and evaluates what the PCF apparatus rejected and disowned.

This history is essential. For it is not just a settling of accounts that would be of interest only to communists and their former comrades. When the Italian writer Ignazio Silone--who was close to Togliatti, before becoming a heretic--writes: "The final struggle some day will be between communists and ex-communists," he does not bring to life the fanatic hostility of members thenceforth severed from the same sect. Daix, who was himself also a communist entrusted with responsibilities--editor in chief of "French Letters," this former deportee from Mauthausen was the "first of the non-excluded" [sic] of the PCF, but he left the party in 1974--proof that heretics are the main enemy of the communists, because, to varying degrees, in given circumstances, they have discovered the truth about the communist apparatus and pierced its secret.

From which arises the necessity, for the party, of preventing their voice, their story, from reaching new adherents. "The PCF," writes Pierre Daix, "is built by successive levelings of the memory." What is known today, in the ranks of the communist party--or even of the socialist party--about Boris Souvarine, de Frossart, Rosmer, Monatte, the founders of the PCF and its first heretics? What is known of Vassart or Ferrat, members of the Political bureau in the Thirties? Is it certain that the testimony of Charles Tillon or Auguste Lecoq--though their names be not unknown--is understood outside of a circle of several thousand readers? And yet the militant courage of these men, their commitment in the Resistance to Nazism, in 1940, is a part of the history of the French workers' movement. Pierre Daix rightly points out the price paid by this workers' movement because of the policy of the PCF. The heretics--militant workers or intellectuals--were most often the best of the social class to which they belonged. Excommunicated, isolated, banned from political activity by the communists, their experience could not fecundate social reality. In this sense, the history of the national community taken as a whole is involved in the fate they met, and the non-communist leftist groups who ignored them out of fear of attacks by the [PCF] party bear a heavy responsibility. In this way, the sentence passed against them by the communist party was accepted, since one yielded to intimidation.

The Secret of the Party

Now Daix shows what treasures of reasoning by some of these heretics were suppressed. One Boris Souvarine, for example a member of the executive of the Communist International, denounced "state Bolshevism" in 1924, unveiled the meaning of Stalinism, told everything about the USSR and the parties that followed from it. He was already noting that "all the different kinds of communism are only varieties of the same phenomenon, despite the external influences that are beginning to make themselves felt in them."

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One could find it astonishing that, 50 years later, the dissidents in the PCF have not yet arrived at the point Souvarine reached. Or even Leon Blum, in 1920, at the Congress of Tours, when he denounced the "Moscow system," "no more temporary dictatorship...but a system of stable government."

This inability to incorporate the experience of the past derives not only from that ignorance of the past in which generations of communists are held, but also from historical circumstances: Popular Front, Resistance, cold war. The USSR seems each time to represent the "good camp" against Nazism or imperialism. And the individual, social, and national reasons (in a country marked by the memory of the French Revolution) for becoming a communist exist. All the more since the militant does not know the "secret" of the party. How, for example, would he know that Maurice Thorez was following, in every political decision, the directives of the envoy of the International--that is to say of Moscow--the Slovak Fried! Only unexpected reversals, such as the German-Soviet Pact, in August 1939, the rupture of the Union of the Left in 1977, or spectacular crises, such as the condemnation of Tito, the Khrushchev, the insurrection of Hungary, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, provoke sharp twinges of conscience, a blazing of heresy which pulls men out of the party who have ceased to be completely blind. To name them would mean listing a sizeable portion of the French intelligentsia (see L'EXPRESS of 16 February 1980), from Marguerite Duras to Edgar Morin, from Annie Kriegel to Claude Roy or Serge July. And the multitudes of unknown militants cannot be counted.

"There Is No More Heresy"

Each time the issue is the demand of these communists for their party's independence with respect to the USSR. The desire to see the birth of a "national communism." Then, faced with refusal by the leadership, a more refined analysis [is made], and many realize the imposture of the Soviet regime! Often, heresy began only with the determination to see these questions discussed "freely" within the party. Now submission to the policy of the USSR expressly connotes "democratic centralism," the rejection of internal debate. Daix doubtless fails to lay enough stress on this link between the "structure of the party" and "loyalty to the USSR." The heretics who followed the light [of reason] and analysis to the end understood that the functioning of the communist party cannot be reformed without jeopardizing the link with the USSR.

So Pierre Daix's book leads into the most burning question of the day: Poland, and its possibilities of internal liberalization without a break with the USSR. A natural link: the history of the PCF heretics is dictated by that of the communist world. Now it is Pierre Daix's firm conclusion that "there is no more heresy." To concede his point it is enough to listen to the repetitive stammerings of the dissidents in the PCF who today are once more playing the anthem of "democratization." "The communist world is unreformable," says Daix.

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Commentary on Main Points

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 6 Sep 80 pp 70-71

[Article by Alain de Benoist: "The Strange Fate of PCF Heretics"--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Excerpts] Already a historian and critic of art, Pierre Daix has just made himself into a geologist, by plumbing the strata of swallowed-up memory: the history of dissidence within the PCF from the beginning to our own day--from Boris Souvarine to Henri Fiszbin, by way of Frossard, Doriot, Nizan, Tillon, and Garaudy. A story told from the /inside,/ as Pierre Daix, before himself breaking with the party, was deputy director of Editions Sociales, then, from 1948 to 1972, editor in chief of "French Letters." A story, too, which could not replace the work of a David Caute on intellectuals and the PCF, but which rather adds to it, like an overflight midway between a testimonial and a historical narrative, without, however--and sometimes this is to be regretted--being distinctly more one than the other (as in the autobiography of Philippe Robrieux, "Our Communist Generation, 1953-1968," Laffont, 1977).

From this work several conclusions can be drawn. The first, emphasized by Pierre Daix, is that from all the evidence the PCF /"has been historically and intellectually the most stalinized of the western communist parties,"/ and that it still is today. The second is that it is very hard to be right, against the party. Naturally, on the ideological plane, one can always speculate on what Marx would have done in such and such a circumstance, on what he "really meant," etc. By contrast, historically, heresies are never right against the Church. To be right, they would have to /become/ the Church, so they would cease being heresies. Now it is quite remarkable that none of the innumerable ruptures, none of the multiple schisms chronicled by Pierre Daix seems to have cut into the real power of the party, nor to have caused its share of the vote to decline in the least. From that point of view, the dissidences have been just so many defeats. One is not right against the party.

Another conclusion is that one does not finish with communism by leaving the party. /"One frees oneself from communism as one heals a neurosis,"/ said Ignazio Silone. Experience shows that one can also be neurotic while being a "heretic." /"An incredible number of [those] excluded [from the party],"/ Daix writes, "have spent the rest of their adult years proving that they were real communists,"/ This is because many Marxists, some of them anti-clerical, are above all believers, and as such, are incapable of following their logic to the end. If the party makes mistakes, well at least Marx could not have been wrong. So it is the party which is no longer Marxist and, by consequence, it is they themselves who are the depositories of true revolutionary orthodoxy, the carriers of the "true party" that the actual PCF has disfigured. Souvarine himself, after his exclusion, launches LE BULLETIN COMMUNISTE, just as Lecoeur in 1956 founds

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THE SOCIALIST NATION: NOTES ON DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONAL COMMUNISM. It also explains the emergence of all these groups, and all these organizations, all of whose leaders wanted to create "count -parties."

From One Fanaticism To Another

The "humanist" preoccupation is however itself relatively recent among the "heretics." Recalling the great purges of the Thirties, Pierre Daix says that with the exception of Charles Rappoport, there could not be found in France /"a single communist of importance to break with the PCF over the [reign of] terror in the USSR."/ It was the same at the time of the revelations about the Gulag at the beginning of the Fifties.

Some, in the final analysis, ended by rejecting everything: the party and communism with it. One thinks especially of Boris Souvarine, the founder of the PCF between 1920 and 1929, and whose figure dominates a large part of the history, not only of French communism, but also of the International. Auguste Lecoœur, himself, does not hesitate to write that /"the duty and the honor of every free man, who intends to remain one, require him to carry the banner of ideological anti-communism."/

Others, on the contrary--and apparently these are the most numerous--obstinately refuse to break with socialism. When they criticize the present USSR, where the state, more even than the party, "commands the guns," it is by comparison with the Twenties. They denounce "liberticidal" communism, but take care not to criticize egalitarian communism. Better still, it is not that which is more fundamentally communistic that they denounce in the PC, but on the contrary the fact that the party is in their eyes /less/ communistic than before. Thus, Jean Elleinstein, who thinks he can discern /"an overall nationalism of the PCF which is oriented toward Gallo-communism"/ ("Battle for the Diaspora," 1980-1).

Many, ultimately, have gone from one fanaticism to another, bringing to new beliefs--ecology, Zionism, leftism, "micro-democracy," critique of the state--the same ardor and the same intolerance. Once out of the party, they have had the renegade complex. Above all they must not be accused of having veered to the right. So, to be armed against this charge, they have become something more. And such a "heretic," scourged in his time for "Hitler-Trotskyism" and "social-fascism," sometimes manifests, in matters of intellectual terrorism, rather curious flashbacks to bygone attitudes. This has been evidenced recently--to cite only two examples--by the incredible campaign pursued in Paris last June against the anthropologist Ilse Schwidetzky, and, at about the same time, the "kritique" based largely on spacious attacks against Noam Chomsky, in the columns of NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, by Claude Roy, former collaborator of JE SUIS PARTOUT and ex-member of the PCF*.

*Cf. the /samizdat/ text of Serge Thion: "The Docemendacity of the Week: Some Commentaries on a Recent Disgrace of NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR," La Vieille Taupe (B.P. 98-05, 75224 Paris Cedex 05).

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When one has spent a part of one's life showered with calumnies and lies, one should think twice before hurling anathemas. But, evidently, old habits remain.

Why should we be astonished to realize that every stratum of the dissidence has endorsed the exclusion of the preceding one--so that the "ex" camp includes both "heretics" and some of their former persecutors? Elleinstein supported the indictment against Pierre Daix after the appearance in 1973 of "What I know of Solzhenitsyn," just as Henri Fiszbin in 1970 was through-out the anti-Garaudy campaign the loyal coadjutor of the inquisitor Georges Marchais.

The "ex" party, Pierre Daix affirms, is the biggest party in France. In the intellectual world it is in any case the majority party. To be communist is no longer in fashion, but to have been one remains an excellent passport to press and publishing house circles. So an entire sub-culture has been created, united by common memories, common references, and fundamental convictions, and there is a goodly number of excluded members. To accredit this party, it would be necessary to be able to examine it in detail. Overall, in any case, it remains the most dangerous. /"The final struggle some day will be between communists and ex-communists,"/ said Ignazio Silone to Togliatti. And the others, those who were /never/ communists-- will they all already have been killed?

"The Heretics of the PCF," by Pierre Daix, Laffont, 350 pages.

"The Strategy of the Lie: From the Kremlin to Georges Marchais," by Auguste Lecoeur, Ramsay, 227 pages.

"The PCF In The War: De Gaulle, The Resistance, Stalin," by Stephane Courtois, Ramsay, 585 pages.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FO SECRETARY GENERAL BERGERON INTERVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 29 Aug 80 p 81

[Interview with Workers Force Secretary-General Andre Bergeron: "Communist Party and the General Confederation of Labor Will Seize Every Opportunity to Step up Social Conflicts"]

[Text] [Question] Are you likewise predicting a hot return from vacations in social terms?

[Answer] I predict nothing at all. Major social events or others will always take place when you do not expect them. There will be difficulties. But those which we are going to run into this year will not be fundamentally different from those we usually encounter.

[Question] Nevertheless, are we not presently having a kind of "decay" of the social climate?

[Answer] What we are having for sure now is a situation where the Communist Party and the General Confederation of Labor will jump on every opportunity to step up the social conflicts as part of the prospects of the presidential elections. The concern of the communists, backed up by the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] is to regain the ground which the socialists have taken from them. Because of that, we are going to see the rise and spread of all kinds of conflicts.

[Question] This is what Edmond Maire has just written in his weekly magazine when he said that the CGT will not come out for labor unionism but rather for the CP.

[Answer] I find that Edmond Maire is in the process of saying what we have been saying now for 33 years. It is obvious that the CGT and the CP are exactly the same thing and that the CGT is permanently with the CP. That Maire is discovering these facts today, facts which have always existed, is something which is making me happy but I cannot just the same refrain from saying: it is a good thing that he discovers them today!

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[Question] Some people say that this will not work and that things will go even worse in the textile industry, in the auto industry.

[Answer] There are indeed many reasons for worry. On the part of the administration, there seems to be some kind of fear, for the end of the year and the start of the next year, that there would be serious economic difficulties. The manufacturers, as far as I know, are divided in their views. Here again it is difficult to make a prediction. Everything depends on international developments.

[Question] Do you believe that we are in the midst of an economic crisis?

[Answer] I believe that this is undeniable. This crisis is foreseeable in countries such as France but it is also foreseeable in countries with a so-called socialist system. To realize that this is so, it suffices to observe what is happening right now in Poland. I always said that the current crisis was more serious than the one during the thirties and that it may run for a long time.

[Question] Do you not think that this crisis situation is incompatible with the claims as to a reduction in working hours?

[Answer] No I do not believe so. Everybody knows only too well that a reduction in working hours would, in any case, be progressive. Nobody has ever imagined that one could, overnight, for example, cut working hours from 40 down to 35. But in the end we are indeed going to have to try to reduce the number of unemployed. One cannot resign oneself permanently to have 1.1 million unemployed who must be given compensation. We must realize that, in 1980, the cost of unemployment benefits came to 4.5 percent of the wage volume, with 3.6 percent taken care of by the enterprises and 0.9 percent taken care of by the government. That is rather considerable. I do not believe that there is any problem in financing the ASSEDIC [Association for the Promotion of Employment in Industry and Business] between now and the end of the year; but what we should really be afraid of, is happening, that is to say, an increase in the number of unemployed, so that the problem will be coming up quite naturally.

[Question] How will FO [Workers Force] go into the presidential campaign?

[Answer] The confederation will not issue any voting instructions but that does not mean that, as of the moment the presidential campaign is underway, we are going to become silent and go into hibernation. We will benefit from the sensitization of public opinion in order to bring out our positions, our demands, starting with the idea--and I hope you will forgive me for saying this with a somewhat ironic tone of voice--that the politicians are generally more sensitive to demands before the elections than afterwards.

[Question] Does the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel], the union of management personnel, plan to put up a candidate in 1981? Do you find that normal?

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[Answer] I would not get the idea of running a candidate. One must not mix styles. The labor unions do not have the mission of managing the affairs of state.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DISSENSION OF LEFT APPARENT AT AVIGNON FESTIVAL

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Sep 80 p 46

[Article by Paul Chambrillon: "The Schisms of Avignon"]

[Text] The Avignon festival has served to bring out the disunity among the left. Between the socialists and the communists but also between the intellectuals and the Communist Party machinery.

"Piaux, you made the festival veer to the right! Even though the shows became better, this does constitute treason." The statement is by Mr Alain Pauly, deputy mayor of Avignon in charge of culture and member of the CP. The man thus accused is Mr Paul Piaux, festival director until last year, but still present this year in various capacities. He is also a communist.

This year, the recent Avignon festival will have been an opportunity for publicly bringing out the big and little quarrels which rend an environment that is supposed to be homogeneous; apart from the senator-mayor, Mr Henri Duffaut, and his deputy, Mr Dominique Taddei, both of them being socialists, all those who kept "the ideological debate" going around this 35th festival, are registered members of the PCF [French Communist Party].

Here is an example of internal quarrels: the violent and public altercation, in the orchard of [Pope] Urban V, between Mr Bernard Rothstein, director of the Gennevillier Theater and of the magazine THEATRE PUBLIC, and Mr Jack Ralite, a communist deputy, who is also the assistant to the mayor of Aubervillier, and by virtue of that, protector of the Theater of the Commune, subsidized by his city. Mr Rothstein strongly reproached him for wanting to "conceal the party's internal difficulties."

This background for the quarrels among the left has been a tradition since 1968. Before that, and ever since the creation of the festival in 1947, Jean Vilar, was its uncontested boss. He had given the festivities their "popular overtones" in the huge court of honor of the palace of the Popes. This style is similar to the style used in the scenes staged in the National People's Theater, on a stage as huge as the Palace of Chaillot.

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During the summer of 1968, the people on half-pay from the Latin Quarter "descended" upon Avignon. Jean Vilar felt insulted when called a fascist by the American anarchists of the troupe from the Living Theater. Disgusted, he turned the affair over to his deputy, a former teacher born in 1920, by the name of Paul Puaux.

The festival's ambiance changed. Mr Puaux, who is not a man of the theater, does not stage any shows; he prefers to invite troupes from all over France and even from abroad. This orientation is not to everyone's taste. Here is a warning from Mr Jacques Lassalle, director of the Vitry Theater and likewise a member of the CP, who this year was unable to stage the show at Avignon which he had planned:

"It is desirable for the festival to produce shows rather than to be content with receiving them. This year, we were doomed to silence. That casts light on the situation confronting creativity which is not profit-oriented."

These internal quarrels of the CP are paralleled by conflicts involving the former allies of the Union of the Left. Senator-Mayor Henri Duffaut, an old-line socialist, deprived Mr Pauly of the position of festival supervisor. Pretext: the latter took over a demonstration of CGT [General Confederation of Labor] miners from Ales who had come to present their ideas on the energy crisis at the cloister of the Carmelites. That evening, a piece was being presented by the poet Nazim Hikmet, devoted to the conscience of a certain Benerdji, in a performance staged by Mr Mehmet Ulusoy. All three of them are members of the Turkish Communist Party.

This eviction was not to the liking of Mr Guy Hermier, member of the PCF Political Bureau and managing editor of the journal REVOLUTION. He threatened:

"We will not postpone until tomorrow any concrete action to prevent a widening of the gap between the working class and living creation."

But it will be difficult to counter the "resumption of control by the socialists." This 35th festival was the first one organized by Mr Puaux's successor who happens to be Mr Faivre d'Arcier, an enarch, an administrator in the Ministry of Culture, director of the Cultural Intervention Fund and a member of the Socialist Party. The communists are already accusing him of wanting to "dismantle the festival through the financial disengagement of the government."

This is a bad quarrel. The festival's financial structure has always been of municipal origin. And this year's budget, more than F7 million, for 3 weeks of shows, was more than respectable.

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Mr Faivre d'Arcier, a manager, furthermore does not intend to become bogged down in artistic work: a festival, such as the one in Avignon is a heavy machine, comprising permanent installations which could be better used during the remaining 11 months. The new director (appointed in November 1979) asserted: "I give myself 5 years to succeed."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

WEST'S INACTION VIS-A-VIS TOTALITARIANISM DEPLORED

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6 Sep 80 p 113

[Article by Jean-Francois Revel: "What Should the West Do?]

[Text] The Polish people do not rely much on the West, which explains its notable prudence and at the same time the contradictions of an endeavor which Jacek Kuron, promoter of the KOR (Movement for the Defense of Workers) summed up as follows when he left prison: "We must broaden the sphere of freedom and reduce that of totalitarianism, without crossing the boundaries delineated by the Soviet tanks." The western governments observed the greatest caution, including verbal self-control, knowing that any encouragement from them to the Polish strikers would probably furnish the Soviets with a pretext to inveigh against an imperialist plot. This moderation of course did not prevent the USSR from denouncing that supposed plot.

However, western moderation does not restrain the USSR from intervening militarily. It is the relationship of forces; it is the probable resistance of the Polish people, and even of the army. In any case, it is also the Kremlin leaders' awareness, after the invasion of Afghanistan, that two colonial wars in less than 1 year would be a little too much. After some vague grumblings, the West swallowed the Afghan affair. Thanks to France, the Olympic games provides a creditable half-way propaganda success. Therefore, why precipitate matters in Poland? The Russians are chess players: they know what a gambit is. Sometimes it is necessary to sacrifice a pawn in order to finally win the game.

But in this planetary game, should the West continue to forego exploitation of the communist camp's weaknesses? When difficulties crop up in the West, the Soviets strive to aggravate them. When difficulties manifest themselves in the East, the West tries to resolve them. Moreover, in order to envenom our disputes, the Soviets have means in the West that we do not have in the USSR.

With respect to central Europe, since 1945 the West has been so timid that it very often reached the point of making concessions to the Soviets that

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the latter had not expected. Kissinger notes this in his memoirs. Originally Stalin did not expect to be able to encircle all of eastern Europe within a satellite zone. His first actions after the war, like agreeing to free elections in Czechoslovakia and Hungary--elections which had been lost because of the communists--show that he was about to be satisfied with temporarily granting these countries a status similar to that of Finland. It was only afterwards, in the face of a patent lack of concern on the part of the West, that he launched a series of coups d'etat that made it possible to establish socialism in central Europe and the iron curtain.

When the satellized people, after having experienced communism for some years, began to revolt, the West again underestimated its trumps and overrated Soviet determination. Does one know, for example, that at the time of the 1953 workers' riots in Berlin, Beria (still the Politburo's strong man right after Stalin's death) was thinking of letting go of the GDR?

Should Democracies Exploit the Crisis of Totalitarian Systems?

At the time of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, the Western governments lavished exhortations, or allowed them to be lavished, on the revolutionaries that were then followed by a spectacular, complete abandonment. After the defeat, Eisenhower sent his vice president, Richard Nixon, on a symbolical visit to Vienna, to refugee camps, but not to Budapest. UN condemnation of the USSR of course was not followed by any effective action. As Francois Fejto ("Budapest 1956," Julliard) wrote: "There was a big difference between the violently anti-communist and interventionist propaganda expressed by Radio Free Europe and Washington's actual diplomatic action."

This difference has since then come to a peak. Our words have been in line with our actions. Like them, they are nonexistent, or insignificant, at least at the official level. This was seen at the time of the 1968 defeat of the Czechoslovaks, and in 1980 in the face of fears of intervention in Poland. Moreover, between these two dates the West gave a royal present to the Soviet Union: official recognition in 1975, in the Helsinki Accords, of the Soviet sphere in central Europe. We have just proved that we have respected those agreements, since we did not even utilize propaganda weapons during the height of events in Poland. Besides, they would have hurt, rather than have served, the capable and delicate maneuver of those on strike.

A counterintervention, or a preventive warning, or a threat of aid to the members of the resistance were still among the West's means of theoretical retortion in 1956, and even in 1968. Today, none of that is within the realm of possibility, even a theoretical one. The only means of pressure

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left to us to influence the course of events beyond the iron curtain is an economic one. Should we continue to help communist regimes to overcome their difficulties, or should we instead let them experience to the bitter end the consequences of their ineptitude with respect to the economy? The first formula, in addition to offering us, too, some economic advantages, aims at sparing the Soviet world an implosion, with external repercussions that could be dangerous. The second would aim to let the system shrivel up under the consequence of its weaknesses. The present policy, that of subsidized detente, raises two questions. Does it not encourage excessive Soviet armament? Does it not supply aid that makes it possible, not to improve the people's standard of living, but to maintain totalitarian governments in force? Is it a question of helping mankind to live or of helping governments to oppress mankind?

We would be very wrong to forget that totalitarian regimes, too, are fragile. They cannot guarantee their populations either material well-being, individual freedoms, or political democracy. In Poland and elsewhere, tomorrow as today, there thus will always be moments when we will have to opt for either the governments or the people, and to choose between the camp of the colonizer and that of the colonized.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CNPF PREDICTS LABOR UNREST, PCF SEES BENEFIT FOR MARCHAIS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Aug-5 Sep 80 p 23

[Article by Roger Priouret: "Employers Foresee a Bleak Autumn"]

[Text] This has been the most worrisome return from vacations in 3 years; this is the official feeling of the employers. The CNPF [National Council of French Employers] has nothing to say. But it asked its collaborators who are in charge of social matters to come back by 15 August. The enterprise managers however are talking.

The first point of concern is this: orders are down, except for capital goods which, with the exception of agricultural machinery, "are holding up" and which even continue to grow when we include information science and electronics. Although retail sales seem to have gone well in July, that is not enough to wipe out two major facts: on the one hand, the three bad months in trade (March, April, and May); on the other hand, the fact that the heavy purchases from July 1979 until the end of January 1980, inclusive were made with a blocked purchasing power and by drawing on savings which will not soon be replaced.

But concern goes beyond that. The price rise in France--higher than in Japan and in the country's neighbors to the north and east--shows that French industry is losing its competitive capacity, not only on foreign markets--which slows French exports down--but also in France itself, where, often aided by the big distributors, the foreigners are increasing their share of the market for household equipment, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and small tools.

To retain this competitive capacity, there are only two solutions: reducing the personnel force, perfecting more high-performance tools, and fighting against demands for wage hikes. These are not easily applied remedies. They generate social tensions in the enterprise itself and they cause additional unemployment throughout the land; jobs eliminated in industry will hardly be compensated for by the creation of new jobs in the nationalized sector, in commerce, and in transportation, everything included in the services, and it will be necessary to classify the 230,000 young people as being surplus on the labor market--something that happens each year anyway.

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There are two other reasons for having a tougher social climate than during the last return from vacations. What happened in 1979-1980? There were no severe strikes except when a company closed its doors or laid workers off. The social events involved interruptions in the work of public services, where job security was assured. We will again find these two causes for tension this year, the first of them aggravated by an economic activity inferior to that of last year plus more numerous bankruptcies.

But in 1980-1981 we will moreover have the pre-election attitude of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]. During the 1974 presidential elections, the united left was interested in winning votes in the center, in other words, it did not want to disturb the social climate too much. For the vote on this coming 26 April, the CP--in other words, the CGT--must, in order to assert itself, cause a maximum of agitation so that Georges Marchais will appear as the exclusive and intractable champion in defense of wages. This is at least what the employers are thinking.

For the CNPF analysts, this does not necessarily mean more strikes--because unemployment, in their eyes, slows them down--but rather "revolutionary actions," such as the kidnapping of managers and acts of vandalism. According to them, here is another element of worry: until recently, the CGT "was leashing" the leftists and prevented acts of sabotage; it will not do that any longer.

The other cause of the hardening of the social climate, as far as the employers are concerned, will be the awakening of the old conflict between wage earners and machines. French workers for a long time were among those in the world who most easily accepted productivity gains due to improvements in tools. The silkweavers war ended a long time ago. The employers are convinced that electronics and information science will revive this sort of thing both in industry and in the service sector.

Here is one consolation for the employers: this hardening on the part of the CGT, like the acts of violence against the production machinery, will--they think--serve the candidate who has their preference and will help beat the left. The premier who will replace Raymond Barre could only be a man of firmness. And, just as the employers managed to lay the groundwork for the victory of March 1978--with money, power, and the fight against the labor unions--as well as the presence of a faithful ally in Matignon [House], so will they not fail to exploit the political situation which will be created by the new economic and social situation.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CURRENT, FUTURE OCEAN EXPLOITATION PLANS DISCUSSED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 23 Aug 80 pp 42-43

[Interview with Yves La Prairie, president of the ASTEO, by Claire Briere;
date and place not given]

[Text] Yves La Prairie was formerly director of the National Center for Exploitation of the Oceans (CNEXO). For the past 2 years, he has been president of an association of private firms, the Scientific and Technical Association for Exploitation of the Oceans (ASTEO).

[Question] What role can your organization play in the battle for control of the oceans?

[Answer] Ever since I became president of the ASTEO, I have laid great stress on exporting. I view myself as an ambassador, or more modestly as a traveling salesman representing French manufacturers abroad.

[Question] Will France's assumption of jurisdiction over the 370-kilometer exclusive economic zone alter its oceanographic activities?

[Answer] At the present time, nine-tenths of our oceanographic activity, financially and technically speaking, is related to oil and the search for oil offshore: deepsea diving companies, construction of platforms, development of tools and equipment for seabed operations, and the laying of pipelines. These exploration and exploitation operations are being conducted in waters off the five continents. On the other hand, among our overseas territories, only Guiana and the Kerguelen Islands are of potential interest to oil companies.

The most urgent task at this time is to evaluate what fishing, biological, and mineral resources can be expected from that area. For this purpose, we are establishing oceanographic centers patterned after the one at Brest. The latter was the world's first multidisciplinary center and remains a model for such a facility.

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The Pacific Oceanographic Center in Tahiti was completed in 1975. It has a staff of 80 experts in multimetal nodule exploration and in aquaculture. The center's aquaculturists also assist local fisheries. We also keep a close look on the area's phosphate resources. A branch of this center has been established in New Caledonia. It specializes in tropical shrimp aquaculture. We are also in the process of installing the nucleus of a research and exploration team in the West Indies and we have an embryonic aquacultural program in Guiana.

[Question] Are we also establishing oceanographic centers in foreign countries?

[Answer] Some oil-rich Middle Eastern countries are asking us to design and build almost completely equipped marine research and exploration centers for them. The same is true of certain South American countries, namely Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil. And then there is also the case of Ecuador. That rather small country wants to move directly into economic development programs and recently signed a contract with France-Aquaculture, a CNEXO subsidiary, for the design of a series of shrimp "farms."

But, I repeat, what has really revolutionized oceanography these past 15 years is primarily oil. Major oil companies, electronics firms like Thomson and chemical firms like Pechiney have literally plunged into the sea. They have been followed by small and medium-size businesses, like COMEX [Maritime Appraisal Company], which specialize in entirely new marine activities. Combined, these companies represent an important part of French economic strength. In 1970, exploitation of the oceans accounted for a turnover of about 1 billion francs. In 1980, this volume of business has increased tenfold.

[Question] Can you estimate France's industrial and technical chances?

[Answer] We rank 18th among the world's fishing industry countries, but third in aquaculture. And we are first in Europe. In offshore oil, we rank second, immediately behind the United States. Depending on whether we consider drilling leases, platform construction, or financial involvement, we account for, by ourselves alone, between 12 and 15 percent of the world's oil activity. In underwater diving, we are the leaders. COMEX had succeeded in capturing a little more than half of the world market. In undersea exploration by bathyscaph or saucer we rank first, in a tie with the Americans. Lastly, there is another successfully expanding field of activity. I refer to the desalination of sea water, a field in which we are third or fourth, depending on the process used.

[Question] And where do we rank in the nodule field?

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[Answer] Inasmuch as commercial exploitation of these nodules has not yet begun, it is difficult to determine any ranking. I would say, however, that we are among the six leading countries in the nodule field. We have compiled extensive mining data that enables us to know where the best deposits are, their density on the seabed, and their ore content. In this respect, we can consider ourselves first among the six countries, possibly in a tie with the Americans. As for nodule metallurgy, each of the six countries has its own efficient process. When the time comes, only the actual cost of the operation will determine which process is best.

On the other hand, in nodule-mining technology, we are far behind the Americans and those--the Japanese and Germans in particular--who are partners in the American consortia. France's financial outlays in the nodule field total some 20 million francs per year. The Americans are spending five and ten times more than that.

We are studying a very conventional and even somewhat archaic method of bringing the nodules up from the depths. It is a dredging system employing buckets and two ships. At a depth of 6,000 meters this means 12 kilometers of cable! We are also studying a self-contained machine, a sort of undersea bulldozer, which would descend with ballast, form a heap of nodules on the ocean bottom, load this heap, and then rise to the surface by discharging its ballast. In contrast, the Americans prefer a sort of vacuum cleaner system with two pipes, one for pressure, the other for drawing the nodules up to the ship. Lockheed is reported to have already completed tests at a depth of 5,000 meters with a scale model one-fifth of full size.

[Question] Are there also such consortiums in France?

[Answer] Our consortium is AFERNOD (French Association for Nodule Studies and Exploration). It was formed in 1973 and its membership includes three government agencies--CNEXO, Atomic Energy Commission, and Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration--and two private firms, the Nickel Company and the Schneider industrial group's France-Dunkerque Shipyards.

[Question] What are the relationships between the public and private sectors in these new activities?

[Answer] The ASTEO offers manufacturers the possibility of following up on public research and exploration. I am pleased to note that they are beginning to do this, and on a large scale. But in all countries, the public sector remains the prime mover.

During the 10-year period from 1965 to 1975, the CNEXO had a great deal of money. This enabled us to take a substantial lead over those countries which appeared likely to be our closest competitors, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Canada, and Sweden. Since 1975,

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however, this financial effort has decreased to a point I consider disquieting. Because if public research and exploration lags behind, the follow-up industries are liable also to lose their drive.

[Question] Yet there is talk of a 31 percent increase in the budget.

[Answer] I welcome that increase. But I am obliged to state that it will merely allow us to regain the level reached 3 years ago. Just think of it, during all these past few years, the German and Japanese governments were increasing their budget 50 to 60 percent year after year. Such support can truly be considered giving priority to the oceans.

[Question] On the whole, you then believe that France remains well-placed but that its chances are in jeopardy if it does not go all-out.

[Answer] Precisely. We still hold some trump cards. We have to be very careful, however, because we are liable to drop far behind. You must realize that 80 to 90 percent of the petroleum-related sector's work is for the export trade. Some 95 percent of the desalination sector's volume of business is in exports.

In these new sectors where we already hold an altogether noteworthy position, it is essential for us to open new markets, particularly in new locations, by intensifying our effort, especially in traditional activities.

As for the nodules, if we do not shift gears and pick up speed, we will not mine these nodules on a commercial scale. Then the capital investment required will no longer be in millions of francs, but in billions. The Americans have set 1988 as their target date. As for us, we cannot count on starting before the next decade.

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

URANIUM SHORTAGE EXPECTED--Uranium is expected to be in short supply within a few years, according to a note from [Minister of Industry] Giraud to [Prime Minister] Barre, who has advised forming a stockpile as a precaution. The minister of industry is to sign an agreement with Australia soon providing for the purchase of this mineral. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 19 Sep 80 p 33]

CGT AUTHORITARIANISM--The noncommunist members of the CGT's executive committee will henceforth be kept out of the committee's deliberations. The communist sympathizers [on the committee] have been asked not to participate. The orthodox communists are supposed to discuss their activities only with the close collaborators of the secretary general [Georges Seguy]. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Sep 80 p 30]

ARMS FOR AFGHANISTAN--The weapons of Soviet and Czech origin confiscated by the SDECE's Action Service during Bokassa's overthrow in Bangui in the summer of 1979 were to be discreetly shipped to the Afghani resistance fighters. When informed of this, Giscard is said to have immediately ordered the project terminated and its authors punished. This probably explains the crisis that recently affected the top levels of the SDECE. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Sep 80 p 30]

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